From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Via: (1) Commander Naval Forces, Far East

Subj: Report of Operation Platform

Ref: (a) COMNAVFE conf. MSG of 110610Z AUG
(b) CONSEVENTHFLT conf. MSG of 112542Z AUG
(c) CINCPACFLT INST. 3500.2

Encl: (1) Summary of Operations
(2) Tabulated Data
(3) Area Chart, Operation Platform
(4) Flight Procedures and Control

1. Operation Platform was conducted in accordance with reference (a) and (b).

2. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (c).

J. T. HAYWARD

Copy to:
COMAIRPAC
COMNAVFE
CONSEVENTHFLT
C.T.F. 95
C.T.G. 95.1
At 0700Z, 26 August 1953, the USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119), Captain J.T. HAYWARD, USN, Commanding, departed Sasebo, Japan, for Inchon, South Korea, to play a key role in one of the most unusual operations of the Korean war—the movement of some six thousand Indian troops into the Demilitarized Zone separating the Communist and the UN-controlled portions of Korea. Thus the U.S. Navy was called on to play an unexpected role in an operation designed to speed the execution of the Armistice Agreement between the United Nations and the Communists. It seemed particularly appropriate that a ship attached to the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force should be selected for this role and that a second ship of this Force, H.M.S. OCEAN, a British carrier, should be called upon to complete the task when previous operational commitments required the POINT CRUZ to leave the area on 30 September. This Force, under the command of Rear Admiral C.E. OLSEN, USN, is the nine-nation naval organization that gave the world its first demonstration of naval unity of action under the United Nations Command and played a key role in the active prosecution of the Korean conflict. Now a ship from that Force was to have an equally vital part in a peaceful maneuver in support of the same United Nations' goal; and now another member of the UN—INDIA—was joining the team working to bring peace to Korea.

The background for Operation Platform (called Operation Byway by the U.S. Army and Operation Patang ("Kite") by the Indian troops involved) can be

* Australia, Canada, Columbia, Great Britain, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, United States.
found in the reluctance of certain Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war to return to their homes. A problem that prevented the signing of an armistice agreement for many months, it was finally resolved in mid-1953 by the negotiators at Panmunjom. The solution agreed on was simple: at the completion of the repatriation of all willing POWs, the unwilling ones would be turned over to the Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War (composed of Indian, Swedish, Swiss, Czech and Polish representatives) and guarded by Indian troops while representatives of the prisoners' home governments attempted to "persuade" them to return home. After a 90-day "persuasion" period, and if a further 30-day attempt to decide their fate in a political conference failed, these men were to be released from POW status. However the execution of this mutually agreeable program was threatened by the hostility of South Korean President Syngman Rhee, who announced that no Indian troops would be permitted to land in South Korea. This left the UN Command with a choice of abandoning the entire plan (and with it a quick armistice) or of finding some method of getting around Mr. Rhee's objections. The latter course was chosen and thus the idea for Operation Platform was born.

The reasoning behind Operation Platform was simple: move the Indian troops into the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone (controlled by the UN Command under the Military Armistice Commission, and not by the South Korean Government); and then, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, move the POW's into this same area, all without conflict with our South Korean allies. Although no one knew whether Mr. Rhee would actually order his troops to attack the Indians if they were landed in
South Korea, it was thought best to take no chances, and so it was planned to move them into the Demilitarized Zone without touching South Korean soil. This could be done in two ways: (1) up the Han River estuary and the Imjin river by boat, a possibility that was very soon abandoned because of low water and the consequent hazardous if not impossible navigating conditions involved; or (2) flying the troops into the Zone. The latter was selected, and, with no conventional airfields in existence in the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone, helicopters were the obvious solution.

As finally decided, then, Operation Platform was to be a "hop, skip and jump" operation: the Indian troops would come to Incheon by troop transport, would "hop" to a carrier in the harbor via small craft, would "skip" up to its flight deck to board waiting helicopters there, and finally would "jump" over South Korean territory into the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone to the location of the holding camp for the prisoners they were destined to guard. Participants in the operation were: six transports which brought the troops to Incheon – two British ships, EMPIRE PRIDE and DILWARA; two Indian, JALAGOPAL and JALADURGA; two American, M.S.T.S. GENERAL COLLINS and USS MENIFEE – the USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119), the army's FIRST TRANSPORTATION ARMY AVIATION BATTALION (PROV), MARINE HELICOPTER SQUADRON 161 and 2ND FAST AIR DELIVERY PLATOON, both attached to the First Marine Division and LCU's from U.S. Naval Fleet Activities, Incheon, to move the troops from the transports to the carrier. The efficiency and smoothness with which this team operated can be shown by the results: 6061 Indian troops, with their weapons and packs, plus some other personnel, moved some 30 miles over
water and land in 1261 helicopter trips in 10 days of operations without the loss of a single man.

It may be said that the active participation of POINT CRUZ in Operation Platform began with her arrival at Inchon early in the afternoon of 27 August. Previously, approximately half of the aircraft belonging to her attached Marine squadron had been flown off to an air station in Japan to provide the additional room needed for the planned operation. Immediately after her arrival in Inchon, contact was made with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Transportation Army Aviation Battalion, the officer who was to be in overall command of the helicopter phase of the transfer. Arrangements were made to begin briefings and rehearsals the following day for the Army and Marine pilots who would be flying the helicopters. This was done on Friday and Saturday, 26 and 29 August, when Army and Marine pilots and helicopters were brought aboard. The pilots were instructed in the proper procedures for landing aboard the carrier; patterns for landing and for holding were worked out; signals were arranged for control of the aircraft approaching the ship and, on her deck, vital radio communications arrangements were worked out, in short, all the many necessary details which seem so obvious but which must be covered beforehand if such an operation is to function smoothly and without casualty from the start. As an added precaution, it was arranged that several landing craft would be stationed in the harbor at intervals along the overwater flight route, and those were supplied by USS MENIFEE (APA 202).

The transfer of Indian troops was accomplished in a series of eight steps. 1. The troops were transported from their troopship to the carrier by
Army and Navy LCU's.

2. The troops would be landed from the LCU on a large float secured to the port quarter of the carrier. Here the troops would assemble, waiting to come aboard. By assembling the troops on the float, over crowding and confusion on the carrier's hangar deck was avoided.

3. The foot of the accommodation ladder was placed on the float and planking with cross-lights was secured over the steps. By rigging the accommodation ladder in this manner, the angle of ascent was not so great and the planking provided a better footing for the soldiers with their bulky equipment.

4. Once on the carrier's hangar deck, the troops were split into groups of five. It might be pointed out that the basic load for the Sikorsky helicopters (called H-19 by the Army and HRS-2 by the Marines) involved had been fixed at five men plus equipment, or not over 2000 pounds. To facilitate this, an area was roped off and chairs were arranged in five rows of five chairs each. In this roped off area the troops were briefed by their own officers on how to board the helicopters, how to operate the CO2 type life jackets and what to do in the event of an accident. Sailors and officers of the carrier demonstrated to the troops how to get into the life jackets and how to inflate them. As one group of five soldiers would leave this area, five more would take their places. In this way, five groups of five men each could be briefed continuously.

5. After the briefing the troops were taken to the flight deck on the carrier's forward elevator. By using the elevator time and effort were saved and serious injuries were avoided.

6. Once on the flight deck, the troops would wait alongside the carrier's island for the helicopters to land. Palisades were rigged so that a ca-
nopy could be placed over this waiting station as a protection against the rain.

7. The helicopter crewmen and carrier personnel would assist in the handling of equipment and would reiterate necessary precautions to be followed in flight as the troops boarded the helicopter. In flight the troops were relaxed and enjoyed the experience. After the helicopter had completed the over-water leg of the journey, the helicopter crewmen would assist the soldiers in the removal of their life jackets.

8. Upon reaching the demilitarized zone, the helicopter would touch down only long enough for the troops to disembark and then start the return trip to the carrier while the troops received directions to their billeting area.

On the morning of 1 September the British Steamer, EMPIRE PRIDE, carrying approximately 1700 Indian troops, arrived at Inchon and anchored near POINT CRUZ. Operation Platform was immediately set in motion, and at 1030 several Army helicopters, carrying life preservers for use by the troops, arrived aboard the carrier. The first troops of the 190th Indian Brigade, a group of 150, arrived at POINT CRUZ at noon. The first three helicopters on deck at 1220, were loaded immediately. The first one was off at 1223, the third by 1226. From there on, operations proceeded steadily and smoothly until 1715 when activity ceased for the day. On the first day, in slightly less than five hours, some 437 Indian troops, with their weapons and combat packs, were moved to the Demilitarized Zone in 89 helicopter flights without casualty or delay.

The lift of troops brought in by EMPIRE PRIDE was resumed the next day.
and continued until 1100 of the 3rd. By the time the transport was ready for her return trip, 1704 Indian personnel had been flown to the Demilitarized Zone in 348 flights. After the 3rd, there was a few days' rest for carrier and helicopters, until the arrival of the second of the four troop ships, the British steamer DILWARA on 6 September. Unloading operations were carried out on the 7th, and in nine hours 979 troops with weapons and packs were moved in 196 flights. Next to arrive was the Indian ship JALADURGA on 13 September and was completed on the 15th. On the morning of the 16th the MST3 troopship GENERAL COLLINS, carrying 267 Indian troops, arrived at Inchon and the troops on board were moved between 1010I and 1413I. For these two ships, then, between 140700I and 161413I, 1555 troops were carried into the Demilitarized Zone in 328 flights.

The final phase of "Operation Platform" commenced at 280838 and was concluded at 301330I after a total of 1823 troops had been transferred, 1368 from the Indian ship JALAGOPAL and 455 from the USS MENIFEE (APA-202), in 389 flights.

The whole operation, which included the transfer of the 6061 Indian troops in 1261 helicopter trips, was accomplished in 65 hours and 19 minutes with no injuries or accidents to personnel or equipment involved.
190TH INDIAN BRIGADE

EMPIRE PRIDE - 1 September 1704 Troops

1. 6th Battalion JATS
2. Detachment of 26 General Hospital Men and Officers
3. Force Headquarters Signal Unit
4. Detachment, Indian Red Cross
5. Headquarters Custodian Force
   Deputy Force Commander Brigadier Gurbaksh Lingh, DSC, OBE
6. Headquarters 190th Brigade Staff Officers
   Commander Brigadier R.S. Paintal

DILWARA - 6 September 979 Troops

1. 3rd Battalion DAGRA Regiment
2. Detachment of 26 General Hospital Men and Officers
3. Headquarters Custodian Force

JALADURGA - 13 September 1288 Troops

1. 5th Battalion Rajputana Rifles
2. Detachment of 26 General Hospital Men and Officers
3. Detachment of Force Headquarters Signal Unit
4. Headquarters Custodian Force

GENERAL COLLINS - 16 September 267 Troops

1. 60th Indian Forward Ambulance Unit

JALAGOPAL - 27 September 1366 Troops

1. 3rd Battalion GARRWAL Rifles
2. Detachment of 26 General Hospital Men and Officers
3. Indian Accounts Department
4. 11th Field Engineering Unit
5. 1st Corp SIKH (120 officers and men)

MENIFEE - 27 September 455 Troops

1. 2nd Parachute Battalion MAHARATHAS.
2. MAHAR Machine Gun Battalion (one company only)

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ENCLOSURE (2) Page 2
Landing

a. Landing Circle.

Pilots will enter the landing circle from well aft of the ship. The landing circle will be a left hand elliptical pattern formed on port side aft. The forward point of which will not extend forward of the aft end of the flight deck. No more than five (5) helicopters will be in the landing circle at one time. Pilots will be signalled in to land as they approach the LSO platform, if a landing signal is not received by the time the LSO platform is reached the pilot will continue around the orbit for another approach.

Plane directors will be stationed adjacent to their respective landing spots and will signal the pilot to land by holding a green flag aloft. A red flag will be shown when a landing is not to be made.

b. Holding Circle.

No more than five (5) helicopters will be in the landing circle at one time. The sixth and succeeding helicopters will form a right hand elliptical holding circle aft and on the starboard side of the ship, the forward point of this circle will not extend forward of the aft end of the flight deck.

When a pilot reaches the aft end of the holding circle he may proceed across to the landing circle if there are less than five (5) helicopters in that circle.

c. Landing.

Upon landing each pilot will, in so far as wind conditions permit, keep the tail rotor to port and the axis of his helicopter parallel to the helicopter next forward of him.

Normally rotors will be left engaged unless in the pilots opinion a dangerous situation precludes so doing, or unless he is otherwise directed to cut.

Take Off

Take-offs will be made when the director signals the pilot to do so with a green flag. Fly control will not give the director the command to launch his helicopter until the helicopter next aft has been loaded and all personnel are clear of that area.

Upon take-off the pilot will clear the ship from the bow or the starboard side and take his departure from well forward of the bow.
Emergencies

All pilots will monitor the emergency channel at all times. When an emergency develops and a pilot requests an immediate landing aboard, all other pilots will clear the vicinity of the ship. Fly control will direct the launching of all helicopters on deck when troops and other personnel have been cleared off. Helicopters on deck will not launch without signal from the plane directors.

The ship's motorwhale boats will be equipped with portable radios, pilots should make their intentions known to the coxswains if a water landing has to be made. Other crash boats may be stationed on the routes to the beach.

Communications and Signals

a. Yardarm Signals.

The "King" flag two-blocked indicates to airborne pilots that the ship is ready to or is launching or recovering helicopters. "King" at the dip indicates a slight delay in operations or that the ship is preparing for helicopter operations. Pilots should remain in the landing or holding circles.

"Emergency" flag two-blocked indicates an emergency in progress. All helicopters except the helicopter in difficulty will clear the vicinity of the ship.

White flag at fly control is a signal for plane directors and pilots that planes may be landed or launched on plane directors signals.

Red flag at fly control indicates to plane directors and pilots to hold launches or landings, i.e. personnel in danger, elevators lowered, fire, or other hazard to flight is present.

Standard airport tower signals utilizing red or green lights may be used to supplement the above signals.