HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BY IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

THE FOURTH EDITION
REVISED AND CORRECTED

LONDON,
Printed for C. NOURSE, in the Strand,
MDCCLXXXVI;
To the Right Honourable

PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of Great-Britain*.

My Lord,

As no one has exercised
the Powers of Speech
with juster and more universal
applause, than yourself; I
have presumed to inscribe the
following Treatise to your
Lordship, its End being to
investigate the Principles of
those Powers. It has a far-
ther claim to your Lord-
ship's Patronage, by being
connected in some degree with
that politer Literature, which,
in the most important scenes

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* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Res-
spect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be con-
sidered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.
of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,
and most obedient humble Servant,

James Harris.
THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of
the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est. ——

For
For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty fruits of a few idle hours; written merely for private amusement; never revised; published against consent, at the importunity of friends, copies (God knows how) having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsity and impiety. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege
be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities?

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name,
PREFACE.

just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Nomemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashion-able phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He
He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments, as the view of ancient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same Reason has at all times prevailed; how there is one Truth, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.
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Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we Britons by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think per-
perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Country-men, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned Men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extin"tion of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is in-
peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than Mathematics. It is hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of Logic, or universal Reasoning. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the Mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since Mind, like other Powers, can

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be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every
PREFACE.

every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service.
service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confessed already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day passing,

—in vicum vendentem tus et odores.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745.
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ERRATA.

Page 83, line 17, for ὑποταξίαν, read ὑποταξικήν.
131, Note, l. 1, for Roman, read Romani.
252, l. 2 from the bottom, for An, read And.
328, l. 3 from the bottom, for ὁγγαν, read ὁγγανοῦ.
332, l. last, for i, read it.
369, Note, l. 15, for unceasing, read unceasing.
384, Note, l. 4, for οἶδεν πος, read οἶδεν ποσ.
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INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

If Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since Speech then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties \( (a) \), (that is to say, of our Reason.)

\( (a) \) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xvi. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume.
Ch. I. from and our social Affection) being withal our peculiar Ornament and Distinction, as Men; those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how Speech may be naturally resolved; or how, when resolved, it may be again combined.

Here a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold Speech, as divided into its constituent Parts, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else, as resolved into its Matter and Form, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

These different Analysings or Resolutions constitute what we call (b) Philosophical, or Universal Grammar.

When

(b) Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia fit literaria, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hâc ipsi re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quae non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.
When we have viewed Speech thus analysed, we may then consider it, as compounded. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) Synthesis, which by combining simple Terms produces a Truth; then by combining two Truths produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of Science.

Now this is that superior and most excellent Synthesis, which alone applies itself to our Intelleet or Reason, and which to

B 2

conduct

(c) Aristotle says—τῶν δὲ καὶ μιθεῖαν σύμ-

πλοκὴν λεγομένων ἐδώ ἄτε ἀλήθες ἄτε ἱευδές ἐσιν;

ὀιον ἄνθρωπος, λευκός, τρέχει, νικᾶ—Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise De Interpretatione, περὶ γὰρ τύπεσιν ὡς διαίρεσιν ἐστὶν τὸ ἱευδός τε ὡς τὸ ἀλήθες. True and False are seen in Composition and Division. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.
HERMES.

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of Logic.

After this we may turn to those (d) inferior Compositions, which are pro-
ductive

(d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Περὶ Ερμηνείας, p. 53, gives the following Extract from Theophrastus, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτῆς γὰρ ἔσης τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθ' ὧν διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφρας) τής τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οίς η ἡ σημαίνει τι, ἦ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων ἔτει-
sαι ἦσσαν τῆς ἀκρόωμενας, ἠτε ἑν ἐν τῷ σχέ-
sιν ἄσυ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καὶ-
γίνολας νοητικὰ ἢ ἐπορίσικα, διότι ἔγγον ἀδιάδε
γεσθαι τα συμπότερα τῶν ὁνύματων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινά
η ἰδῆμενομενον, ή ταῦτα ἐναφρομωσυνομελέκειν ἀλ-
λήλοις, ὡσ ἰδα τέτων ἤ τῶν τετοισ ἐπομένων, οἷον
σαφνείας, γλυκυτητος, τήν τῶν ἀλλων ἑδεῶν, ἔτι τε μα-
xενολογιῶν, τή βραχυλογιῶν, καὶ καὶ ἐν τῶν ὁνύ-
ματων ἀκραλεμεατομένων, ἐστι τε τῶν ἀκρατῶν, ἐκ ἐκπληξίας,
καὶ ἑτέρων τῶν μείων χειραθεία ἐχείν. τῆς δὲ γε ΠΡΟΣ
ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος
προηγυμνώς ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεύδος διελέγχων,
Book the First.

ductive of the Pathetic, and the Plea-

fiant in all their kinds. These latter Com-

positions

The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the Hearers, to whom it explains something, and one to the Things, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the Hearers, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as through these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to Things, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctus speaks elegantly on the same Subject.

Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sei-

monem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhi-

buit. Prima est Grammatica, quae ab oratone folæ-

cisimos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, 

quae in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, 

quae ornatum Sermonis tantum exquitit. Min. 1. 1.

c. 2.
positions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the Imagination, the Affections, and the Sense, become from their different heightnings either Rhetoric or Poetry.

Nor need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. Grammar is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though Logic may indeed subsist without Rhetoric or Poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct Logic, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.
At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part, (that is to say, Logic and Rhetoric) and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, Universal Grammar. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing Speech, as a Whole, into its constituent Parts; then resolving it, as a Composite, into its Matter and Form; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

Should any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

The following Story may not improperly be here inserted. "When the Fame
Ch. I. "of Heraclitus was celebrated through-out Greece, there were certain persons, that had a curiosity to see so great a Man. They came, and, as it happened, found him warming himself in a Kitchen. The meanness of the place occasioned them to stop; upon which the Philosopher thus accosted them—"Enter (says he) boldly, for here too there are Gods (e)."

We shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(e) See Aristot. de Part. Animal. I. i. c. 5.
Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts,

Those things, which are first to Nature, are not first to Man. Nature begins from Causes, and thence descends to Effects. Human Perceptions first open upon Effects, and thence by slow degrees ascend to Causes. Often had Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition; much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).

Even

(a) This Distinction of first to Man, and first to Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See Arist. Phys. Physic. I. i. c. 1. Themis-tius's Comment on the same, Postcr. Analyt. I. I. c. 2. De Anima, I. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between
Even in Matters of Art and human Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical between Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human. God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views Effects thro' Causes in their natural Order. Man views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views Causes thro' Effects, in an inverse Order. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in Aristotle: ὑπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔχει τὸ μέθ᾽ ἤμέραν, ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάλιν. As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man’s Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things. Metaph. 1. 2. c. 1. See also 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. 1. 1. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Ἀγαπητὸν τὴν ἀνθρωπινήν φύσει, ἐκ τῶν αὐτελεῖσθαι κἀπειθεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοπίστεπρᾳ τῇ τελείατερᾳ προϊέναι τὰ γὰρ συνδετα μᾶλλον συνῆθη ἦμεν, κἀ γνωριμιώτερῃ. Οὕτω γὰρ κἂν ὁ πάις ἐγείρῃ μὲν λόγου, κἀ ἐπεὶ τὸν μόρον τὴν περὶ τῆς περὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ άναλύσαι ἐς οὐνομα κἀ ῥῆμα, κἀ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβάς, κἀκεῖνα εἰς σοιχεῖα, ἥξετι. Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh.
tical Observers, the rest look no higher than to the Practice and mere Work, knowing nothing of those Principles, on which the whole depends.

Thus in Speech for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know Grammar universal; that Grammar, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall

walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.
shall follow the Order consonant to human Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin therefore first from a Period or Sentence, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pass, if possible, to those its primary Parts, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few,

With respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we assert, and when we question; when 'tis we command, and when we pray or wish?

For example, when we read in Shakespeare *

* The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for Treasons—

Or

* Merchant of Venice,
**Book the First.**

Or in *Milton* *

> O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,

_Hasting this way—_

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences,* one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

**When** the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions:

> When shall we three meet again

*In thunder, lightning, and in rain?*

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence.*

**When** *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of Banquo,

> ——Hence, horrible Shadow,

*Unreal Mock'ry hence!* ——

he speaks an *imperative Sentence,* founded upon the passion of hatred.

---

* P. L. IV. 866.
Ch. II. When Milton says in the character of his Allegro,

_Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee jest and youthful Jollity,_

he too speaks an _imperative Sentence_, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

When in the beginning of the _Paradise Lost_ we read the following address,

_And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure, Instruct me, for thou know'st—_

this is not to be called an _imperative Sentence_, tho' perhaps it bear the same _Form_, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence _precative_ or _optative._

What then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their
their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Classes? If not, they can be no objects of rational comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that he speaks his mind; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Disssembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the Powers of the soul (over and above the mere nutritive) may be included all of them in those of Perception, and those of Volition. By the Powers of Perception, I mean the Senses and the Intellect; by the Powers of Volition, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the Will, but the several Passions and Appetites; in short, all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.

† Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.
If then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

If we assert, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of Perception. For what indeed is to assert, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect?

Again, if we interrogate, if we command, if we pray, or if we wish, (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative) what do we but publish so many different Volitions?—For who is it that questions? He that has a Desire to be informed.—Who is it that commands? He that has a Will, which he would have obey'd.—What are those Beings, who either wish or pray? Those, who feel certain
certain wants either for themselves, or others.

If then the Soul's leading Powers be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all Speech is a publication of these Powers, it will follow that every Sentence will be either a Sentence of Assertion, or a Sentence of Volition. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

The
Ch. II. The Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the

...
the Eneid to an Epigram of Martial. But the longest Extension, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here considered, that is to say, a Sentence. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Now a Sentence (c) may be sketched in the following description—a compound Sentence

\[ \text{tem, aut Interrogantem vacant; vel rem: sique rem,}\]
\[ \text{vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in bac,}\]
\[ \text{vel ut a prestantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiori, ut in eo, qui proprius Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate proficiscitur: haeque nuncius rerum cognitionem, quae in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Haec sola verum falsumque capiat: preterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.}\]

(c) Ἀριστ. Ποτ. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.
Ch. II. Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.

Thus when I say [the Sun shineth] not only the whole quantity of sound has a meaning, but certain Parts also, such as [Sun] and [shineth.]

But what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) Word. For thus, though the Words

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντική,—ἡ μεγάλη ἐνία εἰς καθ’ αὐτὸ σημαντικήν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows
Words [Sun] and [fineth] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

If therefore all speech, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain Meaning, divisible into other Meanings, but Words imply a Meaning, which is not so divisible: it follows that Words will be the smallest parts of speech, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

Ch. II. To know therefore the species of Words, must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minutest Parts.

This therefore must become our next Inquiry.
Concerning the species of Words, the smallest Parts of Speech.

Let us first search for the Species of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For example, in one of the passages above cited.—

The Man, that hath no music in himself,  
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for treasons—

Here the Word [The] is an Article;—  
[Man] [No] [Music] [Concord] [Sweet]  
[Sounds] [Fit] [Treasons] are all Nouns,  
some Substantive, and some Adjective—  
[That] and [Himself] are Pronouns—  
[Hath] and [is] are Verbs—[moved] a  
Participle—[Not] an Adverb—  
[And] a Conjunction—[In] [with]
Ch. III. and [For] are Prepositions. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the Greek Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The Latins only differ in having no Article, and in separating the Interjection, as a Part of itself, which the Greeks include among the Species of Adverbs.

What then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

The Man that hath no Music, &c.

One Difference soon occurs, that some Words are variable, and others invariable. Thus the Word Man may be varied into Man's and Men; Hath, into Have, Haft, Had,
Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweet- Ch. III.
est; Fit into Fitter and Fittest. On the contrary, the Words, The, In, And, and some others, remain as they are, and cannot be altered.

And yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns and to the ancient Latins. Thus the Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives by the triple Variation of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the English never vary them in any of those ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by Auxiliars, as when for Bruti, or Bruto, we say, of Brutus, to Brutus;
Ch. III. Brutus; some by mere Position, as when for Brutum amavit Cassius, we say, Cassius lov'd Brutus. For here the Accusative, which in Latin is known any where from its Variation, is in English only known from its Position or place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

Suppose then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several Parts as they stand separate and detached. Some 'tis plain still preserve a Meaning (such as Man, Music, Sweet, &c.) others on the contrary immediately lose it (such as, And, The, With, &c.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in company, or associated.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words
Words are significant, or else they would not be Words; and if every thing not absolute, is of course relative, then will all Words be significant either absolutely or relatively.

With respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call'd significant by themselves; the latter may be call'd significant by relation; or if we like it better, the first sort may be call'd Principals, the latter Accessories. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole sub-sists (c).

§ This

(c) Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. Ἔτι, ὑπὸ τῶν σωτήρων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φανήντα, ἀ καθε ἑαυτὰ φανῖν ἀποτελεῖ.
Ch. III. § This Distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our Speculations. All things what—

τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἀπερ ἀνευ τῶν φωνῆσεων ἐκ ἑαυτῶν ἡπτὼν τὸν ἐκφώνησιν. τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἦσθι ἐπινοήσας καὶ τί τῶν λέξεων. δι' ἡμῶν γὰρ αὑτῶν, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνῆσεων, ἤπται ἦσιν καθάπερ ἐπί τῶν ῥημάτων, φωναμάτων, αὐτωνμιμῶν, ἐπιφημάτων—δι' ἐς, ἀπερεὶ σύμφωνα, αναρέωσε τὰ φωνεύτα, ἐ δυνάμενα καὶ ἓδαι ἤπται εἵνει—καθάπερ ἐπί τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων τὰ γαρ τοιαύτα ἀεὶ τῶν μορφῶν συστημαῖνει. In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. i. c. 3. Itaque quibufdam philosophis placuit nomen & verbum Solas esse partes Orationis; caetera vero, Adminicula vel Juncturas earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae & trabes, caetera autem (id est, cera, stappa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutina-
whatever either exist as the Energies, or Ch. III. Affections, of some other thing, or without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called Attributes. Thus to think is the attribute of a Man; to be white, of a Swan; to fly, of an Eagle; to be four-footed, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd Substances*. Thus Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.

*Substances.] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑκτας, τι πωτ' ἐστ' ἡ ἔσθα, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκει-μένα, ἀλλ' καθ' ἐκ τα ἄλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb,
Ch. III. And thus all things whatsoever, being either (f) Substances or Attributes, it follows of course that all Words, which are significant as Principals, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are significant of Substances, they are call'd Substantives; if of Attributes, they are call'd Attributives. So that all Words whatever, significant as Principals, are either Substantives or Attributives.

Again, as to Words, which are only significant as Accessories, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner define or determine, they may justly for that reason be called

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(f) This division of things into Substance and Attribute seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See Categor. c. 2. Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. De Cælo, L. III. c. 1.
Definitives. If to many Words at Ch.III, once, then as they serve to no other purpose than to connect, they are called for that reason by the name of Connectives.

And thus it is that all Words whatever are either Principals or Accessories; or under other Names, either significant from themselves, or significant by relation. —If significant from themselves, they are either Substantives orAttributives; if significant by relation, they are either Definitives or Connectives. So that under one of these four Species, Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives, are all Words, however different, in a manner included.

If any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the Substantives, Nouns; the Attributives, Verbs; the Definitives, Arti-
Ch. III. Articles; and the Connectives, Conjunctions.

Shou’d it be ask’d, what then becomes of Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Interjections; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ There were various opinions in ancient days, as to the number of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * Sophist mentions only two, the Noun and the Verb. Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of † Propositions. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to Logic or

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† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.
Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Ch. III. Speech as contained in these two, because these alone combined make a perfect assertive Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in his *treatise of Poetry (where he was to lay down the elements

(g) Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duae, Nomen & Verbum; quia haec sola etiam per se conjunctae plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἀναφέρουσα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant. Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Pufchii. Exiit hic quodam quæstio, cur duo tantum, Nomen & Verbum, se (Aristoteles se.) determinare promissat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, sufficisc. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ silicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare superfluum est quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non posuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB, τὰ ἰμαχικοταστα μὲν τὰ λόγια, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quæst. Platon. p. 1009.

* Poet. Cap. 20.
ments of a more variegated speech) adds the Article and Conjunction to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To Aristotle's authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoics (*b*).

The latter Stoics instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the Appellative and Proper. Others increased the number, by detaching the Pronoun from the Noun; the Participle and Adverb from the Verb; and the Preposition from the Conjunction. The Latin Grammarians went farther, and detached the Interjection from the Adverb, within which by the Greeks it was always included, as a Species.

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(*b*) For this we have the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom Quintilian follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* Diogenes Laertius and Prisian make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Prisian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*
We are told indeed by (i) Dionysius of Ch. III. Halicarnassus and Quintilian, that Aristotle, with Theodectes, and the more early writers, held but three Parts of speech, the Noun, the Verb, and the Conjunction. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (k) told) admit no other. But as to Aristotle, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the four Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition *.

(i) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(k) Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciant. Estque haec Arabum quoque sententia—Hebrei quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere dixerent, artem eam demum scribere caperunt, quod ante annos centigit circiter quadringentos) Hebrei, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero tria classium numerum alie etiam Orientis linguae retinunt. Dubium, utrum ead in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Graecorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Graecos tres tantum partes agnossisse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Vss. de Analog. l. i. c. 1. See also Sancti Minerv. l. 1. c. 2.

* Sup. p. 34.
Ch. III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the Noun, the Verb, the Article, and the Conjunction; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we choose to call Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives.
Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

Substantives are all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.

The first sort of Substances are the natural, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

There are other Substances of our own making. Thus by giving a Figure not natural to natural Materials, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

Again, by a more refined operation of our Mind alone, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abstract to Fly;
HERMES.

Ch. IV. from Surface, the being White; from Soul, the being Temperate.

AND thus it is we convert even Attributes into Substances, denoting them on this occasion by proper Substantives, such as Flight, Whiteness, Temperance; or else by others more general, such as Motion, Colour, Virtue. These we call abstract Substances; the second sort we call artificial.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in natural Substances, Animal is a Genus; Man, a Species; Alexander, an Individual. In artificial Substances, Edifice is a Genus; Palace, a Species; the Vatican, an Individual. In abstract Substances, Motion is a Genus; Flight, a Species; this Flight or that Flight are Individuals.
As therefore every (a) Genus may be found whole and intire in each one of its Species; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every Species may be found whole and intire in each one of its Individuals; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence it is, that every Genus, tho’ One, is multiplied into Many; and every Species, tho’ One, is also multiplied into Many, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as Many, and so is truly an Individual as well in Nature as in Name.

(a) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of μίαν ἱδέαν διὰ ωφλαίων, ἐνὸς ἐκάστῳ νεωμένῳ χωρίς, πάντα διατεταμένην— καὶ ωφλαίς, ἐτέρας ἄλληλαν, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἐξ ὑπὸν περὶς ὑπομένας. Sophist. p. 253. Edit. Serrani. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the Isagoge or Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle’s Logic.
Ch. IV. From these Principles it is, that Words following the nature and genius of Things, such Substantives admit of Number as denote Genera or Species, while those, which denote (b) Individuals, in strictness admit it not.

Besides

(b) Yet sometimes Individuals have plurality or Number, from the causes following. In the first place the Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. Hence then instead of one only being call'd Marcus, and one only Antonius, it happens that many are called Marcus and many called Antonius; and thus 'tis the Romans had their Plurals, Marci and Antonii, as we in later days have our Marks and our Anthonies. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called accidental, because it is merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the Ptolemies, Scipios, Catos, or (to instance in modern names) the Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues; because a Race or Family is like a smaller sort of Species; so that the family Name extends to the Kindred, as the specific Name extends to the Individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the high Character or Eminence of some one Individual, whose Name became afterwards a kind of common Appellative, to denote all those,
Besides Number, another characteristic, visible in Substances, is that of Sex. Every Substance is either Male or Female; or both Male and Female; or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to Sexes and their Negation, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration.

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language, only regarding those distinctions which

those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great Critic was call'd an Aristarchus; every great Warrior, an Alexander; every great Beauty, a Helen, &c.

* A Daniel come to Judgment! yea a Daniel,*
cries Shylock in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So Martial in that well known verse,

*Sint Mæcenates, non deerunt, Flaccæ, Marones.*

So Lucilius,

*ARGVIIPIOI montes, ÆTHNÆ omnes, aperí ATHONES.*

which are more obvious, considers \textit{Words denoting Substances} to be either \textit{Masculine, Feminine}, or \textit{Neuter}.*

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, \textit{which have reference to common Life}, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, \&c. are \textit{eminently distinguished}, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either \textit{less frequently occur}, or of which one Sex is \textit{less apparently distinguished} from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

* After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle. Τῶν υμομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ Ἰηλεῖα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ. Poet. cap. 21. \textit{Protagoras} before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, Ἰηλεῖα, κ' σκεύη. Aristotle. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ἓδετερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξὺ κ' σκεύη.
† In the English Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is Masculine, but what denotes a Male animal Substance; none Feminine, but what denotes a Female animal Substance; and that where the Substance has no Sex, the Substantive is always Neuter.

But 'tis not so in Greek, Latin, and many of the modern Tongues. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. MIND is surely neither male, nor female; yet is NOTE, in Greek, masculine, and MENS, in Latin, feminine.

† Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexn non aedignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c. Consent. apud Pufch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from Genera Hominum, quae naturalia sunt, &c. is worth perusing.
Ch. IV. In some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even in things without Sex, a distant analogy to that great natural Distinction, which (according to Milton) animates the World ‡.

In this view we may conceive such Substantives to have been considered as Masculine, which were "conspicuous for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately whether to good or to ill; or which had claim to Eminence, either laudable or otherwise."

‡ Mr. Linnaeus, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the Distinction of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable World, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.
THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch. IV.

"such, as were conspicuous for the At-
"tributes either of receiving, of con-
taining, or of producing and bringing
"forth; or which had more of the pas-
"five in their nature, than of the active;
"or which were peculiarly beautiful
"and amiable; or which had respect to
"such Excesses, as were rather Femi-
nine, than Masculine."

Upon these Principles the two greater
Luminaries were considered, one as Mas-
culine, the other as Feminine; the Sun
("Helios, Sol) as Masculine, from com-
municating Light, which was native
and original, as well as from the vigorous
warmth and efficacy of his Rays; the
Moon (Σελήνη, Luna) as Feminine, from
being the Receptacle only of another's
Light, and from shining with rays more
delicate and soft.

Thus
Ch. IV. **Thus Milton,**

First in his East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:
the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before him danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Let's bright the Moon
But opposite, in level'd West was set,
His mirrour, with full face borrowing her Light
From him; for other light she needed none.

P. L. VII. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as Brother and Sister, which still preserves the same distinction.

*Nec Fratis radiis obnoxia surgere Luna.*
G. I. 396.

The Sky or Ether is in Greek and Latin Masculine, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.
The Earth on the contrary is universally feminine, from being the grand Receiver, the grand Container, but above all from being the Mother (either mediate or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

Thus Virgil,
*Tu
t Pater omnipotens 
faeundis im-
bribus 
Conjugis in gre
remium 
Conjugate 
& omnes
Magnus alit magnocommixture corpore 

Thus Shakespeare,
---† Common Mother, Thou
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite
Breast
Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens.

So Milton,
Whatever Earth, all-bearing Mo-
ther, yields.
P. L. V.

* Senecæ Nat. Quest. III. 14.
† Παμμπύτορ γῆ χαίγε—Græc. Anth. p. 281.
Ch. IV. So Virgil,

Non jam mater alit Tellus, viresque
ministrat (c).  Æn. XI. 71.

Among artificial Substances the Ship (Navis) is feminine, as being so eminently a Receiver and Container of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, "she rides at anchor," "she is under sail."

A City (Πόλις, Civitas) and a Country (Πατρίς, Patria) are feminine also, by being (like the Ship) Containers and Receivers, and farther by being as it were the Mothers and Nurses of their respective Inhabitants.

Thus

(c)—διὸ ἥν ἐν τῷ ὀλῷ τήν γῆς φύσιν, ὡς Ὄηλατ
ἠ Μητέρα νομίζεσιν ὁταν ὃ Ἡλιον,
ἣ ἐν τῇ τῶν άλλων τῶν τοιοτῶν, ὡς Γενώντας ἢ
Thus Virgil,
Salve, magna PARENTS FRUGUM, Satur-
nia Tellus,
MAGNA VIRUM—— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those
brave Greeks, who fell at Chæronæa,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει ὡλποις τῶν πλεῖστα κα-
μῶν
Σῶματα——
Their parent Country in her bosom
holds
Their wearied bodies.—*

So Milton,
The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, Queen of
the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the Ocean, tho’ from its being
the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the

Container

* Demost. in Orat. de Coronâ.
Container and Productress of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) Feminine; yet its deep Voice and boisterous Nature have, in spight of these reasons, prevailed to make it Male. Indeed the very sound of Homer's

\[\text{μέγα θεός} \ \text{Ημεροβοῖο},\]

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with female delicacy and softness.

TIME (Χρῶνος) from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as Masculine. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

\[\text{ὁ γὰρ Χρῶνος \ έκαμψε, τέκτων \ έσοφός,} \]
\[\text{Απαντά \ έργαζομένος \ ασθένεσα.} \]

Me Time hath bent, that sorry Artist, He That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse.

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* Ω Χρῶνε, παλιόις Ἐνήλιοι πανεπίσκοπος Δαιμον. 
† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.
So too Shakespeare, speaking likewise of Ch. IV.

Orl. Whom doth he gallop withal?
Rof. With a thief to the gallows.—
        As you like it.

The Greek θάνατος or θάνος, and the English Death, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as Masculine. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a Female Death they would treat as ridiculous (d).

Take a few examples of the masculine Death.

(d) Well therefore—did Milton in his Paradise Lost not only adopt Death as a Person, but consider him as Masculine: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his Masculine Death, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.
Callimachus upon the Elegies of his Friend Heraclitus—

"Αἰ δὲ τειό ζῶσιν ἀγίδοις, ὅσιν ὁ πάντων
Ἀρπάκτηρ Ἁίδης οὐ εἶπε κείρα βαλεὶ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shalt Death
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.

In the Alcestis of Euripides, Ὅιματος or Death is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between Him and Apollo; and towards its end, there is a fight between Him and Hercules, in which Hercules is conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his hands.

It is well known too, that Sleep and Death are made Brothers by Homer. It was to this old Gorgias elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "How he did?"——

"Sleep
Book the First.

"Sleep (replied the old Man) is just Ch. IV.
"upon delivering me over to the care of
"his Brother (e)."

Thus Shakespeare, speaking of Life,
—merely Thou art Death's Fool;
For Him Thou labourest by thy flight to
Sun,
And yet run'st towards Him still.
Meal. for Meal.

So Milton,
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;
Despair
Tended the sick, busi'est from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant Death his
dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike—
P. L. XI. 489 (f).

\[ \text{The} \]

\( (e) \) 'Ἡθν μὲ ὦ ΤΠΝΟΣ ἔχεσται θαρακατατιθεσθας Τ ἈΔΕΛΦΩΙ. \) Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

\( (f) \) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a female Death; suppose we read,
Ch. IV. The supreme Being (God, Θεός, Deus, Dieu, &c.) is in all languages Masculine, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, Numen, Deity (which last we English join to a neuter, saying Deity itself) sometimes I say we meet with these Neuters. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a Negation, than by any of those Distinctions which are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male for example is

And over them triumphant Death her dart
Shook, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened!
is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Ch.IV. Left, &c. &c. (g).

**Virtue** ('Aretē, Virtus) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4 ——abasf'b'd

HERMES.

Ch. IV. — abash'd the Devil stood,
And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw
Virtue in her shape how lovely; saw,
and pin'd
His losi —

P. L. IV. 346.

This being allowed, Vice (Karria) becomes Feminine of course, as being, in the συζοιχία, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (b).

The Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of Fortune would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very

(b) They are both represented as Females by Xenophon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See Memorab. L. II. c. 1. As to the συζοιχία here mentioned, thus Varro—Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia effa bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem. De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also Arist. Metaph. L. I. c. 5. and Ecclesiasticus, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.
very natural Female, which has no small Ch.IV. resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor.

Why the Furies were made Female, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the Furies were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

Talibus Alesto dictis exarstit in iras.
At juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus;
Diriguere oculi: tot Erinmys fibilat Hydris,
Tantaque se facies aperit: tum flammea torquens

Lumina
HERMES.

Ch.IV. Lumina cunélagem & quærentem dicere plura
Repulit, & geminos erexit crinibus angues,
Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc ad-
didit ore:
En! Ego viæta situ, &c.
Æn. VII. 455 (i).

(i) The Words above mentioned, Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say n ἄγελη or ὁ ἄγελη, hæc Virtus or hic Virtus, la Ver-
tu or le Vertu, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in our own language say, Virtue is its own Reward, or Virtue is her own Reward; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time maintains his wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinc-
tion between the severe or Logical Stile, and the orna-
mental or Rhetorical. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,
He, that would see more on this Subject, may consult Ammonius the Peripatetic, as Neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a logical Inquiry. When we give them Sex, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth personified; are a kind of intelligent Beings, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of Rhetoric or of Poetry.

Thus Milton,

_The Thunder,_

Wing'd with red lightning and impetuous rage,

Perhaps hath spent his shafts—— P. Loff. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the Hail, and Thunder, God's Ministers of Vengeance, and so personified them, had he afterwards said its Shafts for his Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again
His red right hand—— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place His Hand is clearly preferable either to Her's or Its, by immediately referring us to God himself, the Avenger.

I shall
tic, in his Commentary on the Treatise *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd*
*Each to his place: they heard his voice and went*
*Obsequious: Heav'n his wonted face renew'd,*
*And with fresh flourrets Hill and Valley smiled.*

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the Face of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to its Place—Heaven renewed its wonted face*—how profaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Prosepepsia*, which he was aiming to establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.
ed with candour, rather than scrutinized Ch. IV. with rigour. Varro's words on a Subject near akin are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. Non mediocres enim tenebrae in silvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque eò, quod pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quaedam objecta, quæ euntæm retinere possunt*.

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both Number and Gender appertain to Words, because in the first place they appertain to Things; that is to say, because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter. There is however this difference between the two Attributes: Number in strictness descends no lower, than to

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.
Ch. IV. to the last Rank of Species (*k*): Gender on the contrary stops not here, but descends to every Individual, however diversified. And so much for Substantives, properly so called.

(*k*) The reason why *Number* goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the cause of which see before, p. 39.
Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

We are now to proceed to a Secondary Race of Substantives, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

Every Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an Object τῆς πρῶτης γνώσεως, of the first knowledge or acquaintance (a); in the latter

(a) See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian—Interess autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis
ter it is called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between Particulars or Individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δεῖξε, that is, Pointing, or Indication by the Finger or Hand, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language

Language were not content with this. They invented a race of Words to supply this Pointing; which Words, as they always stood for Substantives or Nouns, were characterized by the Name of Ἀντωνυμία, or Pronouns (b). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

Suppose the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the

(b) Ἐν eis ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἠ ἀναφοράς ΑΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of Individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, qua pro nomine proprio uniuecujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.
the Subject of the Conversation to be the Speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the Pronoun, I. I write, I say, I desire, &c. and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason the Pronoun of the First Person.

Again, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be the Party addrest. Here for similar reasons they invented the Pronoun, Thou. Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c. and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun of the Second Person.

Lastly, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but some Third Object, different from both. Here they provided another Pronoun, He, She, or It, which
in distinction to the two former was called the Pronoun of the Third Person.

And thus it was that Pronouns came to be distinguished by their respective Persons (c).

(c) The Description of the different Persons here given is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollonius. Personae Pronominun sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quae loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de ea pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de ea, quae nec loquitur, nec ad se directum, accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same Distinctions. Πρώτον (σφόσωμον SC.) ὃς ἐπι ἐκείνη φράζει ὁ λόγων δεύτερον, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς, πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὁ λόγων τρίτον, ὃς ὑπὲρ ἑτέρας. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.

This account of Persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the Speaker; the Second, the Party addressed; and the Third, the Subject. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the Speaker, the other the Party addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the Subject, this is a character, which it shares in common with
Ch. V. As to Number, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (we), because

with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When Eneas begins the narrative of his adventures, the second Person immediately appears, because he makes Dido, whom he addresseth, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

*Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.*

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address'd) we hear nothing farther of this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the First Person may be seen everywhere, because the Speaker everywhere is himself the Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quaque itse miserrima vidi,*

*Et quorum pars magna fui*—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Se-
because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (Thou) has the plural (you), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (He) has the plural (they), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

But tho' all these Pronouns have Number, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of Sex. The reason seems to cond Persons by being introduced as present. The real Second Person (Dido) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, we find neither First Person, nor Second, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.
to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (d) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages the third Person has its Genders, and that even English (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (e) distinction of He, She, and It.

Hence


(e) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him
Hence too we see the reason why a single Pronoun (f) to each Person, an I to destroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, He caused him to destroy him, we are told with the proper distinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) Quaeritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversae indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non agent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentes inter se sunt, & demonstrativa; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Isti; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipsa, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.
Ch. V. to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the *Third* Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some *Noun* (as when we say, *This is* Virtue, or *δειντιμος*, *Give me That*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some *Noun* (as when we say, *This Habit is* Virtue; or *δειντιμος*, *That Man defrauded me*) then as they supply not the place of a *Noun*, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed
indeed a near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine Pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the Power of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine Article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as Attributives or (g) Adjectives.

As

(g) Τό Ἀρθρον μετὶ ὄνοματε, ἕν ἐν Ἀνωνυμίᾳ ἄν ὄνοματε. The Article stands with a Noun; but the Pronoun stands for a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἄια ἐν τὰ ἀρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὄνοματα συναρτησεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀνωνυμίαν μετατίθει. Now Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again—"Οταν το Ἀρθρον μὴ μετ' ὄνοματε ψαραλωμεῖναι, χοιναὶ ὁ ὁνταξιν ὄνοματε."
As to the Coalescence of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: Articulis autem Pronomina commanerantes, finitos ea Articullos appelleabant; ipsos autem Articullos, quibus nos caremus, infinitos Articullos dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articullos commanerabant Pronominiibus, & Articularia eos Pronomina vocabant, &c. Prisc. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hic, calls them both Articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII. See alio L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his Analogia (L. I. c. i.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article,
Second will, either of them, by themselves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—*I am He—Thou art He*—but we cannot say—*I am Thou—nor Thou art I*. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the Speaker to be the Subject also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the Person addressed; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the Speaker, and the Party addressed, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

And now perhaps we have seen enough of Pronouns, to perceive how they differ from

*But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as Articles, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their Signification.*
from other Substantives. The others are Primary, these are their Substitutes; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already (b) mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of Articles, which are nearly allied to them, that

(b) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no " Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. " It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes " equivalent to ἐνεκείναι, that is, to Pointing or Indication " by the Finger." It is worth remarking in that Verse of Persius,

Sed pulchrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, Hic est.

how the ἐνεκείναι, and the Pronoun are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of ἐνεκείναι the Pronoun of the third Person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parces, erit hic quoque Miles. That is, I also will be a Soldier.

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See Vulpian.

It
that "Language, tho' in itself only significant of general Ideas, is brought down to denote that infinitude of Particulurs, which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called Prepositive, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is another Pronoun (in

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of implied Presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius, τας μεν την οψεως ειναι διεξεις, τας δε τυ νυ, that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.
Ch. V. (in Greek ὦς, ὦσις (i); in Latin, Qui; in English, Who, Which, That) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Suppose I was to say—Light is a Body, Light moves with great celerity.—These

(i) The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun ἰποταξικὸν ἄφθιον, the Subjunctive Article. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the ἰποταξικὸν or true Prepositive Article, not only confesses it to differ, as being express'd by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὀθὸν ὅτι ὡς οὐριος ἄν ἐν ἄφθιον ταῦτα—these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article. And just before he says, οὐριός γε μὴν ἄφθιον τὸ ἰποταξικὸν—however properly speaking it is the Prepositive is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.
These would apparently be two distinct Ch. V.

Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, Light, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, it, and say—Light is a Body; it moves with great celerity—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a Connective (as for Example an and) saying—Light is a Body, and it moves with great celerity—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of and it, we substitute that, or which, saying Light is a Body, which moves with great celerity—the Sentence still retains its Unity and Perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the Subjunctive, because it cannot (like the
Ch. V. the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous (k).

The

(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; qui metuens vivit—is another. Ille and Qui are the two Nominatives; Erit and Vivit, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken.

Τὸ ὡποτεκίτον ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἰδιον φέρεται, συνδε- 

δεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῶν προκειμένων ὑπόματι, ἐντεῦθεν ἀπλὲς λόγον ἐπικείμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ 

ῥημάτων συνεπεῖν (κάτω τίν ἐν τῷ ὑπόματι, ἀπὸ τίν ἐν 

ἀυτῷ τῷ ἀρθρῷ) ὅπερ σύλλογοι καὶ πρεπέτοι τῷ ΚΑΙ συν- 

δέσμως. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν)
The Application of this Subjunctive, like the other Pronouns, is universal. It may

The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, and. This Copulative assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came, who dis coursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, and dis coursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part Pronoun, and part Conjunction, in forming their

qui
Ch. V. may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the Animal, Which, &c. the Man, Whom, &c. the Ship, Which, &c. Alexander, Who, &c. Bucephalus, That, &c. Virtue, Which, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, who now read, have nearly finished this Chapter; Thou, who now readest: He, who now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this Subjunctive truly a Pronoun from its Substitution, there being

qui and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KAI and 'ΩΣ, KAI and 'O. Scal. de Curs. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresses the Force of this Subjunctive, Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepositive and a Connective, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See Iliad, A. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. II. 54, 157, 158.
ing no Substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is essentially distinguished from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a Substitute, but withal a Connective (l).

(l) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the Ego and the Tu, are implied in the very Form of the Verb itself (γεγραψα, γεγραψις, scribo, scribis) and are for that reason never expressed, unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrā
Fornosiam resonare doces, &c.

This however is true with respect only to the Casus rectus, or Nominative of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their oblique Cases, which must always be added, because tho' we see the Ego in Amo, and the Tu in Amas, we see not the Te or Me in Amat, or Amant.

Yet even these oblique Cases appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. If they contradiistinguish, then are they commonly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.
AND now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All Sub-

Thus Virgil,

_Quid Thesea, magnum_

_Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Jove summo._

Thus Homer,

_ΤΑΙΝ μὲν ΢τειδ δοίεν_

_Παιδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην_  

_I. A._

where the 'Τμίν and the Μοι stand, as contradistinguishing, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the 'Τμίν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples everywhere obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradicting, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ἐπθοτονυμέναι, or Pronouns uprightly accented. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of Ἐγκλίτικαι, that is, Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in the first person 'Εμι, 'Εμοί, 'Εμέ for Contradistinatives, and Με, Μοί, Μέ for Enclitics. And hence it was that Apollinius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read_ 

_παιδα δ’ ΕΜΟΙ,
stantives are either primary, or secondary, that is to say, according to a language more familiar and known, are either nouns or pronouns. The nouns denote substances, and those either natural, artificial, or abstract.* They moreover denote things either general, or special, or particular. The pronouns, their substitutes, are either prepositive, or subjunctive. The prepositive is distinguished into three orders called the first, the second, and the third person. The subjunctive includes

the

for ἡδεῖ δὲ ΜΟΙ, on account of the contradistinction, which there occurs between the Grecians and Chryses. See Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This diversity between the contradistinctive pronouns, and the enclitic, is not unknown even to the English tongue. When we say, *Give me Content,* the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect enclitic. But when we say, *Give Me Content, Give Him his thousands,* the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an accent of their own, and so become the true ἐσθοτονεῖναι.

* See before, p. 37, 38.
HERMES.

Ch. V. the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a Connective.

Having done with Substantives, we now proceed to Attributives.
Concerning Attributives.

Attributives are all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes. Such for example are the Words, Black, White, Great, Little, Wife, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c. (a).

How-

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles, in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or Verb is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λευκός a Verb, tells us σάταν φωνήν, κατηγορέμενον ὧρον ἐν προτάται ποϊμᾶν, 'PHMA καλεῖται, that every Sound articulate, that forms the
However, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be any thing else. For Existence may be considered as an universal Genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either express, or by implication; express, as when we say, The Sun is bright; by im-

*Predicate in a Proposition, is called a Verb*, p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian’s observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. Non Declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis. L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. L. XIII. p. 970.
implication, as when we say, *The Sun Ch. VI. rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising* (b).

The Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est, Fit, ὑπάρχει ἐσί, πέλει, γίγνεται*, are all of them used to express this general *Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive*, but the *Greeks Ῥήματα Ὑπαρκτικά*, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well *Attribute*, as *Substance*. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, *ἔσι, Est, Is*.

Now all *Existence* is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B is an Animal; B is black, is round, &c.*  

*With*

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.*
Ch. VI. With respect to this difference, the Verb (is) can by itself express absolute Existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not express, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (is) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of a mere Assertion. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, Riseth means, is rising; Writeth, is writing.

Again—As to Existence in general, it is either mutable, or immutable; mutable, as in the Objects of Sensation; immutable, as in the Objects of Intelljection and Science. Now mutable Objects exist all in Time, and admit the several Distinctions
B O O K  T H E  F I R S T .

Definitions of present, past, and future. Ch. VI.

But immutable Objects know no such Differences, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

And hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (is) according as it denotes mutable, or immutable Being.

For example, if we say, This Orange is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it existeth so now at this present, in opposition to past time, when it was green, and to future time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side, we do not intend by (is) that it is incommensurable now, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary we intend that Perfection of Existence, to which Time and its Differences are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this
this Verb, when we say, Truth is, or, God is. The opposition is not of Time present to other Times, but of necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever (c). And so much for Verbs of Existence, commonly called Verbs Substantive.

We are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c. among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive

(c) Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in Substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, dies est, ad nul-lam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid praefens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.
To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise*, these are imperfect sentences, though they denote a substance and an attribute. The reason is, that they want an assertion, to shew that such attribute appertains to such substance. We must therefore call in the help of an assertion elsewhere, an (is) or a (was) to complete the sentence, saying *Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own form not an attribute only, but an assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now
Ch. VI. Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call Verbs. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take the Attribute alone without the Assertion, then have we Participles. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of Adjectives.

And thus it is, that all Attributives are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives.

Besides the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in Motion; such are *to walk*, *to fly*, *to strike*, *to live*. Others have it in the privation of Motion; such are *to stop*, *to rest*, *to cease*, *to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, which have nothing to do
do with either Motion or its Privation; Ch. VI. such are the Attributes of, Great and Lit-
tle, White and Black, Wise and Foolish, and in a word the several Quantities and Qualities of all Things. Now these last are Adjectives; those which denote Motions, or their Privation, are either Verbs or Participles.

And this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all Motion is in Time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies Time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one Place for one Instant only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in one Place for more than one Instant,

† Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion. Ἡρεμᾶς ἐγὼ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἰδέαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ὄν, καὶ αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ μέρῃ.
Ch. VI. Instant, that is to say, during an Extension between two Instants, and this of course gives us the Idea of Time. As therefore Motions and their Privation imply Time as their concomitant, so Verbs, which denote them, come to denote Time also (d). And hence the origin and use of Tenses, "which are so many different forms, signed to each Verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various Times in which such meaning may exist." Thus Scribit, Scripsit, Scripsiat, and Scribet, denote all equally the Attribute, To Write, while the difference between them, is, that they denote Writing in different Times.

(d) The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—\( \lambda \mu \mu \alpha \, \delta \, \varepsilon \, \tau \, \omega \rho \omicron \sigma \mu \alpha \iota \nu \nu \, \chi \rho \omicron \nu, \) a Verb is something, which signifies Time over and above (for such is the force of the Preposition, \( \Pi \rho \omicron \varepsilon \cdot \) If it should be asked, over and above what? It may be answered, over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See Arisf. de Interpret. c. 3. together with his Commentators Ammonius and Boethius.
Should it be asked, whether *Time* itself may not become upon occasion the Verb's *principal* Signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same *Time* may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, *writeth* and *speaketh*) and different *Times* by the same Verb (as in the words, *writeth* and *wrote*) neither of which could happen, were *Time* any thing more, than a mere Concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote *Time*, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are *Timely, Yearly, Dayly, Hourly,* &c. of the substantive kind are *Time, Year, Day, Hour,* &c.

The most obvious division of *Time* is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose verbs have not *Tenses*, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still farther. *Time past* and *future* are both *infinitely extended.*

Hence
Ch. VI. Hence it is that in *universal Time past* we may assume *many particular Times past*, and in *universal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given line, however minute.

*Here* then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.
However as the knowledge of Ten- Ch. VI.

deps depends on the Theory of Time, and this is a subject of no mean specula-
tion, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.
C. VII. 

Time and Space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply Extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the Extension of Space, and between Yesterday and To-morrow, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exist at once and together, while those of Time only exist in Transition or Succession (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of Time, by considering it under the notion

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐὰν χρόνον ἐλθὼν ἀμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλὰ ἀνα κατὰ μέρον τὸ Νῦν ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι αὐτεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἐχεῖ. Time doth not subside the whole at once, but only in a single Now or Instant; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.
notion of a transient Continuity. Hence C.VII. also, as far as the affections and properties of Transition go, Time is different from Space; but as to those of Extension and Continuity, they perfectly coincide.

Let us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given Line we may assume any where a Point, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given Time we may assume any where a Now or Instant, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite Nows or Instants.

Farther still—A Point is the Bound of every finite Line; and a Now or Instant, of every finite Time. But altho' they are Bounds, they are neither of them Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of any Time. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily
farily extended also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their Whole. But if a Point or Now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other Points, and infinite other Nows (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

These assertions therefore being admitted, and both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, but not as Parts (b), it will follow,

(b) — φανερὸν ὅτι εὐθεῖα μόριον τὸ ΝΤΝ τῷ ἕρων, ὡστερ ὥδ' αἱ συγγραμμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς · αἱ δὲ γραμμαί δύο τῆς μίας μόρια. It is evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. Ause. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΤΝ ἀ μέγες· μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέγες, καὶ σύγκειον αὐτὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν. ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ὁ ὄντι σύγκειον ἐκ τῶν ΝΤΝ. A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole; and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but Time doth not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.
follow, that in the same manner as the same C. VII.

Point may be the End of one Line, and the
Beginning of another, so the same Now or
Instant may be the End of one Time,
and the Beginning of another. Let us
suppose for example, the Lines, A B, B C.

I say that the Point B is the End of the
Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line,
B C. In the same manner let us suppose
A B, B C to represent certain Times, and
let B be a Now or Instant. In such case
I say that the Instant B is the End of the
Time A B, and the Beginning of the
Time B C. I say likewise of these two
Times, that with respect to the Now or
Instant, which they include, the first of
them is necessarily Past Time, as being
previous to it; the other is necessarily Fu-
ture, as being subsequent. As therefore

every
C.VII. every Now or Instant always exists in Time, and without being Time, is Time’s Bound; the Bound of Completion to the Past, and the Bound of Commencement to the Future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro’ all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole (c).

From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such

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(c) Τὸ δὲ Νῦν ἐσι συνέχεια χρόνος, ὡσπερ ἔλεχθη, συνέχεια γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ οὖσα πώςες χρόνες ἐσίν ἐσὶ γὰρ τῷ μεν ἁρχῇ, τῷ δὲ τελευτᾷ. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.
such thing as Time present. For if all Time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such Continuity is essential?

Farther than this—If there be no such thing as Time Present, there can be no Sensation of Time by any one of the senses. For all Sensation is of the Present only, the Past being preserved not by Sense but by Memory, and the Future being anticipated by Prudence only and wise Foresight.

But if no Portion of Time be the object of any Sensation; farther, if the Present

† Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθάνεις ἕκ.) ὅπετ τὸ μέλλον, ὅπετ τὸ γινόμενον γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρόν μόνον. Αἰσ. περὶ Μην. Α. α.
C.VII. Sent never exist; if the Past be no more; if the Future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts, out of which Time is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity (d)? Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

The World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more, than some moving spectacle

(d) "Ὅτι μὲν ἐν ὅλος ἐκ ἔσιν, ἡ μόνης ἡ ἀμιθοῖς, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις ἂν ὑποπλέουσες το μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ γέγονε, ἡ ἐκ ἔσιν τὸ δὲ μέλλει, ἡ ἐπὶ ἔσιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἡ ὁ ἀπειρός ἡ ὁ αἰών οἰκεῖον ἄρπον συνείσται" το ὁ ἐκ μη ὑκτων συνείσειον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δοξεια νατές-χεῖν νοτε ἔσιες. That therefore Time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity. Natural. Ausc. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.
tacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to the Imagination, and above all to the Intellect, the several Now or Instants are not lost, as to the Senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be transient and passing. "Now it is from contemplating "two or more of these Instants under one "view, together with that Interval of "Continuity, which subsists between "them, that we acquire insensibly the "Idea of Time (e)." For example: The Sun

(e) Τότε φαμέν γεγονέων χρόνον, ουκ αυ τῇ πρώτῃ κε υσέρα ν εν τῇ κινήσει άισθησιν λαέωμεν. Ορίζομεν ὅτι
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C.VII. Sun rises; this I remember: it rises again; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an Extension bet-ween

dε τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπολαξεὶς ἄντα, καὶ μεταξύ τι
ἀντίων ἑτερον. ὡταν γὰρ τὰ ἀκρα ἑτερα τε μέσαν νοσω-

κευ, καὶ δύε ἐπὶ τῇ ἄρα ἡ ἦ NTN, τὸ μὲν ὑπότερον,
τὸ δὲ ἕπερον, τότε καὶ ταῦτα φαινέν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ.
It is then we say there has been Time, when we can ac-
quire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But
we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first,
then the other, together with an interval between them dif-
ferent from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes
to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two
Now's, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say
there is Time, and this it is we call Time. Natural.

Aucult. L. IV. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon
this passage is to the same purpose. "Ὅταν γὰρ ο νῦς
ἐναμανυσθεὶς τῷ NTN, ο χθεis ἐπτεν, ἑτερον πάλιν ἐπὶ
tῷ τέμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς ἑνενόησεν, υπὸ τῶν δύο
NTN φριζόμενον, οὗν ὑπὸ περάτων δυον· καὶ ἤτω λέγειν
ἐχει, ὅτι ποσόν ἐνί πεντεκάιδεκα όρῶν, ἤ ἐκκαίδεκα,
ὅντα εἰς ἀπείρα γραμμῆς ἑνχωρίαν δύο σημείωσ απα-
tεμνόμενον. For when the Mind, remembering the
Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another
Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of Time,
terminated by these two Now's, as by two Boundaries; and
thus is it enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or
even sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length
Aldi. p. 45, b.
between them—not however of *Space*, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize some Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, *but a natural Day*? And what is that, but pure *Time*? It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.*

And thus it is the Mind acquires the Idea of Time. But this Time it must be remembered is Past Time only, which is always the first Species, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of Time Future? The answer is, we acquire it by Anticipation. Should it be demanded still farther, And what is Anticipation? We answer, that in this
C. VII. this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I anticipate a similar succession from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights in futurity. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, in Time future.

We go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these natural Periods, but even in matters of human and civil concern. For example: Having observed in many past
past instances how health had succeeded C. VII. to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate future health to those, who, being now sickly, use exercise; and future sickness to those, who, being now healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of practical Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them the barren prospect of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those, who have had diviner assis-
C. VII. ances) we may justly say, as was said of old, 

He's the best Prophet, who conjectures well (f).

(f) Μάντις δ' ἀψίσις, ὅπες εἰκάζει χαλῶς.

So Milton.

Till old Experience do attain
To something like Prophetic Strain.

Et facile exsilmini potest, Prudentiam esse quodam-
modo Divinationem.


There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the
Mind or Intellect only, as the Future does, since
we can find no place for its existence any where else.
Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the
Past. For tho' it may have once had another kind of
being, when (according to common Phrase) it actually
was, yet was it then something Present, and not some-
thing Past. As Past, it has no existence but in the
Mind or Memory, since had it in fact any other, it
could not properly be called Past. It was this intimate
connection between Time, and the Soul, that made
some Philosophers doubt, whether if there was no Soul,
there could be any Time, since Time appears to have its
Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ἄνας ψυχῆς

Auclt. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments
the above passage, expresses himself more positively.
Εἰ τῶνν δι' χρῶς λέγεται τὸ ἀφίθμητον ἵτο τὸ ἀσιμέ-
μενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀφίθμητον ἰδιακὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐν-
ἐφείσω, ταύτα δὲ ἐν ἄν ὑποσαίνῃ, μὴ ὑστος τὸ ἀφίθμη-
σουτος
From what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of the Future comes from knowledge of the Past; as does knowledge of the Past from knowledge of the Present, so that their Order to us is that of Present, Past, and Future.

Of these Species of knowledge, that of the Present is the lowest, not only as first in perception, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all animal Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess Sensation. Knowledge of the Past comes next, which is superior to the former, as being confined to those animals, that have Memory as well as Sensés. Knowledge of the Future

\[\text{σωτηρ \ μήτε δυνάμει \ μήτε \ ένεσθεία, \ πανερόν \ ώς \ ούχ \ αὐτοῖ \ \δ' \ ξρόνος \ εἶν, \ μη} \ έισος \ ψυχὴς. \] Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid, etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de Anim. p. 94.
C. VII. *Future* comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse *

And now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

*See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.*
Again, the present Now may so far belong to Time of either sort, as to be the End of the past, and the Beginning of the future; but it cannot be included within the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the present Now included within the limits of the past Time AD.

In such case C D, part of the past Time AD, will be subsequent to C the present Now, and so of course be future. But by the Hypothesis it is past, and so will be both Past and Future at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a future Time, such as BE.

What then shall we say of such Times, as this Day, this Month, this Year, this
C. VII. Century, all which include within them the present Now? They cannot be past Times or future, from what has been proved; and present Time has no existence, as has been proved likewise *. Or shall we allow them to be present, from the present Now, which exists within them; so that from the presence of that we call these also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such Times present, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be a compound of the Past and the Future, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and jointly called Present, while that Now remains within them. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

\[ f \ldots X \quad A \quad B \quad C \quad D \quad E \quad Y \ldots g \]

let

* Sup. p. 104,
let us call a Day, or a Century; and let C.VII. the present Now or Instant exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, Time present. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY Time past, and still more so, when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY Time future; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became Time present. And thus it is that Time is present, while passing, in its present Now or Instant. It is the same indeed here, as it is in Space. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane in a single Point at once, while
while during the whole progression its parts absent are infinite (g).

From what has been said, we may perceive that all time, of every denomination,

(g) Place, according to the antients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe, because I am in England; in England, because in Wiltshire; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. Thus far Mediate Place. And what is my Immediate Place? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. 

Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to Time. The Present Century is present in the present Year; that, in the present Month; that, in the present Day; that, in the present Hour; that, in the present Minute. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at that real and indivisible instant, which by being itself the very Essence of the Present diffuses Presence throughout all.
Book the First.

Minoration, is divisible and extended. But if so, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for Time.

Now from the above doctrine of Time, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of Tenses.

The Tenses are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely with-

all even the largest of Times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemmides speaks much to the same purpose. Ἐνεστὸς ἢν χρόνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ. χρόνος μερίδος, ἐν παρελθόντος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεστὸς, ἕν διὰ τὴν πέρας τὸ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ γενικάσων, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς. Present Time therefore is that which adjoins to the real Now or Instant on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that real Now said to be Now also itself. Ἐπὶ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also Arist. Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.
C.VII. without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else definitely, in reference to such distinctions.

If indefinitely, then have we three Tenses, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If definitely, then have we three Tenses to mark the Beginnings of these three Times; three, to denote their Middles; and three to denote their Ends; in all Nine.

The three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

And thus it is, that the Tenses in their natural number appear to be twelve; three
three to denote *Time absolute*, and nine to denote it under its respective distinctions.

Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aorist of the Past.

'Εγραψα. *Scripsi.* I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράφω. *Scribam.* I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens sum.* I am writing.

Compleitive Present.

Γέγραφα. *Scripsi.* I have written.

Inceptive Past.

'Εμελλὼν γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I was beginning to write.
C. VII. Middle or extended Past.

'Εγράφων or ἐτύγχανον γράφων. Scribebam. I was writing.

Completive Past.

'Εγραφάιεν. Scripseram. I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. Scripturus ero. I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

'Εσομαι γράφων. Scribens ero. I shall be writing.

Completive Future.

'Εσομαι γραφώς. Scripsero. I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with Tenses.
Tenses, as with other affections of speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

In the first place, as to Aorists. Aorists are usually by Grammarians referred to the Past; such are ἤλθον, I went; ἐπέσον, I fell, &c. We seldom hear of them in the Future, and more rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present, past, or future, the Tense is an Aorist.

Thus
Thus Milton,

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep. P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (walk) means not that they were walking at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but ἄορίστω indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls Hypocrisy,

—the only Evil, that walks Invisible, except to God alone,

the Verb (walks) hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the Gnomologic kind, such as

Ad paenitendum properat, cito qui judicat.
Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte facit, &c.
All these Tenses are so many Aorists of the present.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise Aorists of the Future.

_Tu nihil admittes in te, formidine pæna._ Hor.

So too Legislative Sentences, _Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, &c._ for this means no one _particular_ future Time, but is a prohibition extended indefinitely to every part of Time future (_b_).

(b) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of Aorists. It has no peculiar Form even for an Aorist of the Past, and therefore (as Priscian tells us) the _Præteritum_ is forced to do the double duty both of that Aorist, and of the perfect Present, its application in particular instances being to be
C.VII. We pass from Aorists, to the inceptive tenses.

These may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar. \( \text{ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφω. Scripturum sum.} \) I am going to write. But the Latins go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called Inchoatives or Inceptives. Thus from Caleo, I am warm, comes Calesco, I begin to grow warm; from Tumeo, I swell, comes Tumesco, I begin to swell. These Inchoative Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the Beginnings of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its Completion, and thence be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that \text{feci} means (as the same author informs us) both \( \text{πεποίηκα} \) and \( \text{ποίησα} \), I have done it, and I did it; \text{vidi} both \( \text{σέβηκα} \) and \( \text{σέβομαι} \), I have just seen it, and I saw it once. \text{Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.}
therefore have neither Perfectum, Plus quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in Greek Ἐφετικά, in Latin Desiderativa, the Desideratives or Meditatives, which if they are not strictly Inceptives, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμήσειω, Bellaturio, I have a desire to make war; βρωσείω, Efurio, I long to eat. (i). And so much for the Inceptive Tenses.

The two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) the Middle Tenses (which express Time as extended and

(i) As all Beginnings have reference to what is future, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρωσω come πολεμήσειώ and βρωσείω; from Bellaturus and Esurus come Bellaturio and Efurio. See Macrobius, p. 691. Ed. Var. ἐ τῶν γε με νῦν ἐν ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ εποίησας γελάσας. Plato in Phaedone.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these middle Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.
and passing) and the Perfect or Complete, which express its Completion or End.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. Hoadly, and explained and confirmed by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his rational edition of Homer's Iliad. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in Scaliger, and by him (1) ascribed to † Grocinus, as its author. The learned Gaza

(1) Ex his percipimus Grocinum acuè admodum Tempora divisisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quae bifariam secat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: sic, Praeteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Praeteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Reče sanè. Et Praefens imperfec-
tum, Amo. Reče hæcennus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolut. At Praefens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè sentit, ita controversi-
sum est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: significat enim Amavo, amorem futurum & absolutum iri: Amabo perfor-
tionem nullam indicat. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

† His Name was William Grocin, an Englishman, contemporary with Erasminus, and celebrated for his learning. He went to Florence to study under Landin, and was Professor at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor. p. 205.
(who was himself a Greek, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner (m). What Apollonius hints, is exactly consonant (n).

Priestian

(m) The Present Tense (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεργοῦν ἄτελες, that which is now Instant and incomplete; the Perfectum, τὸ ἐρεμεληθὸς ἄρτι, ἄτελες τῷ ἐνεργοῖς, that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present; the Imperfectum, τὸ ἐρεμεληθεῖσαμένον ἄτελες τῷ ἐρεμεληθόν, the extended and incomplete part of the Past; and the Plusquam-Perfectum, τὸ ἐρεμεληθὸς πάλαι, ἄτελες τῷ ἐρεμεληθεῖσαμένῳ, that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the praeteritum. Gram. L. IV.

(n) Εντεύθεν δὲ ωθῆμεν, τοὶ δὲ συνεργοῦν συνέτελειαν σημαίνει τὸ συνεργαζόμενον, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεργοῖς

—Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but Present Completion. Apollon. L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle ἄν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted Potentiality or Contingence, would asfert (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this Perfectum, because this implied such a complete and indefasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a Contingent.

K
C.VII. Priscian too advances the same doctrine from the Stoics, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to Dialectic, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these Grammatical Speculations (o). Before

(o) By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was called the Imperfect Present, and the vulgar Præteritum, the Perfect Present, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear Priscian, from whom we learn these facts. Præsens tempus proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriiit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in praefenti, hoc est, in infantii. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriiit vel futura est.—Unde Stoici jure hoc tempus presens etiam Imperfectum vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriiit, transacta est, dext autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priores ejus parte scripta; cui adhuc dexte extrema pars, præsenti utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed Imperfectum est, quod dext adhuc versu, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nasceitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur Præterito Perfecto; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dice, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the Latin Per-
Before we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

And first, the Latins used their Præteritum Perfectum in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, Vixit, signified, is dead; Fuit, signified, now is not, is no more. It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the People of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catilinarian Conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum.

Perfектum, he says—sciemum tamen, quod Romam Præterito Perfecto non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Graecos ωφεξικεύοντες vocatur, quem Stoici ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro 'Aogίς accipitur, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.
C. VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice, *Vixerunt. So Virgil,  
--- || Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium & ingens  
Gloria Dardanidum---  Æn. II.  
And

* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim Dixerunt, i.e. they have done speaking. Ascon. Pæd. in Verr. II.

|| So Tribullus speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hae fucrunt olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,  
Prodigia indomitis merge sub aequoribus.  
Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

Let these Events have been in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But henceforth let them be no more.

So Eneas in Virgil prays to Phæbus.  
Hac Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta.  

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, and its inhabitants,) have so far followed us. By implication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic fit Finis, as Servius well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the Tense, but of the Mood, the Prepositive or Imperative, not in the Future but in the Past. See p. 154, 155, 156.
And again,

—Locus Ardea quondam

Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet

Ardea nomen,

* Sed fortuna fuit—Æn. VII.

The reason of these significations is derived from the compleitive Power of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of Contraries. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say, hath lived, or, hath been, has the same meaning with, is Dead, or, is no more.

K 3

* Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:

Cumque nibil spes firmius esse, fuit.


Sive erimus, seu nos Fata fuisse volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.
C.VII. It is remarkable in *Virgil, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this complete and perfect Present with the extended and passing Present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of Time, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

——*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens Scorpios, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere fera—— G. I.

Præsertim fæ tempestas a vertice sylvâ. Incubuit, glomeratque fœrens incendia ventus.

G. II.

——illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ, Ad terram fugit, & portu fæ condidit alto.

Æn. V.


He hath his Shield redeem’d, and forth his Sword he draws.
In the same manner he joins the same two modifications of Time in the Past, that is to say, the complete and perfect Past with the extended and passing.

—Inruerant Danai, & teëtum omne tenebant.  
Æn. II.

Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosae  
Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis aütri.
Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-  
tumque
Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus  
iras (p).  
Æn. VIII.

As

(p) The Intention of Virgil may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into English.

—Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpios, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.
For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws, and hath already left thee more than a just portion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting Augustus among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made him more than room enough, yet he still...
C.VII. As to the Imperfectum, it is sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus surgebat and scribēbat signify not only, he was rising, he was writing, but upon occasion they signify, he used to rise, he used to write. The reason of this is, that whatever is customary, must be something which has been frequently repeated. But what has been frequently repeated, must needs require an Extension of Time past, and thus we fall insensibly into the Tense here mentioned.

Again,

continues to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read relinquuit; but reliquit has the authority of the celebrated Medicean manuscript.

—Ilia noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, continues flying to land, and is hid within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those spectators, who had gone out to
Again, we are told by Pliny (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it pendenti titulo, in a suspenseive kind of Inscription, and employed for that purpose the Tenea here mentioned. It was Ἀτελανής ἔποιει, Ἀπelles faciebat, Πολυκλεῖτος ἔποιει, Polycletus faciebat, and never ἐποίησε or fecit. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished (q).

see the Ship-race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within.

—Inrueant Danai, & τειτομ omne tenebant.

The Greeks had entered and were then possessing the whole House; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession continued still.

(q) Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I. The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the
It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the Latins derive these tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the passing Present come the passing Past, and Future. Scribo, Scribem, Scribam. From the perfect Present come the perfect Past, and Future. Scripsi, Scripsieram, Scripsero. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from Fero come Ferebam and Feram; from Tuli come Tuleram and Tuleron.

We shall conclude by observing, that the Order of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already.

the antient Artifts used the same Tenfe. Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of Demofthenes.
ready (r). Hence it is, that the Present C.VII. Tense stands first; then the Past Tenses; and lastly the Future.

And now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time indefinitely; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleative) we here finish the subject of Time and Tenses, and proceed to consider the Verb in other Attributes, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—Ordo autem (Temporum seu.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præterit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in anima: quandobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quae memorïa prædita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caufl. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.

CHAP.
C. VIII. 

WE have observed already (a) that the Soul's leading powers are those of Perception and those of Volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all Speech or Discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain Perception, or a certain Volition. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a different part, or after a different manner, hence I say the variety of Modes or Moods (b).

(a) See Chapter II.

(b) Gaza defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βελημνα, ιτι ειν πωθεμα ψυχης, δια φωνης σημαινομεν—a Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice, or Sound articulate. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is Apollo-
If we simply declare, or indicate some thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Perception or Volition, it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the Declarative or Indicative.

A Perception.

—Nosco crinis, incanaque menta
Regis Romani— Virg. Æn. VI.

A Volition.

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
Corpora— Ovid. Metam. I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something possible only, and in the number of

C.VIII. Contingents, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the Potential; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, haberet
Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

Yet sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only subjoined to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the End, or final Cause; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

Ut jugulento homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. Hor.

Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.
Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the Declarative or Indicative Mode; but as to their cutting men’s throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly ever it may be the End of their rising, it is still but a Contingent, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but the Subjunctive.

But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some Perception informed, or some Volition gratified. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we interrogate, it is the Interrogative Mode; if we require, it is the Requisitive. Even the Requisitive itself hath its subordinate Species: With respect to inferiors, it is an Imperative Mode; with respect to
C. VIII. equals and superiors, it is a Precative or Optative*.

And thus have we established a variety of Modes; the Indicative or Declarative, to assert what we think certain; the Potential, for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent; the Interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us Information; and the Requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions. The Requisitive too appears under two distinct Species, either as it is Imperative to inferiors, or Precative to superiors (c).

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with—Sing, Muse, the Wrath,—when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. ἐφικτήσας οἰκειόνος, ἐπιτατέ. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of Modes in great measure depend on the Species of Sentences. The Stoics increased the number of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many
As therefore all these several Modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain

many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret. p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Affertive. There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Affertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the ιδος ηλθικόν, but the Stoics more properly προσαγω-

γευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. Ammonius and Boethius, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from Homer and Virgil, after the following manner.
certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled

Boethius's Account is as follows. 

**Perfectarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt:**

- **Deprecativa, ut,**
  *Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,*
  *Da diende auxilium, Pater, atque haec omina firma.*

- **Imperativa, ut,**
  *Vade age, Natae, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.*

- **Interrogativa, ut,**
  *Dies mihi, Damata, cujum pecus?*—

- **Vocativa, ut,**
  *O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque extera potestas.*

- **Enuntiativa, in quâ Veritas vel Falstas inventur,**
  *Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.*
  Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.
enabled by our discourse to signify them, one to another. And hence those various Modes or Moods, of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than "so many "literal Forms, intended to express these "natural Distinctions" (d).

In Milton the same Sentences may be found, as follows. The Precative,

—Universal Lord! be bounteous still
To give us only Good—

The Imperative,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

The Interrogative,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?

The Vocative,

—Adam, earth's ballow'd Mold,
Of God inspir'd—

The Assertive or Enunciative,

The conquer'd also and enslav'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The Greek Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,
C.VIII. All these Modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the Syllabic and the Temporal. The Latin, which is but a Species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the Auxiliar, sum. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the English Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from Write cometh Wrote; from Give, Gave; from Speak, Spake, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. Do, Am, Have, Shall, Will, May, and Can; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I am writing,
the Soul and its Affections. Their C. VIII. Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, as follows.

The Requisitive and Interrogative Modes are distinguished from the Indicative and Potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a Return, to the two former it is always necessary.

If we compare the Requisitive Mode with the Interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the Return, but in other Peculiarities.

The

ing, I have written; sometimes two together, as, I have been writing, I should have written; sometimes no less than three, as I might have been lost, he could have been preserved. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the Genius of the English Language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, intitled, A Short Introduction to English Grammar.
C.VIII. The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds. To the request of Dido to Eneas—

—a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis

Insidias Danâum—

the proper Return was in Words, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—date obolum Belisario—the proper Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to the Interrogative, the Return is necessarily made in Words alone, in Words, which are called a Response or Answer, and which are always actually or by implication some definitive assertive Sentence. Take Examples. Whose Verses are these?—the Return is a Sentence—These are Verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy Man?—the Return is a Sentence—Brutus was a worthy Man.

And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the
the near affinity of this Interrogative Mode with the Indicative, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form \((e)\), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent \((f)\).

\(_{\text{But}}\)

\((e)\) "Ἡν ἐν προκειμένη ὁρισμῇ ἔννοιαι, τὴν ἐνε-ρέσειν κατάφασιν ἀποθάλλουσα, μεθίσαται τῷ καλε-σθαι ὁρισμῇ—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποσχέθει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὁρισμῇ. The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Character. Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, Introd. Gram. L. IV.

\((f)\) It may be observed of the Interrogative, that as often as the Interrogation is simple and definite, the Response may be made in almost the same Words, by
But to return to our comparison between the Interrogative Mode and the Requisitive.

by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—Are these Verses of Homer?—Response—These Verses are of Homer. Are those Verses of Virgil?—Response—These are not Verses of Virgil. And here the Artificers of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we say—Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?—much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general—Whose are these Verses?—we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance
The Interrogative (in the language of Grammarians) has all Persons of inftance—Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's? (1.) They are Homer's—(2.) They are not Homer's—(3.) They are Virgil's—(4.) They are not Virgil's—we may add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interrogations go flill farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For inftance—Whose are these Verses? We may answer affirmatively—They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.—or negatively—They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and fo on, either way, to infinity. How then fhould we learn from a fingle Yes, or a fingle No, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which muft be always answered by a Sentence. Yet even here Cuftom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the single effential characteriflic Word, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the reft, which reft the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?—we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.
C.VIII. of both Numbers. The Requissive or Imperative has no first Person of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in Modes for a person to request or give commands to himself, as it is in Pronouns, for the speaker to become the subject of his own address *

Again, we may interrogate as to all Times, both Present, Past, and Future. Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will discover the Longitude?—But Intreating and Commanding (which are the essence of the

The Antients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called 'Ερωτημα, Interrogatio; the complex, ἡσυχ, Percon- tatio. Ammonius calls the first of these 'Ερωτησις δια- λεξική; the other, 'Ερωτησις ψυχρατική. See Am. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 160. Dig. Laert. VII. 66. Quinct. Infl. IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.
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Requisitive Mode) have a necessary respect to the Future (g) only. For indeed what

(g) Apollonius’s Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. 'Επὶ γὰρ μὴ γινόμενοι ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἢ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΙΣ τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἔπιτηθειότητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἐσι. A Command has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the Future. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—’Απαντα τὰ προσακλινὰ ἐκείμενα ἔχει τὴν τὰ μέλλοντας διάθεσιν—χρῆτον γὰρ ἐν ᾿Ισώ ἐστὶν, ὃ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνα ἔννοιαν τῇ ἔκκλιτει διηλαξάς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσακλινὸν, τὸ δὲ ὑφίσταν. All Imperatives have a disposition within them, which respects the Future—with regard therefore to Time, it is the same thing to say, Let him, that kills a Tyrant, be honoured, or, he, that kills one, shall be honoured; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is Imperative, the other Indicative or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Present to be
C. VIII. what have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

be nothing else than an immediate Future, as opposed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitute videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperannus, quæ vel in praæenti statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatatione, vel in futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the Perfectum, and of the two Aorists. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are used to insinuate such a Speed of execution, that the deed should be (as it were) done, in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our English Imperative, Be gone, and those others of, Go, or Be going. The first (if we please) may be styled the Imperative of the Perfectum, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be styled Imperatives of the Future, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

It is thus Apollonius, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between σκαψάτω τας αμπέλινας, Go to digging the Vines, and σκαψάτω τας αμπέλινας, Get the Vines dug.
It is from this connection of Futurity C.VIII. with Commands, that the Future Indicative is sometimes used for the Imperative, and that to say to any one, You shall do this, has often the same force with the Imperative, Do this. So in the Decalogue—Thou shalt not kill—Thou shalt not bear false witness.

dug. The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς ἔπατασιν, by way of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εἰς συντελείωσιν, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σκάπτε and Σκάψον, he says of the last, ή μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον ἄροσάσει, ἀλλὰ γ’ τὸ γινόμενον εἰς ἔπατασει ἀπαγορεύει, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an Extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to haften him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΦΕ, Write (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΥΩΝ, Get your writing done; make no delays. See Apoll. L. III. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Grec. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non estimaverunt, &c.
C. VIII. Witness—which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the Potential Mode, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its subordinate or subjunctive Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the Requisitive and Interrogative, by implying a kind of feeble and weak Assertion, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falsity. Thus, if it be said potentially, This may be, or, This might have been, we may remark without absurdity, It is true, or It is false. But if it be said, Do this, meaning, Fly to Heaven, or, Can this be done? meaning, to square the Circle, we cannot say in either case, it is true or it is false, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the Potential does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a dubious and conjectural Assertion,
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Assertion, whereas that of the Indicative C. VIII. is absolute, and without reserve.

This therefore (the Indicative I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of Time, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various Past Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its Futures is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its Present Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish necessary Truth; that Truth, which from its nature only ex-ists
C.VIII. *is in the Present*; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one (b).

Through

(b) See the quotation, Note (c) Chapter the Sixth.

*Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a Roman of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as Themistius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing in Time and not in Time, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

"The things, that exist in Time, are those whose Existence Time can measure. But if their Existence may be measured by Time, then there may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable
THROUGH all the above Modes, with their respective Tenses, the Verb being capable of being numbered. And hence it is that things temporary have their Existence, as it were limited by Time; that they are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they all submit to its power, according to those common Phrases, that Time is a destroyer; that things decay through Time; that men forget in Time, and lose their abilities, and seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time always attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Motion is to put something, which now is, out of that state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that state.

The reverse of all this holds with things that exist eternally. These exist not in Time, because Time is so far from being able to measure their Existence, that no Time can be assumed, which their Existence doth not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolution.

To instance in examples of either kind of Being. There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, that the Diameter of the square is commensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was there
C.VIII. considered as denoting an Attribute, has always reference to some Person, or Substance. Thus if we say, Went, or, Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have gone, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero went; Cæsar might have gone; whither goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor! But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—To eat is pleasant; but

"ever a Time, when it was not incommensurable, as "it is certain there was a Time, when there was no "Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it daily growing less "incommensurable, as we are assured of Decays in both "those maifly Structures?" From these unchangeable Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the unceasing Intelle6ion of the universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See Nat. Ausf. L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, &c. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII. The following Paflage may deserve Attention.

but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, To eat, and, To fast, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the Latin and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, Infinitives. Sanctius has given them the name of Imper-personals; and the Greeks that of ἄνερευς-φατα, from the same reason of their not discovering either Person or Number.

These Infinitives go farther. They not only lay aside the character of Attributes, but they also assume that of Substantives, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several Attributes. Thus in the instance above, Pleasant is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, To Eat; Wholesome the attribute attending the Infinitive, To Fast. Examples in Greek and Latin of like kind are innumerable.

* Dulce & decorum est pro patria mori. *

* Scire tuum nihil est — *

M. 2

'Ou
The Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they

(i) It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes ὧνομα ῥηματικόν, a VERBAL NOUN; sometimes ὧνομα ῥήματος, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spencer,

For not to have been dip't in Lethe lake,
Could save the Son of Thetis from to die—

ἀνι ἐν τῷ Ἑνειν. In like manner we say, He did it, to be rich, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, For. He did it, for to be rich, the same as if we had said, He did it for gain—ἐνεκ αὐ τῷ ἔλευθεν, ἐνεκ αὐ τῷ κέρδος—in French, pour s'enrichir. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βάλομαι, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἔλευθεν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES, τὴν "φιλο-
they held this alone to be the genuine C.VIII. PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the Infinitives, Πεπτατεύ, Ambulare, To walk, mean simply that energy, and nothing more. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, superadd certain Affections, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus Ambulo and Ambula mean not simply To walk, but mean, I walk, and, Walk Thou.

And

ϕιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἕπερ τοῦ πλατών. Thus too Priscian, speaking of Infinitives—CURRENEM enim est Cursus; & Scribere, Scriptura; & Legere, Lectio. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, hic est.

And soon after— Cum enim dico, Bonum est legere, nihil aliud signifício, nifi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza Gram. L. IV. Το δε άπαξεμφατον, ὄνομα εις φόρμας τος κ. τ. λ.

12
And hence they are all of them resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. Ambulo, I walk; this is, Indico me ambulare, I declare myself to walk. Ambula, Walk Thou; that is, Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the Assertion, the Command, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than the MERE INFINITIVE, which (as Priscian says) significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum (k).

(k) See Apollon. L. III. 13. Кαθότας δαν χαρακτή-
μένον ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See also Gaza, in the note before. Igitur a Constructione quaque Vimarrei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possimus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alias verbi motus. Itaque omnes modi mone, id est, Infinitivum, transfumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From these Principles Apollonius calls the Infinitive 'Fnma γενικωτατων, and Priscian, Verbum generale.
The application of this Infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those Verbs, that denote any Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say ἄφελομένω ζῆν, Cupio vivere, I desire to live; but not to say ἔσθω ζῆν, Edō vivere, or even in English, I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of I eat for to live; as we say ἐνέκα τῷ ζῆν, or pour vivre. The reason is, that though different Actions may unite in the same Subject, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, He walked and discoursed) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to Volitions, and Actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the Volition is unintelligible, till the Action be expressed. Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect.
C. VIII. We must help them then by Infinitives, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see. Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment, as in syntax (l).

And so much for Modes, and their several Species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be expressed under positive assertions, and as positive

(1) Priscian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, Verba Voluntativa; they are called in Greek Προσωπητικα. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see Apollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat. p. 685. Ed. Var.

Nec omne àπαγόμεναν quinque Verba, &c.
fitive assertions only belong to the Indicative, we may denominate it for that reason the Mode of Science (m). Again, as the Potential is only conversant about Contingents, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, the Mode of Conjecture. Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming Proficients; hence we may call the Interrogative, the Mode of Proficiency.

Inter cuncta leges, & percontabere doctos,

Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,

Quid purè tranquillet, &c. Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the Requisitive Mode is legislative

C. VIII. gislative command, we may stile it for this reason the Mode of Legislature. Ad Divos adeunto caste, says Cicero in the character of a Roman law-giver; Be it therefore enacted, say the laws of England; and in the same Mode speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this Mode that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish.

There are other supposed affections of Verbs, such as Number and Person. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the Number and Person of every Substantive, that we may know
know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of Sex, with respect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Beings male or female, tho' Substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex (n). We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind,

(n) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as Sanctius, should justly deny Genders, or the distinction of Sex to Adjectives, and yet make Persons appertain, not to Substantives, but to Verbs. His commentator Perizonius is much more consistent, who says—At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maximè, imè unicè ineft ipsa Persona; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina plane sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantivae, quibus solis autor (Sanctius scil. L. I. c. 7.) & rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis. Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.

There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of Sex and Person. There are but two Sexes, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two Persons (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed. The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.
HERMES.

C. VIII. as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials (o) of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is the Difference of Verbs, as to their several Species, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(o) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (b) of this chapter, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. John Petvin, Vicar of Ilfington in Devon, a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

CHAP.
CHAP. IX.

Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining Properties.

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called, Ch.IX. denote (a) Energies. Now as all Energies are Attributes, they have reference of course to certain energizing Substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as Men, Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some Subject. For example, if we say, Brutus loves—we must needs supply—loves Cato, Cassius,

(a) We use this word Energy, rather than Motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Privation. See before, p. 94, 95.
Ch. IX. Cæsius, Portia, or some one. The Sword wounds—i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is active, and a Subject which is passive. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a Verb active.—Thus we say Brutus amat, Brutus loves. On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call a Verb passive.—Thus we say, Portia amatatur, Portia is loved. It is in like manner that the same Road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is Ascent, with respect to the foot is Descent. Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference
But to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. Brutus loved Portia.—Here Brutus is the Energizer; loved, the Energy; and Portia, the Subject. But it might have been, Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the Roman Republic; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say Brutus loved himself, flew himself, &c. in such Case the Energy hath to the same being a double Relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See Sancl. Min. L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. r. L. IV. c. 3. Priscian. L. XVIII. p. 1134. Apell. L. III. sub fin. In which places the reader will see a proper Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.
Ch. IX. among the Greeks to that species of Verbs, called Verbs middle (c), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (fe or himself) is expressed like other accusatives.

Again, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy always keeps within the Energizer, and never passes out to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, Caesar walketh, Caesar sitteth, it is impossible

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(c) Τὰ γὰρ παλάμενα μεσότητος χῶματα συνέμεθ-\(\text{ωσιν} \) ἀνεδεχατο ἐνέγευσις καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως. The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the middle verb explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic Kusler, entitled, De vero Ufu Verborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.
ble the Energy should pass out (as in the case of those Verbs called by the Gram-
marians Verbs transitive) because both the Energizer and the Passive Sub-
ject are united in the same Person. For what is the cause of this walking or sit-
ting?—It is the Will and Vital Powers belonging to Cæsar. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to sit?—It is the Body and Limbs belonging also to the same Cæsar. It is this then forms that species of Verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call Verbs neuter, as if indeed they were void both of Action and Passion, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to imply both. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their Energizer always discover their passive Subject (c), which other Verbs

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happy express by the Terms, 'Αυτοτρόπα and 'Ιδιοτρόπα, which Priscian renders, quæ ex se in se ipsa sit intrinsecus Passio. L. VIII. 790. Consentii Ars apud Pufch. p. 2051.
It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Acutives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the Form of Neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere Energy or Affection only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, ἐὰν οἶδεν ἀναγνωστεῖν ἅτος, This Man knows not how to read, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, ἐὰν οἶδεν ἀναγνώστειν τῇ 'Ομήρῳ, He knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero, &c.

Thus Horace,

 Qui cupit aut metuit, iuvat illum scribunt suos aut res,

Ut liquam pie pie tabula—

*He that desires or fears* (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these
that *Verbs Active* require an *Accusative*, while *Neuters* require none.

Of the above species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. The *Species of Verbs* therefore remaining are the *Active*, the *Passive* and the *Neuter*, and those seem essential to all languages whatever *(d)*.

*these affections prevail* has the same joy in a *House or Estate*, as the *Man with bad Eyes* has in fine *Pictures*. So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic Epistle* of, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, where two *Actives* we see follow one *Neuter* in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the *rapid Sequel of the Event*. Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apol. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.*

*(d) The *Stoics*, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.*
Ch. IX. There remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of Energy.

When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some Noun, made without farther help a perfect affactive Sentence, as Ἀφικάτος ἔρπτατεί, Socrates walketh; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγόρημα, a Predicate; or else, from its readiness συμβάνειν, to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβαμα, a Co-incider.

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect affactive Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun, but under some oblique Case, as Ἀφικάτει μεταφέλει, Socrates panteth: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Παρασύμβαμα or Παρακατηγόρημα.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other Noun under an oblique Case, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, Plato loveth Dio, (where without Dio or some other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite:)
Energy and Motion. But there are some Ch. IX.
which appear to denote nothing more, than a mere simple Adjective, joined to an
Assertion. Thus isāze in Greek, and
Equalleth in English, mean nothing more

nite:) Such Verb, from this Defect, they called ήτλου
ή σύμεβαμα, or ή κατηγόρημα, something less than a Co-
incider, or less than a Predicable.

Lastly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique
Cases, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we
say Σωράτει Αλκιέαδις μέλει, Tadet me Vite, or the
like: Such Verb they called ήτλου, or έλατλου ή χαρα-
σύμεβαμα, or ή χαρακατηγόρημα, something less than
an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable.

These were the Appellations which they gave to
Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the form-
ing of Propositions. As to the Name of 'PHMA, or
Verb, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the
Infinitive, as we have shewn already. See page 164.
See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon.
de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs
Neuter are Συμεβαμα; Verbs Active, ήτλονα ή συμ-
εβαμα.
Ch. IX., than $\dot{\theta} \dot{\varepsilon} \varepsilon\varepsilon_{\eta}$, is equal. So Albeo in Latin is no more than albus sum.

-Campique ingentes ossibus albent. Virg.

The same may be said of Tumeo. Mons tumet, i.e. tumidus est, is timid. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

Fluctus uti primo capit cum allescere Vento. Virg.

-Freto ponti
Incipient agitata tumescere. Virg.

There are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in Abstract Nouns (such as Whiteness from White, Goodness from Good) as also in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attributive is converted into a Substantive; here the Substantive on the contrary is converted into an Attributive. Such are Kωλίς from κωλύω, to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cy-
Book the First.

...nic; ὕλππτιζεν from ὕλππτε, to Philip-... Ch. IX.

pize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla, to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperor, by way of counsel to himself —οὐκ ἀποκεισμένος, beware thou beest not be Cæsar'd; as though he said, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle into a mere Cæsar (e). In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

Sternhold himself be Out-Sternholded.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bishop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he out-bonner'd even Bonner himself.*

And so much for that Species of Attributes, called Verbs in the strictest Sense,
Concerning those other Attributives,
Participles and Adjectives.

Ch. X. THE nature of Verbs being understood, that of Participles is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an Attribute; of Time; and of an Assertion. Now if we take away the Assertion, and thus destroy the Verb, there will remain the Attribute and the Time, which make the essence of a Participle. Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb, Γράφει, Writeth, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, Writing, which (without the Assertion) denotes the same Attribute, and the same Time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the Assertion, we discover Γράψε in Εγράψε, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuse to refer to the Greek, as being of all languages
the most complete, as well in this respect, as in others.

And so much for Participles (a).

(a) The Latins are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in or, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in O, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as Scribens, and Scripturus) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as Scriptus) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as Scribendus and Docendus for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for γραψας they say, cum scripsisset—for γραφόμενος, dum scribitur, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The English Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Lan-
The nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of *Adjectives* becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an * Assertion*; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time*; and an *Adjective* only implies an *Attribute*; that is to say, in other Words, an *Adjective* has no *Assertion*, and only denotes such an *Attribute*, as has not its essence either in *Motion* or its *Privation*. Thus in general the *Attributes* of quantity, quality, and relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*,

Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few *Traces*, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*; for, *he was driven*; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a *Verb* is absurdly used to supply the proper *Participle*, without any necessity from the want of such *Word*. 
It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of Motion, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo, tumeo, ἵππω*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives.* It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *doctus* in Latin, and *learned* in English, lose their power, as Participles, and mean a Person posseessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not a man now speaking, but a man, who possesses the habit of speaking, whether he speak or no. So when we say in English, he is a *thinking Man,* an *understanding Man,* we mean not a person, whose mind is *in actual Energy,*
Energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in natural species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already (b) in the Instances of Φίλιππίζειν, Syllaturire, Ἀποκαθαιρέω, and others, how Substantives may be transformed into Verbal Attributives. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into Adjectives. When we say the party of Pompey, the stile of Cicero, the philosophy of Socrates,
in these cases the party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons, whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then they actually pass into Attributes, and assume, as such, the form of Adjectives. And thus it is we say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian stile, and the Socratic philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of Brass, we say, a brazen Trumpet; for a Crown of Gold, a golden Crown, &c. Even Pronominal Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the Book of Me, of Thee, and of Him, we say, My Book, Thy Book, and His Book; instead of saying the Country of Us, of You, and of Them, we say, Our Country, Your Country, and Their Country, which Words may be called so many Pronominal Adjectives.
[Ch. X.] It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex (c). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote Attributes; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as never properly denoting Substances. But of this we have spoken before (d).

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(c) Sup. p. 171.
(d) Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.
The Attributives hitherto treated, Ch. X, that is to say, Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives, may be called Attributives of the first Order. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed Attributives of the second Order, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.
Concerning Attributives of the Second Order.

As the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote the Attributes of Substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the Attributes only of Attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind—when we say, Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote; in these instances the Attributives, eloquent, and wrote, are immediately referable to the substantives, Cicero, Virgil, &c. As therefore denoting the Attributes of Substances, we call them Attributives of the First Order. But when we say, Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably; in
in these instances, the Attributives, Mo-
derately, Exceedingly, Indifferently, Ad-
mirably, are not referable to Substantives,
but to other Attributives, that is, to the
words, Eloquent, and Wrote. As there-
fore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we
call them Attributives of the se-
cond order.

Grammarians have given them the
Name of Ἐπιρρήματα, Adverbia, Ad-
verbs. And indeed if we take the word
Ῥῆμα, or, Verb, in its most comprehensive
Signification, as including not only Verbs
properly so called, but also Participles and
Adjectives [an usage, which may be justi-
fied by the best authorities (a)] we shall
find

(a) Thus Aristotle in his Treatise de Interpretatione,
instances "Ἀνθρώπος as a Noun, and Λέονος as a Verb.
So Ammonius—κατὰ τὸν τὸ σημαίνομενον, τὸ μὲν
ΚΑΛΟΣ ἥ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ἥ ὁσα τοιαύτα—ῬΗΜΑΤΑ
λέγεσθαι ἥ ἐκ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signifi-
cation (that is of denoting the Attributes of Substance
O
and
find the name, \( \text{E}^{\pi}\text{i} \text{p}^{\eta} \text{m}^{\alpha} \), or Adverb, to be a very just appellation, as denoting a Part of Speech, the natural appendage of Verbs. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an Adverb can no more subsist without its Verb, than a Verb can subsist without its Substantive. It is the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid Body \( (b) \).

Among

and the Predicate in Propositions) the words, Fair, Just, and the like, are called Verbs, and not Nouns. Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arist. de Interp. L. I. c. i. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note \(^{(a)} \) p. 87.

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the Participle. Nam Participium communerantes Verbis, Participiale Verbum vocabant vel Casuale. Priscian, L. I. p. 574.

\( (b) \) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the same Genus with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) and of explaining it to be the Verb’s Epithet or Adjective (by
Among the Attributes of Substance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, a white Garment, a high Mountain. Now some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, a Garment exceedingly white; a Mountain tolerably high.

(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an Adverb, as follows—μέτος λόγος ἄπιωτον, κατὰ ρήματος λεγόμενον, ἥ ἐπιλεγόμενον ρήματι, κ' ὀν εἰπθετον ρήματος. A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an Adjective, since its principal sometimes has cases, as in Valdè Sapiens; sometimes has none, as in Valdè amat.) Priscian's definition of an Adverb is as follows—Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabils, cujus significatione Verbis adjunctur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativos nominibus adjuneta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says—Etiam Adverbia Nominibus vel Verbis connumerabant, et quae adjectiva Verborum nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also Apoll. de Synt.
L. I. c. 3. sub fin.
high, or moderately high. It is plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, Intension, and Remission. The Greeks have their ἐναμασῶς, μάλιστα, πάντα, ζημία; the Latins their valdè, vehementer, maximè, satis, mediocriter; the English their greatly, vastly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.

Further than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be compared together. Thus if the Garment A be exceedingly White, and the Garment B be moderately White, we may say, the Garment A is more white than the Garment B.

In these instances the Adverb More not only denotes Intension, but relative Intension. Nay we stop not here. We
not only denote Intension merely relative but relative Intension, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say the Mountain A is more high than the Mountain B, but that it is the most high of all Mountains. Even Verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple Intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following Example—Fame he loveth more than Riches, but Virtue of all things be loveth most—the Words more and most denote the different comparative Intensions of the Verbal Attributive, Loveth.

And hence the rise of Comparison, and of its different Degrees; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote Simple Excels, and one to denote Superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited Number, when in all subjects,
Ch. XI. susceptible of Intension, the intermediate
Excesses are in a manner infinite? There
are infinite Degrees of *more* White, be-
tween the *first Simple White*, and the *Su-
perlative, White*st; the same may be said
of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute,
&c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about
three such Degrees, which they call the
Positive, the Comparative, and the Super-
lative, must needs be absurd; both be-
cause in their Positive there is † no Com-
parison at all, and because their Superla-
tive is a Comparative, as much as their Com-
parative itself. Examples to evince
this may be found everywhere. *Socrates
was the most wise of all the Athenians—
Homer was the most sublime of all
Poets.*

—*Cagit et Ripheus, justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris*—

Virg.

† *Qui (seil. Gradus Positivis) quoniam perfectus est,*
a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Con-
sentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.
It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the simple, as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative Nature, and only retain their intensive. Thus in the Degree, denoting simple Excess,

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nintentes. 

Rusticior Paulo est—

In the Superlative this is more usual. Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man,—that is to say, not the bravest and most learned Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an eminent Degree.

The Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of More fair, they say FAIRER; instead of Most fair, FAIREST, and the same holds
This Practice however has reached no farther than to Adjectives, or at least to Participles, sharing the nature of Adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure; as when we say, a Circular Table, a Quadrangular Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, partaking the same Figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting definite Quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot Rule
A cannot be more a two-foot Rule, than any other of the same length. Twenty Lions cannot be more twenty than twenty Flies. If A and B be both triple, or quadruple to C, they cannot be more triple, or more quadruple, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no Comparison without Intension and Remission; there can be no Intension and Remission in things always definite; and such are the Attributives, which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative Degrees. A Mountain cannot be said more to Be, or to Exist, than a Mole-hill, but the More and Less must be sought for in their Quantities. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called more a Lion, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species
Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are more bulky, more strong, &c. the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite—that Substance is not susceptible of More and Less (c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of Quantity continuous; Once, Twice, Thrice, are Adverbs of Quantity discrete; More and Most, Less and Least, to which may be added Equally, Proportionally, &c.
are Adverbs of Relation. There are Ch. XI. others of Quality, as when we say, Honestly industrious, Prudently brave, they fought bravely, be painted finely, a Portico formed Circularly, a Plain cut Triangularly, &c.

And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same Essence, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ Honest, Honestly, and Honestly. The Answer is, they are in Essence the same, but they differ, in as much as Honest is the Attributive of a Substantive; Honestly, of a Verb; and Honestly, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the Power of a Substantive, so as to stand by itself.

The Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to Verbs of every Species; but there
there are some which are peculiar to Verbs properly so called, that is to say, to such as denote Motion or Energy, with their Privations. All Motion and Rest imply Time and Place, as a kind of necessary Coincidents. Hence then, if we would express the Place or Time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of Place, as when we say, he stood there; he went hence; he travelled far, &c.: of Time, as when we say, he stood then; he went afterward; he travelled formerly, &c. Should it be asked—why Adverbs of Time, when Verbs have Tenses? The Answer is, tho' Tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote Yesterday, To-day, Tomorrow, Formerly, Lately, Just now, Now, Immediately, Presently, Soon, Hereafter, &c.? It was this then that made the
the Temporal Adverbs necessary, over and above the Tenses.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the Intensions and Remissions peculiar to Motion, such as speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c. as also Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions, such as ἄνω and ὑπάρχω from ἄνα and ὑπάρκω, in English upward and downward, from up and down. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, CIRCA equitat, he rides about; PROPE cecidit, he was near falling; Verum ne post conseras culpam in me, But do not after lay the blame on me (d).

There

There are likewise Adverbs of Interrogation, such as Where, Whence, Whether, How; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their Interrogative power, they assume that of a Relative, so as even to represent the Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun. Thus Ovid,

\[
\text{Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit—}
\]

translated in our old English Ballad,

\[
\text{And Corn doth grow, where Troy town stood.}
\]

That is to say, Seges est in eo loco, in quo, &c. Corn groweth in that place, in which, &c. the power of the Relative, being implied in the Adverb. Thus Terence,

\[
\text{Hujusmodi nibi res semper comminiscere,}
\]
\[
\text{ubi me excarnusices— Heaut. IV. 6.}
\]

where ubi relates to res, and stands for quibus rebus.
Book the First.

It is in like manner that the Relative Ch. XI. Pronoun upon occasion becomes an Interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace,

Quem Virum aut Heroo lyrâ, vel acri Tibiâ sumes celebrare, Clio?

So Milton,

Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

The reason of all this is as follows. The Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, Relatives. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an Interrogation, to a Subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown,
HERMES.

Ch. XI. known, and which it is expected that the Answer should express and ascertain,

Who first seduced them?—

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' unknown, the Pronoun, Who, has a reference.

Th' infernal Serpent—

Here in the Answer we have the Subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) as much a Relative, as if it had been said originally, without any Interrogation at all, It was the Infernal Serpent, who first seduced them.

And thus is it that Interrogatives and Relatives mutually pass into each other.

And so much for Adverbs, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all Attributives. We have likewise attempted
tempted to explain their general Nature, which we have found to consist in being the Attributes of Attributes. There remains only to add, that Adverbs may be derived from almost every Part of Speech; from Prepositions, as when from After we derive Afterwards—from Particles, and through these from Verbs, as when from Know we derive Knowing, and thence Knowingly; from Scio, Sciens, and thence Sciento—from Adjectives, as when from Virtuous and Vicious, we derive Virtuously and Viciously—from Substantives, as when from Πίθηκος, an Ape, we derive Πίθηκειον βλέπειν, to look Apishly; from Λέων, a Lion, Λεοντωδής, Leoninely—nay even from Proper Names, as when from Socrates and Demosthenes, we derive Socratically and Demosthenically. It was Socratically reasoned, we say; it was Demosthenically spoken *.

Of

* Aristotle has Κυκλοπικώς Cyclopically, from Κυκλώψ a Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X. 9.
Ch. XI. Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina, Sisenniter from Sisenna, Tullianè from Tullius, &c. (e).

Nor are they thus extensive only in Derivation, but in Signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f), that Adverbs may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal Genera. The Stoics too called the Adverb by the name of Παιδείας, and that from a view to the same multiform Nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata per fatiram, concessa sibi rerum variâ potèstate. It is thus that Sosipater explains the


(f) — διὸ ὅτι ἀμείνον ἵσως δέκα ἄ τὸν ἐπιρήμα-
tαν γένος Ἐιεθαί εἰκείνα, ἀσίαν, τοῖον, ἰσοφίν, ἰσοφος τι, ε. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. L. II.
the Word (g), from whose authority Ch. XI. we know it to be Stoical. But of this enough.

And now having finished these principal parts of speech, the substantive and the attributive, which are significant when alone, we proceed to those auxiliary parts, which are only significant, when associated. But as these make the subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

HERMES
OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.
Concerning Definitives.

WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I.
is a matter of less difficulty, and it being the same here, as in
some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an
easy labour to design the rest.
Ch. I. Definitives, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, Articles, Articuli, Ἀρτικαί. They are of two kinds, either those properly and strictly so called, or else the Pronominal Articles, such as This, That, Any, &c.

We shall first treat of those Articles more strictly so denominated, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

The visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least
least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it Dog, or Horse, or Lion, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, Animal.

But this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? Known, or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before, and now remembered?—It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (The). (A) respects our primary Perception, and denotes Individuals as unknown; (The) respects our secondary Perception, and denotes Individuals as known. To explain by an example—I see an object pass by.
by, which I never saw till now. What do I say?—There goes a Beggar with a long Beard. The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—There goes the Beggar with the long Beard. The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

Yet mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, once vague, is now recognized as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past (a).

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and (The) are both of them definitives, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most

(a) See B. i. c. 5. p. 63, 64.
most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself unascertained, whereas the Article (The) ascertains the Individual also, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the Greeks have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'O. 'O ἄνθρωπος ἐπεσεν, The man fell—ἄνθρωπος ἐπεσεν, A Man fell, without anything prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (b). Even in English, where the Article

(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἀνθρωπῶν ἦτε νομέα, ἦ τε ἄνθρωπων ἐπεσεν ὑπὸ ὄφισμον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγείρει. Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. IV. c. i. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36.
Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express by the same Negation. Those are the Men, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. Those are Men, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, A Man, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

But

The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says ' άνθρωπος ἢκε, Man came (which is the same, as when we say in English A man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ο ἄνθρωπος, ἢκε, The man came, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.
But tho' the Greeks have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'O, to the Article, The. 'Ο βασιλεὺς, The King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

"Εἰςιν ἐν πλῆρῳ ἡ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεθηγμένα, ἰδιον ἀρθρων ἡ ἀναφορὰ, ἡ ἐξι προκατέλεγμαν προκόπτεται παρασεική.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shown elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again—'Ου γαρ δὴ γε τὸ ὑόματα ἐξ ἀυτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίζησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάλοις τῷ ἀρθρῷ, ἀ ἡμαρτότος ἐςιν ἡ ἀναφορά. For Nouns of themselves imply not Re-
Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—Τὸ ἀφρον ἀφολεξόσαι γνωσι δηλοὶ—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).

His reasoning upon Proper Names is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to Adjectives or Epithets. For example—there were two Grecian chiefs, who bore the name of Ajax. It was not therefore without reason, that Meneβheus uses Epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

(с) Апог. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of Reference is as follows—’Ιδιωμα ἁναφορας ἀφοκα-τελεγμενα ἀφοκατα τετερα γνωσι. The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.
If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, 
---at least alone

Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

Apollonius proceeds——Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say, the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes an Article before it, that it may indicate a Reference to some single Person only, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορὰ, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικὸς, Trypho the Grammarian; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, Apollodorus the Cyrenian, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this
this Section is worth remarking. \( \Delta \varepsilon \nu \tau \omegaς \ \alpha \acute{\varphi}a \ \varepsilon \nu \ \kappaατα \ \tau\delta \ \tauου\tauου \ \eta \ \varphi\omicron\sigma\thetaε\sigma\varsigma \ \varepsilon \varsigma \ \tau\delta \ \alpha \acute{\varphi}r\acute{o} \ \sigmaυ\nu\nu\delta\imath\acute{\alpha}k\uilde{\varepsilon}a \ \tau\delta \ \epsilon\pi\iota\theta\epsilon\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu \ \tau\delta \ \kappa\upsilon\rho\iota \ \omicron\nu\mu\mu\varsigma \) — It is with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise, as the proper Name (d).

We may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the Article even common Appellatives come to have the force of proper Names, and that un-assisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the Athenians \( \Pi\lambda\omicron\iota\omicron\omicron \) meant Ship; "\( \varepsilon\nu\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha, \ \text{Eleven} \); and "\( \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\epsilon\gamma, \ \text{Man} \). Yet add but the Article, and \( \tau\omicron \ \Pi\lambda\omicron\iota\omicron\omicron, \ \text{the Ship} \), meant that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos; "\( \Omega; \varepsilon\nu\delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha, \ \text{the Eleven} \), meant certain Officers of Justice; and '\( \mathrm{O} \ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\epsilon\gamma, \ \text{the Man} \), meant their public Executioner. So in English, City, is a Name

\[\text{(d)} \ \text{See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by mistake} \ \text{Menex} \]
Name common to many places; and Speaker, a Name common to many Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, the City means our Metropolis; and the Speaker, a high Officer in the British Parliament.

And thus it is by an easy transition, that the Article, from denoting Reference, comes to denote Eminence also; that is to say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal Notoriety. Thus among the Greeks 'O Ποιητής, the poet, meant Homer (e); and 'O Σταυρείπτης, the Stagirite, meant Aristotle; not that there were

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής, once at the end of the seventh Book of his Nicomachian Ethics, and again in his Physics, L. II. 2. Plato also in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit. Serr.) denotes Hesiod after the same manner.
were not many Poets, beside Homer; and many Stagirites, beside Aristotle; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

It is on a like principle that Aristotle tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert—eìναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄγαθον, or, ΤΟ ἄγαθον—that, Pleasure is a Good, or, The Good. The first only makes it a common Object of Desire, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign Good, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

But to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require defining, for

for it is by nature a Definitive.—And what Words are these?—Not those which already are as definite, as may be. Nor yet those, which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite.

Upon these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, O ΕΓΩ, THE I, or O ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can make those Pronouns more definite, than they are (g). The same may be asserted of

(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun’s Definition, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. ’Εκείνῳ ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ δείκτες ἤ ἀναφοράς ἄντωνυμα-ζήμειον, ἢ εὑρέσει τὸ ἄθροιον. That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with which the Article doth not associate. L. II. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns—Πάλιν δὲ—ἐν ἐπιδίκτολαν ἄθροιον. L. IV. Priscian says the same. Jure igitur apud Graecos prima
of Proper Names, and though the Greeks say ὁ Σωράτης, ἡ Ξάνθη, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek ΟΙ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in English, THE BOTH, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, I have read BOTH Poets, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δύος ἐγνωσμένη, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself, (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, I have read Two Poets, this may mean any Pair out of

et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativa sunt, articulüs adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. Supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas Pronomin.

(b) Apollon. L. I. c. 16.
of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense indefinite (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to assume the Article, whenever it would become definite*. And thus it is, The Two in English, and οἱ Δύο in Greek, mean nearly the same thing, as Both or ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some primary and indefinite Perception, while the Article, The, has reference to some secondary and definite; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad Greek to say Δύο οἱ ἈΝΩΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad English, to say Two the Men. Such Syntax is in fact a Blending of Incompatible,

* This explains Servius on the XIIth Æneid. v. 511, where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. In English or Greek the Article would have done the business, for the Two, or τοῖς δύοῖν are equivalent to Both or ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, but not so Duorum, because the Latins have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216,
patibles, that is to say of a defined Substantive with an undefined Attributive. On the contrary to say in Greek ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ οἱ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in English, Both the Men, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, οἱ Δύο Ανθρώποι, The two Men, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, extends its Power as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to define them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, because they are by Nature as definite as may be, so there are others, which admit it not, because they are not to be defined at all. Of this sort are all Interrogatives. If we question about Substances, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΤΟΣ, ΤΗΕ ΥΗΟΙ ΑΙ ΑΗΗΙ; but ΤΙΣ ΟΤΟΣ,
Book the Second.

οὗτος, ὁ ὅτι τῆς; (i). The same as to Qualities and both kinds of Quantity. We say without an Article ποιός, ποι-σοί, πλαίκος, in English, what sort of, how many, how great. The Reason is, that the Articles ὁ, and the, respect Beings, already known; Interrogatives respect Beings, about which we are ignorant; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

In a word the natural Associators with Articles are all those common Appellatives, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different Article, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (k).

Q. 3

(i) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐνανηματαν τῶν ἄγαθων, a Part of Speech, most contrary, most averse to Articles; L. IV. c. i.

(k) What is here said respects the two Articles which we have in English. In Greek, the Article does no more, than imply a Recognition. See before p. 216, 217, 218.
Ch. I. We shall here subjoin a few Instances of the Peculiar Power of Articles.

Every Proposition consists of a Subject, and a Predicate. In English these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing first, the Predicate last. Happiness is Pleasure—Here, Happiness is the Subject; Pleasure, the Predicate. If we change their order, and say, Pleasure is Happiness; then Pleasure becomes the Subject, and Happiness the Predicate. In Greek these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the Article, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. Happiness is Pleasure—δονι ἡ εὐδαιμονία—Pleasure is Happiness—ἡ ἰδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—Fine things are difficult—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ—Difficult things are fine—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλὰ.
In Greek it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same Article, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—'O Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη—Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured. The Participle γυμνασιαρχήσας has here no other force, than to denote to us the Time, when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the Article, and say, 'O γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured. The Participle in this case, being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (/).

(l) Apollon. L. I. c. 33; 34.
In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the Articles, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the Man*. In that single the, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the Article, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a Man. Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices bodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

* ΣΤ ΕΙ Ό ΑΝΗΡ. Βασίλ. Β', κεφ, 16°.
But enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that "minute Change in **PRINCIPLES** leads to mighty Change in **EFFECTS**; so that well are **PRINCIPLES** intitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial and low."

The Articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the **PRONOMINAL ARTICLES**, such as, **This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None**, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (m), where

(m) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—*Nil fermo Articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur.* Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His declaratis, satis constat Graecorum Articulos non negeatos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid prescribendum est, quod Graeci per articulum efficient (*τοιοῦτος* *τοῖς*) expletur a Latinis per *Is aut Ille*; *Is, aut*,
where we have shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, this Picture I approve, but that I dislike, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, Some men are virtuous, but All men are mortal, what is the natural Effect of this All and Some, but to define that Universality, and Particularity, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them.

aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea fuit, aut qui alio quo pati notius est. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cuius antea non nescii sumus, aut ad praescribendum intellectionem, quae latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui poterat dictator fuit. Nam alii suæ C. Cæsares. Sic Graeci Καῖσαρ δι' ἑαυτοχράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131,
them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as — Some substances have sensation; others want it — Choose any way of acting, and some men will find fault, &c. For here some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different Parts of a given Whole; some, to denote a definite Part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining Part, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a large indefinite Portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining Part, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

Excedent ali spirantia mollius aer; (Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
Orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romanes,
memento, &c.
Æn. VI,

Nothing
Nothing can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; one \textit{Ae} \textit{et} as equal to many other \textit{Ae} \textit{ts} taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is \textit{Tu Romane}, not \textit{Vos Romani}) to all other Men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of \textit{Alii} to \textit{Tu}.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of Connectives.
C H A P. II.

Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions.

Connectives are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either Sentences or Words, are called by the different Names of Conjunctions, or Prepositions. Of these Names, that of the Preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the Conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the Conjunction first, because it connects, not Words, but Sentences. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry *, and which led us, by parity

* Sup. p. 11, 12.
parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a *Conjunction* is as follows—a *Part of Speech*, void of *Signification itself*, but so formed as to help *Signification*, by making two or more *significant Sentences* to be *one significant Sentence* (a).

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the *Conjunction* as connecting rather *single Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes. *Conjonctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.* Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjoncionis autem notionem veteres paullò inconfultius prodierunt; neque enim, quod aient, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Conjonctio est, quae conjunctit Orationes plurès.* De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 165.
This therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II. Conjunctions, we deduce their Species in

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἀσημος, ἐν ἡλειῶν μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν ἔφυκυκτα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικήν. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as one, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men are by nature social, it is their Interest to be just, though it were
were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences. (i.) Men are by nature social. 
(2.) It is Man's Interest to be just. (3.) It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just. The first two of these Sentences are made One by the Conjunction, If; these, One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, Tho'; and the three, thus united, make that ψωνή μία σημαντικη, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. 'Ὁ γὰρ συνῆσιμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλὰ, ὅσε εἶναι εἰςαρθή, δῆλον ὅτι τιναντίον ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν πολλά. The Conjunction makes many, one; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, ἡλθον, ἀπήνυσα, ἔδιψαν, veni, occurri, regnavi, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ἡλθον, ἀπήνυσα, and ἔδιψαν, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's
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also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two Sentences—
Rome was enslaved—Caesar was ambitious—and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Caesar was ambitious. Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say,—Manners must be reformed, or Liberty will be lost—here the Conjunction, OR, though it join the

Anamnios's account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διδ κ' των λόγων ο μεν ὑπαρξει μίαν σπανίων, ο κυρίως εἰς, ἀνάλογα ἃν ἐν τῷ μηδέπω τετ-μημένῳ ξύλῳ, κ' διὰ τῶ ἐνι λαγομένῳ ὃ δὲ πλείονες ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἐνα (lege διὰ) τινα δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡμῶς-θαὶ τῶς δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νη τῇ ἐν πολλῶν συγκε-κένη ξύλων, ὕπο δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένων εἰς ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνωσιν. Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence singly, and which is strictly one, may be considered as ana- logosous to a piece of Timber not yet fedvered, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made one by some Conjunative Parti- cle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.

Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.
Ch. II. the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions conjoin Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, some are Conjunctive, and some Disjunctive; and hence (b) it is that we derive their different Species.

The Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulatives, or Continuatives. The principal Copulative in English is, And. The Continuatives are, If, Because, Therefore, That, &c. The Difference between these is this — The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate

(b) Thus Scaliger. "At ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sension vero dis-jungunt." De C. L. Lat. c. 167.
Sentences into one continuous Whole, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an essential Co-incidence.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, Lysippus was a Statuary, and Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, and the Sky is clear—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, Lysippus was a Statuary, because Priscian was a Grammarian; though not to say, the Sun shineth, because the Sky is clear. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the Co-incidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between Copulatives and Continuatives (c).

As

\[(c)\text{ Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sen-}
\text{sum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit—si Sen-
\text{sum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut ne-}
\text{cessario,} \]
As to Continuatives, they are either Suppositive, such as, If; or Positive, such as, Because, Therefore, As, &c. Take Examples of each—*you will live happily, if you live honestly*—*you live happily, because you live honestly*. The Difference between these Continuatives is this—The Suppositives denote Connection, but assert not actual Existence; the Positives imply both the one and the other (d).

Farther

cessario, aut non necessario: & si non necessario, tum sunt Copulatives, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian’s own account of Continuatives is as follows. Continuative sunt, qua continuationem & consequentiam rerum significant—ibid. Scaliger’s account is—causam aut praefitutum, aut subsunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was *Συνδεσμος* & *συμπλεγμένος*; for the Continuative, *συναπτικός*; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name *Συναπτικός*, and the Latins that of *Continuativa*, to those
Farther than this, the Positives above mentioned are either Causal, such as, Because, Since, As, &c. or Collective, such as, Therefore, Wherefore, Then, &c. The Difference between these is this—the Causals subjoin Causes to Effects—The Sun is in Eclipse,

Conjunctions, which we have called Suppositive or Conditional, while the Positive they called παρασυναπτικον, or Subcontinuative. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to Gaza are, οи ὑπαφεξειν μεν ἢ, ἀκολουθειν ἡ τινι ἢ ταξιν ἐν-λυντες—L. IV. Priscian says, they signify to us, quais est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquid essentiae rerum—p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin fine subsistentia necessaria; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or παρασυναπτικον (to use his own name) Gaza tells us, ὅτι ἡ ὑπαφεξειν μετά ταξεως σημαδεως ἑτοιμης—And Priscian says, causal continuationis attendant consequentem cum essentia rerum—And Scaliger, non ex hypothes, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt. Ibid.
BECAUSE the Moon intervenes—The Collectives subjoin Effects to Causes—The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse. Now we use Causals in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and Collectives, in Demonstrations, and Science properly so called, where the Cause being known

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Positive Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the Suppositive, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what actually is; the Suppositive extend to Possibles, nay even as far as to Impossibles? Thus it is false to affirm, As it is Day, it is Light, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day, it is Light, because the, If, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—amplitudinem Continuativaæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando praesupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.
known first, by its help we discern consequences (e).

All these Continuatives are resolvable into Copulatives. Instead of, Because it is Day, it is light, we may say, It is Day, and it is Light. Instead of, If it be Day, it is Light, we may say, It is at the same time necessary to be Day, and to be Light; and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the Copulative extends to all Connections, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence therefore the Continuative may be resolved into a Copulative and something more, that is to say, into a Copulative implying an essential Coincidence (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4  As

(e) The Latins called the Causals, Causales or Causativae; the Collectives, Collectivae or Illativae: The Greeks called the former Ἀιτιολογικοὶ, and the latter Συλλογικοὶ.

(f) Resolvuntur antem in Copulativas omnes ha, propertea quod Causa cum Effectu Suâpte naturâ conjuncta est. Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.
As to Causal Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, the **Material Cause**—The Trumpet sounds, because it is made of Metal—the **Formal**—The Trumpet sounds, because it is long and hollow—the **Efficient**—The Trumpet sounds, because an Artist blows it—the **Final**—The Trumpet sounds, that it may raise our courage.

Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are exprest by the strong affirmation of the **Indicative Mode**, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the **Contingent** or **Potential**. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be first in **Speculation**, is always last in **Event**. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which,
which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not (g). Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as, THAT, iva, UT, &c.

The Sum is, that all Conjunctions, which connect both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulative, or Continuative; the Continuatives are either Conditional, or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

And now we come to the Disjunctive Conjunctions, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they disjoin the Sense, they conjoin the Sentences (h).

With

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol I. Note XVII. p. 280.

(h) 'Oi δέ διαζευγίκες τὰ διαζευγμένα συντίθεσιν, ἢ ἡ ἐφάγμα αὖ τὸ ἐφάγματο, ἡ ἐφόσωπου αὖ τὸ ἐφο-
τίπα διαζευγνῦτες, τὴν φράσιν ἐπισυννῦσιν. Gauze
Gram.
With respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of Union diffused throughout all things, by which this Whole is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of Diversity diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i).

Now

Gram. L. IV. Disjunctivae sunt, quae, quamvis distinctiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intellectual be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note (b). p. 3.

(i) The Diversity, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as Individuals, but if we recur to their Species, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are Socrates and Plato. Others differ as to Species, but as to Genus are the same: such are
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Now it is to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity, that Disjunctive Conjunctions seem first to have been invented.

Of these Disjunctives, some are Simple, some Adversative—Simple, as when we say, either it is Day, or it is

are Man and Lion. There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in those transcendental Comprehensions of Ens, Being, Existence, and the like: such are Quantities and Qualities, as for example an Ounce, and the Colour, White. Lastly All Being whatever differs, as Being, from Non-being.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of Opposition with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is itself, and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not the same. In Relatives, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In Contraries, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous
is Night—Adversative, as when we say, It is not Day, but it is Night. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the Adversative disjoin, with an Opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the Adversative are definite; the Simple, indefinite. Thus when we say, The Number of Three is not an...
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an even Number, but an odd, we not only disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, *The Number of the Stars is either even or odd*, though we assert one Attribute to be, and the other not to be, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for *simple Disjunctives* (k).

(k) The simple Disjunctive ἢ, or Vel, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with ὥς εἶναι, or, *Et non*. It is thus Gaza explains that Verse of Homer.

Βόλοι' ἐγὼ λαὸν σθεν ἐμμενει, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

I. A.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, and not be destroyed*, the Conjunction ἢ being ἀναφερομενος, or sublative. It must however be confessed, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of μᾶλλον, or ἄντις, concerning which see the Commentators.
Ch. II. As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply *Opposition*. Now there can be no Opposition of the same *Attribute*, in the same *Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of the same *Attribute* in different *Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot, but Caesar was not*—or of different *Attributes* in the same *Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist, but not a Philosopher*—or of different *Attributes* in different *Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher, but Hippias was a Sophist*.

The *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called *Absolute Adversatives*.

But there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful, than Achilles—Virgil was as.*
as great a Poet, as Cicero was an Orator.

The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only Opposition, but that Equality or Excess, which arises among Subjects from their being compared. And hence it is they may be called Adversatives of Comparison.

Besides the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are unless and altho'. For example—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, altho' Hector defend it. The Nature of these Adversatives may be thus explained. As every Event is naturally allied to its Cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its Preventive. And as every Cause is either adequate (I) or in-adequate (in-

(I) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.
Ch. II. (in-adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every Preventive. Now adequate Preventives are exprest by such Adversatives, as unless—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved; that is, This alone is sufficient to prevent it. The In-adequate are exprest by such Adversatives, as altho'—Troy will be taken, altho' Hector defend it; that is, Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.

The Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (m). They may be better perhaps called Adversatives Adequate, and In-adequate.

And thus it is that all Disjunctives, that is Conjunctions, which conjoin Sentences,

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(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, Adversatives, or Ἐναντιωματικοί.
sentences, but not their Meanings, are either Simple or Adversative; and that all Adversatives are either Absolute or Comparative; or else Adequate or In-adequate.

We shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

In the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the same Disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, Every Number is even, or odd—Every Proposition is true, or false—nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the Disjunctive, because no things are in Nature more incompatible than the Subjects. But if we say, That Object is a Triangle, or Figure contained under three right lines—the (or) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than distinctly to express the Thing, first by its Name,
HERMES.

Ch. II. Name, and then by its Definition. So if we say, That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, or a Ball—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several Names, which belong to the same Thing (n).

Again—the Words, When and Where, and all others of the same nature, such as, Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c. may be properly called Adverbial Conjunctions, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Sentences;

(n) The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called Subdisjunctiva, a Subdisjunctive; and that was Sive. Alexander five Paris; Mars five Mavors. The Greek ἕτερ τὸ ἀκούει seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks—Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivarum reāte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivae. Nam Disjunctivae sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivae autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander five Paris. De C. L. Lat. c. 170.
ces; of Adverbs, as they denote the Attributes either of Time, or of Place.

Again—these Adverbial Conjunctions, and perhaps most of the Prepositions (contrary to the Character of accessory Words, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of obscure Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes in Nature; a kind of (o) middle Beings, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (p).

\[\text{(o) Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δὴν γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταξεῖντα, ὡς αἱμφιστηῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, ἔκτερον ζῶον ἡ φυτῶν. Themist. p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also Aris. de Animal. Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.}
\[\text{(p) It is somewhat surprizing that the politeft and most elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all} \]
the rest, should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is Connection in the Meaning, there must be Words had to connect; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would choose to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

*Venimus ad summam fortunam*; &c.

**CHAP.**
Concerning those Connectives, called Prepositions.

Prepositions by their name express their Place, but not their Character. Their Definition will distinguish them from the former Connectives. A Preposition is a Part of Speech, devoid itself of Signification, but so formed as to unite two Words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves (a).

This

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, Prepositiva Conjunction, a Prepositive Conjunction. "Ως μέν ἐν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῶς συνάδεξας γίνονται παρεμφατικαί, λέξεις δὲ ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀφορμή ἐγγενεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Στοιχείοις τὸ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὰς Συνδέσμους. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conclusive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too
Ch. III. This connective Power, (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Morter and the Stone coalesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities coalesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain; and from this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident, arises the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective. In like

the Stoics took occasion to call them *Prepositive Conjunctions*. *Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313.* Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gaz. L. IV. de Praeposit. Prifé. L. XIV. p. 983.*
like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, Agent, Energy, and Patient, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, Alexander conquers Darius. And hence, that is from these Modes of natural Co-alescence, arises the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb.

Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as ran, beautiful, learned, he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c. And hence the Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.

The general Conclusion appears to be this.""
Ch. III. "themselves in nature." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute. Now tho' substances naturally co-incide with their attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, one with another (b). And hence those known maxims in physics, that body is impenetrable; that two bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same attribute cannot belong to different substances, &c.

From these principles it follows, that when we form a sentence, the substantive without difficulty co-incides with the verb, from the natural co-incidence of substance and energy—The sun warmeth. So likewise the energy with the subject, on which

(b) Causa, propter quam duo substantiva non ponuntur sine copula, e philosophia petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse posse, sicut substantia et accidentes; itaque non dicas, Cæsar, Cato pugnat. Scal. de Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 177.
Book the Second.

which it operates—warmeth the Earth. So likewise both Substance and Energy with their proper Attributes.—The Splendid Sun,—genially warmeth—the fertile Earth. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, Air, or Beams. How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as Nominatives or Accusatives, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, Sun; the Accusative by the Substance, Earth. Not as Attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the Rise and Use of Prepositions. By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, Thro', and With, and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned. The Splendid Sun with his Beams genially
genially warmeth thro' the Air the fertile Earth. The Sentence, as before, remains intire and one; the Substantives required are both introduced; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the Relations of Place (c). The reason is, this is that grand Relation, which Bodies or natural Substances maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said indeed that in the Continuity of Place they form this Universe or

(c) Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus suit aliquâ notâ, quae TO NOT significaret, seve esset inter duo extrema, inter quae motus sit, seve esset in altero extremorum, in quibus sit quies. Hinc eliciemus Prepositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.
or visible Whole, and are made as much One by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the contiguous Relation of Body, as when we say, Caius walketh with a Staff; the Statue stood upon a Pedestal; the River ran over a Sand; others for the detached Relation, as when we say, He is going to Italy; the Sun is risen above the Hills; these Figs came from Turky. So as to Motion and Rest, only with this difference, that here the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, that Lamp hangs from the Ceiling, the Preposition, From, assumes a Character of Quiescence. But if we say, that Lamp is falling from the Ceiling, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of Motion. So in Milton,

—To support uneasie Steps
Over the burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here over denotes Motion.

Again
Ch. III. Again—

—He—with looks of cordial Love
Hung over her enamour'd—Par. L. IV.

Here over denotes Rest.

But though the original use of Prepositions was to denote the Relations of Place, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to denote Relations, as well intellectual as local. Thus, because in Place he, who is above, has commonly the advantage over him, who is below, hence we transfer over and under to Dominion and Obedience; of a King we say, be ruled over his People; of a common Soldier, be served under such a General. So too we say, with Thought; without Attention; thinking over a Subject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out of Love; through Jealousy, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind,
kind, shew that the first Words of Men, Ch.III.
like their first Ideas, had an immediate re-
ference to sensible Objects, and that in af-
terdays, when they began to discern with
their Intellect, they took those Words,
which they found already made, and
 transferred them by metaphor to intellec-
tual Conceptions. There is indeed no
Method to express new Ideas, but either
this of Metaphor, or that of Coining new
Words, both which have been practised
by Philosophers and wise Men, accord-
ing to the nature, and exigence of the oc-
casion (d).

(d) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe
to Anaxagoras, Ὄμοιομέτρεια; to Plato, Ποιήσις; to
Cicero, Qualitates; to Aristotle, Ἐκθέσεια; to the
Stoics, Ὄντις, κεράτις, and many others.—Among
the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to
special Meanings, to the Platonics we may ascribe Ἰδέα;
to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, Κατηγορία, and
Κατηγορεῖν; to the Stoics, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, κα-
θισμον; to the Pyrrhonists, Ἠξίω, ἐνδίκηται, ἐπίκου,

And
In the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied \( \nu \alpha \tau \alpha \ \varepsilon \alpha \rho \alpha \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \nu \), by way of **juxta-position**, that is to say, where they are prefixed to a Word, with-

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical; — He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain.
without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch. III. may be used also κατὰ σύνθεσιν, by way of Composition, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (e). Thus in Greek we have Επιγραφή, in Latin, Intelligere, in English, to Understand. So also, to foretel, to overact, to undervalue, to outgo, &c. and in Greek and Latin, other Instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of Place, (f) as used either in its proper or metaphorical acceptation.

Lastly,

(e) See Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpositione.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space. E & Ex signify out of that Space; Per, through it, from beginning to end; In, within it; Sub, under it. Hence
Lastly, there are times, when Propositions totally lose their connective Nature, being

Hence then **E** and **Per** in composition augment; **Enormis**, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; **Dico**, to speak; **Edico**, to speak out; whence **Edictum**, an **Edict**, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So **Terence**.

*Dico*, *Edico vobis*—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an **'Augens'. Fari, to speak; Effari, to speak out**—hence **Effatum**, an **Axiom**, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnus, Per-utilis*, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, **In** and **Sub** diminish and lessen. **Injustus**, **Iniquus**, unjust, inequitable, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; **Subniger**, blackish; **Subrubicundus**, reddish; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

**Emo** originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. **Inter, Between**, implies **Discontinuance**,
being converted into Adverbs, and used Ch.III. in Syntax accordingly. Thus Homer,

—Γέλασσε δὲ ἔσσε ορφὶ χθὼν.
—And Earth smiled all around.

I. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter. (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of Cases in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is expressed by two Methods,

ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, Interimo, to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also Perimo, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, Ἄναπεσεῖν, and the English Verb, To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before, p. 205.
Ch. III. thods, either by Situation, or by Prepositions; the Nominative and Accusative Cases by Situation; the rest, by Prepositions. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning Prepositions.
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Chapter IV.

Concerning Cases.

As Cases, or at least their various powers, depend on the knowledge partly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly of Prepositions; they have been reserved, till those parts of speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the subject of so late a chapter, as the present.

There are no cases in the modern languages, except a few among the primitive Pronouns, such as I, and Me; Je, and Moy; and the English Genitive, formed by the addition of s, as when from Lion, we form Lion's; from Ship, Ship's. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a case is, the periphrasis, which supplies
plies its place, being the Case (as it were) unfolded. Thus Equi is analized into Du Cheval, Of the Horse, Equo into Au Cheval, To the Horse. And hence we see that the Genitive and Dative Cases imply the joint Power of a Noun and a Preposition, the Genitive’s Preposition being A, De, or Ex, the Dative’s Preposition being Ad, or Versus.

We have not this assistance as to the Accusative, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

The Vocative we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the Nominative.

The Ablative likewise was used by the Romans only; a Case they seem to have adopted
adopted *to associate with their Prepositions*; as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

There remains the *Nominative*, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no *Case*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line AB.

![Diagram](image)

The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if AB were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or AD. Hence then they only called these...
Ch. IV. Variations, πτωσεῖς, Casus, Cases, of Fallings. The Stoics on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the Nominative a Case also. Words they considered (as it were) to fall from the Mind, or discursive Faculty. Now when a Noun fell thence in its primary Form, they then called it πτωσεῖς ὀρθόν, Casus rectus, an erect, or upright Case of Falling, such as AB, and by this name they distinguished the Nominative. When it fell from the Mind under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a Gé-nitive, a Dative, or the like, such variations they called πτωσεῖς παλαιάς, Casus obliqui, oblique Cases, or side-long Fallings (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, καίσις, Declinatio, a Declension, it

(a) See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.
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it being a sort of progressive Descent from Ch. IV.

the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms, that is, a Descent from A B, to A C, A D, &c.

Of these Cases we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the Nomina\-tive, the Accusative, the Genitive, and the Dative.

It has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are Substance and At-\ntribute. Now from this Natural Con-\ncord arises the Logical Concord of Subject and Predicate, and the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Attribu-\utive (b). These Concords in Speech produce Propositions and Sentences, as that previous Concord in Nature produces natural Beings. This being admitted,

(b) See before, p. 264.
admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, Nature's Substance, the Logician's Subject, and the Grammarian's Substantive are all denoted by that Case, which we call the Nominative. For example, Cæsar pugnat, æs ſingitur, Domus ἐδιſcitur. We may remark too by the way, that the Character of this Nominative may be learnt from its Attributive. The Action implied in pugnat, ſhews its Nominative Cæsar to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in ſingitur, ſhews its Nominative æs to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in ἐδιſcitur prove Domus to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a Nominative also. So we find it in such instances as—Cicero eſt eloquent; Vitium eſt turpe; Homo eſt animal,
ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases, Ch. IV.
(as happens with Verbs) it is forced to
content itself with such assimilations as it
has, those of Number and Person *; as
when we say, *Cicero loquitur; nos
loquimus; Homines loquentur.*

From what has been said, we may
make the following observations—that as
there can be *no Sentence without a Sub-
stantive,* so that Substantive, if the Sen-
tence be *regular,* is always denoted by a
Nominative—that on this occasion *all the*
Attributives, *that have Cases,* appear as
Nominatives also—that there may be a re-
gular and perfect Sentence *without any of*
the other Cases, but that *without one Nomi-
native at least,* this is utterly impossible.
Hence therefore we form its Character and
Description—the *Nominative is that*
Case, *without which there can be no regu-
lar

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see
before, p. 170, 171.
When the Attributive in any Sentence is some Verb denoting Action, we may be assured the principal Substantive is some active efficient Cause. So we may call Achilles and Lysippus in such Sentences as Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still in suspense, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some Agent, but it must have a Subject also to work on, and it must produce some Effect. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the Subject or the Effect) that the Authors of Language

(c) We have added regular as well as perfect, because there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfect without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics ἔνεσται or Παρακατηγορήμαι, such as Σωκράτες μετάμελει, Socrates pænitet, &c. See before, p. 180.
guage have destined the Accusative. Ch. IV. Achilles vulneravit Hectorem—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. Lysippus fecit statuas—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—the Accusative is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action joins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

It has been said in the preceding Chapter (d), that when the Places of the Nominative

(d) See before, p. 265.
minative and the Accusative are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of Prepositions. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

Among the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the Term or Point, which something commences from, and the Term or Point, which something tends to. These Relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar Terminations of their own, which express their force, without the help of a Preposition. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive, and Dative, the Genitive being formed to express all Relations

com-
commencing from itself; the Dative, Ch.IV. all Relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already (e).

It is on these Principles that they say in Greek — Δειμαὶ ΣΟΓ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ, Of thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected from; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes to. So again—

(f) Πεφοιηταῖ ζίθη, it is made of Stone. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the Genitive, as being the Term from, or out of which. Even in Latin, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

Implentur

(e) See before, p. 275, 276.

(f) Χρυσοὶ πεποιημένος, η ἐλεφαῖος, made of Gold and Ivory. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. V. p. 400. See also Hom. Iliad. Σ. 574.
The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, of or from which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνα τὰ ὅσα, is a Phrase in Greek; and Je bois de l'eau, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, I take some or a certain part, from or out of a certain whole.

When we meet in Language such Genitives as the Son of a Father; the Father of a Son; the Picture of a Painter; the Painter of a Picture, &c. these are all Relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a Term or Point to the other, from or out of which it derives its Essence, or at least its Intellecution (g).

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, ὅπως δὲ τὰ πάντα τι πάντα ἀφιερωθείη λέγεται,
The Dative, as it implies Tendency to, Ch. IV. is employed among its other uses to denote the Final Cause, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

—Tibi suaveis daedala tellus
Submittit flores— Lucret.
—Tibi brachia contrabit ardens
Scorpios— Virg. G. I.
—Tibi serviat ultima Thule.
Ibid.

And so much for Cases, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,
tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (b) both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(b) Annun et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnibil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationem, casuum, conjugationem, et similia suffit; modernas, bis ferè desitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria signitur expedire? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (ut tumque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris suffè multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. i.
Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—Conclusion.

Besides the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains the Interjection. Of this Kind among the Greeks are Ὠ, Ψε, Ἀι, &c. among the Latins, Ab! Heu! Hei! &c. among the English, Ab! Alas! Fie! &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their Adverbs; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now Interjections co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in separating

† Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.
parating them by themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

Should it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain Voices of Nature, rather than Voices of Art, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (a).

(a) Interjectiones a Graecis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de ipsis, quando usu regunt. Sed quando orationi seu omnis referuntur, ut nota affectis, velut suspiri aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinentes, ut quae naturales sint notae; non, aliarum vocum insitutum, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. Interjectio est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi eodem sententiam comprehens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat clas-

**AND**
"And thus we have found that all Words are either significant by themselves, or only significant, when"

similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis. Nam cum haece dicatur Conjunctionio, quia coniungat; Interjection tamen, non quia interjacent, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ά' ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. Interjectionem non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed genemitus & signa letitiae idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eae partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex insitute, non natura, debent confitare. Interjectionem Graeci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falsa. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. Interjectionem Graeci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hae quaque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subduantur. Ut si dicam—Papae! quid video?—vel per se—Papae!—etiamsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quae res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in se Verbi, et plenam motus animi significationem, etiamsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjettio tamen non sohun illa, quae dicit Graeci σχετικωσμον, significat; sed etiam voces, quae cujuscunque possessis animi pulsu per exclamatio-nem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.
"When Associated—that those significant by themselves, denote either Substances or Attributes, and are called for that reason Substantives and Attributes—that the Substantives are either Nouns or Pronouns—that the Attributes are either Primary or Secondary—that the Primary Attributes are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives; the Secondary, Adverbs—Again, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either Definitives or Connectives—that the Definitives are either Articular or Pronominal—and that the Connectives are either Prepositions or Conjunctions."

And thus have we resolved Language, as a Whole into its constituent Parts, which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry(b).

But

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(b) See before, p. 7.
But now as we conclude, methinks I hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantery, and ridicule—"Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? "Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned, as learned; as well poor Peafants, as profound Philosophers?" We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peafants use the Levar and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peafants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation—of our very Senses and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing else—That
That they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—What they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world (c).

But a graver Objector now accosts us. "What (says he) is the Utility?" "Whence the Profit, where the Gain?" Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent

(c) Ἀλλ' ἐστι σωλάδα τῶν ὑδάων, ὡς τῶν μεν ὑπαρξίων ἔχει γνωσματάτην, ἀγνωστάτην δὲ τῶν ἔσων ὡστε ἥτε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μάλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάσθ' γὰρ τάτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον, τίς δὲ ποτέ ἔστι ἀυτῶν ἡ ἔσω, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁραθήναι. "Εσι δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιοτῶν καὶ ἡ ψυχή τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τί τῶν ψυχῆς, γνωριμώτατον καὶ φαινομένως τί δὲ ποτέ ἔστι, εἴ ῥέσιον καθαρθεῖν. Ἀλέξωδ. Ἀφεδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β'. p. 142.
lent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for the measuring of Estates; Astronomy, for the making of Almanacks; and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

Thus much to the Sordid — If the Liberal ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.
Perhaps too there is a Pleasure even in Science itself, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of Body desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen; And have not Health and Strength of Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of fordid Emolument? Why should there not be a Good (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere Energy of our Intelle&$, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, why they pursue such things; but if they answer, they pursue them, because they are Good, it would be folly to ask them farther, why they pursue what is Good. It might well in such case be replied on their
their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) that if there was not something Good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence. For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are Ends, some things are Means, and that if there were no Ends, there could be of course no Means.

It should seem then the Grand Question was, what is Good—that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

In the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country,
Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect Good, without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called Miserous, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all Objects? Shall the Intelect alone feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were
were to be controverted, may not the Intellectual Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of Intellectual Good, that it is "the Good of that Part, which is most excellent within us; that it is a Good accommodated to all Places and Times; which neither depends on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external Fortune; that it is a Good, which decays not with decaying Appetites, but often rises in vigour, when those are no more (d)."

There is a Difference, we must own, between this Intellectual Virtue, and Moral Virtue. Moral Virtue, from its Employment, may be called more Human,

(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.
HERMES.

Ch. V. MAN, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be surely called more DIVINE, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

Indeed for Moral Virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, it would be impious to suppose the Deity to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God Is, and Lives. So we are assured from Scripture it self. What then may we suppose the Divine Life to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE
Book the Second.

Chapter V.

Comprehensive Objects of Intellection, which Objects are no other than that Intellect itself? For in pure Intellection it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that the perceiver and thing perceived are always one and the same (e).

(e) Ἐι ἐν ὑτωσ εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ὑποτε, ὅ Θεὸς ἀεί, Θεομοιῶν ἐς δὲ πᾶλλον, ἔτι Θαυμασιώτερον ἔχει δὲ ὑμεῖς, ἵ ἐν ὑπάρχει: ἵ γὰρ Ὁ ἐνεργεία, ἐκείνη ἐκείνω άντιν, ἐκείνω ἐνεργεία δὲ ἦ καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκείνω ἐνεργεία ὑπάρχει. Φαμέν δ' τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ἐνεργεία αἰῶν, ἀριστον ὃς ζωὴ ἡ ἄνω συνεχῆς ὡς αἰῶν ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΤΟ γὰρ ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυτὰ Λ'. ζ. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as a Living God, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.

To
It was Speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—"That the Man, "who could live in the pure enjoyment "of his Mind, and who properly culti-"vated that divine Principle, was happiest "in himself, and most beloved by the Gods. "For if the Gods had any regard to "what past among Men (as it appeared "they had) it was probable they should "rejoice in that which was most excellent, "and by nature the most nearly allied to "themselves; and, as this was Mind, "that they should requite the Man, who "most loved and honoured This, both "from his regard to that which was "dear

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. 'Αυτόν δὲ νοέτος νῦν κατὰ μετάληψιν τὰ νοητὰ νοητές γὰρ γίνεται, Συγκατα-

νομέν ἐγὼν ἐστὶν ὙΜ作品内容. ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΝΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.
Book the Second.

"dear to themselves, and from his acting a Part, which was laudable and right (f)."

And thus in all Science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine.

(f) Ἡθικ. Νικομαχ. τὸ Κ. κεφ. 7.

End of the Second Book.
HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

SOME things the Mind performs thro' the Body; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs without such Medium; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last
more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is Mind ultimately the Cause of all; of every thing at least that is Fair and Good.

Among those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one. Corporeal Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animal-cule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the Mind surmounts all power of Concretion,

(a) *Itaque Naturæ facienda est prorsus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ, Lib. II. 16.
Book the Third.

creation, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho’ they had never been united.

And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as Wholes, into their more conspicuous Parts, but persisting, till it even separate those Elementary Principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest Part, as much as in the mightiest Whole (b).

Now if Matter and Form are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether these, or any things analogous to them, may be found in Speech

(b) See below, p. 312.
Herms.

Ch. I. Speech or Language (c). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

Every

(c) See before, p. 2. 7. Matter and Form (in Greek Σα and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal or concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Proces.

The original meaning of the Word Σα, was Sylva, a Wood. Thus Homer,

—Τρείμε δ' ἐξεα μακαρ τ' Σα,
Ποστὶν ὑπ' αὖθανάτοις Ποσειδάνων ἱόντος.

As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.

Hence as Wood was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "Σα", which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote Matter or Materials in general. In this sense Brass was called the "Σα" or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the "Σα" or Matter of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The Platonic Chalcidius, and other Authors
Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution composed in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution composed

Authors of the latter Latinity use *Sylva* under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, *Matter* and *Body* have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acception. By these, every thing was called *Yαλη*, or *Matter*, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Bras* the "Yαλη of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Yαλαι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Yαλαι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Yαλαι of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power (πα τα εις ἐμοι) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dihonour, Health
compounded of something Common, and something Peculiar; of something Common

Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the χαλας, or Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. Arr. Epict. L. I. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the χαλας and ἀρετής are opposed to each other). The Peripatetics, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be ἀσώματος, or Incorporeal, yet still talked of a Νός ἀληθος, a material Mind or Intellect. This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, Natural Capacity, and consider them as only denoting that original and native Power of Intellecction, which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of ΤΑΗ, or Matter. See Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144, b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 122, 141. Edit. Sytb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of Form or Figure, considered as denoting visible Symmetry, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from ΕΙΔω to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus Euripides,

Πρεπών μὲν ΕΙΔΟΣ ἀξίων τυχανόδος.
Fair Form to Empire gave the first pretence.
Now as the Form or Figure of visible Beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its "Σωμα or Matter, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form. Thus not only the Shape given to the Brass was called the ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form of the Statue; but the Proportion assigned to the Drugs was the ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form of the Medicine; the orderly Motion of the human Body was the ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form of the Dance; the just Arrangement of the Propositions, the ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form of the Syllogism. In like manner the rational and accurate Condui of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that ΕΙΔΟΣ or Form, described by Cicero to his Son,—Formam quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem Honesti vides: quae, si oculis cernaretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientia, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—the supreme Intelligence, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,
this supreme Intelligence has been called EΙΔΟΣ EΙΔΩΝ, the Form of Forms, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those essential and distinctive Attributes, which make it to be itself, and not any thing else.

And so much concerning Form, as before concerning Matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their separating, to perish, and be at an end—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate Co-incidence, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persift in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both Matter and Form, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the Beings, which they constitute; the Matter being to be found in the world at large; the Form, if artificial, pre-existing within the Artificer, or if natural, within the supreme Cause, the Sovereign Artift of the Universe.

—Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even
Hence Language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Foun-

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their immediate generating Cause; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

Matter.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sineulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatis hoc verbum ct tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque effixa sint: (quae tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eaque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

Form.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi image, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectitur. — Has rerum formas appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimius auctor et magis, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cetera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est
a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a Sound*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language *a Meaning or Signification is essential*. Again, Language, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from Nature*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from Compact* (*d*).

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(*d*) The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *κατὰ συνθέσιν*, by Compact. See *Aristot. de Interp.* c. 2. 4. *Boetius* translates the Words *κατὰ συνθέσιν*, *ad placitum*,
Book the Third.

From hence it becomes evident, that Language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings; and that of these two Principles, the Sound is as the Matter, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the Meaning as that peculiar and characteristic Form, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

tum, or secundum placentum, and thus explains them in his comment—Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandum positionem, placitunque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sic ut subjicta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigatur, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjicitarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

C H A P.
CHAP. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

Ch. II. THE ΤΑΗ or Matter of Language comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ΤΑΗ or Matter is Sound, and Sound is that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect (a).

(a) This appears to be Priscian's Meaning when he says of a Voice, what is more properly true of Sound in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit*. Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of Sound to an Undulation in the Air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and
As the Causes of this Percussion are various, so from hence Sound derives the Variety of its Species.

Farther, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand Species of Sounds are likewise Animal or Inanimate.

There is no peculiar Name for Sound Inanimate; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely accidental. But that,

and to be as plausible as any—Ἀκούειν άδ, τι μεταξυ τι τε φωνοῦντος κ' τι τι αὔγοντος αέρος πλητσομένα σφαίροειδῶς, έιτα κυματουμένα, κυ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπλοντος, αν κυματύται το εν τι δεξίμενη ὕδωρ κατά κύκλους ὑπό τέ ἐμεληθέντος λίθου—Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquement, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et si fletur aqua per orbem injecta agitatur lapide. Diog. Laert. VII.
that, which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a Voice.

As Language therefore implies that Sound called Human Voice; we may perceive that to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to know the Matter or common Subject of Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers
sophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stop'd, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now pure and simple Voice, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) transmitted to the Mouth. Here then, by means of certain different Organs, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the Form or Character of Articulation. For Articulation is in fact nothing else, than that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c. The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its primary Qualities) but it acquires to these Characters certain
certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of Speech, but those very different ones likewise of Mastication and Respiration; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for Discourse in Man, who is a Discursive Animal, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animā. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much jufter cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what
THE simplest of these new Characters are those acquired thro' the mere Openings of what authority we have to distinguish Voice from mere Sound; and articulate Voice from simple Voice.

Kai ὙΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστι πληγή ἄρεσ αἰσθητῇ ἁκόβ. ΩΝΗ δὲ, ψύφος εὲ ἐφιψυχε γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συνολής τῃ Θάραξας εὐκλειόμενος ἀπὸ τα πνεύμωνος δ εἰσπνεύθες ἄηρ προσπίπτῃ αὐθενίς τῇ καλυμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἄφτηριᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερῷ, ἦτοι τῷ γαργαρεῖν, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελή τινα ἕχον αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὑμένα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὡπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευσῶν ἔσερ τοῖς μαστικοῖς καλυμένων ὄργανοι συμβαίνει, διὸν αὐλίων καὶ συζύγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ἄκουστων, καὶ χειλῶν πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὑπῶν, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἉΠΑΛΩΣ ΩΝΗΝ ἐπὶ πάντως συμ- 

—Ephraem Sonus, idius acris qui auditu fonsititum: Vox autum est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elyfsis simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulacionem impingit, et ex idiu sonum quendam sensubilem in animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quae via inflant, idem ζυγνυβα a musicis dicitur, si venit, ut in tibiis; ac fsiulìs contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquaciam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplieiem non omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Intepr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 632.

Y It
HERMES.

Ch. II.  

of the Mouth, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several Vowels; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus eminently Vocal (c), and easy to be founded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by different Contacts of its different parts; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote Sound in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἔδον ἀκοῆς ἄκοῆς, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the Note preceding. Animal Sound they defined to be—'Αὐρ, ὑπὸ ὀμίους ἑπελημένος, Air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse; and Human or Rational Sound they defined—'Εναρ-θρος ν' ἀπὸ διανέεισ ἑκκερπωμένη, Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty. Diog. Laert. VII. 55.

(c) ΦΩΝΗΣ ΕΝ ΤΗΝΤΑ.
Book the Third.

with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Ch. II.
Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the Articulations so produced are called Consonant, because they found not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel (d).

There are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of Element.

(d) \( \Sigma T M \Phi \Omega N A \).
M E N T (e), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest Combination they produce a Syllable; Syllables properly combined produce a Word; Words properly combined produce a Sentence; and Sentences properly combined produce an Oration or Discourse.

And thus it is that to Principles apparently so trivial (f), as about twenty plain ele-

(e) The Stoic Definition of an Element is as follows—Έσι δὲ σοιχεῖαν, ἢ δὲ ἄριστα γίνεται τὰ γυνόμενα, κ' εἰς ὅ ἐσχατον ἀναλυέται. An Element is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon Elements with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς σοιχεία, εὗ ὁ σύγκειται τῇ φωνῇ, κ' εἰς ὅ διαιρεῖται ἐσχατας ἐκεῖνα ὅ μὴν' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐτέρας τὸ ἐμε ἁυτῶν. The Elements of articulate Voice are those things, out of which the Voice is compounded; and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(f) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they
they called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the Name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a Head alone without other Limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral Basis. The Head itself was that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petasus, or Bonnet, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ΕΡΜΗΣ ΑΟΡΙΟΣ, the Hermes of Language or Discourse. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the Head, because no other was deemed requisite to rational Communication. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well describes them) ἔπεξ ἀείκονα, Winged Words, were represented in their Velocity by the Wings of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the Front of his Basis (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a Youth be seen drawing off this Veil; and a Nymph, near the Youth, transcribing what She there discovers.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. The Youth we might imagine to be the Genius of
It appears from what has been said, that the Matter or common Subject of Language is that Species of Sounds called Voices articulate.

What

Of Man (Naturæ Deus humanae, as Horace stiles him;) the Nymph to be ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, or Memory; as much as to infinuate that "Man, for the Preservation of his Deeds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to Letters; and that Memory, being conscious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

Mr. Stuart, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the Antiquities of Athens, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one possessest more eminently than himself.


For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34.

12
What remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar Form, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to Sound, but to Meaning.

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning Elementary Sounds, p. 324, 325.

CHAP. III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

Ch. III. WHEN to any articulate Voice there accedes by compact a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called a WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) under the same Compact (a), unite in constituting a PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

(a). See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. i. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remarkable—Καθότερ ἐν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κυνεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὁμολογεῖσθαι, Ψέσει ὡς κατὰ συνθήκην, ὡς τὸ μὲν εὐ-λογεῖν, φύσει, ὡς ὁ Θύρα, Ψέσει. ἄτω ὡς τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ ἐρμαίτων σημαίνειν, Ψέσει—ὡς ἐσθε τόν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ἀφανειν ἢ σαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἤμιν ἀνυμέμην γνωσικῶν, ἢ ὁμολογεῖν, κατὰ φύσιν ἑχεῖν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀραπαλητίσι φοις ἀλόγον ζωῆς.
Book the Third.

It appears from hence, that a Word Ch. III. may be defined a Voice articulate, and significant by Compact— and that Language may be defined a System of such Voices, so significant.

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be

ξόοις τῷ δὲ ὄνομασιν, ἡ ὑμασίῳ, ἡ τοῖς εἰκ τῶν συνεμενοῖς λόγοις χρησθαι ἔρει τῆς σημασίαν (ἐκτὸς φύσει οἷῳ, ἀλλὰ Ἡσίου) ἔξουσι τοὺς ἔχειν ἄλογα σώε, διότι ὃς ἠκούμενος τῶν ὑπότων αὐτοκυντρε μετεχεὶ λύχνθος, ἥ τεχνικῷ ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ὥσ ὃ ἐν ἀυτῷ τῷ φονείν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακυκται δυναμίς

ὁν εἴς ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλῃ συντεθεμενοι λόγοι μεταμετρῶν, ἡ ἀνευ μετρῶν. In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul’s faculties of Knowledge or Polition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as

irra-
Ch. III. be tempted to call Language a kind of Picture of the Universe, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if Pictures and Images are all of them Imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the

irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (ἰερογεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10. 158, 159, &c.
the Original, will by help of the fame Ch.III.
faculties know also its Imitations. But it
by no means follows, that he who knows
any Being, should know for that reason
its Greek or Latin Name.

The Truth is, that every Medium
through which we exhibit any thing to
another’s Contemplation, is either derived
from Natural Attributes, and then it is
an Imitation; or else from Accidents
quite arbitrary, and then it is a Sym-
bol (b).

Now,

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τὰ ΣΤΜΒΟ-
ΛΟΤ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὀμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν ἄνυτην τῷ
αἷμανάτος κατὰ τὸ δύνατον ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βάλεται,
κἂ ἐκ ἐςιν ἐφ’ ἠμῶν ἀυτὸ μεταπλάτσαι τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
εἰκώσι σχηματικῶσι τὰ Σωκράτες ὀμοίωμα, ἐς μὴ κἂ τὸ
φαλάκρων, κἂ τὸ οἰμῶν, κὰ τὸ ἐξόφθαλμον ἔχει τὰ
Σωκράτες, ἐκτὸ ἀν ἄντε λέγοιτο εἶναι ὀμοίωμα· τὸ
νὲ γε σύμβολον ὅτοι σημεῖοι, (ἀμφότερῃ γὰρ ὁ φιλο-
σοφὸς ἀυτὸ ὀνόματε) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ’ ἠμῶν ἔχει, ἀντὶ κἂ
κἂ μὲν χριστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπιστολῆς· οἶτε, τὰ
ὅτε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλεις τὰς πολεμάσωσι, ὅτα-
ναι.
Ch. III. Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their natural Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that Words must of necessity be Symbols, because it appears that they cannot be Imitations.

But here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—“ Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols pre-
preferred, although Symbols are only Ch. III. known by Habit or Institution, while Imitations are recognized by a kind of natural Intuition?—To this it may be answered, that if the Sentiments of the Mind, like the Features of the Face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the Art of Speech or Discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our Minds lie enveloped and hid, and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our Thoughts, to

culiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl’ed, the sign
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.) or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.
Ch. III. to convey them to each other through a Medium which is corporeal \(c\). And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the Senses \(d\). Now the Senses, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by Symbols but by Imitations, as far as things are characterized by Figure

\(c\) Αἱ φυσικὴ οἱ ήμέτεραι, γυμναι μὲν ἐστι τῶν σωμάτων, ἠδύνατο δὲ ἀυτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἄλληλαις τὰ περάγματα. Εἴπειν δὲ σύμμαχοι συνείσην-ται, διὸν νέφος περικαλύπτεισιν ἀυτῶν τὸ νοεῖν, ἐδεήθησαν τῶν ἐνομάτων, δι' ὃν σημαίνεσιν ἄλληλαις τὰ περάγματα. Animi nostri a corporis compagi secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde ac nebula, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegitur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 18. a.

\(d\) Quicquid scindii posset in differentias fatis numerosis, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentiae illæ senfui perceptibles sint) fieri poteft vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.
Figure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch. III. necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also.

Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how complicated such Imitation would prove.

If we set Language therefore, as a Symbol, in opposition to such Imitation; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly

* Epex ἀλεξίτα—See before, p. 325.
plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, "Imitations have been rejected, and "Symbols preferred."

Hence too we may perceive a Reason, why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirror exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between the Medium and themselves there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

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(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.
It is true indeed, when Primitives were once established, it was easy to follow the
Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of Derivatives and
Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water, and, Fire, being once annexed to those two
Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, Watry, of the last, Fiery, than to com-
mute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what natural
Connections the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found,
I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most
others. We may here also see the Reason, why all Language is founded in
Compact, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a cer-
tain Species.

The Question remains if Words are Symbols, then Symbols of what?
Ch. III. If it be answered, of things, the question returns, of what things?—If it be answered, of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a proper Name. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

Again, if all Words are proper Names, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as Individuals are infinite, to make a perfect Language, Words must be infinite also. But if infinite, then incomprehensible, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which Mission-
Missionaries (if they may be credited) at-tribute to the Chinese.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow that in Language there can be no general Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis all Terms are particular; nor any Affirma-tive Proposition, because no one Individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but Particular Neg-
CH. III. \( \text{tives.} \) But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating General Affirmative Truths—If so, then of communicating Demonstration—If so, then of communicating Sciences, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating Arts, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (e). And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

If Words are not the Symbols of external Particulars, it follows of course, they must be the Symbols of our Ideas: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols

(e) The whole of Euclid (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon general Terms, and general Propositions, most of which are affirmative. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their style,

\[ \text{Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,} \]
\[ \text{Neve Negativis, recte concludere si vis.} \]
Symbols of things without, they can only be Symbols of something within.

Here then the Question recurs, if Symbols of Ideas, then of what Ideas?—Of sensible Ideas.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of external Particulars; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several Ideas, which Particulars imprint, must needs be as infinite and mutable, as they are themselves.

If then Words are neither the Symbols of external Particulars, nor yet of particular Ideas, they can be Symbols of nothing else, except of general Ideas, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by general Ideas?—We mean such as are common to many Individuals; not only to Individuals which exist now, but
Ch. III. but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with proper Names.

It follows that one Word may be, not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many Particulars, past present and future; so that however these Particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Language notwithstanding may be definite and steady. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the Chinese Absurdity *.

Again, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands

* See p. 338, 339.
stands for the same general Ideas, may be as intelligible now, as it was then. The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of ever new and ever changing Objects.

Again, it follows that Language may be expressive of general Truths; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind (f).

Now if it be true "that none of these things could be asserted of Language, were not Words the Symbols of general Ideas—and it be further true, that these things may be all undeniably asserted of Language”—it will follow (and that necessarily) that Words are the Symbols of general Ideas.

(f) See before Note (e).
And yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of general Ideas, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about general, and abstract Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of Particulars, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than general Ideas?

To this it may be answered, that Arts surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are general Terms from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be rationally explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through general Terms
Terms learnt those general Theorems, that Ch.III. respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration?

But suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—That the Objection was just; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of Language, that it should be expressive of Particulars, as well as of Generals. We must however add, that its general Terms are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives "that comprehensive Universality, that just proportion of Precision and Permanence, "without which it could not possibly "be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and Science;"
Ch. III. "Science;"—that particular Terms have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

One Method of expressing Particulars, is that of Proper Names. This is the least artificial, because proper Names being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly, therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of Definitives or Articles (g), whether we assume the pronominal, or those more strictly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite Art of Language, which, without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of Definitives properly applied to general Terms,

(g) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.
Terms, knows how to employ these last, Ch.III. tho' in number finite, to the accurate expression of infinite Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, as unknown; I say, a Man—known; I say, theMan—indefinite; any Man—definite; a certain Man—present and near; this Man—present and distant; that Man—like to some other; such a Man—an indefinite Multitude; many Men—a definite Multitude; a thousand Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout; every Man—the same ones, taken with distinction; each Man—taken in order; first Man, second Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively; all Men—the Negation of this Multitude; no Man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

7
Ch. III. The Sum of all is, that Words are the Symbols of Ideas both general and particular; yet of the general, primarily, essentially, and immediately; of the particular, only secondarily, accidentally, and meditatively.

Should it be asked, "why has Language this double Capacity?"—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourse of our Ideas? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express the whole of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either Intellection without Sensation, or Sensation without Intellection? If not, how should Language explain the whole of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To
To conclude—As in the preceding Ch.III. Chapter we considered Language with a view to its Matter, so here we have considered it with a view to its Form. Its Matter is recognized, when it is considered as a Voice; its Form, as it is significant of our several Ideas; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A System of articulate Voices, the Symbols of our Ideas, but of those principally, which are general or universal.
Concerning general or universal Ideas.

Ch. IV. Much having been said in the preceding Chapter about general or universal Ideas, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

The Vulgar merged in Sense from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to
to be real, but what may be tasted, or Ch. IV. touched. The Philosopher, as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to experimental Amusements, deeming nothing Demonstration, if it be not made ocular. Thus instead of ascending from Sense to Intellect (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of Sense, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of Science, the Studies of Mind, Intellection, and Intelligent Principles, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by Experiment, is deemed no better than mere Hypothesis.

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that there should still remain two Sciences in fashion,
fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment. By these I mean Arithmetic, and Geometry (a). But to come to our Subject concerning general Ideas.

Man's

(a) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two Sciences so eminently abound, arise originally from Principles, the most obvious imaginable; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of Experiment, that they are self-evident to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue Experiment; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject to be founded in Experience, which is no more than the result of many repeated Experiments. But I must add withal, that the man who acts from Experience alone, tho' he act ever so well, is but an Empiric or Quack, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize Art, and that the Empiric quits his name for the more honourable one of Artist, when to his Experience he adds Science,
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Man's first Perceptions are those of the Senses, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and transient, than the very Objects, which they exhibit, because

Science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, what is to be done, but why it is to be done; for Art is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it Materials, and Science giving them a Form.

In the mean time, while Experiment is thus necessary to all practical Wisdom, with respect to pure and speculative Science, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For whoever heard of Logic, or Geometry, or Arithmetic being proved experimentally? It is indeed by the application of these that Experiments are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.

A a
because they not only depend upon the existence of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their immediate Presence. Hence therefore it is, that there can be no Sensation of either Past or Future, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the Senses, it never could acquire the least Idea of Time (b).

But happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called Imagination or Fancy, which however as to its energies it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in dignity and use. This it is which retains the fleeting Forms of things, when Things themselves are gone, and all Sensation at an end.

That this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may be

(b) See before, p. 105. See also, p. 112. Note (f).
be seen from hence. We have an Imagination of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of Sensation. We have an easy command over the Objects of our Imagination, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our Sensations are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (c).

(c) Besides the distinguishing of Sensation from Imagination, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are MNHMH, and ANAMNHΣΙΣ, Memory, and Recollection.

When we view some relié of sensation reposéd within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object, this is Phantasy or Imagination.

When we view some such relié, and refer it without to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original, this is Memory.
Ch. IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to retain, as well as to receive; the fame holds of the Soul, with respect to Sense and Imagination. Sense is its receptive

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is Recollection. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between Memory and Phantasy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the Portrait, such Contemplation is analogous to Phantasy. When we view it with reference to the Original, whom it represents, such Contemplation is analogous to Memory.

We may go farther. Imagination of Phantasy may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It is here that Hope and Fear paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But Memory is confined in the strictest manner to the past.
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Ceptive Power; Imagination, its re-tentive. Had it Sense without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

Thus then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call Sense (if we please) a kind of transient Imagination; and Imagination on the contrary a kind of permanent Sense (d).

Now

What we have said, may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult Aristot. de Animā, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise de Mem. et Reminisce.

(d) Τί τούτων ἵσιν ἡ φαντασία ὡς αὖ γνωρίσαμεν δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνέργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, διὸν τύπου (lege τυποῦ) τινὰ καὶ ἀναγωγέαρμα εἰν τῷ πρῶτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθητῆς γνωριμίας κινήσεως. ὦ καὶ μικρὰ τῇ αἰσθητῇ παράνοιᾳ, ὑπομένει τῇ καὶ σῶζεται, ὃν ὀκεὶ περὶ εἰκῶν τις.
Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the Soul in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of Reason and Intellect, till Imagination first fix the fluency of Sense, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

After

αὐτὲ, ὃ καὶ τὰς μνήμες ἡμῖν σωζόμενον ἄλιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιεῖτον ἐγκατάλειμμα, ἐκ τοῦ τοιεῖτον ἀστερ τύπου, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλῶσιν. Now what Phantasy or Imagination is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a reliæ of that motion caused within us by the external object; a reliæ, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of reliæ and (as it were) Impression they call Phantasy or Imagination. Alex. Aphrod. de Animal, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.
After this manner, in the admirable Ch. IV. Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there no Things external, the Senses could not operate; were there no Sensations, the Imagination could not operate; and were there no Imagination, there could be neither Reasoning nor Intellection, such at least as they are found in Man, where they have their Intensions and Revisions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere Capacity or Power. Whether every Intellection begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which "Intension and Remission and mere Capacity "are unknown (e)." But not to digress.

(e) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of Man's Existence is not a little different from that of the Deity. The Life of Man has its Essence in Motion.
Ch. IV. It is then on these permanent Phantasms that the human Mind first works, and by

Motion. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that Life, which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to Practice or Contemplation. But the Life or Existence of God (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all Motion.

It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστιν ἐνέγγεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήτως. Ἡ ἐνδον μάλλον ἐν ἑσομία ἐστιν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ σώματος γλυκυ, κατὰ τὸν σεμπτὴν, διὰ σωματικῶν τινά. Ὅσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐυμεταβόλος ὁ σωματικός, ἢ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολὴς εἰ γὰρ ἀπλὴν, οὐδὲ ἐπεικής. For there is not only an Energy of Motion, but of Immobility; and Pleasure or Felicity exists rather in Rest than in Motion; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For
by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once what

in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. s.ub. fin.

It is to this unalterable Nature of the Deity that Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—Tempus ab Aevy

Ire jubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.

From this single principle of Immobility, may be derived some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes; such as that of Impassive, Incorruptible, Incorporeal, &c. Vide Aristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9. 10. Edit. Du Val. See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that tho' we are not Gods, yet as rational Beings we have within us something Divine, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, per-
permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—\( \text{Ομοιωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δύνατόν, the becoming like to God, as far as in our power. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ Θεῖς ἡώς ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δὲ αὐθεντοίς, \( ἕφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωματι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. For to the Gods (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to Men, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat. in Theæt. Arist. Eth. X. 8.

\( (f) \) This connective Act of the Soul, by which it views one in many, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all these, and other attributes united; not an unknown Constitution of insensible Parts, but a known Constitution of sensible Parts, unless we choose to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.
Behold a kind of superior Objects; a new Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive than

What then perceives this Constitution or Union?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some higher collective Power, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordinate Wholes, much more in that comprehensive Whole, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this collecting, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this unifying Power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of pure Truth. By virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea, in many Individuals; One Proposition in many general Ideas; One Syllogism in many Propositions; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of Science,

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspersunt, &c.
Lucter.

Even
Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so necessary is this uniting Power to every Species of Knowledge. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between sensitive Perception, and intellectual, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by our Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both hear and understand the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles. That this is one Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to Sensation?—The Answer is obvious; it is by successive Portions of little and little at a time. When the first Word is present, all the subsequent are absent; when the last Word is present, all the previous are absent; when any of the middle Words are present, then are there some absent, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is not, (to Sensation at least) as tho'
B O O K  T H E  T H I R D.

and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de-
parting

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of Sense, than which we see nothing can be more dissipated, fleeting, and detached.

And is that of the Mind similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that one Mind would no more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms successively and apart, than many distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every Truth is one, tho' its Terms are many. It is in no respect true by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once and in an instant.—What Powers therefore recognize this Oneness or Unity?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the Stagirite, Τὸ ἐν ἩΝ ΠΟΙΟΤΝ τὸ ὑπὸ ΝΟΤΣ ἵνασον—If this be allowed, it should seem, where Sensation and Intellection appear to concur, that Sensation was of Many, Intellection was of One; that Sensation was temporary, divisible and successive; Intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are Many; at the Center that they are One. Let us then suppose Sense and Mind to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the Circumference, Mind at the Center; and
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Ch. IV. parting from the unity and permanence of its own nature.

And

and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is another Act of the Mind, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not one in many, but many in one. This is that mental Separation, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it by itself the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particular Sciences to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as Optics, were we necessitated to contemplate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured Body.

Those
Those two noble Sciences, **Arithmetic** and **Geometry**, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this separative Power. They are both conversant about **Quantity**; **Geometry** about continuous Quantity, **Arithmetic** about discrete. **Extension** is essential to continuous Quantity; **Monads**, or **Units**, to discrete. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple and perfectly similar Units, which being combined make Number, and are the Subject of **Arithmetic**. Again, by separating from **Body** every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed **Magnitude**, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of **Geometry**.

By the same analytical or separative Power, we investigate Definitions of all kinds, each one of which is a developed Word, as the same Word is an involved Definition.

To conclude—In Composition and Division consists the whole of Science, Composition...
Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of Science and Real Knowledge, which can by no means be, but of that which is general, and definite, and fixed (g).

Here

Tion making Affirmative Truth, and shewing us things under their Similarities and Identities; Division making Negative Truth, and presenting them to us under their Dissimilarities and Diversities.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that those Philosophers took Half of Wisdom for the Whole, who distinguished it from Wit, as if Wisdom only separated, and Wit only brought together?—Yet so held the Philosopher of Malmbury, and the Author of the Essay on the Human Understanding.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, Scientia, and Understanding, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ωνόμαζαι, δια το ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ ἐξ ὑπον τῶν ἑναγμάτων ἐγειν ἴπασ, τῆς
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Here too even Individuals, however of Ch. IV. themselves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge,

τὴς ἀδορισίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μὲν μέρους ἀπάγωσαν ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πρὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμεταπλωτα καταγίνεται. Science (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) to some Stop and Boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of it from his Cratylus. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (according to the Heraclitean Philosophy, which Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that Flow and unceasing Mutation, supposed by Heraclitus to run through all things, at length changes his Sytem, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds:

—ζυγοποιεῖν ὧ, ἐς αὐτῶν ἀναλαξίωτες ψεύδων μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ύπομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιλέσον ἐστὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔσοιε συμπαίνει τι ὥστε ΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῦ ἀπάγαμος τὴν ψυχὴν, ἡ ὥστε συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very Words

B b
Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any Particular be

Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word Science; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that it stops the Soul at Things, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐποθα and μενευ, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See Plato as before, p. 412.

As to Scientia, we are indebted to Scaliger for the following ingenious Etymology. Ratiocinatio, motus quidam est: Scientia, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Graecos, tum etiam nostrum. Παξα το ΕΠΙ ΙΣ-ΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Sifitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum Scientia, ότι γι-νεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latinis, quod nomen entis simplex ab utu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus aetiosis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, α'ξεων ον. Sciens, χων ου. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

The
be said to be known, when by ascertaining it Ch. IV.
to be a Man, or an Animal, or the like,

The English Word, Understanding, means not so properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was sup-posed to stand under them, as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered Science and Understanding, not as fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather as steady, permanent, and durable Comprehensions. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain steady, permanent, and durable Objects; since if Perception of any kind be different from the thing perceived, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) such Perception must of necessity be erroneous and false. The following passage from a Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—Εἰ ἐσὶ γνώσις ἀληθείας τῆς ἀισθήσεως, ἐν αὐτῷ γνωστὰ ἀληθεία τῶν ἀισθητῶν. If there be
we refer it to some such comprehensive, or general Idea.

Now it is of these comprehensive and permanent ideas, the genuine perceptions of pure mind, that words of all languages, however different, are the symbols. And hence it is, that as the perceptions include, so do these their symbols.

A Knowledge more accurate than sensation; there must be certain objects of such knowledge more true than objects of sense.

The following then are questions worth considering,—What these objects are?—Where they reside?—And how they are to be discovered?—Not by experimental philosophy it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of mathematics; for this, at its very commencement, takes such objects for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own minds, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the satirist be no ways improper,

—NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.
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Symbols express, not this or that set of particular objects only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the Inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the local proper Names; which Names, as we have said already*, are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the Language of modern England is able to describe antient Rome; and

* Sup. p. 345, 346.
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Ch. IV. and that of antient Rome to describe modern England (b). But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. And now having viewed the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence it is that these Ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, what kind of Beings they are, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

Let

(b) As far as Human Nature, and the primary Genera both of Substance and Accident are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages: so far all Languages share one common Identity. As far as peculiar species of Substance occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics are everywhere different; so far each Language has its peculiar Diversity. To the Causes of Diversity here mentioned, may be added the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.
Let us suppose any man to look for Ch. IV. the first time upon some Work of Art, as for example upon a Clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—And what is it, to retain such Idea?—It is to have a Form internal correspondent to the external; only with this difference, that the Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the External is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view many such Machines, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of intelligible Form, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen already, but every Work also of like Sort, which he might see hereafter.—
Ch. IV. Should it be asked "which of these Forms is prior, the External and Sensible, or the Internal and Intelligible;" the Answer is obvious, that the prior is the Sensible.

Thus then we see, there are intelligible Forms, which to the Sensible are subsequent.

But farther still—If these Machines be allowed the Work not of Chance, but of an Artist, they must be the Work of one, who knew what he was about. And what is it, to work, and know what one is about?—It is to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess a Form internal, corresponding to the External, to which external it serves for an Exemplar or Archetype.

Here then we have an intelligible Form, which is prior to the sensible Form; which, being truly prior...
as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.

Thus then, with respect to Works of Art, we may perceive, if we attend, a triple order of forms; one order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to work; thro' the second, the Works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; the first may be called the Maker's Form; the second, that of the Subject; and the third, that of the Contemplator.

Let us pass from hence to Works of Nature. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; "a Plain, for example, spacious and fer-
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Ch. IV. "tile; a river winding thro' it; by the
" banks of that river, men walking and
" cattle grazing; the view terminated
" with distant hills, some craggy, and
" some covered with wood." Here it
is plain we have plenty of FORMS NA-
TURAL. And could any one quit so fair
a Sight, and retain no traces of what he
had beheld?—And what is it, to retain
traces of what one has beheld?—It is to
have certain FORMS INTERNAL corres-
pondent to the EXTERNAL, and resem-
bling them in every thing, except the
being merged in Matter. And thus, thro'
the same retentive and collective Powers,
the Mind becomes fraught with FORMS NA-
tURAL, as before with FORMS ARTIFICIAL.—
Should it be asked, "which of these natu-
ral Forms are prior, the External ones
viewed by the Senses, or the Internal ex-
isting in the Mind?" the Answer is ob-
vious, that the prior are the External.

Thus
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Thus therefore in Nature, as well as Ch. IV. in Art, there are intelligible Forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in Sensu*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the Ideas of a mere Contemplator.

But to proceed somewhat farther—Are natural Productions made by Chance, or by Design?—Let us admit by Design, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly* more exquisite than any Works of Art, and yet these we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by Chance.—Admit it, and what follows?—We must of necessity admit a Mind also, because Design implies Mind, wherever it is to be found. —Allowing therefore this, what do we mean

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* Aris, de Part. Animal. L. I. c. i.
Ch. IV. mean by the Term, Mind?—We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.

That such Exemplars, Patterns, Forms, Ideas (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be a Mind, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? Chance surely is as knowing, as Mind without Ideas; or rather Mind without Ideas is no less blind than Chance.

The Nature of these Ideas is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances,
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stances, which are but their Copies or Pictures. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the Essence of Mind, and consequently no Objects to any of the Senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by Time or Place.

Here then, on this System, we have plenty of Forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all Forms sensible. Here too we see that Nature is not defective in her triple Order, having (like Art) her Forms previous, her Concomitant, and her Subsequent (i).

That

(i) Simplicius, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the first Order of these intelligible Forms, τὰ α ': τὸς μεθέξιος, those previous to Participation, and at other times, ἡ ἐξηνημένη πνεύμα, the transcendent Universality or Sameness; the second Order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξιος, those which exist in Participation, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ καταταχθεῖσα πνεύμα, the subordinate Universality or Sameness; lastly, of the third Order he says, that
that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—ἡμεῖς ἀφελώντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐν-
νοίαις, καθ’ ἐαυτὰ ύπερήπαμεν, we ourselves abstracting
them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such ab-
straction an existence as of themselves. Simp. in Predic.
p. 17. In another place he says, in a language some-
what mysterious, yet still conformable to the same
doctrine—Μήποτε ἐν τρίτον λυπλεόν τὸ κοινόν, τὸ μὲν
ζηηηηηην τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοι-
νότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἐαυτῇ φόσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇς δια-
φορότητος κατὰ τὴν ποιεῖσθαι πρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ
ἐς τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ αὐτὸ κοινό ἀπὸ τοῖς διαφοροῖς ἔδεισιν
ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν
ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοιαῖς ἐξ ἀφαίρεσες ύπερήπαμεν,
ὑποβολεῖσθαι ὡς—Perhaps therefore we must admit a
TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND
THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and su-
perior to Particulars, which thro’ its uniform nature is the
cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro’ its multi-
form pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that
of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal
Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its
existence in those several Species—that of the third Order,
what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being
of subsequent origin to the other two. Ibid. p. 21.
prior to all things else. The whole visible world exhibits nothing more, than...
Ch.IV. so many passing Pictures of these immutable Archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even a Sem-

méllcii τωιειν; ὃ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, αὐλόγω δυνάμει
toieii* ( قائلا x' τωιειν τη φύσις, ἐκ ἐφισάνιστα γνωσι-
kς τῷ γιγνόμενῷ) ἔτι δὲ τὴ καθ' ἔξιν λογικὴν τωιειν,
οἴε τὰ πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτά. ᾿Εἰ τοῖνυν
μὴ χῄσον, ὡς κατὰ ἀνθρώπον, ὡς τῶς τωιείν, οἴε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτᾶ γιγνόμενον εἰ δὲ οἰδὲν τὰ τωιείν, αὐτῶν ὑπλον, ὡς
ἔσιν εἰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ έιδὴ. ᾿Εσι δὲ τὸ έιδος ἐν τῷ
Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὃ εν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος τ' λέγεται
τό καθ τὸ έιδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, κτ' χαρισόν
tῆς οὐλης. ᾿Εσι δὲ τὸ έιδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τ' εἰν τοῖς καθ' ἐκασον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ εἰν τοῖς κεραίς ἐξυπάματα. τ' λέγεται τὰ τοιαύτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ζηνι, ΚΤ' ἀρχώρια τῆς οὐλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τάς κατὰ μέρος
ἀνθρώπους, ὃς πάντες τό αὐτὸ έιδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξανει,
(ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ ύπερον ἐλθόντος, κτ' Θεασάμενα τὰ κεραία)
ἀνεμαχόμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διάνοιᾳ τ' λέγεται τόπο
ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ήγουν μετὰ τὰ πολλά, ΚΤ' ύπερογενὲς. Αντιλυτέρον annulus, qui alicujus, ut-
pate AchiLL'is' imaginem insculptam habeat: multae insuper
ceræ sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quis-
piam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione for-
matas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum
annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis
impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo ve-
nerat intelligentia remanserit, POST MULTA, et postle-

rivos
Δέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη κἂν τὰ εἴδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· διὸν εὐνοεῖσθω τι σφραγισθήριον, ἕχον ἡ ἐκλύσωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ ἡ κηρία πολλα μεταλαβέτω τὰ ἐκλύσωματ, καὶ τις ὑπ’ ὑμιν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ ἐφοκατιδὸν μὴν ὅλως τὸ σφραγισθήριον ἐω- βακιας δὲ τὰ ἐν ὧν τὸ ἐκλύσωμα, κἂν ἐπισήματο ὅτι πᾶσα τὰ ἀὑτὲ μετέχασιν εκλύσωματ, κἂν τὰ δοξά- τα πολλα τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ὑπ’, ἐχέτω τάτο κα- τὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἐν σφραγισθήριον τύπωμα λέγε- ται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τὸ δ’ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐκ ἀὑτῶν καταληφ- θὲν, κἂν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀὑλῶς ὑπογας, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. "Ουτως ἐν τῇ τὰ γένη κἂν τὰ εἴδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μὲν εἴσιν ἐν τῷ Νῆμερ- γῷ, κατὰ τὰς σωιτικίδες λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ εἰ- σιοποιι λόγοι τῶν ὑμών ἑναίως σφραγίζησιν, καθ’ ἑς λόγους τὸ ὑπεράστη· τὰ ὀνλα πᾶσα κἂν σφραγίζεις κἂν παρήγαγες· υφεσθήκειν δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη κἂν τὰ εἴδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους τὸ τὰ ἀνθρώπα εἴδος ἐστὶ, κἂν τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τὰ ὑπερα ἐἴδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ, κἂν ἵπποις, κἂν τοὺς ἀλλοίς ζώοις τὸ γένος ἐυρίσκεται τῶν τοιεῶν εἴδων, ὑπὲρ ἑστὶ τὸ ζώον· κἂν τοὺς ζώοις ὁμοι κἂν τοὺς ζωοφύτους τὸ καθολικῶτερον γένος, τὸ ἀισθητικόν, ἐξετάζεται· συμαχθέντων δὲ κἂν τῶν φυτῶν,
CALLY ONE, amid those infinite particula

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Ch. IV.

Theeonei...

(k) The following elegant Lines of Virgil are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.
MAY we be allowed then to credit those speculative Men, who tell us, "it is in
these

Ergo ipsas quamvis angusli terminus ævi
Excipiat: (neque enim plus septima ducitur etas)
At Genus immortale manet—G. IV.

The same Immortality, that is, the Immortality of the Kind, may be seen in all perishable substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' Individuals perish, the several Kinds still remain. And hence, if we take Time, as denoting the system of things temporary, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the Timeus, where the Philosopher describes Time to be—μένωντι άιωνι ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' αodiedον ιεσαν άιωνι έικόνα. Αεternitas in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.

We have subjoined the following extract from Boetius, to serve as a commentary on this description of Time.—Aeternitas igitur est, interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessor. Quod ex collatione temporaliium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in tempore, id preæsent à pretérstitis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitae suæ spatiun pariter possit amplecti; sed eæstuum quidem nondum approbendi, hepternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vita non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili transitoriae.
Ch. IV. “these permanent and comprehensive Forms that the Deity views at once, without looking abroad, all possible productions both present, past, and future—that this great and stupendous View is but a View of himself, where all things lie enveloped in their Principles and Exemplars, as being...”

momento. Quodigitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo consitit Aristoteles, nec caeperit unquam esse, nec definit, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est, ut æternum esse jure credatur. Non enim tum simul infinitae licet vitae spatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possit, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec praeteriti fluxerat, id æternum esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos presens sibi semper affluere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Unde quidam non recte, qui cum audient visum Platonis, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse deficiunt, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci vitam, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse præsentiam, quod Divinae Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim Deus
ing essential to the fulness of his universal Intellecation?—If so, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mentioned. We must now say—Nil est in Sensu, quod non prius fuit in Intelle- tu. For tho’ the contrary may be true with respect to Knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to

Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti-
tate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. Hunc enim vitæ immobilis præsentarium sta-
tum, infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur; cumque cum effingere, atque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quanti-
tatem; et, cum tantum pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem ne-
queat possidere, hoc ipsō, quod aliqua modo nonquam esse deśinit, illud, quod impleere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualcumque præsentiam hujus exigui volucrifque momenti: quæ, quo-
niam manentis illius præsentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibusquecunque contigerit, id præ-
flat, ut esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non po-
tit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum est, ut continuaret vitam eundo, cujus pleni-
tudinem complecti non valuit permanendo. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.
Ch. IV. Knowledge universally, unless we give Precedence to Atoms and lifeless Body, making Mind, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.

§ 3. It is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above Precedence.

For mark the Order of things, according to their account of them. First comes that huge Body the sensible World. Then this and its Attributes beget sensible Ideas. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that Mind was coeval with Body, yet till Body gave it Ideas, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more,
more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for Ch. IV. innate ideas it could not possibly have any.

At another time we hear of Bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very Exility makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrank into Intellect by their exquisite subtility, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle Æther, animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, and the like; Terms, which modern Philosophy, upon parting with occult Qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

But the intellectual Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental Cause. It is here it looks for the origin of intelligible Ideas, even of those, which exist in human Capacities. For tho' sensible Objects may be
Ch. IV. be the destined medium, to awaken the dormant Energies of Man's Understanding, yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in Sense, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (l).

In

(l) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted before, p. 371.) upon the Phædo of Plato; who tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of Platonic Reminiscence, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the Senses assist in the acquisition of Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.
In short all Minds, that are, are Similar and Congenial; and so too are their efficient Cause, but as it raises our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timaeus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of Sense to Reminiscence or Recollection.

And in another passage he observes—Επειδὴ γὰρ χόρῳ καλοροφυ άγώντα εἰσιν ἡ ψυχή, αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸν ἔχον λόγως, ἐρείδομεν ὡς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμμενόμεναι ὃν ἐνδον ἔχει λόγων, τά τετοια τρομάλλεται. For in as much as the Soul, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of Omniform Representation or Exemplar; when it is raised by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὸν ψυχήν φασίν οἱ τὰ ἐιδοὶ τιθέμενοι άναλαμβάνονταν ἐσογε ἐπιζημιον τάς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγως, αἰρισθεσαρ σκώτωσ εὐχοντας καὶ τελεότερον ἐν ἑαυτή ἴχειν, ὥ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθήσεως ἐχοι. Τὸ ἐν τελεώτερον ταῦτα ἀκριβεσεβασιν ἂν ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅσα μὴ ἔσιν ἐν ἑαυτῶς. Οὐ δ' αὐτομάθει ἀλλοθεί οὐν ἑαυτὴν ἰξ ἑαυτῆς διενοεῖσθαι.
HERMES.

Ch. IV. their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were it otherwise, there could be no intercourse between

νοεῖσθαι: ο' δὲ γὰρ ἐφευκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μυθαμένη ὁν, τι διανοεῖσθαι: τὰς γὰρ ἑυθεῖς τῶν δόξων ἐχὶ μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων ἐναι συνθέσεις τινας, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γνωμένας. Δειπτεθαι δὲ ἄφ'. έτέρας τινὸς φύσεως περὶ ἐν τῇ κριτίνας τε τῇ τελεωτερής ἀφίκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τελεωτερήσ τῷ τὼν ἐν τοῖς ἀισθητοῖς λόγον. Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS, say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence any where else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real Beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the Soul from some other Nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect.


The ΑΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which Geometrius here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions
portions of Equality and Inequality, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical Lines, Angles, Figures, &c. of all which Λόγος or Proportions, tho' we possess in the Mind the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible World.

To these two Authors we may add Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the Mind or Intellect, wholly distinct from Sensation, and independent of it, at length concludes,

Hæc est efficiens magis
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressâs patitur notas.
Precedit tamen excitans,
Àe viret animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vela vox auribus instrepit;
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscit imagines.

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.
For what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of Speaking and Hearing.—To the Speaker, it is to teach; to the Hearer, it is to learn.
—To the Speaker, it is to descend from Ideas to Words; to the Hearer, it is to ascend from Words to Ideas.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at no Ideas, then is he said not to understand; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said to misunderstand.
—What then is requisite, that he may be said to understand?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the Speaker. The same may be said of a Writer and a Reader; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in Greece two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should be so exact an Identity of our Ideas, if they were
were only generated from *sensible* Objects, Ch. IV.
infinite in number, ever changing, distant
in Time, distant in Place, and no one
Particular the same with any other?

Again, do we allow it possible for God
to signify his *will* to Men; or for Men to
signify their *wants* to God?—In both these
cases there must be an *Identity of Ideas*, or
else nothing is done either one way or the
other. Whence then do these common
*Identical Ideas* come?—Those of *Men*,
it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And
whence come *God's Ideas*?—Not surely
from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly
venture to affirm, without giving to *Body*
that notable *Precedence of being prior to the
Intelligence of even God himself*.—Let them
then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and
*essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be
true, is it not a fortunate Event, that
*Ideas of corporeal rise*, and others of mental,
(things derived from subjects so totally dis-
*tinct*)
Had we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all Minds have their Ideas derived; or all have them original; or some have them original, and some derived. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, which is itself not Mind, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them original, then are all Minds divine, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one Mind (at least) have original Ideas, and the rest have them derived. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—From Mind, or from Body?—From Mind, a thing homogeneous; or from Body, a thing heterogeneous? From Mind, such as (from the Hypothesis) has original
original Ideas; or from Body, which we Ch.IV.
cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? (l)—An Examination of this kind,
pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean Poet,

**Corpora natura animum constare,**

**animamque;**

or trust the Mantuan Bard, when he sings in divine numbers,

**Ignem est ollis vigur, et cælestis origo Seminibus.**

**But**

(l) **NOTN ὑ ἑ φ Ῥ ΣΩΜΑ γενης ὡς γαρ ἂν τὰ ANOHTA NOTN γενήσοι; No Body produces Mind: for how should Things devoid of Mind produce Mind? Sallust de Diis et Mundo, c. 3.**

D d
Ch. IV. But it is now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.
CHAP. V.

Subordination of Intelligence — Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations — Different Genius of different Languages — Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages — Superlative Excellence of the Last — Conclusion.

Original Truth (a), having the most intimate connection with the supreme Intelligence, may be said (as it were) to

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of Being and Knowledge are derived from Body and Sensation, have a short method to explain the nature of Truth. It is a factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the least of any, being not only subsequent to sensible Objects, but even to our Sensations of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have
to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits Diminution, nor Change, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among these therefore we must look for ignorance and not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent Truth not as the last, but the first of Beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method how they perceive Truth, was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to describe the road to London, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the
and errour, and for that *Subordination* of Ch. V. 
*Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

We have daily experience in the *Works of Art*, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to *Nature*; and well for mankind is it found
to

the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural* materials, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a *Bolus or Elixir*.

If *Milton* by his *Urania* intended to represent *Truth*, he certainly referred her to a much more antient, as well as a far more noble origin.

*Heav'nly born!*

Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal *Wisdom* didst converse,
*Wisdom* thy *Sister*; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celestial *Song*.

--- P. L. VII.

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Ch. V. to be true, else never could we attain any natural Knowledge at all. For if the constitutive Proportions of a Clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to those seminal Proportions, which make the essence and character of every natural Subject?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some too general, some too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νηφε, ἵ μεμνησ' ἀπίσειν, ἀδρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

And thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of Letters, and that
that of Virtue appear to co-incide, it being the business of both to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth (b).

In this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how these peculiar Ideas become the Genius of their Language, since the Symbol must of course correspond to its Archetype (c); how

(b) How useful to Ethic Science, and indeed to Knowledge in general, a Grammatical Disquisition into the Etymology and Meaning of Words was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting Plato in his Cratylus; Xenoph. Mem. IV. 5. 6. Arrian. Epit. I. 17. II. 10. Marc. Anton. III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

how the wisest Nations, having the most and best Ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by Words, to whom they are indebted for Things.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. We Britons in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our multiform Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in polite Literature prove, that this came from Greece; our Terms in Music and Painting, that these came from Italy; our Phrases in Cookery and War, that we learnt these from the French; and our Phrases in Navigation, that we were taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in Regularity and Analogy. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect,
defect, that what we want in Elegance, we gain in Copiousness, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own.

Let us pass from ourselves to the Nations of the East. The (d) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about the Form of their Government; (for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, who should be their Master, whether

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δελικώτερον εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ευρώπην, ὑπομένοι τὴν δεσποτικὴν αἵχη, οὐδὲν δυσερείνοντες. For the Barbarians by being more servile in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4.
whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a *Mu-
homet* or a *Mustapha*.

Such was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, forever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into *the Great and Magnificent* (e), they as frequently degenerated

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(e) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispositions of divine Providence, &c.
gerated into the Tumid and Bombay. The Greeks too of Asia became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that Luxuriance of the Asiatic Stile, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of Athens. But of the Greeks we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the Romans.

And what sort of People may we pronounce the Romans? — A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their Language became, like their Ideas, copious in all Terms expressive of things political, and well adapted to the purposes both of History and popular Eloquence. — But what was their Philosophy? — As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to
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Ch. V. to this Subject; a defect, which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (f). Virgil seems

(f) See Cic. de Fin. I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular Tusc. Diff. I. 3. where he says, Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc eatem, nec ullum habuit lumen Literarum Latinarum; quee illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c. See also Tusc. Diff. IV. 3. and Acad. I. 2. where it appears, that 'till Ciceron applied himself to the writing of Philosophy, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of Amatarius the Epicurean, and others of the same sort. How far the Romans were indebted to Cicero for Philosophy, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The Epicurean Poet Lucretius, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the Latin writers of his own sect; deriving all his Philosophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in Philosophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject.
Book the Third.

Seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty.

Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperit
Difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus presertim quom fit agendum,)
Præter egestatem linguæ et rerum novitatem:
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitiae quemvis perfisse laborem
Suadet—

Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of Philosophy; as did the Patriot Brutus, a Treatise concerning Virtue, much applauded by Cicero; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Horace, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of Latin Philosophy, whether we consider the purity of their Stile, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho’ with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,
so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the Latin Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also Seneca; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is described with great accuracy by the noble Author of the Characteristics, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him) Agellius, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a Philosopher, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With Aulus Gellius we range Macrobius, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived 1
From considering the Romans, let us pass to the Greeks. The Grecian Common-

under Honorius and Theodosius) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with Aulus Gellius, flourished Apuleius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was Martianus Capella, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a Philologyst, than of a Philosopher.

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the Timaeus of Plato.
Ch. V. **Commonwealths**, while they maintained their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They were the

The last Latin Philosopher was Boethius, who was descended from some of the noblest of the Roman Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the **Logical** way. But his **Ethic** piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbled Africans already mentioned. By command of Theodoric king of the Goths, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the last remains of Roman Dignity, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other Romans, who left Philosophical Writings; such as Musonius Rufus, and the two Emperors, Marcus Antoninus and Julian; but as these preferred the use of the Greek Tongue to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of Latin Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for the Latin Authors of Philosophy; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.
the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering that Golden Period, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend (g).

Now

(g) If we except Homer, Hesiod, and the Lyric Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the expedition of Xerxes. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the Persian power was at an end, the Fulgence of Grecian Genius (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that Golden Period spoken of above. I do not mean that Greece had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the Great, the Striking, the Sublime (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.
Now the Language of these Greeks was truly like themselves, it was con-

The same kind of fortune besel the people of Rome. When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as Horace informs us) they began to cultivate the polite arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden Period, which lasted to the death of Octavius Cae-

far.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Ge-

niuses that flourished in each, one the Socratic Pe-

riod, the other the Ciceronian.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their de-

struction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon en-

sued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally pro-

duced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vi-
tious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were intensibly dissolved. Hence then among the
conformable to their transcendent and universal Genius. Where Matter so abounded,

the Greeks that fatal Peloponnesian War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wafted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the Romans; raised those unhappy contests between the Senate and the Gracchi; between Sylla and Marius; between Pompey and Caesar; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony at Actium, the Romans became subject to the dominion of a Fellow-Citizen.

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexander and Octavius had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with Alexander. In the time of the same Monarch lived Theophrastus, and the Cy-nic, Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and Aeschines spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of Octavius, Virgil wrote his Eneid, and with Horace,
abounded, Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in Greek.

**HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an Aristophanes;** for the native

*Horace, Varius,* and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, soon stopp’d the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—

Θερψαί τε γὰρ ἰκατὶ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρώνων η ἘΛΕΤΘΕΡΙΑ, κα ἐπετίθαι, κα ἀμα διωθεῖν τὸ πρέπωμον τῆς ψεὺς ἀλλήλως έξειδος, κα τῆς ψεύς τὰ πρωτεία φιλοτιμίας. *It is Liberty that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another; and the generous emulation of being the first in rank.*

De Subl. Sect. 44.
native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of Composition; for as to their *Philosophy* itself, it was in reality the same. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such
such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in Greek? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either Xenophon or Plato, nothing of this method and strict order appears. The Formal and Didaetic is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

And yet though these differ in this manner from the Stagirite, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—Plato, copious, figurative,
tive, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of Stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

The Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

And thus is the Greek Tongue, from its Propriety and Universality, made
for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.

Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
Musa loqui.

It were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more fordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of Grecian Literature; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the French and English Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any
any rational pleasure, and more rarely Ch. V.
still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men*, and *not Books*, we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the common
common helps, have been sufficient of themselves to great and important Ends.
But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitius imitabile—

In truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of natural Capacity, and of super-induced Habit. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess the best Capacities, cultivated with the best Habits. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of Culture and good Learning, they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.
And so much at present as to general Ideas; how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language. So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, Universal Grammar.

End of the Third Book.
ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95.—to Stop, &c.] The Quotation from Proclus in the Note may be thus rendered—

That thing is at rest, which for a time prior and subsequent is in the same place, both itself, and its Parts.

P. 105. In the Note, for γετινάζεις read γενόμενον, and render the passage thus—For by this faculty (namely the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.

P. 106. Note (d).] The passage of Philoponus here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were said to be nearly approaching to Non-Entities. The Author explains this among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἄτι γενόμενον; Ἡρωτοὶ μὲν, ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρελθόν ἐστιν κάθετο πέλλαν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἄντας τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡφαίστειας ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ Ĥτὶ ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἄμω ἐστιν συμπαραβαθεῖ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φυσικὰ πᾶλαι, μέλλουσι δὲ τὸς χιονίσεις αὐτῶν παραπολυληθησάγοις ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος. How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entities? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exists the Past and the Future, and these are Non-Entities; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. now all natural Substances pass away along with Time, or rather it is upon their Motion that Time is an Attendant.

P. 119
P. 119—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the Real Now, or Instant, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a necessary Connection between Existence and the Present Instant, because no other Point of Time can properly be said to be, but also between Existence and Life, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily Is. Hence Sophocles, speaking of Time present, elegantly says of it—

—καὶ ζῶν τῷ ζώνι, ἀπὶ ταφήνι ὄν.

The Living, and Now present Time.

Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in Virgil, of which Servius here speaks, is a description of Turnus’s killing two brothers, Anycus and Diore; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru abscissa Duorum Suspendit capita—

This, literally translated, is—he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas the Sense requires, of the Two persons, that is to say, of Anycus and Diore. Now this by Amborum would have been expressed properly, as Amborum means The Two; by Duorum is expressed improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from Themistius, may be thus rendered—Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.
P. 294. Note (c)—There are in the number of things many, which have a most known Existence, but a most unknown Essence; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The Existence of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their Essence is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.


P. 368.—in the Note—yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.] Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of Wisdom or Philosophy, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—"Ειδον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχειν διαφορὰν δείξαν τὴν κοινώνιαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχειν κοινώνιαν δείξας τίνι διαφέρειν; καὶ γὰρ δυσχερές τὸ δείξαι φάτνης (lege φάτνης) καὶ διαφερέσας κοινώνιαν (παντὶ γὰρ ψεύδον), ἀλλ' ἐστὶν (lege ὅπερ) τὸ διάφορον τὰ τών ἐπειδὴ δὲ κυνὸς ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κοινῷ ἔχειν. It is the proper business of Philosophy to shew in many things, which have Difference, what is their Common Character; and in many things, which have a Common Character, thro' what it is they differ. It
is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—they are more exquisite than, &c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μαλλον δ' ἐσι τὸ ἑνώπιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως φρονισι, η ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. The Principles of Design and Beauty are more in the Works of Nature, than they are in those of Art.

P. 379.—we must of necessity admit a Mind, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by antient Philosopher.
therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why the Hypothesis of Ideas pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunar, are either from Chance, or according to a Cause. From Chance is impossible; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the Endings of things will be more excellent than their Beginnings. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that essential Causes ought to be prior to accidental, in as much as every accidental Cause is a Deviation from them; so that whatsoever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be One. After which he goes on, as follows.—

—'Ει μὲν ἐν ἀλογον τῷ, ἀτοπον. ἔσχι γάρ τι ῞αλίν τῶν ὑσέρων τῆς τέταν αἰτίας κατίτου, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γνώσιν ποιών, ἔσον τῷ Παντός ὑπ', κ' τῇ Ὄλθ μέζος, ὃ ἐσιν α' αἴτιας ἀλόγος τεῖτο. 'Ει δ' ἄλογον ἔχουν καὶ αὐτὸ γνώσιν, οἴδειν εαυτὸ ὑπὲ τῶν σώματων αἴτιον ὑπ', ἴ τῷ ἀγνοοῦν, ἀγνοοθεὶ τῷ εαυτῷ φύσιν. 'Ει δὲ ὑείν, ὅτι κατ' αἰτίαν ἔστι τῷ ψαλίδος ἀιτίον, τὸ

Ff 2
Additional Notes.

但现在，如果这个原因不是由于某种原因而被废弃；那么在这种情况下，就会有某些东西，其中有些东西在某种意义上，比其原理或原因更优越。我指的是，更优越，更合理，更知识地操作，而且是整个宇宙的一部分，就是，它是从原因中无法得到的。——现在这个原因会被废弃，这表明一切原因，都是由于偶然原因，再者，原因和知识，就在宇宙之中，而且在宇宙的某一部分中，这与它是什么，从原因而废弃原因。

But if, on the contrary, the Cause of the Universe be a Cause, having Reason and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from its very Essence it is the Cause of the Universe, and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. It knows therefore the Universe, and all things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by knowing itself, it knows what comes after itself, and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain Reasons and Forms devoid of Matter that
Additional NOTES.

that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—agreeable to which Ideas these Works are fashioned, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an Artist—in τῇ τῇ τεχνί αὐτῇ διανοια, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philoponus, in his manuscript Comment, observes as follows—τεχνίαν φιλή τον Θεόν, ως ωάν τῶν τας πρωτάς άιτίας καὶ τῆς λόγως αυτῶν ἐξουσία. He calls God an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ὡσπερ ἐν ἡμείς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σχιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ξοὶ ημεν τὸ δὲ τι, ἀτώ καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, χρῆς ἐκείνα ἀποθέπων, τὰ τῆς ἡμᾶς κεκόσμηκεν ἀλλ' ἵστεν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ σχιαγραφήματα ἀτέλη ἔστων, ἐκείνοι δὲ ὥστε ἐν τῷΘεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ πανελείμενοι ἔστων. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at these Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those Reasons or Proportions, which exist in God, are ARCHETYPAL and all-perfect.

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

F f 3 ——how
Proclus proves the Existence of these General Ideas or Universal Forms by the following Arguments. ——: if there be a Cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing operate from its own proper Essence, such Cause is primarily, what its Effect is, secondarily, and that which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth
to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life: and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, that the Cause of the Universe, operating after this manner, is that primarily, which the World is secondarily. If therefore the World be the multitude of Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be primarily in the Cause of the World; for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The Forms therefore, previous to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient Causes, are to be found pre-existing in that one and common Cause of all the Universe. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this antient Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Orpheus himself.

If the Phrase, to operate merely by existing, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359.
That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy, where he forms the Character of these Divine and Creative Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—αλλ' είπερ ἑθέλοιμεν τὴν ἴδιότητα αὐτῶν (sic. Ιδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμικών, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάθωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικόν, ὦν ἔν' εὖ ποιησίαν ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικόν, ὥν ποιησίαν, εἰ κ' ἐν' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιησίαν, κ' ταῦτα ἑνώσασθε φῶ- μεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς Ιδιας δημιουργικὰς ἀρχας κ' νοερὰς παντῶν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεμένων. But if we should choose to define the peculiar character of Ideas by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from natural Principles the Power of effecting, merely by existing, all the things that they effect; and from artificial Principles the Power of comprehending all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that Ideas are at once the efficient and intelligent Causes of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem.

The
The Verfes of Orpheus on this subject may be found in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. Edit. Sylburg.

Zeus ἀρσεν γένετο, Zeus x. τ. λ.

P. 391—Where all things lie invected, &c.

—οTargetException ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τίνα με-ρισμόν, τοσαῦτα ἐς ΤΟ ΕΝ εἰκεν πέρι τῇ μερισμῷ κατὰ τὸ πάνιν ἀμερίς· ἐ γὰρ ἐν, ὡς ἐ ἄρχεσι, κα-θάπερ ο Σπεύσιππος ἐδόξε ἑγείν, ἀλλὰ ΕΝ, ως ΠΑΝΤΑ. As numerous as is the multitude of individuals by partition, so numerous also is that principle of unity by universal impartibility. For it is not one, as a minimum is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say), but it is one, as being all things. Damascius πειρὰ Αρχάν, MS.

P. 408—the wisest nations—the most copious languages.] It is well observed by Muræus—Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quaesierunt. Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411.—But what was their philosophy?] The same Muræus has the following passage upon the Roman taste for philosophy.—

Beati autem illi, et opulentì, et omnium gentium victores Romani, in petendis honoribus, et in prenñandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo compendiosis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Graeculis efurientibus, relinquebant. Ifs, quod ab avari-
Additional Notes.

quia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus relictum erat
temporis, ejus si partem aliquid aut ad audiendum Graecum
quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia
libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad
eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profligata-
tam jacere Graeciam somniabant. Var. Lect. VI. i.

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