From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via:  
1. Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN  
2. Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
3. Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
4. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subject: Action Report for the period of 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952

Reference: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4

Enclosures: (1) CVG 102 Action Report 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 28 October 1952 through 22 November 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I  
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), with Carrier Air Group 102 embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor as a unit of Task Force 70, under SECRET orders, in company with the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening units at 13241 on 28 October 1952. Commander Task Force 70 and Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33). At 0200 31 October 1952 Task Force 70 was dissolved and the same units formed Task Element 77.01.

At 0351 31 October 1952 Task Element 77.01 was dissolved and the units joined Task Force 77, Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM H. E. Regan, USN embarked in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). Other ships in company were the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63), with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. Clark, USN embarked; the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening destroyers. On 1 November 1952 Commander Carrier Division FIVE assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 aboard the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33); the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) with Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked, departed from the Task Force. The ship departed area SUGAR for Yokosuka on 19 November 1952, arriving 22 November 1952.

During the period in the forward area operations were conducted in accordance with Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order 2-52. The mission...
of the Force, in support of the United Nations conflict with North Korea, was close air support to front line ground forces, interdiction of enemy movements and resupply over Northeast Korean supply lines and storage areas, destruction of enemy troops, and air support of Naval gunfire.

PART II
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

26 OCTOBER 1952
Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 1324 in company with the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and accompanying destroyer screen. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN CTF 70 and COMCARDIV 5 embarked aboard the U.S.S. KEARSARGE.

29 OCTOBER 1952
In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. Conducted AA firing exercises. At 2330, the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) and accompanying destroyer screen joined Task Force 70. VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMTHFLT embarked in the U.S.S. MISSOURI.

30 OCTOBER 1952
In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. Conducted flight operations. Launched 44 sorties consisting of ASP patrols, jet reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance flights.

31 OCTOBER 1952
In company with Task Force 70 enroute to the Korean operating area. At 0200 Task Force 70 was dissolved and Task Element 77.01 was formed consisting of the same ships formerly in Task Force 70. At 2035 Task Element 77.01 was dissolved and units joined Task Force 77 consisting of the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) with RADM R. E. REGAN, USN, CTF 77 and COMCARDIV 1 embarked, the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and screening destroyers with COMDESDIV 12 designated as the screen commander.

1 NOVEMBER 1952
COMCARDIV 5, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN assumed duties as CTF 77. CTF 77 cancelled flight operations due to inclement weather and high seas.

2 NOVEMBER 1952
Conducted combat flight operations.

3 NOVEMBER 1952
Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA; dry stores and provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS; and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CALIENTE. Conducted AA firing exercises.
4 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises. ENS A. L. RIKER, USNR, VA 923, was shot down while on a strike in the Wonsan area. Although he was seen to parachute from his plane, rescue operations were hindered due to heavy AA fire and ENS RIKER is listed as missing in action.

5 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises. A flight deck crewman, John May GUILDHORN AA, USN, was fatally injured when he fell and was crushed beneath an aircraft being towed by a tractor.

6 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

7 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. TALUGA. Conducted AA firing exercises.

8 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

9 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Poor weather restricted afternoon flights. Conducted AA firing exercises.

10 NOVEMBER 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

11 NOVEMBER 1952

Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CIMARRON.

12 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather and high seas.

13 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather and high seas.

14 NOVEMBER 1952

Flight operations were cancelled due to inclement weather.
15 November 1952

Afternoon flight operations were restricted and evening flights were cancelled due to weather. LT G. A. GAUDETTE, USNR, VA 923 failed to return from a combat mission. His plane was seen to spin into a mountain side. Since no parachute was seen, he is presumed to be dead. LT D. I. KINNEY, USNR, VC 61 detachment GEORGE, successfully parachuted in the vicinity of K-18 and was recovered uninjured.

16 November 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

17 November 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Evening operations were cancelled due to poor weather.

18 November 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. At approximately 13401, CIC reported bogies at 82 miles. Task Force 77 CAP consisted of 8 ORISKANY F9F-5's. One division of this CAP was vectored to remain between the bogies and the force. At about 60 miles the bogies were identified as seven (7) MIG type aircraft. The MIG's broke for attack and opened fire on the CAP. In the resulting melee, two MIG's were shot down and two were badly damaged. One MIG pilot was observed bailing out. The second division of CAP was not engaged. One F9F-5 received a hit in the fuselage forward of the tail section. LT E. R. WILLIAMS, USNR and LTJG J. D. MIDDLETON, USN, both of VF 781, were each credited with the destruction of one MIG. LTJG D. M. ROWLANDS, USNR, was credited with severely damaging one MIG.

19 November 1952

Replenished dry stores and provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS; aviation and electronic stores from the U.S.S. CHOURRE; ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN; and NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CIMARRON. Upon completion of replenishment CTF 77 detached the U.S.S. ORISKANY and directed it to proceed to Yokosuka for upkeep.

20 November 1952

Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

21 November 1952

Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

22 November 1952

Arrived Yokosuka. End of reporting period.
PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure of air ordnance (see enclosure (1)).

2. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for training.
   a. During employment with CTF 70
      (1) Service Types
         5"/38 AAC Proj.  14
         5"/38 Non-flashless cart.  14
      (2) Training Type
         3"/50 FCL (VT) NF Non-flashless  76
   b. During employment with CTF 77
      (1) Service Types
         5"/38 AAC Proj.  63
         5"/38 FCL (VT) Proj.  30
         5"/38 Non-flashless cart.  93
         3"/50 FCL (VT) Non-flashless  564
      (2) Training Types
         3"/50 FCL (VT) NF Non-flashless  14

3. Performance was considered normal and satisfactory with the exception of three instances in which 3"/50 NF steel cases were not ejected after firing. The ejector lips have in each instance remained undamaged while bending and parting those portions of the case fuse which they engage. The case walls show light scoring which may or may not have been made after firing. At present it is believed that heat of firing causes binding through either expansion or the binding of similar metals. A more comprehensive report will be made through normal channels after further research and evaluation.

PART IV
BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by the ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy (see enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft (see enclosure (1)).
PART V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.

a. Personnel.

During the period of this report morale and personnel performance has been excellent despite the fact that approximately forty-nine (49) enlisted personnel are berthed on cots and living out of seabags. U.S.S. ORISKANY letter serial 2282 of 13 November 1952 to COMAIRPAC covers this problem and requests installation of additional bunks and lockers. During this period the average on board count was 2768: 2052 ship's company; 61 marines; 17 SWU team and 638 CVG 102.

Critical shortages exist in the following rates: ET, FC, MM, and AA/AN. U.S.S. ORISKANY CONFIDENTIAL letter serial 0207 of November to COMAIRPAC covers the shortage of ET ratings.

Despite the critical shortage in some rates, berthing on cots of personnel, lack of movies during operating periods, and irregular intervals of mail delivery, the overall general performance and morale of all hands is still at a very high level.

b. Training.

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

- Enrolled 6 Officer Correspondence Courses
- Enrolled 123 Enlisted Correspondence Courses
- Enrolled 3 USAFI College Extension Courses
- Enrolled 42 USAFI Correspondence Courses
- 22 USAFI GED Examinations taken
- 12 USAFI GED Examinations requested
- Ordered 2 USAFI end of course examinations
- 165 Classroom hours held by divisions
- 509 Students attending classes (Classes are held 6 days per week)

Legal activity for the period covered by this report declined considerably. The total number of mast cases, courts-martial, and sundry legal assistance matters processed is estimated to have decreased to less than 60 per cent of normal.

d. Welfare and Recreation.

Bingo equipment has been procured for regularly scheduled bingo parties in the various crew's messing compartments, Chief Petty Officers' Mess, Warrant Officers' Mess and Ward Room. Happy hours are conducted on replenishing
days, making use of the ship's band and talent from ship's company and Air Group. Occasionally the band plays in the Ward Room.

The Hobby Shop is open daily for use by all hands. It carries a wide variety of crafts, leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc.

The ship's library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

e. Religious Services.

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) Masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots.

Protestant Divine Services are conducted on Sunday mornings and regularly as operation schedule permits. Vesper services and Bible Class meets on Wednesday evenings.

Jewish Services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish Calendar.

f. Public Information Office.

Activities of the Public Information Office were as follows:

Twenty daily press releases,
210 individual hometown releases,
Four reels of tape recordings and hometown releases consisting of 44 recordings,
a broadcast each evening of the day's combat events over the radio or public address system. (This daily event has proven very popular. The Assistant AIO prepares the script and presents the information as news commentator.)
Publication of the daily press sheet known as the HERKIMER HERALD and of the ship's paper, THE PATRIOT (bi-monthly)

2. Casualties.

a. Ship's Company.

The following casualties were incurred by U.S.S. ORISKANY personnel:
(1) On 5 November 1952 Airman John Max GULDHORN was killed as a result of an accident involving a towed aircraft. He was walking between the tow bars of a tractor towing an F4U-5. When he jumped over the tow bars he slipped and fell under the right wheel of the aircraft. The aircraft stopped on his midsection and caused extreme crushing of the abdomen and chest. His death followed approximately 7 minutes after the accident. Cause of death was listed as "Injuries Multiple Extreme Number 8651,"

[Redacted information]
(2) On 10 November 1952, MM1 Edward Herrick TOWNSEND died. Cause of death was listed as "Thrombosis Coronary Artery Number 7402."

b. Air Group 102. (see enclosure (1))

PART VI
COMMENTS

1. Engineering Department.

a. Casualties.

(1) No major damage sustained from any cause.

(2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/1/52</td>
<td>Minor deflection of Port side Gasoline Filling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Platform.</td>
<td>Heavy Seas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/1/52</td>
<td>Plastic Fire Clay dislodged approximately 4 1/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>feet along water screen header, superheater</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>side #6 Boiler.</td>
<td>360 degree rotation of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>soot blower, due to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sheared stop pin, caused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>condensed moisture to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strike fire clay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/3/52</td>
<td>Superficial smoke and fire damage to</td>
<td>Class &quot;A&quot; Fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squadron Locker #2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Recommendations.

(1) None.

c. Steaming Data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engine Miles Steamed</th>
<th>8045.8 miles.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Received</td>
<td>1,336,938 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Delivered</td>
<td>1,354,498 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Consumed (underway)</td>
<td>1,327,135 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Consumed (anchored)</td>
<td>0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Speed</td>
<td>15.6 Knots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Underway</td>
<td>514.7 Hours.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Fueling.

During the period 28 October to 19 November 1952, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled Destroyers 9 times at an average rate of 102,500 gallons per hour. The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tankers 3 times during this period at an average rate of 186,000 gallons per hour.
2. Medical Department

a. The medical department supplies and equipment were adequate. No significant supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period. It is noted, however, that the procurement of certain items of supplies and equipment in excess of allowance or items not listed in the allowance is necessary and greatly increases the operating efficiency of the department.

b. The medical department personnel allowance of 25 men is considered to be adequate. At the present time there are 19 hospital corpsmen and three strikers on board; and although the mission can be adequately carried out during normal operations, it is felt that should a major casualty incident occur this number would be inadequate.

c. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) For the twenty-two days of this operating period the general morale and physical well being of both the Air Group and Ship's Company was excellent. Minor anxieties, noted as the ship approached the line, disappeared after the second or third day of actual operations. It is felt that the realization that the ship was finally carrying out the mission to which it had been assigned in a more than satisfactory manner meant a great deal to the overall morale of the ship. Speculation as to what might have happened had the period of actual operations been longer, or losses to the enemy greater, is felt to be entirely unwarranted at this time. There was no detectable loss of resistance to disease; the incidence of personnel on the sick list was not increased; no increase in tenseness was noticed; and the number of minor injuries was unchanged.

(2) In general, whatever the effect of a longer period on the line may be, it is not felt that a three week period is too long. Personnel have readily responded to the demands made upon them in a more than adequate manner. The increase in the working day, the increased hardships of colder weather, irregular eating and sleeping conditions have seemed to increase morale and give personnel a pride in being a "can do" outfit rather than having a deleterious effect. In conclusion it is the opinion of this Medical Officer that the ship is a better ship for having had twenty-two days in a forward area.

d. Medical Department Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ship's Company.

| (1) Admitted to sick list. | 190 |
| (2) Admitted to Hinnicle List. | 15 |
| (3) Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days. | 30% |
| (4) Officers admitted to sick list. | 10 |
| (5) Total visits to sick call. | 1161 |
| (6) Patients received from other ships. | 1 |
| (7) Patients transferred to hospital. | 0 |
| (8) Minor injuries treated. | 20 |
| (9) Major injuries treated. | 1 |
(10) Number shipboard injuries resulting in death. 1
(11) Number personnel died of disease. 1
(12) Minor surgical procedures. 25
(13) Major surgical procedures. 3
(14) Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis. 58
   (a) Gonorrhea. 7
   (b) Chancroid. 14
   (c) Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure. 37

c. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen.

(1) Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed not recovered. 2
(2) Planes lost, operational, pilot not recovered. 0
(3) Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries. 1
(4) Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured. 0
(5) Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured. 0
(6) Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured. 0
(7) Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured. 0
(8) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons. 15
(9) Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation. 0
(10) Average number days pilots grounded. 2.4
(11) Crewmen grounded for medical reasons. 0

3. Air Intelligence.

The Air Intelligence Section prior to departure from the West Coast lost the majority of its force due to transfers. One officer and a PNSN constituted the Air Intelligence organization. Two intelligence officers reported aboard at Yokosuka, one assigned by COMAIRPAC and one who had been sent to the Air Intelligence School at COMAIRALAMEDA from the ship. Since the officers and men were not available for duty until the ORISKANY arrived at Yokosuka, little operational experience for the entire organization was possible.

COMNAVFE sent an officer on TAD orders to the ORISKANY prior to departure from Yokosuka for the purpose of lecturing on ESCAPE and Evasion doctrines and procedures. This system seemed more advisable than lecturing in port.

Upon arrival on the line an Air Intelligence officer from the BON HOMME RICHARD reported aboard to assist in briefings and to pass out the latest intelligence information. This was considered of inestimable value and should be continued for all reporting carriers.

Although emphasis is still placed on interdiction operations, considerable effort is now being placed on Close Air Support by the carrier based planes.

It is recommended that the Photo Interpreters work in an office as close to the ship's Air Intelligence office as possible, but not in the Air Intelligence office.
Since Photo Interpretation is a new function on board, the ORISKANY personnel have been temporarily assigned working space in the ship's Air Intelligence office. Work accomplished during this period included Target Searches, Route Surveillance and Tourauds.

Since many of the pilots are somewhat inexperienced in using aerial photography, it was considered necessary to supplement all photography with graphic aids. Target Folders, composed of orientation maps and pin-pointed photographs, were distributed to each pilot. Although this practice will improve the effectiveness of air strikes, the nature of this work in itself proved to be a hardship because of the critically inadequate working space.

4. Photography.

There is a total of nineteen men assigned to the Photo Lab. A night crew of six men was used to complete all printing so that photographs were available for pilot briefing the following day. Air Group personnel processed gun camera film and maintained gun cameras installed in aircraft. Due to lack of experience in processing and printing of aerial film by laboratory personnel, a training program was put in effect and speed and efficiency in production increased throughout the operating period.

A total of 2896 usable 9x9 inch and 7585 usable 9x18 inch prints were made during the period. From 74 8x10 inch negatives of plot charts, overlays and target pinpoint photographs, 902 8x10 inch prints were made. Seven thousand feet of gun camera film were processed.

The Norse B5 developing outfit now in use will not hold a full roll of 9½"x390" aerial film, making it necessary to cut the film and use two reels for developing. It was found that the cover for the AEB aerial film magazine cracked very easily if not handled with extreme care in installation and stowage. This is due to the material used in the construction of the cover.

It is recommended that aerial film developing outfits with a 400 foot capacity and printing paper in 400 foot rolls, in lieu of the present 200 foot rolls, be made available to all units using the K-38 camera with AEB magazines.

5. Communications.

Communications during this period was considered highly satisfactory. The ship manned 22 different frequencies, excluding those of the AN/ARC1. Eleven circuits were manned in Main Radio necessitating a two section watch making it mandatory to place unqualified strikers on some circuits. However, this procedure provided valuable training, and no adverse conditions developed from this practice.
Circuit T6 proved very effective in delivering high precedence traffic; however, the circuit was frequently inoperable due to unknown ship's failing to turn off their transmitters thereby leaving a continuous carrier wave on the air. It is recommended that only large ships guard this circuit. Destroyers should find circuit C4-JC adequate for their traffic.

Reception on circuit B32 was generally good but often deteriorated from midnight to 0600. It is recommended that messages be repeated at least two hours after initial transmission instead of immediately afterwards. This practice would provide different reception conditions with more chance of receiving a clear signal.

The operations of the Primary and Secondary Tactical circuits was considered highly satisfactory. This ship employed two separate transmitters and receivers on these circuits thereby insuring against any fadeout sectors. Recommend that all ships able to do so employ this system of a back up receiver on these circuits.

It is felt that the tendency of using precedences of "OP" and "ON" indiscriminately is a policy that could lead to a major weakness in the Force Communication Linkage. A better part of the traffic bearing such precedence consists of summaries of past action and other unrelated matters, which of itself does not warrant such urgency. As operations now stand, taking particular note of the general inexperience of Communication Office personnel and the cryptographic facilities of the various units, an urgent dispatch dealing with an on-the-spot tactical situation might easily be overlooked for twenty to thirty minutes while that time is spent decoding an intelligence summary of a preceding day. Subject to the above comments the following recommendations are submitted:

1. Recommend commands review current instructions defining the correct use of precedence.

2. Designate a separate circuit for traffic pertaining to tactical situations and other urgent matters only.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Messages Handled in MAIN RADIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transmitted on T6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on T6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relayed on various circuits other than T6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing from ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on B32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on George Fox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Messages Handled</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Messages either from or addressed to U.S.S. ORISKANY (included in above count) 2,147

Total Classified Messages (58,333 groups) 2,147
Messages handled by Signal Bridge

The above total does not include approximately 200 BT's handled during replenishments. Of the 377 total, 77 (1147 groups) were by Nancy.

The following statistics of Postal Activities are considered to be of general interest:

- 1602 Money Orders issued
- Stamps sold: $69,464.34
- Registered mail received: 183 pieces
- Registered mail dispatched: 124 pieces
- Airmail dispatched: 20 sacks (Approx 66,000 letters)
- Airmail received: 46 sacks
- Air Parcel dispatched: 2 sacks (approx 65 parcels)
- First Class received: 5 sacks
- First Class dispatched: 7 sacks
- Parcel Post received: 114 sacks
- Parcel Post dispatched: 76 sacks
- Insured mail dispatched: 105 pieces
- Insured mail received: 123 pieces

The only difficulty encountered in Postal operations was the shortage of stamps in this area. The delay in obtaining stamp stock from Post Office, New York almost imposed a curtailment of Parcel Post leaving the ship. It is recommended that the Fleet Post Office in this area provide stamp stock to ships.

6. Combat Information Center.

Operating procedures. During the period of this report CIC has been assigned the control of CAP, strike, and ASP on a rotational basis. Watch stations, layout of display and status boards, and techniques previously employed had to be revised considerably to adapt them to the demands peculiar to the type of operations experienced. Since none of the CIC Personnel of this ship had previous experience with TF-77 operations, the CIC officer and an Air Controller spent 10 days TAD aboard the PRINCETON and KEARSARGE prior to the ORISKANY's arrival in Japan. This plan of indoctrination is believed to be extremely beneficial and is highly recommended when the CIC team possesses little or no experience with TF-77 operations.

Strike control is practically impossible without the identification features of MK-10 IFF. On one occasion this ship was forced to relinquish strike control because of a temporarily inoperative MK-10 system. In most instances MK-10 is employed as a beacon, or, in reality, an additional radar system to locate and identify friendly targets rather than to distinguish between friendly and bogey. Presentation in CIC was available to only one VK repeater and to one SX console. Additional presentation was urgently
needed and this need has been temporarily solved by piping the SPS-6B and MK-10 video through an unused position in the radar switchboard. Now any repeater can provide the MK-10 presentation as selected by the central control box on the SX console as originally installed.

Equipment performance. Radar performance has been generally good. Single B-29 type aircraft have repeatedly been detected at ranges in excess of 100 miles and an 8-plane flight of jets detected approaching at 85 miles. Although the height information of the SX is not reliable at ranges greater than 45-50 miles, on one occasion accurate altitude determination was established on a flight of 7 MIG-15 type aircraft at nearly zero target angle at a range of 65 miles. The main difficulty experienced operationally with the SPS-6B has been excessive side lobing which masks a wide band of scope presentation throughout nearly 360° at ranges of 40 miles or less from land masses.

The RCK receivers have proven to be quite limited in range unless silencer circuits are almost completely cut out. However, with silencer circuits cut out, the constant noise level of the receiver very nearly cancels out the advantage of slightly increased range. The AN/ARC-1 receivers have been more satisfactory than the RCK's. Good results have been obtained by using both an AN/ARC-1 and an RCK/TDQ simultaneously through the RCA Communication Console. This arrangement allows the advantage of long transmitter range of the TDQ and the best available receiver range of the AN/ARC. This arrangement, however, is only a temporary expedient since use of remote radio stations as selected through the console is lost for other purposes. It is planned to install headset jack boxes at key controller positions to allow transmitting on a TDQ through the normal sub-console units and receiving the AN/ARC through the jack. Excessive cross-talk and feed over on many of the VHF circuits has complicated air control problems, but they have been somewhat reduced by selection of widely separated antennae.

7. Gunnery Department

Copies of the ORISKANY's rearming plan, prepared on the basis of previous operational experience of PRINCETON and KEARSARGE, and obtained by ORISKANY's Advance Liaison Team have been forwarded to all interested commands. This plan has been used in four rearming operations, and on the basis of this limited experience it appears to be the most suitable for this ship. The "bottleneck" factor is the fragility of ORISKANY's electro-hydraulic winches, which equipment is presently under study by BUSHIPS. When these winches are operating properly the rate in loads-per-minute is optimum, but the capacity in pounds per load could be increased with no attendant overburdening in other phases.

8. Air Department

a. Personnel. During this period the personnel complement of the Air Department was as follows:
Although all schedules and requirements were met during this operating period, shortages of personnel were particularly felt in the ordnance and aircraft handling divisions. With the advent of the winter months in Korean waters, it is recommended that at least 500 men be available in the Air Department.

b. Aircraft Handling. During the period the average on board count of aircraft was 73 plus one helicopter. Due to reduction of available space on hangar deck as a result of the CVA-34 conversion program, the rapid handling of aircraft, particularly the F9F, requires the highest degree of coordination in order to meet schedules. Obstructions on hangar bulkheads amplify the parking problem. Aircraft availability sometimes varies by four or five aircraft between squadrons. The sorting of aircraft that go "down" or come "up" only minutes prior to launch time disrupts aircraft handling and pilot plane assignment planning. All special aircraft with the exception of the jet photographic planes are parked aft in Hangar Bay #2 or on the flight deck. A total of five unflyable dud aircraft occupied Hangar Bay #3 at the end of this operating period.

In order to utilize all time possible for ordnance rearming of the AD type aircraft, these planes are recovered last and spotted starboard side and aft during modified ready deck at an angle of approximately sixty degrees with wings spread. This permits ordnance and handling crews to reload wing stations, refold wings and tighten the spot for next recovery. The development of a small easily portable hoist to load 250# bombs on folded AD wings would greatly save time and space. VA squadron 923 is at present designing and experimenting with such a hoist.

c. Catapults and Arresting Gear. During the period of this report 569 catapult launches were made, the majority of which were F9F aircraft. The BUAER forged eye pendant arrestor for the F9F has been unsatisfactory. An RUDM has been submitted reporting the damage to shuttle tow fittings with recommendations for an improved arrestor. The principal change recommended to the arrestor is to put the wire served ends of the bungee into the fire hose under the nylon straps. By using this change 510 successful F9F-5 launches at an average of 20 arreastations per arrestor have been made.

During the period of this report there have been 911 arrested landings. Approximately 50 per cent have been jets. (F9F-5). For forward area operation, arresting gear usage has indicated the desirability of having on board at least 50 per cent spares over current allowance. Highest usage items are the F2H and F9F combination barriers (longs).
d. Gasoline. The Robb quick disconnect coupling has proven to be very efficient and time saving on replenishment days.

9. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

Procurement of aeronautical material from other carriers, mobile support ships, and other local sources has been successful for 61.55 per cent of 463 items requested. However, for priority "A" (53) and "B" (49) requirements availability was only 37.73 per cent and 36.73 percent respectively.

The range of items included in the various allowance lists is considered adequate since 391 of the 463 items requested were for replacement of exhausted or seriously depleted stocks or as an increase in allowance based on squadron recommendations. Most noticeable inadequacies at the present time are the major control surfaces for F4U and AD type aircraft. As time on the line crystallizes this ship's experience, a more complete report of allowance list inadequacies will be made.

Usage of F9F MLG tires has been extremely high - 138 tires and 131 tubes for 436 landings. Information available indicates that other activities have not experienced such a high usage rate; therefore, further comment is withheld for the present.

The squadrons embarked with shortages of hand tools and winter flight clothing. Since the ship's allowance list for these items are intended for replacements only considerable difficulty was experienced on these items. Squadrons and composite units should be properly outfitted prior to embarkation for overseas deployment.

Cold weather items recommended in COMAIRPAC Instruction 44441-5B of 23 July 1952 and appropriate portions of Section "B" allowance are essential to operations in this area. This ship has been unsuccessful to date in its endeavors to obtain certain cold weather items, notably engine preheaters, engine; propeller and cockpit covers; and aircraft gun lubricants.

Certain items of section "B" material continue in short supply. The following items have been procured on an emergency basis only:

- R 85-FW-171394 Liner Weldment - F9F
- R 85-FW-198061 Liner Weldment - F9F
- R 85-HO-A70026 Fuel Controls - F9F
- R 82-GV-9520461 Brake Lining - F9F
- R 94-C-550079 Controller Gun - F9F
- R 82-P-580000 Point Tail Hook - All
- R 82-GY-510717-2 Brake Lining - H035-1
- R 94-C-78550 Gun Chargers AERO - 13A-AD3
Procurement of allowance list items from CONUS has been slow. By effective area procurement, salvage and substitution, AOG's due to lack of parts, for this cruise, were limited to 2 AD3 and 2 FHU for periods of less than 7 days. 1 AD3, 1 F2H2P and 1 AD4W have been AOG for periods in excess of 7 days.

b. General Stores.

Stock level limits have been generally adequate. Most noticeable exceptions have been those for teletype paper and standard solvent, with an increase over part usage of approximately 10 to 1.

c. Ships Store.

It was found necessary to secure the after soda fountain during flight operations due to the proximity of the bomb stowage area and the resultant working groups congregated at or near the fountain. This fountain was used, however, to make ice cream for sale at the forward fountain and, in addition, has made all ice cream for the general mess and the private messes.

Ship's Store schedule was revised to include night operation of one store from 1900 to 2130 on Tuesdays and Thursdays. This revision was necessary due to the fact that the increased workload during operations in the Korean area makes it virtually impossible for many personnel to make purchases during the regular hours.

Shortages have arisen in stocks of cigars, chewing gum and marking tubes (for clothing). These items sold at approximately twice the anticipated rate.

d. Clothing and Small Stores.

C&S Issue Room schedule was revised to include night operations from 1900 to 2130. This revision was necessary due to the fact that the increased workload during operations on the line makes it virtually impossible for many personnel to make purchases during the regular hours.

Shortages have arisen in black socks, dungaree jumpers and chambray shirts. Demand for these items as compared to past experience has proven to be approximately 1.5 to 1, 3 to 1 and 2 to 1, respectively. It should be noted that woolen socks are preferred to cotton socks.

The assigned replenishment ship was short on towels and black socks during the first period in port at Yokosuka. However, information has been received that these items can be procured from other auxiliary ships operating in the area.

e. Commissary.

Since arrival in Korean waters it was found desirable to discontinue the serving of regular night rations and to commence serving a full meal at
2315. This change has met with favorable reception and has resulted in substantial savings in bread and meat.

f. Disbursing.

The exchange of U.S. currency for MTC's and Yen upon first arrival in Japan has presented the largest problem to date. Necessity for procurement of MTC's and Yen after arrival in Yokosuka involved noticeable delay. Non-receipt of complete information regarding currency controls also contributed to the delay. Recommendations on this subject will be covered by separate letter.

It is recommended that all officers be advised as to their rights for additional income tax withholding as prescribed by para. 5543-5 BUSANDA Manual (IM 21-4) in order to prevent delay for those desiring such additional withholding. This should be done prior to arrival in the combat zone.

g. Replenishment Underway.

To date this ship has had two underway replenishments of stores under Supply Department cognizance (other than fuel oil and aviation gasoline) as follows:

11/1/52 - Provisions
11/19/52 - Aviation Stores
Provisions
Aviation Stores

Replenishment of provisions has been only moderately satisfactory in that quantities were drastically cut and in many instances some items were NIS. Further, fresh tomatoes and lettuce have been received in very poor condition. Survey was necessary for approximately one third \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the tomatoes and one fourth \( \frac{1}{4} \) of the lettuce received on 1 November.

Aviation stores were received in far greater quantity than advance reports indicated. Analysis as to types of items and priorities received could not be made prior to submission of this report.

Rate of transfer underway to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Store Type</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>65 tons/hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Stores</td>
<td>45 tons/hour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While far from record shattering, the transfers were apparently effected as fast as the supplying ship could deliver. The provisions transfer was accompanied by substantial damage to crates and packages. The aviation stores transfer was very satisfactory, and accomplished in a safe and orderly fashion.

h. Wardroom Mess.

The major problem to be solved was that of serving a large number of officers at odd hours depending on operational requirements. The shift from
Table services to cafeteria style service at all meals except for the second seating at dinner has solved this problem to a very large extent. Food is kept hot and palatable, and serving time is reduced. This arrangement leaves more time for other requirements, both for the officers and the stewards. This system has received very favorable comment from all personnel concerned.

The procurement of wholesale cuts of Japanese beef and veal by the Ward room Mess has not only improved the variety available to the mess but has proven to be a sizeable economy factor.
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report for the period of 2 December 1952 through 27 December 1952  

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4  
Encl: (1) CVG 102 Action Report 2 December 1952 through 27 December 1952  

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 2 December 1952 through 27 December 1952 is hereby submitted.  

PART I  
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION  

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) with Carrier Air Group 102 embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 0616, 2 December 1952 and at 0826, 4 December 1952 joined Task Force 77 operating in Area Sugar, the Japan Sea. Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31).  

During the operating period other ships in company were the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9), the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked and various cruisers and screening destroyers. On 18 December 1952 Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77; the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) with Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked departed from the Task Force. The ship departed Task Force 77 and Area Sugar for Yokosuka on 24 December 1952, arriving 27 December 1952.  

During the period in the forward area operations were conducted in accordance with Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order 2-52. The Mission of the Force, in support of the United Nations conflict with North Korea, was close air support to front line ground forces, interdiction of enemy movements and resupply over Northeast Korean supply lines and storage areas, destruction of enemy troops and air support of naval gunfire.
PART II
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

2 December 1952
Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 0616 enroute to the Korean operating area.

3 December 1952
Rendezvoused with the U.S.S. RENSHAW (DE-499).

4 December 1952
Rendezvoused with Task Force 77, Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) with Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked was detached from Task Force 77 and departed for Yokosuka, Japan. Conducted combat flight operations. ENS WILLIS RADEBAUGH, USN, VA-923, was hit by AA fire during an attack in the Pyong-gong area. ENS RADEBAUGH was able to remain airbourne until over friendly territory where he parachuted without injury.

5 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations.

6 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations. LT W. P. HUGHES, USNR, VF-874, ditched off Hungnam after being hit by AA fire. LT HUGHES was rescued uninjured by the U.S.S. ROOKS (DD-804) after about 45 minutes in his raft.

7 December 1952
Rendezvoused with T.E. 92.11 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CACAPON (AC-52) and ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA (AKA-58).

8 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9) joined Task Force 77.

9 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations. Captain JAMES A. VAN ZANDT, USNR, member of the House of Representatives, visited the ship.

10 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations.
11 December 1952

Rendezvoused with T.E. 92.11 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CHEMUNG (AO-30) and ammunition from the U.S.S. CHARA (AKA-58).

12 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

13 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

14 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

15 December 1952

Rendezvoused with T.E. 92.11 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CHEMUNG (AO-30) and ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18). Received provisions and dry stores from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55).

16 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

17 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations.

18 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5 embarked, joined Task Force 77. RADM HICKEY relieved RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV 1 as CTF 77. The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), with COMCARDIV 1, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, embarked was detached and departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

19 December 1952

Rendezvoused with T.E. 92.11 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. TALUGA (AO-62) and ammunition from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18). Received aviation stores from the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1).

20 December 1952

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing practice.
21 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations.

22 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing practice. LTJG J. A. HUDSON, USN, VA-923, was seen to crash during an attack west of Songjin. Since the aircraft exploded on impact and no parachute or other evidence of survival was noted, LTJG HUDSON is presumed dead.

23 December 1952
Conducted combat flight operations.

24 December 1952
Rendezvoused with T.E. 92.11 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. MISPILLION (AO-105) and ammunition from the U.S.S. TITANIA (AKA-13). Upon completion of replenishment, the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in company with the U.S.S. SHIELDS (DD-596), was detached from Task Force 77 and ordered to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep.

25 December 1952
Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

26 December 1952
Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. Conducted AA firing practice.

27 December 1952
Arrived Yokosuka. End of reporting period.

PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ammunition expenditures for the period 4 December to 23 December 1952.
   a. Service Types (Included in enclosure (1)).
   b. Training Types
      
      5\(\text{in}/38\) projectile AAC 35
      5\(\text{in}/38\) projectile FCL (UT) 47
      5\(\text{in}/38\) powder SPDN 82
      3\(\text{in}/50\) cartridge FCL (UT) non frag non flash 70
PART IV
BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by the ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy (see enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft (see enclosure (1)).

PART V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

a. Personnel

During the period of this report the morale was excellent and personnel performance improved considerably with experience in combat operations. The total number of personnel berthed on cots has been decreased to 21 men which has reduced this morale problem. During this period the average on board count was 2735: 2025 ship’s company; 63 marines; 17 SWU team and 630 CVG 102.

Critical shortages exist in the following rates: ET, FC, RM, MM, EM, AO and AA/AN. These shortages have been the subject of official correspondence.

b. Training

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

- New classes organized: 04
- Active classes at end of period: 11
- Classroom hours held this period: 196
- Navy Training Courses (texts) checked out: 61
- Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered by men: 33
- USAFI texts checked out: 14
- USAFI correspondence courses ordered: 43
- USAFI GED tests administered: 30
- USAFI end of Course Tests administered: 01
- USAFI GED batteries ordered by men: 33
- Enrollments in college extension courses: 04
- Letters sent to civilian schools on behalf of men for counseling and placement purposes: 03
- Requests for service schools forwarded: 14

A class in Personnel and Administration procedures has been organized in order to train all Yeomen, Personnelmen and strikers. This class
is also open to Department Administrative Officers, Division Officers and Junior Division Officers in the study of quarterly marks assignment, Navy Job Classification Code Manual, and advancement in rating.

c. Welfare and Recreation

Regularly scheduled bingo games have been conducted at 1900 on Wednesdays and Saturdays of each week in the crew's messing compartments for enlisted men, on Fridays for Chief Petty Officers and Warrant Officers. Happy hours have been conducted on replenishment days, using talent from ship's company and air group.

The Ship's Glee Club meets regularly on the evening preceding replenishment days.

The Hobby Shop is open daily for use by all hands. It carries a wide variety of crafts, e.g., leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc.

The Ship's Library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

d. Religious Services

Catholic services are held daily. Three Masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots.

Protestant Divine Services are conducted at 0900 on Sunday mornings, Vesper services at 1900. The Bible Class meets at 1900 on Wednesdays.

Jewish services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish calendar.

Mormon services are conducted at 1000 on Sundays.

Christian Science study periods are observed on Sundays at 1100.

A memorial service was held on 26 December for LTJG JAMES A. HUDSON, USN, of VA-923 who was killed in action on 22 December 1952.

A special Christmas Eve carol service was conducted at 2200, 24 December and Catholic services were conducted at midnight.

e. Public Information activities covered during the period of this report consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily news dispatches</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown releases</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feature stories</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still pictures</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape recordings released</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ORIS Daily News Commentator broadcasts at approximately 1930 daily the day's combat events and other special or spot announcements of interest to the crew.

"Operation Morale Lift 1952", a movie showing family scenes of dependents of 90 officers and men of the ORISKANY, was shown on Christmas day.

2. Casualties
   a. Ship's Company

   No ship's company casualties occurred other than minor injuries during the reporting period.

   b. Air Group 102. (See enclosure (1)).

PART VI
COMMENTS

1. Engineering Department
   a. Casualties
      (1) No major damage was sustained from any cause.
      (2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations:

      | Date    | Description                               | Cause          |
      |---------|-------------------------------------------|----------------|
      | 12/23/52| Minor damage to flight deck involving     | Aircraft landing|
      |         | approximately 1000 linear feet of deck   |                |
      |         | planking                                   |                |

   b. Recommendations
      (1) None

c. Steaming Data

   Engine miles steamed - 84,012
   Fuel oil received - 1,472,896 gals
   Fuel oil delivered DD's - 187,220 gals
   Fuel oil consumed (underway) - 1,351,202 gals
   Fuel oil consumed (anchored) - 9803 gals
   Average speed - 15.06
   Hours underway - 557.7

d. Fueling

   During the period 2 December to 24 December 1952, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled destroyers three (3) times at an average rate of 120,000 gallons per hour.
The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tanks five (5) times during this period at an average rate of 163,600 gallons per hour.

2. Communications

Communication difficulties were noticeably minimized during the current period of operations, and no noteworthy difficulties were experienced.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN RADIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transmitted on UHF Ratt</td>
<td>1,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on UHF Ratt</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relayed on various circuits other than UHF Ratt</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing from ship</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on B32</td>
<td>5,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on George Fox</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received on George Roger Fox</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relayed on UHF Ratt</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total messages handled</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,908</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Messages either addressed to or from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (included in above count) 570

Total classified messages (90,116 groups) 2,546

MESSAGES HANDLED ON SIGNAL BRIDGE

Total incoming and outgoing 496

Note: The total noted above does not include approximately 50 messages handled during replenishment periods. Of the total, 86 messages (1,386 groups) were by Nancy.

The following statistics of postal activities are considered to be of general interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of 1,506 money orders issued</td>
<td>$62,498.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered mail received</td>
<td>338 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered mail dispatched</td>
<td>188 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Class mail received</td>
<td>10 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Class mail dispatched</td>
<td>14 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel Post received</td>
<td>440 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel Post dispatched</td>
<td>151 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured mail received</td>
<td>815 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured mail dispatched</td>
<td>121 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mail received</td>
<td>60 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mail dispatched</td>
<td>56 pouches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Air Intelligence

Flak in and near the target areas is plotted on four AM3 L751 charts covered with acetate. A series of these charts are made up for the navy area of responsibility and an overlay of the areas covered is maintained on a 1:500,000 chart. Ready reference to these target charts posed a problem. Swinging panels, as have been employed on other carriers, was considered, but due to the minimum number such a rig can hold it was discarded. At present these charts are attached by means of staples to wooden slats 35 inches by 1/4 inch by 3/4 inch. These wooden slats rest on the one inch flange of two angle irons 18 inches long. One angle iron is attached to a file cabinet and the other to a bulkhead approximately three feet from the deck. This arrangement easily accommodates fifty target charts.

With the advent of winter, camouflage and deception as employed by the North Koreans, has lost some of its effectiveness. Photo Interpretation of supposedly empty AW positions disclosed tracks leading from the empty revetments to nearby buildings. It is considered that the North Koreans might use such tactics in view of the mobility of their AW guns.

4. Combat Information Center

CIC personnel from destroyers were assigned TAD aboard the ORISKANY for qualification and refresher training as air controllers. Refresher training of previously qualified air controllers poses no special problems, and requalification can be accomplished in a reasonably short time. However, initial qualification of prospective air controllers who have had little background or training in the mechanics of air intercept, jet and conventional aircraft performance, radio procedure, vocabulary of brevity codes, etc. is not considered practicable aboard a carrier operating on the line. Refresher training requires relatively few practice intercepts while initial training leading to qualification requires a substantial number. In three carrier operations each CVA can normally expect CAP control only one day out of each four, and time available for practice intercepts is quite limited. It is therefore recommended that only refresher training be given on board operating carriers.

5. Photography

The number of ship's photographic personnel assigned remained at 18. This figure includes one warrant, one AFC, and ten rated men. The number and rating of personnel assigned are proving generally adequate. However, it is felt that the addition of one rated camera repairman would materially reduce the high percentage of photo mission failures due to camera malfunction. Statistical summary of failures: total photo missions this operating period - 66; total failures - 20; failures due to camera or installation malfunctioning - 13.

Laboratory personnel are now doing all the aerial film processing and loading of magazines. This arrangement is proving satisfactory since it gives photo detachment personnel more time to take care of installation and checking of photographic equipment in the planes.
Flash prints are made of all photo missions in order to expedite construction of mosaics by the photo interpretation section.

Print totals for the period were 14,250 9x18 inch, 4610 9x9 inch and 699 8x10 target photos for pilot briefing.

Mechanical difficulties encountered resulting in the mission failures referred to above, were with the K-38 aerial camera and A8B magazine. Among the more frequent mechanical failures were sheared taper pins in the case drive of the K-38. One A8B magazine was out of commission because of broken gears. The original gears were made of plastic and were replaced with metal gears. The heating element in one A8B magazine short circuited causing a mission to be aborted.

Switches for the 1800 watt heating elements on the A10A aerial film dryers burned out frequently due to over heating. However, ships electricians repaired the switches promptly and time loss in drying was negligible.

It is recommended that all units using K-38 cameras and A8B magazines be furnished instruction handbooks and technical bulletins on this equipment as soon as possible. This essential data was not included with cameras received and has not yet been made available to this ship. It is believed that much of the maintenance difficulty would have been avoided and the resulting failures on combat missions would have been considerably lessened had this data been on hand.

6. Medical Department

The Medical Department supplies and equipment were adequate. No significant supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period.

a. Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company

On this second operating period of twenty-two days, it has been interesting to note the great degree of parallelism or analogy with the first period. For example, the occasional anxiety presenting itself has been based on a home front situation, unfaithful wife for example, rather than on real or fancied dangers associated with operations. There has been no detectable loss of resistance to disease, and no increase in the number of injuries or psychosomatic complaints.

In conclusion, there has been nothing in this second period on the line to make one feel that three weeks is too long an operating period for personnel despite the increased hardships of colder weather.
b. Medical Department Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>1st Period</th>
<th>2nd Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to sick list</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to binnacle list</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers admitted to sick list</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visits to sick call</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients received from other ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients transferred to hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor injuries treated</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major injuries treated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number shipboard injuries resulting death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of personnel died of disease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor surgical procedures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major surgical procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal diseases cases and non-specific urethritis</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Gonorrhea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Chancroid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>1st Period</th>
<th>2nd Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, pilot not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered minor injuries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, crewmen recovered uninjured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes damaged, enemy action, crewmen injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number days pilots grounded</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crewmen grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. On 22 December 1952, LTJG JAMES ALEXANDER HUDSON, 532903, USN, was killed in action at 0925 when his plane, an AD-3 crashed into ground in enemy territory near Hwansungwon-ni, Korea, cause unknown.

7. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

The major operational procedure problem experienced during the period covered by this report has been caused by the receipt of material without proper covering invoices, particularly material air lifted from continental sources. Such shipments entail considerable research to insure accomplishment of requisitions and in some cases has caused unnecessary delay in the issue of priority material.
Status information received indicates that many important items are being held at NSD Yokosuka for delivery to the ship despite the fact that the ship has a periodic replenishment schedule "on the line."

Further, many small items requisitioned on a priority basis, available in the area as indicated by status information, have still not been received by COD aircraft during this period.

One problem of considerable importance which resulted in the continuing ACOG of an aircraft was the receipt of an F4U4 wing assembly without the Aree 14A Rocket provisions (Change 432). Corrective action has been taken by COMFAIRJAP 210703Z December.

The first on line replenishment (19 November 1952) from the CHOURRE was highly satisfactory. The dispatch in the assembly of stores, the excellent tagging and identification, and the method of transfer indicates a high degree of efficiency on the part of the CHOURRE as a whole and the Supply Department in general. A total of 12k7 items were requested of which 796 items were received for a percentage of 63.8 comprising approximately 23.7 tons.

Procurement difficulties were negligible during the period of this report with the exception of continued shortage of cold weather items cited in the first report. The condition of other shortages has improved.

Intra-Task Force cooperation has proved very satisfactory on request for allowance list material as shown by the receipt of 62.5 percent of items requested.

Usage of F9F MLG tires during this period has been reduced to normal expenditure.

b. General Stores

There were no unusual developments in this category except high consumption of certain stores. Usage of general mess and wardroom cups has been approximately three times that anticipated, principally as a result of breakage. Usage of class 40 and 41 (hand tools) has been extremely high due to inadequate outfitting of squadrons. Rags have been consumed at an average rate of 120 bales per month.

c. Ship's Store and C&SS

Operational Procedure Problems - Care must be exercised to insure that woolen underwear is bagged separately for delivery to the laundry, and that such articles are washed and rinsed in lukewarm water only.

Stock Excesses and Shortages - To date no excesses have been found to exist in ship's store stock. However, the following shortages do exist:
(1) Watches - Sold 500 the first three months at sea. 100 of these watches were military type; all others dress. Average selling price of the dress watches, $35-40. Stock ratio of men's to women's was about 8:1. It is recommended that for Christmas sales this ratio be adjusted to about 3:1.

(2) Pen and Pencil Sets - During the pre-Christmas buying, sales increased to about five sales per day for a thirty day period over a previous normal of 1/2 to 3/4 per day. Sets sold were the Sheaffer at about $12-25 selling price.

(3) Pens - Demand for fountain pens, particularly the inexpensive pen of the Esterbrook type, is very great. Sales run on an average of 100-125 per month. Since these pens are unavailable in this area, it is recommended that adequate stock be carried.

(4) Clothing and Small Stores - Shortages cited in previous report continue, and are characteristic of this area.

Procurement Difficulties - The replenishment ship, U.S.S. CASTOR (AKS-1), to date has been unable to supply required items of C&SS. The available ship's store stock is satisfactory but limited quite strictly to staples (e.g. soaps, cigarettes, dentifrices, etc.).

d. Commissary

Operational Procedure - The serving of a midnight meal has met with continued success insofar as health and morale is concerned. On the last night of the patrol, however, it became necessary to serve only soup and coffee to avoid an over expenditure of general mess funds.

Stock Shortages - The following items of provisions have been in short supply:

- Tomato puree
- Potatoes, sweet, fresh
- Grapefruit, fresh
- Beans, string, can
- Tomato paste
- Crackers
- Syrup
- Vanilla, flavoring
- Mayonnaise
- Cereal, assorted
- Juice, orange

Procurement Difficulties - On return to Yokosuka, after the previous period "on the line", requisitions were submitted to the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) for fresh frozen and dry provisions. The ORISKANY requested about one hundred forty tons and the amount received was sixty-three tons. The ORISKANY left Yokosuka, therefore, without a capacity load.
e. Disbursing

It has been found that the most convenient time for pay day, while operating, is at night or on replenishment day.

Many disbursing forms are unavailable in this area. A complete cruise requirement should be acquired when outfitting.

f. Replenishment Underway

On 15 December the ORISKANY replenished at sea from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). The ship came alongside at 1342 for replenishment of fresh, frozen and dry provisions. About 95 per cent of the requisitions submitted were filled. Around 1545 the ALUDRA had to break away from the ORISKANY because of rough weather. About ten tons of flour was left on board the ALUDRA. The average tonage taken on board was 60 tons per hour.

Aviation stores replenishment was accomplished from the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1) on 19 December 1952. (Amplifying comments on the 19 November replenishment are contained in Aviation Stores section above). Very few items were received. Only priority BAKER requisitions were processed due to late delivery of requisitions to the CHOURRE, occasioned by the advancement of the replenishment schedule.

8. Navigation Department

During the present operation the Navigation Department had excellent opportunities for the training of deck-watch-standers. The rapidity of the tactical maneuvers and the great variety of tactical situations, affords excellent practice in ship handling. During this last tour four (4) officer-of-the-deck qualifications were granted, three (3) to ensigns and one (1) to a lieutenant. To supplement the on-the-job-training classes are held each day to improve the watch standers knowledge and use of the tools of his trade. Voice radio procedure is practiced daily utilizing a tape recorder so that voice deficiencies and improper procedure can be corrected. This practice has greatly improved voice radio procedure. To broaden the OOD's knowledge of his assistants, their duties and especially their problems, a rotational system has been established to place CIC personnel on the bridge and bridge watch standers in CIC. In our deck-watch-stander training credit must be extended to the U.S.S. PRINCETON since a modified program similar to hers has been adopted.

The starboard wing of the open bridge has undergone several changes to increase the comfort and efficiency of the conning officer during the winter replenishment operations. A seat has been installed with a foot rest, a plexiglass wind shield has been erected and a canvas awning has been installed. The top half of a gear locker door has been painted black so that it may serve as a blackboard to indicate the RPM and course being steered.
9. Air Department

General - During this period a general improvement was noted in the execution of assigned functions of all divisions in the Air Department. This was due primarily to experience gained during the first tour in the operating area. Personnel shortages in the aircraft handling and ordnance divisions continues to be the most serious item effecting the efficiency of the department. During the last week of operations, due to illness and injuries, the flight deck division plane handling crews were reduced to 9-10 men per crew on occasion. A minimum of twelve (12) men per crew should be available in order to expeditiously resport the heavier AD and jet type aircraft. The use of the F9F tail tow during this period resulted in some conservation of manpower. Ingenious methods of conserving space on the hangar deck permitted operations to continue normally despite the presence of six non-flyable duds in hangar bay #3. Continued efforts are underway to gain additional room in hangar bays for maintenance facilities. Relocation of lumber racks from present location, port side elevator #3, to top of uptake space starboard side, will provide room for some work bench space. Installation of tool box racks between #3 elevator stanchions, port side hangar deck, frames 1100-1145, is also being accomplished. The practice of turning up all propeller aircraft approximately one and one-half hours before first morning launch is most desirable during cold weather. Plane captains run engines from 10-15 minutes at 1000-1200 RPM.

a. Aircraft Handling

An auxiliary aircraft spotting board of the flight deck, manufactured by the ship's aircraft metal shop, has been installed in flight deck control directly above the existing board. Since installation, it has saved much time and confusion by providing the actual deck spot while succeeding launches and spots are being planned and worked out on the lower board.

Design of a suitable tow-bar to tow F9F's backwards is still necessary. A number of universal tow bars were modified for this use by shortening one bar sufficiently to reach the tail skid while the remaining bar towed from the landing gear. Principal difficulty encountered is that the bars are not strong enough to withstand the stresses encountered at all angles of towing particularly during sharp turns.

Due to the ever increasing demand for hangar deck space for checks and other maintenance work on aircraft, and due to the number of permanent "dud" aircraft accumulated, it was necessary to resort to unorthodox methods of aircraft parking to conserve space. Vertical stabilizers and propellers were removed from two F4U dud aircraft permitting them to be "stood on their nose" with the tail lashed to the overhead. F9F tail sections were removed and suspended from the overhead in Bay #3 by means of the tail section hoisting sling. This permitted considerable tightening of dud parking and provided necessary space for parking of additional aircraft.

Operations have been speeded up on recovery of aircraft by taxiing jet aircraft off elevator #2 onto the hangar deck. The plane is taxied
straight off the elevator, and the tail is not swung inboard until it is
determined that no residual fire exists in the engine. This permits taking
almost every other jet down elevator #2 thereby increasing the space available
for spotting aircraft forward during recovery.

b. Catapults

A total of 753 catapult launches were made during the period, the
majority of which were F9F-5 aircraft. The use of fire hose to protect
the bungee strands on the F9F forged eye launching pendants from being struck
by the sharp edges of the shuttle has proved satisfactory and has reduced
considerably the use of bungee. Except for five pendants being lost in one
day due to inadvertent use of overage bungee none have been lost during this
period due to arrestor failures. It is recommended that CVA's stock 1500
feet of fresh 3/4" bungee for the F9F forged eye launching pendants. Both
catapults were available for all scheduled operations during this period.
Cable tensioner and whip dampener packings were changed after 400 shots due
to excessive leakage.

d. Arresting Gear

The installation of a small jet blast deflector aft of #2 elevator
provides protection to the barricade and barrier operator by dispersing the
blast of aircraft being taxied onto the elevator during recoveries. The
deflector is a fixed installation, set back far enough not to interfere with
operations and deflecting the blast over and around personnel in the port
catwalk stations.

Although frequent draining of arresting gear air supply lines is
accomplished, water condensation in exposed portions of these lines freezes.
This problem has been solved to a satisfactory degree by lagging the lines with
asbestos cloth.

A total of 1375 arrested landings were made during the period. There
were 7 jet barrier crashes and 3 prop barrier crashes, including 2 barricade
engagements.

Failure of a hook point on an F9F-5 aircraft resulted in the breakage
of #4 and #8 cross deck pendants with resultant major damage to the aircraft and
minor injuries to three personnel of the arresting gear division stationed in
the catwalks. To date, there have been four (4) hook point failures this
cruise on jet aircraft. The Air Group has made recommendations to BUAER re-
garding the redesign of the F9F-5 hook points.

d. Maintenance

Due to the large number of tire changes, the aviation metal shop
manufactured a tire bead breaking machine, which can also serve as a hydraulic
press. Constructed of salvaged materials the machine consists of a heavy
framework, a hydraulic hand pump and actuating cylinder and various size adapters
which fit against the tire close to the rim. The beads are broken by the
single action of the machine.
Due to non-availability of a fork lift truck crane adapter, one was manufactured. The crane adapter serves purposes including the installation and removal of jet and propeller engines from aircraft and handling of bombs during replenishment. The adapter is quickly attached to the fork truck requiring only the removal of the forks and hanging the adapter in place since no securing devices are necessary.

Operation of the oxygen-nitrogen system was satisfactory; however, difficulty was experienced in handling the flexible oxygen service hose during operations. All the service outlets are on the port side of the ship; and in order to service planes on the starboard side, the use of a 200 foot length of hose is necessary. Handling this much hose, with planes, tractors, and bomb skids moving about the deck is dangerous; and caution is necessary to prevent damaging the hose. It is recommended that a hose reel be installed at the service outlets to facilitate break-out and return of the hose.

The electronics shop installed an APU plug-in on the LeTourneau crash crane in order to provide easier starting during cold weather. This modification has proven very satisfactory.

The use of an area in hangar bay #3 adjacent to the Aviation Metal Shop for tire mounting and stowage has proved necessary and desirable due to high tire usage of the F9F-5.

The present number of different type aircraft on board requires an excessive amount of special tools and maintenance equipment which absorbs premium stowage space both in storerooms and hangar deck. The design and distribution of universal equipment and tools would help greatly in alleviating the problem.

e. Ordnance and Gasoline

The MK 1 bomb skid requires continual inspection and repair to the "V" center-brace which prevents the bomb from slipping forward or aft while being hauled. The Aviation Metal Shop has welded heavy steel stock reinforcements across the lower section of the center "V" brace to remedy this fault. A skid similar to the MK 1 but with larger wheel and grooved edge tires for rolling bombs over barrier and arresting gear cable would be an improvement over the present MK 1.

Napalm bombs are normally made up on the flight deck, however, under certain conditions, (i.e. high winds, rough seas) this is virtually impossible. This problem was solved by closing the fire doors between hangar bay #2 and #3 and pulling the blackout curtains aft of #3 aircraft elevator. Number 3 elevator was lowered and the napalm mixed on the lowered elevator. In this manner, proper ventilation was maintained and the work was accomplished much more rapidly in a sheltered position, and bombs were in a position to be taken immediately to the flight deck.
The present allowance of eight (8) hoisting bands of the Aero 35A hoisting band for the 2,000# bomb is insufficient to meet present loading demands. Frequently thirteen (13) bombs and sometimes fifteen (15) are required for loading between recovery and next launch of the AD strike. This shortage of hoisting bands means only a part of the required number can be assembled and placed on bomb skids prior to loading time.

Cooperation of the Fleet Tankers in sending the proper type coupling hose fitting has cut our "hook-up" time to about five (5) minutes. On the last replenishment day, 137,000 gallons of AVGAS was received from the "first line over" to "cast-off time" of two (2) hours and twenty (20) minutes.

Copies to:
CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (5) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMCARDIV 1
COMCARDIV 3
COMCARDIV 5
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMSEVPAC
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRQUONSET
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NLO JOC KOREA
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 7
CVG 9
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 102
ATG 2 (5)
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period of 7 January 1953 through 11 February 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG-12 Action Report 7 January 1953 through 11 February 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 7 January 1953 through 11 February 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) with Carrier Air Group 102 (redesignated Carrier Air Group 12 on 4 February 1953) embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 06581, 7 January 1953 and at 08221, 10 January 1953 joined Task Force 77 in Area Tare, the Japan Sea. Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45).

Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 22 January 1953. On 11 February 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) returned to the force with Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77.

During the operating period other ships in company were the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and various cruisers and screening destroyers. Prior to departing Task Force 77 and Area Tare for Nagoya on 11 February 1953 Commander Carrier Division FIVE administration was shifted from the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) to the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34).
During the period in the forward area, operations were conducted in accordance with Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order 2-52. The Mission of the Force, in support to front line ground forces, interdiction of enemy movements and resupply over Northeast Korean supply lines and storage areas, destruction of enemy troops and air support of naval gunfire.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

7 January 1953

Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 0658I enroute to the Korean Operating Area. Rendezvoused with the U.S.S. RENSHAW (DDE-499). Conducted joint flight operations with the Japan Air Defense Command.

8 January 1953

Enroute to the Korean Operating Area. Conducted afternoon flight operations.

9 January 1953

Enroute to the Korean Operating Area. Conducted AA firing practice.

10 January 1953


11 January 1953

Continued replenishment from Task Element 92.1. Replenished aviation gasoline and NFSO from the U.S.S. MISSPILLION (AO-105). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20) and provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF-29).

12 January 1953

Flight operations cancelled due to high seas and inclement weather.

13 January 1953

Flight operations cancelled due to continuing inclement weather.

14 January 1953

Flight operations cancelled due to continuing inclement weather.
Conducted combat flight operations.

16 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

17 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

18 January 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Received provisions and dry stores from the U.S.S. GRAFFTLAS (AF-29). Replenished aviation gasoline and NFSO from the U.S.S. CHEMUNG (AO-30). Received aviation stores from the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20).

20 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) with RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, COMCARDIV 5 embarked, joined Task Force 77.

21 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

22 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), assumed command of Task Force 77. The U.S.S. VALLEY FORCE (CVA-45) with RADM A. SOUCEK, COMCARDIV 3, embarked was detached and departed Task Force 77.

23 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

24 January 1953


25 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.
26 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

27 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

28 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises.

29 January 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. PARACUTIN (AE-29). Replenishment of ammunition was discontinued due to heavy seas. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-29).

30 January 1953

Continued replenishment from Task Element 92.1. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. PARACUTIN (AE-29). Conducted flight operations upon completion of replenishment.

31 January 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) joined Task Force 77.

1 February 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. CDR J. C. MICHEEL, USN, Commanding Officer of VA-923 crashed in enemy territory while making an attack during a close air support mission. No evidence of survival was noted and CDR MICHEEL is listed as killed in action.

2 February 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Conducted AA firing exercises. LTJG B. L. IVES, USNR, VF-781, crashed landed in Wonsan Harbor after his F9F-5 was hit by AA fire in the Wonsan area. LTJG IVES was rescued uninjured by the U.S.S. HAILEY (DD-556).

3 February 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Received fresh and dry provisions from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF-29). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27).
Conducted combat flight operations.

5 February 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

6 February 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

7 February 1953

8 February 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

9 February 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

10 February 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

11 February 1953
Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5). Received provisions and freight from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). Replenished NFSO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32). The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) with RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, embarked, joined Task Force 77. RADM SOUCEK relieved RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked in the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached and departed Task Force 77 enroute to Nagoya, Japan. COMCARDIV FIVE shifted flag to ORISKANY. End of reporting period.

PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Enclosure (1) lists all aviation ammunition expended during the period covered by this report.

2. Gunnery Department expenditures of training ammunition are as follows:
3. 3"/50 FCL, VT fused, non-fragmentation, steel case ammunition of various lots used in AA sleeve firings have given about 30 percent premature arming at approximately arming range. Similar performance has been observed in the firing of other ships of this Task Force. Specific performance has been regularly reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in the Ammunition Performance Report, and will not be detailed here due to the non-operational nature of the ammunition involved.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Generally, no battle damage was sustained by the ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy (see enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft (see enclosure (1)).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

a. Personnel

During this period the average on board count was 2723; 2021 ship's company; 63 marines; 17 SWU team and 625 CVG 12.

Critical shortages continued to exist in the following rates; MM, AD, AQ, AA/AN, and SA/SN. These shortages have been covered under separate correspondence.

The overall general performance and morale of all hands is still at a very high level, the regular delivery of mail, scheduled bingo games, movies and happy hours are considered as contributing factors.

b. Training

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

New classes organized
Active classes at end of period
Classroom hours held this period

03
12
313
Navy Training Courses (texts) checked out 63
Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered out 25
USAFI texts checked out 20
USAFI GED tests administered 30
USAFI correspondence courses ordered 52
USAFI end of course tests administered 09
USAFI GED batteries ordered by men 37
USAFI end of course tests ordered by men 03
Enrollments in college extension courses 05
Letters sent to civilian schools on behalf of men for counseling and placement purposes 02
Requests for service schools forwarded 03
Number of examinations given in pay grade E-7 79

2. Legal

The legal office previously occupied the flag spaces on the O2 level. In anticipation of the arrival of Commander Carrier Division FIVE and staff it was necessary to utilize a portion of the After Training Room on the 2nd deck as Legal Office.

3. Welfare and Recreation

Regularly scheduled bingo games have been conducted at 1900 on Wednesdays and Saturdays of each week in the Crew's messing compartments. Bingo hours have been conducted on replenishment days, using talent from ship's company and Air Group. The ship's band plays on Tuesday and Friday evenings in the Officers' Ward Room.

The Hobby Shop is open daily for use by all hands. It carries a wide variety of crafts, e.g. leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc.

The Ship's Library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

4. Religious Services

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) Masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots.

Protestant Divine Services are conducted at 0900 on Sunday mornings, and Vesper Services 1900. The Bible Class meets at 1930 on Wednesdays.

Jewish Services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish calendar.

Mormon Services are conducted at 1000 on Sundays.
Christian Science study periods are observed on Sundays at 1100.

The March of Dimes fund raising appeal for Infantile Paralysis was conducted during the month of January. The sum of $3,000.00 was donated.

**f. Public Information**

Public Information activities covered during the period of this report consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Navy News Dispatches</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hometown news stories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of news and feature stories (by mail)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of still pictures released</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name and affiliation of all civilian correspondents embarked:

Mack R. Johnson, New York Herald Tribune

**2. Casualties**

**a. Ship's Company**

No ship's company casualties occurred other than minor injuries during the reporting period.

**e. Air Group 12. (See enclosure (1)).**

**PART VI**

**COMMENTS**

**5. Communications**

Communications during this period were considered satisfactory. All communication personnel gained considerable experience during the previous two trips on the line and therefore operated more efficiently.

The tendency of using precedence of "OP" and "O" indiscriminately could lead to a major weakness in communications. It has been noted that some of the traffic bearing this precedence consists of summaries of past action and other subject matter, which apparently does not warrant such urgency. Considering the general inexperience of Communication Office personnel and with the cryptographic facilities available on urgent dispatch dealing with an on-the-spot tactical situation might easily be overlooked for twenty to thirty minutes while that time is spent decoding an "OP" intelligence summary for a preceding day.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:
PART VI

Messages either addressed to or from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (included in above count) 2,083
Total classified messages outgoing 178 (22350 groups)
Total classified messages incoming 430 (83723 groups)

MESSAGES HANDLED ON SIGNAL BRIDGE

Total messages incoming 325 (6865 groups)
Total messages outgoing 293 (4667 groups)
Total flashing light messages incoming 291 (5968 groups)
Total flashing light messages outgoing 233 (3608 groups)
Total Nancy messages incoming 31 (847 groups)
Total Nancy messages outgoing 55 (942 groups)
Total Semaphore messages incoming 3 (50 groups)
Total Semaphore messages outgoing 5 (117 groups)

The following statistics of postal activities are considered to be of general interest:

Registered mail received 328 pieces
Registered mail outgoing 239 pieces
Insured mail received 451 pieces
Insured mail dispatched 114 pieces
Money orders issued 1,292
Money orders cashed 93
Amount of Money Order business conducted 848,818.36
Air mail received - 30 sacks - 25 pouches (approx. 110,000 letters)
Air mail dispatched - 10 sacks - 47 pouches (approx. 114,000 letters)
First class mail received 8 pouches
First class mail dispatched 15 pouches
Parcel Post received 315 sacks
Parcel Post dispatched 118 sacks

2. Air Intelligence

As an aid to photo interpretation, an atlas of 1:50,000 AMS maps of Korea was prepared during this period. A continuous plot of (1) confirmed flak and
coastal defense positions, (2) CTF 77 designated targets, and (3) suspect areas such as possible radar sites and enemy troop dispositions is maintained on these maps. The compilation of this information formed the basis for a more comprehensive method of photo interpretation than had previously been employed by this carrier. By checking daily photo coverage against the atlas, it was possible to eliminate duplicate reports of already designated targets, substituting a surveillance instead. Instead of blindly reporting flak, it was possible to give recently abandoned flak positions an inactive status as well as to report the existing AA.

In preparing PT Flak Studies, the actual photo coverage was plotted on the chart in addition to the flak positions.

3. Photography

The number of photographic personnel assigned for this period was 15. This figure includes one warrant, two APC, and eight rated men. The above number of personnel is the minimum requirement for efficient operation of the photo lab.

Laboratory production increased considerably. Print totals for the period were 43,588 3½x5 inch, 3,742 9x9 inch and 6,549 8x10 inch target photos for briefing.

There is a critical need for a qualified camera repairman on ships operating in the forward area due to numerous camera and equipment failures caused by constant use. It is again recommended that the present personnel allowance list be revised to include one camera repairman.

4. Medical Department

The medical department supplies and equipment continues to be adequate. No supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period.

a. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company. During this period there has been no reliable statistical difference in the incident of disease, of injury, or of death that may in any way be correlated with or explained by the length of the time spent on the line. Operationally, the officers and men have continued to improve their performance as judged by such factors as the handling of ammunition and supplies on the replenishment days, decrease in launch and recovery intervals, ratio of accidents to landings, etc. If opinions may be permitted to replace the above mentioned facts, it is felt that this exceptionally creditable performance has been gained at the expense of a mild increase in psychic tension and anxiety.

b. Medical Department Statistics Summary Air Group and Ship's Company.
Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen.

- Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed not recovered: 1
- Planes lost, pilot not recovered: 1
- Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries: 1
- Planes lost, operational, crewmen recovered uninjured: 0
- Planes damaged, enemy action, crewmen injured: 0
- Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured: 0
- Pilot temporarily grounded for medical reasons: 15
- Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation: 0
- Average number days pilot grounded: 2.4
- Crewmen grounded for medical reasons: 0

*This does not reflect the true health of our pilots because two were on the grounded list because of fractures involving the lower extremity and a third pilot was grounded for sinusitis over a month ago, shortly thereafter he departed on an emergency leave and has not yet returned.*

On 1 February 1953, Commander J.C. MICHEEL, USN, Commanding Officer of Attack Squadron 923, was killed in action while leading a strike on an enemy target near Ando-ri, Korea. It is presumed that his aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire.

5. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores - After thirty-four days operation no aircraft are
grounded for lack of spare parts. During this period only six items were requested on an ACOG basis. These items were received from other units of the force. A total of 3021 items were requested and 2960 (97.9%) were issued from shipboard stocks.

The following chart indicated the degree of supply support received during this period from the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGN</th>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
<th>ITEMS REQUESTED</th>
<th>ITEMS RECEIVED</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td>570</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. General Stores - Replenishment difficulties were experienced in the following: lumber (for repair of bomb skids), helium (requisitions were only 50% filled), masking tape and lamps G17-L-4511 (not carried by supply ships).

Replenishment problems centering around the below listed directives will be encountered by ships deployed to the forward area and can be alleviated and anticipated somewhat by obtaining these directives as far in advance of deployment as possible.

(1) Commander Service Division Thirty One
Staff Supply Boarding Bulletin

(2) Fleet Activities Yokosuka Supply Department
(Now NSD Yokosuka) Logistics Bulletin

(3) Mission of NSD Yokosuka, Japan

c. Ship's Store and C&SS - Overall ship's store stock is very low with a general replenishment required. No major replenishment of stock carried has been made since leaving San Diego, 15 September 1952. Major replenishment source for ship's store stock is the U.S.S. CASTOR (AKS-1) which can furnish standard items such as cigarettes and soap. Transfers of limited quantities of cigarettes, ice cream topping, etc. are possible while underway.

Clothing and small stores stock is also low with a major replenishment required. No major replenishment has been possible since the U.S.S. CASTOR (AKS-1) is limited in number and quantity of items carried. Heavy sales have been noted in black socks, large towels and combs.

d. Commissary - During the period of this report the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) received approximately 240 tons of fresh, frozen and dry provisions from the U.S.S GRAFIAS (AF-29) and the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). Approximately 83 percent of the material requisitioned was received. Shortages exist in the below listed items:
Grapefruit, fresh
Tomatoes, fresh
Tomatoes, tnd
Lettuce, fresh
pears, fresh

Potatoes, dehy
Potatoes, sweet
Eggs, powrd
hominy, tnd
crackers, saltine

e. Disbursing - It was found that the new form required for addressograph plates, requiring five lines per plate, could not be cut with the standard Graphotype Embossing Machine. The ship's machine shop designed, produced and installed two ratchet gears which allowed the proper spacing to be made.

f. Replenishment Underway - During the period covered by this report the U.S.S. ORISKANY replenished from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) and the U.S.S. GRAFias (AF-29) four times. An average of 60 tons per hour were transferred with an average time alongside of one hour. The replenishment of 19 January 1953 only 35 tons per hour were received because of mechanical trouble with the winches and the transfer of mail and personnel by hand operated high line.

Aviation Stores replenishment from the U.S.S. CHOURRE (ARV-1) on 7 February 1953 was negligible. Time alongside was 9 minutes; 2 cargo nets of stores were received and 2 cargo nets of Class 265 material were offloaded.

6. Gunnery Department

COMAIRPAC Instruction 8010.2 of 25 September 1952 cautions Commanding Officers to consider safety before speed in ammunition replenishment at sea. Replenishments on board the ORISKANY have at all times been so controlled as to permit time-saving steps only when personnel training and experience indicate that no hazard accompanies these steps. As a result the rearming operations have been speeded without increasing the potential hazard. There have been no casualties to date.

All six rearming operations during this period included a normally varied load from 2000 lb GP bombs to .50 caliber cartridges and primer-detonators, averaging 270 gross tons. The theoretical rate (including deductions from time for breakdowns etc.) averages 110 tons per hour. The more practical actual rate (using total time from first line to break-off) averages 97 tons per hour. With the able assistance of the U.S.S. VIRGUTIN (AE-18) 328 tons (not especially planned for speed) was received at a theoretical rate of 148.8 tons per hour and an actual rate of 113.9 tons per hour.

It is felt that the foregoing figures, which are based on a large operational replenishment of two to three hours, are fairly indicative of replenishment capabilities of the CVA-34 type carrier using present type winches.

Two operations with the VIRGO have revealed a distinct time-saving measure which involves no change in safety. Actual rates with VIRGO have been 95 and
102 tons per hour and theoretical rate 100 and 112 tons per hour. VM00 distributes the load so that all three loading stations are in full operation throughout the alongside period. During ammunition replenishments with other vessels the No. 3 station (frame 72) is idle for the last one or two hours.

For the purpose of uniform employment of the crew, the order of replenishments should be arranged to preclude the peak caused by commencing re-arming when provisioning parties are still involved in clearing the hangar deck, and vice-versa. A "mopping up" period could be easily provided by scheduling re-fueling between re-arming and re-provisioning. For reasons of safety to preclude the handling of fuel and explosives concurrently, the most desirable order would be re-provision, re-fuel, and re-arm.

Provisioning has likewise been accomplished at high delivery rates with the peak performance being obtained on 11 February 1953 when 64.3 tons of stores were brought on board from U.S.S. ALDRA (AF-55) in 40 minutes time from first load to last load. The more practical actual rate (time from first load to break-off) averages 69.5 tons per hour. One load was received on board on average of each 30 seconds as against prior averages of a load each minute.

This entire operation was a first time event on board this ship in that five stations were employed. A housefall rig was used at stations 1 and 4, a double housefall at station 2 and a modified housefall at station 3. This method should insure continuing improvement in the total time spent taking provisions on board.

7. Air Department

General - All Air Department functions were carried out in a normal manner despite several periods of inclement weather, accompanied by snow and ice. Foul weather clothing for exposed personnel proved adequate for temperatures as low as 7°F. However, there is a need for an improved glove which will allow personnel full use of their hands and still prevent injury from frost bite and contact with cold metal. The sub-freezing temperatures did not seriously hamper the availability or operation of auxiliary power units, jeep starters and tractors as these units were spotted and serviced on the hangar deck and brought to the flight deck only as needed. Catapults and arresting gear machinery continued to function normally, although inspections have disclosed wear to machinery. Shortage of personnel exist and will be even more noted during the next period on the line due to a loss of twenty-four (24) men on arrival in Yokosuka. A total of four hundred forty-eight (448) remain in the Air Department.

a. Aircraft Handling

Freezing salt spray and rain caused an additional hazard in taxiing planes on and off the deck edge elevator. Rock salt, followed by a wash down with a salt water fire hose helped remove accumulated ice but the wet surface still offers insufficient traction. The use of fire hoses to remove wet snow and slush from the flight deck in temperatures above 28°F. appears to be the
fastest method, however, it is not recommended for lower temperatures due to
the probability of creating a more hazardous layer of clear ice. Several
experiments with steam and salt water met with little success due to lack of
suitable steam outlets. Rock salt, snow plows, snow brushes, and ice scrapers
proved adequate in the removal of ice and snow when temperatures dropped below
28°F. It was also noticeable that ice and snow conditions had little effect
on availability and operation of jet type aircraft. When temperatures dropped
below the 20's, VAN and VAW type aircraft were spotted on the hangar deck until
an hour or so before the pre-dawn launch and then brought to the flight deck
for a pre-flight turn up. When time permitted, a plane captain turn up of all
propeller types was made prior to pilots manning planes.

The embarked Corsair squadron has reduced wing fold mechanism failures by
leaving jury struts on until after the ship has turned to launching course. All
conventional type aircraft idle engines on order from Primary Fly to permit
removal of jury struts just prior to launch. Only one (1) failure has been
reported during this period and that one was believed to have been due to an
improperly secured jury strut.

The breakage rate of the aluminum casting towing lugs on the F9F
reverse towing bar (previously reported) has been reduced by fabrication
of replacement lugs from ½" or ¾" flat stock. The added weight to the tow bar
is compensated for by the additional strength.

b. Catapults

Availability of both catapults was good despite mounting maintenance
problems. An F6U bridge failure during night catapults from the starboard
catapult resulted in a partial run away shot. Damage to the catapult was
slight and repairs were completed in three hours. The pilot was able to ground
loop his aircraft to a stop on the bow. The only damage to the aircraft was
caused when the propeller struck the bridge.

Two cable whip damper cylinders on the port catapult had to be replaced.
The former cylinders required change of packing every twenty (20) to seventy (70)
shots. Crosshead retrieving sheaves on both machines have developed squeals
and have required extra work and lubrication to remain in commission. One or
more sheaves will probably require replacement soon.

During this period, a total of one thousand one hundred sixty-six (1166)
aircraft were catapulted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Starboard</th>
<th>Bridles Expended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42 AD</td>
<td>18 AD</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 F2H</td>
<td>43 F2H</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 F6U</td>
<td>27 F6U</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>508 F9F</td>
<td>477 F9F</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 TBM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15
Average aircraft weight was nineteen thousand (19,000) pounds, thirty-six (36) knots average wind and twenty-seven hundred (2700) PSI average pressure.

c. Arresting Gear

There was a total of one thousand nine hundred seventy (1970) landings during this period of which one thousand fifty-four (1054) were jets and nine hundred sixteen (916) were conventional type. Average wind across the deck was thirty-five (35) knots and the average pull out was one hundred nine (109) feet for the propellers and one hundred twenty-three and five tenths (123.5) feet for the jets.

There were eleven (11) barrier and/or barricade engagements. Of these, six (6) were jet aircraft and five (5) were conventional types. Three (3) of the engagements occurred at night. One (1) night crash involved an ADW which engaged the barriers due to collapse of hook and tail wheel. Upon engagement with the barrier the ADW flipped over on its back. Two (2) of the crew members escaped immediately but the pilot was trapped in the cockpit uninjured. Repair 8 personnel quickly extinguished a fire which started in the engine nacelle and the pilot was helped from the plane shortly afterwards. The crash crane aided by manpower was used to lift and slide the aircraft sufficiently to spot it on the deck edge elevator where it was left until after the scheduled night recovery. It may be of interest to note that the crash crane was not capable of completely lifting the ADW aircraft. Due to lack of space on the hangar deck and the problem of attempting to right the crashed aircraft in darkness, it was removed from the deck edge elevator and spotted forward of the island after completion of the night recovery. Routine operations were conducted throughout the next day and night; and on the following day, while the ship was replenishing, the plane was righted and taken to Hangar Bay #3. Portable lights covered with red lenses were utilized by the Repair 8 crew while working with the night crashes.

This ship has experienced several instances of unnecessary delays during jet recoveries caused by the pilot coming out of the gear fast and applying hard brakes in the barrier/barricade area. This practice resulted in breaking the shear pins of the barrier and barricade.

There is a critical shortage of barricade shear pins. This ship is now using its last twelve (12) pins but fortunately a useable substitute has been found in the safety pins removed from the AN-M230 hydrostatic fuses used in aviation depth bombs.

d. Maintenance

At the end of this period, there were eight (8) non-flyable duds spotted in hangar bay #3 and two (2) in hangar bay #2. The practice of removing wings and tails surfaces from such aircraft has continued to alleviate the space problem for maintenance of aircraft in both bays.

Several hydraulic wing jacks were out of commission due to lack of "O" ring seals used to prevent leakage of hydraulic fluid from the top and bottom of the pump casing which acts as a fluid reservoir. The aviation metal shop
returned these jacks to service by mounting a small hydraulic fluid tank to the outside of the casing and piping the fluid from the tank directly to the pump.

The standard tow bar hitch found on most plane handling tractors will not accommodate all tow bars and is difficult to release when under tension. These deficiencies were corrected by designing a hitch consisting of three pieces of steel plate welded horizontally to the rear of the tractor with a steel pin through the center of the plates. Bead welding around the pin between the top and middle plates prevents the pin from dropping through the hole in the plates. A small ring attached to the top of the pin facilitates lifting for removal or attachment of the tow bar between the middle and lower plate.

e. Gasoline and ordnance

This ship uses the six (6) inch quick disconnect Robb coupling for refueling at sea. Hook up time has been reduced to an average of four minutes, however, this time could be reduced to a matter of seconds if the tankers were equipped with the male part of the Robb coupling. The main problem of hooking up in rough seas is holding the flange end of the tanker's hose steady during the removal of the blank flange and attachment of the male fitting.

Shortly after the start of this period, many of the jet aircraft were found to have water with a saline content in their gas tanks. Immediate and exhaustive tests were conducted on the ship's gasoline systems but no trace of water could be found. The only difference in operating procedures for this period was the addition of alcohol in the aircraft tanks for the purpose of preventing auto acceleration. Tests were performed on samples of gasoline mixed with alcohol and it was found that a residue of water resulted. Oil has now been substituted for alcohol at the ratio of about eighteen (18) parts of oil to one thousand (1000) parts of gasoline and no further difficulty has been experienced.

Congestion on the third deck in the vicinity of the bomb magazines has been considerably reduced by installing the fins on 100#, 250#, and fragmentation bombs prior to storing in the magazine. Finning is accomplished on the hangar deck during ammunition replenishment.

8. Engineering Department

a. Casualties:

(1) No major damage was sustained from any cause.
(2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Jan-11Feb</td>
<td>Minor damage to Flight deck involving approximately 1500 linear feet.</td>
<td>Aircraft landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 Jan</td>
<td>Torn loose and lost overboard;</td>
<td>Storm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9-10 Jan

**Damaged Equipment:**

- 1 - 3"/50 Ready Service Locker.
- Cracks in stiffeners for gun sponsoon Frame G.
- Shell casing guards Frame E. 01 level torn loose.
- 2 Protective clothing lockers damaged Frame 1-01 level.
- Gasoline line 02 level Frame 1 to 15 ruptured.
- Director 31, Frame E 02 level damaged.
- Mt. 33: 5" crack at Main Deck level, Frame 79 on sponsoon
- Mt. 37: 5" crack at Main Deck level, Frame 111 on sponsoon.
- Other minor cracks where expansion joints meet skin of ship and deck.

11-12-13 Jan

**Damaged Equipment:**

- Storm
- Boat Boom stowage bracket twisted Frame 69 Port Main Deck.
- Steam heat line froze and ruptured frame 25 Port 02 deck.
- (1) Steam heating system pre-heater frozen and ruptured.
- Double life raft stowage cradle and two life floats carried away Frame 115, Main Deck.

**b. Recommendations**

(1) None

**c. Steaming Data:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engine Miles Steamed</th>
<th>13587.7</th>
<th>7 Jan - 11 Feb 1953 (2400)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Received</td>
<td>2,150,803 gals.</td>
<td>7 Jan - 11 Feb 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oil Delivered DD's</td>
<td>115,124 gals.</td>
<td>7 Jan - 11 Feb 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fuel Oil Consumed (Underway) - 2,170,968
Fuel Consumed (Anchored) - None
Average Speed - 15.4 knots
Hours Underway - 881

7 Jan - 11 Feb 1953 (2400)

Fueling:

(1) During the period 7 January thru 11 February, the USS ORISKANY fueled destroyers on two (2) occasions at an average rate of 106,000 gallons per hour. The USS ORISKANY refueled from tankers eight (8) times during this period at an average rate of 168,000 gallons per hour.

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COMFAIRJAPAN
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COMFAIRQUONSET
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USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS Kearsarge (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 7
CVG 9

USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 12
ATG 2 (5)

COURTNEY SHANDS
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953  

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4  

Encl: (1) CVG-12 Action Report 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953  

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 1 March 1953 through 29 March 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I  
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION  

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) with Commander Carrier Division FIVE and Commander Air Group TWELVE embarked, sortied from Yokosuka Harbor at 0655I, 1 March 1953 and at 1215I, 4 March 1953 joined Task Force 77 in Area Sugar, the Japan Sea, Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45).

Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, embarked in the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 15 March 1953. On 29 March 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) returned to the force with Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77.

During the operating period other ships in company were the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77.

During the operating period other ships in company were the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77.

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached on 29 March 1953 from Task Force 77 and proceeded to Hong Kong, B.C.C. for upkeep and maintenance.
1 March 1953

Sortied from Yokosuka Harbor, Japan at 06551 enroute to the Korean operating area. RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, COMCARI 5, embarked.

2 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Conducted AA firing exercises. The U.S.S. Owen (DD-536) joined and assumed screening station. Conducted refresher flight operations.

3 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Conducted refresher flight operations.

4 March 1953

Enroute to Korean operating area. Rendezvoused with the U.S.S. Mount Baker (AE-4) for replenishment. Joined Task Force 77 in the Korean operating area. RADM A. Soucek, USN, COMCARI 3, and Commander Task Force 77, embarked in the U.S.S. Valley Forge (CVA-45). Conducted combat flight operations.

5 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

6 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. At 15431, LT E. L. Kummer, USN, VF-124 F6U pilot landed aboard with one hung 250 lb. general purpose bomb. The bomb dislodged, and after several bounces, exploded on the number three elevator causing major damage. Two enlisted men died of injuries and thirteen others, including LT Kummer, were injured. Wing tip tanks of two F9F aircraft parked in Hangar Bay Two were punctured and the bay had to be isolated due to the fire hazard of the leaking gasoline. All further flight operations for the day were cancelled due to inoperative flight deck.

7 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. Manatee (AO-58). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. Firedrake (AE-14). Conducted AA firing exercises. All bomb damage repair was completed and the ship reported its status as "fully operational" at 14121 to Commander Task Force 77.

8 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.
9 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

10 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

11 March 1953
Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.1 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. NARASOTA (AO-106). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14). Ammunition replenishment was discontinued due to rough seas and high winds.

12 March 1953
Rendezvoused with Task Element 95.1 to complete replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14).

13 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations. ENS D. B. PLACE, USNR, VA-125, ditched his AD in Wonsan Harbor after being hit by enemy AA fire. ENS PLACE was rescued uninjured by helicopter. The U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) joined Task Force 77.

14 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

15 March 1953
Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. NAVASOTA (AO-106). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. MOUNT BAKER (AE-4). Received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked aboard the U.S.S. ORISKANY, relieved RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3 embarked, was detached and departed Task Force 77.

16 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

17 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

18 March 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.
19 March 1953


20 March 1953

Flight operations cancelled due inclement weather. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVL-17), joined Task Force 77.

21 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

22 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. LTJG R. N. Mew, USN, VF-122, F9F-5 pilot, crashed into the sea immediately after being catapulted. The aircraft exploded upon contact and immediately sank. LTJG Mew was not recovered. Cause of the accident is not known.

23 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

24 March 1953


25 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. SAINT PAUL (CA-73), RADM H. Sanders, USN, COMCUDIV 1 embarked, joined Task Force 77.

26 March 1953

Flight operations were cancelled due to rough seas and high winds.

27 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

28 March 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.
29 March 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Element 92.5 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-114). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32). Received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AP-55). The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3 embarked, joined Task Force 77. RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, relieved RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5 as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVL-34) was detached from Task Force 77 and ordered to proceed to Hong Kong, B.C.C. for a period of upkeep and recreation. End of reporting period.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Enclosure (1) lists all ammunition expended by aircraft during the reporting period.

2. Gunnery Department expenditures of training ammunition were as follows:

- 5"/38 caliber projectile, AAC: 160
- 5"/38 caliber projectile, FCL (VT): 18
- 5"/38 caliber projectile, FCL (VT) (non-frag): 7
- 5"/38 caliber cartridge, SPIN: 185
- 3"/50 caliber, FCL (VT): 321
- 3"/50 caliber, FCL (VT) (non-frag): 331

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by enemy action by the ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy. (See enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft. (See enclosure (1)).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.

a. Personnel.

During the period of this report morale and personnel performance has been excellent. During this period the average on board count of enlisted men was 2743, i.e., 1948 ship's company; 62 marines; 17 SWU team; 641 Air Group TWELVE and 75 staff COMCARDIV 5.
Critical shortages exist in the following rates: MM, EM, AD, AL, AO, and AE.

During the period of this report there were fifty-four (54) transfers and four (4) receipts.

b. Training.

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New classes organized</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active classes at the end of period</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of class hours held during period</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Navy Training Courses (texts)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of USAFI tests checked out</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) completed</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of USAFI Correspondence Courses ordered</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of batteries of USAFI GED tests administered</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of USAFI End-of-Course tests administered</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of USAFI GED tests batteries ordered</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of enrollments in College Extension Courses</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of USAFI End-of-Course tests ordered</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of letters sent to civilian schools on behalf</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of men for counseling and placement purposes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests for service schools forwarded</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Legal.

As compared with prior periods during and immediately following a stay in port, the number of offenses ashore increased noticeably. Most of the cases were quickly disposed of by non-judicial punishment or courts-martial.

Aside from disciplinary matters, a total of four (4) incidents required processing by fact finding bodies--three boards of investigation and one court of inquiry. It became necessary to utilize, on a round-the-clock basis, clerical personnel in addition to those assigned to the legal office.

d. Welfare and Recreation.

Regularly scheduled Bingo games have been conducted at 1900 on Wednesdays and Saturdays of each week in the crew’s mess compartments for all hands. Happy hours have been conducted on replenishment days, using talent from ship’s company and the Air Group. The ship’s band plays on Tuesday and Friday evenings in the officer’s ward room.

The hobby shop is open daily for the use of all hands. It carried a wide variety of crafts, i.e., leathercraft, model planes, ships, sail boats, wagons, autos, etc.
The ship's library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

The Charity Committee has conducted special raffles and bingo parties for the purpose of raising funds for the March of Dimes, Netherlands Flood Relief, Red Cross, and the two (2) amputees who lost arms as a result of a bomb explosion on 6 March 1953.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March of Dimes</td>
<td>$3,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Flood</td>
<td>350.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputee Fund</td>
<td>2,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td>3,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bingo parties and raffles have provided "on-the-line" recreation for all hands and are serving both morale and charity.

e. Religious Services.

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots. The Rosary, Novena, and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament are held daily.

Protestant divine services are conducted at 0900 on Sunday mornings and Vesper services at 1900. The Bible Class meets at 1930 on Wednesdays. Memorial services were conducted for LTJG R.M. Mew, Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO, on 30 March 1953. LTJG Mew lost his life while on a combat mission against the enemy.

Jewish services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish calendar.

Mormon services are conducted at 1000 on Sundays.

Christian Science study periods are observed on Sundays at 1100.

f. Public Information Office.

The Public Information Office releases covered by this period are as follows:

- 16 Navy news dispatches (by radio)
- 6 News feature stories (by mail)
- 57 News photo releases (by mail)
- 1 Magazine article submitted
- 1570 Hometown news stories (FHTNC)
- 24 Hometown photographs (FHTNC)
- 5 Radio newscasts (internal)
- 59 Letters from Commanding Officer
  - Motion picture footage (bomb explosion)
The following is a list of news correspondents who visited the ship during the period:

- Barry Bingham
- William Atwood
- Peter Robinson
- Walter Durrel
- Bob Schnecke
- Robert Updick
- George MacArthur
- J.P. Higgins
- Patrick Catling

- Louisville Courier
- Look Magazine
- Reuters
- United Press
- International News Service
- United Press
- Associated Press
- Buffalo Evening News
- Baltimore Sun

Distinguished visitors that visited the ship:

- Adlai Stevenson (and party)
- LT. GEN. Maxwell D. Taylor (Eighth Army Commander)
- Harry Henshel (Chairman, Armed Forces Div., Jewish Welfare Board)

Air Group 12 (See enclosure (1)).

2. Casualties.

a. Ship’s Company.

On 6 March 1953 a Corsair landed aboard with a hung 250 pound general purpose bomb. On landing the bomb fell from the plane and exploded on number three elevator platform, killing 2 men and wounding 13 others, including 4 men from the Air Group and 2 from the Marine detachment.

Ship’s company men killed were:

- Thomas Leo McGeorge, PHN
- Thomas Michael Yeager, AEAN

Ship’s company men injured were:

- J. Blackburn, AN
- C. N. Hanks, AN
- L. N. Henshaw, AE3
- S. S. Kalfas, QMSN
- J. D. Moore, AN
- J. N. Oliver, AN
- R. L. Williams, AN
- J. A. Mulach, PFC
- W. T. Allain, PFC
The injuries sustained by MOORE and MULACH resulted in the amputation of each of their left arms.

b. Air Group 12 (See enclosure (1)).

PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Air Department.

a. General. During this period two AJ aircraft were recovered and launched without incident. On 17 March 1953 a member of the flight deck crew was blown overboard by jet blast and recovered within 1 minute by helicopter.

b. Aircraft handling.

(1) Special operations utilizing AJ type aircraft were conducted during the first day's operation. Prior to arrival of the two AJ's, six (6) AD aircraft were launched with strike loads and accompanied aircraft from other carriers on a routine mission, and were recovered by another carrier. This left a total of 68 aircraft and 2 helicopters on board at the time the two AJ's were recovered. A ready deck was maintained until dark with sufficient space available to recover 3 or 4 aircraft. No difficulty was encountered in resportion with the two AJ's on board; however, alignment of the AJ over the number 1 bomb elevator required considerable effort. Landing gear spot lines were painted on the deck which should reduce future spotting time to a minimum. The AJ's were catapulted the following morning, on a OST training mission, followed by routine prop and jet strikes.

(2) On 6 March a 250 pound general purpose bomb became dislodged from an F4U during an arrested landing and exploded on #3 elevator. In spite of the serious damage resulting, the elevator and flight deck were placed back in commission within 24 hours. Repair parties were effective in preventing further damage as a result of a bomb explosion on the flight deck. Repair Eight immediately extinguished the fire on the flight deck as the hot suit man rescued the injured pilot. Hangar bays were isolated by shutting fire doors on the hangar deck and the Repair Seven and Repair One crews effectively controlled the serious gasoline leakage which resulted when bomb fragments pierced two wing tip tanks on aircraft parked on the hangar deck.

(3) An increase in the size of jet flights launched and recovered during this period caused some concern for handling crews particularly in cases where a large prop recovery was scheduled to follow a twenty (20) to twenty-two (22) jet recovery. In order to assure sufficient room to recover all aircraft, most of the jets had to be struck below during the recovery. Due to the usual low fuel states of the jets, action had to be fast and both #1 and #2 elevators utilized to the maximum degree. During such recoveries, some pilots were over-eager to taxi out of the gear, and occasionally this haste resulted in pilots having to use excessive brakes to
slow up in the barrier area. Several foul decks of 3 to 4 minutes duration were caused by the breaking of barrier and barricade shear pins due to braking action of wheels when taxiing over the barricade. Another critical situation experienced was the recovery of large jet flights with most props on board in the pack ahead of the barrier. Only #2 elevator was available during such conditions and usually 8 to 10 jets had to go below to the hangar deck. In order to prevent wave-offs the jets extended their interval slightly. A time saving method was incorporated by having the pilots report on the down wind leg if their plane is going to be "down". Knowing this, the plane can be struck below upon recovery, leaving only "up" aircraft on the flight deck for the next launch.

(4) During this period several jet strikes were scheduled carrying 500# bombs. Loading the 500# bomb requires spreading the wings of the F9F as it does on the AD aircraft. This problem is of no significance if the loading is accomplished during the night or periods during the day when the props are off on a strike. Wing spreads are difficult to accomplish when all aircraft are on board and ready deck condition set.

(5) One additional jet starting unit would be of great value on the hangar deck at #2 elevator. Many times standby aircraft are brought up to the flight deck for launch and delay is experienced in starting if a starting jeep is not available. The ship's allowance is four jet starting jeeps, and this number barely keeps up with the fast catapulting abilities of this ship.

c. Arresting Gear.

(1) There was a total of one thousand six hundred seventy-six (1,676) landings made during this period of which eight hundred ninety-two (892) were conventional type aircraft. There was an average run out of cross deck pendants for the jet aircraft of one hundred thirty-four point three (134.3) feet and one hundred thirty point four (130.4) feet for the conventional type.

(2) There were three (3) barrier and/or barricade crashes involving three (3) jet aircraft.

d. Catapults.

(1) A total of nine hundred eighty-six (986) aircraft were catapulted, the majority of which were F9F-5 Panthers. One (1) arrestor was lost on the second shot due to a failure of the webbing loop. A second arrestor and pendant assembly was lost after twenty-two (22) shots due to a similar failure. Nylon webbing for use in the manufacture of loops is not available.

(2) Availability of both catapults has remained excellent despite the continued wear of crosshead sheave bearings. One Anseo Air Solenoid valve was changed on the starboard catapult on 17 March due to erratic action. This valve has been installed since September 1950.
LAUNCHING STATISTICS:

Average wind - Jet launch - 37 knots

Average wind - Propeller launch - 32 knots

F9F - 823  Average weight - 19,500 lbs.
F2H - 67   Average weight - 18,000 lbs.
F4U - 42   Average weight - 17,000 lbs.
AD - 45    Average weight - 20,000 lbs.
TBM - 7    Average weight - 14,000 lbs.
AJ - 2     Average weight - 46,000 lbs.

(3) One F9F-5 crashed ahead and to port of the ship following a normal catapult shot from the starboard catapult. The aircraft exploded upon impact and the cause of the accident is unknown.

e. Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Getting the "downed" aircraft spotted so it can be worked on is a major handling problem. This problem has been partially eliminated due to the efforts of CVG maintenance and aircraft handling personnel. Timely information is passed to Flight Deck Control concerning maintenance requirements and check requirements are closely watched in order to assure getting the plane below for checks during recoveries and resprays. One of the major maintenance problems is the lack of space for jet turn-ups on the hangar deck. Prop turn-ups in hangar bay #3 require opening all curtains and at night obviously require cutting off all lights, thereby stopping all maintenance work in progress at that time. Every effort is being made to spot "down" aircraft on the hangar deck in such a manner that when the aircraft is ready for turn-up, it can easily be brought top side via one of the available elevators.

(2) In order to provide more hangar space it has been found that two tail sections from F9F "dud" aircraft can be suspended from the overhead on the port side of #3 elevator. By shortening the cables of the standard hoisting sling the tail section can be suspended high enough to allow personnel and equipment to move about freely underneath. These tail sections had previously been suspended from the overhead in the after part of bay #3, but this position was difficult to reach and prevented removing wings from the overhead stowage without first removing the tail sections.

f. Ordnance.

(1) Elevator stoppage and over-travel was encountered due to old and faulty General Electric controllers. The relays stuck causing the main highspeed contact points to arc and weld closed. This causes over-travel resulting in the stoppage of the elevator. These controllers will be overhauled and new equipment installed. At present, no spare contact points are available. It is recommended that an adequate supply of these contact points be carried by all ships using this type control box.
(2) 20mm ammunition, previously belted and stored in ship's magazines, should be re-checked for calibration before using. It is a good idea to save a supply of bomb nose and tail plugs for replacement in the event fuzes are withdrawn due to non-flying or bad weather.

(3) Maximum effort strikes necessitating rapid reloading, refueling, and respotting of F9F-5 aircraft again highlighted the difficulty and excessive time required in re-loading the 20mm guns due to the design and placement of ammunition cans and feed chutes. It requires approximately three (3) times as long to re-arm the F9F-5 as to re-arm other type aircraft. With limited numbers of ordnancemen available, this seriously hampers overall operation.

2. Engineering Department.

a. Casualties.

(1) The following major damage was sustained during routine operations from 0000 1 March to 2400 29 March 1953:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-29 Mar</td>
<td>(a) Hole in #3 elevator main platform approximately 5 and one half feet athwartship by seven feet fore and aft. Frames 137-138, approximately 15 feet port of centerline.</td>
<td>Explosion of 250lb. G.F. bomb which fell from wing of plane during arrested landing. (See ORISKANY Conf ltr ser 0105 14 Mar 1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Specific damage as follows:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Two longitudinal deck girders size 12&quot;x4&quot;. (22 lb. &quot;T&quot; beams) destroyed and two additional girders (same size) bent down about one half inch outward. Location frames 137-139.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Intermediate transverse girders 18&quot;x7/8&quot; (55lb. &quot;T&quot; beams) at frame 139 between points 13'6&quot; and 13'10&quot; to port of centerline bent down on forward flanges and up on after flanges about one inch. Web of girder has a slight twist at the point of maximum flange bend.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Approximately 360 linear feet of wood deck planking destroyed and additional linear feet damaged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Approximately 46 square feet of 4.2 lb. deck plate destroyed with three additional holes in plating at frame 140 between 11' and 12' to port of centerline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Elevator platform bent down in area of blast. Readings were taken by means of chalk line and show a maximum depression of 2&quot; at frame 140 at a point 11'4&quot; to port of centerline decreasing to zero depression at frames 133 and 144.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The following minor damage was sustained during routine operations from 0000 1 March to 2400 29 March 1953:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 March</td>
<td>(a) Damage to flight deck planking involving approximately 1000 linear feet.</td>
<td>Aircraft landings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March</td>
<td>(a) Rupture of superheater tube in #7 boiler (see ORISKANY ltr ser 767 14 March 1953). Location: Two MK 368 in the inlet header, 22 tubes down from the top of the header. (See BUSHIPS plan CV9-S5101-114).</td>
<td>Believed to be internal corrosive condition of tubes as previously reported in ORISKANY ltr ser 2833 21 Dec 1952.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March</td>
<td>(a) Secondary damage to #3 elevator main platform as follows:</td>
<td>Bomb explosion. See a (1) (a) above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Channel securing track about 14' bent or destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Arresting gear chafing plate about 12 feet at frame 136 bent and pierced by small fragments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Welds in blast area, in particular the joining points between intermediate transverse girder (frame 139) and main longitudinal girder, show external strain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Damage to auxiliary elevator platform as follows: Same as above</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. One hole 10&quot;x14&quot; in 15 lb. plating at frame 140 about 13 feet to port of centerline.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Longitudinal deck girder 10&quot;x6&quot; (18 lb. &quot;I&quot; beam) at frame 140 had lower flange bent down two inches for distance of about 6&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. One hole in 15 lb. deck plating size 1&quot;x3&quot; frame 140 at 13'10&quot; to port of centerline.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Safety net fr me on port edge, frame 140, cut through.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Additional minor damage was incurred by flying debris or shrapnel extending from hangar deck to 09 level of the island and as far forward as frame 98.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATE
11 March

(a) Plates cracked at the following locations:

1. Upper forward cover of coaming and knife edge of 16,000 lb. bomb elevator door, hangar deck level, frame 63, starboard side, approximately 11" long.

2. Cracked plates, diagonally from covers of opening of vent system (supply) 2-66-4, frames 64-67, main deck walkway port side, approximately (1) 5" long, (2) 3" long, (3) ½" long, (4) 10" long.

3. Frame 60, starboard side, main deck, 6 feet above main deck over winch, approximately 6" long.

4. Frame 71, starboard side, main deck 47" above main deck, approximately 3½" long.

5. Frame 67, starboard side, main deck, 12' above main deck, approximately 12" long.

6. Frames 78 to 79, starboard side, main deck, 1" above the deck, approximately 5" long.

7. Main deck level, frame 112, where expansion joint meets main deck, is cracked.

b. Recommendations.

(1) None.

c. Steaming Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engine miles steamed</th>
<th>11,846.8</th>
<th>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil received</td>
<td>2,047,623</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil delivered DD's</td>
<td>43,667</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil consumed (underway)</td>
<td>2,122,153</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel consumed (anchored)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average speed</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours underway</td>
<td>689.1</td>
<td>1 Mar-29 Mar 1953 (2400)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Fueling:

(1) During the period 1 March through 29 March, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled one destroyer on one occasion at an average rate of 67,180 gallons per hour. The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tankers on six occasions during this period at an average fueling rate of 180,137.5 gallons per hour.
3. Medical Department.

The Medical Department supplies and equipment continue to be adequate. No supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period.

a. Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) The health of ship's company and the Air Group has continued to be excellent. If anything the incidence of disease, anxiety, and psychic tension has been less than on previous tours. There has been no loss in performance. Morale has improved, and is on a higher level than previously described. Two factors undoubtedly contributed to this. First of all, the ship is about to return to the United States. Secondly and probably more important, the disaster (vide infra) of the sixth of March has served to weld the ship more firmly together making every man realize that he is part of an organization that has been tried and found to have what it takes. Ship's pride, squadron pride is at an all time high. We know we have the best ship.

(2) On an inspection of ship's company on the 31st of March, only five cases of a very mild acne, one case of blepharitis, and one sebaceous cyst were noted in approximately 3,000 men. Many times this number were noted when the ship was inspected on the West Coast. No evidence of any other illness was noted.

(3) In conclusion it is felt that the personnel of this vessel are in excellent physical condition after six and one half months overseas.

(4) On the sixth of March 1953, a two hundred and fifty pound bomb exploded on the flight deck blasting a hole through the number three elevator platform. Two men were killed and thirteen injured. The important fact was that no one gave way to panic. Every man did his job coolly and efficiently. Men walked through gasoline on the hangar deck, men rushed to rescue the pilot even though the plane had begun to burn. Men did this with the memory of the BOXER fresh in their minds. It is felt that only a well disciplined crew with good morale and spirit could have performed in so creditable fashion. No cases of anxiety have resulted from this incident, an amazing record. Medically the first aid training of ship's company and the medical department paid off. Stretchers appeared, first aid was given, and patients evacuated to sick bay within a matter of minutes. Supplies and equipment were readily available. More casualties could have been handled without break-down of the organization.

b. Care of the Dead.

(1) It is hoped that some more expeditious plan may be worked out for the disposing of the dead. Under present operating conditions, it is felt that embalming of bodies is not technically feasible. The procedure ties up sick bay facilities for several hours, aboard a man of war that may be called on at any time to handle more casualties. Four hours time elapsed recently when this was done. Half of sick bay was made untenable by formaldehyde fumes for an even longer period.
(2) Even then embalmed bodies must be placed in storage at 34 to 40 degrees. This might be satisfactory for a few days, but is not for periods at sea of 25 to 30 days. Freezing of embalmed bodies at 16 degrees, or less, is technically satisfactory, but against present directives. The present procedure aboard this vessel has been to freeze unembalmed bodies holding them until the ship arrives at Yokosuka. Embalming these bodies at such a late date is technically difficult. To solve this problem it is recommended that special COD flights be made to transport bodies, which have been previously frozen, to Atsugi for further transfer to the U.S.N.H.. Five or ten flights per month would be more than adequate. If this is not logistically sound, it is recommended that bodies be buried at sea. The present method of holding bodies for further transfer, though meeting the wishes of a few bereaved relatives, imposes a greater psychic trauma on ship's company, and uses up valuable reefer space.

c. Medical Department Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to sick list</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to billet list</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 101,175 work days</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 67,091 work days</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers admitted to sick list</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visits to sick call</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>3,879</td>
<td>1,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients received from other ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients transferred to hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor injuries treated</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major injuries treated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number shipboard injuries resulting death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of personnel died of disease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor surgical procedures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major surgical procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal diseases and non-specific urethritis</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonorrhea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chancroid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, pilot not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured
Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons
Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons
Average number days pilot grounded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks.

On 6 March 1953, LT E. L. KUMMER, USNR, sustained numerous missile wounds about both lower extremities, left upper arm, left shoulder and face when a 250# general purpose bomb fell from the port wing rack of his F4U-4 fighter and exploded, as he landed aboard the carrier. Wreckage burst into flames immediately thereafter, but because of the expeditious manner in which he was removed from the cockpit and by virtue of the protection afforded by his helmet, goggles and exposure suit, he sustained only second degree burns of both cheeks and his chin. He remains on the sick list, having been transferred to the United States Naval Hospital at Yokosuka, Japan for further treatment on 15 March 1953.

There were twelve others wounded and two fatalities, as a result of this accident. It is considered miraculous that the pilot escaped more serious injury.

LTJG R. J. MEW, USNR, was killed on 22 March 1953 when his F9F-5 fighter crashed into the sea shortly after being catapulted from the carrier.

Navigation Department.

The Navigation Department has continued its OOD training plan with thoroughly qualifying as many personnel as possible as the goal. Although it is an accelerated plan, each watch stander receives excellent training, both on the job and by written examination. Officers from departments not normally assigned bridge watches are included in this program in an effort to benefit as many as possible. This can be seen in the fact that of the six qualifications granted this tour, one officer was from the Air Department, one from Air Intelligence, one from CIC, and one from the Executive Department and the remaining two from Gunnery. As personnel become qualified, they are rotated from OOD watches to other duties to allow billets for new officers to qualify. So far on this Korean tour 16 officers have been qualified, bringing the total of qualified Officers-of-the-Deck to 28.

To increase the experience of those officers already qualified, OOD's have been given practice in actually making approaches on replenishment ships and keeping station alongside. This has greatly increased the OOD's practical knowledge of relative motion in addition to relieving the workload on the Navigator and Executive Officer during replenishment days.
During this tour more use has been made of the automatic steering and it has been found generally quite satisfactory and especially so during the rough weather encountered on 26 and 27 March. During this period excessive rudder was used by the helmsman in "hand" steering because of the yaw caused by the seas, combined with our slow speed (10 knots). It was found that where the helmsman needed 25 to 30 degrees of rudder to maintain a satisfactory course, that, by proper adjustment, automatic steering could maintain the same course using approximately one half the rudder or 10 to 15 degrees. This not only was a rest for the helmsman, but it also reduced the wear on the steering engines.

5. Operations Department.

a. Air Intelligence

The Air Intelligence Office force consisting of three officers and three enlisted men plus the Air Group AIO and two enlisted men from the Air Group staff is considered adequate to meet the Air Intelligence requirements. The ship's AIO spent this period on the bridge training for the qualification of OOD underway.

A card index system has been initiated to facilitate ready reference to maps and charts. This method will also indicate high and low usage maps and those which have reached a critical supply level. It is believed this card index system will provide a means whereby a more workable stock level of maps and charts can be maintained aboard.

The Photo Interpretation unit has been separated physically from the Air Intelligence Office and reassigned working space in the wardroom air conditioning machinery room, compartment A-211-EL. The space is adequate and this solution has relieved the critical working space problem for both Air Intelligence and Photo Interpretation.

b. Air Operations

Air Operations officer personnel during the ship's fourth line tour consisted of two officers, one lieutenant commander and one lieutenant. The third officer normally assigned to Air Operations, a lieutenant junior grade, was returned without relief to CONUS for release to inactive duty at the completion of the third line tour. This officer was the assigned CCA officer and had additional duties as air plot officer and OA division officer. Since aircraft recovery by CCA is not presently in effect in the Task Force, this loss was absorbed. Other officers assumed the duties of air plot officer and one of the ship's air intelligence officers became the OA division officer.

The assigned CCA enlisted personnel have been utilized to man Air Operations. Five rated air controlmen and five strikers were assigned to CCA. This permits manning the one and two JG circuits by two status board keepers, one air controlman on the land/launch frequency, and allowed the watch officer to act as a general supervisor. The two JG talker also mans the ready
room teletype. As long as there are a minimum of ten enlisted men assigned to CCA, it is believed that Air Operations could continue to be efficiently manned even with the occasional use of CCA during poor weather conditions.

The above mentioned personnel on a watch basis were always on duty at all other times when underway. A twenty-four hour watch was thus maintained, personnel being organized on a three watch or section basis.

Air Operations has acted as the general information and coordination center for all phases of air operations. A direct line sound powered telephone connection was installed between the open bridge and Air Operations prior to reporting for the first line tour with Task Force 77. This direct line telephone has proven a very valuable and efficient means of rapidly transmitting the Captain's decisions to the pilots, particularly in emergency situations.

A gradual improvement in aircraft availability and percentage of assigned missions actually launched and completed has been noted with each successive line period. The fourth line period was the ship's most successful and efficient to date. With the exception of two days at the beginning of the period, the Air Group maintained a daily aircraft availability of well over ninety percent. This was reflected in the ship's averaging very nearly one hundred percent in meeting the assigned flight schedule over the twenty-nine day period.

c. Communications.

Communications during the period covered by this report were highly satisfactory from the view point of equipment performance. Traffic in general was processed expeditiously under all circumstances with the exception of short periods of atmospheric disturbance and circuit over-load.

Encrypted traffic, especially with a Staff embarked, has a tendency to "bog-down" with the ultimate result of lengthy delays in delivery to addressee concerned. It is felt that one cause of increased encrypted traffic loads is due to the abuse of overclassification. The results of such misuse are set forth in the United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

Attention is invited to the communication section of the Action Report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) for the period 28 October - 22 November 1952. Note was made of the indiscriminate use of precedences of "OP" and "O" in this particular theater. This misuse, which also tends to tie-up circuits being used, has on more than one occasion caused delay in attempting to clear traffic of an immediate operational nature.

Subject to the above comments, the following recommendations are submitted:

(1) Recommend commands review current instructions defining the proper use of precedence.
(2) Recommend commands insure that all personnel having authority to assign security classification, are familiar with the contents of Chapter 4 of the United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation:

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN RADIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIRCUIT</th>
<th>NO. OF MSGS. RELAYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Group Common</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Commanders Net</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group Commanders Net</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM/THFLT Circuit</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOCK Circuit</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,135</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MESSAGES HANDLED IN MAIN COMMUNICATIONS AND CRYPTO-CENTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming (Classified)</td>
<td>2,457 (502,338 groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing (Classified)</td>
<td>361 (45,624 groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming (Plain)</td>
<td>4,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing (Plain)</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,566</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MESSAGES HANDLED BY THE SIGNAL BRIDGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flashing Light (Incoming)</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashing Light (Outgoing)</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy (Incoming)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy (Outgoing)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>784</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups: Incoming: 11,334; Outgoing: 5,003.

The following statistics represent postal activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money orders issued</td>
<td>1,241 ($59,043.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money orders cashed</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered mail received</td>
<td>456 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered mail dispatched</td>
<td>488 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mail received</td>
<td>15 sacks, 50 pouches (approx 115,000 letters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air mail dispatched</td>
<td>8 sacks, 38 pouches (approx 95,000 letters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel post received</td>
<td>330 sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel post dispatched</td>
<td>106 sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured mail received</td>
<td>233 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insured mail dispatched</td>
<td>110 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First class mail received</td>
<td>6 pouches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First class mail dispatched</td>
<td>10 pouches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Photography.

The number of photographic personnel assigned for the period was 14. This figure includes one warrant, one AFC and eight rated men.

Laboratory production was less than for the previous operating period. Print totals for the period were 23,332 9x18 inch, 1,926 8x10 inch target photos for briefing. 378 8x10 inch copy negatives were made of target mosaics selected by staff and ship photo interpretation units.

It is recommended that ships returning to the west coast be outfitted with new AIOA film dryers, print dryers and print washers before their next deployment. Due to constant use, approximately 15 to 20 hours each operating day, these dryers and printers become unreliable, especially the AIOA film dryer. Print washers tend to rust and corrode from use of salt water for washing prints.

6. Supply Department.

a. Aviation Stores.

During the 30 days covered by this report no on-the-line replenishment from ARS/ARV vessels was accomplished. Miscellaneous freight items were shipped via replenishment tankers and by COD aircraft. It was noted that priority screening is desirable for COD delivery since items of low priority were occasionally received when status information indicated that high priority materials were probably available for lift.

The following items continue in short supply and procurement has been on emergency basis only:

- R82-C-625120
- R85-FW-198061
- R85-HO-A70022
- R90-NAF-600455-89-5
- R94-SUA-50A770103

b. General Stores.

Procurement problems as indicated in previous reports remain substantially unchanged, providing experience which will be of great assistance prior to next scheduled deployment.

c. Ship's Store and C&S

Stationery is a high usage item with sales of one package per month for every two men on board.

89,000 packages of cigarettes were sold during the month of March.
Fifty-three percent of the C&SS requisitions were filled. This leaves shortages in undershirts, dungaree jumpers, and dungaree trousers.

d. Commissary.

On 15 March 1953 the U.S.S. ORISKANY received provisions from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). Eighty-one percent of the requisitions were filled. On 29 March 1953 ninety percent of the material requisitioned was received from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) leaving shortages in the following:

- Potatoes, sweet, fresh
- Lettuce, fresh
- Tomatoes, fresh
- Pears, fresh
- Spaghetti
- Potatoes, dehy.
- Pickles, sweet
- Salad oil
- Hot sauce

c. Disbursing.

Due to an anticipated 60 days without the availability of funds it was necessary to request permission from COMNAVFIE to carry funds in excess of the authorized amount. Permission was granted to carry funds for a 90 day period.

PART VII

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Page 10 paragraph 1 b (5)

One additional jet starting unit be allotted for use on hangar dock at #2 elevator.

2. Page 11 paragraph 1 f (1)

An adequate supply of contact points for General Electric controllers be carried by all ships using this type control box.

3. Page 16 paragraph 3 b (2)

Special COD flights transport bodies of deceased personnel to Atsugi.

4. Page 16 paragraph 3 b (2)

That bodies be buried at sea.

5. Page 19 paragraph 5 c (1)

That commands review instructions defining proper use of precedence.
6. Page 20 paragraph 5 c (2)

That commands insure that all personnel having authority to assign security classifications are familiar with contents of chapter 4 of United States Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter.

7. Page 21 paragraph 5 d (3)

That ships returning to west coast be outfitted with AIOA film dryers, print dryers and print washers before next deployment.

Copies to:

CNO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (5) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMCARDIV 1
COMCARDIV 3
COMCARDIV 5
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMSVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRQUONSET
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NLO JOC KOREA
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 7
CVG 9
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 12
ATG 2 (5)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
      (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
      (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period of 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 12 Action Report for the period of 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953
      (2) U.S.S. ORISKANY summary report of operations during deployment in WESTPAC
      (3) CVG 12 statistical summary report of operations during deployment in WESTPAC

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period of 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) with Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, and Commander Air Group TWELVE embarked, sortied from Hong Kong Harbor, British Crown Colony at 06081, 8 April 1953 and at 07571, 11 April 1953 joined Task Force 77 in Area Sugar, Japan Sea. Commander Task Force 77 and Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45).

Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. Hickey, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 11 April 1953. On 11 April 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) was detached and on 22 April 1953 returned to the force with Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked. Commander Carrier Division THREE assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77, 22 April 1953.

During the operating period other major ships in company were the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62)
with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and screening destroyers.

The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached on 22 April 1953 from Task Force 77 and proceeded to Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and maintenance.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8 April 1953
Sortied from Hong Kong Harbor, B.C.C. at 0608I enroute to the Korean operating area, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked. Rendezvoused with the U.S.S. TWINING (DD-540) and the U.S.S. ERENE (DD-631).

9 April 1953
Enroute to the Korean operating area.

10 April 1953
Enroute to the Korean operating area. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. MANATEE (AO-55).

11 April 1953
Enroute to the Korean operating area. Replenished provisions and stores from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55). Joined Task Force 77 in the Korean operating area. RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, and Commander Task Force 77, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45). Conducted combat flight operations. RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, embarked in the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), relieved RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3, as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) with COMCARDIV 3 embarked, was detached and departed Task Force 77.

12 April 1953
Conducted combat flight operations.

13 April 1953
Conducted combat flight operations. LTJG R. TAYLOR, USNR, VF-122, ditched near the Task Force when his F9F-5 flamed out. LTJG TAYLOR was not recovered.

14 April 1953
Rendezvoused with Task Unit 92.1.1 for replenishment. Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20). Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. CAPACON (AO-52). Conducted AA firing exercises utilizing F6F type drones.
Conducted combat flight operations.

16 April 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

17 April 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) joined Task Force 77. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) was detached and departed Task Force 77.

18 April 1953


19 April 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. The Honorable J. J. FLOBERG, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, arrived on board. Mr. FLOBERG departed in the afternoon for the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62).

20 April 1953

Conducted combat flight operations. Ens R. T. SCOGGAN, USNR, VF-121 F9F-5 pilot, bailed out ten miles east of Hodo Pando Peninsula as he was returning from a strike in the cherokee area. Ens SCOGGAN radioed that he was bailing out due to loss of control of his aircraft. The actual bail out was not observed nor was the parachute ever actually seen. Ens SCOGGAN has not been recovered and is listed as missing.

21 April 1953

Conducted combat flight operations.

22 April 1953

Rendezvoused with Task Unit 92.1.1 for replenishment. Replenished NSFO and aviation gasoline from the U.S.S. GUADALUPE (AO-32). Replenished ammunition from the U.S.S. MOUNT BAKER (AE-4). Received provisions from the U.S.S. ALSTEDE (AF-48). RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), relieved RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5 as Commander Task Force 77. The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached from Task Force 77 to proceed on a special mission enroute to Yokosuka, Japan for transfer of material prior departure to CONUS. End of reporting period.
PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ammunition expenditures for the period 8 April 1953 to 22 April 1953.
   a. Service Types (Included in enclosure (1)).
   b. Training Types
      
      5"/38 FCL (VT) NF projectile
      5"/38 Non flashless cartridge
      3"/50 FCL (VT) NF non flashless

PART IV
BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship. No battle damage was sustained by the U.S.S. ORISKANY during the current period.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy (see enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted on ORISKANY aircraft (see enclosure (1)).

PART V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance
   a. Personnel
      
      During the period of this report the average on board count was 2717: 1947 ship's company; 62 Marines; 17 Special Weapons Team; 612 CVG-12 and 79 CMCARDIV 5; 9 men received and 68 transferred.
   b. Training
      
      Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:
      
      New classes organized
      Active classes at the end of period 6
      Number of class hours held during period 24
      Number of Navy Training Courses (texts) checked out 17
      Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered by men 11
      Number of USAFI texts checked out 4
      Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) completed by men 6
Number of USAFI Correspondence Courses ordered 8
Number of batteries of USAFI GED tests administered 10
Number of USAFI End-of-Month Tests administered 6
Number of USAFI GED batteries ordered 5
Number of enrollments in College Extension Courses None
Number of USAFI End-of-Month Tests ordered by men 3
Number of letters sent civilian schools on behalf of men for counseling and placement purposes None
Number of requests for service schools forwarded 12

c. Legal

Except for work connected with the completion of the record of proceedings of a board of investigation, legal activity consisted chiefly of a few Summary and Special courts-martial. It appears this decline is due to the relatively short time spent in port and, further, to the comparatively short period covered by this report.

The assistant legal officer departed on temporary additional duty at the Naval School of Justice in Newport, Rhode Island.

d. Welfare and Recreation

Regularly scheduled bingo games have been conducted at 1900 on Wednesdays and Saturdays of each week in the crew's messing compartments for all hands. Happy Hours have been conducted on replenishing days, using talent from ship's company and Air Group. The ship's band plays on Tuesday and Friday evenings in the officers' wardroom.

The Hobby Shop is open daily for use by all hands. It carries a wide variety of crafts, i.e., leatherscraft, model planes, ships, sailboats, wagons, automobiles, etc.

The ship's library is open daily from 0830 to 2130 for use by all hands.

The Charity Committee is currently conducting special raffles and bingo parties for funds for the Navy Relief Society. Bingo parties and raffles are providing "on-the-line" recreation for all hands and are serving both morale and charity.

e. Religious Services

Catholic services are held daily. Three (3) Masses are said on Sundays followed by Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Special daily prayers are said for the safety of our pilots. The rosary, novena, and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament are held daily.

Protestant services are conducted at 0900 on Sunday mornings and Vesper services at 1900. The Bible Class meets at 1930 on Wednesdays.
Jewish services are conducted on Friday evenings and on special days of religious significance on the Jewish calendar.

Mormon services are conducted at 1000 on Sundays.

Christian Science study periods are observed on Sundays at 1100.

f. Public Information

Public Information activities covered during the period of this report consisted of the following:

Navy news dispatches (by radio) 6
News feature stories and layouts (by mail) 1
News photo releases 3
Radio newscasts 2
Hometown news stories (to FHTNC) 1476

2. Casualties

a. Ship's Company

No ship's company casualties occurred other than minor injuries during the reporting period.

b. Air Group 12. (See enclosure (1)).

PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Engineering Department

a. Casualties

No major nor minor damage was sustained from any cause.

b. Recommendations

None.

c. Steaming Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engine miles steamed</td>
<td>6,545.2</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil received</td>
<td>1,851,624</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil delivered DD's</td>
<td>93,430</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil consumed (underway)</td>
<td>1,182,284</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil consumed (anchor)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average speed</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours underway</td>
<td>354.0</td>
<td>8 April-22 April 1953</td>
<td>(2400)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Fueling

During the period 8 April through 22 April 1953, the U.S.S. ORISKANY fueled destroyers on one (1) occasion, at an average rate of 254,577.6 gallons per hour. The U.S.S. ORISKANY refueled from tankers four (4) times during this period at an average fueling rate of 181,888.4 gallons per hour.

2. Navigation Department

The voyage from Hong Kong to the Battle Line gave the Navigation Department an opportunity to navigate in new waters. The navigational aids in the South China Sea and the Formosan Straits were very limited and navigation many times consisted of "dead reckoning". The skies were continually overcast allowing no celestial navigation whatsoever. Loran coverage was good north of Formosa, but in the Formosan Straits and the South China Sea, it was impossible to pick up Loran. If held, the readings were considered unreliable since the waves traveled over land masses. Radar also offered difficulties because the charts depict little or no topography, and the identification of landmarks on the radar was difficult. However, the currents encountered gave very little set and the "DR" track proved successful.

This tour marked the completion of the intensified OOD training program with three additional qualifications. This brings the total of OOD qualifications granted this WESTPAC tour to twenty-one.

3. Combat Information Center

During the period of this report the CIC of the U.S.S. ORISKANY functioned as Flag CIC for COMCARDIV 5.

CIC watch officers have continued the program of training for qualification as OOD underway, and OOD's have been indoctrinated in CIC procedures, capabilities and limitations. To date five CIC watch officers have been qualified as OOD underway and a like number of OOD's have received CIC indoctrination. Besides furthering the professional qualifications of the officers concerned, immediate benefits have been realized, in that each officer now has a much better appreciation of the problem of the other, and a smoother CIC-Bridge relationship has resulted.

Air Controllers from destroyers and cruisers have been ordered aboard for refresher training and observation. Day intercept practice can be afforded these controllers, but the nature of the Task Force operations affords little opportunity for all-weather control practice intercepts. ORISKANY has also been assigned the stand-by guard for CAP when this control is passed to DD's. This guard requires continuous monitoring of the CAP frequency by a qualified Air Controller. Control of CAP had to be assumed from DD's on numerous occasions since many of the destroyers had inadequate equipment for control of jet CAP. In most cases positive control of jets at medium or long ranges can be maintained only through the use of MK-10 IFF.
Surface and air search radar performance has been uniformly excellent throughout this operating period. However, the SX height radar performance has been consistently poor. Even when RHI gear is operating at peak performance, no altitude information can be obtained on targets at ranges greater than 45-55 miles. This range is considerably reduced on small flights of jet aircraft. On several occasions the ship has been unable to assume an altitude guard assignment due to equipment breakdown. It is believed that the altitude determining capability of the entire Task Force poses the greatest limitation to adequate air defense. Accurate altitude information is of primary importance in the consummation of a jet air intercept at maximum range.

VHF radio communications have been excellent during this period, however, it has been necessary to utilize the TDQ transmitter and AN/ARC's receiver for voice communication at extreme ranges. Cross-talk on AN/ARC's has been greatly reduced, but continues to handicap controllers using TDQ-RCK's as well as AN/ARC's on circuits Elz and Elaa with only a 0.18 MC separation.

1. Communications

During the period covered by this report, a vast improvement was noted in the overall efficiency of communication personnel, and the manner in which traffic was processed.

The comments noted below pertain to circuit C2B (replenishment net) (23100 kcs). This circuit was used on a trial basis commencing 13 April 1953. Interference was noted as follows:

Unknown voice circuit, making radio checks, interrupted the circuit intermittently. (Believed to be an Army voice circuit).

Maneuvering signals were evident, believed to be originated by CTU 92.1.1 (CW).

Own ship's TTY RATT signals were evident in the background. (These signals were not of sufficient strength to cause serious interference).

This frequency (23100 kcs) is considered superior to the former replenishment frequency (2630 kcs) due to the improved reception. Circuit C2B does not interfere with other circuits being used, whereas 2630 kcs was blocked at times by circuit C16 when on frequency 4620 kcs.

Excellent results were noted on ship-shore RATT on circuit AH.7A (4485 kcs) for a period of five days. The "TBA" transmitter keyed continuously on 4485 kcs with an approximate outage of three hours for the entire period.

The signal bridge is responsible, in the event of a deck crash during night flight operations, to illuminate the flight deck. Should such an emergency arise, a red filter is fitted to the port 12" searchlight, thereby providing illumination and complying as far as practicable with darkened ship regulations.
It has been determined that amber filters are most appropriate for flashing light signalling. The use of red or green filters give rise to the situation where the signal lights may be mistaken for a ship's running lights.

Flags required to be flown at the fore, such as the guide flag or personal flags, should be fitted with tabling. Grommets have proved to be of insufficient strength to withstand wind conditions prevalent in Fast Carrier Task Force operations.

The following statistics are indicative of the communication aspects of the operation.

**MAIN RADIO**

- Total number of messages received on "NDT" FOX: 2,171
- Total number of messages received on "G" FOX: 1,553
- Total number of messages received other circuits: 1,835
- Total number of messages transmitted: 1,613
- Total number of messages received for relay: 725

**MAIN COMMUNICATION OFFICE**

- Total number of classified messages processed: 876
- Total number of outgoing messages processed: 704
- Total number of messages processed (in and out): 2,907

**SIGNAL BRIDGE**

- Total number of messages received: 234
- Total number of messages transmitted: 98

Note: Approximately 15 percent of the messages handled were by NANCY method.

The following statistics of postal activities are considered to be of general interest:

- Money orders: 322 issued; 66 cashed
- Registered mail received: 236 pieces
- Registered mail dispatched: 160 pieces
- First class received: 5 pouches
- First class dispatched: 6 pouches
- Parcel post received: 180 sacks
- Parcel post dispatched: 60 sacks (75 boxes of chinaware)
- Insured mail received: 85 pieces
- Insured mail dispatched: 36 pieces
- Air mail received: 10 sacks, 30 pouches
- Air mail dispatched: 5 sacks, 24 pouches
5. Photography

The number of photographic personnel assigned this period was 16. This figure includes one AFC and 9 rated men. One-rated man remained assigned to the photographic interpretation unit. A six man night crew was maintained to complete all photography. A total of 964 useable 9x9 inch and 11,549 useable 9x18 inch sonne prints were made. From 304 8x10 inch negatives of plot charts, overlays and target pinpoint photographs, 3,587 8x10 inch prints were made. Also 89 16x20 inch prints were made and used for briefings. 6,300 feet of gun camera film was processed.

One B6 type aerial film developing unit was used and worked very satisfactorily. It proved to be a time saver in processing and handling of film in rolls of 400 foot lengths. It is recommended that B6 type aerial film developing units be made available to all units using the K-38 cameras with the A8B magazines.

A8B magazine malfunctions ceased after the camera repairman removed heavy oil from the clutch. Mechanical difficulties with the K-38 camera continued due to the shearing of taper pins in the case drive. The reason for this still remains unknown.

6. Air Intelligence

The attached Air Group has had no known opportunity to use the present barter kit, and it may be assumed the articles contained therein are satisfactory. The pouch itself presents somewhat of a problem. It has a dual purpose of protecting the articles contained and acting as a possible water bag, but investigation has shown a very small percentage of these pouches are capable of either. Pencils, needles, and other sharp object easily penetrate the plastic and many have split at the lower seam. The only solution advanced by the pilots is using scotch tape which is at best only a temporary cure.

It is recommended that the kits be constructed of heavier material of one piece construction.

During the past two tours the AD squadron and Hecklers have used the new Texoprint Korean Strip Chart, (Songjin to Tu-U-Men, number 15642-1). As only one of the three charts covering the Navy area is presently available a complete report cannot be made. A few of the pilots comments follow:

Advantages:
Excellent for Recco Routes and flak plotting.
Good for coastal navigation.
Long strip format (only three required for Navy area) eliminates hours of map arrangement.
Easy to mark with a grease pencil.
Terrain shading is good.
Could be of value for Escape and Evasion purposes.
Disadvantages:
Maps are subject to considerable wear along the folds. Map is a little unhandy due to its length and width. The large area covered compensates for this disadvantage. Leaves a smudge when erasing grease pencil marks.

A more detailed report on these charts will be forwarded to ANO, COMFAIRJAPAN.

Photographic interpretation as directed by CTF-77 consisted of railroad and highway route surveillance, damage assessment and target search. Damage assessment is being emphasized along with target searches. Targeting itself has been limited to supply areas, troop concentrations, vehicle parks and small industrial facilities.

Stereo briefing was employed successfully during this last tour. It was used for briefing pilots on artillery positions. It is recommended only for the more difficult targets and for flak positions. The use of stereo briefing for all targets is presently beyond the capabilities of a small interpretation unit.

7. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

On this tour, replenishment of routine requirements of aviation stores was by-passed due to the ship's deployment to Hong Kong where no supply support was available. The ship began the tour on the line without a major replenishment since leaving Yokosuka on 1 March 1953, except for supercargo received from replenishment vessels other than the aviation stores ship.

If the operating schedule permits, it is recommended that CVA-type ships enroute to Hong Kong be replenished either from AVS prior to leaving the line, immediately upon return, or during a stop-over at Sasebo. "On the line" replenishment from an AVS is considered most desirable. Underway transfer of all aeronautical material including engines is considered practicable.

Although there was no "on the line" replenishment of aviation stores from AVS during this period, there was considerable aviation stores freight received from other replenishment vessels. About 5 percent of the total received was from COD aircraft and helicopter.

Section "B" Shortages - The following items of section "B" material continue in short supply and procurement has been on an emergency basis only:

- R85FW-171394 Liner Weldment F9F
- R85FW-198061 Liner Weldment F9F
- R85HO-A7002G Fuel Control F9F
- R94BUA-50A70R103 Launcher, Rocket, Aero 14A

11
In summary, upon the completion of the fifth tour on the line, it is desired to point out that the items that are in short supply now are the very same items that were difficult to obtain during initial outfitting for this cruise Aug-Sep 1952. It is assumed that these shortages are Navy-wide and not of a local nature.

b. General Stores

Procurement problems as indicated in previous reports remain unchanged. Solutions appear to lie in a re-loading program based on experience gained in the Far East during this deployment. Items in short supply remain unchanged.

c. Ship's Store and C&S

One replenishment at sea was successfully accomplished during adverse weather conditions when 100,000 packages of cigarettes, on consignment, were transferred from the U.S.S. MANATEE (AO-58). Only minor damage was noted. On 14 April 1953, 2400 packages of stationery which had been ordered from CONUS on 20 October 1952 were transferred at sea.

Sales in ship's store and C&S have been very slow, after the crew's "spending festival" in Hong Kong, with no single item showing unusual sales.

d. Commissary

On 11 April the U.S.S. ORISKANY went alongside the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) at 0540 for replenishment of fresh, frozen and dry provisions. The first load landed on deck at 0545 and the last load arrived at 0635. The amount of provisions received was 74 tons, at a transfer rate of 88.8 tons per hour. The percentage of requisitions filled was 66%. The following items were not available at this replenishment:

- Spinach, td
- Catsup, td
- Syrup, td
- Spaghetti, dry
- Crackers
- Jam, asst
- Juice, orange
- Cereal, dry
- Cabbage, fresh
- Lettuce, fresh
- Celery, fresh
- Grapefruit, fresh
- Broccoli, f.f.
- Brussel sprouts, f.f.
- Cauliflower, f.f.

On 22 April the U.S.S. ORISKANY went alongside the U.S.S. ALSTEDE (AF-48) for replenishment of fresh, frozen and dry provisions, Seventy-seven tons were delivered in one hour.

e. Disbursing

Because of the large number of rebate checks received by the personnel of this ship from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the small demand for Postal Money Orders, it was impossible for the ship's post office to cash all dollar instruments presented to it during subject period.
This problem was solved by the Commanding Officer authorizing the Disbursing Officer, in writing, to cash dollar instruments in accordance with BUSANDA Manual para. 53265 for a two day period. They were then forwarded to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco with a Treasury Form 6599 as a deposit to the Disbursing Officer's official checking account.

8. Medical Department

The Medical Department supplies and equipment continue to be adequate. No supply shortage or equipment breakdown occurred during the reporting period.

Medical Evaluation of the Air Group and Ship's Company: The health of ship's company and the Air Group has continued to be excellent. This last tour of duty has, however, been in the nature of an anticlimax coming as it has between a visit to Hong Kong and the return to the continental limits of the United States. There has been no decrease in overall efficiency, but for the first time there has been noted a general feeling that personnel would like to finish the show and go home.

In conclusion it is felt that the personnel of this vessel are in excellent physical condition after eight months overseas.

Medical Department Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to sick list</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admitted to binnacle list</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 67,232 work days</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 104,175 work days</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 67,091 work days</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent sick days out of possible 44,980 work days</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.65</td>
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<td>Officers admitted to sick list</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total visits to sick call</td>
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<td>1,258</td>
<td>3,879</td>
<td>1,901</td>
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<td>Patients received from other ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patients transferred to hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minor injuries treated</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major injuries treated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number shipboard injuries resulting death</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of personnel died of disease</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minor surgical procedures</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major surgical procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal diseases and non-gonococcal urethritis</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gonorrhea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chancroid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-gonococcal urethritis following sexual exposure</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>32</td>
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</table>
Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, enemy action pilot killed, not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planes lost, pilot not recovered</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered minor injuries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number days pilots grounded</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crewmen grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The health of the Air Group personnel was considered excellent during the period covered by this report and the majority of treatments administered were for minor upper respiratory ailments. On 20 April 1953 a twenty millimeter shell was accidentally discharged while a gun was being removed from an F9F-5 fighter plane on the hangar deck. It struck the overhead and exploded, inflicting minor injuries on several air group plane captains and ordnance personnel.

Two pilots were lost during this period. On 14 April 1953, LTJG R. (N) TAYLOR, USNR, of VF-122 was returning at 11,000 feet from a strike when he experienced a flame-out. He could not restart his engine and ditched his F9F-5 fighter plane, which broke apart on impact with the water. He was not observed to have left the plane.

On 20 April 1953, ENS R. T. SCOGGAN, USNR, of VF-121 reported that his plane had been damaged by enemy antiaircraft fire, while on strike at Hamhung, Korea and that he was bailing out at 20,000 feet. Although his plane was observed to crash into the sea east of Hodo Pando, neither he nor his parachute was observed. He has been declared missing in action.

9. Air Department

a. General

During this final tour on the line Air Department functions were carried out in a normal manner. The period has been marked by longer hours for the flight deck crews, greater ordnance loads on aircraft for the ordnance gang, and greater catapult maintenance problems. The morale of the Air Department remains high with men looking forward to our return to the CONUS.
b. Aircraft Handling

The aircraft handling situation has been of a routine nature. Although the hours of the working day have increased due to earlier sunrises and later sunsets, the crews handled aircraft in a smooth and expeditious manner.

c. Arresting Gear

There was a total of 916 landings made during this period of which 404 were conventional type aircraft. There was an average run out of cross deck pendants for the jet aircraft of 137.3 feet and 129.2 feet for the conventional type.

There were no barrier and/or barricade crashes.

d. Catapults

F9F aircraft were launched carrying two thousand seven hundred and sixty (2760) pounds of bombs, believed to be the heaviest load attempted in the Korean area. As a result of this load, higher pressures were required and numerous "O ring" packings started leaking on both catapults.

On 17 April number six oilgear launching pump, type CG-15035, on the starboard catapult was shut down and found to have four broken pistons. The remainder of the tour was completed utilizing only six launching pumps.

Total shots this period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Port Catapult</th>
<th>Starboard Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2P</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-5</td>
<td>232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Aircraft Maintenance

In order to reduce the expenditures of manila line a number of tie-downs, consisting of nylon webbing and hardware salvaged from worn out arresting gear barriers, have been manufactured. These tie-downs adequately serve the purpose of securing many items of material and equipment against movement on the hangar deck.

Announcing ship turns over the hangar deck 3 MC system has proven helpful to maintenance personnel involved in use of heavy equipment as well as movement of aircraft, particularly in bay number 3. Movement of aircraft
engines, fork trucks, and installation of wings, engines or propellers, becomes extremely hazardous during turns, especially those of high speed which create vibration as well as cantiing of the deck. These few moments of warning permit personnel to secure equipment or materials against movement.

An improved arrangement was fabricated by the Aviation Electronics Shop for the LSO Platform radio. This consisted of equipping the LSO with a headset and lip microphone, thus permitting the LSO to talk directly with the pilots and give split second directions instead of relaying instructions through a talker. A switch, salvaged from a lip microphone cable, was cut out of its rubber mounting and fitted into the handle of one of the LSO paddles. The cable was clipped to the LSO's clothing and so arranged for quick discard in emergency.

Several AN/ARC-1 radio sets received by the Aviation Electronics Shop for repairs from escort destroyers were found to have had parts removed and wires unsoldered or connected to incorrect terminals. It is believed that repairs were attempted by inexperienced or unqualified personnel.

The ship has eight WAUKESHA Mod. E APU's which have received almost constant and continuous use for starting and testing aircraft. The frequent movements of these APU's over flight deck arresting gear cables and barriers places undue strain on the frame and axle of the APU. Frequent repairs were required, welding the frames and straightening and strengthening the axle. It is recommended that a stronger frame and axle be provided for these units.

The Aviation Metal Shop performed a difficult and intricate task of rebuilding a damaged TBM-3 horizontal elevator. The job was completed in an elapsed time of 31 hours and was accomplished without the use of jigs or special metal forming tools.

f. Ordnance

The bomb skid aero 12B with adapter aero 9B was used to carry four full aircraft ammunition cans from ready service lockers to aircraft. This saved extra trips and saved man-hours normally required.

The V.T. fuzes received have been modified with a heavy antenna ring. The jump-out pin that receives the arming wire has not been modified for the extra thickness of this antenna ring, making it necessary for all pins to be drilled to receive the arming wire.

g. Gasoline

The lack of spare parts continues to effect the operation of the gasoline system. An attempt was made to obtain some items on open purchase in Hong Kong, B.C.C., however, lack of commercial source prevented success in this venture. Allowance lists have been found to be unrealistic and suitable
representation has been made to correct the present allowance list. Emphasis should be placed on the necessity of instituting adequate allowance lists immediately for components that are peculiar to this particular type of gasoline system.

Overall operation of the gasoline and aviation lube oil systems has been very good.

PART VII
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Page 10 paragraph 5 (2)
   That B6 type aerial film developing units be made available to units using the K-38 camera with A8B magazines.

2. Page 10 paragraph 6 (2)
   That barter kits be constructed of heavier material of one piece construction.

3. Page 11 paragraph 7 (2)
   That CVA-type ships proceeding to Hong Kong be replenished from AVS prior to leaving the line or immediately upon return, or during a stop-over at Sasebo if operational commitments permit.

4. Page 16 paragraph 9e (6)
   That the frames and axles on the WAUKEsHA Mod E, APU be constructed stronger.

5. Page 17 paragraph 9g (1)
   That allowance lists pertaining to gasoline system components be revised to reflect normal usage items.

COURTNEY SHANDS
Distribution List

CNO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (5) advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) advance
CTF-77 (1) advance
COMCARDIV 1
COMCARDIV 3
COMCARDIV 5
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRQUONSET
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NLO JOC KOREA
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS WASP (CVA-18)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 7
CVG 9
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 12
ATG 2 (5)
SUMMARY REPORT OF OPERATIONS DURING DEPLOYMENT IN WESTPAC

This summary is submitted to provide interested commands with a consolidated report of this ship's comments, based upon actual combat experiences, while attached to Fast Carrier Task Force 77.

PART I
SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Stores

The total money value of aviation material issued to embarked squadrons was $923,334.68. During the period of deployment in the forward area 9933 items were requested of which 9627 were furnished from stock. Availability from stock was 96.9 percent. There were 32 individual ACOG item requests passed by the ship. Thirteen of these were requested for NIS allowance items; nineteen were requests for non-allowance items. Major components issued were:

Aircraft Engines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J3LWE3h</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J46P6A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2800-18W</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2800-32W</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3350-26WA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 24

Wing Panels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A A F F F F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>D D 4 4 9 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>W W U U VSN P5 H2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 0 1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 18

Although the aviation supply system has operated, generally, in a very effective manner, this ship received, near the end of its deployment, shipments of certain priority B initial outfitting requirements with original DND prior to deployment. The ship was replenished on the line three times by the U.S.S. CHICOREE (ARV-1). A total of 66 tons were received; 13 tons on 19 November, 22 tons on 19 January, and 1 ton on 7 February. The COD system was

Enclosure (2)
of great value and delivery of aviation fleet freight via other replenishment vessels was of considerable value.

2. General Stores

Previous usage data was found undependable during the first combat deployment to the Far East. Unforeseen requirements and unanticipated usage caused high requisitioning from service forces. Items in shortest supply were hand tools (class 40,41), teletype paper, stoddard solvent, and general mess cups.

Mobile service forces provided excellent support within their limitations.

Total value of issues for period $211,443.20
Total value of present inventory $242,552.97

3. Ship’s Stores and Clothing and Small Stores

Woolen winter underwear has been separated from normal laundry and washed in lukewarm water in order to reduce shrinkage. Occasional breakdowns of washers, extractors, presses, and soft drink machines have required adjustments of the normal work schedule. A brief shortage of cigarettes required rationing.

Ship’s store sales have been constantly high. No serious excesses have been encountered, except for a few old costume jewelry sets. Ship’s store shortages have occurred in watches (both dress and military), in Argus C-3 cameras, marking tubes, on occasion in stationery, in inexpensive pens, Dial soap, shaving lotions, and, on one occasion of cigarettes. Ship’s store inventory has declined in value from $150,000.00 to $45,000.00.

C&SS sales have been very high, with special demand for work items, such as dungaree trousers, dungaree jumpers, chambray shirts, black socks, gloves, etc. The only slow moving items have been "whites" and blue cloth caps.

Many procurement difficulties were eliminated by carrying a large beginning inventory. Staple ship’s store items were available in the Yokosuka area. C&SS requisitions were only from 50-70 percent filled. Souvenir items were found difficult to obtain from the Central Purchasing Office, with delivery coming from one to four months after submission of orders. No status information was available. An independent vendor was able to furnish similar material upon very short notice. Replenishment at sea was successful when used. An acute shortage of cigarettes was eliminated by a large transfer at sea. Other items were small transfers between ships, by verbal request made at the time to replenishment ships.

4. Commissary

The total tonnage of provisions received by this vessel during the period in the forward area from 30 October 1952 to 25 April 1953 amounted to 935 tons.
at sea and 233 tons in port. The percentage of requisitions filled at sea was 83.9 percent and 63.7 percent in port.

During the tour in the forward area some items have been available only in limited quantities from support ships. While operating in this area a total of 1964 lbs. of crackers, 666 lbs. of powdered eggs and 25,995 lbs. of lettuce, 10,052 lbs. of fresh tomatoes have been received, against total orders of 23,500 lbs., 3,050 lbs., 47,000 lbs., 26,000 lbs., respectively.

5. Disbursing

Upon first arrival in Japan liberty parties were held up nearly one whole day because it was necessary for the Disbursing Officer to obtain MPC and Yen and then hold a currency exchange prior to their departure from the ship. If MPC had been available at Pearl Harbor, exchange could have been completed prior to arrival in Japan. By the same token, if the Disbursing Officers be allowed to turn in MPC at Pearl Harbor, thus allowing exchange to be made after departure from Japan, much last minute confusion could be prevented.

Disbursing forms are not available in any appreciable amounts in the COMNAVFE area. All ships should carry sufficient amounts to last the complete cruise with emphasis on DD-137's and tax forms 1040 and 1040A.

Repair facilities for calculators, adding machines, etc., in Yokosuka are inadequate. All machines should be cleaned and reconditioned if possible prior to departure from the United States.

6. Wardroom

The outstanding change made for the period of operation was that of cafeteria style feeding at all meals rather than the normal serving arrangement. At evening meal a second seating was used for senior officers or those preferring regular service for that meal. This meal was served 45 minutes after completion of cafeteria feeding. This innovation fitted in very well with the air operations. Any variation from the cafeteria hours was listed on the air operation schedule one day in advance to insure that meals were available for those flights unable to meet the schedule.

A tight system has been drawn up for the collection of charges from transient personnel. The system used by this ship is to have the Transfer Officer notify the Mess Treasurer by memo of new arrivals and the expected departure dates of each. In addition, each morning a schedule of the day's anticipated departures is forwarded to the Mess Treasurer.

Prices in the commissary store in Yokosuka should be compared with general mess prices. On butter, for example, a large saving can be realized.
During the present operations the Navigation Department has had excellent opportunities for the training of deck-watch-standers. The rapidity of tactical maneuvers and the great variety of situations affords excellent practice in ship handling. To supplement on-the-job training, classes were held to improve the watch standers knowledge and technique in the use of the tools of his trade. Voice-radio procedure was practiced utilizing a tape recorder which readily demonstrated improper procedure. Officers in departments not normally assigned OOD watch standing have been included in an effort to benefit as many as possible. To increase the experience of those officers already qualified, OOD's have been given practice in actually making the approaches and keeping station alongside the replenishment ships. This has greatly improved the officers' conception of relative motion.

The total number of Underway OOD qualifications granted on this Korean tour is twenty-one, bringing the total of qualified Underway OOD's to thirty-one.

During this tour the "automatic" steering device, now incorporated aboard the ORISKANY, was used approximately one half of the time. It was found generally satisfactory, and especially well suited to heavy weather steering. During heavy weather, the recording machine indicated that automatic used one half the rudder angle that the helmsman needed to maintain the same course. This greatly reduced the wear on steering engines, and reduced helmsman fatigue.

The starboard wing of the bridge has had several features incorporated to increase the comfort and efficiency of the conning officer during the winter replenishment operations. A seat was installed with a foot rest, a plexiglass windshield was erected, and a canvas awning covering the wing was installed. A blackboard is maintained on the wing on which is recorded the most recent engine RPM and course being steered.

Navigation presented no serious problems. Loran coverage was excellent in the Japanese Sea, and in most areas traversed with the notable exception of the South China Sea.

PART III
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Performance
   a. Personnel

   During the period from 28 October 1952 to 22 April 1953 the average on board count was 2795: 2011 ship's company; 62 Marines; 17 SNU; 626 CVG-12 and 79 COMCARDIV 5.

   Enclosure (2)
During the period covered by this report a total of 19 officers reported for duty and 26 were detached.

The overall general performance and morale of all hands was maintained at a very high level throughout the tour in the operating area.

During the period covered by this report a total of 250 enlisted personnel were received on board and 364 were transferred (excluding conferences) by the following methods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COD</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Line</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Training

Training for the period as covered by this report consisted of the following:

- New classes organized: 7
- Active classes at the end of period: 29
- Number of class-hours held during period: 698
- Number of Navy Training Courses (texts) checked out: 144
- Number of Navy Training Courses (correspondence) ordered by men: 192
- Number of USAFI texts checked out: 38
- Number of USAFI Correspondence Courses ordered: 145
- Number of batteries of USAFI GED texts administered: 92
- Number of USAFI GED batteries ordered: 87
- Number of enrollments in college extension courses: 12
- Number of USAFI End-of-Month Tests ordered by men: 8
- Number of letters sent to civilian schools on behalf of men for counseling and placement purposes: 5
- Number of requests for service schools forwarded: 29

c. Legal

Legal activities covered by the period of this report showed a marked decline in legal matters.

Legal matters for the latter part of this period concerned mostly the completion of the proceedings of a board of investigation.

d. Welfare and Recreation

Bingo parties were organized for morale purposes and also for various charities. Proceeds from the parties and special raffles held on board were
donated to the March of Dimes, Red Cross, Netherlands Flood Relief and the Navy Relief Society. The parties seemed to be a big success and served as an "on-the-line" morale builder for both officers and enlisted.

Happy Hours have been conducted on replenishing days, using talent from ship's company and Air Group.

The Hobby shop is open daily for use by all hands. There is a wide variety of crafts, i.e., leathercraft, model planes, automobiles, ships, sail boats, etc.

e. Religious Services

Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Mormon and Christian Science services are held regularly and on special occasions. During the period covered by this report, special services were held for the personnel who lost their lives while in the execution of their duties.

f. Public Information

Public Information activities covered during the period of this report consisted of the following:

- Navy news dispatches (by radio) 63
- News feature stories and layouts (by mail) 16
- News photo releases 128
- Radio newscasts 2
- Hometown news stories (to FHTNC) 3528
- Tape recording releases 55

PART IV
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

In the one hundred and twenty-three days of operations the health of ship's company and the Air Group has been excellent. The incidence of disease, of anxiety, and of psychic tension has been minimal. Performance has continued to improve until it has reached a peak of excellency at which point it has leveled off. Morale has remained on a very high level. The unit pride of ship's company and squadron personnel has been as high as any vessel or squadron in the area.

There has been no indication that present operating policies of Task Force 77 are inadequate in so far as personnel are concerned. An adequate balance of rest and recreation with operation has been maintained. It is, however, felt that the last period on the line was anticlimatic in nature. Had strategic requirements permitted, personnel would have rather spent an additional period on the line and then gone home, rather than going to Hong Kong only to return for fifteen days longer.

Enclosure (2)
Medical Department Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ship's Company.

Admitted to sick list 997
Admitted to binnacle list 48
Percent sick days out of possible 371,010 work days .72
Officers admitted to sick list 33
Total visits to sick call 9211
Patients received from other ships 4
Patients transferred to hospital 4
Minor injuries treated 824
Major injuries treated 12
Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death 3
Number of personnel died of disease 1
Minor surgical procedures 174
Major surgical procedures 33
Venereal disease and non-gonococcal urethritis 498
Gonorrhea 57
Chancroid 68
Non-gonococcal urethritis following sexual exposure 373

Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed not recovered 3
Planes lost, pilot not recovered 4
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries 2
Planes lost, enemy action, not operational, pilot recovered uninjured 5
Planes lost, operational, crewmen recovered uninjured 0
Planes damaged, enemy action crewmen injured 0
Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured 0
Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 57
Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation 0
Average number days pilots grounded 7.9
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons 1

The above statistical summary does not reflect the true state of health of the Air Group pilots as two were grounded over a protracted period as a result of fractures of the lower extremities. In general, the health of the Air Group personnel was considered excellent over the period covered by this report, with no serious physical or mental illnesses in evidence.

The following is a chronological summary of Air Group personnel lost during the period covered by this report:

11/4/52 ENS A. W. Riker, USNR, 551737, missing in action, after bailing out over North Korea following antiaircraft damage to his aircraft.

11/15/52 LT G. A. Gaudette, USNR, 453144, killed in action when his plane crashed in North Korea. Circumstances unknown.
12/22/52 LTJG J. A. HUDSON, USN, 532903, killed in action when his plane crashed in North Korea. Circumstances unknown.

2/1/53 CDR J. C. MICHIEL, USN, 85362, killed in action after his plane shed wing while diving on North Korean target.

3/22/53 LTJG R. N. MEW, USNR, 394627, killed when his plane crashed into the sea after being catapulted from carrier.

4/14/53 LTJG H. (H) TAYLOR, USNR, 401295, killed when he ditched plane.

4/20/53 Ens R. T. SCOOGAN, USNR, 551739, missing in action after presumably bailing out from plane damaged by enemy anti-aircraft fire.

PART V
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Air Intelligence

ORGANIZATION: The Air Intelligence force throughout our operations in the Korean area consisted of three officers and three enlisted men plus the Air Group AIO and two enlisted men from the Air Group Staff. No officers or men were detached during the period which greatly aided the functioning of the office. Officers and men were rotated in their billets with each tour on the line. The only enlisted man not rotated was the flak specialist.

GENERAL: Upon reporting to the Task Force for the first tour, the intelligence section experienced a degree of confusion which persisted for approximately one week. This condition is well known to other carriers reporting for their first tour. The major problem is setting up a workable procedure in compiling and disseminating the mass of information forwarded by the carrier being relieved, i.e., flak plots, chart layouts and displays, briefing aids, reporting instructions, brief notes, etc. The importance of having a smooth functioning organization at the outset cannot be overstressed. AIO's reporting to the forward area prior to deployment helps to alleviate this problem, but this system is far from a cure-all.

To relieve this condition it is recommended that relieving carriers request a ship or squadron AIO, from the line, meet their ship at Yokosuka and remain on board until the relieving ship has operated in the Korean area for several days.

FLAK: Flak for target briefings was plotted on four AMS L751 charts (scale 1:50,000). Ready reference to these charts is maintained by an overlay on a 1:500,000 scale chart. Flak for RAI and Recco Routes was plotted on AMS L751 charts backed with kraft paper. The use of flak overlays, periodically distributed by CTF-77 was of little value for target briefings due to the scale employed, i.e., 1:250,000, but is of value for hecklers and planning ingress routes to targets.
Receiving flak information when returning to the line is considered to be inadequate. Some improvement to this problem during the last tour was made when CTF-77 sent by dispatch flak positions located in the target areas.

Flak suppression continues to be a necessity in heavily defended areas. It is interesting to note that many flak positions do not open fire until the attacking aircraft have passed over the target and are on their climb out.

Stowage: Maps and charts are stored in a fan room, compartment 2-78. A card index is maintained on these maps and charts precluding the possibility of running short on any one area. Target possessors are stowed in the Registered Publications Office.

Charts: Excellent service was received from the COMPATJAPAN Air Navigation Office in fulfilling all chart requests. COD delivery was used to replace a low supply during the first tour.

Charts showing the highest usage factor were the AMS L751 series. It is recommended that carriers carry an initial allowance of 100 L751 charts of the area from Wonsan south to the bombline.

1:250,000 scale coverage should be obtained for the entire Far East coastal areas. Fifteen of these charts of the more important areas should suffice, further supplemented by 1:500,000 scale coverage.

It was found that no one method of arranging display boards sufficed for all ready rooms. Variations were made according to the type aircraft being flown and space limitations. All squadron AIO's found, however, that the AMS L552, plastic terrain model map of Korea, was of considerable value both for debriefing purposes and preflight tactical planning.

The majority of the pilots have expressed a preference for the AMS L552 series charts, with hill shading, over the AAC charts. During the latter part of the cruise, however, it was noted that one jet squadron changed back to the AAC chart. The reason given for the change back was that some pilots felt roads and rivers stand out more clearly on the AAC charts.

2. Communications

ORGANIZATION: The commissioned officer complement consisted of one LTJG and six Ensigns other than the Communication Officer. Upon embarking, Commander Carrier Division FIVE supplemented this complement with two CWO's of the rank of LTJG.

The operational strength of the CR Division consisted of a total of 62 men. A three section watch was maintained and proved adequate under most circumstances. The Flag supplemented this total with an additional 15 men upon embarking.

Enclosure (2)
GENERAL: Communications throughout the period covered by this summary were considered highly satisfactory. The number of frequencies and circuits named varied, dependent upon whether the ship was, or was not, operating in the capacity of a flagship. Variance is noted below. AN/ARCI frequencies are not included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
<th>Circuits</th>
<th>Main Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Unit</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flagship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to man the necessary circuits in main radio, a two section watch was mandatory during the first period covered by this report, necessitating the use of unqualified strikers on some circuits. However, this procedure provided valuable training, and upon all successive periods a three section watch proved adequate.

Circuit T6 provided a very effective means of moving high precedence traffic. Reception on circuit R32 was generally very good, except during the period from midnight until 0600.

Little or no difficulty was experienced in maintaining communications on the primary and secondary tactical circuits. This ship employed two separate transmitters and receivers on these circuits, thereby ensuring protection should the problem of equipment failure arise.

Cryptographic facilities were frequently overloaded. It is felt that the tendency of using precedences of "O" and "OF" indiscriminately, is a practice that could lead to a major weakness in the force communication linkage. A notable portion of the traffic bearing such precedence consists of summaries of past actions and other unrelated matters, which of themselves do not warrant such urgency, compared with traffic of an immediate operational nature. Overclassification is another factor to be considered with regard to the situation of overloaded cryptographic facilities.

Visual communications consisted almost entirely of flashing light and Nancy. The OS Division operated with a divisional strength one-half of that set forth in the allowance list for a CVA class vessel of this conversion. Had flag hoist communications been used extensively, the complement of the OS Division would have been definitely inadequate.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Subject to the above comments, the following recommendations are submitted:

That commands review current instructions defining the correct use of precedence.

That a separate circuit be designated for traffic pertaining to tactical situations of an immediate nature and other urgent matters. Close supervision should be maintained to ensure that no commands violate the use of this net.
That commands ensure that personnel authorized to assign security classification are familiar with the regulations pertaining to such assignment.

3. Photographic Interpretation

ORGANIZATION: The Photographic Interpretation unit consisted of one officer, one CPO and two enlisted men. The officer and CPO were primarily concerned with interpretation and targeting. The enlisted Alameda graduate PI assistant assembled and annotated target mosaics. The other enlisted man was used to file photography.

GENERAL: A total of 208 photo sorties were interpreted during the cruise. Interpretation as directed by CTF-77 consisted of railroad and highway route surveillance, flak studies, airfield surveillance, damage assessment and target search. Target search was emphasized during this cruise. Targeting itself was generally limited to supply areas, troop concentrations, vehicle parks and small industrial facilities.

Photo sorties from all carriers were plotted on 1:250,000 maps and keyed to carrier and sortie number, under which the photography was filed. It was occasionally desirable to have more than one coverage of each area, but space limitations restrict the photo file to only the latest current set of photography.

A secondary cockpit briefing aid was developed during the cruise which proved very valuable to the pilot. The coverage of each target mosaic was plotted on 1:50,000 maps with nearby flak. This was reproduced and when combined with the CTF-77 target mosaic, became a valuable cockpit target folder. It enabled pilots to navigate more easily to the exact target area and enabled them to plan flak free avenues of attack and withdrawal.

An atlas of Korea was composed in such a manner that four adjoining 1:50,000 maps could be viewed simultaneously. In this atlas is maintained a continuous plot of CTF-77 designated targets, confirmed flak, hospitals, POW camps, bomb-line information, CD guns and suspect areas. This information when plotted proved the basis for a more comprehensive approach to interpretation than had previously been employed by this carrier. The duplication of already existing targets was eliminated, providing instead a means of informing CTF-77 of the condition of targets. The established status and position of flak made it possible to report abandoned flak as well as new positions. The overall effect of the system is to furnish a composite picture of all pertinent intelligence which had been obtained from previous TF-77 photography and Air Force reported flak and target areas. In addition, the mechanical composition of the atlas provided a much simpler method for photo tracking.

Stereo briefing was employed successfully on a few occasions. It is recommended for the more difficult targets. However, the use of stereo on all targets is presently beyond the capabilities of a small interpretation unit.
COMMENTS: It is suggested that some permanent system be established whereby experience gained in the combat area could be pooled. New systems which are constantly being improvised by Photo Interpretation units in the forward area need to be evaluated for the benefit of other units. A possible solution is the "detachment" method employed by the VC-61 Photo Squadron, which would enable Photo Interpretation Units to be assembled and trained as a unit prior to embarking for a forward area.

4. Photographic Laboratory

ORGANIZATION: Two crews were assigned to have all photography completed by 0730. Each crew worked 12 hours, the day crew starting at 0730 with the night crew taking over from 1930 to 0730 the following morning. The day crew having the majority of men, developed all the aerial film, made all flash prints, manned flight quarter stations and kept up the routine work. One photo detachment man assisted in the processing of aerial film and the loading of aerial camera magazines. This was discontinued after the first operating period ended and the lab personnel did all the film processing and loading of magazines for the remaining periods on the line. This arrangement proved satisfactory since it gave the photo detachment personnel more time to take care of installation and checking of photographic equipment in the planes. Air Group personnel processed all 16mm black and white gun camera film and maintained gun cameras in the aircraft. They also covered some of the PIO photography of the Air Group. The night crew of six men, headed by the AF1 camera repairman, completed all printing of sortsies, plot charts and target pin point photographs.

GENERAL: Upon arrival in the operating area on 28 October 1952 the number of photographic personnel assigned was 19, including one Warrant Officer, 1 AFC, 2 AF1, 1 AF3, 1 PH3, and 13 nonrated men. The majority of personnel were inexperienced in the processing and printing of aerial film and all equipment connected with aerial photography. Work load for the first operating period on the line was far below expectations due to non-flying days, A8B magazine and K-38 camera failures. However, much needed experience was gained and speed and efficiency in production increased in each operating period.

The combination of using D-19 film developer and Tri-X panchromatic aerial film produced very satisfactory negatives both before and during the winter periods when snow blanketed Korea. D-72 paper developer was used to make all prints. Flash prints were made from all rolls of aerial film.

More photographic work was accomplished upon returning to the line, but malfunctioning of the A8B magazines and K-38 cameras resulted in lost sorties. Taper pins in the K-38 camera case drive sheared, when film back lashed and jammed after 200 feet of film was exposed. Plastic gears were stripped and replaced with metal gears in all A8B magazines. However, the malfunctioning continued.

Work increased greatly on the third trip on the line. A8B magazines worked satisfactorily after the camera repairman removed heavy oil found on the
Spring clutch. The K-38 cameras gave minimum trouble. The K-38 36" lens kits were used frequently and no difficulty was encountered in the conversions from the 24" to the 36" lenses. The heater switches in the ALOA dryers burned out, due to over heating. Ship's electricians repaired the switches and time lost in drying was negligible. The B-5 developing outfit worked well in processing film and some prints of 200 foot lengths. Rolls of 390 feet had to be cut in order to fit on the B-5 outfit which resulted in lost exposures in the middle of the rolls. Upon receipt of a B-6, 400 foot developing outfit, this difficulty was eliminated and time was saved in processing and handling of 390 foot rolls.

Photographic copying of plot charts, overlays, and target pin point photographs were done in the print shop by print shop personnel. The photo lab furnished all the necessary film and photographic personnel did all the developing of exposed film and the making of all prints.

T. L. MC CRAWD, PHAN, was killed by bomb fragments while at his flight quarter station in the after starboard catwalk. After this accident, only one man on the 06 island level was used to cover both landings and take offs.

Upon receipt of instructions from COMCARDIV 5 an image motion compensator for use on the K-38 camera was manufactured. With the aid of personnel from the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) and VC-61, this was accomplished in two days. The ground test proved satisfactory, and with the limited time left on the line, only a few sorties were flown. The results of these flight tests also proved satisfactory.

STATISTICS: Photographic sorties flown during the operating periods on the line were 208. The usable aerial negatives and prints made from these sorties are as follows:

- 4,791 9x9 inch negatives
- 18,291 9x18 inch negatives
- 11,174 9x9 inch prints
- 106,361 9x18 inch prints

Still negatives and prints of plot charts, overlays, and target pin point photographs for ACI, Staff, and pilot briefings were as follows: 1,627 8x10 inch negatives; 23,643 8x10 inch prints; 724 20x24 inch prints. This figure does not include negatives and prints made for PIO, RADM's and other routine work. Total negatives and prints of all sizes made (exclusive of aerial negatives and prints) were: 7,908 negatives and 45,642 prints. 57,553 feet of black and white gun camera film was processed.

Major chemicals expended are as follows: 477 gallons D-19 film developer; 556 gallons D-72 paper developer; 2268 gallons acid fixer.

Some printing paper expenditures are as follows: 1,394 rolls, of this 9x6 rolls were grade #3.

13 Enclosure (2)
RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that all units operating with the K-38 cameras and A8B magazines be supplied with a total of two B-6 aerial film developing outfits. There is a critical need for a qualified camera repairman on the ships operating in the Far East due to numerous camera and equipment failures caused by constant use. It has been recommended that the present allowance list be revised to include one camera repairman.

The amount of aerial photography accomplished is indeed great and since the developing outfits for film and some prints contain 5 gallons or more solution, it is desired that D-19 and acid fixer be supplied in 5 gallon containers. It is believed that time in mixing the chemicals and saving of money would result because of the larger containers.

5. Combat Information Center

ORGANIZATION: A minimum of two full time Air Controllers were required during operating periods. A third controller was assigned whenever the flying day became extended. Remaining officers were assigned as CIC watch officers. Newly reporting officers and enlisted section leaders performed the duty of assistant CICWO.

A radar control officer was required during all flight operations to aid in identification and to insure a complete up to date summary plot. This duty was normally performed by an experienced petty officer stationed at a V6 repeater in front of the vertical board. It is necessary that the RCO have access to MK-10 IFF controls and that he continuously monitor the strike control frequency.

GENERAL: Prior to the ship's arrival in the combat zone the CIC Officer and an Air Controller of the ORISKANY were given TAD aboard operating carriers of TF-77 for a brief period of indoctrination. This opportunity to observe TF-77 operational procedures and practices was of great value in that it prepared ORISKANY's CIC team to assume its control functions with a minimum of initial error and confusion.

During the six month operating period on the line ORISKANY's CIC served as Flag CIC for three months for COMCARDIV 5. Four men were assigned from the OI Division to perform Flag CIC duties on a full time basis.

Five CIC watch officers have been qualified as OOD underway and a like number of OOD's have been indoctrinated in CIC procedures, capabilities and limitations. Besides furthering the qualifications of the officers concerned, immediate benefits have been realized in that each officer now has a much better appreciation of the problems of the other and a smoother CIC-BRIDGE relationship has resulted.

Air Controllers from destroyers and cruisers have been ordered aboard for refresher training and observation. Day intercept practice can be afforded these controllers but the nature of the Task Force operations affords little opportunity for all-weather practice intercepts. ORISKANY has also been assigned
stand-by guard for CAP when CAP control has been assigned to DD's. This guard requires continuous plotting of CAP and monitoring of the CAP frequency by a qualified air controller. Control of CAP had to be assumed from DD's on numerous occasions since many of the destroyers had inadequate equipment for control of jet CAP. In most cases positive control of jets at medium and long ranges can be maintained only through use of MK-10 IFF.

**ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT:** Air and surface search radar performance was uniformly excellent throughout the period of operations. However, performance of the SX height system has been poor. Even when the height gear is operating at peak performance, no altitude information can be obtained on targets at ranges greater than 45-55 miles. This range is considerably reduced on small flights of jet aircraft. The ship has been unable to assume an altitude guard assignment on occasion due to equipment breakdown. Shearing of the SX drive gear has been experienced on four separate occasions. It is believed that the altitude determining capabilities of the entire Task Force constitutes the greatest limitation to adequate air defense. Accurate altitude information is of primary importance in the consumation of a jet air intercept at an acceptable range.

VHF radio communications have been good to excellent. However, it has been necessary to utilize TDQ transmitters and AN/ARC receivers for voice communications at extreme ranges. Cross-talk on AN/ARC's has been reduced but not eliminated. Alignment of the mixer circuit in the transmitter to prevent spurious radiations as outlined in COMAIRPAC ltr ser 73/2832 has failed to eliminate radio interference. Interference continued to handicap controllers using TDQ-RCK's as well as AN/ARC's on circuits Elz and Elaa with only a 0.18 MC separation.

There is a great need for additional MK-10 IFF equipment. MK-10 video presentation should be available to repeaters for the RC0, two air control stations and the search radar operator. These four stations are considered the minimum necessary and each should have a separate IFF presentation control system.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** That every effort be made to develop a radar suitable for installation aboard CVA's which is capable of accurate altitude determination of jet type aircraft at a range of at least 100 miles.

That VHF circuits be assigned with due regard to adequate frequency separation for commonly used air control and tactical nets to prevent mutual interferences.

That a minimum of four C-814/UPX-1 radar set controls be made available to each CVA for adequate IFF presentation.

6. Air Operations

**ORGANIZATION:** Air Operations should have a minimum of ten enlisted personnel assigned. At least three of these ten men should be rated air controlmen.
If a CCA personnel unit (minimum of ten men) is on board, these men can be utilized to man both Air Operations and CCA with a resulting increase in efficiency for all concerned. The ORISKANY's CCA personnel were quickly able to learn and actually perform most of the duties of Air Operations. The duty air control man made practically all the radio transmissions. This permits the air operations watch officer to act as a general supervisor and greatly increased the efficiency and value of Air Operations.

GENERAL: A general and gradual improvement was noted in all phases of air operations as the line tours progressed. From the experience gained the following comments are submitted as summarizing the more valuable lessons learned.

COMMENTS: A sound powered telephone direct to the open bridge should be installed. This is a considerable convenience for the Captain and greatly expedites obtaining decisions and reports concerning air operations. It is of particular value during emergency situations.

Air Operations should handle all outgoing communications to the departing aircraft (launch report, switch to control frequency, last minute instructions, etc.) and primary fly should control incoming aircraft on the land/launch frequency as they report to the ship from strike control etc.. This eliminates much of the inter-com on sound powered transmissions and, it is believed, effects a much more positive and smoother control of aircraft. Air Operations, being in direct contact with the Captain, controls all except the most immediate of emergencies.

Air Operations on this ship was fortunate in its physical arrangement since four radios were always available for its use. One TDQ-RCK was used for the land/launch frequency and two CCA VHF stations were set up for guard, strike, and CAP control. The fourth radio was set up on the recently established UHF air operations net. The strike control CCA radio was also crystalized for all Task Force 77 carrier land/launch frequencies. This enabled Air Operations to relieve or assist primary fly with the helicopter communications and with emergencies involving other carriers' planes. It was also frequently very convenient to monitor the strike or CAP circuits. However, the land/launch and guard radios are the only two considered essential.

Air Operations should be generally arranged physically so that the watch officer can see the status and availability boards, contact the Captain and primary fly, via intercom circuits, and reach all radios without moving. The many daily "in extremis" situations arising in combat aircraft operations makes this an almost mandatory requirement. It also greatly improves the endurance and dispositions of all connected with Air Operations.

Along with other ship's representatives, an Air Operations Officer was among the operations department officers who were ordered to Task Force 77 about three weeks in advance of the ship's arrival in the operating area. This experience proved very helpful and is highly recommended.
GENERAL: During the operating period just completed, the Air Department carried out all assigned duties with an average on board count of 460 enlisted personnel and 12 officers. The helicopter detachment assigned to this ship was comprised of 2 officers and 7 enlisted men. There were no accidents involving helicopters on board this vessel during the period. A small cadre of experienced and energetic petty officers, warrant officers, and division officers contributed to the development of the high morale and teamwork exhibited by the crews during this period. There were 2 fatal accidents; one resulting from a bomb explosion on the flight deck and the other during respot operations when a plane handler fell beneath the wheel of an AD type aircraft. One man was blown over the side during a jet launch but was rescued immediately by the plane guard helicopter.

The average on board count of aircraft was 72 plus 1 helicopter. As a result of the development of an efficient maintenance control organization, aircraft availability improved greatly. The close coordination existing between the aircraft handling officer and CVG maintenance officer insured economy of time and effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The most serious problem confronted by the department during the period was created through loss of personnel by transfer and/or separation without replacement. The department on board count varied from a high of four hundred seventy to a low of four hundred forty. The first figure is considered low for the type operations scheduled and the latter figure so jeopardized assigned functions that a transfer of forty 5A/SN's from the Gunnery Department was effected immediately. The rapid respot, rearming, and servicing of aircraft required in the Task Force can only be accomplished smoothly and safely with sufficient personnel, particularly for plane handling crews. A minimum allowance of 496 enlisted men is recommended for the Air Department of the CVA-30 class carriers while engaged in operations in the Korean area. This is particularly desired during winter months.

It is highly recommended that all enlisted personnel in the Air Group be thoroughly indoctrinated and trained in shipboard safety precautions and orders before embarking on the ship. This applies particularly to plane captains, trouble shooters, and ordnancemen. All plane captains should be sent to fire fighting school.

AIRCRAFT HANDLING: While operating in the Korean area, a total of 7,001 sorties were flown. About 3 weeks were required to shakedown the handling crews and get accustomed to the type operations being conducted in this area, after which time, most of the spotting and respotting was routine. A noticeable decrease in hangar deck and flight deck handling accidents was apparent as the time progressed. Flight quarters averaged about 15 hours daily, however, approximately one third of the plane handling crews averaged 18 hours on duty. The crews were rotated regularly and, as a whole, the health and morale remained
very high. Handling the F9F type aircraft presented a problem because of the ease with which it can be tipped over when turned broadside to a strong wind. In order to reduce the wind pressure on the wing area, tail tow bars were used when practicable. Prior to securing from flight quarters daily, hurricane cables were placed on all aircraft on the flight deck, as additional security of the planes was warranted by the frequent high increase in winds without warning. Material shortages were few during this operational period because adequate preparations were made prior to departure from CONUS. Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that all carriers anticipating a tour in the Korean area make a special effort to obtain over-allowances on chocks, two bars, tie-downs, reels, and hurricane cables.


Installation of a small jet blast deflector aft of number two elevator provides protection to the barricade and barrier operator by dispersing the blast of aircraft being taxied onto the elevator during recoveries. The deflector is a fixed installation, set back far enough not to interfere with operations and deflecting the blast over and around personnel in the port catwalk stations.

During cold weather operations, water condensation in the arresting gear air supply lines caused these lines to freeze. Although frequent draining was accomplished, this condition was best remedied by lagging the lines with asbestos cloth.

CATAPULTS: During this Korean cruise, a total of 4,114 shots were fired from both catapults as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Catapult</th>
<th>Starboard Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No loads</td>
<td>No loads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional aircraft</td>
<td>Conventional aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet aircraft</td>
<td>Jet aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAINTENANCE: One of the first problems of the maintenance division was the stowage of equipment and materials that accumulated on the hangar deck. It became immediately apparent that to provide ample working and aircraft parking space, only essential items could be accommodated on the hangar deck, particularly in hangar bay three. Section "G" allowance list items were closely reviewed and all excess items off-loaded at the first opportunity. In this connection, it would be desirable to off-load any allowed equipment which is not used; i.e., engine overhaul stands. QEC "L" stands for reciprocating engines also consume much space and are bulky to handle. Since their use is necessary, only the upright portions of the stands were used and these were welded to the bulkhead. This installation saved considerable space.
Other savings of space were made by hanging occasionally used items, such as snow plows and brooms and Herman-Nelson heaters, in the open areas under the flight deck suspended from beam clamps attached to the underside of the flight deck.

Equally important is the requirement for suitable facilities for the accomplishment of maintenance work. Work stands are essential and it was found that rearming stands are not only suitable but more desirable because of their sturdier construction and ease of collapsible stowage when not in use. A 3 tier tool box rack was installed between the stanchions on the port side of number three elevator which conserved space and added to the neatness of the hangar deck for stowing the many squadron's tool boxes. The work bench in the center of the Accessory Shop was removed, cut in half, and tacked to the deck in the after portion of hangar bay three to facilitate work on engine build-up and engine changes. A squadron work bench area installed on the port side below and aft of the squadron tool cages adjacent to number three elevator provides a useful and convenient area for many repair jobs.

A positive system for determining the status of aircraft was necessary for efficient operation. Tight flight schedules and movements of aircraft from the flight to hangar deck for maintenance work made such a system a must. A maintenance status board was mounted in hangar bay two to provide a ready source of information. This board is also used as the reporting center for changes in status of all aircraft. The board and "maintenance taker" in flight deck control, manned by Air Group personnel, are the basis of the system.

In order to provide adequate Aviation Electronics maintenance facilities for all squadrons of the Air Group, personnel were pooled and assigned to shop maintenance of specific installations. This method made best use of well qualified men and permitted maintenance work to run smoothly.

The following items have been manufactured from ideas of the maintenance division personnel or from similar devices of other ships and have proven successful and useful in saving time and manpower.

A portable work stand which attaches easily to the fingers of a conventional fork lift truck and it is used extensively for painting, changing light bulbs or other high work on the hangar deck.

Beam clamps to hold chain falls or block and tackle for wings, propeller and engine changes throughout the hangar deck.

An APU plug-in on the LeTourneau crash crane for cold weather starting boosts.

A hydraulic tire bead breaking machine with adapters to fit all wheels. This machine has been valuable due to the high usage of F9F tires.
A fork lift truck crane adapter that is useful for engine, propeller and wing installation or removal as well as many other weight lifting tasks.

An oxygen servicing hose reel cart that facilitates movement and handling of necessary 200 feet of oxygen hose on the flight and hangar decks.

A two bar hitch for plane handling tractors that speeds removal or attachment of the tow bar especially when under tension.

A hangar deck rust remover and polisher made from a number of long wire brushes attached to a weighted pallet and towed by a tractor.

GASOLINE: Gasoline and aviation lube oil expenditures; 28 October 1952 to 21 April 1953:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aviation Lube Oil (gallons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline (gallons)</td>
<td>3,781,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Lube Oil (gallons)</td>
<td>24,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ship uses the six inch quick disconnect Robb coupling for refueling at sea. Cooperation of fleet tankers in sending the proper coupling hose fitting has reduced hook-up time to an average of 4 minutes, however, this time could be reduced to a matter of seconds if the male part of the Robb coupling could be sent over with the first hose. The main difficulty in hooking up in rough seas is holding the flange end of the tanker's hose steady enough to remove the blank flange and attach the male fitting.

AVIATION ORDNANCE: The MK-1 bomb skid requires continued inspection and repair to the "V" center brace which prevents the bomb from slipping forward and aft while it is being hauled. A skid similar to the MK-1 but with larger wheels and grooved edge tires for rolling bombs over barriers and arresting gear cables would be an improvement over the present MK-1.

Elevator stoppage and over-travel were encountered due to old and faulty General Electric controllers. The relays stuck causing the main high speed contact points to arc and weld closed. This causes over-travel resulting in the stoppage of the elevator. These controllers have been overhauled but new equipment should be installed. At present, no spare contact points are available. It is recommended that an adequate supply of these contact points be carried by all ships during a cruise using this type of control box.

At present, this ship has one bomb disposal ramp. In an emergency, this would not be adequate. It is recommended that 2 more be installed, one aft of the island on either port or starboard side, and one made with wooden rollers, aft on the port side to dispose of napalm tanks.
PART VII
GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

REFUELING AT SEA: This ship refueled from oilers 25 times, receiving a total of 9,344,336 gallons of fuel oil. During 25 of these refuelings, 3,781,000 gallons of aviation gasoline was received.

REARMING AT SEA: During the 26 rearming operations effected, a total of 5,427 tons of ammunition were received at an overall average rate of 96 tons per hour. The largest single rearmament consisted of 377 tons received from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18) on 24 January 1953 at 103 tons per hour. The best rate was achieved on 30 January 1953 when 328 tons were received from the same ship at 148.8 tons per hour. The U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) gave the best service, averaging 119 tons per hour for two rearmings. Four rearmings from the U.S.S. VIRGO (AKA-20), three from the U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-14) and two from the U.S.S. MT BAKER (AE-14) averaged between 103 and 110 tons per hour. It is believed that these rearming ships are primarily responsible for this highly satisfactory performance because of the two following results of their well-planned deck spots.

(1) The type of load being handled at a particular station was changed as little as possible, permitting the receiving crews to establish and perfect the most expeditious routine for clearing the loading stations.

(2) The quarter deck loading station was in use during the full period of rearming, permitting nearly one third of the total load to be handled here.

Total ammunition receipts.

Ship's ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/38 projectiles</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/38 powder</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;/50 cartridges</td>
<td>939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aircraft ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>1,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>3,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>13,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>2,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 lb SAP bombs</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 lb SAP bombs</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350 lb AD bombs</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220/260 frag bombs</td>
<td>5,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 lb frag clusters</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb fuzes</td>
<td>53,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb boosters &amp; dets</td>
<td>17,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;/5 rocket heads (solid)</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;/5 rocket heads (smoke)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;/25 rocket motors</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/0 rocket heads (ATAR)</td>
<td>1,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/.0 rocket motors</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket fuzes</td>
<td>2,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm a/c ammo</td>
<td>447,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal a/c ammo</td>
<td>320,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm (gallons)</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm igniters &amp; fuzes</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrotechnics</td>
<td>2,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arming wires</td>
<td>57,895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (2)
The electric-hydraulic winches installed at replenishment stations 1 and 3 suffered several breakdowns which were repaired by ship's force. The breakdowns occasioned during the early periods on the line were primarily attributable to non use of the winches and the non availability of manufacturers spare parts. All replacement items to place winches back in service were fabricated on board.

The other objectionable features of the winches was their slow speed and limited weight lifting capacity. These deficiencies were discussed in prior action reports and it is understood that a corrective study is currently being made by BUSHIPS.

PROVISIONING AND PROCUREMENT OF AVIATION STORES AT SEA: The ship provisioned 11 times and a total of 935 tons of food and 66 tons of aviation stores were received. The best hourly rate was 91 tons from the U.S.S. ALUDRA (AF-55) on 15 March 1953.

REFUELING DD's AT SEA: This ship refueled 16 destroyers discharging 884,261 gallons of fuel oil. Numerous transfers of freight, personnel and mail were conducted.

PART VIII
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. Damage Summary

During operating periods covered by Action Reports numbers I-V (28 October 1952 - 22 April 1953) the U.S.S. ORISKANY sustained the following damage to hull structure and engineering machinery:

a. Major Damage

Damage to #3 elevator platform and auxiliary elevator platform involving destruction of two longitudinal deck girders and approximately 46 square feet of deck plate, twisting and bending of intermediate transverse girders and secondary damage to surrounding area, caused by explosion of 250 lb. general purpose bomb.

b. Minor Damage

(1) Damage to hull structure and external units consisting of cracks in structural plating and minor damage to ready service lockers, protective clothing lockers, gun director 31, mounts 31 and 37, boat boom storage cradle caused by storm and heavy seas. Six 3"/50 ready service lockers torn loose and lost overboard and the port side gasoline filling platform deflected due to storm and heavy seas.
(2) Approximately 3500 linear feet of flight deck planking damaged due to routine aircraft landings and 360 linear feet destroyed by bomb explosion.

(3) Superficial damage caused to number two squadron locker by class "A" fire.

(4) Two boiler casualties occurred during subject period as follows:

   (a) Plastic fire clay dislodged in superheater side of #6 boiler due to maloperation of soot blower.

   (b) Rupture of superheater tube in #7 boiler due to possible corrosive condition of boiler tubes.

2. Summary of Recommendations

   a. None.

3. Steaming and Fueling Data Summary

   The following are statistics pertaining to operating periods covered by Action Reports I-V (28 October 1952 - 22 April 1953).

   Days underway - 144.6 (3,470.9 hours).
   Engine miles steamed - 50,362.1.
   Fuel oil consumed - 8,147,563 gallons.
   Fuel oil delivered (16 DD's) - 884,261 gallons at an average rate of 130,050 gallons per hour.
   Fuel oil received (25 tankers) - 9,344,336 gallons at an average rate of 175,925 gallons per hour.
   Fresh water distilled (feed and potable) - 11,266,325 gallons.