USS Bon Homme Richard, a 27,100-ton Essex class aircraft carrier, was built at the New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, New York. Commissioned in November 1944, she went to the Pacific in March 1945 and in June joined the fast carriers in the combat zone and took part in the final raids on Japan. With the end of hostilities in mid-August, Bon Homme Richard continued operations off Japan until September, when she returned to the United States. "Magic Carpet" personnel transportation service occupied her into 1946. She was thereafter generally inactive until decommissioning at Seattle, Washington, in January 1947.

The outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 called Bon Homme Richard back to active duty. She recommissioned in January 1951 and deployed to the Western Pacific that May, launching her planes against enemy targets in Korea until the deployment ended late in the year. A second combat tour followed in May-December 1952, during which she was redesignated CVA-31. The carrier decommissioned in May 1953 to undergo a major conversion to equip her to operate high-performance jet aircraft.

After Action Reports

USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 May-28 Jul 1951, Part 1
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 May-28 Jul 1951, Part 2
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 10 Aug-5 Sep 1951
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 19 Sep-18 Oct 1951
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 Oct-30 Nov 1951, Part 1
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 Oct-30 Nov 1951, Part 2
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 Oct-30 Nov 1951, Part 3
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 21-27 Jun 1952
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 2 Jul-4 Aug 1952, Part 1
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 2 Jul-4 Aug 1952, Part 2
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 7-18 Aug 1952
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 20 Aug-28 Sep 1952, Part 1
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 20 Aug-28 Sep 1952, Part 2
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) 30 Sep-5 Nov 1952
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) 8 Nov-18 Dec 1952, Part 1
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) 8 Nov-18 Dec 1952, Part 2
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) 8 Nov-18 Dec 1952, Part 3
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 31 May 1951 through 28 July 1951

Ref: (a) OCENAV Instruction 338.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 18 August 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 31 May through 28 July 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Complying with ComAirPac confidential dispatch 0222302 of May 1951, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), CAPTAIN CECIL E. NELL Commanding, departed San Diego Harbor, California with Carrier Air Group 102, for Hawaiian waters. After a brief period of training, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD left Pearl Harbor, T.H. 21 May for Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with ComNavPac dispatch 2000352 of May 1951. While enroute, the ship was directed by ComTaskPac dispatch 2200022 to proceed to the action area and relieve the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. It rendezvoused with the USS O'BRIEN (DD 725) and the USS WALKE (DD 723) in the Korean Straits on 29 May 1951.

On 30 May the ship joined other units of Task Force 77 in the action area close to the 38th parallel. The task force was commanded by RAID W.G. TOMLINSON aboard the USS BOXER (CV 21), and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Plan 1-51 dated 2 February 1951 and 22-51 dated 1 July 1951. It was composed of the USS SPERRY (DD 755), USS CUMMINS (DD 760) USS EARDY (DD 545), USS ROYAL (DD 872), USS ZELLARS (DD 777), USS BRUSH (DD 745), USS USS TOLEDO (CA 133), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 37), and USS BOXER (CV 21).

After seventeen days of operations, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD proceeded to the port of Sasebo, Japan on 17 June for a period of maintenance and upkeep. By order of CTF 77 dispatch 3007322 of June, the BON HOMME RICHARD with Carrier Air Group 102 aboard, returned to the operating area in company with USS EPPESON (DD 719) and the USS NICHOLAS (DDE 449), and rejoined TF-77 consisting of the USS PRINCETON (CV 37), USS BOXER (CV 21) and other units, on 1 July 1951. After campaigning for 27 days, the ship returned to port again, this time to Yokosuka, Japan, leaving the operation area on 28 July 1951.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the east coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.
(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H.N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 30 May 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>NO. OF PILOTS</th>
<th>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF 781</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24 F9F-2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF 783</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF 874</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA 923</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16 AD-3 2 AD4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 F4U-SNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 AD4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 AD-UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC 61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 F9F-2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 H03S-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART II**

**CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS**

5/30/51: The ship rendezvoused with TF-77 in the early morning to replenish. We received 818,000 gallons of fuel oil, 105,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 16.9 tons of ammunition.

5/31/51: The ship launched close air support, armed reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting over northeastern Korea with 26 sorties for the day. A supply dump was damaged, 2 trucks and 2 oxcarts were destroyed.

6/1/51: Anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks were conducted. 1 tank, 76 boxcars, 7 trucks, 1 track section, 1 car, 1 barracks, 1 house, 4 highway bridges, 15 buildings, 2 warehouses and 1 oxcart were damaged. 2 boxcars, 2 warehouses and 2 houses were destroyed. Excellent results were reported on close air support and 5 troops were killed and 20 wounded. 105 sorties were flown for the day.

6/2/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol were flown, 11 railroad cars, 1 railroad yard, 1 tank, 1 car, 1 highway bridge, 4 buildings, 1 house and 7 trucks were damaged. 2 highway bridges, 3 houses, 1 tank, 3 trucks, 1 car and 7 oxcarts were destroyed. Results were reported excellent for close air support with 20 troops killed. 96 sorties were flown.

6/3/51: Bridge strikes, close air support and armed reconnaissance were conducted. 1 highway bridge, 2 houses, 1 tank, 3 trucks, and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 65 boxcars, 1 railroad bridge, 9 buildings, 1 barracks and 3 warehouses were damaged. There were 87 troops killed. 63 sorties were flown. We rendezvoused with the replenishment group and received 268,156 gallons of fuel oil, 119,400 gallons of aviation gasoline and 360 tons of ammunition. Close air support had 96% coverage.

6/4/51: The ship launched close air support, armed reconnaissance, bridge strikes, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and photo missions. 9 buildings, 11 houses, 1 highway bridge, 1 tank, 1 barracks, 2 trucks, and 6 oxcarts were destroyed. 48 boxcars, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 18 buildings, 8 cars, 3 houses, 2 railroad yards, 2 supply dumps, 7 trucks, 1 railroad track section, 2 factories, 1 gun position, 2 villages and 1 tank were damaged.
Excellent close air support was reported. 156 troops were killed. There were 94 sorties flown.

6/5/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, naval gunfire spotting and photo missions were conducted. These missions destroyed 1 railroad bridge, 30 buildings, 1 cart, 1 locomotive, 1 supply dump and 3 gun emplacements; damaged 1 railroad bridge, 1 truck, 3 buildings, 20 houses, 1 village and 1 supply dump. There were 101 sorties flown. Excellent close air support was reported.

6/6/51: The ship launched close air support, combat air patrol, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance, and photo missions. 10 railroad cars, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 19 buildings, 2 trucks and 14 oxcart were destroyed. 72 railroad cars, 2 railroad bridges, 2 railroad yards, 1 railroad track section, 1 warehouse, 11 trucks, 2 barracks, 2 villages were damaged. 1 ox and 20 troops were killed. There were 91 sorties flown.

6/7/51: The ship rendezvoused with the replenishment group and received 256,710 gallons of fuel oil, 212,300 gallons of aviation gasoline, 209 tons of ammunition and 11½ tons of provisions.

6/8/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, and naval gunfire were conducted today. 1 railroad bridge, 1 car, 14 tanks, and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 27 boxcars and 1 barracks were damaged. 20 troops were killed. There were 82 sorties.

6/9/51: The ship launched combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, close air support and night hecklers. These missions destroyed 10 boxcars, 12 buildings, 2 trucks and damaged 2 locomotives, 1 tank, 27 boxcars, 1 railroad yard, 1 tunnel, 1 railroad bridge, 3 highway bridges, 4 buildings, and 4 trucks. 10 troops were killed and 20 wounded. 105 sorties were flown.

6/10/51: Due to poor weather only a few flights were made. These were weathered in and no damage was done.

6/11/51: Combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, close air support, and night hecklers were launched. 16 buildings and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 3 tunnels, 1 factory, 8 houses, 1 warehouse, 1 supply dump and 3 villages were damaged. 69 sorties were flown.

6/12/51: Our planes flew close air support, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol and night heckler missions; 6 houses, 1 mortar emplacement, 2 highway bridges, 2 railroad cars, 1 village, 1 factory and 1 building were damaged. 1 oxcart, 3 railroad cars and 4 barracks were destroyed. There were 54 sorties flown.

6/13/51: Close air support, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and night heckler missions were conducted. 14 factory buildings and 26 trucks were destroyed. 1 factory, 1 warehouse, 2 buildings, 24 trucks and 1 village were damaged. 25 troops were killed. There were 99 sorties flown. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

6/14/51: This day's operations consisted of combat air patrol, close air support, strikes and photo missions. 7 boxcars were destroyed. 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge and 1 factory were damaged. 32 sorties were flown. Replenishment activities prevented all but afternoon sorties. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

6/15/51: The ship launched night hecklers, combat air patrol, close air support, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, and anti-sub patrol. 1 railroad yard, 2 vehicles and 3 buildings were damaged. 52 sorties were flown. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.
6/16/51: We conducted close air support, armed reconnaissance, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols. 4 gun emplacements were destroyed and 90 troops killed. 42 sorties were flown. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.

6/17/51: The ship was underway from the operating area to Sasebo Japan and anchored in Sasebo Harbor for maintenance and upkeep.

6/30/51 Left Sasebo, Japan and proceeded to the operating area.

7/1/51: The ship rendezvoused with TF-77, and met with the replenishment group. We took on board 94,501 gallons of fuel oil and 28,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The ship conducted flight operations in the afternoon and launched close air support, strikes, armed reconnaissance, anti-sub patrol and combat air patrol. Pilots were forced to return before contact due to bad weather.

7/2/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort comprised our flight activities for the day with 84 sorties flown. 5 boxcars; 1 highway bridge, 11 houses, 7 buildings, 10 trucks and 10 ox carts were destroyed, 8 boxcars, 2 railroad yards, 1 track section, 2 highway bridges, 6 supply dumps, 8 trucks, and 3 ox carts were damaged. 30 troops were killed and 2 villages damaged. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

7/3/51: Activity consisted of anti-sub patrol and combat air patrol with a total of 6 sorties flown.

7/4/51: A total of 42 sorties on anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, sweeps and strikes, were sent forth. Weather over the target area was bad. The results of the sweeps and strikes were unobserved.

7/5/51: No flying was done as it was replenishment day.

7/6/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol comprised the day's activity. 45 buildings, 1 factory, 2 tanks, 1 gun emplacement and 1 power installation were destroyed. 1 small boat, 2 tanks, 2 warehouses, 7 buildings, 6 villages and 3 houses were damaged. 135 sorties were flown.

7/7/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, and escort duty was conducted. There were 86 sorties flown. 1 bridge, 9 boxcars, 1 warehouse, 4 buildings were destroyed; 3 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 6 boxcars, 1 railroad yard, 3 buildings, 1 supply dump, 2 track sections, 1 factory and 1 warehouse were damaged, 50 troops were killed. Close air support was reported very good.

7/8/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, and escort duty was conducted, 5 boxcars, 3 warehouses, 1 house, 3 trucks, 14 ox carts, 1 bunker and 3 gun emplacements were damaged. 91 sorties were flown. Close air support was reported 75% coverage.

7/9/51: No flying was done due to replenishment activities.

7/10/51: No flying was done due to bad weather.

7/11/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort of photo planes comprised the day's activity with 93 sorties being launched, 1 locomotive 1 railroad bridge, 42 boxcars, 11 buildings, 10 trucks, 4 barracks, 12 ox carts, and 5 horses were destroyed. 3 railroad yards, 24 boxcars, 2 railroad bridges 5 buildings, 3 warehouses, 3 barracks, 16 trucks, 2 villages and 4 ox carts were damaged. 30 troops were killed. 75% coverage was reported on close air support.
7/12/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, and escort duty comprised the day's duty with 101 sorties flown. 2 gun positions, 2 tanks, 1 barracks, 2 ox carts, 8 buildings, 29 boxcars and 17 trucks were destroyed. 7 tanks, 1 gun position, 1 ox cart, 1 factory, 6 buildings, 4 warehouses, 57 boxcars, 3 houses, 4 barracks, 15 trucks, 3 cars, 1 railroad yard, 1 track section and 2 railroad bridges were damaged. 333 troops were killed.

7/13/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, anti-sub patrol and escort duty comprised the routine for this day with 102 sorties being sent out. 11 trucks, 10 ox carts, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 3 buildings, and 13 gun positions were destroyed. 3 tanks, 13 trucks, 1 railroad bridge, 2 tunnels and 2 villages were damaged. 270 troops were killed. Close air support was reported to be excellent.

7/14/51: No planes were launched due to replenishment activities.

7/15/51: Combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, weather reconnaissance, close air support, anti-sub patrol and photo escort comprised the day's missions with 57 sorties being flown. 3 warehouses, 8 railroad cars, 3 buildings, 2 ox carts, 1 truck were destroyed; 2 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 2 buildings, 2 tunnels, 1 ammunition dump, 1 warehouse, 1 gun position, 4 railroad bridges, 5 houses, 2 highway bridges, 2 railroad yards, and 1 track section damaged.

7/16/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort duty comprised the day's activities with 95 sorties being launched. 1 truck, 5 boxcars, 1 building, 29 houses, 8 ox carts and 1 ox were destroyed. 1 locomotive, 18 boxcars, 3 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 1 track section, 2 railroad yards, 1 factory, 5 trucks, 4 ox carts, 2 houses, 1 village and 1 tunnel were damaged.

7/17/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort duty were performed with 95 sorties being released. 1 truck, 7 ox carts, 3 buildings, 1 railroad yard, 1 ox, 3 boxcars, and 1 house were destroyed. 11 railroad cars, 1 ox cart, 5 villages, 3 gun positions, 1 highway bridge and 6 tanks were damaged. 100% coverage on close air support was performed.

7/19/51: No activity was conducted due to replenishment activities.

7/20/51: Bad weather prevented all but combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol. 8 sorties were released.

7/21/51: Bad weather prevented all but combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol. 18 sorties were released.

7/22/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, photo escort, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol comprised the day's activity with 80 sorties being sent out. 15 buildings, 1 house, 1 factory, 2 trucks and 5 ox carts were destroyed. 1 locomotive, 16 boxcars, 4 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 2 railroad yards, 10 gun positions and 3 villages were damaged. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.

7/23/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, photo escort, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol were conducted with 90 sorties sent from the carrier. 1 boxcar, 19 buildings, 1 warehouse, 5 houses, and 12 trucks destroyed; 2 locomotives, 17 boxcars, 3 railroad bridges, 13 buildings, 2 warehouses, 1 supply dump, and 20 trucks damaged. 60 troops were killed. 100% coverage on close air support.
7/26/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols comprised the day's activity. 93 sorties were sent out. 18 tanks, 2 locomotives, 18 carts, 6 railroad bridges, 1 railroad yard, 1 tunnel, 15 railroad cars, 3 gun positions, 2 mortars, 2 villages and 2 vehicles were damaged. 15 ox carts, 18 railroad cars, 1 ammunition dump, 8 buildings, and 191 troops were destroyed. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

7/25/51: This was a replenishment day. No sorties were flown.

7/28/51: 42 sorties were flown with close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and combat air patrol as the missions. 2 gun positions, 2 buildings, 7 trucks, 6 railroad cars, 9 ox carts, and 1 warehouse were destroyed. 1 village, 2 buildings, 2 trucks, 5 railroad bridges, 36 railroad cars and 1 warehouse were damaged.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORNAMENT MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ordnance Maintenance and Repair

1. A steady program of maintenance and adjustment was required to keep ordnance equipment in optimum operating efficiency. Repairs required were mainly of a routine nature and not considered excessive in view of the extensive use of equipment.

B. Deck Evolutions

1. Deck evolutions (i.e., fueling, ammunition, replenishing, etc.) during the period of this report were considered satisfactory considering the fact that this was the first operation of this kind, except during UTE, for the ship and crew. All evolutions were executed with a minimum amount of difficulty and there were only minor material failures except for #1 winch at the forward replenishing station.

2. There are two winches at the forward replenishing station: one steam and 1 electric. The electric winch is considered satisfactory in all respects. The steam winch is considered altogether too slow and during excessive use tends to overheat which causes numerous delays during replenishment. The ship's force is continually trying to repair and eliminate this difficulty.

C. Ammunition Expended

| 2,000# G.P. Bombs | 42 | Fuzes AN-M100A2 | 7539 |
| 1,000# G.P. Bombs | 853 | Fuzes AN-M100A2 | 1837 |
| 500# G.P. Bombs | 865 | Fuzes AN-M102A2 | 794 |
| 250# G.P. Bombs | 1039 | Fuzes AN-M103A2 | 652 |
| 100# G.P. Bombs | 5012 | Fuzes M139A | 3345 |
| 260# Frag AN-M81 | 2557 | Fuzes VT-T91 | 4701 |
| 350# D.P. AN MK 54 | 21 | Fuzes, Rocket Mk. 149 | 1093 |
| 5" HVAR Rocket bodies | 1093 | .50 Cal. Ammunition | 687895 |
| 5" HVAR Rocket motors | 2270 | 20MM Ammunition | 236668 |
\[ \text{Part IV} \\
\text{Battle Damage} \\
\]

\textbf{A. Damage to Ship:}

None.

\textbf{B. Damage to Aircraft:}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
No. of planes & Types & Causes \\
\hline
49 & F4U-4 & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
34 & AD-3 & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
15 & F9F-2B & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
7 & F4U-5NL & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
4 & ADM & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
3 & F9F-2P & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
2 & ADMQ-2 & Enemy anti-aircraft fire. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textbf{C. Loss of Aircraft}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Date & Squadron & Type & Bu.No. & Causes \\
\hline
5-31 & VF 781 & F9F-2B & 123670 & Lost at sea (cat. shot) \\
6-3 & VF 783 & F4U-4 & 80947 & Lost at sea (Launch) \\
6-16 & VF 874 & F4U-4 & 97292 & Lost at sea (Engine-Launch) \\
7-3 & VF 781 & F9F-2B & 123677 & Lost at sea (Fuel exhausted) \\
7-4 & VF 783 & F4U-4 & 97239 & Lost at sea (spin on approach) \\
7-6 & VA 923 & AD-3 & 122746 & Blown up on landing at K-18 \\
7-7 & VC 35 & AD-3 & 122768 & Lost at sea (engine trouble) \\
7-17 & VC 35 & AD-4N & 124137 & Lost to enemy fire over Korea. \\
7-17 & VF 874 & F4U-4 & 97034 & Lost to enemy fire over Korea. \\
7-18 & VA 923 & AD-3 & 122760 & Lost to enemy fire over Korea. \\
7-27 & VF 781 & F9F-2B & 123700 & Lost at sea (cat. shot) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textbf{D. Damage Inflicted on Enemy:}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Targets & Damaged & Destroyed \\
\hline
Tanks & 26 & 16 \\
Trucks & 168 & 119 \\
Cars & 13 & 2 \\
Locomotives & 14 & 2 \\
Ox cars & 53 & 123 \\
Highway bridges & 31 & 8 \\
Supply dumps & 16 & 1 \\
Ammo dump & 0 & 1 \\
Factories & 15 & 2 \\
Warehouses & 33 & 9 \\
Barracks and other Bldgs. & 230 & 326 \\
Gun emplacements & 24 & 25 \\
Mortar emplacements & 0 & 2 \\
Lumber piles & 1 & 0 \\
Horses & 0 & 6 \\
Oxon & 0 & 4 \\
Villages & 34 & 0 \\
Boats & 7 & 4 \\
Power Installations & 2 & 1 \\
Bunkers & 4 & 0 \\
RR Yards & 26 & 1 \\
RR Tracks split & 12 & 0 \\
RR tunnels & 15 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
E. The foregoing represents a conservative, factual estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilot could assess the damage to a definite total were used in these tables. Probable damage or results are not included. The major portion of close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. 38 missions of this type were flown without any report of damage inflicted. As many as 3000 troops have been attacked in northeastern Korea without assessment of losses. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, delayed action bombing, or seeding obviously may never be known.

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Despite the fact that the major portion of the crew was inexperienced, and the ship had only a brief training period, the performance of ship and men was excellent. It was necessary at times to move men from one department to another in order to meet operational requirements. The men so assigned adapted themselves to the task and performed remarkably well.

What is believed to be a record in loading ordnance was performed at Bangor prior to our departure for the forward areas. This is the best evidence of the spirit, enthusiasm, and performance of the men aboard this ship.

In commenting on the performance of this ship, the Commanding Officer of the USS PRINCETON said in a dispatch 1306582 of July:

My sincere congratulations on the way the Bon Homme Richard has come in here and learned the business so quickly and well. Your air operations are at least as good as ours and we have had eight months practice. We know from experience in steaming in formation with TRUSTFUND that it will never put itself in position to menace other ships in the force. To you and your crew and air group, a sincere well done.

On our last day of operations in this period, Commander, Task Force 77 in dispatch 2723302 of July said it has been a personal pleasure to observe the outstanding performance of duty of the Bon Homme Richard and attached squadrons during this tour in the operating area. The combination of Bon Homme Richard and Air Group 102 is one which does credit to naval aviation.

B. Casualties:

Lt. Eugene Daniel Redmond, 250615, USNR 3 June 1951

At Lat. 37° 44.0' N Long. 129° 34.5' LT REDMOND was lost on take-off on combat operations. The plane stalled and spun into the sea approximately 300 feet off the bow. Every effort was made for rescue, but the body was not recovered.

Lt. John B. Dixon, 453354, USNR 4 July 1951

At Lat. 39° 21.1' N Long. 128° 47.5' the F4U-4 aircraft of which Lt. Dixon was pilot was on the base leg of landing approach to the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) at approximately 150 feet altitude, when the plane appeared to stall and go onto a spin. The pilot was unable to recover and the plane crashed into the sea. There was no visible indication that the pilot managed to escape. Every effort was made for a rescue, but the body was not recovered.
LTJG James E. Savage, 403195, USNR  6 July 1951

Mr. Savage had a hung bomb that was supposedly armed on his plane after he had made his attacks. He was unable to release it and was ordered to land at K-18. Upon landing at K-18, the plane exploded killing the pilot instantly. His body was recovered.

LT Thomas F. Allard, 240383, USNR  11 July 1951

Mr. Allard sustained head injuries on being rescued by helicopter after being shot down over enemy territory.

LT Orville M. Cook, 301489, USNR  / 19 July 1951

LT Cook was seen going in on an attack on a bridge target in North Korea and failed to appear at the point of rendezvous with the remainder of the flight. It is believed that he was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. No remains of the wreckage were seen and LT Cook was listed as missing in action. Results of searches were negative.

LTJG Beaxton G. Harrell, 403072, USNR  27 July 1951

Mr. Harrell was injured in the face by anti-aircraft fire over North Korea.

LTJG Hugh C. Ingle, 453365, USNR  28 July 1951

Mr. Ingle was injured in the arm by anti-aircraft fire over North Korea.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. General

Two of the four squadrons in the Air Group assigned to this ship are F4U squadrons. An effort was made at the commencement of this Waspac tour to schedule pilots only in the aircraft assigned to their squadron. This plan complicated the spotting of aircraft that it was abandoned within a few days. Now the policy is any F4U pilot in any F4U.

The present type flight deck shoe is considered quite unsatisfactory. The shoe offers no support to the arch, is not waterproof and wears out too soon. The field shoe is much better suited to flight deck work despite the fact that it is heavier.

2. Aircraft Handling

(a) Flight Deck

Throughout this reporting period the flight deck was normally spotted with a "split spot" consisting of two AD's and two F4U's across the deck. The split spot forward put the AD's on the port side and the F4U's on the starboard side. The split spot aft placed the AD's on the starboard side and the F4U's on the port side.

During periods of little or no wind the split spot degenerated into spotting the F4U's across the deck aft and the AD's in front, inasmuch as the AD's need less wind across the deck for take-off.

The installation of the Aero-14A rocket launchers on F4U's has resulted in a 2-1 echelon spot thus allowing a spot of 2 AD and 3 F4U on the split spot aft.
The F9F jet spot employed for catapulting is considered the ultimate in handling of duds and still expediting the launch. After two jets are spotted on the catapult, the next plane is headed with its nose toward the tail of the plane on the starboard catapult. The next jet is pointed to port with its nose at a 90 degree angle to the plane in front of it. The remainder of the spot is a staggered spot (with jets facing fore and aft) keeping each successive plane clear of the tail pipe of the plane ahead. On large jet launches the last jets are tailed out over the port side aft of the #2 elevator. The standby jet is kept on the elevator.

It was found that the present type of equipment available for loading 250# and 260# bombs on AD's with wings folded was inadequate. On landing, the AD's are spotted forward with the wings spread. With a competent loading crew the average time of loading, fusing, and folding wings took approximately five (5) minutes per plane. Upon completion of loading the spot forward is immediately tightened up.

The use of expanded metal hose racks has resulted in a more expeditious handling of hoses. It is recommended that where convenient the standard type of hose stowages be replaced by the above type rack.

The taxiing and spotting of jets on the catapults is greatly facilitated by the use of jet tiller bars with skids manufactured to specifications by this ship. It is recommended that they be manufactured and a materiel allowance be established for all CV types having jets aboard.

It is recommended that a spare parts allowance be established, as the wear and tear on these bars is excessive due to present type of operations.

(b) Hangar Deck

Bay #1 is used for the housing and maintenance of jet aircraft. For housing only seventeen (17) jets can be stored. For maintenance and loading ammo 14 planes can be handled forward of the fire curtain.

The jets are moved from hangar deck to the flight deck via the #2 elevator. #1 elevator is not used at all. By securing this elevator we gain parking space for 2 extra jets.

Bay #2 starboard side is used to park the photo jets so that they can be accessible at short notice and close to the photo lab for expediting loading and maintenance of camera equipment. The center line of bay #2 is used to park the F4U-4's night fighters. In this manner they are all together and can be moved to the flight deck easily on either #2 or #3 elevator. (These Planes are usually handled during the time the ship is blacked out.) The port side of bay #2 is used to park F4U-4's. They can be moved to the flight deck by either #2 or #3 elevator.

Bay #3 starboard side and center line is utilized for the parking and maintenance of AD-3's, AD-4N's and AD-4N's. The port side is used for the parking and maintenance of F4U-4's. The after part of bay #3 is used for engine changes as required.

(c) General Comments on Aircraft Handling

Chain falls should be located where they can be used to the best advantage, and not interfere too much with the movement of the other planes during operations. The ones in bay #1 should not be located in the middle of the deck. This prevents passing other planes around during operation and does not allow ample time for the completion of work between hops. The low overhead of Bay #2 prohibits use of chain falls. In bay #3 chain falls should be located on the center line and in the high bays so that planes can be drop checked right in the parking line. This will help to eliminate excess movement of aircraft.

3. Catapults

During catapulting of F9F's on the H&B catapult it has been determined that an F9F with full main fuel cell, full tip tanks, full ammo, and six (6) rockets should not be launched with less than thirty-three (33) knots of wind over the deck.
For every knot of wind under thirty-three (33) knots, two rockets are removed. Using this yardstick with a wind of thirty (30) knots, the jets do not carry rockets. If the wind falls below thirty (30) knots, jets are not launched until such wind is reached.

It was also observed that when catapulting a mixed group of planes (jets and conventional) there was a large amount of foaming in the gravity tank. This resulted in oil being discharged throughout gravity tank vents and flooding the deck of the catapult machinery room. To counteract this, more anti-foam agent was mixed with the oil, and canvas tubes were manufactured to lead from the vents into G.I. cans. Two (2) additional vents were installed on the top of the gravity tank, but as it was accomplished during the last "in port" period, there has been no chance to make an evaluation of this change.

It is recommended that a close check be kept on the towing cables of the catapult. This ship experienced the difficulty of having both towing cables on the port catapult stretched an excessive amount on one shot. This resulted in kinking both cables which required replacement. At that time there was only one (1) cable in the area of sufficient length to use as a replacement. The other cable had to be sent from the U.S. It is understood that there are a number of cables now in the area.

Two minor accidents occurred when the bridle slipped from the launching hook of AD-LW aircraft at time of firing, resulting in runaway shots. There was no damage to either planes or catapults. The AD-LW's did not have service change No. 231 installed. This change is now installed. It is recommended that AD-LW's listed in the change not be catapulted until the change is made. If they are, a very close inspection should be made to insure a positive hook-up.

Since this carrier does not have the articulating shuttle, the old type bridle catcher is being used. This catcher is not sufficient strength to properly retrieve a 7/8" bridle. We are experiencing great difficulty in keeping the bridle catchers repaired. It is understood that a larger and stronger bridle catcher is being manufactured.

Difficulty has been experienced in that the launching pendant for the F9F has repeatedly dented the inboard flaps at the end of the launching run. When the pendant is released, it rebounds from the deck into the flaps. To correct for this, a longer webbing is being installed at the shuttle. It is believed that this will allow the pendant to remain on the deck for a greater length of time thereby allowing the aircraft to pass over the pendant before the pendant is retrieved by the bungee. The bungee catcher is very satisfactory in that few pendants are lost.

Pilot technique is a major factor in catapulting the F9F. If the nose is allowed to drop when the plane leaves the deck, the plane will settle quite a number of feet before the pilot can stop it. There were a number of "close calls" before this situation was corrected. If the plane is held in about the same position as it is in when it leaves the deck, very little settling is experienced. The elevator trim tab is also set at 2 degrees nose-up. This relieves most of the pressure on the stick.

4. Arresting Gear

Very little trouble is being experienced as far as arresting gear machinery is concerned. The machinery itself is capable of stopping any type of plane operating in this area without too much strain. Having the first three engines revved 12:1 has taken a tremendous load off these engines. The greatest difficulty is in keeping the first three wires in good condition. They are good for only 15 to 20 jet landings apiece, before changing. One of the first three wires is changed approximately every day.

The Davis barriers have not had enough engagements to be evaluated. The only engagements experienced since the ship has been in the operating area was caused by an intentional no-hook landing. Excellent pilot technique was employed and only the #2 and #4 barriers were engaged.
5. Aircraft Maintenance

It has been found that QEC units for R-3350 engines are not complete. This has lengthened engine change time approximately 2 days per engine. This has been partially corrected by obtaining a completely "Ready" engine installed with QEC on an L stand.

The supply of special tools for various aircraft types was found to be incomplete. This was a critical item especially with such tools as engine mount wrenches for R-3350 engines.

The ship has installed three chainfalls for drop checking aircraft. Two of these are located just forward of the metal shop and one is located near frame 60 amidships. It would be desirable to have two additional chainfalls located in the forward hangar bay to facilitate drop checking when the hangar is congested. The mounting required for these chainfalls has so far been unobtainable.

The special stands for removal of jet engines from cans were found to be of no use and were off-loaded. The same results may be obtained by the use of forklifts and/or standard hoists. The stands take up considerable room, and space is at a premium.

In order to furnish the squadrons with a working space readily available to their planes, the crew berthing space B-227-L was converted to a working space fitted with tool cages, work benches and designated "Maintenance Control". A watch is manned on phones and availability boards are maintained. Squadron maintenance personnel report their discrepancies and completion to Maintenance control from which they are forwarded to Flight Deck Control and the ready rooms.

Auxiliary power units were originally issued from a central pool. This turned out to be highly unsatisfactory as responsibility for damage to units, running out of fuel and security of units could not be fixed. The AFU's were issued to individual squadrons with satisfactory results.

All tires are mounted by ship's maintenance crew. In this way there is little danger to personnel in handling tires and satisfactory arrangements have resulted.

All props are mounted and pulled by the ship's air maintenance division. The concentration of these functions, along with engine changes has resulted in better availability and better use of special tools required.

One special device constructed by the metal shop has shown considerable utility. A reinforced beam has been built which projects the forklift about six feet higher and about 24 inches in front of the fork. This is helpful in the removal and installation of props and engines and lifting heavy bombs as they come aboard when bands are removed and they are placed on skids.

Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining properly heat-treated parts for surface repairs. Several of the newer airplanes require 80 percent to 100 percent of the original strength over portions of their surface. It is recommended that a heat-treat oven of approximately 24" by 24" be installed in ships of this class.

It is recommended that a small spot welder be added to the metal shop in order to facilitate repair of class 265 surfaces.

Although no spark-plug hot locker has been available, the ship constructed one and installed light-bulb elements. This has worked very well.

6. Aviation Electronics

When this carrier was recommissioned it was necessary to re-establish the Aviation Electronics shop. Very little of the original test equipment was available or suitable for maintaining the present type of electronic equipment now being used. In addition the shop arrangement was not suitable and alteration plans to cover the removal of storage bins was considered. A ship alteration covered the removal of the bins and the installation of a center line bench which would provide additional space for maintenance of electronics equipment.
Due to the fact that the ship was scheduled for 27A conversion after this cruise the ship alteration covering the removal of bins and installation of fluorescent lights was not done completely. The ship's force removed the bins and designed a suitable bench which would suffice during the cruise. Power required for the test equipment of the new bench was also provided.

Since the Air Group assigned to the ship would have a detachment of AD-4W planes with AEW electronic equipment it was necessary to provide space for the maintenance of this equipment. A ship alteration covered the provision of space, benches and power for this purpose; however, in view of the conversion mentioned above it was not deemed advisable to make this alteration. In order to provide for maintenance of the AEW equipment the ship arranged for the necessary power for the motor-generator sets to be provided in Squadron Armory No. 3 and a center line bench was installed. The installation of the necessary auxiliary power and bench setup for maintenance of the equipment was done by Air Group personnel after embarkation.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining the QR allowance test equipment and material during the time the ship was being recommissioned and during its shakedown and qualification period. It was felt advisable to have the electronic personnel check the material so marked for electronics (green ball marking) and unpack it to determine whether it was test equipment or material. If this had not been done the shop would have been slow in getting established and shortages of test equipment would not have been realized prior to the ship's departure from the states. In addition, it was necessary to have certain racks and cabling for the initial bench setups which would come from the QR material allowances. There again the provision of all necessary racks, cabling, units and control boxes was slow and progress of establishment of the shop layout was drastically retarded. No bench setups were available at the time the ship arrived at San Diego for taking aboard the Air Group for its qualifications, nor was the shop in a satisfactory condition during the ORI. Time was available prior to this period but the material and test equipment had not been received. It is essential that the material and equipment be made available as promptly as possible in order to permit an orderly installation.

The present arrangement of recommissioning a carrier does not provide for the electronic equipment necessary to make the bench setups in the shop. It was necessary to take equipment from the QR allowances for the various types of gear and this caused shortages. It is felt that each carrier should be provided with the necessary equipment to provide the initial bench setups and not be required to take such items from the QR section allowances.

Due to the size of the shop space it was believed that conditions would be extremely crowded if the APS-4 and APS-19 radar equipment were maintained in the main shop. A platform just aft of the shop on the 02 level was utilized and a small bench with associated power provided. All maintenance of the APS-4 and APS-19 radar equipment is done in this space. Radar bomb racks for the APS-4 are readily available in this platform as well as a hoist for raising or lowering them. This eliminates the necessity of opening the hatch in the main electronic shop and provides more space for the maintenance personnel. Prior to this arrangement the platform was used as a storage place for electronic equipment.

The present CV carriers are not provided with storage spaces for the APS-19 radar bomb units. In order to provide suitable storage facilities modifications were made to the radar bomb storage facilities on the second platform aft of the electronic shop. This was done by the removal of the vertical angle irons in eight storage compartments and converting them to six storage compartments by respacing the vertical angle irons. The bins removed from the aviation electronic shop were reinstalled on this platform and provide the additional space required to store electronic equipment.

Initially, no AC auxiliary power units were provided. One of the Wakesha units was modified to provide both AC and DC power which is necessary for maintenance of certain electronic equipment. It is felt that all ships should be provided with both types of auxiliary power equipment.
7. Aviation Gasoline

By effecting close cooperation between the jet plane captains and the gasoline crews, the time required to re-fuel this type of aircraft has been reduced considerably. Immediately upon landing the jets are spotted on the port side forward of #2 elevator. The gasoline crew produces a proportioner gasoline line and gives it to the plane captain who commences re-fueling the main cell. Two men from the gasoline detail gas the wing-tip tanks simultaneously. By this time the second plane has been received and a second proportioner line is given to the plane captain and the main cells are started. The wing-tips fill faster than the mains so these crews gradually gain on the operation until all tip-tanks on the incoming flight are re-fueled. At such time both proportioner lines are fed to one jet aircraft. During this period of time the squadron armament personnel are rearming the jets with 20MM's and rockets, if required. The gasoline crew furnishes the fire protection throughout the operation.

Upon completion of refueling from a tanker and in preparation for unhooking the gasoline line, it was found that considerable time could be saved by setting up the carrier's pump room for main back and utilizing the eductor to take a momentary suction on the re-fueling line instead of the usual procedure of blowing back by means of forcing inert gas through the piping system in order to force the gasoline back to the tanker. This method is faster, more effective and eliminates the necessity of recharging the inert gas accumulators. Approximately 2,000 lbs of inert gas pressure was required to effectively accomplish the blow back. Replacing this amount of inert gas required about four and one half hours operation of the producer.

This vessel's capacity for receiving gasoline from the tanker is limited by the fact that there is only one available receiving station which is on the starboard side forward. This line is a four inch line. By removing the plus valve now installed in the port side of the gasoline system at frame 40 and installing a three-way, three position valve it would be possible to isolate the system, from the after system. By leading a four inch line across the hangar deck from this new valve, it would permit the ship to fuel both systems at once by using the WIE fitting offered by the tanker, thereby reducing the fueling time considerably.

8. Aviation Ordnance

Upon commencing operations on 31 May difficulty was experienced in having the right quantities of assembled bombs and rockets available when required. The bomb supply crews had not had sufficient training in preparation of large quantities of different sizes of bombs with several different types of fuses. After a period of trial and error methods a firm plan of assembly and supply was put into effect which has proven satisfactory for present operations: The assembly of 1000#GP, 250#GP, 500#AR and 2500#GP, 5" HVAR and 6.5" ATAR was assigned to bomb supply forward. The assembly of 260# FRAG, 500# GP, 3.5# AR and 350# ADB was assigned to bomb supply aft. Due to the better location of the two bomb elevators forward in relation to the assembly space it is possible to supply more than twice the munitions than bomb supply aft.

Some difficulties have been experienced because of small elevators peculiar to this ship. 6.5" ATAR heads must be assembled on the motors on the flight deck as the bomb elevators are not long enough to handle an assembled 6.5" ATAR. A 2000#GP bomb will barely fit into the elevators. Handling these large bombs is a slow operation due to the work required with the loaded Mk 8 skid on the elevator.

After gaining experience ordnance assembly crews have proven very capable and keep ahead of munition requirements with ease.

More training should be given to munition assembly crews prior to departure from the U.S. This training should be based on actual operations that are being conducted in the forward area. The Air Ordnance Officer should be sent on TAD to the operating area ahead of the carrier to observe actual operations.

Some AN M57 250#GP bombs were received with a wide, triangular shaped single suspension lug that was too large to latch on a Mk55 bomb rack. This situation has been remedied as 250#GP are now screened for large lugs prior to issue to ammunition ships.
Napalm thickener, Type I – Some napalm powder received has been useless due to exposure to weather. The containers were seemingly in good shape but upon being opened the powder was found to be so caked (and even wet in some cases) that it was not usable.

B. AEROSCOPY

1. Aerological Data

A tremendous amount of error has been found in official publications pertaining to the climatology of the eastern coast of Korea and its adjacent waters. This is fully brought out by the statistics that have been worked up by this ship. The climatological reports indicated that there would only be seven days flying weather in the entire month of July in our target areas. The weather was not ideal but the total number of flying days far exceeded the number as layed down by the climatological reports available.

The following statistics are offered as an aid in correcting the climatology of this area:

(a) June 1 to June 16

Prevailing wind direction, south, from which the wind blew 23% of the time.
Average wind velocity was 8 knots with the strongest winds coming from the south at 29 knots.
Duration of the wind over twenty four knots was ten hours.
Average air temperature 62F
Average maximum air temperature 66F
Maximum air temperature during the period 75F
Minimum temperature during the period 55F
Average minimum temperature 60F
Average sea water temperature 63F
Average maximum sea water temperature 66F
Average minimum sea water temperature 61F
Minimum sea water temperature during the period 57F

Ceiling:
Unlimited 37%
Greater than 9,950 feet 12%
Between 4,950 and 18,000 feet 19%
Between 2,450 and 5,000 feet 21%
Between 950 and 2,500 feet 10%
Less than 1,000 feet 1%

Visibility:
Over 6 miles 93%
Between 3 and 6 miles 7%
Precipitation occurred only as light and brief on 6 days.

(b) July 1 to July 28

Average wind velocity for the month 10 knots
Strongest winds came from the south at 33 knots
Average air temperature 70F
Average maximum air temperature 74F
Maximum air temperature 81F
Average minimum air temperature 68F
Minimum air temperature 60F
Average sea water temperature 72F
Average sky cover 6 tenths

2. Equipment and Communications

Aerology is hampered by faulty operating radios and the lack of adequate communication facilities with other departments and offices on board, and the lack of a teletype in the office. It is suggested that in order to increase the efficiency of communications that a teletype be installed in the office connecting air plot, CIC and the ready rooms and that a squawk box be installed and connected with the ready rooms, air plot, the bridge, air intelligence, flag plot and CIC.
C. COMBAT INFORMATION

1. General

The primary function of CIC during this operation has been passing information to and from the flagship, along with aircraft control. For the most part this has consisted of jet cap control. Numerous intercepts have been conducted on friendly aircraft returning from the target areas. No enemy aircraft was sighted. On a few occasions strike control was shifted to this vessel, although the general policy has been to keep strike control on the flagship.

2. Radar Guards

Radar guards were maintained as assigned. These consisted chiefly of the SK guard and the homing guards. The SFS/6B was used consistently by the air controllers. Due to its antenna location it has proved to be less than 50% efficient from 0° to 130° relative on the starboard side of the ship. The performance of this radar has been excellent on the port side. On several occasions jets have been picked up at ranges exceeding 60 miles (2 jet at 15,000 feet or above). The maximum recorded range on jets was 82 miles (2 jets at 15,000 feet). Propeller type aircraft was consistently picked up at ranges exceeding 60 miles. The maximum recorded range on props was 124 miles (10 props at 7,000 feet). Some phenomenal ranges have been recorded on surface contacts. An aircraft carrier and its escorts were picked up at 135 miles and tracked.

The SM radar has been a maintenance nightmare from the beginning and has been in operation less than 20% of the time. The information received was so unreliable that it was used only as a check for other altitude radars in the force. Recorded ranges on jets were never greater than 35 miles. Props have been held at 70 miles. Surface contacts have been picked up and tracked at 54 miles.

3. Mark V IFF

The Mark V IFF system has worked effectively, but it is felt even better performance could have been effected with AN/UPL3 Slave antenna. Bongo ranges have been consistent at 80 miles. The system also has the same limitations as the SFS/6B radar on the starboard side.

4. Flight Information

Flight information was displayed on an edge-lighted status board where launch time, recovery, event number, number and type of aircraft scheduled, mission, flight leaders, call control channel and control ship were listed. As the hops were landed, the events were erased from the board.

5. CIC Communications

Communication difficulties encountered consisted mainly of feed back from one circuit to another. This was particularly noticed between the land-launch frequency and all air control channels, and all air control channels through the screen common. Communications with aircraft and other ships during this period has been uniformly good. It is recommended a second AN/ARC be installed in CIC, because of the necessity of getting on one of these channels for operational information from the flag when the AN/ARC is being used by the air controller. Air controllers have preferred the AN/ARC to the RCK/TDQ because of the high noise level experienced coming from our receivers.

Difficulties have been experienced in liaison between Air Plot and CIC because of the location of CIC in the hold and Air Plot thirteen decks above.

D. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Equipment

Considerable material difficulties were experienced during this period which it is believed to be the result of improper installation or faulty repair of equipment during the yard availability period in Bremerton, Washington.
Practically all of the VHF and UHF antenna were found to be grounded or open due to improper installation of coaxial fittings. Receivers were misaligned resulting in low sensitivity.

2. Personnel

The volume of traffic and the communication plan in effect places an extremely heavy load on the communication personnel aboard this vessel. It is felt that the authorized allowance is not practical or sufficient for the type of operations being conducted by this task force.

E. INTELLIGENCE

1. Pre-Combat and Equipment

The gathering and collecting of intelligence materials presented no problem. The Air Intelligence Officer reporting aboard a ship being re-activated, however, will be confronted with many problems pertaining to storage and equipment. Unless he reports early, he will find storage facilities crowded by other divisions and the Air Intelligence Office stripped of many essential items. Also, he will be confronted with the general reluctance to install many types of needed equipment, on a ship scheduled later for modernization.

For the tools to operate, he must start from scratch. Indeed, still operating under a 1945 Bureau of Ships' Allowance List, not even one typewriter was allowed for the Air Intelligence Office. Typewriters were, however, procured just prior to our departure for the operating area. An Intelligence Office aboard a large carrier cannot operate efficiently without at least two typewriters. Moreover, the work load during shakedown and training for an Air Intelligence Office, accumulating, assembling, cataloging and indexing materials represents a considerable work load.

The teletype box originally installed in the Air Intelligence Office on this ship had been removed and installed elsewhere. A teletype box is indispensable during periods of operation as it provides the only tie with all ready rooms. Indispensable as it might be, one was not provided and had to be recovered from the surplus disposal pile at the Bremerton Navy Yard.

It was recommended by the Operational Readiness Inspection Group that a teletype be installed in the Air Intelligence Office to provide for printed communications between Air Plot, CIC and all of the ready rooms. Last minute information, for instance, passed from the flag must necessarily come from CIC, or the main communications center, to Air Plot, to Air Intelligence and then go to the ready rooms. A teletype would eliminate this process and provide reliable printed communications between the ready rooms and the Air Intelligence Office. The request for a teletype was turned down. It would have been a great value to this ship during operations.

During the first training exercises at sea with the Air Group, it became apparent that a loud speaker system should be installed in each ready room. With the noises and interference caused by telephones, squawk boxes and planes landing and taking off on the flight deck, it was almost impossible to brief or interrogate flights properly. The request for installation of the NC-28 system, which is standard equipment for all CV type carriers was approved in the Bremerton Navy Yard during the period of final repairs. These systems have not yet however been provided. Various types of equipment have been improvised to aid briefing officers to make their voices audible. The MC-28 speaker systems would relieve the strain. In the meantime we are compelled to do the best we can with what we have.

The aforementioned equipment is essential for achieving peak efficiency during operations. The need for the equipment under combat conditions exists; the cost is small.

2. Maps, Charts and Grids

ComAirPac and CinCac did an excellent job in providing maps and charts for the ship. The charts were well packaged and indexed and more than filled our operating requirements. There were aboard approximately 100,000 maps and charts to provide for the possible operational requirements of the carrier.
With the commissioning of map centers in foreign countries however, it is felt that the allowance for charts can safely be reduced. Such reduction would alleviate the problem involved in the storage of large quantities of charts, which could be drawn within a short period from map centers as the needs for them arise.

3. Escape and Evasion Materials

Blood chits, pointee talkers, E & E kits and safe conduct passes were not provided to the ship until weeks after operations had commenced. An evasion and escape team sponsored by ComNavPac came aboard after operations had started and thoroughly briefed all pilots and aircrews on evasion and escape techniques. It immediately procured, by special transportation, blood chits, and safe conduct passes for flying personnel. Approximately three weeks later, ComNavPac procured E & E kits for the ship. It is felt that all E & E materials should be made available prior to the departure of the ship from the U.S. to eliminate the possibility of having to operate without them.

4. Briefings Prior to Entering Combat

During training exercises in Hawaii, CinCPac assigned two Air Intelligence Officers who had recently returned from active duty in Korea to temporary duty aboard the ship for the purpose of briefing the Ship's Intelligence Officer on carrier operations in the Korean area. A special briefing on the situation in the orient was given at CinCPac for the Commanding Officer, and approximately forty additional officers of the ship and Air Group, at CinCPac Headquarters prior to our departure from Pearl Harbor.

On joining the Task Force the Intelligence Officer, Staff, Carrier Division Three lectured to all officers on the intelligence phases of operations; and provided up to date overlays on flak, reconnaissance routes and ground situation, operating doctrine and procedures.

These briefings and the assistance rendered to the ship by CinCPac and ComCardDivTHREE staff officers proved invaluable in the organization of the ship's intelligence office and greatly facilitated commencement of operations. It is recommended that similar briefings and assistance be given to each carrier destined for foreign operating areas.

5. Operations

Complete and up to date charts and overlays on the ground situation, order of battle, flak intelligence, reconnaissance and interdiction routes, friendly and enemy airfields were maintained in the Air Intelligence Office. These were copied by the squadron AI's or distributed to them and displayed in each ready room. Enroute to the forward areas, the ship displayed a wide variety of Korean target photographs. A terrain map of the ASW L-772 series was erected and tabbed to enable pilots to familiarize themselves with the topography and geographic features of Korea. In addition, the ship prepared and disseminated to each pilot printed materials on doctrine and procedures in the Korean area based on advance information received from the Task Force.

This type of graphic presentation and method of dissemination of information was a large factor in the operational readiness of the Air Group.

A daily Intelligence Brief was prepared by the ship's Intelligence Officer and distributed to the Air Group and key officers of the ship. This brief consisted of a summary of the ground situation and known enemy intentions, the friendly naval situation, enemy and friendly air activity, political notes when appropriate, mine information, the latest bombline, bombing and attack restrictions, flight precautions, communications, flak intelligence, search and rescue, evasion and escape, and miscellaneous items of an intelligence nature. This brief served as the source of all briefs to assure that intelligence required for any type of mission was presented to the pilots in a clear logical form. It was comprehensive enough to provide information for short lectures during general quarters on such topics as new type enemy aircraft, enemy intentions, etc.
Debriefing was done by the squadron AI's in the ready rooms, and coordinated by the ship's Intelligence Officer. Optimum conditions for the most effective debriefing are lacking and will never exist under the present type of operations until a separate room for debriefing purposes is provided.

6. Photographic Interpretation

A photographic interpretation officer reported for temporary additional duty on the first day of operations. This officer briefed all photographic missions and conducted a photographic briefing for strikes until the pilots became proficient in reading annotated photos. Since then, an annotated target photo has been prepared for each pilot on every strike.

The ship's plan did not provide space for photographic interpretation. Space was provided in an office on the number 2 deck which is removed from the Air Intelligence Office and ready rooms. This office provides adequate room for both the photo interpretation section and the squadron photo detachment team. Storage equipment, lighting and ventilation are unsatisfactory at present. It is believed that these deficiencies can be alleviated very shortly.

Photographic interpretation functions aboard carriers have increased greatly since World War II. It is recommended that suitable space be set aside on each CV type carrier for the exclusive use of the photo interpreter and the squadron photo detachment, and that this space be fully equipped for photo interpretation, film annotation, photo layouts, and the preparation of photo plot overlays. Such space should be located near or adjacent to the Air Intelligence Office. It is further recommended that photo interpreters be assigned to all CV type carriers before their deployment from the United States in order that the photo interpretation section of Air Intelligence may be properly organized and equipped before the ship reaches the operating area.

7. USAF Target Dossier

All of the target dossier material was delivered to the ship unassembled. The problem of assembling and properly indexing this material is complicated because suitable space does not exist aboard ship to spread the material out and sort it into proper order. Moreover, this imposes an additional burden on personnel fully occupied with other work. It is therefore suggested that the target dossiers be completely assembled and indexed prior to their delivery aboard ship.

8. Recognition

The recognition program started on the commissioning of the ship was greatly accelerated on departure for the forward area. An intensive recognition program was given to all gunnery crews and lookout teams. Recognition materials and posters were widely disseminated throughout the ship. A recognition program for all hands was carried on each evening for approximately 20 minutes before the movies. This program was made as interesting and entertaining as possible, and the crew seemed to enjoy it.

The common problem of lack of slides on new type aircraft was experienced aboard this ship also. Slides and photographs on mines were non-existent.

9. Personnel

Only one Air Intelligence Officer was ordered to the ship. One photographic interpretation officer reported for 90 days temporary duty at the start of operations. The volume of work on intelligence and photographic interpretation in this theater is tremendous. Photographic interpretation alone requires the full efforts of a qualified photo interpreter and two trained assistants. The assistance that such an officer can render to the ship's Intelligence Office on work other than photographic interpretation is therefore limited. Any amount of time devoted to assisting the Air Intelligence Officer seriously hampers photo interpretation work because of the large demands for photography, the review and analysis of a tremendous volume of photos, the briefing of photographic missions, and the proper interpretation of photographs.
Full cooperation and a close working relationship existed with the Intelligence Officer and the Air Group AI's, but the assistance these officers were able to render was negligible due to the heavy operations schedule for briefing and debriefing pilots.

Four enlisted men were assigned to the Air Intelligence Office. None had prior experience in intelligence. In fact, two strikers had no experience of any kind. After a brief period of training these men performed duties far above those ordinarily required by men of their rate.

Air Intelligence requirements in the Korean theater are rigorous. It is unreasonable to require one officer to carry the full load of air intelligence aboard a large carrier operating four squadrons plus 4 VC teams on a schedule that requires his full attention almost 24 hours a day, over extended periods of time. This ship was under complemented in other departments and no officers satisfactory for air intelligence work could be made available to assist in AI. The first officer that could be spared to AI, a newly commissioned Ensign, reported for duty 20 July 1951 and is now undergoing training for AI watch duties.

The photographic interpretation officer is scheduled to leave here in 30 days. A trained replacement for him is required to maintain efficient operations of the Air Intelligence section. An additional officer of any rank is also required for assumption of the many and varied duties. It is strongly recommended that such officers be provided.

10. Reporting Requirements

It is felt that some action should be taken to ease the reporting requirements for the more routine type of air operations. For example, no less than 27 copies of the Air Attack Report must be distributed to various commands after its preparation. Much of the information included in this report is duplicated and also included in other reports such as the debriefing form, flash reports, daily summary, Air Mission Log, War Diary and the ship's history. Moreover, the end use of these reports seems to be statistical. It seems that a better analysis could be made quicker and more efficiently in some other way of the present type of operations.

11. Miscellaneous

In accordance with the directive issued by CinCFac requiring Commanding Officers of vessels visiting foreign ports to indoctrinate crews on the customs, traditions and usages of the various countries visited, this ship established a policy whereby the crew would be indoctrinated before entering port and also be kept abreast of all developments.

Prior to our arrival in Pearl Harbor a pamphlet entitled "Hawaii-Pacific Crossroads" was prepared and distributed to each man aboard. In anticipation of our service within Korean waters another pamphlet, "Korea" was printed and distributed. This pamphlet was intended as a method of acquainting the crew with the geography, resources, and features of the country, but more important it explained the reason for our being here to halt aggression and repulse the expansion of Communism.

Before we reached Sasebo, Japan, a simple, attractive information booklet on the geography, history, the customs, traditions, usages, religion and politics of Japan was published for all hands. The major part of this material was gathered from other publications, as was true for all these informative productions. The material was assembled and prepared by the ship's Intelligence Officer, and the printing and art work done by the ship's personnel.

Enroute to the combat area a series of five intelligence lectures was delivered to the ship's company prior to the movies each evening. The topics were drawn from our activities in Korea and their international policy implications. Each evening a summary of our own actions and plans with brief references to geography and current affairs was broadcast over the public address system to keep the crew informed.
The amount of time involved in the preparation of these materials, lectures, and summaries is small compared to the beneficial affects on the morale of the crew and the appreciation that has been expressed. Moreover, a definite interest on the part of the crew to know more about the lands we visit and the things we do is shown. The projects have proven to be worth while, and although they can still be improved upon, are recommended to any ships planning to operate abroad.

**F. SUPPLY**

1. **Aviation Supply**

On the basis of experience gained in supporting CAG-102 during aerial combat missions the following suggestions are recommended for consideration for incorporation with the Aviation Supply System, especially applying to ships being commissioned or re-activated.

(a) Much thought should be given to a system that would provide newly commissioned vessels with complete sets of pre-printed or pre-typed stock ledger cards on all material with the cognizant symbol of "R", "M", "U" and "E". These cards could be typed or printed in sheets on a continuous form, perforated for convenient insertion in stock ledger files. All applicable BuAer allowance lists, including sections "B" and "R" should be included and prepared in alphabetic order.

(b) The importance of all precommissioning details on ships supporting aircraft relative to the establishment of proper and adequate Aviation Stock Ledgers should be greatly emphasized.

(c) Interchangeability of Section "B" material should be more thoroughly considered and all items of this nature on aircraft assigned to individual ships should be combined and procurement instigated under one SR instead of by separate allowance lists. This would eliminate much duplication of effort, much critical transportation saved and many man hours utilized for other purposes.

(d) All parties concerned should be directed to adhere more closely to the provisions of the BuAer Manual and current directives.

(e) On the basis of available usage data on all Section "B" items, current allowances should be reviewed and increased at all major aviation supply points, thus making for quicker availability to Fleet units, of all peculiar items necessary for the support of current aircraft types in combat. This usage information should be made available to higher authority as soon as established. Current section "B" allowances should be considered mean guides for initial outfitting primarily and then given wide flexibility on the basis of actual usage. Due to the circumstances and combat factors it would seem impossible to anticipate what items will or may be needed within any period.

(f) Critical spares should be made available closer to the operational area. Aviation supply ships should be supported either by ASB's or ASD's at Yokosuka, Japan, Guam, or Pearl Harbor; thus eliminating the necessity of procuring from the United States. Recurrent requests made of the supporting AVS should warrant the stocking of such critical or controlled material by the AVS. This applies especially to insurance items that are justified by usage.

In any theatre of operations on vessels supporting aircraft in any quantity, time is important. Combat aircraft must be kept in the air. Material must be stowed, broken out and replenished and then stowed again. This is an on-the-toes job, continuing around the clock, hence it is felt that too much importance cannot be given to paragraphs 1 (a), (b), (c) and (d).

2. **GSK**

The only difficulty encountered in routine replenishment of General Stores has been that the AFS's cancel requisitions for material when it is not in stock or not carried, therefore making it necessary to re-submit new requisitions in the future. At present, items not in stock are not obligated against stocks due by the AFS's.
Some requisitions are being forwarded to the United States by ComServRon3 for further action when the requisitions are submitted direct and the material is not available in this area.

3. Ship's Store

It is recommended that a full capacity of luxury items, i.e., approximately 1500 watches of various grades and 1500 pen and pencil sets of various grades be carried aboard. If coca cola dispensing machines are aboard, it is recommended that the following spare parts be on board: One complete set of electrical spares with syrups pump motor or extra switches for all parts of the machine, one spare coin changer motor for each two machines and one spare coin changer for each two machines.

4. Clothing and Small Stores

It is difficult to obtain khaki shirts and trousers and miniature CPO devices in the forward areas.

5. Disbursing

During this period the disbursing office carried on its normal outcover period. All U.S. Currency was recalled and replaced with MPC Series 4/72. CODFISH was used for procurement of currency with excellent results.

6. Commissary

The logistic support given to the USS Ben Harny Richard in all kinds of provisions, from activities afloat and ashore, has been most gratifying.

G. ENGINEERING

1. Shipboard Electronics

This vessel had never operated under the new CV organization which provided for electronic maintenance and repair under ER Division.

At the time of commissioning the radar spare parts room frame 99 amidship was used as a workshop office and issue room although inadequate in size. Just prior to departure for the Far East area, authority was obtained to cut an archway between the Radar Spare Part Room frame 99 amidship and the spare SM console room frame 99 starboard. This was accomplished by ship's force, and the radar spare parts room was fitted out suitably as a work shop and the spare SM console room was fitted out as an office and tool issue room. All work on working benches, cabinets, racks, etc. on the job was accomplished by ship's crew. This has now proved to be a workable arrangement, but it is felt that had this been accomplished by the Navy Yard prior to the ship's departure from the U.S., it would have been very beneficial in building a better electronics organization.

It was not until the ship had left the states that a decision was made to provide storeroom A308A for electronic maintenance spare parts. During the time the ship was with the underway training command, the spare parts were in Compt. B-127-L. However during the vessels second yard availability period this space was taken by the Air Department for Squadron Shops and for a period of approximately one week the spare parts were stored on the hanger deck. An electronic maintenance parts allowance for this vessel was not received on board until after the vessel had been in commission almost two months. Also, the allowance did not cover the model 5 SM radar equipment in particular plus a number of additional equipment. A revised ALLO report was submitted to the Bureau of Ships, and a new electronic maintenance part allowance was received after the ship had been operating in the Far East area for approximately a month. This new allowance did not cover the model SM radar equipment, and No. 2 NITS list covering this equipment is available. Stowage for electronics spare parts was not provided because the ship is scheduled to undergo the 27A conversion in 1952.
The service of two field service engineers was provided for the ship at the start of the period that the vessel was engaged in the underway training program. Their services have been extremely valuable in connection with the repair and maintenance of electronic equipment. Their presence on board has practically revived the situation from having insufficient and inexperienced electronic personnel.

The Mark 12/22/32 fire control radar was not in a satisfactory operating condition when the vessel left PSNS after the first yard availability period. It required the efforts of one field service engineer one month to put this equipment in good operating condition.

The model SM radar has been very difficult to maintain. Troubles have been encountered in almost every unit at some time. The radar can be used in connection with radar intercepts, but it is not dependable.

Trouble was encountered with the SPS-6B rotational system. With winds of 40 knots or more the antenna would stall and blow fuses. It was found experimentally by rotating the antenna counter clockwise, it did not stall with high winds as in the clockwise rotation. The antenna has been operating for approximately two months using counter clockwise rotation without rotational failures.

Trouble was encountered with the YE homing equipment due to water leaking into the antenna drive unit. Several days' operations of this equipment were lost drying out the antenna unit and the cables feeding the unit.

An AN/SPN-12 air speed radar was installed on this vessel in the second yard availability at PSNS. Results with this equipment have proved very satisfactory. It has been of greatest value with landing jet aircraft and with landing "prop" type aircraft at night.

2. Personnel

The complement of personnel assigned the Engineering Department is adequate in all divisions except the Boiler Division. Due to the ship's operating at high speeds the presently assigned complement of Boiler Division is inadequate at 171. It is recommended, that with all stations having to be manned at high speeds, that the Boiler Division total complement be increased to 212 men.

3. Boiler Operations

Where speed in excess of 25 knots is required, 4 boiler operation will be normal with one boiler per fireroom. Where surprise air attack is probable or if speed requirements exceed 25 knots, then 8 boiler operation will be used. It should be noted that operational data indicated that at speeds above 20 knots for this vessel, 8 boilers will operate as economically as 4 boilers under 4 fireroom operation. This is due to higher boiler efficiency at lower fuel rates per boiler. Six boiler operation should not be used except under special conditions, because it drastically reduces machinery segregation and has negligible economy advantages over 8 boiler operation. Six boiler operation may lead to danger of overheating superheaters because of unstable flow conditions at low power, if load is not carefully balanced between boilers, it is absolutely necessary to insure cross connection of the steam drums via the auxiliary line on all boilers operating cross connection on the main steam line.

Cecil B. Gill
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 10 Aug-5 Sep 1951
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
Care Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California  

6 September 1951

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: Commander, Task Force S.WANY-SEVEN  
Commander, S.WANYH Flood  
Commander, Naval Forces, FAR EAST  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 10 August 1951 through 5 September 1951  
Ref: (a) OPNAV Instructions 338.4 dated 1 July 1951  
Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 6 September 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 10 August 1951 through 5 September 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

After ten days of repairs and upkeep, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Yokosuka, Japan 8 August 1951 and rejoined Task Force 77 in the action area 10 August 1951 by order of CTF-77 Confidential dispatch 043.944.2. This area was near the coast of Korea close to the 38th parallel. The Task Force was commanded by RADM W. G. TOMLINSON aboard the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), and operated under Task Force Operation Plan 22-51 dated 1 July 1951. It was comprised of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) and other units composing a submarine radar screen. Aboard the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD was Carrier Air Group 102. After 27 days of operations, the ship departed for port in Yokosuka, Japan for another period of maintenance and upkeep, leaving the action area on 5 September 1951.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.
The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H. N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 10 August 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>NO. OF PILOTS</th>
<th>NO. &amp; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16 F9F-2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 AD-3 &amp; AD-4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 F4U-5NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 AD-4W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 AD-4N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 F9F-2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG-102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 AD-4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-1</td>
<td>2 (attached to ship)</td>
<td>1 H03S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/10/51: The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) reached the combat area for her third tour of duty in the Sea of Japan with air operations conducted from near the coast of Central Korea. 69 sorties were flown consisting of 19 defensive and 50 offensive missions. Combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, anti-sub patrol, photographic and naval gunfire spotting made up the day's missions. 1 oxcart, 2 bridges, 40 buildings, 18 railroad cars and 1 truck were destroyed, 22 buildings, 3 vehicles, 4 oxcarts and 27 railroad cars were damaged. Close air support had 80% coverage, and 6 troops were killed. Due to bad weather, a few of the originally scheduled sorties were diverted to reconnaissance as weather alternate targets.

8/11/51: 90 sorties were flown on this day with 22 defensive and 68 offensive missions. The missions consisted of night hecker attacks, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photographic flights. 36 buildings, 4 trucks, 9 boxcars, 13 oxcarts and 1 gun position were destroyed. 46 boxcars, 1 locomotive, 6 lumber piles, 12 buildings, 14 trucks, 5 vehicles, 13 bridges, 3 boxcars and 1 tunnel were damaged. 35 troops were killed. No estimate of close air support results was given. Two planes and pilots were lost in combat over enemy territory. Again weather obscured many targets.

8/12/51: This day was devoted to replenishment activities. The ship received 439,840 gallons of fuel oil from the USS PLATTE AO-24 in 1 hour and 14 minutes.

8/13/51: 69 sorties were flown; 12 defensive and 57 offensive. 4 buildings, 1 gun position and 9 trucks were destroyed, 7 boxcars, 23 trucks and 1 bridge were damaged. On events 15 and 16 consisting of 4 defensive and 18 offensive sorties, all ordnance was necessarily jettisoned as weather prevented carrying out the assigned missions. The missions consisted of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photographic, strikes and naval gunfire spotting.

8/14/51: This was one of those perfect days for CAG-102's pilots. All events ran off on schedule with 104 sorties launched, 24 defensive and 80 offensive. 34 trucks, 8 vehicles, 5 boxcars, 11 gun positions, 17 oxcarts, 1 block house, 1 gas storage tank, 3 boats and 1 building were destroyed. 1 railroad car, 5 buildings, 40 trucks, 4 oxcarts, 31 boxcars, 9 bridges, 1 railroad platform, 8 boats and 1 vehicle were damaged. 90 to 100% coverage was reported on close air support with 74 troops killed. On several events, estimates of damage could not be made as weather prevented observation of results. Combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photographic hops, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting were the missions flown.
8/15/51: This was another fruitful day with 102 sorties flown consisting of 21 defensive and 81 offensive missions. 3 trucks, 1 gun position, 12 buildings, 2 gondolas, 3 railroad cars, 7 oxcarts, 1 boat, 1 bridge, and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 2 gun positions, 8 buildings, 1 car, 13 bridges, 29 railroad cars, 1 oxcart, 1 boat, 4 vehicles and 3 tunnels were damaged. Close air support reported 90 to 100% coverage with 50 troops killed. The day included many raids on troops' living quarters with an untold toll of lives being taken. Weather hindered plane activities but combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photo hops, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting made up the day's missions.

8/16/51: This day was devoted to replenishment activities. The ship received 195,709 gallons of fuel oil from the USS CACAPON AO-52 in 1 hour 7 minutes.

8/17/51: 62 sorties were flown with 40 offensive and 22 defensive missions. Hecklers, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance and bridge strikes were flown. 1 gun position, 3 trucks, 17 railroad cars, 1 car, 6 buildings, 4 boats, 10 oxcarts, 1 vehicle and 9 bridges were damaged. 10 troops were killed. No close air support was flown.

8/18/51: 90 sorties were flown with 17 defensive and 73 offensive missions. 32 trucks, 20 railroad cars, 32 buildings, 6 vehicles, 5 oxcarts, 3 bridges, and 1 gun position were destroyed. 4 boats, 23 buildings, 17 railroad cars, 5 bridges, 4 oxcarts, 2 tanks and 2 vehicles were damaged. No close air support was flown.

8/19/51: This was devoted to replenishment activities. These activities were undertaken early due to typhoon dangers. The typhoon was forming in the Sea of Japan and moving north. 158,998 gallons of fuel oil were received from the USS PLATTE AO-21 in 1 hour 1 minute.

8/20/51: No flights were made due to typhoon danger. The typhoon moved at 45 knots past the southern tip of Korea and moved northwest. It made the weather over Korea unconducive to flight.

8/21/51: No flight activities were attempted due to typhoon danger. The typhoon slowly moved northwest, but North Korea was still covered with bad weather preventing air operations.

8/22/51: The weather over North Korea was still bad for flying with only night hecklers flying 4 offensive sorties. 1 truck was destroyed, and 2 buildings and one warehouse were observed to be damaged. It was too dark to make further assessment. 16 defensive sorties flew combat air patrol, weather reconnaissance and anti-sub patrol.

8/23/51: A tropical storm moved northeast between the 37th and 38th parallels and near longitude 129 East. This made the seas and skies too difficult for operations, and all flights were cancelled.

8/24/51: Despite some bad weather the BON HOMME RICHARD returned to normal flight activity with 22 defensive and 80 offensive sorties. 9 boxcars, 2 gun positions, 1 ammo dump, 20 buildings, 7 trucks, 1 tank, 7 oxcarts, 1 locomotive, 4 lumber piles, 1 lumber mill, 5 mortar positions, 8 railroad cars and 3 boats were destroyed. 23 boxcars, 7 bridges, 12 trucks, 1 warehouse, 4 oxcarts, 12 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 1 factory building and 4 vehicles were damaged. Two planes were lost, one on take off and one was ditched; both pilots were recovered.
8/25/51: Rain and low ceilings hampered all activities; nevertheless, 72 sorties were launched, 30 defensive and 42 offensive. Combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, bridge strikes and photo reconnaissance were attempted with varying results. The weather made assessments almost impossible but pilots noted 2 locomotives, 8 boxcars, 2 warehouses, 71 buildings and 1 pile of railroad ties destroyed, and 16 bridges, 3 boxcars, and 1 radio tower damaged. One village housing enemy troops was strafed with unassessed results.

The Task Force had no close air support missions because it had moved north to aid the Air Force to bomb in North Korea at points in Rashin and Najin out of range of Air Force escort planes. However, BON HOMME RICHARD pilots flew mostly bridge strikes north of Chongjin. This was one of the important days of the conflict for the BON HOMME RICHARD and CTF-77.

8/26/51: The BON HOMME RICHARD returned to the normal full schedule of the day with combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, close air support, naval gunfire spotting and bridge strikes. 100 sorties were flown, only 19 of which were defensive. 19 boxcars, 2 gun positions, 1 ammo dump, 2 bridges, 6 buildings, 1 truck, 2 ox carts and 10 vehicles were destroyed. 48 boxcars, 10 bridges, 3 buildings, 1 tank, 1 motorcycle, 1 tunnel and 5 vehicles were damaged. 30 to 85% coverage was reported on close air support.

8/27/51: This was a much needed replenishment day, and no flights were made. The ship received 396,068 gallons of fuel oil from the USS CHEMING AO-30 in 2 hours and 23 minutes.

8/28/51: A warm front moved from the northwest of Korea toward the southeast. The ship and mainland were densely covered with precipitation, and only two sorties were made from the BON HOMME RICHARD. These were armed weather reconnaissance missions, but they did destroy 15 buildings.

8/29/51: Nine separate events saw planes leave to fly 111 sorties. Missions consisted of heckler attacks, anti-sub patrol, reconnaissance, combat air patrol, bridge strikes and close air support. Special missions over Purple Beach were flown. Total destruction for the day included 1 factory, 26 railroad cars, 1 truck, 20 buildings, 6 bridges, 1 locomotive, 4 ox carts, 3 ammo dumps and 3 artillery pieces, 1 railroad turn table, 59 railroad cars, 6 bridges, 2 gun positions, 3 locomotives, 1 truck, 1 warehouse and 1 tank were damaged. Close air support reported 100 troops killed and 65% coverage. 29 sorties were defensive and 82 were offensive.

8/30/51: There were 107 sorties for the day including 31 defensive and 76 offensive. The missions were composed of heckler attacks, anti-sub patrol, escort, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, photo reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting. 169 troops were killed in close air support with 100% coverage reported. 27 buildings, 3 gun positions, 14 railroad cars, 9 vehicles, 25 trucks, 1 ammo dump, 1 supply dump and 7 ox carts were destroyed. 1 building, 23 vehicles, 99 railroad cars, 12 trucks, and 3 gun positions were damaged. Some 2000 troops were attacked on close air support with 90% coverage estimated. At least 70 troops were killed.

8/31/51: 103 sorties left the deck of the BON HOMME RICHARD. There were 30 defensive and 73 offensive. Missions were made up of hecklers, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, bridge strikes, close air support, and naval gunfire spotting. 90% coverage was reported on close air support with 150 troops killed. 12 trucks, 3 gun positions, 36 railroad cars, 22 buildings, 9 ox carts, 1 ammo dump, 3 boats and 3 bridges were destroyed. 12 trucks, 97 railroad cars, 1 tunnel, 10 buildings, 11 bridges, 1 gun position, 2 warehouses, 1 tank, 5 ox carts and 2 gondolas were damaged. Special activity continued with Navy planes bombing Purple Beach.

9/1/51: This was again replenishment day. The ship received 365,045 gallons of fuel oil from the USS NAVASOTA AO-106 in 2 hours and 16 minutes.
9/2/51: 90 sorties were sent out on missions of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photography, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting. There were 16 defensive and 74 offensive. 5 jeeps, 4 vehicles, 21 buildings, 27 trucks, 39 railroad cars, 1 bridge, 1 ammo dump, 1 fuel dump, 15 artillery pieces, 2 gun positions, 6 ox carts and 1 trailer were destroyed. 5 jeeps, 46 railroad cars, 5 bridges, 4 warehouses, 3 trucks, 1 vehicle, 2 AA positions and 10 ox carts were damaged. 200 troops were strafed with good coverage in one close air support mission and 100% coverage on another. 242 troops were killed, 30 on close air support and 212 on reconnaissance.

9/3/51: Close air support missions stole the show on this day. One controller reported that the close air support was the best that he had ever seen and he gave it 100% coverage. One mission had 90% coverage and another had "very good". A concrete gun emplacement was attacked later with 100% coverage again being reported. 125 troops were killed. The days missions consisted of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photography, close air support, bridge strikes, and naval gunfire spotting. 3 gun positions, 13 trucks, 14 buildings, 21 railroad cars, 2 bridges, 8 ox carts, 2 locomotives, 1 bunker and 2 vehicles were destroyed, 1 gun position, 33 buildings, 55 railroad cars, 4 bridges, 2 vehicles, 3 jeeps, 7 ox carts, 2 tunnels and 2 tanks were damaged.

9/4/51: 94 sorties were launched of which 21 were defensive and 73 offensive. Combat Air Patrol, reconnaissance, photo, close air support and bridge strikes composed the missions. 11 buildings, 1 bunker, 17 vehicles, 1 motorcycle, 1 tank, 12 ox carts, 1 gun position, 2 bridges, 8 railroad cars, 4 warehouses, 8 trucks, 1 van were destroyed. 9 buildings, 30 railroad cars, 1 locomotive 9 bridges, 1 gun position, 8 trucks, 3 vehicles, 1 ox cart, 1 tunnel and 1 wagon were damaged. Close air support had 90 to 100 percent coverage. A total of 105 troops killed. One plane was lost on takeoff, and another was shot down in close air support. The pilot in the first plane was rescued, but the second pilot apparently did not escape his plane.

9/5/51: The ship replenished and departed from the action area for Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. General

1. No serious material casualties occurred during the period of this report. Results of practices were considered satisfactory.

B. Ammunition Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fuzes</th>
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<td>40mm Ammunition</td>
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PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship

None.
B. Damage to Aircraft

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>44</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AD-4N</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>F9F-2P</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

C. Loss of Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu.No.</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81988</td>
<td>Lost in combat over Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>96793</td>
<td>Lost in combat over Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-24</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97187</td>
<td>Lost at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-24</td>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>123667</td>
<td>Lost at sea (out of fuel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-26</td>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97325</td>
<td>Forced down over Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-29</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122740</td>
<td>Crash landing in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-30</td>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81585</td>
<td>Shot down over Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122758</td>
<td>Lost at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97170</td>
<td>Shot down over Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-4</td>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>80977</td>
<td>Lost at sea (burned after take-off).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-4</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81924</td>
<td>Crashed (exploded in Korea).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Plant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply, Fuel and Ammo. Dumps</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels and Caves</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Pieces</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Mills</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Platforms</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Turntables</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foregoing represents a conservative, factual estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilot could assess the damage to a definite total were used in these tables. Probable damage or results are not included. The major portion of close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, delayed action bombing, or sodium obviously may never be known.
A. Performance

This action period brought the crew and Air Group to the peak of efficiency.

Toward the end of the tour, signs of stepped up activity in the Korean campaign brought traces of battle fatigue especially amongst the pilots and gave warning that the next action period will probably gain in difficulties. However, the crew of the Bon Homme Richard has given every indication that it is capable of surmounting any obstacles that might arise.

B. Casualties

11 August 1951 - LT James J. VENES, USNR, 429311/1315 while piloting an F4U-4 was killed making a dive on a bridge target over North Korea at 5000 feet. The aircraft exploded and disintegrated in mid-air. The cause of the explosion is unknown. The pilot failed to bail out.

11 August 1951 - LTJG Fred L. KOCH, USNR, 453370/1315 was killed while piloting an F4U-4 on the same bridge strike. The aircraft had just started to level off after a dive when the plane exploded and the port wing came off. The cause of the explosion is unknown and the pilot was not seen to bail out.

24 August 1951 - LT Thomas F. ALLARD, USNR, 420383/1315, after takeoff, was forced to make a water landing due to the engine not developing full power. Possible cause was attributed to fuel plugs, as the aircraft had not been flown for several days. The pilot suffered multiple contusions and abrasions. He was recovered from the sea within 5 minutes by helicopter.

24 August 1951 - LT Robert Gene HUGHES, USNR, 403090/1315, while piloting an F9F-2B as escort on a photo hop, was forced to make a water landing after running out of fuel. The aircraft had been hit by enemy ground fire causing fuel exhaustion. The pilot was rescued by the DD Hopewell after being in the water for five hours. He sustained a compound fracture of the right leg.

31 August 1951 - LT Franklin (n) PILTZ, USNR, 414311/1315, was injured by enemy fire while on a recce mission. His F4U was at 800 feet; having just pulled out of a strafing run, when an explosive shell entered the right wing. A small piece of shrapnel from the shell passed completely through his foot. The oil line was punctured causing a slow loss of oil pressure. LT PILTZ was able to return safely to the ship and land without further mishap.

3 September 1951 - LT Robert J. BELL, USNR, 419888/1315, bailed out of his F4U-4 when it was hit with anti-aircraft fire on a close air support mission over the battle lines. The plane caught fire and he was forced to parachute. On landing, he was protected from the enemy by U.S. Marines and brought back by them to friendly territory. He suffered second degree burns on the face and leg.

4 September 1951 - LTJG William H. MERO, USNR, 506072/1315, was shot down while on a close air support mission. His F4U-4 was hit by 20MM fire while making a run on a ridge of entrenched troops from an altitude of 4500 feet. The shells were seen to hit in the engine and canopy. The plane continued in its dive and exploded on hitting the ground. Observers maintained that it was impossible for the pilot to survive.
PART I

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Safety

A concentrated effort has been made to stress safety in flight deck operations. The relatively low accident rate attests to the effectiveness of the safety program. About once per month (usually just prior to the beginning of a new operating period), the Air Officer addresses a letter to each Division Officer and the Air Group Squadron Commanders. In this letter certain laxities in safety precautions are discussed. Specific happenings are examined. The last paragraph of the letter directs the Division Officers to bring the contents of the letter to the attention of their personnel, review all existing safety precautions and endorse the letter stating that the intent of the letter has been carried out. From time to time a dope sheet entitled "The Hot Gavot" is published and distributed to the personnel on the flight deck. The intent of this dope sheet is primarily to stress safety; however, in order to make it readable, an attempt at humor is made. It is similar to the "Sense Pamphlets" in tone. A typical entry was one in which an attempt was made to prevent personnel from crowding too close to the edge of number two aircraft elevator when going to and from the flight deck at mealtimes. It was entitled "How to Amputate a Leg" and reads as follows:

"Get on number 2 elevator when there is a large group of people going down to get in the chow line. Stand as near the edge as possible. (This is important.) As the elevator starts down, have one of your anxious and hungry friends accidentally jostle you from behind (or slightly lose your balance and fall forward as the ship rolls). To keep from falling on your face, you jump to the hangar deck which is just a few feet away. You land easily enough, but the deck is slightly wet, or you hit an oil spot, and one leg slips from under you and goes under the rail and into the path of the down-coming elevator. BINGO! Your leg is amputated as cleanly as if by a surgeon's knife, but much faster and without necessity of anesthetic. Result - you lose your place in the chow line. Your friends do too - They're not hungry anyhow."

Needless to say, personnel now riding the elevator stand a respectable distance from the edge of the elevator.

2. Napalm Thickener - Type 1

Considerable difficulty has been experienced during this operating period in getting napalm thickener that was satisfactory for use. Out of 12000# received from the U.S.S. PARACUTIN (AV-18) on 16 August, about 50% was unfit for use. This napalm thickener was of early 1945 manufacture, some by the Ferro Chemical Corporation and some by the Chicago Pulverizer Co. The packing drums were seemingly in good condition but on being opened the powder was in large lumps and in some cases very wet. The latest powder received was packed in 100# drums of 1950 manufacture and in excellent condition. It is recommended that napalm thickener of old manufacture be screened prior to issue to carriers for unusable drums.

3. VT Bomb Fuzes

During the operating period two (2) F4U-4 aircraft attached to the ship exploded in mid air while diving at an enemy target. The 100# GP wing bombs on these planes were VT fused; some with T50W and some T91 (AN-M168). No definite evidence exists as to the cause of these planes exploding. The T91 fuzes were installed in accordance with the instructions in OP-1444 (1st Rev.). The T50W fuses had only the one arming wire. However, after the explosions of the 2 F4U's, the T50W fuses had in addition to the regular arming wire, another arming wire affixed to the plane's structure and led through the arming safety plate and through the second hole in the single jump out pin.
This eliminated the possibility of arming the fuse while the bomb was still on the plane. However, the use of T50E4 fuses has been discontinued recently by order of CTF-77 due to lack of positive check on safe position of detonator holder by a booster safety pin.

(a) First check is made by the ordnance chief of the squadron concerned.
(b) Second check is by the bomb disposal officer.
(c) Third and final check just prior to turn-up is made by the Air Ordnance Officer.

It is believed that this system eliminates the possibility of aircraft taking off with any improperly fused ordnance or other possible dangerous conditions.

4. Catapult

The installation of additional vents on the gravity tanks, as discussed in the last Battle Action Report, has proven very satisfactory in preventing excessive overflow of oil during quick changes of pressure while firing.

Considerable trouble has developed from foreign matter in the oil. As far as can be determined, it is the preservative that was used on all internal parts of the machinery during inactivation.

It is recommended that a complete cleaning and flushing of all parts and lines be accomplished when being reactivated. As this preservative was supposed to dissolve in oil, a thorough check should be made to determine whether or not it will dissolve.

Aircraft change 231 on the AD4W has proven very satisfactory during catapulting. There have been no cases of the bridle slipping from the towing hooks during firing.

5. Aircraft Maintenance

During this operational period the ship has been called upon to furnish two tires and tubes for C.O.D. TBM aircraft. Due to the foresight of aviation supply this requirement was fulfilled but our supply is now exhausted. It is suggested that a limited number of tires and tubes be furnished operational carriers to accommodate Codfish aircraft.

The maintenance division had to preserve 2 J-42, 3 R-3350 and 2 R-2800 engines this cruise. No pre-oiler and preservaive unit is available. This unit is urgently required in the Korean area carriers.

Due largely to gun explosions the F4U wing spares have been inadequate and we were two wings short this time out.

The establishment of the tractor pool by Convair Japan will relieve many problems for this ship. Three of our Ford-Ferguson tractors are completely inoperative. It was found necessary to remove the governors from all tractors in order to expedite respotting. The establishment of a fork-lift pool would be helpful inasmuch as these units have components such as hydraulic cylinders which require repairs beyond the normal capacity of an operating carrier.

6. Aviation Electronics

In the initial action report covering the period from 31 May to 28 July 1951, the method of handling the shop was not outlined. Since the ship does not have an Electronics Officer in the Air Department the supervision has been turned over to the Air Group Staff Electronics Officer. He has directed supervision insofar as the work is concerned of both ship and Air Group personnel assigned to the shop for upkeep and maintenance of electronics equipment.
A chief from the ship and one from the Air Group Staff supervise the day and night check crews. This arrangement has proven very satisfactory and has provided excellent results in clearing troubles and maintaining equipment. All reports required, as to performance, troubles, material usage are made up by the Air Group and forwarded to the proper departments.

Difficulty is still being experienced in obtaining certain repair parts for electronic equipment. The QR Section Allowance has proven inadequate under fleet operations in numerous instances. Examples are the allowances for LN238 crystal tubes used in APS-19A equipment, APN-l antennas, pulse forming networks and parasitic dipoles for APS-19A equipment, electrolytic condensers for the power supply of ARR-2, numerous types of tubes especially 6AK5, 723A, 2J55 and 2K28. Some of the shortages which existed before the ship left the States still remain.

During this period repairs were made by the shop on the ARC-l equipment used on several of the destroyers in TF-77. It was found that in all instances the Technical Order 67-50 modifying the guard channel for 121.50 megacycles, operation had not been performed. It was recommended by this carrier that a check be made of the number of sets still requiring modification in the area. However, no modifications can be made by this command since spare kits are not carried in stock. It might be advisable to permit each carrier to carry in stock at least 12 of these kits to enable modification of any ARC-l units serviced for the destroyers or those that might be received unmodified when replacement aircraft are received from the Supply Center. It is also felt that improvement in communications between destroyers and carriers using ARC-l equipment could be improved by establishing a method of routing, the units aboard the carriers where adequate facilities for the purpose are available.

B. AEROLOGY

1. Aerological Summary

The most significant weather for this period was the typhoon "Marge". This typhoon had its origin south of Guam on the 11th of August. It moved slowly to the northwest and into the Yellow Sea, finally arriving in the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Wonsan at 231200Z. Evasion tactics used by TF-77 took the force over to within 100 miles of the west coast of Japan, where the ship sat out the storm and encountered little associated weather. (See chart on back cover.)

On the night of 28 August, a sudden storm hit the force while it was steaming about 130 miles southeast of Wonsan. The barometer had been falling for the previous 22 hours, but it was slow and steady, with the total drop being 12.7 millibars, only 3 millibars in the last 6 hours. The normal Diurnal fall was though to have caused a good part of the last 6 hour fall, so nothing was thought of this movement. At approximately 2145K high wind struck the force with velocities up to 38 knots, and gusts to 60 knots. Accompanying this wind were high choppy seas, such that the force had to be maneuvered to protect the destroyer screen which was reporting rolls up to 40 degrees. These winds lasted for 2 hours, at which time they subsided almost as quickly as they had started. The winds for the previous 6 hours had been south-southeast 18 to 20 knots. At the time the higher winds started, the direction backed to east-northeast for the next 17 hours. During the time of the high winds, the barometer was 1001.3, and afterwards rose to 1011.2 at 1100K the next day.

It is felt that the cause of the winds was a very rapidly forming low pressure area to the east of Wonsan. This type of circulation has formed before when a cold, or an occluded front, had hung up in the mountains behind Wonsan, and along the east coast of North Korea, and then with a sudden push from the upper air, dropped to the surface, and immediately formed a low pressure cell.
It is interesting to note that during the time of the high winds, and before, there were no winds over 8 knots reported among the 4 widely dispersed reporting stations along the east coast. Nor were there any rapid falls of pressure before 2200, nor any sharp rises afterwards, reported from these stations.

2. Aerological Statistics

The summarization presented below includes observations taken while in an area of the Sea of Japan boundaried by the 37th and 41st Parallels on the south and north and the 131st meridian and the Korean Coast on the east and west. The period covered includes the 10th through the 18th and the 22nd thru the 31st of August.

Winds: Prevailing wind direction southwest 18% of the total time with south and south-southwest 17% and 15% respectively. No periods of calm winds were observed, however, two periods of 44 and 60 hours with winds 10 knots or less occurred. The overall average velocity was 11 knots with an average of 10 knots from the southwest. Strongest velocity observed was from the east-northeast at 38 knots with gusts estimated up to 50 knots. This high wind lasted 4 hours with winds of 15 knots or less preceding and following. 10 and 22 hour periods of winds over 20 knots were observed.

Air Temperature: The average for the month was 75 degrees, with highest and lowest daily average at 79 and 69 degrees. Maximum temperature average was 78 degrees with high and low daily maximums of 85 and 73 degrees. Minimum temperature average was 72 degrees with high and low daily minimum of 76 and 67 degrees. Sea temperature average for the month was 75 degrees, with an average maximum of 79 degrees, and an average minimum of 71 degrees. The highest and lowest sea temperature observed during the month were 83 and 65 degrees.

Ceiling:
- Greater than 9950 feet ...................................... 72%
- Greater than 4950 but less than 10,000 feet .............. 9%
- Greater than 2450 but less than 5000 feet .............. 9%
- Greater than 950 but less than 2500 feet ............... 7%
- Less than 1000 feet ........................................... 3%

Visibility:
- Over 6 miles................................................. 90%
- 3 to 6 miles inclusive...................................... 7%
- 1 to 2½ miles inclusive................................... 2%
- Less than 1 mile............................................ 1%

Precipitation occurred on 8 days of the month with the longest period of continuous rain lasting 17 hours and 20 minutes. Total time of rainfall during the month was 50 hours and 30 minutes.

C. AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Debriefing

As mentioned in a previous report, debriefing is done by the Squadron AI's and coordinated by the ship's Intelligence Officer.

Debriefing has been found to be the most difficult and challenging duty of the AI. Pilots of one squadron may be briefed with those of another for the same mission without difficulty, but the debriefing of pilots from different squadrons in one place by one AI presents a problem which is complicated by space limitations, crowded ready rooms and the general lack of knowledge of the personality and traits of pilots other than those in one's own unit. Moreover, it has been found almost essential that AI's secure sufficient information at the time of debriefing not only for the flash report but for the Air Attack and other reports required by the Combat Reporting Manual, the preparation of which are the responsibility of the individual Squadron AI.
A debriefing form was developed for the purpose of uniform reporting and the preparation of an informative flash report. It was discovered early in this action, however, that pilots on the same flight did not agree on the results of attacks and had widely varying concepts of locations. Hence, it was necessary for the ship's Intelligence Officer to reconcile these differences with the Squadron AI's before a flash report could be prepared. Our concerted attention and effort was, therefore, directed to the debriefing process on this tour.

The problem involved in securing accurate and complete data had to be approached from many angles, the more important being to impress on pilots the importance of making observations, estimating damage and reporting the correct locations of their activities, and to discipline them to the debriefing process and develop a technique on the part of AIs of orderly interrogation on the successive stages of each mission.

As a result of efforts for improvements, debriefing has constantly improved and it is believed to be as good as possible under existing circumstances. Despite lack of training in this phase of operational intelligence, AIs have done a commendable job under trying conditions, but they necessarily had to learn the hard way.

Debriefing is of continuing importance in this conflict. Good targets are scarce and future success depends largely on our own reconnaissance and observations. The observations made in recent days have paid substantial dividends. Proper interrogation in several instances, with expert assistance, has produced invaluable information on the use of enemy radar.

Pilots must be trained on the reporting of accurate and complete information. The major effort in training then, almost invariably falls on the Squadron AI's. Obviously, adequate training cannot be accomplished unless AIs are trained in the techniques themselves. This phase of intelligence is therefore commended to all those concerned with the training of Air Intelligence Officers, as it is a very important one that warrants more attention.

2. Air Attack Report

During this tour, a representative of the evaluation group of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations visited the ship in relation to Air Intelligence matters and aviation ordnance utilization. A round table discussion was arranged on the "Air Attack Report". While not questioning the use or value of portions of the report, AIs aboard this ship have felt from the beginning of operations that this report in its present form is not suited to the Korean type of operations. The task of preparing the report has, for the most part, fallen directly on already overburdened Squadron AIs.

It has always been felt that these officers should be unshackled from the monotonous routine of duplicating reports so that more effort could be devoted to more constructive intelligence endeavors such as careful analysis of the intense flak that confronts every mission and study of photographs for strike briefings and results.

It was emphasized, therefore, that if the need for such a report exists, that the form at least be tailored to conform to Korean Operations; that if possible the apparently unusable portions of the report be eliminated; that the features of a standard debriefing form and Air Attack Report be combined to make debriefing of pilots a reasonable procedure; that the distribution be cut down to reduce clerical work. Every AI aboard had an opportunity to air his views frankly and fully. After a thorough discussion, it was agreed that these recommendations would be made the subject of a separate letter. If an improvement is made in the reporting requirements, it will be regarded that the visit was well worth while.
3. Radar Mapping

Early in the operations the need was evident for radar photographs of the Eastern Coast of Korea for the briefing of night fighter and attack teams who must depend on radar navigation along unfamiliar coast lines to reach assigned targets. To fulfill this need, a radar mapping mission was undertaken by AD-W Team Eleven during this operational period. Radar photo mapping was commenced bearing 090 degrees 28 miles from Kilchu. The flight followed the coast line to a position south of Wonsan and a second flight started at a point 18 miles southeast of Chongjin and proceeded southward. This flight was conducted in a heavy rainstorm with visibility reduced to zero, yet the results obtained were excellent.

These flights:

(a) Provided the ship with a radar photographic file of a portion of the Eastern Coast of Korea that will be of great value, if, due to weather conditions, it is necessary to use the AD-W type aircraft to position a strike group over targets along the coast or to return a flight from North Korea to the Task Force in marginal weather.

(b) Demonstrated the ability of the AD-W type aircraft to bring back to the force photographic evidence of the movement of surface forces along the coast or in enemy held ports under conditions of reduced visibility or during periods of darkness.

(c) Provided excellent briefing material for new night fighters and night attack teams that are deployed to this theater.

(d) Provided a picture of the coast line more exact than any type of map available of this area since the coast line changes with time. Moreover, errors in maps or enlargements of rivers, the merging or disappearance of small islands or alluvial changes can now be detected by comparison of the radar maps with those produced by survey and partial aerial photographs.

4. Training of Enlisted Personnel for Air Intelligence Duties

It was noted, from ComAirPac's Intelligence Report Number 4-51 that an Air Intelligence course for enlisted personnel is expected to be initiated at Alameda in the near future. In the first two periods of operations this ship necessarily had to depend to a large extent on untrained enlisted personnel to fulfill its air intelligence functions. These men performed exceptionally well after a brief period of training. It is felt that all personnel connected with Air Intelligence should be trained and ready for combat on departure for the forward areas. "On the job" training during periods of combat operations should never be necessary. ComAirPac's plan, therefore, has strong endorsement of this command. It is recommended that the course be basically an elementary one in air intelligence with due consideration given to the limitation of responsibilities of enlisted personnel. It is believed that the course should emphasize maps and map reading, plotting, intelligence procedure and forms, filing and the handling of dispatches and classified material.

5. Photo Interpretation

(a) Strike Photographs

A strike target photo is prepared for each strike pilot annotated as follows:

(1) Six coordinate position
(2) North arrow
(3) Target elevation (if greater than 500')
(4) Brief target description
(5) AA positions and other hazards to aircraft
All target photos are delivered to the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers at least one hour prior to each briefing. Photos are returned to the photo interpreter by the Squadron AIO after the strike groups return. This latter procedure saves extra work in the photo laboratory when the same targets are reassigned.

The best pictorial view of the target is selected for copying. This photo may not necessarily be the latest photo available; however, any new information which may be on the latest photo is transferred to the copy print in addition to annotations listed in paragraph 1.

(b) Copying of Photographic Prints

A very useful time-saving method of copying photographic prints (one to one) for target photos has been devised. This copy method is not claim-
ed as a new *discovery*, but is very effective and is being used daily aboard this ship. The method of contact copying as described herein is much more practical than the copy camera method.

An ordinary Eastman Professional contact printer is used to make the contact copies. A sheet of blotting paper is placed over the dodging glass to reduce the intensity of the 300 watt light source in order to control the exposure. The emulsion side of the print is placed up on the printer and the emulsion of the film is turned down (emulsion to emulsion as in ordinary contact printing). The film is then backed up by a sheet of black paper. A sheet of film separation paper prevents film impressions from showing on the film. A negative needs about a five (5) second exposure if the print is on resisto rapid waterproof paper, however, the exposure may be varied as necessitated by the density of the copy to two (2) part water for about two (2) minutes. A red safelight (series 2) is used until three-fourths of the developing time has elapsed, then the film is viewed through the base side by the use of an Oa safelight. Contrast can be controlled to some extent by exposure and development. Commercial film is used for most ordinary continuous tone work; however, the film can be determined by the type of print to be copied.

(c) Strike Photography

K-25 cameras are carried in camera pods on at least one AD or F4U type aircraft in each strike group. The best photos are obtained when exposures are made as close to the target as practicable in order to get large, clear images. Fine results have been accomplished by each pilot who has used the camera a number of times. Sometimes a few rolls of film are expended before satisfactory results are obtained; however, errors in technique were pointed out to each pilot, examples of the desired quality were displayed, and it may now be said that the effort is highly profitable. This is considered the best method of obtaining immediate damage assessment at the present time. This photography also presents an excellent opportunity to study the effects of various bomb loadings and fuzings due to the ease of obtaining first hand information.

D. CIC

1. General

CIC functions were generally the same as those covered in the last battle report, i.e., reporting to the flagship as prescribed, air control, and covering radar guards as assigned. The following radar guards were assigned to this ship during the period: Long range and short range air search, altitude determination and identification. In addition, the ship was assigned the homing guards of Trout, Racon and Ye.
2. Radar Performance

The radars in operation were: SG/1B, used primarily for station keeping, SM for altitude determination, and SPS/6B for air controlling and air search. The SG was in continual use and required little maintenance and performed well. The SM worked much better than before and was in operation about 25% of the time but is still very difficult to maintain. The information from the SM has proved to be fairly accurate. The SPS/6B performed as before with very good results on the port side and with mediocre results on the starboard side due to the antenna location. The antenna for the SK was left in port during this period for overhaul and the SPS/6B was the only air search gear available. Jets have been tracked out on the SPS/6B at ranges exceeding 70 miles at 15,000 feet, but the reliable range on jets has been from 25 to 50 miles. On prop flights the reliable range is 50 to 55 miles with a maximum of little over 100 miles. The latter was on a flight consisting of 6 VF and 4 VA at 9,000 feet.

3. Air Control

Air Control assignments were handled in an exceptional manner in both JUTCAP and Strike control. The JUTCAP made numerous intercepts, however, no enemy aircraft was sighted. While handling Strike control, returning flights were usually identified before they reached 40 miles from the force and the Strike Controllers were given many “Well Dones” by the flag for the efficient manner in which they carried out their duties.

4. Communications

Communication difficulties cleared up somewhat during this period but still much remains to be done to keep feed back from blocking vital circuits. The AN/ARC in Air Plot is the worst offender and it effectively cuts in to all Air and Strike control channels rendering them all but useless during the Land/Launch period. This is due more to the proximity of the gear rather than the frequencies. It was found that the TDQ's were far better, when properly maintained and were preferred by the Air Controllers over the AN/ARC due to greater range and a lower noise level. The preformance of the TDQ's and RCK's has been exceptional.

The difficulties between Air Plot and CIC due to location and communications have been greatly reduced. This is due primarily to more experience, by the use of the 2JG, a greater use of the Teletype, and using the 1JG to get the Land/Launch information directly from the flight deck rather than having it filtered through Air Plot. The NC circuit was used only for emergencies.

5. Lookouts

Lookouts have been on the job now for about four months and consequently know what is expected of them. They have performed well because of their experience and training. During Condition III surface lookout stations are manned forward and aft as well as the bow lookout from half an hour before dawn to half an hour after sunset. Night lookouts are on the two surface stations only. During Condition I, sky lookout stations forward and aft, port and starboard are manned. Recognition classes are conducted for all lookouts. Use is made of movies, slides, posters, magazines and models.
1. General

On departing from the states the ship drew its allotment of three (3) Bell and Howell Filmo, magazine load, 16mm movie cameras from NSD, Oakland. These were supposedly reconditioned and ready for any action. After two months of operations one of the cameras jammed. Upon taking the camera apart for inspection, it was found that the camera was dry, and what little oil was found in it was so old that it was hardened. A program of preventive maintenance was immediately instigated, whereby one of each camera type was stripped down. It was found that approximately 25% of all the cameras aboard needed to be reoiled.

During operations, 2 movie cameras have been stationed in easily attained spots on the ship; also there are several 3 K-20 or K-25 cameras. Because of a heavy schedule crowded into a period of two months, most of the cameras were used for an extended time without overhauling.

2. Dryers

The ship has two (2) Pake dryers, one (1) Feritype, and one (1) Matt and three (3) Smith automatic Film dryers, Model J. From 8 to 12 rolls of aerial film are passed through the lab on an average day. An increased allowance of aerial film dryers is urgently needed due to the increased load of aerial work we are called on to handle. It is impossible to use the same film dryer for drying the film and the scavenger paper. These dryers are chain driven with fiber gears which break down continually. With the increased speed of the film advance on the K-17 camera and the advent of newer, faster, and larger photo coverage with the F2H-2P Banshee, it is recommended that the Navy look into the purchase of faster aerial film dryers. The present day film dryer is the main handicap to the expedient processing of aerial film.

F. SUPPLY

1. Aviation Supply

Through this action period, support in Aviation Supply has been fairly satisfactory.

Cooperation between vessels supporting aircraft in making critical material quickly available has been responsible for keeping high priority requests at a minimum. Air and surface transportation for critical spares is quickly provided and the system of delivery by CODFISH has in many cases prevented AOG requests.

Although many items necessary to the support of aircraft still are not available in the operational area, closer support between vessels and shore activities is very noticeable, namely the USS JUPITER, NAS, Agana, Guam and ComFltActs, Yokosuka.

In closely following the progress of priority requests for material originated during the middle of the week it seems apparent that in some cases no action is taken during weekends at activities within the continental limits. In most cases this has resulted in the delay of from 24 to 48 hours in the receipt of highly critical material, and it is suggested that this situation be corrected.

2. GSX

The Yokosuka area has a fairly good variety of GSX material, and requisitions are filled promptly. Priced invoices for material received from the USS POLLUX and FltActs Yokosuka have not been received at this date. FltActs Yokosuka were very cooperative in the handling of urgent items needed before sailing date.
In view of the fact that most GSK material must be drawn from the USS POLLUX and similar supply ships while in port, it is felt that these vessels should be moored alongside the docks, rather than in the stream. This would eliminate the duplicate handling of materials as is the case at the present time, whereby they are loaded into boats, brought alongside, and off-loaded on board.

3. Disbursing

During this period the disbursing office engaged in "G" day, during which all series 472 MFG was exchanged for 481. Transition and auditing of all pay records was completed, along with normal operations.

4. Ship's Service

If available, when ships have vending machines aboard, a coin counter and wrapper would be of great help. Have plenty of coin tubular wrappers, primarily nickle and quarter. In the hot summer months this ship averaged using 450 to 700 gallons of coca cola syrup per month in five vending machines. Root beer syrup was used in one machine, and was greatly enjoyed by everyone.

There are few cap frames available in this area.

Ships destined for the forward areas should have sufficient spares for the cobbler shop and laundry.

Large varieties of Japanese goods, i.e., trinkets, chests, linen, silver etc, are plentiful in the area.

5. Clothing and Small Stores

Rating badges, distinguishing marks, striker's badges, and service stripes are at a minimum.

6. Commissary

Ships which operate between Japan and the Task Force have very fine service although a very limited variety and supply of items. Invoice procedure is rather slow. When the ship was in Yokosuka, we found service very poor concerning small boats to transport supplies from the supply ships to us. A great amount of our fresh items ordered were not filled. In one instance we submitted a requisition to FLTFJAC where we were told they could not supply us the items ordered, but could substitute for them, to which we were agreeable, but when trying to draw their substitutions we were informed they too were not-in-stock- items.

It is further noted that fresh items are being handled too frequently, causing them to be received in condition ready for survey. If AP's could come directly to ships, there would be a great savings of provisions.

G. Welfare and Recreation

1. At Sea

Lack of adequate space for recreation for the crew continues to be a problem, particularly while at sea. One small compartment is provided which must serve as Library, Crew's Lounge, Chaplains' Offices, and a meeting place for small religious services, choir rehearsals, committee meetings and the USAFI examination room. A locker has been built which partially alleviates the lack of storage space for recreational and religious gear but additional space is needed to provide for stowage of the large quantity of paper back books, Bibles, and other materials which must be kept in stock in the forward area.
Seating space in the Library is adequate for 20 men although it is possible to crowd in 35 after working hours. Enlargement of the Library, provision of a Crew's Lounge in a separate compartment, and assignment of a storeroom to the Chaplains would help greatly to improve morale while at sea for long periods. A disc jockey program over the RBO system each afternoon has proved to be very popular.

2. Ashore

The ship had been in Yokosuka before the start of this operating period for the first time. Seven hundred applications had been made for rest hotels but only 296 reservations could be secured. Reports on the rest hotels were enthusiastic, as is shown by the fact that 1400 applications were received for the coming stay in port. Other facilities for rest and recreation provided in Yokosuka, Yokohama and Tokyo proved very popular. Information on these facilities was given to the crew in a booklet published on board and by other publicity media.

While in port seven beach parties for various groups were held and an intra-mural program in softball, basketball and volleyball was started. This program was very successful and will be enlarged in the future.

Copy to:

CNO (2 advance)  
ComAirPac (10)  
CinCPac (5 advance)  
CTF 77 (2 advance)  
ComCarDivONE (2)  
ComCarDivTHREE (2)  
ComCarDivSEVENTEEN (2)  
CO USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47) (1)  
CO USS BOXER (CV 21) (1)  
CO USS FRINCEON (CV 37) (1)  
CO USS VALLEY FORGE (CV 45) (1)  
CO USS ANTETAM (CV 36) (2)  
CO USS ESSEX (CV 9) (2)  
ComCarAirGru TWO (1)  
ComCarAirGru FIVE (1)  
ComCarAirGru ELEVEN (1)  
ComCarAirGru FIFTEEN (1)  
ComCarAirGru NINETEEN (1)  
ComCarAirGru ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)  
ComCarAirGru ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)  
ComCarAirGru (ATU) ONE (1)
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 19 Sep-18 Oct 1951
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: Commander, Task Force SEVENTY·SEVEN  
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report for the period 19 September through 18 October 1951  
Ref: (a) OPNAV Instructions 338.4 dated 1 July 1951  
Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 18 October 1951  

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 19 September through 18 October 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

After ten days of repairs and upkeep, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Yokosuka, Japan 17 September by order of CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 0207322. The destination was designated "Sugar" area. This area was near the coast of Korea close to the 38th parallel and was reached on 19 September 1951. The Task Force was commanded by RADM W. G. TOHLIDSON aboard the USS BOXER (CV 21) and operated under Task Force Operation Plan 22-51 dated 1 July 1951. It was comprised of the USS BOXER (CV 21), USS ESSEX (CV 9), and other units composing a submarine radar screen. Aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was Carrier Air Group 102. After 30 days of operations, the ship departed for Yokosuka, Japan for another period of maintenance and upkeep, leaving the action area on 18 October 1951.

The mission of the Carrier Groups of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.
The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR. H.N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 19 September 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>NO. OF PILOTS</th>
<th>NO. &amp; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24 F9F-2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-974</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16 AD-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 F4U-5NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-11</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 AD-4N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 F9F-2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG-102</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 AD-4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-1</td>
<td>2 (attached to ship)</td>
<td>1 HO3S-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART II**

**CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS**

9/19/51: The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) joined Task Force 77 at 1300. Two events scheduled for the afternoon were cancelled. Reasons for cancellation were not revealed.

9/20/51: The ship returned to full flight activities with nine events consisting of anti-sub patrol, hecklers, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes and photo hops. 90 sorties were flown, of which 19 were defensive and 71 offensive. 5 bridges, 9 buildings, 20 railroad cars, 140 feet of track, 9 boats, 4 trucks and 8 ox carts were destroyed. 7 bridges, 21 railroad cars, 7 buildings, and 4 trucks were damaged. Close air support reported 60 to 100% coverage; bridge strikes were exceptionally successful.

9/21/51: Flight missions remained the same as the previous day except that no close air support was flown. 94 sorties were launched with only 19 of them being defensive. 26 buildings, 2 trucks, 5 gun positions, 3 railroad cars, 1 bridge and 1 factory were destroyed. 14 bridges, 3 trucks, 6 vehicles, 1 gun position, 15 railroad cars, and 2 locomotives. 1,350 troops were strafed and numerous rail centers attacked with unassessed damage. 15 troops were confirmed dead.

9/22/51: No flight activities were conducted. The efforts of the BON HOMME RICHARD were directed to replenishment activities.

9/23/51: All missions were flown with 64 sorties being launched. 7 sorties were defensive and 57 offensive. 26 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 2 bridges, 4 ox carts, 4 buildings and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 2 buildings, 8 bridges, 6 railroad cars and 1 highway appliance were damaged. Low clouds and rainy weather hampered flight operations.

9/24/51: Reconnaissance, photo hops, combat air patrol, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, and anti-sub patrol were flown today. 79 sorties were flown of which 16 were defensive, with the remaining 63 being offensive. 22 railroad cars, 45 feet of track, 3 ox carts, 5 buildings, and 6 vehicles were destroyed. 42 railroad cars, 2 bridges, 1 locomotive, 2 ox carts, 2 vehicles, 1 AA position and 8 trucks were damaged.
9/25/51: 79 sorties were flown with 16 defensive and 63 offensive missions, 19 trucks, 39 buildings, 8 ox carts, 2 bridges, 1 AA position, 1 wagon and 30 railroad cars were destroyed, 36 railroad cars, 1 bypass bridge, 22 buildings, 5 ox carts, 2 bridges, 19 trucks, and 1 gun position were damaged. Several tunnels and strategic bridges were seeded with large bombs. An estimated 252 troops were killed.

9/26/51: Flight activities were not conducted because of replenishment activities.

9/27/51: 30 sorties were flown as bridge strikes; this was more than 1/3 the total of 83 sorties flown for the day, and almost one half of the 64 offensive sorties. 5 ox carts, 1 railroad handcar, 5 railroad cars, 3 trucks, 1 ox cart, 2 bridges, 10 buildings and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 17 railroad cars, 28 buildings, 19 bridges, 1 tank, 1 tunnel and 4 trucks were damaged. An estimated 60 troops were killed.

9/29/51: Only heckler, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol and weather reconnaissance flights were attempted due to bad weather over the action area. 12 sorties were flown of which 12 were defensive. 5 ox carts, 7 buildings and 2 trucks were destroyed, 1 ox cart, 2 buildings, 1 bridge and 2 trucks were damaged.

9/29/51: Only 22 sorties were released because of the continued bad weather, and only 6 of these were offensive. Only reconnaissance was attempted as an offensive movement. 1 locomotive, 7 railroad cars, and 1 weapons carrier were destroyed. 2 railroad cars and 1 factory building were damaged.

9/30/51: No flights were made due to replenishment activities. RAIN W.G. TOMLINSON, CTF 77 and ComCarDivTHIRTEEN transferred with his staff from the USS BOXER (CV 21) to the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31). The BOXER was scheduled to return to the United States.

10/1/51: Flight activities approached normality with 77 sorties. 16 sorties were defensive and 61 were offensive missions, 13 buildings, 18 railroad cars, 2 wagons, 2 horses and 1 truck were destroyed, 34 buildings, 2 railroad bridges, 2 PT type boats, 2 vehicles and 5 railroad cars were damaged. Many primary targets were reined in, but pilots utilized dump targets and reconnaissance to the highest degree possible. An estimated 15 troops were killed.

10/2/51: Despite heavy weather, BON HOMME RICHARD pilots continued to attack enemy targets. 85 sorties were flown of which 20 were defensive and 65 offensive sorties. Because of the weather most of the damage was unassessed. An estimated 40 workers and troops were killed in the action. 1 railroad car, 4 gondolas, 10 buildings, 2 boats, 9 trucks, and 2 bridges were damaged. Several sorties were utilized to "cut" railroad lines by tearing up track in assigned areas. The cuts are made approximately one mile apart and away from towns and villages where workers can be recruited. With the assumption of this type of target a proportional decrease in bridge strikes may be noted.

10/3/51: This was one of those days when fate acted against the pilots of the BON HOMME RICHARD. Three planes were lost and one ace pilot was killed. Weather prevented 75 sorties from doing but little damage to the enemy. 65 offensive sorties were flown and 10 defensive missions. Some consolation was achieved in the killing of 140 troops by jet reconnaissance. 5 trucks, 13 ox carts, 2 railroad cars and 1 building were destroyed, 1 bridge, 3 bridges, 9 railroad cuts, 10 railroad cars and 5 trucks were damaged.
10/4/51: Drills were conducted on the BON HOMME RICHARD but no flight activities were attempted due to weather and replenishment activities.

10/5/51: 82 sorties were flown, 16 were defensive and 66 offensive missions. 8 railroad cars, 24 buildings, 6 trucks, 1 water tank, 3 bridges, 11 oxcarts and 3 supply dumps were destroyed. 7 buildings, 1 radio station, and 45 railroad cars were damaged. 51 railroad cuts were strategically made. 23 troops were killed.

10/6/51: A full schedule of bridge strikes was conducted on this day. 82 sorties were flown of which only 16 were defensive. 7 trucks, 5 buildings, 5 railroad cars, 3 oxcarts, 1 boat, 1 vehicle, 1 tank and 1 jeep were destroyed. 9 trucks, 11 buildings, 21 railroad cars, 1 oil tank, 7 bridges, 8 piles of supplies, 2 jeeps and 4 oxcarts were damaged. 18 railroad cuts were made. An estimated 32 troops were killed.

10/7/51: The edge on bridges, rails and troops continued along with the constant demolishing of supplies. 77 sorties were flown, only 14 of which were defensive missions. 21 buildings, 2 boats, 8 railroad cars, and 5 oxcarts were destroyed. 15 buildings, 4 trucks, 21 railroad cars, 8 bridges, 5 boats and 1 bypass bridge were damaged. 15 rail cuts were made. Troops were attacked but only 16 were noted as probably killed.

10/8/51: No flight activities were attempted due to replenishment activities.

10/9/51: 84 sorties were launched only 12 of which were defensive. Main event for the day was led by Commander FUNK, Air Group 102 Commander, with 16 sorties striking with high success. In this one event, a battalion headquarters building, a mining laboratory, 36 barracks type buildings and several gun emplacements were demolished. In addition pilots from the USS ESSEX (CV 9) isolated two supply trains by cutting the tracks on both ends of the trains. BON HOMME RICHARD pilots then aided in destroying the trains. The day's total consisted of 9 railroad cars, 2 oxcarts, 24 buildings, 2 gun emplacements, 1 locomotive, 3 vehicles and 3 trucks destroyed, plus 5 vehicles, 29 buildings, 1 transformer, 1 locomotive, 15 boxes of supplies and 4 trucks damaged. 24 railroad cuts were made. The whole day was highly successful.

10/10/51: Weather hampered flight activities to such an extent that only 38 sorties were flown. 14 of these were defensive. 2 trucks, 48 oxcarts and 12 railroad cars were destroyed. 1 bridge, 1 bypass, 1 vehicle, 8 buildings, 8 railroad cars, 25 oxcarts and 5 trucks were damaged. 29 strategic rail cuts were made. An estimated 55 troops were killed.

10/11/51: This afternoon, 16 AD's and F4U's of the EHR joined with 11 planes from the ESSEX in a special strike mission against an enemy ordnance depot north of Hungnam. The pilots reported that the primary targets were destroyed and secondary targets from 50% to 80% damaged. Huge explosions were reported as well as 17 distinct fires. A total of 71 sorties were launched for the day. Only 12 of these sorties were defensive. 13 buildings, 11 railroad cars, 11 trucks, 1 horse cart, 1 oxcart, 150 foot boat and 1 bridge were destroyed. 2 bypasses, 14 railroad cars, 3 trucks and 6 buildings were damaged. 21 railroad cuts were made.
10/12/51: This day was devoted to replenishment activities.

10/13/51: Weather prevented all but 32 sorties from being launched. Only 22 of these were sent on offensive missions. The low ceiling almost totally prevented assessment of the damage inflicted. An estimated 35 troops were killed, 1 house and 5 ox carts were destroyed. 4 railroad bypasses and 5 ox carts were damaged. 30 railroad cuts were made.

10/14/51: Weather prevented all but 24 sorties from being launched. 6 of these were defensive. 3 ox carts, 1 house, and 4 box cars were destroyed. 1 vehicle, 5 ox carts, 1 tunnel, 1 railroad bypass and 1 railroad car were damaged. 17 rail cuts were made. 500 troops and supplies were attacked with an estimated 300 casualties.

10/15/51: Despite bad weather 64 sorties were flown, 15 of which were defensive. 7 buildings, 1 ox cart, 1 boat, 1 truck, 2 box cars and 1 bridge were destroyed. 9 railroad cars, 4 boats, 2 trucks, 1 bridge, 10 buildings, 1 tunnel and 2 ox carts were damaged. 25 rail cuts were recorded. 15 to 20 troops were killed.

10/16/51: The Bon Homme Richard along with the USS Essex (CV 9) and the USS Antietam (CV 36) had a prosperous day. 78 sorties were flown with 66 of these consisting of offensive missions. When strikes were made in Event 6 and 16, it was discovered that Bon Homme Richard planes were carrying 10 500 pound and 18 100 pound dud bombs. This of course, marred the success of the day. 5 buildings, 1 locomotive, 3 railroad cars, 4 trucks, 2 stacks of supplies, 1 boat, 4 ox carts, 1 jeep and 1 gun emplacement were destroyed. 5 trucks, 1 building, 2 locomotives, 11 railroad cars, 4 bridges, 6 bypasses, and 3 warehouses were damaged. 40 rail cuts were made.

10/17/51: This day was utilized for replenishment.

10/18/51: The ship left the action area for Yokosuka, Japan and a period of rest and repair. Gunnery exercises were conducted enroute.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Gunnery Exercises

Enroute to the operating area from Yokosuka, the ship conducted AA exercises "Z-5-G", "X-7-G" and "Z-12-G" on 18 and 19 September. AA exercises "Z-7-G" were conducted on 22, 26 and 30 September and 8 and 12 October. No significant material casualties occurred during or as a result of practice firings and results obtained were considered satisfactory. A total of 739 rounds of 5/38 caliber ammunition and 12,341 rounds of 40MM ammunition were expended during the course of these exercises.

B. Maintenance

Hydraulic seals and packing and amplifier units, where subjected to extreme vibration, continue to be the largest material maintenance problem.

C. Deck Evolutions

During this period a total of 32 DDs were taken alongside for transfer of passengers, baggage, freight, guard mail, movies and fuel. The ship obtained aviation gasoline and fuel on seven different occasions. 1,118 short tons of ammunition were received in addition to approximately 100 tons of fresh provisions and stores. All transfers were handled without incident.
D. Ammunition expended

2,000# G.P. bombs 122  20MM ammunition 136,942
1,000# G.P. bombs  579  50 Caliber  508,495
500# G.P. bombs  648  F5L Drop Tank  73
250# G.P. bombs  1,403  Parachute Flares  220
100# G.P. bombs  3,040  Napalm mix  4,380 lbs.
260# Frag bombs  649  6.5" AAA  326
350# Depth bombs  14  5" HVAR  830
3.5" Rockets  54

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>P4U-4</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AD-4Q</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>P4U-5NL</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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C. Loss of Aircraft

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu.No.</th>
<th>Causes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-20</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>124456</td>
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<td>9-21</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>124557</td>
<td>Lost at sea, (catapult)</td>
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<td>9-24</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>82076</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-27</td>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>82088</td>
<td>Lost over Korea, (enemy AA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-27</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122730</td>
<td>Lost at sea, (ditched due to enemy A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-3</td>
<td>VF-783</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97325</td>
<td>Lost at sea, (possibly enemy AA)</td>
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<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81591</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122753</td>
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D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

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<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
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<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Probably Damaged</th>
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<td>Warehouses</td>
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## Damage Inflicted on Enemy

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<th>Targets</th>
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<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Probably Damaged</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Ammunition Dumps</td>
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<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ore Mine</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundhouses</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Radio Station</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Riles</td>
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<td>Bunkers</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Tank</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>291</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway cuts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Killed</td>
<td>991 (estimated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilots could assess the damage to a definite total or felt that damage had been inflicted were used in these tables. Close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilots inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, fires, delayed action bombing or seeding obviously may never be known. An estimated 3,700 troops were attacked during this period. Of this number it is conservatively estimated that 991 were killed.

## PART V

### PERSONNEL

#### A. Performance

Each action period seems to bring out better performance from the men of the Don Hume Richard. Typical of the continually improving performance is the catapulting of 8 jets at an interval of 15.5 seconds. Other units were equally proficient.

The outstanding feature of this action period was the spectacular rescue of three of our pilots from enemy troop infested areas in North Korea. Commenting on the most spectacular of these, when one of our pilots was snatched from almost certain capture or death and scores of enemy troops were slain, the Commander of the Seventh Fleet said: "Your 2703002 makes me very proud of the privilege of being in the Fleet. The initiative, aggressiveness and boldness of all participating deserves a well-earned well done."

During this period raids were conducted on two strategic targets. "Well Done" were extended on both by the Commander of Task Force 77.

The pilots of the Air Group were, however, noticeably disappointed on receipt of news that the Task Force would no longer play a major role in
close air support. This type mission has always been most appealing to them.

Morale continued high and will probably climb higher as the time to return to the United States approaches. Performance and efficiency will undoubtedly increase simultaneously.

The ship was shocked and saddened by the accidental death of one of the flight deck crew. This accident marred the almost perfect safety record of the ship, but this gave warning that "accidents will happen" and it is now expected that higher records in safety will be achieved in the future.

B. Casualties

LTJG J.W. ROBERTS, 504285/1315 On 24 September while making a bombing and strafing run on AA positions in North Korea, LTJG ROBERTS's plane was struck by 40mm fire. Proceeding immediately to Wonsan Harbor, he ditched the plane and was picked up by a helicopter in a short time. He sustained a minor hand injury.

LTJG Leslie R. DONNIS, 522168/1310 While flying an F4U on a rail cut strike about 60 miles west of Wonsan on 3 October 1951, LTJG DONNIS's plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire. He headed toward the harbor, but because of the rough-running engine was forced to bail out over enemy territory. The plane was a ball of fire by the time he made a deflected jump from 8,000 feet. Landing on the side of a hill LTJG DONNIS made his way to the top where he waited until a helicopter picked him up and took him to an LSD for treatment of many severe second degree burns.

LTJG Leonard A. GUNDERT, 157628/1315 On 3 October 1951 after spotting for naval gunfire at Songjin, LT GUNDERT and his wingman attacked railroad tracks in that area. Upon pulling out from his run, LT GUNDERT's plane was observed to be on fire. The flames seemed to be coming from the nose and the accessory section and reached back beyond the cockpit. The plane zigzagged out over the ocean and was getting dangerously low (about 600 feet) and almost on its back when the pilot's body was seen to leave the plane. The chute opened at about 150 feet and he seemed to enter the water at a fairly normal rate of descent. A destroyer was dispatched to pick up LT GUNDERT, who was pronounced dead upon recovery.

LT H.C. INGLE, JR, 453365/1315 While making a strafing run on railroad cars at Tonghae-ri on 5 October 1951, his F4U-4 was hit by a 40mm shell in the forward part of the accessory section. The plane was ditched in a river in the general area, and LT INGLE was knocked momentarily unconscious as a result of his safety belt being unfastened. Corsairs flying protective cover held the enemy troops at bay, and after 45 minutes on the ground, he was picked up by a helicopter from the USS NEW JERSEY. Bruises and superficial cuts on the outside of the upper right arm, inside of the right foot and leg, a bump on the head, and slightly chipped teeth were the result. After medical treatment aboard the battleship, LT INGLE was returned to the carrier.

ENSIGN William C. BALLUY, 507924/1315 On 6 October 1951 while flying an AD-3 on a bombing mission over North Korea, ENS Balluy's plane was hit by light anti-aircraft fire, forcing him to make a water landing. The plane sank in less than a minute, and the pilot remained in the water for fifteen minutes before a raft was dropped to him. An hour later a helicopter from the LST 799 picked him up and returned him to that ship for treatment for exposure.
LTJG R.D. SORNSON, 470604/1315 On 6 October 1951 after spotting for naval gunfire in the vicinity of Songjin, LTJG SORNSON attacked a shore battery in that area. After releasing his bomb at 3,000 feet, his F4U-4 was hit by ground-fire. Dumping his remaining bombs and heading seaward, LTJG SORNSON made a water landing near the USS HATSAN and was picked up by its whaleboat. Treated for exposure, shock, and for injuries to his back, neck, and head, the pilot was returned to this ship.

WILLHOITE Everett Ray, 988 9502, AA, USN On 2 October while assisting in preparing planes for launching on the flight deck, Everett Ray WILLHOITE, Lt, apparently lost his balance and was blown by the propeller blast of one plane into the revolving propeller of a plane directly behind. Critically injured by the blow on the head, he was rushed to the sick bay, where, despite the best efforts of the Ship's Doctors and the entire medical department, he died an hour later.

C. Other Losses

LT John J. WRIGHT, 383397/1315 On 20 September 1951 while cruising at 7,000 feet over North Korea, LT WRIGHT'S F4U-5NL was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire and he was forced to ditch at sea. The landing was smooth and uneventful; the plane sank in 58 seconds; the pilot climbed aboard a life raft and in a short time was picked up by a whaleboat from the destroyer, USS PARKS.

LT Howard H. SOESTER, 364051/1315 21 September 1951 a victim of a pre-dawn launching accident in an F4U-5NL, LT SOESTER left the catapult without gaining flying speed and went over the bow into the water. Escaping from the plane easily enough, he was rolled and ducked several times before being able to use his survival equipment. After being in the water for twenty minutes, LT. SOESTER was picked up by a destroyer and returned to the carrier in good condition. He sustained severe body bruises.

LTJG Robert C. BROWN, 499805/1310 On 27 September 1951 upon sustaining a hit from enemy anti-aircraft fire while making a bombing attack on a bridge northwest of Hamhung, LTJG BROWN was forced to crash land on a sand bar in the center of the Song Chon River. After evading enemy troops in the area for one hour and twenty minutes, the pilot was rescued by a helicopter from an LST.

LT, J.A. REWARD, 176842/1315 On 27 September 1951 while recovering from a bombing run on an enemy target in the Sinop railroad yards, LT REWARD'S AD-3 was struck by ground fire and suffered an immediate loss of oil pressure. He ditched the plane at sea and inflated his life raft without trouble. Thirty minutes later the pilot was picked up by a helicopter and taken aboard the LSD-3.

LTJG R.W. PROBEN, 170669/1310 On 3 October while on a railroad destruction flight over North Korea LTJG PROBEN'S AD-3 was struck by flak on its first run. After making four more runs the engine developed an electrical fire, and the pilot headed for sea. Upon reaching the Task Force and while on his downwind leg, the engine quit. Because his wheels were down in anticipation of a carrier landing the plane immediately went over on its back upon hitting the water. LTJG PROBEN dove clear of the airplane, and was picked up by a helicopter and returned to the ship.
1. Catapulting

The catapult crews, with the cooperation of VF-781 pilots, have become exceedingly proficient in catapulting aircraft, particularly the F9F's. Our record and the one which is believed to be an unofficial fleet record is the catapulting of 8 jets in 124 seconds for an interval of 15.5 seconds. Other excellent catapult launches of 8 jets are: 128 seconds for a 16.2 interval, 138 seconds twice for a 17.2 interval and 142 seconds for a 17.7 interval.

2. Aviation Ordnance

The Mark 10 type suspension band furnished for use with the 2000# GP bombs is much easier to install than the Mark 34 type which requires spacing of each band and the tightening of numerous bolts. For carrier use, where space and time are limited the Mark 10 is highly recommended.

No Mark 1 arming wires have been available during this period. Mark 2 (double strand) arming wires have been adapted for use. One wire of the Mark 2 is cut a short distance from the ferrule and crimped back so that the remaining wire will not pull out of the loop.

3. Flight Operations

Prior to deployment to WestPac, this ship had installed a two-way combination ready light and buzzer attention signal between Primary Fly and the bridge. In Primary Fly there is a red and blue light. These lights are actuated by a switch on the bridge and indicate to the Air Officer if the bridge is "ready" or "not ready" for the launching or the recovery of aircraft. A red and blue light on the bridge, actuated by a switch in Primary Flight Control indicates to the bridge if the Air Officer is "ready" or "not ready" for the launching or recovery of aircraft. A buzzer at each station actuated by the button at the other station is used as an attention signal whenever the lights are changed.

The above described system has worked out exceedingly well. The greatest single advantage is that it always provides for both the Air Officer and the bridge a definite check on the other's readiness for air operations. The light and buzzer system proves much faster than a visual system or the use of sound powered phone talkers and often provides for the recovery of an aircraft that might otherwise be waved off. The approach of winter greatly enhances the value of this system.

4. Aviation Electronics

The operation of the Aviation Electronics Shop under the supervision of the Air Group Staff Electronics Officer continued to function in a well organized manner with both Air Group and ship personnel performing like tasks in the maintenance of electronics equipment. By this combined arrangement loss of personnel which occurred to both Air Group and ship personnel during this period was alleviated. And replacements during the remainder of the cruise were not considered necessary.

Difficulty was again experienced with the 28 volt power supply furnishing power to the shop. Failure of this unit would have left the ship without any power to maintain and service electronics equipment since no replacement 28
Volt generator was available in the forward area. Through foresight, the Air Group Staff Electronics Officer installed, in a semi-permanent manner, a 28 volt selenium rectifier formerly used for supplying power to the 50 caliber gun turret trainer formerly installed in the Anti-aircraft training room. This temporary installation has permitted the shop to continue maintenance without interruption. It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to providing an emergency power supply for the aviation shop or provide available generator replacement in the forward area for such emergencies.

Continued difficulty is being experienced with the auxiliary power units provided for maintenance work. Since the start of this cruise two of the units have become completely worn out and replacements are needed. The exceedingly short life is due to the fact that it is necessary to use high test aviation gasoline in the engines which are normally designed to operate with ordinary gasoline. Therefore ring and cylinder walls are worn, and since no replacement parts are provided, maintenance cannot be performed. Replacement units are not available in the forward area, and a shortage of units now exists. It is recommended that the number of units allowed be increased to insure that an adequate number be available, or that replacement units be provided in the forward area.

B. AEROLOGY

1. September Weather Summary

The following summary includes observations made while in an area in the Sea of Japan bordered by the 37th and 41st parallels on the south and north and the 131st meridian and the Korean Coast on the east and west. The period covered includes the 1st to 5th, 8th to the 19th, and 26th to the 30th of September 1951.

Winds: Prevailing wind direction was west 30% of the time with south and north winds 20% and 14%, respectively. Calm winds were observed for a total of 6 hours. The strongest wind velocity was 33 knots from the south and lasted 3 hours. Periods of winds over 20 knots were 6, 8, 12 and 17 hours.

Air Temperature average for the month was 74 degrees with high and low daily average of 76 and 60 degrees.

Maximum temperature average was 71.4 with high and low daily maximum of 76 and 61.

Minimum temperature average was 65.3 with high and low daily minimum of 73 and 60.

Sea water temperature average for the month was 70 degrees with an average maximum of 74 degrees and an average minimum of 65 degrees. The highest sea water temperature observed was 78 degrees and the lowest was 58 degrees.

Ceiling:

Greater than 9,950 feet 79%
Greater than 4,950 but less than 10,000 11%
Greater than 2,450 but less than 5,000 2%
Greater than 950 but less than 2,500 4%
Less than 1000 feet 4%

Visibility

Over 6 miles 96%
Precipitation occurred on 3 days of the month with the longest period of continuous rain lasting 10 and one half hours but of intermittent type. The total rainfall was 15 hours.

2. October Weather Summary

The summary presented below includes observations taken while in an area of the Sea of Japan bounded by the 37th and 41st parallels on the south and north and the 131st meridian and the Korean coast on the east and west. Period is from the 1st up to and including the 15th of October 1951.

Winds: The prevailing wind direction was south 38% of the time with west and east winds 30% and 15% respectively. There were no calm winds observed during the period, but there were 24 hours of winds with a velocity under 5 knots. The strongest wind velocity was 35 knots from the west, which lasted only one hour but was preceded by 4 hours of winds averaging 32 knots. Periods of winds of velocity over 20 knots were 6, 8, and 11 hours.

Air temperature average for the month was 62 degrees with a high and low daily average of 70.8 and 59.5 degrees.

Maximum temperature for the month was 63.7 with high and low daily maximum readings of 72.4 and 37.6 degrees.

Minimum temperature average for the month was 61.0 degrees with high and low daily minimum readings of 70 and 55 degrees.

Sea water temperature average for the month was 66.6 degrees with an average maximum of 72 and an average minimum of 63 degrees. The highest sea water temperature observed was 77 degrees and the lowest was 60 degrees.

Ceiling:

Greater than 9,950 feet 78%
Greater than 4,950 but less than 10,000 12%
Greater than 2,450 but less than 5,000 7%
Greater than 950 but less than 2,500 3%
Less than 1000 feet 0

Visibility:

All visibility recorded was over 6 miles.

Precipitation

The only precipitation that occurred was a few scattered rain showers on the 14th which lasted for slightly less than one hour.

Radio facsimile recording equipment, Type RD-92/UX, was installed at the Navy Base, Yokosuka, on the 15th of September. With the exception of normal interference, which at times made reception impossible, the equipment has been working very satisfactorily. Recent intership transmissions from another carrier in company have been received with excellent clarity.
1. General

The operations during this period were conducted as before and have been covered in previous reports. CIC handled Radar Guards, Radio Guards, Air Control as assigned by the OTC in an efficient and satisfactory manner. The personnel and equipment were superior in operation to any other period due to training, becoming better acquainted with operations, and better efficiency in all matters of men and material. The last half of the period the ship operated as a flagship, and though there were deficiencies in the physical set-up of CIC, the Flag commented that in general the performance was most satisfactory, and they were able to carry out their duties with a minimum of trouble and confusion to the shipboard CIC organization. The deficiencies noted above will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. Radars

(a) SPS6/B was used constantly except when secured for maintenance and during some periods when no guards were assigned. At night it was placed on standby in accordance with existing instructions. In general the performance was good to excellent, but in this period it was secured for repairs approximately twice as long as any comparable period before. This was due to a lack of experienced maintenance personnel due to transfers and the release of some men from the service. The radar was consistent in picking up 2 jets at a range of 40 miles, but on some days, due to unusual circumstances, ranges of more than 80 miles were reported on 2 F9F's at 15,000 feet. The reliable range of prop aircraft was 50-55 miles on 2 AD's at 5,000 feet. The radar will never function any better until the antenna is raised to a height that will clear the stack, yardarm, tripod mast, and the SK antenna. This handicap reduced the effectiveness on the starboard side by more than 50% through 130 degrees beginning at 025 relative.

(b) SK was used to supplement the SPS6/B because it is mounted on the starboard side clear of the obstacles that hinder the SPS6/B. In general the performance was far below that of the SPS6/B as is to be expected, but on occasions gave information that was unobtainable from any other source. It was also used to interrogate the Mark III, IFF.

(c) SK is still a very hard radar to maintain, and the technicians had no previous training on this equipment before they came onboard. This period it operated about 25% of the time, and the altitude given were within the limitations of the radar, as designed. It is a poor substitute for any other height gear, but is better than none at all when it is operating.

(d) SGL/B was satisfactory in station keeping, and in surface search it was in constant use. The newer antenna would improve the range, which is 36,000 yards on a DD.

(e) Under Radars. Mark 5/10 IFF has worked exceptionally well but as it is coupled with the SPS6/B, it necessarily has been secured for repairs more during this period than in any other period. The performance would be improved with a slave antenna and thus could be used with other than the SPS6/B radars. Also the Mark 5 as installed on this ship, is limited in that only one code can be interrogated at a time on all ranges, since they are all tied in series. The range continues to be more than 125 miles and has been a most valuable aid in Strike Control as well as CAP Control.
3. **Communications**

The radios were good during this period except for about 10% of the time when they were secured for repairs. This figure is much higher than previous periods due to the Flag coming aboard, and since they required several more circuits than the ship, it became impossible to maintain standbys on the most important circuits. Whether the ship remains a flagship or not, another UHF unit should be installed as a standby CI net. This is the primary CI circuit in CIC, and when it is out the efficiency drops to 50%. It is strongly urged that a second AN/ARC be installed in CIC and with the Flag it is mandatory. To remain a flagship at least 3 more TDQ/RCK units should be made available to CIC; at the present time only five VHF channels are available on TDQ/RCK units.

4. **Flagship Difficulties**

In addition to the communications difficulties experienced, the following items should be taken into consideration: The radars aboard are inadequate and obsolete with the exception of the SPS6/B. The location of CIC on the lower decks makes the rapid dissemination of information difficult, and the liaison between Air Plot, Flag Plot, Air Intelligence and Communications Office is seriously hampered. To function as the Flag wishes, at least two and preferably three, remote FlI's should be installed. These would be assigned as follows: The first two to the Flag, one for the watch officer, and one for the gunnery officer. The third would be used by the ship's company and assigned to the second air controller.

**D. COMMUNICATIONS**

1. **General**

With the coming of ComCarDiv3 to this vessel, the communications load has more than tripled. The volume of communications traffic is excessive, and only the close cooperation between ship and Flag personnel, both under-complemented, made it possible to handle and process this voluminous correspondence.

All radio transmitters on board, low, medium, high, very high, and ultra-high frequencies, are in use, with some having to perform double duty, such as shifting for short scheduled transmissions and then back again to the continuous circuit.

The lack of spare equipment eliminates any flexibility and places full dependency on rapid repair to prevent the placing of impossible loads on some radios. Fortunately, during this period, circuit outage was at a minimum and probably is the result of the maintenance program and good fortune. The fates still smile on the Bon Homme Richard as of yore.

The use of HF radi circuit to ComNavFE for ship to shore and relay circuit is excellent, and with the volume of messages passing between these two stations, such a circuit is necessary if long traffic delays are to be avoided. Unfortunately the excessive vibration in Radio 3, which causes the THK-FSA combination to shift frequency beyond acceptable standards, excludes the use of that frequency shift equipment. This makes it necessary to depend on the one piece equipment installed in Radio 2 with the resultant circuit outage time when shifting frequency.
This outage time has been reduced to an excellent minimum by drill and training in rapid frequency shifting.

If this type of operations now being conducted in this area is to be the pattern for future operations, it is recommended that additional LF-HF radio equipment be installed on Task Force flagships and that at least 3 additional sets of UHF radio equipment be added. Radio 3 equipment should be adequately shockproof mounted or the excessive vibration eliminated in some other manner.

E. AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Search and Rescue

During this period major attention was devoted to search and rescue matters. SAR Instructions as promulgated by Commander, Task Force 77 were followed meticulously with highly successful results, and certain techniques improvised by the pilots were effectively employed on several occasions.

As planes get older and enemy counter-measures are intensified, interest in search and rescue matters increases and pilots are eager to have as much information as possible on the subject. Pilots are always anxious as to the locations of helicopters.

Once a pilot gets into trouble over enemy territory, standard procedure is to head for the coast, East preferably, but West if necessary to avoid enemy capture. On this tour seven pilots whose planes were hit were able to clear the East coast and ditch in the Sea of Japan. Six of these stayed with their planes and all were rescued by either helicopter or naval vessels dispatched to the scene. The seventh jumped at a low altitude and, although his parachute opened and he was seen to enter the water in a proper manner, he was dead, but floating in his inflated life jacket, when picked up by a destroyer a few minutes later.

Jig and Charlie points are well known to all pilots and have been of assistance to rescue craft in locating downed aviators in the sea. Procedure demands that at least one section of planes orbit to guide the helicopter or ship to the pilot. This system of positioning the pilot has been one hundred percent effective to date.

If the pilot is unable to reach the coast, experience has shown that ditching on a sand bar or in a river bed in enemy territory affords the best chance of a safe landing and prompt rescue. To capture the pilot, the enemy would have to expose himself to our orbiting ReSCAP, which he at times is seemingly reluctant to do. And, usually firing distance from the hidden enemy to the plane is such that only sporadic and inaccurate fire is encountered. When a pilot ditches over land, a relatively simple and well-organized chain of events is put into motion which, to date, has led to the successful evacuation of every pilot who landed alive on enemy-held soil.

CTF-77 Instructions advise the pilot to gather all available survival equipment and leave the aircraft to seek cover a safe distance from it. It has not at all times been practical or even possible to take all survival equipment, since running to nearby brush or hills is often the only means of evading the enemy gunfire, and some pilots admittedly over-burdened themselves
with extra smoke flares, pistols, and ammunition. The Mae West, placed
near the plane if ditched, or near the spot where the pilot landed by chute,
is an excellent means of notifying the RESCAP that he has not been seriously
injured in landing. At that time, after taking his bearings, "making oneself
scared" is excellent advice, since enemy troops will make a determined effort
to effect a capture if the pilot's position is known, and there is no
effective air opposition. However, it is in slaying enemy troops or keeping
them under cover that the RESCAP has been most effective. Its first duty
is to get word through to the nearest rescue center and then to the Task Force.
A wide orbit at varying altitudes, with occasional direction & feints, is
necessary to avoid indicating the pilot's exact position, but at the same
time the orbiting pilot must not lose sight of the location of the pilot.
It is also necessary in most cases to indicate to the downed flyer that he
has been seen, thereby enabling him to take the best cover available until
the rescue craft shows itself.

A pointer cloth made by one of the pilots has been useful to indicate
to the RESCAP the origin of enemy gunfire. One pilot suggested, however,
that some means be devised by which a pointer could be used without exposing
the user to the enemy.

Limitations of the helicopter are recognized. To date no helicopter
pilot has failed to perform his mission despite hazards of terrain and
heavy enemy fire. Of the three pilots who went down in enemy territory, all
were rescued by helicopter. One of the three parachuted (his plane was in
flames), and the other two rode their planes in to comparatively smooth
landings. The one who bailed out left his plane at 8,000 feet and delayed
his jump until he was approximately 3,000 feet, the purpose of this being to
lessen the period of time the enemy could fire on him while descending. As
it turned out this was a providential precaution, since, as soon as he landed,
he was fired upon from the surrounding countryside by enemy forces.

Rescued pilots have made these suggestions:

(1) Do not take excess survival gear.
(2) Ride the plane down, if possible. It is safer than bailing, because
    the plane gives protection. A man in a parachute is an easy target.
(3) "If you can keep calm, keep thinking, and know how to pray, you still
    have a chance."

Statistically, there were eleven planes lost during this operating
period; one of these was lost on launching and the pilot was picked up
by a destroyer. Of the remaining ten planes, seven were ditched and three
were landed in enemy territory. All pilots were rescued. One, as previously
mentioned was dead, but his body was recovered.

2. Photographic Interpretation

(a) Flak

A great increase in the number of anti-aircraft guns was noted during
this period of operations. As many as 50 guns were found defending a single
railroad bridge. The AA caliber varied from light .30 to 40MM; the latter
were often found in four gun radar controlled batteries.
20MM AA positions were usually installed in columns on ridge tops; these guns also were often radar controlled. All of this was observed by close scrutiny of photographs.

Annotated photo mosaic flak maps were made up for most of the bridge targets. Two flight strips of 4 or 5 photos of the target and adjacent areas were prepared for pilot briefing; all AA positions were annotated; a scale of 1 to 7500 proved best for this type of study. This scale easily covered all of the AA positions which might defend a target. Because of the increased amount of AA, the pilots enthusiastically welcomed the photographic picturing of the AA positions. Danger from these flak positions was thus minimized.

(b) Observations of Photo Pilots

As has been proven many times, photographic pilots are excellent observers. During this period one pilot observed and photographed a large concentration of troops which was later successfully attacked by other jet aircraft. Another photo pilot skillfully observed and photographed a previously unreported airfield that was under construction. Such observations are commendable because they are not just accidental, but these properly demonstrate the high degree of training and alertness maintained by photographic pilots.

F. SUPPLY

1. Aviation Supply

For the current operational period the logistic support of combat aircraft has been maintained in a satisfactory manner. There has been an unusually large number of wings required, four R32-CVVS-37013-1 and two R32-CVVS-37013-2, due to explosions of wing guns. A large number of propellers have also been used, two for F4U-4 and eight for AD-3 planes.

No difficulty has been experienced on routine or emergency replenishment, and it is believed that a minimum amount of delay has been experienced on emergency requests of a high priority nature.

2. O&K

Replenishing and freight transferring at sea, rather than requisitioning material to be picked up the next availability, has proved very satisfactory.

The USS CASTOR is to be highly commended on the expeditious handling and service rendered this ship.

3. Ship's Service

Excellent service in replenishing was supplied by the USS CASTOR, but they were rather slow in furnishing priced invoices.

There is an acute shortage in this area of Officers and CPO cap frames, cameras and film.

4. Clothing and Small Stores

There is a shortage of many clothing and small stores items including khaki shirts, khaki trousers, rating badges (all colors), distinguishing marks and service stripes.
5. Commissary

The replenishing service, in the operation area, is found to be very good although there is a limited variety of items, and invoice procedure is slow from all activities and especially from Fleet activities, Yokosuka.

Usually stores are received in fair to good condition, but fresh vegetables are not too good.

G. Engineering

1. Machinery and Equipment

During the period from 19 September to the present there was no machinery disarrangement. Repairs required were minor and were considered as shipboard routine maintenance.

DISTRIBUTION:

Original - COMO (plus 4 for chain of command)
COMO (2 advance)
ComAirPac (10)
CtnPac (5 advance)
CTF-77 (2 advance)
ComCarDivONE (2)
ComCarDivTHREE (2)
ComCarDivFIVE (2)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) (1)
USS BOXER (CV-21) (1)
USS PRINCETON (CV-37) (1)

CO USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) (2)
CO USS ANTLER (CV-36) (2)
CO USS ESSEX (CV-9) (2)
ComCarAirGruTWO (1)
ComCarAirGruFIVE (1)
ComCarAirGruWBN (1)
ComCarAirGruFIFTH (1)
ComCarAirGruNASTD (1)
ComCarAirGruONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
ComCarAirGruONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
ComCarAirGruATU ONE (1)
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 Oct-30 Nov 1951, Part 1
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
     (2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
     (3) Commander, Naval Forces, FAR EAST  
     (4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
Subj: Action Report for the period 31 October through 30 November 1951  
Ref: (a) CPNAV Instructions 2480.4 of 1 July 1951  
Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of  
     11 December 1951 p. 29  

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period  
   31 October through 30 November 1951 is hereby submitted:  

   PART I  

   COMPOSITION OF CARRIER FORCES AND MISSION  

   After nine days of repairs and upkeep the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
   departed Yokosuka, Japan, 29 October by order of CTF-77 confidential dispatch  
   171236Z. The destination was designated "Sugar Area". This area was near the  
   coast of Korea close to the 38th parallel and was reached on 31 October 1951.  
   The Task Force was commanded by RADM J. J. CLARK, whose Flag was carried aboard  
   this ship, and operated under Task Force Operation Plan 22-51, dtd 1 July 1951.  
   It was comprised of the USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS BON HOMME  
   RICHARD (CV-31) and other units composing a submarine radar screen. Aboard the  
   USS BON HOMME RICHARD was Carrier Air Group 102. After 31 days of operations  
   the ship departed for Yokosuka, Japan for final preparation and return to San  
   Diego, California leaving the action area on 30 November 1951.  

   The mission of the Carrier Groups of Task Force 77 was as follows:  

   (1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea  
       to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction  
       of enemy routes of movement and supply and armed reconnaissance  
       of enemy installations and lines of communications.  

   (2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval  
       surface forces when necessary.  

   (3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.  

   (4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.  

   (5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.  

   (6) Coordinate air operations with the Fifth Air Force through JOG Korea.  

   (7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged  
       in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.  

   -1-
The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H. N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 1 November 1951:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>NO. OF PILOTS</th>
<th>NO. &amp; TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF-73/1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18 F9F-2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-73/2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-8/6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-92/3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14 AD-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 AD-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4 F4U-5NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 AD-4W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2 AD-4N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG-102</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3 F9F-2P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-1</td>
<td>2 (Attached to ship)</td>
<td>2 AD-4Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 H03S-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART II

10/31/51: USS DON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) arrived at the operating area "Sugar". This day was utilized for replenishment activities and anti-aircraft defense drills.

11/1/51: The weather made flying difficult and obscured target areas. Only 36 sorties were flown, 24 of which were sent on offensive missions, consisting of bridge strikes, rail cuts, armed reconnaissance and weather reconnaissance. Defensive missions were combat air patrol, photographic and anti-sub patrol. The dawn hecklers destroyed 3 vehicles. Bridge strike of 16 planes dumped ordnance on a supply area after destroying one bridge. Weather reconnaissance planes destroyed 2 vehicles and 6 gondolas.

11/2/51: 64 sorties were flown, and only 12 of these were on offensive missions, 1 bypass, 18 ox carts, 9 buildings, 4 wagons, 6 trucks, 1 transformer and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 15 railroad cars, 1 boat, 2 buildings, 1 locomotive and 1 bridge were damaged. 18 railroad cuts were made and 17 troops were killed.

11/3/51: 74 sorties were flown, 59 of these were offensive and 15 defensive. 30 of the sorties were flown by Jet Squadron 781. 2 piles of supplies and 1 bridge, 13 vehicles, 1 building and 1 truck were destroyed, 4 buildings, 1 locomotive, 1 tank, 1 bridge, 5 boats and 14 railroad cars were damaged. 38 railroad cuts were made; 40 troops were killed.

11/4/51: CTF-77 postponed replenishment because of good weather indications. The weather was good and 82 sorties were launched. 19 of these were defensive and 63 offensive missions, 7 railroad cars, 28 trucks, 8 buildings and 4 vehicles were destroyed. 29 railroad cars, 1 factory, 1 bridge, 5 buildings, 1 oil barge and 2 vehicles were damaged. 10 troops were killed. One night heckler plane and pilot were dawned late at night.

11/5/51: This day was utilized for replenishment activities while 10 sorties were launched to search for the pilot lost the night before. The results of the search were negative. 2 trucks and 1 AA position were destroyed.

11/6/51: No flights were launched due to bad weather.

11/7/51: No flights were launched due to bad weather.
11/8/51: The day was clear and 66 sorties were launched. 14 of these flights were sent on defensive missions; the remaining 52 were sent on offensive missions. 5 trucks, 3 buildings, 6 railroad cars, 1 bridge, 1 AA position, 13 vehicles, 1 locomotive and 6 small boats were destroyed. 2 trucks, 6 buildings, 1 bridge and 3 tunnels were damaged. 32 rail cuts were made and 5 to 15 troops were killed.

11/9/51: 72 sorties were launched. 20 of these were sent on defensive missions. Big news of the day was the discovery of four supply trains. The rails were cut before and after these, while events 2, 4, 6 and 9 were sent to rake them with bombs and cannon fire. 4 locomotives, 18 railroad cars, and 1 roundhouse were destroyed in this action. 8 railroad cars and 3 locomotives were damaged. In other activity 1 boat and 2 railroad cars were destroyed; 3 buildings, 1 locomotive, 3 railroad cars and 7 trucks were damaged, 15 rail cuts were made. At least 75 of an attacked 150 troops were killed. This was sort of a dream day for the Allies and a nightmare for the enemy.

11/10/51: A V.I.P. in the person of General Matthew B. RIDGWAY, Commander-in-Chief, FAR EAST, came aboard this day. In addition to an outstanding demonstration of carrier aircraft operating procedure for which the ship and Air Group were given an emphatic "well done" by ComfltFlt, the results of missions over North Korea were highly satisfactory. Of the 72 sorties flown, 53 were offensive. 12 railroad cars, 10 buildings, 4 gun positions and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 1 truck, 3 locomotives, 1 barge, 2 factories, 31 other buildings, 1 freighter, 36 railroad cars and 3 bypasses were damaged. 23 rail cuts were made.

11/11/51: This day was utilized for replenishment of ammunition, supplies and fuel.

11/12/51: Only anti-submarine patrol, combat air patrol and weather reconnaissance were flown. These totaled 8 missions. No damage was reported. Weather obscured the Korean mainland.

11/13/51: 79 sorties were launched with 15 of these sent on offensive missions. 44 railroad cars, 3 buildings, 1 gun position, 1 boat and 7 vehicles were destroyed. 38 railroad cars, 1 tunnel, 8 buildings, 3 bridges, 3 boats, 10 trucks and 1 locomotive were damaged. 46 railroad cuts were made. 10 enemy troops were killed.

11/14/51: 75 sorties were launched. Only 17 of these were sent on defensive missions. 15 railroad cars, 6 buildings, 1 factory, 31 trucks, 34 vehicles, 12 AA positions and 1 bridge were destroyed. 8 buildings, 14 railroad cars, 2 AA positions, 3 boats, 2 vehicles and 21 trucks were damaged. At least 60 troops were killed as they defended supply convoys attacked. This was another good day.

11/15/51: Bad weather and replenishment kept all planes on the dock.

11/16/51: High seas permitted only afternoon flights. 59 sorties were launched; 19 of these were for defensive missions. 1 railroad car, 10 vehicles, 6 boats, 3 warehouses were destroyed. 2 boats, 9 railroad cars, 9 buildings, 2 trucks and 1 bridge were damaged. 23 rail cuts were made.

11/17/51: 67 sorties were launched. 18 of these were sent on defensive missions. 18 vehicles, 4 trucks, 2 bridges, 11 buildings, 1 hangar were destroyed. 1 supply pile, 6 buildings, 1 boat, 2 vehicles, 1 railroad bypass, 2 boxcars, 2 trucks and 2 bridges were damaged. 8 rail cuts were made and 3000 feet of track were destroyed. 25 troops were killed.
11/18/51: 72 sorties were launched with 22 of these being defensive missions. 6 trucks, 1 jeep, 3 bridges, 10 buildings, 6 vehicles, 8 railroad cars were destroyed. 1 truck, 2 bridges, 9 buildings, 1 factory, 6 boxcars and 16 vehicles were damaged. 20 troops were killed. Panther jets, Corsair fighters and AD bombers combined smoothly and efficiently in a raid on Changsan-ni. The jet planes leveled about one half of the AA position, the Corsairs finished the rest and the AD's devastated the bridge. Other strikes were at Uihor and Ilisin-Dong. Naval gunfire spotting was performed for ships at Songjin and Tackon. Rocco routes were from Wonsan to Songchon and Kown to Pachsong-ni.

11/19/51: Replenishment was postponed enabling the Task Force to take full advantage of excellent flying weather. 68 sorties were flown, of which 54 were offensive and 14 were defensive. 6 vehicles, 9 railroad cars, 6 bridges, and 9 buildings were destroyed. 1 factory and 1 bridge were damaged. 18 rail cuts were made and 175 troops were killed. Bridges were attacked between Hungnam and Tanchon with high success, as reflected in the above results. Later in the day railroad installations near Songjin were attacked.

11/20/51: No flights were attempted due to replenishment activities.

11/21/51: With a storm moving toward the Sea of Japan, the typhoon, "Manda" forming, and a cold front gathering over the target areas, the BON HOMME RICHARD managed to fly 66 sorties. Only 14 of these were defensive missions. 7 buildings, 1 crane, 3 railroad cars, 1 locomotive and 10 vehicles were destroyed, 32 railroad cars, 9 buildings, 1 pier, 1 locomotive, 1 bridge, 2 bypasses and 1 gun position were damaged, 8 rail cuts were made. A fatal flight deck accident, loss of one pilot west of Wonsan, and the loss of three planes made this a day in which fortune smiled on the enemy and ignored the BON HOMME RICHARD.

11/22/51: Threatening weather permitted only 3 events of 24 sorties to fly. 3 of these missions were defensive. Armed reconnaissance planes destroyed 7 vehicles, 2 trailers, 20 Mounds of supplies and damaged 7 buildings, 1 pier, 11 trucks, 4 bridges and 4 boats. 10 rail cuts were made. Close air support, on the schedule for the first time in many weeks, reported 95% coverage.

11/23/51: No flights were attempted due to replenishment activities and threatening weather.

11/24/51: The weather was clearing but still very a micious. One flight of 16 planes left for missions of anti-sub patrol, strike and naval gunfire spotting. All planes returned to the ship when visibility became dangerously low.

11/25/51: 25 sorties were launched with 6 of these being on defensive missions. 6 buildings and 10 railroad cars were destroyed. 5 railroad cuts were made. The weather remained bad.

11/26/51: No flights were attempted due to high seas and foul weather.

11/27/51: This day is noted for one thing—an attack by 2 MIG-15s upon a flight of five F4Us and 3 AEs northwest of Wonsan. A total of 3 runs were made at the friendly planes, resulting in damage to one AD-3. All planes returned safely to the ship. Although the F4Us fired at the enemy planes, no hits were confirmed. 46 of the 38 missions flown were offensive. 4 buildings, 5 railroad cars and 1 boat were destroyed. 8 buildings, 3 trucks, 1 locomotive, 11 railroad cars, 1 bridge and 1 boat were damaged. 20 railroad cuts were made.
11/28/51: 63 sorties were flown, 12 of which were on defensive missions. 16 vehicles, 3 bunkers, 1 locomotive and 1 building were destroyed, 1 building, 10 vehicles, 1 locomotive, 5 railroad cars and 2 bridges were damaged. 27 troops were killed.

11/29/51: On this, the last in the operating area, 40 sorties were flown, 30 of which were offensive. 1 warehouse, 9 buildings, 10 vehicles, 1 railroad bridge and 4 railroad cars were destroyed, while 1 factory, 9 buildings, 1 railroad bridge, 1 boat, 1 railroad car and 2 vehicles were damaged. In addition, mainline railroad tracks were cut in 12 places. At 1635 itam the ship left Task Force 77 and headed for Yokosuka, Japan accompanied by the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135), USS MIDDENDORF (DD-684) and the USS HOFEN (DD-691).

11/30/51: The ship was on route for Yokosuka, Japan for replenishment and minor repairs before leaving the Far East area for the United States.

PART III
BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AD-4M</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AD-4Q</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>Enemy aircraft fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Loss of Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu.No.</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-2</td>
<td>122346</td>
<td>Lost over Korea (enemy AA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>123671</td>
<td>Lost at sea (fuel pump)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-17</td>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>123625</td>
<td>Lost at sea (catapult)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-18</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>96851</td>
<td>Lost at sea (ditched due to enemy AA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-21</td>
<td>VF-781</td>
<td>F9F-2B</td>
<td>123664</td>
<td>Lost at sea (catapult)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-21</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122767</td>
<td>Lost over Korea (enemy AA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-21</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97295</td>
<td>Lost at sea (engine failure after takeoff)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate type vessel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freighter (300 ft.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun emplacements</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply dumps</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Damage Inflicted on the Enemy (CONT'D)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel dumps</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition dumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundhouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail cuts</td>
<td>338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway cuts</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops killed</td>
<td>395 (estimated), 116 (confirmed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilots could assess the damage to a definite total or felt that damage had been inflicted were used in these tables. Close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafing, fires, delayed action bombing or smoke ob-viously may never be known. An estimated 1,140 troops were attacked during this period. Of this number it is conservatively estimated that 395 troops were killed. 116 troops were confirmed killed.

PART IV
PERSONNEL

A. Performance

The overall performance of the crew during this last action period was excellent. Each job on the ship was performed efficiently and expeditiously. All hands were extremely careful in their work and in their conduct in view of an early return to the United States.

The development from a green, inexperienced crew to a well drilled and trained team has been an outstanding one. On November 10 the whole Task Force, and especially the BON HOMME RICHARD, was on parade for General Matthew B. RIDGWAY, Commander of United Nations Forces in the Far East.

After this historic day, the following dispatch was received:

*FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CVMT/HF FLYING X QUOTE X THE WHOLE TASK FORCE SHOULD BE VERY PROUD OF THE SHOW IT PUT ON FOR GENERAL RIDGWAY X IN PARTICULAR THE BON HOMME RICHARD DESERVES A WELL DONE FOR AS FINE A DEMONSTRATION OF CARRIER OPERATIONS AS I'VE EVER SEEN X MARTIN X UNQUOTE X TO THIS I WISH TO ADD MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL HANDS AND I AM PROUD OF ALL OF YOU X WELL DONE X CLARK*

Upon the departure of the ship from the operating area for the final time, two dispatches, one to the BON HOMME RICHARD and the second to COMANDIVTHREE, information to the BHR, were received from CVMT/HF and CVN/WPFE respectively:

FROM CVMT/HF: COMMANDER 7TH FLEET EXTENDS TO OFFICERS, MEN AND ENRAMED AIR GROUP BON HOMME RICHARD HEARTY WELL DONE FOR OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT IN ALL TYPES WEATHER AND UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS X HAPPY VOYAGE HOME X VICE ADMIRAL HAROLD M MARTIN SENDS

FROM CVN/WPFE: UPON CONCLUSION OF YOUR TOUR OF DUTY IN THE FAR EAST COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST TAKES GREAT PLEASURE IN EXTENDING HIS CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE MAGNIFICENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY BY THE AIR GROUP AND SHIPS COMPANY OF THE BON HOMME RICHARD UNDER YOUR DIRECTION WHILE SUPPORTING UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA X MERRIEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO ALL X WITH C T JOY

ORIGINA
B. Casualties (enemy inflicted)

ENSIGN GERALD C. CANAN, 505907/1310

On November while flying an AD-2 on a night heckler mission, Ensign Canan's plane was struck by 40mm fire south of Vonsan, forcing him to bail out. His own parachute was observed upon the ground near the crashed plane, but because of darkness, no rescue attempt could be made until the following morning. On November 4 an extensive search of the area was made; the parachute had been removed from the ground; truck marks were seen near the crashed plane, but no sign of the pilot was found. Since he did parachute safely, it is believed that he is a prisoner. Ensign Canan is listed as missing in action.

LEUTENANT CHARLES J. BADWITZ, 250770/1315

On November 9 while on a rail strike over North Korea, Lieutenant Badowitz's plane was hit by small arms fire, and he was wounded in the right arm. Due to the injury and the resulting loss of blood, the pilot was forced to land at an airfield in friendly territory. After medical treatment had been rendered, he was returned to the ship.

LEUTENANT DILE F. MORITZ, 301509/1315

On November 21 Lieutenant Moritz, flying an AD-3 on a bridge strike, was forced to bail out over North Korea when his plane was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. A RosCap was immediately set up and a helicopter dispatched from the USS Los Angeles. The first approach of the helicopter over the pilot was unsuccessful because of severe turbulence. Ground fire became intense during the second attempt at rescue; the crew was wounded in the leg and the helicopter was seriously damaged. At this time Lieutenant Moritz was observed to run up a hill to facilitate rescue. He was then seen to fall and tumble down the hill, presumably as a result of small arms fire which was observed in the immediate vicinity. Any further rescue attempt appeared futile. Because of the observations of the helicopter crew, Lieutenant Moritz is believed to have been seriously wounded and taken prisoner. He is officially listed as missing in action.

C. Casualties (other)

JAMES EDWIN HODGESON, JR., 225 24 21, AB1, USN

On November 21 at 0645, Hodgeson, while assisting in preparing an F9F for a jet reconnaissance flight, was struck and instantly killed by the plane when it was accidentally catapulted. Four other enlisted men were injured as a result of this accident. All have been returned to duty.

RAYMOND J. BULTIN, FN, 245 42 43, USN

From 0400 on November 22 Bultin has been listed as missing from this ship. He was last seen at approximately 2300 on November 21, and did not report to stand his engineering watch at 0400 on the 22nd of November. A thorough and extensive search of the ship was made immediately after his absence was disclosed, but he has not been found. It is presumed that he was lost over the side between the hours of 2300 on November 21 and 0400 on November 22.

LTJG B.L. IVES, 496290/1315

On November 13, while returning from a jet reconnaissance flight over North Korea, LTJG Ives' F9F exhausted its fuel supply before being taken aboard the carrier and was forced to ditch within the Task Force. The pilot was promptly picked up and returned to the ship.

LTJG R. L. SOULLY, 431593/1315

On November 17 LTJG Scully was catapulted from the ship. His plane engine failed to maintain full power after the launch, and it crashed into the sea ahead of the carrier. The pilot was rescued by the ship's helicopter.
C. Casualties (other) CONT'D

LTJG JOHN KEANE, 522000/1310

On November 18 LTJG Keane's F4U-4 was hit and badly damaged over North Korea by enemy flak. He was forced to bail out south of Wonsan. A helicopter from the USS LOS ANGELES was dispatched to the scene and he was picked up and returned to the cruiser. After being treated for immersion, the pilot was returned to the carrier.

LT R.D. MCCLUS, 460359/1315

On November 21 LT Mcclus' F9F was accidentally catapulted into the sea. The pilot escaped and was picked up by a helicopter without having suffered any injury.

LT. R. E. BROWN, 499806/1310

On November 21 LT Brown, in an F4U-4, was launched from this ship. Shortly after takeoff the engine of his plane lost power, and he attempted to return, but before he was aboard, the engine cut out and he was forced to ditch. He was picked up by a helicopter and returned to the ship.

PART V

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

1. Material

Since arriving in the operating area there have been a total of 70 casualties to ordnance and fire control equipment which have been serious enough to place the affected installation out of commission temporarily. In most cases it has been possible to effect repairs to the equipment within 24 hours. Nine of these casualties have occurred during the period covered by this report.

The installed bomb elevators of 2500 pound capacity are definitely inadequate to meet the requirements of this type operation. The limitations imposed by these small elevators hamper ordnance loading of planes during normal flight operations and cause a very serious delay in striking ammunition below during replenishment operations.

2. Training

The training program for personnel of the Gunnery Department has been modified to render it more flexible and still provide instruction and training periods as permitted by operating schedule. Gun and mount captains have been utilized as instructors for their respective watches with good effect. It is believed that this procedure promotes interest, utilizes the time spent on watch and keeps the crew more alert.

The following AA practices were fired between 30 October and 30 November on orders of CTF-77:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Z-4-G</th>
<th>Z-5-G</th>
<th>Z-6-G</th>
<th>Z-7-G</th>
<th>Z-9-G</th>
<th>Z-10-G</th>
<th>Z-12-G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conduct of these practices between air operations greatly improved the ship's ability to deliver accurate gunfire under conditions of combat operations. It is recommended that the ammunition training allowance be increased to provide for additional anti-aircraft practices for ships operating in the forward areas.
Ammunition expended on these practices: 570 rounds 5"/38 AAC, 84 rounds 5"/38 VT, 80 rounds 5"/38 VT(NF), 734 charges 5"/38(IF) and 7950 rounds 40MM. Ten gunnery coordination exercises were conducted. Target acquisition was good with the Mark 12/22 radar. Target acquisition with the Mark 63 Gun Fire Control System is difficult and usually required coaching. For this reason it is not considered reliable against jet type aircraft.

3. Deck Evolution

For the cruise in Korean water from 30 May to 30 November, the ship was alongside 128 destroyers, 31 tankers and 43 provisioning ships. The transfer of ammunition, provisions, freight, oil and gasoline was accomplished with the maximum of efficiency allowable with available equipment. During the first three months number one steam winch added to the work load and handicapped operations by frequent breakdowns and dragging action. A change was effected for a newer model steam winch from the USS PRINCETON (CV 37) at the conclusion of her tour. The newer winch facilitated operations but still failed to equal the speed, efficiency or workload of the electric winch which bore the brunt of the work. For maximum effort the receiving winches should be of equal power as those of the replenishing vessel.

On several occasions, severe weather and high seas handicapped exchanges but the training and ability of personnel was sufficient to complete the cruise loadings and off loadings without casualty.

Ammunition loading, because of great weight and bulk, proved most difficult of any transfers. Efficiency and cooperation from the USS L&O (ADA-60) simplified the problem. Handling between the USS L&O and the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was coordinated to insure maximum effort and safety with a minimum amount of handling. Ordnance supplies as a result were put aboard at the maximum rate for available equipment.

Due to limited incinerator capacity it was impossible to burn the wood containers in which rocket heads, rocket motors, fuzes, flares and other types of ordnance, freight and stores were received. Limited stowage facilities and their potential as a fire hazard preclude holding these containers on board until they could be disposed of in port. A study of this problem is recommended since realistic instructions are lacking.

4. Aviation Ordnance Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,000#/ G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Nose Fuses AN-M103AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000#/ G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>Nose Fuses AN-M139AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250#/ G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>Nose Fuses AN-M140AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100#/ G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>Nose Fuses T-50AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260#/ Frag Bombs</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>Tail Fuses AN-M102AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350#/ Depth Bombs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tail Fuses AN-M101AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>Tail Fuses (hydrostatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5&quot; ATAR Rockets</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Exterior Ignitor AN-42230-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Internal Ignitor AN-42230-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20MM Ammunition</td>
<td>144,399</td>
<td>Fuse Napalm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal Ammunition</td>
<td>291,930</td>
<td>Drop Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Powder (pounds)</td>
<td>3,780</td>
<td>Parachute Flares</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total tonnage this period: 1,109
Total tonnage for the period from 31 May to 29 November: 5,287
1. Operations

Four fireroom operation has been most successfully used. During the earlier part of the ship's employment in the area two firerooms were secured when speed requirements were 25 knots and below in order to secure additional watches. But due to the unstable wind conditions boilers had to be kept available and the saving in watch standing personnel was nullified. The plant was put in a four fireroom status and completely segregated - one fireroom per engine - which affords maximum security. Standby boilers can be brought in on the line without additional time required to warm up steam lines, and with a minimum of valve operations. Boosting standby boilers is accomplished by personnel already on watch.

Six (6) boiler operation is not recommended when it can be avoided. Eight boilers operate almost as economically as six, but with much greater safety and security because the plant cannot be segregated with a six boiler combination; superheat and smoke control is difficult, and there is danger of overheating the superheaters at low power due to unstable steam flow conditions.

During days when there was no wind the ship made a full power run for flight operations on an average of approximately every one and one half hours. There were no casualties, and all operations were smoothly executed. However, this record could not have been maintained without a great amount of work being done on machinery repair at night, and during periods of low power requirements. Much was accomplished on replenishment days, which, for the Engineer Department was not a day of rest, but a day to get caught up and tuned up for the following days of operations.

2. Maintenance

As time progressed a greater amount of time was required for machinery repair due to wear over longer periods and interminable high power runs requiring all units available. Regulators, traps, valves, governors, and other units with movable parts failed frequently and one to six hours of work was required. Since the department was in a one in three watch status it was impossible to accomplish all repairs during the night, when high speeds would not be made, although the major amount of work done was done at night. Much of the night work was reduced by planning, and by the maximum cooperation between the OOD and the OOW. When the OOD could foresee a slack period of from thirty minutes to several hours, he informed the OOW, personnel were alerted, and a leaking gasket could be replaced, a regulator repaired, etc. It is recommended that this policy be initiated at the earliest possible moment on all ships in this area.

3. Communications

In connection with communications between the OOD and the OOW: The IJV Circuit is the main channel, and every effort should be made to improve the efficiency of this channel by close attention to the performance of talkers while making routine reports, and by requiring the highest standards in all details. In addition, the ship's service telephone on the bridge should not be in such a place that it is relatively inaccessible to the OOD, which is the case, when due to foul weather, the pilot house doors are closed and the OOD is on the open bridge. This condition has been corrected on this vessel by relocating a phone forward in the pilot house where it can be reached by the OOD through a porthole. This was not done as a precaution, but as the result of a misunderstanding between the OOD and the OOW, wherein four standby boilers were secured, instead of being put on the line, and the ship was unable to make the required turns for the first, and only time.
4. **Personnel**

In conclusion it should be noted that there were no rest periods for engineering Department personnel. During replenishment days it required the maximum from all personnel in the Department to furnish working parties, stand watches, and complete repairs that were required before the ship could be ready for the following day's operations. When the ship was in port the engineers were required to overhaul all unreliable units in addition to perform all of the BuShips required test and inspections that could not be done underway because of the amount of man hours involved. Shore Patrol, and miscellaneous details reduced manpower availabilities. Boiler cleaning, and cleaning of the bilges was a major item. It is therefore recommended that the personnel complement be maintained at allowance at all times, as it is the allowed complement is considered inadequate, being based on the minimum requirements to fill battle stations, and was established prior to around-the-clock flight operations.

5. **Recommendations**

Completion of the following outstanding ShipLts is considered mandatory if the ship is to return as an effective fighting unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ShipLt</th>
<th>Brief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV-72</td>
<td>Install wartime armament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-45</td>
<td>Modify Repair Party lockers to accommodate 3 dimensional diagrams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-88</td>
<td>Install whip antennas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-725</td>
<td>CIC rearrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-581</td>
<td>Blank off sections of wind tunnels and install berthing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-835</td>
<td>Alts of high military importance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-813</td>
<td>Bomb stowage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-937</td>
<td>Explosion proof lighting in gas trunks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-932</td>
<td>Provide electric winches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-879</td>
<td>Install emergency power for gasoline pump room blowers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-972</td>
<td>Replace underwater log equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-963</td>
<td>Install whip antennas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-956</td>
<td>Relocate unit repair lockers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-953</td>
<td>Provide rocket stowage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-993</td>
<td>Install casualty communications circuit X40J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-981</td>
<td>Installation of radar repeater system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Replanking of certain areas of the flight deck is necessary as well as a number of other urgent repair items.

6. **Replenishment**

The following is a summary of fueling operations conducted:

3 November - In operating area, steaming at various speeds. Refueled USS WADDERBURN (DD 684), pumped 15,600 gallons of fuel oil in 25 minutes. Refueled USS UHLMANN (DD 687), pumped 10,400 gallons of fuel oil in 20 min.

4 November - Refueled USS REMIT (DD 51), pumped 33,000 gallons of fuel oil in 34 minutes.

5 November - Received 319,400 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 1 hour 55 minutes.

7 November - Refueled USS ASHTABULA (AO-51), pumped 32,000 gallons of fuel oil in 53 minutes. Refueled USS UHLMANN (DD 687), pumped 18,900 gallons of fuel oil in 39 minutes. Received 131,640 gallons of fuel oil from the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 44 minutes.

11 November - Received 229,600 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 1 hour 4 minutes.

14 November - Refueled USS WADDERBURN (DD 756), pumped 20,400 gallons of fuel oil in 29 minutes.
15 November - Received 239,060 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 2 hours 8 minutes.
20 November - Received 322,160 gallons of fuel oil from USS TALOVANA (AO-64) in 3 hours 7 minutes.
21 November - Refueled USS WEDDERNORN (DD 684), pumped 50,000 gallons of fuel oil in 1 hour 20 minutes.
23 November - Received 73,000 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 1 hour 4 minutes. (One hose connection)

C. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Communications

a. General: After approximately two months experience as flagship for CTF-77 the comments in this ship's Action Report dated 20 October 1951 are still appropriate. The volume of communications traffic is still excessive and although improvement has been made, a more forceful progress will be required to eliminate and consolidate the numerous routine dispatch reports. The delays on high precedence traffic are intolerable and appear to be the result of over classification of precedence and the volume. Even when in port the volume of traffic continues to such a degree that little rest or recreation can be given to the communications personnel. It is strongly recommended that during these in-port periods facilities be provided by shore personnel to assume communication and crypto guard.

The use of Pac 6 leaves much to be desired in rapid handling of encoded course changes, etc. It would appear desirable to eliminate the phrase "shackle/unshackle" when no ambiguity will occur or possibly a better method would be to assign letters daily to the eight cardinal and intercardinal compass points and use the letter plus or minus so many degrees to define the course and/or bearing. Example: Assume King is the letter for North; then King minus 15 would be course 345 if it were preceded by the appropriate signal. Encoding of speeds would require the dual assignment of letters for the numerals 0 to 7 plus two additional letters for 8 and 9.

b. Communication Procedure: It is considered that ACP 125 (A) Art. 304 could be expanded to indicate the appropriateness of indicating feedback, hum, cutting-out, etc., in making "readability of signal" reports. In spite of ACP 125 (A) suggested that Art. 316 be amplified to indicate "roger" is not an answer to a question, but only a receipt for the transmission and that if an answer can be given immediately a receipting transmission is superfluous. In the same vein ACP 124 (A) Art. 110 should be expanded to show the proper method of handling service messages. Under the present Article numerous varieties are being used with resultant confusion. This is true in both inter and intra-service transmission and is responsible for numerous presently unavoidable delays.

c. Command Task Functions: In July this command received information that the ship would have the Force Flag embarked in the near future. On 28 July the Commanding Officer was ordered to assume command of TF 77.01 and proceed to Yokosuka, Japan. This was considered an excellent opportunity to test available flagship facilities and provide training of a rare nature by setting up a "mock flag" in Flag Plot. This was kept distinctly separate from the ship's command. Such operation was used four (4) times as the command was designated CTF of TF 77.01, TF 77.02, TF 77.03 and TF 77.06. Size of the element varied from three to fourteen vessels, including underway replenishment operations.

The value of this training is unlimited and proved its worth in the smooth orderly change over to a flagship upon the embarking of the Force Commander.
It is recommended that all vessels so equipped be given the opportunity for this excellent practical training. It is in this type of training that the Ship's Flag facilities can be tested and modified as required. In addition, the functions, planning, and problems of a Flag Command are learned and Flag requests and directives are more readily understood; therefore a higher degree of cooperation between ship and Flag personnel will exist.

2. Aerology

The summary presented below includes observations taken while in an area of the Sea of Japan bounded by the 37th and 41st parallels on the south and north and the 131st Meridian and the Korean Coast on the east and west. The period covered is from the 1st up to and including the 28th of November 1951.

a. Winds: The prevailing wind direction was northeasterly 33% of the time with winds from the west-northwest 28% of the time. Six hours of calm were recorded. A total of 76 hours of winds over 24 knots were recorded. The average wind velocity was 14 knots with the strongest wind of 42 knots being recorded on the 25th of the month, at the beginning of our most severe storm in the area.

The average air temperature for the month was 49 degrees, with high and low daily average of 53 and 45 degrees respectively.

maximum temperature for the month was 62 degrees, with a minimum temperature dropping to 30 degrees.

Sea water temperature average for the month was 60 degrees with an average maximum temperature of 67 degrees and an average minimum temperature of 56 degrees. The highest sea water temperature recorded was 72 degrees, with the minimum being 51 degrees.

b. Ceiling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Height Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 9,950 feet</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 4,950 feet but less than 10,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 2,450 feet but less than 5,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 950 feet but less than 2,500</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1,000 feet</td>
<td>less than 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Visibility:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visibility Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 6 miles</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 3 - 6 miles</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 miles</td>
<td>less than 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first snowfall was recorded on the 24th of the month and lasted about 1 hour. The temperature was 35 degrees and the dew point was 28 degrees.

3. Photo Interpretation:

There has been little change in the type or scope of work in photo interpretation since the last report. Flak studies of nearly all of the strike targets were prepared for pilots briefing as has been done previously.
During this operating period a considerable amount of photography and interpretation was accomplished for units outside the carrier Task Force. Mosaics were prepared, gridded and copied at scales of one to fifteen thousand for the use of surface bombardment groups and naval gunfire spot planes. These UTM gridded mosaics are more accurate and show physical detail not found on the one to fifty thousand NTS charts normally used.

4. Combat Information Center

a. Radars

(1) General: All radar performed in a satisfactory manner but many breakdowns were encountered due to the lack of time to maintain them. It has been necessary for one carrier to have strike control and the other JetCap control. It was found that ships without MK5 IFF could only control JetCap to 40 miles and then one CV would have to home the JetCap. Even if JetCap control was assigned to a support or screening vessel one CV had to stand by to assume control over 40 miles or to home planes, leaving no time for radar maintenance. The addition of the DDR helped this problem immensely and it is recommended that one DDR be present at all times. The DDR can take JetCap control, YE, Trout, Mother, as well as radar guards, giving the CV its necessary time for repairs.

(2) Specific: The SP86/B performed as satisfactorily as before but approximately one week was lost as the equipment suffered casualties due to long periods of operation with little time for maintenance. The most serious time loss was caused by a casualty to the antenna motors and approximately 3½ days were lost before it was restored to full operation.

The SK operated extremely well and made several pickups of planes over 125 miles from the force. The SK was also used to interrogate MK III IFF identifying a large number of bogeys, especially since the new IFF code system was adopted.

The SG was inoperative for several days due to casualties and still needs several field changes that are authorized to get peak performance.

The SM was of no value as an altitude determining radar as the tilting motor of the antenna burned out and could not be replaced at sea; however, it made an excellent replacement for the SG in surface search and in station keeping.

b. Communications

The communications were as good as could be expected from the type, location and age of the equipment. One significant fact was noted: When two transmitters were used on the CI Net they both had to be of a carbon type, for two magnetic or a combination of one magnetic and 1 carbon caused a loss of volume and much feed back.

c. Flag Operations

CIC functioned as the Flag CIC for Task Force 77 and despite its obvious limitations was able to perform its duties in a satisfactory manner. Flag personnel commented on the fine cooperation received from the officers and men of CIC. The Air Controllers were especially praised for their outstanding work in all types of control.
d. Recommendations

Most of the recommendations have been made before in other Action Reports and the most important are to be done during the conversion of the ship. CIC should be moved to the O2 level; more AN/APC or units capable of working those frequencies should be made available; at least two units for UHF should be set up on the CI net frequency at all times; modern gear should replace all our ROM equipment and all radars but the SP56/B. It is felt that the ship is not adequate for another tour in the Korean conflict without a major overhauling of CIC.

5. Public Information

Administration of the Public Information Office aboard this ship was the collateral duty of the Aerology Officer. He was handicapped by the lack of trained enlisted personnel and sufficient space in which to operate. A system set up by him for the dissemination of information suitable for public consumption functioned very well under the circumstances, but several recommendations for improvements are included in this report. At the end of each flying day, the squadron P.I.O.'s turned in their stories to the Air Group P.I.O., who edited them and condensed them into one release. This in turn was forwarded to the ship's P.I.O., who further edited the condensed releases and wrote other material released by means other than by dispatch form. On feature stories, pictures with captions, and other material released by means other than by dispatch, a similar release procedure was followed in order to coordinate the work in the photo lab, prevent repetition, and check the work for compliance with censorship regulations. By following this procedure, one record is kept of all material that is sent to the press from this ship.

It is recommended that the billet of Public Information Officer be made a primary duty of an officer trained in such work. He should occupy a billet in the administrative department. It was at times difficult to determine the type of stories and pictures desired by ComNavFe; this was especially true when the ship first came to the area, and the problem was only solved by experience. It is therefore recommended that Ship's P.I.O. Officers spend a few days TAD at ComNavFe Headquarters at the beginning of the combat tour. Many excellent releases were apparently overlooked because there was no defined policy on the part of other P.I.O.'s. It is further recommended that, except for the dispatch releases, each unit should be permitted to disseminate its information direct to the naval sources of their own choice. This is particularly true in the cases of the Air Groups, whose squadrons may have originated at any one of the many Naval Air Reserve Training Units throughout the United States. It is considered particularly desirable that their home stations be kept fully aware of their activities in the operating area. Finally, a P.I.O should be thoroughly familiar with the Photographer's Manual and censorship regulations. A knowledge of security regulations is particularly desirable since much delay would be encountered if all public information were to be passed by the Security Officer of a large ship, whose full time is taken up with registered publications and other matters of internal security.
6. Air Intelligence

a. Organisation: The Air Intelligence organisation was established and modified in accordance with requirements indicated through operating experience.

Aboard this ship the Air Group operated independently, but at the same time totally dependent on the AI office for all intelligence. This, as might be expected, posed some problems, that only through the whole hearted effort on the part of the Squadron and ship's Air Intelligence Officers were successfully overcome.

It is strongly recommended that when the Air Group reports aboard that all Al's be placed under the immediate supervision of the ship's Air Intelligence Officer, who should be senior to all other Al's. This recommendation is made for the following reasons:

1. The ship is responsible for all briefing and debriefing, the provision of supplies and keeping the Air Group and ship's personnel informed. The Commanding Officer is responsible for the proper functioning of the Air Intelligence Section.

2. Authority to make certain that all connected with Air Intelligence carry out their duties efficiently should go with this responsibility.

3. Pooling all Al's would insure an efficient briefing and debriefing schedule, an equal distribution of the workload among Squadron Al's and full use of Al personnel.

b. Training of Enlisted Personnel: The six months tour of duty saw five enlisted men serve in the AI office. Four of these advanced in rates outside Al work. Two SA's advanced to seaman; one yeoman third advanced to second class and one personnelman second advanced to first class. Heavy responsibilities were given these men, which is a difficult way to learn, but one which proved practical. The maintenance of charts, daily reports briefs and filing of highly classified material were among the activities in which the men were trained.

The men learned quickly with the practical experience presented and by ardent reading of publications. Nevertheless, it is definitely felt that training in Air Intelligence School is needed for enlisted men. An AI Office should be established with rated men in Air Intelligence work. This would lessen the burden of the AI Officer and increase efficiency.

c. Flak: In this, the last operating period, the pilots became increasingly concerned with enemy anti-aircraft fire. This concern was due largely to the heavy increase of accurate AA fire encountered in recent weeks. Pilots, therefore became more cautious in attacking minor insignificant targets and flight leaders planned tactics and approaches to primary targets with more care. Consequently, without a lessening of effectiveness or results, losses to enemy anti-aircraft became fewer. In the previous operating period ten planes were lost to AA. In the current period, in which there were an approximately equal number of flying days, only three planes were lost to enemy AA fire.

Another factor which tended to curtail losses was the shifting of attacks from heavily defended bridges to "rail cuts". The latter program has removed attacks from defended areas but nevertheless has been very effective.

d. Search and Rescue: Statistically speaking, Search and Rescue operations were not as successful as they were in the previous period of operations. During the fourth period, three pilots were forced to ditch their planes in North Korean territory. All three were rescued by friendly helicopters. In this period two planes were shot down and the pilots bailed out over land. Neither of these pilots has been recovered. However, certain circumstances practically precluded their rescue which were not present during the fourth period. Aesign G.C. CIAAN, while on a night heckler mission, was hit just south of the city of Wonsan and forced to bail out.
The area of this incident is especially noted for its intense anti-aircraft fire and extremely heavy concentration of enemy troops. Because of this and the fact that he was hit at night, which prevented any rescue attempt until the next morning, the probability of his being captured before any help could be given was greatly increased. Unfortunately when a special flight was dispatched at first light the next day, no sign of the pilot was found, although it is known that his parachute did open and it is presumed that he did survive the jump. The second pilot to bail out, Lieutenant D. B. MCINTZ, was seen to land in the immediate proximity of a bridge which was under attack. Due to unusually heavy and accurate small arms fire, the helicopter which had been dispatched from a cruiser to attempt the rescue was heavily damaged and the crewman injured. Although it is known that the pilot did land safely in his parachute and made an attempt to evade the many enemy troops in the area, he was observed to fall at the instant. the fire was being directed at him. Because of the condition of the helicopter and crewman, plus his own inability to aid the rescue attempt, no further attempt was deemed feasible. It should be noted at this point that if the pilot of a downed plane can remove himself from the immediate vicinity of the attack and especially from the area of heavy troop concentrations, the ResCap can be set up effectively and protect the helicopter for a sufficient time to enable it to approach the survivor and pick him up. But where the pilot remains in the area of the attack, either by choice or because of his inability to assist in the rescue, and is surrounded by enemy forces, the operation of both the helicopter and the ResCap becomes increasingly difficult, if not almost impossible.

Fortunately all pilots who ditched at sea were promptly rescued by either helicopters or other United Nations ships operating in the area.

7. Air Plot

a. Hooker Control: During this period a modified visual Hooker Control was utilized during all night recoveries. This addition proved to be of great value, especially from the morale standpoint of the pilots. Pilots were able to enter the traffic pattern without worry of instrument failure. Also directions by Hooker enabled pilots to maintain position about the force, thus avoiding disorientation. Hooker Control is considered a great safety factor.

Hooker was stationed in Air Defense forward which afforded best visual coverage. Equipment utilized was radio, chest set, 1 J6 sound power phone and MG box. Radio was tuned to land/launch frequency. Sound power added communication to Air Plot, CIC, Primary Fly, Bridge and Landing Signal Officer.

It is strongly recommended that a visual Hooker Control be utilized by carriers operating at night. It is also recommended that the port and starboard 24" search lights be manned during all night launches and recoveries when circumstances permit.

b. Efficiency Quotients:

(1) Ratio of sorties scheduled to those completed: 79.9 percent
1583 sorties scheduled for November - 1265 sorties actually flown.

(2) Aborted flights: 26
(1) 3 JetCap (2) 3 JetPhoto (3) 2 ASP (4) 4 NUF (5) 14 Strike

(3) Jettisoned Ordnance:

6-2000# GP
8-1000# GP
6- 500# GP

30-250# GP
30-100# GP
23 rockets

(4) Number of planes lost to enemy fire:
1 FAU
2 AD's

(5) Operational losses:
3 FF's
1 FAU
8. Photographic Laboratory

Photography results from the necessity for obtaining adequate and complete aerial photographic coverage for current target areas as well as those areas designated as future objectives. Also there is a desire for permanent photo records of all operations. To meet this demand the Photo Lab has worked on a 2h hour basis. Work such as aerial film developing, some printing, reversal film developing, copying operational and public information stills has indicated that not enough supplies were available, 100,000 9x9 aerial, 30,000 feet of reversal movie film were processed, and several thousand public information and file prints were made. To keep up with this workload, photographic supplies by necessity were replenished every thirty days. A normal three month supply of such items as sonne paper, film, chemicals, has lasted only one month.

The modol J dryer has held up work because it is too slow and was under constant repair. Defects noted were breaks in drive belts, cog and wooden roller chain drive. Aerial film processing was greatly delayed because of these breakdowns.

Recommendations: The aerial film dryers should be replaced with newer and faster dryers where possible. It is further recommended that because of the expended necessity of photographic coverage that a Lieutenant be assigned as Photographic Officer, with a Warrant Officer as his assistant.

9. Electronics

Following is a summary of electronic maintenance problems that have been encountered by this vessel during the period from the first sea trials 19 February 1951 to date.

At that time the ship had completed reactivation by the Bremerton Group, Pacific Reserve Fleet, and had undergone its initial yard availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.

Upon completion of the initial activation yard availability less than 50% of the major electronic equipment aboard was giving satisfactory operation. Typical of the condition existing were the following:

(a) SK-2 Radar Equipment - Bearing information was inaccurate due to wiring errors in the synchro system.
(b) AN/SPS-6B - Were unable to pick up aircraft targets at a range greater than approximately 25 miles, while surface targets were observed up to approximately 65 miles. This was found due to improper assembly of antenna food horn upon installation.
(c) SM Radar Equipment - Operation of this equipment was erratic and unreliable. Subsequent inspection and test of this equipment by General Electronic Engineers revealed 29 assorted undesirable conditions and malfunctions existing, most of which had been in existence at the time of sea trials.
(d) YE-2 Homing Equipment - Provided improper bearing information due to wiring error in synchro system. Strip heater in antenna drive unit was not connected which subsequently caused a failure due to condensation of moisture in this unit.
(e) AN/GCN-6 Homing Equipment - The thermostatic control governing the receiver blower motor was inoperative causing subsequent failure of the components due to severe overheating.
(f) FSA Frequency Shift Equipment (Radio III) - Reversed keying due to incorrect wiring within the equipment.
(g) VHF/UHF Radio Antennas - Five of the 12 installed antennas were open due to improper assembly of coaxial connectors in the transmission lines.
(h) TBS Radio Equipment (Radio I) - Inoperative due to wiring error causing reversed rotation of motor generator.
The preceding are representative examples of the conditions encountered on a large percentage of the electronic equipment. The large number of equipment malfunctions remaining after completion of reactivation and yard availability is contributed to the non-availability of engineering services at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Fremonton, Washington. It is believed that a thorough engineering test and inspection would have uncovered most of these conditions in time for them to be corrected during yard availability.

a. Personnel: The enlisted personnel situation aboard this vessel has been unsatisfactory throughout the entire cruise. While the allowed complement is adequate and the number of rates on board conforms fairly close with the complement, comparatively few of the rated men on board are fully qualified for the rates they hold.

b. Shop Facilities: At the time this vessel left the United States for the Far East there were no adequate electronic repair shop facilities or stowage for electronic test equipment provided. One space was subsequently modified by ship's force to provide rudimentary shop facilities and test equipment stowage. This lack of facilities needlessly impaired the functioning of the electronic repair division during the critical period immediately following activation.

c. Test Equipment Allowance: With a few exceptions the allowance of electronic test equipment is considered adequate. However at the time of departure from the United States approximately 60% of the allowance was on board. The remaining 40% unfortunately include some of the more critical items such as multimeters, oscilloscopes, signal generators, RF wattmeters and precision oscilloscopes. After exchange of innumerable dispatches and the passing of time, about 4 months, eight multimeters were received on board. This was an occasion of great rejoicing until it was discovered that 7 of the 8 meters were defective due to weak magnets.

d. Spare Parts: Experience indicates that unless a vessel receives the authorized type bins for stowage of electronic spare parts it is inadvisable to convert from the old box system.

e. Maintenance Troubles: This vessel has encountered more major aircraft casualties than should normally be expected. A great majority of these have been of a mechanical nature. Typical examples follow:

(1) Bad main support bearings in the SM-2 radar antenna pedestal.
(2) Worn gears and frozen guide bearing on antenna assembly of YE-2 homing equipment.
(3) Defective lube switching assembly in MK 12 radar antenna due to non-removal of silica gel bags inside housing prior to placing equipment in service.
(4) Approximately 10 bad bearings in various amplifiers.
(5) Replaced 5 blowers motors in various equipment due to bad bearings, replacement bearing not being available.
(6) Replaced 5 open armatures in TBN radio equipment.
(7) Re-aligned 75% of the HF/VHF/UHF radio receivers on board in order to achieve specified sensitivity.

Many of the bearing failures are attributed to improper or lack of lubrication at the time of reactivation.

At the present time most of the electronic equipment on board is in a satisfactory operating condition. The SM radar equipment continues to be very difficult to maintain. In the past two months it had been necessary to replace the antenna azimuth drive motor and the antenna elevation drive motor; a spare azimuth drive motor was available from spare parts. A spare elevation motor being available necessitated sending this item to Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, Japan to be repaired. Also the slip rings and associated brushes in the antenna pedestal have repeatedly caused difficulties.
1. Publication of Supply Department Instructions

Supply Department Instructions of this vessel are published in the form of a Supply Department Organization and Order Book. This book was submitted by the Supply Officer and approved in its entirety by the Commanding Officer. It consists of the following divisions and sub-divisions:

Part I - The Supply Department Organization

Chapter 1. Personnel and Functions of the Supply Department
Chapter 2. Departmental Organization
Chapter 3. The Supply Division
Chapter 4. Duty Supply Officer
Chapter 5. Duty Sections and Watches
Chapter 6. Locks and Keys
Chapter 7. Inventories
Chapter 8. Surveys

Part II - Supply Department Responsibilities

Chapter 9. Stores Group
Chapter 10. Commissary Group
Chapter 11. Ship's Store and Service Activities Group
Chapter 12. Clothing and Small Stores Group
Chapter 13. Disbursing Group
Chapter 14. Special Bills and Details
Chapter 15. Safety Precautions

Part III - Supply Department Orders

Section A. General Instructions
Section B. General Stores Section
Section C. Clothing and Small Stores Section
Section D. Ship's Store Section
Section E. Commissary Section
Section F. Steward's Section
Section G. Aviation Stores Section
Section H. Disbursing Office
Section I. Training

Each person in the Supply Department is required to read the book and to show that he has read and understood the orders affecting him and he is required to initial the original continuation sheet of those particular orders.

2. Use of Liaison Officers at Yokosuka

The Supply Department has been fortunate in being granted permission to send an officer on TAD orders to Yokosuka a few days prior to the ship's entering port each time. This has been a tremendous help in loading since advance arrangements can be made for supplies and their deliveries in order to save much valuable time during these short availabilities.

3. Recommended Improvements in Logistics in TF-77

a. General Stores: It is recommended that all material on one Bill of Lading be placed on the same ship so that the paper work can be accomplished without having to wait for split shipments. It is recommended that freight carried by the Godfish be landed on the carrier for which intended in order to prevent multiple handling and unnecessary delays in delivery.

b. Provisions: Logistic support in furnishing food has been most satisfactory.

c. Ship's Store and Clothing: It is recommended that ship's store stock and clothing and small stores be made available in full case lots on the line as it has been impossible to get any re-supply of these items on at least one visit in port.
4. Allotment and Fiscal Accounting

This vessel has experienced no difficulty with the new Afloat Accounting Procedures which became effective 1 July 1951. The present quarterly ship's maintenance allotment has proved to be adequate since all departments have been able to operate within their budgets and no over-expenditures have occurred. A portion of the allotment has been allocated to the Supply Officer for the purpose of replenishing storeroom items in order to maintain GSK stocks at the required operating level.

B. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. General

a. Inasmuch as this will be the final Action Report submitted during the current tour of this ship, the comments listed under the Air Department are a summary of the experience gained and the recommendations for the correction of discrepancies for the entire six (6) months operating tour in the Korea area.

b. For the type of air operations in which the ship has been engaged the following number of personnel are recommended for efficient and prolonged operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>No. Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V-1</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-3</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-4</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-5</td>
<td>0 (for CASD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-6</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-7</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The requirements by rate were submitted in CO, DON HOME RICHARD ltr. sor. 0110 of 30 October 1951.

Note 2: Air Department organization in accordance with ComAirPac ltr. sor. 10/16006 of 17 September 1951.

c. During the tour of this vessel, the below listed times were the best established for the indicated evolutions:

(1) Launch - 4 F9F's, 16 pistons in 5 minutes, 36 seconds for average interval of 18.3 seconds.
(2) Jet launch - 8 F9F's in 2 minutes, 4 seconds for average interval of 20.7 seconds.
(3) Recovery - 18 pistons in 7 minutes, 11 seconds for average interval of 25.3 seconds.

d. During this tour and particularly during the last operating period, combatant type aircraft of the AD-0-Q, N, and -W series were utilized for the expeditious transfer of personnel (particularly V.I.P.'s) ashore and of parts for aircraft making emergency landings at airfields in Korea. In addition to the aircraft utilized for these purposes, an escort had to be furnished for cross-water flight, thereby decreasing the aircraft availability by two (2) aircraft for at least two (2) days, and sometimes longer under adverse weather conditions. Because of the many disadvantages, (i.e., spare parts, maintenance personnel and pilots familiar with the type required) in assigning a TBM to one of the operating carriers, it is recommended that a TBM assigned to VR-23 be rotated on the carriers. As CCF flights are made to TF-77 at least every 2-3 days, weather permitting, one of the 2 or more arriving TBM's and crew could relieve the one on board. By this method, the services of a TBM would always be readily available while all maintenance could be performed at the home station.
a. Flight Deck

(1) The recommissioning of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD for active duty
found the V-1 Division with 129 enlisted personnel of which six had
previous experience. The flight deck organization was built around
these men until such time as more men were trained and capable of
holding key positions. It was found, due to the shortage of experi-
enced personnel and the rapidity with which they were needed
for operations, that quite often the job was learned the hard way,
by practical experience. This resulted in numerous flight and hangar
deck crashes during the movement of aircraft. In order to help al-
lieve the accidents and yet forcibly bring to the minds of the
personnel responsible for the crash the seriousness of the offense,
a written report containing statements of personnel concerned
and a recommendation by the Flight Deck Officer of action to be,
taken after a thorough investigation was made as to the cause of the accident was
forwarded to the Air Officer. This, plus the experience gained by the
flight deck personnel, resulted in cutting down the number of accidents
to such a minimum as to be negligible.

(2) For overall efficiency and morale the following breakdown of
the V-1 Division was used and is highly recommended:

(a) Two crews forward with directors to handle spotting and
chocking of aircraft when landing; pulling of planes when re-
spotting.
(b) One crew and two directors working #2 elevator.
(c) One crew and two directors working #3 elevator.
(d) Two crews and four directors respotting planes aft.
(e) One crew and four directors and two tractor drivers
on night shift to handle early morning launches, plus ex-
changing of aircraft from hangar to flight deck at night.

(3) A modification of the present asbestos "hot-suit" is recommended
so that the "hot-suit" man will be able to move more freely. The
present suit is a definite handicap when the "hot-suit" man, may be
required at times to run half the length of the flight deck over bar-
rriers and arresting gear to get to the scene of the crash. The foot
design is not adequate for climbing around the cockpit of an aircraft.
A change could be accomplished by re-enforcement of the foot section
with a stiff sole and using a belt in the mid-section, or re-enforcing
the mid-section to stand more abuse. It is recommended that the pre-
sent type of fire-fighting suits used by the fire-fighters at NAS, San
Diego be issued to CVs.

(4) Upon activation of the BON HOMME RICHARD the flight deck was
thoroughly gone over by rotary sanders removing the preservative.
Upon removal of the preservative it was found that a large amount of
the planking had dry-rot caused by water or moisture collecting be-
tween the preservative and the planking. During the period of oper-
ation from March through November 1951, 6000 linear feet of deck
planking were installed. Due to the porous quality of the planking,
oil or grease falling upon the deck from aircraft will penetrate the
planking to such a depth that neither cleaning nor scrubbing will
remove the oil completely. Another cause of a slippery deck was the
melting of the grease from the cross-deck pendants, by the jet blasts
as the jets taxied forward after coming out of the gear. During the
latter part of the tour only a minimum amount of grease was utilized
on the pendants, thereby reducing this cause of slippage. When it
rained, the water floated the oil out, causing the deck to become ex-
tremely slippery and dangerous. This often resulted in a slippage
of chocks while aircraft were being turned up prior to launching. Due
to the chock slippage, several incidents occurred in which the prop-
eller of the after plane chewed the tail cone of the preceding plane.
However, the flight deck has stood up well, with one exception. The
area on the centerline of the flight deck aft, particularly from the
#5 cross-deck pendant to the ramp, has been considerably dug out and
splintered from the tail-hooks of aircraft.
This area was replaced during the last yard availability of this ship in April 1951. It is recommended that this area be completely covered with teak rather than douglas fir. Although the teak is dug out to some extent by tail hooks, it does not splinter like the fir, thereby being potentially less dangerous to the eyes.

(5) Throughout the tour in Korean waters the flight deck was normally spotted with a split spot consisting of two AD's and two F4U's across the deck. The split spot forward put the AD's on the port side and the F4U's on the starboard side. The split spot aft placed the AD's on the starboard side and the F4U's on the port side. Forward of the break in the deck on the port side aft, a 2-1 echelon spot was employed for the F4U's.

(6) The F4F jet spot employed for catapulting is considered the ultimate in handling of duds and still expediting the launch. After two jets are spotted on the catapults, the next plane was headed with its nose toward the tail of the plane on the starboard catapult. The next jet was pointed to port with its nose at a 90 degree angle to the plane in front of it. The remainder of the spot was staggered spot (with jets facing fore and aft) keeping each successive plane clear of the tail pipe of the plane ahead. On large jet launches, the last jets were tailed out over the port side aft of #2 elevator. The standby jet was kept on the elevator. The standby spot was spotted aft of the other jets on the flight deck and dropped down #2 elevator after the jet launch, if not needed. As there was only one regular jet as standby if 2 or more jets went "dead", the number of jets necessary to complete the launch were brought up #2 elevator after the jet launch. During this period the piston aircraft remaining on deck after the piston launch were tailed and spotted on one side of the flight deck while the jet(s) was (were) catapulted on the other side. In fact occasionally, returning piston aircraft were landing before the final jet launch was completed.

(7) It was found that the present type of equipment available for loading 250 lb. and 260 lb. bombs on AD's with wings folded was inadequate and extremely slow. On landing, the AD's were spotted forward on the port side with the wings spread. With a competent loading crew the average time of loading, fusing and folding wings took approximately five (5) minutes per plane. Upon completion of loading the wings were folded and the spot was immediately tightened up.

(8) The method of securing the cross-deck pendant chaffing plates to the flight deck proved inadequate. The plates are securely to the flight deck with wood screws. After a time the plates become "dished-out" in the center from the tail skage and hooks hitting it and the screws were pulled loose from the deck. It is recommended that studs be welded to the steel deck underneath and that the plates be bolted down with the nuts flush with the face of the plate.

(9) Due to the constant usage of the 15 lb. CO2 bottle used by Repair 8 when starting aircraft engines, it has been found that the present type of clip holder for securing the horn to the bottle is inadequate as it breaks off or loses its tensile qualities. It is recommended that a stronger and heavier clip be installed on future bottles.

b. Hangar Deck

(1) It was discovered that there was little or no use for the number one elevator during flight operations; hence it was secured. This allowed more room in Bay #1 as it permitted jets to be spotted with their nose sections extending out over number one elevator pit.
(2) Sixteen F9F's were parked and maintained in Bay #1 (frame 49 to 79). In an emergency seventeen could be parked in that area by lowering the nose wheel doors on the jets, thereby permitting the nose section to go under the tail section of the plane parked ahead. The F9F's were parked to the port side so as to enable the fueling crews on replenishment to rig hoses at the fueling station forward on the starboard side of Bay #1, without moving any F9F's up to the flight deck. Parking in this manner made it necessary for only three F9F's to be moved. These were pulled back and parked alongside the dock-edge elevator.

(3) In Bay #2 (frame 79 to 145) one F9F was parked on the starboard side just forward of Hangar Deck Control. This space was used as an area for checking F9F's for it provided working space necessary for pulling the tail section and engines for checking. The three F9F's photo planes were parked and maintained on the starboard side of Bay #2 (frame 91 to 123). This space was selected because of its proximity to the photographic laboratory. The area aft of the photo jets on the starboard side (frame 123 to 131) was used to park and maintain four F4U-5NL's. This made possible the use of either number two or number three elevator in moving the night fighters to or from the flight deck. The port side of Bay #2 (frame 100 to 131) was used for four F4U's. The area to the port side of number three elevator held one FLU.

(4) In Bay #3 (frame 145 to 193) the space on the starboard side was used to park and maintain four AD's. This spot left all hatches in that area accessible. Five AD's can be parked here by covering the torpedo hatch. The center row of Bay #3 was used to park and maintain four F4U's.

(5) By using the hangar deck spot described above it was possible to park forty-three planes, the helicopter and leave an emergency spot for two aircraft alongside the dock-edge elevator. This spot proved to be workable and flexible enough to meet the demands of the schedule.

(6) During the early part of the tour the number of hangar deck crashes was alarmingly high. As time progressed the number moved ever lower until the point was reached where damage to planes on the hangar deck was quite infrequent. This gratifying decrease was attributed to continued training of directors, the replacing of personnel who failed to respond to training, the use of a static spotting system, and the development of teamwork between pilots, plane captains and directors.

(7) A space on the hangar deck at frame 70 to 92 could be made available for movies by moving four jets to the flight deck. Movies were shown except when weather, operations or maintenance failed to permit them.

3. Catapults and Arresting Gear

a. Catapults

(1) Two cases of catapult accidents occurred during the last period of operations.

(a) In the first accident, the bridle spreader broke in half at the moment of firing of an F9F. This caused sieck in the pendant and as the shuttle continued in its travel, the pendant was cut by the finger that protruded from the shuttle. The resultant force was sufficient to break the tension ring and give the F9F enough of a shot to start it rolling down the deck slowly. As the pilot did not realize what was happening, he made no attempt to retard throttle or hit the breaks. The plane went off the bow and the pilot was picked up immediately without injury.
(b) In the second accident, an F9F was inadvertently catapulted. On the one-finger turn-up the pilot of the F9F on the port catapult indicated his plane was down. The Catapult Officer turned to the F9F on the starboard catapult, which had received a one-finger turn-up at the same time as the other plane and launched it. It was at this time that an aircraft trouble shooter ran around to the port side of the plane on the port catapult to question the pilot as to his trouble and a director and two plane handlers walked in front of the starboard wing to push the plane aft from the catapult. Simultaneously with the plane on the starboard catapult being fired, the one on the port catapult fired. The trouble shooter received fatal injuries, the director received minor cerebral concussion and a broken hand, one handler received a cerebral concussion and the other handler received scratches. The plane made a water landing and the pilot was recovered uninjured.

(2) The largest single maintenance problem was controlling the amount of high pressure oil leaks. Due to the excessive amount of vibration during high pressure launches, the copper tubing connection was the greatest source of trouble. The copper tubing hardened on the flanged seat, and had to be annealed frequently. The return line from the composite valve to the main gravity return line also leaked excessively. If this line which is steel tubing, could be changed to flexible tubing, the vibration on the composite valve would be greatly reduced.

(3) Many difficulties were encountered with the tubular bridle catchers. They were improved by inserting a 20MM gun spring in place of the original spring. With the usage of heavier bridle, the old spring allowed the plunger to bottom against the forward part of the catcher and usually the entire insides was lost over the bow. To keep the insides of the bridle catcher from being pulled out, a piece of strap iron was cut to a length of 8 inches. This was then bent to a 90 degree angle about 2 inches from the end. A bolt was welded to the long end and a key slot clip was inserted in the deck. When this piece of metal was installed it butted against the forward end of the catcher and acted as a brake.

(4) Approximately 90% of the personnel received on board and assigned to catapults were inexperienced. After about three (3) months of operations, (including the period of training) the peak of efficiency was reached although most of the men know only one job. However, at the conclusion of the tour, all the non-rated men were familiar with all non-rated jobs and men could be shifted around as needed.

(5) The mercury relay timing switch that controls the hydraulic gear pumps was a critical item. One switch caused trouble on the No. 3 pump on the starboard catapult for several months. This defective switch was in a continual state of repair as replacement switches were not available in the area.

(6) The following minimums of relative wind across the deck were required for catapulting F9F's with full fuel (internal and wing tip tanks) and 20MM loads, using 3500 psi pressure on the catapults.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WIND KTS RELATIVE</th>
<th>ARMAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>2 Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>4 Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>6 Rockets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rockets were removed, as necessary, to meet the above minimums. Catapulting pressures were reduced by 50 psi for every knot of wind obtained over the minimum required.
b. Arresting Gear

(1) Davis Barrier:

(a) The Davis Barrier proved highly satisfactory during this operation. All engagements were excellent and no major difficulties were encountered when re-rigging. The flight deck crews and Repair VIII were checked out on rigging, and this helped tremendously in the saving of time. A new Davis Barrier could be installed and ready in four minutes.

(b) A Davis Barrier that was not rendered useless by an engagement would last from five to six days until the normal wear of aircraft running over them required their replacement. Rain had no effect except that the barrier would stretch and the slack had to be taken out.

(2) Since there have been some cases of jets going through all the Davis Barriers without an engagement, the nylon barricade is highly recommended for installation on all carriers.

(3) When jets are landing the conventional barrier operators are alert for any possible emergencies. They have been instructed to use the conventional barriers in an attempt to stop a jet if the nose wheel is broken off, or if there is a possibility of its not being engaged normally. The barrier should be raised after the nose of the jet has passed the cable, thereby making it possible for the conventional barrier to engage the main landing gear or tail hook of the jet.

(4) Pilots and the Landing Signal Officers have been repeatedly cautioned of the probability that a normal barrier engagement cannot be made if an F9F lands with speed brakes down. As the speed brakes, when extended, are in the near vertical position, about six (6) inches from the deck and equidistant from the nose and main gear, they will probably slap the cables down to the deck after the cables have been flipped up by the action of the nose gear.

(5) There were numerous cases of the tail hook dropping from an F9F during taxiing out of the gear. The hook usually picked up No. 5 Davis Barrier and destroyed it. The most probable cause of this discrepancy was the nut cracker switch on the starboard wheel opening when the oleo extended during a taxi turn or excessive braking. When the switch opened the hook dropped.

(6) When a Davis Barrier was accidentally torn by the hook, there usually was not sufficient time to re-rig for the remaining jets. The jets were then brought aboard with two barriers up.

(7) The barriers were rigged in accordance with prescribed standards; No. 1 and No. 3 being conventional, and No. 1's 2, 4 and 5 Davis. Except as noted above, three (3) Davis Barriers are always used for jet recoveries.

(8) The first three cross-deck pendants were changed quite frequently, one of the three being changed daily. This unusual wear is assumed to have been caused by the high speed and weight of the landing jet. To help save the pendants, every jet tail hook was greased before each launch by the plane captain.

(9) No maintenance difficulties were encountered with the arresting gear, and the equipment functioned highly satisfactorily.

(10) Approximately 75% of the arresting gear personnel were inexperienced when training was first commenced. Relatively little operating time was required before the crew was proficient in their duties.
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 31 Oct-30 Nov 1951, Part 3
4. Aircraft Maintenance (Ship)

a. Engine Changes

(1) All engine changes were performed by the V-4 Division with the assistance of two CAG maintenance men. The number of engine changes, exclusive of swapping engines from dud aircraft, consisted of one jet (J-42) engine, one R-2800-32W; seven R-2800-18W and five R-3350-26WA engines.

(2) Although 21 F9F's were on board, only one jet engine was changed. The ship had been issued five canned jet engines. It is recommended that only three engines of this type be issued as they are available in the area and may be picked up during in-port periods.

(3) The original outfitting also included four jet engine stands of which only two were required. Two special car-puller stands which proved to be unnecessary were off loaded. Seven jet OEC's were received of which only one was used. It is recommended that only three OEC's be provided. Twelve jet hoisting slings were furnished. It appears that three would be adequate. Four F9F tail dollies were furnished and were adequate as to number but had to be modified to fit the aircraft as specified in VF-52 RADM 27-50. The screw operating mechanism is very weak. It is recommended that a hydraulic mechanism be provided.

(4) The jet engine change was performed by hoisting the engine into place by using a fork lift. This procedure proved satisfactory. The fork lift was used due to lack of space under the only chain fall in Bay #1 of the hangar deck, which space was utilized for jet parking and maintenance. It is recommended that three chain hoists be provided in Bay #1. Two additional chain falls could have been installed by the ship, but the suspension hangers were not obtainable. The hangers provided were completely satisfactory, if obtainable.

b. Propeller Changes

(1) The V-4 Division is charged with the assembly, stowage and installation of all propellers. This was satisfactorily accomplished without undue moving of aircraft by the use of a fork lift and a ship constructed attachment which projects 32 inches forward and 40 inches upward from the fingers of the lift. A total of 15 Aero A-652-G8 and 11 Hamilton 2E-60-45 propellers were changed. It was found advantageous to spot one assembled propeller of each type in the vicinity of Hangar Deck Control to avoid unnecessary shifting of aircraft on the hangar deck.

c. The electric hoist on the monorail in the after end of the hangar deck was satisfactory. However, an additional manually operated chain hoist on the monorail would facilitate the changing of engines in that an engine could be removed from an aircraft, moved away and another moved into place without taking one engine off the hoist to pick up the other. No spare hooks for hoists were available.

d. The engine storage space, C-4L4A, on this type of CV was designed for the storage of spare engines in boxes and has insufficient clearance for canned engines other than jets. Spare engines had to be stored in the sponsors on the starboard side aft and on the hangar deck.

e. Adequate preservation of all off load engines and aircraft was accomplished with difficulty due to the lack of a portable pre-oiler. Furthermore, newly installed engines had to be started without adequate pre-oiling. It is recommended that a portable pre-oiling outfit be provided each ship.
f. Hangar deck lighting for aircraft maintenance was inadequate. It is recommended that portable lighting stands be provided for this purpose.

g. It was found that a spark plug hot locker was mandatory. A satisfactory one was built by the Aviation Metal Shop for this ship. It is recommended that this be made part of each CV's allowance. All plugs used were drawn, checked, tested and placed in the hot locker for issue to the operating squadrons by the V-4 Division.

h. All tires and tubes were drawn and assembled by the V-4 Division's tire detail. This insured a supply of ready issue assembled wheels and assured compliance with all safety orders applicable.

i. It was found necessary to tap in on the catapult system to obtain high pressure air for refilling the air bottles of the F9F aircraft. It is recommended that all CV's be provided with a high pressure air pump.

j. The five bottle type of oxygen cart was found to be too cumbersome to move around closely packed aircraft. Three of this type were provided. One was disassembled and stowed and the other two were spotted on the hangar deck. Aircraft oxygen bottles were removed from the aircraft and refilled at the spotted carts, which saved the trip to the oxygen shop. It is recommended that a two-bottle cart be provided that can be readily maneuvered around the aircraft. 43,983.8 cu. ft. of oxygen were expended during the six months tour.

k. Considerable repair of potential class 265 material was effected; however, repairs were limited by the lack of a small spot welder, a heat oven and a set of sheet metal dimpling tools. It is recommended that the aforementioned equipment be furnished all CV metal shops. The heat treat oven should be of sufficient size to handle items up to 24 inches in length.

l. The ship had inadequate racks for aviation sheet metal. Temporary racks were installed at frames 193-195 outside the aviation metal shop and frames 186-187 inboard, inside the metal shop.

m. All aircraft recovered on board from other carriers and all COD aircraft were serviced and repaired by plane captains and crews of the V-4 Division. It is recommended that a limited number of spare parts such as tires, tubes and control surfaces for TFN type aircraft be carried on board.

n. The parachute loft effected parachute inflation, inspections and repack on board. 118 parachutes were repacked monthly at Naval Air Facility (Oppama) Yokosuka, Japan. 37 parachutes and 35 rafts were expended.

o. The Ford Ferguson type of plane handling tractors were unsatisfactory until the governors were removed. It required low gear operation to move loaded aircraft and insufficient speed in the low gear required the removal of the governors. Furthermore, the step between the 2nd and 3rd gear ratio is too high, and whereas one provides power, the speed is inadequate, and visa versa. It is recommended that a tractor be developed with a diesel engine of more power, fluid drive to eliminate the clutch and gear shift and smaller wheels to increase the pulling power.

p. The establishment of a tractor pool at Yokosuka was highly satisfactory. Four tractors were exchanged.

q. Operating and safety instructions for mobile equipment and heavy machinery were promulgated and posted on all equipment.

r. The disposal of waste gasoline has proved a definite fire hazard. It is recommended that a waste gasoline drain line be installed from the flight deck and hangar deck to exhaust below the water line of the ship aft.

-28-
The system of aircraft maintenance by individual squadrons of the Air Group has been excellent as shown by the availability of aircraft; however, the duplication of effort, storage space and tools seems to offset any esprit de corps that might be gained by this system. At times some squadron personnel were working short-handed while those of other squadrons were idle. Each squadron and the CAS office maintained a technical library while the Air Department also maintained one. The squadron logs and records were kept in the Aircraft Maintenance Office thereby effecting centralization; however, each squadron had its own yeoman to maintain its logs. It is recommended that the CAS system be adopted to eliminate duplication and also establish a system of job control in the various shops, especially in the sheet metal shop where competition at times was objectionable. Consideration should also be given to providing equipment more suitable and usable in various phases of maintenance.

Aviation Electrical Shop

(1) During the tour the Aviation Electrical Shop was operated by ship's personnel for use by the Air Group personnel. It was found that the space provided is inadequate for maintaining test equipment and the squadrons' need for space when repairing defective electrical equipment. Although all the necessary test equipment was available, sufficient space was not provided to install all test setups needed with the present type of aircraft in use. It is recommended that consideration be given to utilizing the space normally utilized for stowing diving gear which is located aft of the aviation electrical shop. Rearrangement of the stowage of diving gear would probably permit the use of a portion of this space and enable the performance of a better maintenance job.

Battery Shop

(1) Under the present setup the battery shop is operated and maintained by personnel in the Engineering Department of the ship. During operations when an Air Group is embarked the load on this shop is primarily aircraft batteries. Present space is inadequate and it is recommended that consideration be given to rearranging the space, taking into consideration the type of aircraft batteries serviced.

Aviation Electronics

(1) Shop Arrangement

(a) Under the present arrangement, the AN/APS-4 and AN/APS-19 test bench setups were installed on the platform, 02 level, between frames 107-111. 28 volt power was utilized from the main shop and an 800 cycle AC Supply from an Onan installation was reworked to provide better voltage regulation. This arrangement eliminated congestion in the main electronics shop and isolated the maintenance of radar equipment from other types of electronic gear. It also provided easy access to the stowage spaces for radar equipment.

(b) In the event additional types of electronic equipment such as AN/APS-31 and AN/APS-30 are to be maintained during the next tour along with the present types now aboard it will be desirable to rearrange some of the test bench setups. In this connection it appears desirable to increase the platform space and it is recommended that a review be made to determine a solution for maintaining additional equipment which could be further developed as maintenance changes occur.
(2) **Auxiliary Power Units**

(a) During the first five months of operation the use of auxiliary power units was limited primarily to maintenance of electronic equipment, and to operating wings on the AD type aircraft in connection with ordnance loading. The 28 volt Howe-lite units served these purposes very satisfactorily except for maintenance of electronic equipment in F4U-5NL, AD-4N and AD-4W aircraft where the load was heavier, thereby necessitating the use of the 28 volt Wakesha units. However, with the advent of colder weather which required the starting of engines with auxiliary power, it was necessary to rely solely on the heavier APUs. In this connection suitable space was not provided on the flight deck for stowage of these units when not in use. It is recommended that consideration be given toward providing a satisfactory space for stowage purposes. It appears that suitable space could be provided by the addition of a platform outboard of the flight deck on the starboard side near the 5 inch gun mount.

(b) During this ship's tour of duty in the forward area the inadequate stowage space for auxiliary power equipment resulted in the damage of several units which could not be repaired or replaced in the area. It is recommended that suitable repair facilities be made available for such repairs during yard availability and that replacements also be on hand when units cannot be repaired.

(3) **Material Usage**

(a) Except for shortages which constantly occurred due primarily to items not being available in the area, the usage during the six months period did not, in general, exceed that normally provided under the Section R Allowances. However, these shortages existed prior to the ship's departure from the States and such shortages were not filled until the latter part of this tour. There were a few items where the allowance was inadequate, and recommendations have been included in the Air Group's section of this report.

(4) **Performance of Test Equipment**

(a) The test equipment was adequate and very little trouble was experienced during the period. However, it is recommended that consideration be given toward reviewing the quantities provided to determine if some items could be eliminated or reduced and others increased.

5. **Aircraft Servicing**

a. **Aviation Ordnance**

(1) **Personnel**

(a) The total number of permanently assigned personnel was insufficient to carry out the V-6 Division's task as required by air operations in TF-77. An average of 65 men was permanently assigned during the operating period. Twenty non-rated men were furnished by the Gunnery Department to augment the work load in the division while in the operating area. It is therefore recommended that a minimum of 85 men be provided to efficiently carry out the assigned duties of this division. The assigned duties included mess cooks, compartment cleaners, special weapons personnel, bomb supply crews, 20MM belting crews, bomb elevator operators and napalm mixing crews. The day crew worked from 0730 to 1930 whereas the night crew worked from 1930 to 0730. Other crews worked as required by the air plan.
(b) After an initial breaking in period, the ordnance personnel performed their duties in an excellent manner, meeting all loading requirements in a minimum of time.

(2) Bomb and Rocket Handling

(a) The ship's bomb elevators are small and of 2500 lb. capacity which far under the capacity needed for modern operations. Varied 2000 lb GP bombs and assembled 6.5" ATARS are too long to be safely handled on the elevators and must be vested or assembled on the flight deck. Additional trips of the elevators were required as the ATAR heads and rocket motors had to be sent up separately. This was not conducive to the rapid handling that is required when only forty-five minutes (sometimes less) is allowed to re-arm 6 AD's, 8 F7U's and 6 F9F's.

(b) Mk. 10 suspension bonds were assembled on the 2000 lb GP on the hangar deck when received on replenishment days. These bombs were then stowed in the magazines. The time required to install the bonds was saved when they were required to be loaded for a strike.

(c) The bomb elevators gave satisfactory service from a maintenance viewpoint. No bomb elevator was out of commission due to mechanical failure for any extended period.

(3) Napalm

(a) The Napalm mixing procedure used proved satisfactory. During close air support flights approximately 50 tanks per day were filled, without difficulty, using incendiary mixers, Mk 1 bod 1, modified to add Xylenol. A crew of 10 Air Department men handled all the details such as renaming the gasoline stations, keeping an adequate supply of tanks available for the squadron ordnancemen, and filling the tanks when hung.

(b) The Mk 77 fire bomb was evaluated from the ship's standpoint as to assembly and handling. A crew of 3 men could assemble one (1) Mk 77 in approximately 25 minutes. This included uncrating. The hanging, filling and installation of the igniters required 15 minutes per bomb. At a usage rate of 40 per day a crew would be required for full time duty, just for assembling fire bombs. While no extensive experience has been accomplished in moving the filled Mk 77 on deck, it is believed that a hoisting lug on future models would simplify handling.

(c) In warm weather about one-half a gallon of Xylenol per tank was sufficient to give a very satisfactory gel. In cold weather this amount was increased to one gallon to obtain the same result.

(4) Advanced Underwater Weapons and Mines

(a) The torpedo shop is in an overcrowded condition due to this vessel carrying a full allowance of tools and spares for the Mk 13 torpedo, Mk 24, and 25 mines. It is recommended that the Mk 13 torpedo equipment be offloaded as the space is required for storage of Mk 24 and 25 mine equipment.

(b) Four Mk 24-0 aircraft mines were kept in a ready condition and one was used each day for DASP. No difficulty was experienced with maintenance, although servicing facilities were less than adequate. No cold storage space was available for the "B" batteries or M25 mine 'SD' sterilizers. A minimum of 8 cu. ft. of refrigeration should be available for this. Battery charging facilities were not adequate nor in a good location near the torpedo shop. Facilities for keeping 12 batteries on charge should be available but under the present arrangement of using the ship's battery shop facilities, this was not possible due to lack of space.
(5) Ordnance Disposal and Safety

(a) The ship had at least one qualified explosive ordnanceman on board during the entire tour. This man and an assistant were stationed on the flight deck at all times during flight operations, and were responsible for the following:

1. Handling and disposal of all returned explosive ordnance.
2. Assist in inspection of loaded bombs and rockets for proper installations and safe condition.
3. Guarding against all unsafe or dangerous practices which may be detected in the handling and loading of explosives, taking immediate and positive corrective action as necessary.
4. Under the supervision of the Air Ordnance Officer, installation of all long-dwty, anti-withdrawal fuses. This included inspection and assembly of these fuses and gaging threads in the bomb fuse cavities.

(6) Ammunition Belting

(a) All .50 caliber ammunition received was belted, most of it in 255 round belts. This was highly satisfactory from the ship’s viewpoint. With only two squadrons using 20mm aircraft ammunition, a belting crew of eight men was able to keep up with requirements easily. If all aircraft aboard had 20mm guns installed, it would be necessary to have a day and a night crew, as sufficient space is not available for two crews to work at one time.

b. Aviation Fuel

(1) The Gasoline Division (V-7) has a total of 57 men assigned. This number, while not extremely critical, is insufficient for complete coverage of all work to be accomplished. Experience indicates that an increase of personnel to 71 men is needed for the most efficient operations, particularly if two jet squadrons are embarked.

(2) The division is proud of the fact that no flight was delayed for lack of gasoline. The stress laid on safety has paid off in that during this six months of “stepped-up” operations there was no damage to equipment or injuries to personnel.

(3) The operation of receiving gasoline at sea was accomplished by the standard Elwood method of replenishment. Due to the construction of this vessel’s gasoline piping system, it was impossible to take advantage of the modified gasoline re-fueling hook-up offered by all the tankers (ACTs) that have serviced this ship, except the USS ASHTARULA (AO-61), which utilized the four inch hose and single connections. By installation of a three-way, three-position valve in the refueling line at the fueling connection on the forward port side of the hangar deck, it would be possible for this ship to receive the modified hook-up and increase the receiving rate by about thirty percent. At present, the receiving rate is approximately forty thousand gallons per hour with tank top pressure of 10 psi or less.

(4) During a refueling operation, early in the operating period, a minor casualty was experienced. During this casualty, in order to prevent excessive gasoline spillage, the ship used the eductor for a positive and immediate drain-back. This proved to be so effective that on the next replenishment operation the eductor was used instead of the customary Inert Gas blow-back method for clearing the hose and found to be superior in that a positive drain-back was made and there was, therefore, no raw gasoline exposed to create a serious fire hazard. The eductor method decreased the time involved in unhooking from the tanker from approximately fifteen minutes to something less than five minutes.
(5) On two occasions the gasoline received by this vessel was of doubtful quality. First, on 7 July 1951, gasoline was received from the USS CALIENTE (AO-53), that was suspected of being contaminated. The gasoline was of a dark brown color. An immediate investigation was started to determine the cause and nature of the possible contamination. This gasoline was put into one piston type aircraft and one jet powered aircraft and ground checked. Neither plane engine indicated any trouble, loss of power, failure to take throttle or inclination to cut out. The Maintenance Officer of CAG-102 determined that the gasoline was usable. To support this decision, a sample was sent to the Quartermaster, Petroleum Products Laboratory (Motor and Aircraft) Sasebo, Japan (Yokosuka Terminal), for analyzing. Their report: "According to the distillation test, the sample is satisfactory for use." The second occasion was on 5 November 1951, when this ship refueled from the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51). During the first hour, about fifteen thousand gallons of water and eleven thousand gallons of gasoline were received. In the water, in suspension, was great deal of foreign matter that looked like rust. After two hours of pumping, the gasoline cleared up. Upon completion of re-fueling a sedimentation test was made on a sample of the fuel. The particles, resembling rust, were found to be too heavy to suspend in gasoline and they rapidly settled out of the water that carried it. Extensive checks were made at all filtering points of the system with negative results. It was decided that the fuel was fit to use. It proved to be satisfactory.

(6) Aviation lubrication oil, received on board in drums was struck down by use of a finger lift which supported the drums above the funnel at the hangar deck oil inlet ports. It took approximately three (3) minutes to drain each drum.

(7) Gasoline is issued from the flight and hangar deck fueling stations by teams made up from the V-6 division. These teams consist of a hose man and one man with a GO2 bottle and a swab. The plane captain assists and is responsible for the fueling of his plane.

(8) For normal operations, the fueling of jets is accomplished by the use of the gasoline-lube oil fuel proportioner (3% by volume). It was found that the use of this proportioner cut down the discharge rate of the station as the output of proportioned fuel was dependent on the oil inlet pressure to the proportioner. Since the maximum pressure drop in pumping station is fifty psi and with the resultant pressure drop in the pumping up to the discharge points, the pressure at the proportioner inlet was usually about twenty-five psi. This deficiency was overcome by installing a de-fueling pump in the oil line immediately ahead of the proportioner. This served as an oil pressure booster. The oil pressure thus attained was set at approximately sixty psi at the proportioner inlet and resulted in nearly one hundred percent increase in proportioned fuel output. The pump employed was the Navy standard de-fueling pump.

(9) In the event that time for re-fueling aircraft is limited, the proportioner outlets are augmented by the plane captains carrying the necessary oil in a metal dispenser and the gasoline crews using a straight gasoline outlet. The quantity of oil was predetermined by the amount of gasoline required to fill the plane being serviced.

(10) To insure against the possibility of a plane leaving the ship short of fuel, personnel are employed to check with the plane captain of each plane scheduled for a flight thirty minutes prior to launching time.

(11) To prevent possible contamination of gasoline on board, the hose nozzles, when not in use, were covered with canvas boots.
(12) Daily, prior to any fueling, the ships filtering devices were all checked and drained and the system inspected for leaks.

(13) The lube oil is issued from one lube oil outlet on the hangar deck and from three outlets on the flight deck (at present only one flight deck outlet is used for bulk issue). The oil for these outlets is supplied from a gravity tank on the 05 level. This tank is maintained and kept full by the two men assigned to the lube oil pump room.

(14) No alcohol was received on board during the six months tour. When issued, it was done so under the strictest supervision and then only on request of the Maintenance Officer or CO of the activity requiring it. Alcohol was issued only in safety cans.

(15) De-fueling of aircraft was accomplished by means of the standard Navy de-fueling pump. Whenever possible, de-fueling was accomplished back into the main system to avoid unnecessary waste of fuel. Jets, due to the oil mixture used, were de-fueled over the side.

(16) When night landings were to be made, the last two rows of aircraft on the flight deck were completely de-fueled to reduce the fire hazard in the event of a barrier failure. (Ref: Com Caribic One-Three-Five Standard Operating Instructions, para. 204).

To assist in handling the de-fueling pump, the pump was mounted on a MK 1 Bomb skid. The pump was set on the skid and secured with the straps attached. By using a "C" clamp on either side, additional security was gained. No modification of the skid was necessary.

(17) The major part of the training program was under the cognizance of the Air Department Training Officer. The part the division played was for the most part, an "on the job" version. This was done by a periodic rotation of non-rated men from one job to another. For the rated men the same applies but the rotation was made at greater intervals and when possible, to a job with a higher degree of responsibility.

(18) There were two incidents during the six months tour in which aviation gasoline was spilled from wing tip tanks on the F9F. Both occurred on the hangar deck and therefore, created a serious fire hazard. In one, the tip tank dump switch was inadvertently pulled in the cockpit, thereby partially jettisoning the fuel in that tip tank. In the other case, the tip tank was punctured by a projection from the hangar deck bulkhead when one oil cap of an F9F dropped. In each occurrence, the casualty was immediately detected, and the proper safety precautions were instituted to prevent a serious fire. It was and still is the policy to fuel all the tip tanks of jets as soon after landing as operations permit in order to be prepared for any emergency launch.

6. Safety

a. This ship has made an effort during this past tour to stress safety as much as possible consistent with the demand for fast, efficient flight operations. The keynote of the safety effort was to convince each man that he was responsible for his own safety. As time progressed and each individual became more familiar with his job and more used to working in the vicinity of danger he tended to become less safety conscious. To offset this dangerous trend each division officer was required to personally ascertain that all existing safety orders were reviewed to each man in his division at least once per month. Flagrant violations of safety were immediately brought to the attention of all hands and corrective measures were taken. As the need for it became apparent a pamphlet concerning safety was published and distributed to Air Department and Air Group personnel. In this pamphlet an effort was made to highlight dangerous practices with an interjection of a bit of humor for readability. Despite all efforts to make each man aware of his own safety, certain practices crept into operations from time to time. Some of these for which definite corrective measures were instituted are commented on here.
(1) It was discovered that during cold rainy weather, plane captains while manning their aircraft, tended to close the canopies of the cockpits when the planes were being moved from hangar to flight deck or visa versa. If a plane went overboard from rough seas and/or high winds, the chances of escaping from the plane would be greatly lessened by a closed cockpit. Cooperation of Squadron Safety Officers and instructions to elevator operators, not to operate elevators while the canopy was closed on a plane solved this problem.

(2) The use of elevators as a means of transportation between the flight and hangar decks endangered those who tried to get on at the last minute, be the first person off, or stand closest to the edge. The safety man on the elevator was held strictly accountable for giving the up and down signal.

(3) On two occasions jets taking late wave offs passed dangerously low over the number two elevator. This necessitated keeping planes and personnel off of number two elevator during jet recoveries.

(4) Because of the inherent danger of a jet jumping or going through the barriers and crashing into the pack, no personnel were allowed on the forward part of the flight deck during jet landings except the directors. Prior to each jet recovery, the Air Officer passed the word for all personnel to get clear of the forward part of the flight deck and unnecessary and unauthorized personnel to get clear of the catwalks. Masters-at-arms stood by to enforce the Air Officer's order.

(5) After a launch when aircraft were being taxied forward, chockmen drifted up the deck and tended to "grab" their planes as they came forward. Chockmen were instructed to keep "hands off" the plane until it was parked by the director.

(6) Filled tip tanks on the folded wings of the F9F created a hazard during high wind conditions and ship maneuvering. Several near upsets occurred. Personnel were continually reminded not to get under the sides of jets opposite the direction of turn during the ship maneuvers.

(7) The urge to get to the other side of the flight deck despite the fact that planes were being taxied up the deck resulted in frequent dashes across to the other side. Close supervision by personnel in primary Flight Control and the supervisory personnel on the flight deck resulted in a lessening, but not cessation, of this dangerous practice.

(8) An unbelievably large amount of small bits of metal (arming wires, clips, bolts, pins, screws, etc.) collected on the flight deck. In propeller or jet blasts each bit of metal became a potential hazard. Prevention at the source was the best method of eliminating this hazard. Instruction of ordnance crews, maintenance crews, and plane captains to pick up all bits of metal for which they were responsible helped, but did not eliminate this practice.

(9) Maintenance personnel often drew a small amount of gasoline from aircraft. It was discovered that in some cases personnel disposed of this gasoline through the deck drains rather than walk aft to the garbage chute on the fantail, (the designated place for gasoline disposal). It would be desirable to have at about four different spots on the hangar deck, a waterline drain for disposing of contaminated gasoline.
(10) The area just forward of Flight Deck Control tended to collect such items as chocks, bomb carts, tie-downs, reels, etc. Items that drifted too far out into the deck were caught in blasts during jet launches and became dangerous missiles. Closer supervision by flight deck personnel and indoctrination of all concerned lessened this hazard.

(11) The need for safety consciousness on the flight and hangar decks is ever present. Not only must all personnel be made to constantly think safety, but supervision must be constant to eliminate and prevent certain short cut practices that personnel tend to adopt from time to time.

(12) Two accidental firings of 20mm rounds occurred on the flight deck during the six months tour. One was controlled, the possibility of a round firing from a jammed gun was considered and precautions were taken that personnel and objects in the line of fire were clear. The other inadvertent firing occurred after the night landing of an F4U-5NL while the ordnanceman was clearing the gun. One round was fired causing extensive damage to the fuselage of an F4U spotted forward. The policy had been to return the breech block to battery position (forward) after the guns were cleared and prior to the new ammunition being wound back into the feed mechanism. The disadvantage of this system is that of the possibility of carelessly overlooking a remaining round in the gun, particularly at night. The policy was changed so that the breech block is left back (out of battery) after the guns are cleared. Prior to cleaning guns, the line of fire was checked to determine that personnel and obstructions were clear. Furthermore, all guns were cleared prior to the aircraft being moved to the hangar deck.}

(13) During this six months tour in the Korean area, the following personnel casualties occurred on board ship during air operations: One man was fatally injured when he walked or fell into a propeller. One man was fatally injured and two were moderately injured during the inadvertent catapulting of a jet.

7. Statistics

a. The following is the expenditure of the indicated items for the six (6) months tour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>F4U</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wing panels</td>
<td>5L &amp; 10R</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailerons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaps</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dive brakes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilizer (Horiz.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevators</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudder</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG Main Strut</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG Tail/nose strut</td>
<td>7/1 Yoke</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10/1 Yoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheels (main)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel brakes</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheels, Tail/nose</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires (main)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires, nose/tail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubes (main)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubes, nose/tail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail hooks</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowling (Eng,Ring)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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</table>
(2) Aviation Material Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>F4F</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TBD</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>MATERIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wing panels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16 sq.ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaps</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 sq.ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevators</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 sq.ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudders</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 sq.ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowling, Speedring</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 sq.ft. 3 SO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Aviation gasoline - 3,064,000 gallons.

(4) Aviation lube oil - 46,087 gallons.

(5) Alcohol - 300 gallons.

b. The following is the number of catapult shots, deck launches, arrested landings and barrier crashes made during the six months tour:

(1) Catapult shots:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Catapult</th>
<th>F4F</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TBD</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std Catapult</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3082</td>
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(2) Dock Launches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F4F</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TBD</th>
<th>F6F</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2207</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3915</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) Arrested Landings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Strike</th>
<th>Major O/H</th>
<th>On Board</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F4F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Personnel

a. During the period covered by this report 54 men have been transferred from the ship, 47 of whom were for separation; 20 men were received on board for duty, making a total loss of thirty-four men. However, the total remaining on board in ship's company is 1,934, which is the approved allowance for this vessel. During the last stay in Yokosuka 246 enlisted, 246 officers were sent on rest leave.

2. Training

a. Training was conducted during each trip to port and whenever operating conditions permitted. 26 USAF courses were completed, three shipboard classes in Physics, Algebra and Geometry were organized; forty-five (SED) (High School Level) and 15(College Level) test were administered. 736 men have been recommended for advancement and service wide competitive examinations have been requested for the examinations to be conducted in January 1952. 863 men became eligible for advancement to pay grade E-3 and 562 were advanced.
3. Recreation

a. Recreational facilities in port consisted of service rest hotels, beach facilities and use of athletic and recreational activities at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan. It is considered that during the limited times the ship is in port a motor vehicle should be made available to the Commanding Officer. This is particularly true at Yokosuka for official visits, transportation to NAS, Atsugi, for administrative flying and for recreational activities. Recreational facilities at sea were limited by the nature of the operations during this period. Motion pictures provided the main form of recreation, being shown nightly in six different places, though it was not always possible to have movies shown on the hangar deck. Football contests in the weekly ship's paper brought an average of 150 entries per week. A chess tournament and a photography contest were brought to a successful conclusion. Band concerts were held daily, weather permitting, and proved very popular. Plans, preliminary to the return of the ship to the United States, were made for a ship's dance upon arrival on the West Coast.

4. Awards and Discipline

a. During this period corrective discipline remained low. There were 32 men brought before Captain's Court, seven were tried by Summary Court Martial and three were tried by Special Court Martial. Twenty-four men received Good Conduct Medals and one Legion of Merit, three Bronze Star Medals and fourteen Letters of Commendation with ribbon were awarded.

5. Operations

a. On 29 October, while clearing Yokosuka Harbor enroute to the operating area as a unit of the Task Element under command of Commander, Cruiser Division FIVE in the LOS ANGELES, the Commanding Officer of the BON HOMME RICHARD was directed to assume the duties of OTC of the Task Element, composed of the NEW JERSEY, DESTROYER SQUADRON FIFTEEN and DESTROYER DIVISION ONE SEVEN TWO, totaling fourteen ships, when the LOS ANGELES was delayed in Yokosuka for emergency repairs. The Task Element rejoined Task Force 77 and the replenishment force on the afternoon of 31 October, after conducting training exercises enroute.

DISTRIBUTION:

Original - CNO (plus 4 for chain of command) CO USS PRINCETON (CV-37) (1)
CNO (2 advance) CO USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) (2)
ComAirPac (10) CO USS ANTLER (CV-36) (2)
CinCFOc (5 advance) CO USS ESSEX (CV-9) (2)
CTF-77 (2 advance) ComCar.lrGruTWO (1)
ComFairJap (1) ComCar.lrGruFIVE (1)
NavIntelScol, Wash., D.C. (1) ComCar.lrGruLEVEN (1)
ComCarDivONE (2) ComCar.lrGruFIFTEEN (1)
ComCarDivTHREE (2) ComCar.lrGruNINETEEN (1)
ComCarDivSEVENTEEN (2) ComCar.lrGruONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
CO USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) (1) ComCar.lrGruONE HUNDRED TWO (20)
CO USS BOXER (CV-21) (1) ComCar.lrGru (ATU) ONE (1)
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 21-27 Jun 1952
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 21 June through 27 June 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group SEVEN letter dated 28 June 1952
(2) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN confidential dispatch

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 21 June through 27 June is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) CAPTAIN PAUL W. WATSON commanding, with ComCarDivONe, Rear Admiral HERBERT E. REGAN and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area on 21 June 1952.

On 23 June 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN off the eastern coast of Korea near the Thirty Eight Parallel. The Task Force was commanded by Rear Admiral A. SOUCEK, ComCarDivTHREE, aboard the USS BOXER (CV 21) and operating under Task Force Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of the USS BOXER (CV 21), USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47), USS PRINCETON (CV 37) and various heavy support and screening ships.

On 26 June 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Task Force 77 in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 2502402 and arrived in Sasebo, Japan on 27 June 1952 for duty as ready carrier.

The mission of Task Force 77 is in accordance with CTF 77’s Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

Carrier Air Group SEVEN is commanded by Commander G.B. BROWN, USN, and consisted of the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 21 June 1952:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>NO. OF PILOTS</th>
<th>NO. AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 F9F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16 F9F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 F4U-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16 AD-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 F4U-5N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 AD-LW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 AD-LNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 AD-3Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU-1</td>
<td>2 (Assigned to Ship)</td>
<td>1 HO3S-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

6/21/52: Departed Yokosuka, Japan for the Operating Area, Underway Operational Training flights were conducted off the eastern coast of Japan.

6/22/52: Enroute to Operating Area.
6/23/52: At 0528Z the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN, marking the return of this carrier to the Korean Theater of Operations after an absence of nearly seven months. The first strike of the day, launched at 1415Z, saw 13 AD's, 13 F4U-4's, and 19 F9F-2's strike the power plants and electrical installations of previously restricted areas in North Korea. The strike, coordinated with the United States Air Force through JOG, Korea, was a spectacular success, resulting in total destruction of the transformer and power house of Fusen #2 Hydro-Electric Plant. 80% destruction to the transformer yard and turbine building of Kyosen #2 hydro-electric plant, rendering both plants, exclusive targets of BHR planes, permanently non-operational.

6/24/52: Continuing the offensive operations of the previous day, this ship launched a total of 42 offensive sorties in one event against Kyosen #4 hydro-electric power plant, a target that had been attacked by the planes of another carrier the preceding day, but which photographic interpretation indicated was not severely damaged and might be operable. According to the P.I. Report following the BHR attack, the following damage was inflicted: Power House destroyed, fuel storage tank and transformer yard completely demolished. Overall damage - plant and facilities 75% destroyed. In addition to the power plant attack, two bridges were destroyed and one heavily damaged on a rail strike mission.

6/25/52: Unfavorable weather over most of North Korea hindered the BHR planes this date. Coordinated jet-prop strikes were made on troop concentrations, supply storage areas and truck parks in the CT sector south of Wonsan. The first casualty of this tour was inflicted upon a VF 74 pilot, Ensign Ronald EATON, USNR, whose F4U-4 was believed to have been hit by flak immediately before the pilot parachuted over enemy territory in the target area. A helicopter picked up the downed pilot, but was itself struck by enemy fire and crashed. It is believed at this time the BHR pilot was captured and is a prisoner of war. Other sorties for the day included 22 CAP and 4 ASP.

6/26/52: No flights were conducted. The efforts of the Bon Homme Richard were directed to replenishment activities.

6/27/52: The Bon Homme Richard arrived at Sasebo, Japan at 0800Z.

PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Material
   (a) Performance of ordnance material was satisfactory and without casualty.

   (b) Lower stage bomb elevator B-1-A at Frame 65 parted its cable when electric switches failed to operate and allowed elevator to over-run. Repairs are being effected by ship's force.

2. Training
   (a) An intensive training program was conducted with emphasis on recognition, battle telephone procedure, and on station instruction of gun and control crews.

3. Deck Evolutions
   (a) During this period, fuel, aviation gasoline, ammunition and personnel were transferred without casualty to personnel or equipment.

4. Ammunition Expended
   (a) Aviation Ordnance
      (1) 2000 lb G.P. Bombs 27
      (2) 1000 lb G.P. Bombs 11
      (3) 500 lb G.P. Bombs 58
      (4) 250 lb G.P. Bombs 263
      (5) 100 lb Inc. AN-M12 82
      (6) 20 MM Ammunition 16,379
      (7) 50 Cal. Ammunition 21,664

   (b) Ship's Ammunition
      None
PART IV
OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship
None

B. Damage to Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Planes</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAU-4</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>Enemy anti-aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>Bomb Blast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Loss of Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu. No.</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/25/52</td>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>FAU-4</td>
<td>81002</td>
<td>Lost over Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(probably due to enemy anti-aircraft fire)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

TARGET

KYOSEN Hydro-Electric Plant No. 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Storage Tank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transformer Yard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KYOSEN Hydro-Electric Plant # 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Yard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control House</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surge Tank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Storage Tank</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUZEN Hydro-Electric Plant # 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Yard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dump</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rail Cuts . . . . . . . . 7

E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target or in those instances when the pilots could assess the damage to a definite total or felt that damage had been inflicted were used in these tables. In many attacks weather, flak, or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, fires and bombings obviously may never be known,
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

Although severely handicapped by the transfer of many experienced key personnel, both officer and enlisted, after its return to the United States in December, the ship, through a well organized training program, coupled with two months operations in the California area, attained a degree of efficiency not ordinarily expected at such an early date. This was made possible by the excellent performance turned in by the Air Group (CVG 7). On the second day of the operation the following dispatch was received from the Task Group Commander.

"YOUR SHIP AND NEW AIR TEAM ARE PERFORMING IN MID SEASON FORM X WISH YOU CONTINUED SUCCESS X" CTF 77 SENDS

This dispatch was received at a most appropriate time and was greatly appreciated as it was a big boost to the morale of the group as well as the ship.

During this brief period of operations, many dispatches commenting upon the excellent performance of Task Force 77 were received. Among these were:

"MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL STRIKES ON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER COMPLEX X THEY DEMONSTRATE WHAT DETERMINED AND WELL TRAINED SQUADRONS CAN DO IN A COORDINATED INTERSERVICE EFFORT . . . WELL DONE" . . . CINCPACFLT SENDS.

"IT IS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I READ THE DISPATCH AND NEWS REPORT OF THE MAGNIFICENT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF YOUR FORCES IN THE SUPERATTACKS UPON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER INSTALLATIONS X THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AND HIGH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS DEMONSTRATED BY YOUR FORCES AND PARTICULARLY THE PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL COMBAT ARE DESERVING OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE X AN INSPIRATION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE AND A WARNING TO THE ENEMY OF HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT X WELL DONE" CNO SENDS TO CTF 77

B. Casualties

ENSIGN RONALD D. EATON, 523824/1325 On 25 June, while flying an F4U-4 on a strike mission over North Korea, Ension Eaton's wingman reported anti-aircraft fire in the form of large black burst at 10,000 feet. Shortly thereafter Eaton reported that his plane was losing oil pressure rapidly. Unable to reach the water, Eaton bailed out, made a normal descent and reached the ground apparently uninjured. A RESCAP was immediately formed from members of his flight, and a nearby helicopter was dispatched to the position. The helicopter effected a rescue but was then shot down, presumably by the intense small arms fire in the area. The Air Force RESCAP, who relieved the Navy flyers, reported one or more survivors from the helicopter. It appeared that any survivors were immediately captured by the enemy, who rushed to the crashed helicopter. Ens. Eaton is listed as mission in action.
of pilots in procedures etc., while enroute to the combat area. It is strongly recommended that these be provided to every carrier prior to deployment from the United States.

b. Equipment

During periods of operations, with the noises and interference caused by telephones, squawk boxes and planes landing and taking off on the flight deck, it is almost impossible to lecture to or brief flight crews properly; and, it is obvious that some type of voice amplifier is needed in each ready room for the proper dissemination of essential information. Requests for some type of amplifying equipment have been repeatedly turned down despite the fact that the NC 28 system is standard equipment for most CV type carriers. It is again recommended that loud speakers be provided for the ready rooms of the USS Bon Homme Richard.

c. Indoctrination of Personnel

In accordance with CinCPacFlt Instruction Number 1560.1 dated 19 February 1951 a 26 page brochure entitled "The Bon Homme Richard Returns" was prepared and distributed to every officer and man aboard prior to the entrance of the ship to Pearl Harbor. This pamphlet was intended as a method of acquainting the crew with the geography, resources and features of Hawaii, Japan and Korea; the customs, traditions and usages of Japan, Japanese politics and the Japanese peace treaty. The importance of respect for other people overseas and the all-important reason of being in the Korean Area to halt aggression and contain communism was stressed throughout.

The major part of the material was drawn from a variety of publications and the printing and artwork were done by ship's personnel. Much appreciation has been expressed for this pamphlet, especially by those going overseas for the first time. Unfortunately limitations on works of this nature are imposed by the lack of sufficient printing facilities aboard ship. It is recommended, therefore, that a similar work be prepared by commands ashore and distributed to everyone deploying to the forward area.

d. Intelligence Lectures

A special lecture on the military and political situation in the Far East was given for the Commanding Officer and approximately thirty additional officers of the ship and Air Group at CinCPac Headquarters prior to departure of the ship for the forward area.

Enroute to the combat area a series of comprehensive lectures as listed in below paragraph was delivered to the Air Group by the ship and Air Group Intelligence Officers. The lectures were well received as they provided background and current information for the pilots on practically all phases of Korean Operations. Each lecture was repeated in each ready room so as to facilitate questions, answers and discussion of the various topics on the agenda.

1. Korean Operational Intelligence
2. Maps, Charts, Grids and Folding Methods
3. Military Geography of Korea
4. Geopolitical Importance of Korea
5. Flak
6. Evasion and Escape
7. Photography and Photographic Interpretation
8. Camouflage
9. Communications and Procedures

On arrival in Yokosuka the Evasion and Escape Team sponsored by ComNavFe boarded the ship and briefed all pilots on evasion and escape techniques in the Korean Area.
The importance of the aforementioned type briefings and lectures cannot be emphasized too strongly and are suggested to all ships and air groups deploying to the forward area.

e. Maps, Charts, Grids and Templates

The Air Navigation Offices located at North Island and NAS Atsugi did an excellent job in providing maps, charts and grids to this ship. The production unit of CinCPac furnished maps and charts not procurable from ANO. Among these the 11" x 8" UTM Grid prepared by CinCPac intelligence numbers 51-224 and the 16" x 10½" airfields Chart No. 52-26 were found very useful by the Air Group and it is recommended that these be made available in quantity to ships deploying to the Korean Theater.

Radar Charts of the East Coast of Korea seemingly are not available from any source. Such charts would be invaluable to personnel engaged on flights during periods of darkness for navigation with radar and pinpointing positions on ECM missions. At least two Guppy units are known to have photographed the East Coast of Korea for this purpose and it is recommended that these be now provided on the basis of this photography.

A template of the Korean Operating area was prepared by the ship, reproduced by the ship's photo lab and distributed to each pilot using the Mark III A plotting board. It is recommended that templates of this kind be produced in quantity and distributed to each ship deploying to the Korean and forward areas.

f. Personnel

On May 15, 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD had aboard four Intelligence officers. Immediately prior to departure of the ship one Ensign was detached, not on his own request, for training in CIC. One Lt. had already submitted a request for release to inactive duty and will be discharged sometime in August. The third, an Ensign, recently received orders and will be detached in July. Replacements are required for these three officers.

2. Photographic Interpretation

Oblique coverage obtained by the Photo Planes of the Bon Homme Richard were distorted on the lower portion of the negative because of interference caused by the plexiglass window. Installation of a new type port in the F9F-2P would eliminate this distortion.

3. Photography

A new system has been adopted for the accounting of photographic materials. A sample part of the new weekly report follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Buer Allow</th>
<th>Ship's Allow</th>
<th>Quant &amp; By Whom Used</th>
<th>Tot. Exp</th>
<th>Amt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Film 8x10</td>
<td>30 boxes</td>
<td>1 ship, 1 Squ</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film 5 1/4x20</td>
<td>20 rolls</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considerable effort was expended in the original compilation of this report. However, since it has been set up, it has been a simple matter to keep it accurate and up to date.
4. Aerology

a. Typhoon Dinah

(1) On the 22nd of June typhoon Dinah was over Ishigaki Shima on a north-northeast course which caused some concern over the ability to carry out operations during this operating period. On the 23rd it was off the southern coast of Kyushu and had by this time increased 20 to 25 knots. It then veered to a northeast course and proceeded up the southern coast of Japan. This movement caused polar air to be drawn in over the operating area from a northwest direction. A high was formed to the west of the storm and over the area. As a result the weather remained operational throughout the period except for short periods due to fog and low stratus along the northeast coast of Korea.

b. Aerological Data

(1) The summary presented below includes observations taken while in the Sea of Japan bounded by the 37th and 40th parallels on the south and north and the 132 meridian and the Korean coast on the east and west. The period covered is from the 23rd to the 25th of June 1952 inclusive.

(a) Winds: The prevailing wind direction was ESE 25% of the time with winds from the SE 17% of the time. The average wind velocity was 8 knots, with the strongest wind of 17 knots from the ENE recorded on the 23rd.

(b) Air Temperature: The average air temperature for the period was 66.7 degrees, with an average maximum and minimum of 68.9 and 65.1 degrees respectively. Maximum temperature for the period was 70.4 degrees, and minimum was 65.5 degrees.

(c) Sea Temperature: Sea water temperature average for the period was 71 degrees with an average maximum temperature of 73 degrees and average minimum temperature of 69 degrees. The maximum and minimum sea water temperature recorded was 74 degrees and 68 degrees respectively.

(d) Ceiling:

Greater than 9950 feet - 33%
Greater than 4950 feet but less than 10,000 - 11%
Greater than 2450 feet but less than 5,000 - 56%
Greater than 950 feet but less than 2,500 - 0%
Less than 1000 feet - 0%

(e) Visibility:

Over 6 miles - 100%
Between 3 and 6 miles - 0%
Less then 3 miles - 0%

5. Communications

a. General: With the embarking of ComCarDiv ONE on this vessel, the communications load has more than tripled. The volume of communications traffic is excessive for the available working space. Only close cooperation between ship and flag personnel, both undercomplemented, has made it possible to handle and process the heavy volume of traffic.

b. Personnel: The shortage of qualified personnel is critical and will be further intensified by additional losses during the next six months. Unless qualified rated personnel losses are met with replacement, communication functions will be affected adversely. In spite of the constant improvement of strikers, both radiomen and quartermaster, as a result of on the job training, the ship is still short due to transfer of those of higher rating.
To meet circuit commitments during this period of operations, it was necessary to utilize strikers to man operational circuits which in order to be manned properly should be manned by experienced rated radiomen. The circuit is only as fast as its slowest operator and the overall speed of traffic handling has dropped to below 14 words per minute.

6. CIC

a. Radars:

(1) SG-1 was satisfactory in station keeping and surface search. It's present useful range is 34,000 yards. This gear remained in operation constantly except for brief periods required for tuning.

(2) SPS-6B operated exceptionally well on long range surface and on air search. CAP and ASP were handled by the air controllers using this unit, with pistons being held up to 70 miles. No height information was available from this ship's radars and this information was provided on all bogeys by other ships in the force. The MK-10 IFF is a valuable aid in tracking jets. On two occasions contacts were held 195 miles from the ship by using MK-10 IFF. The SPS-6B remained in operation the entire period except when secured for tuning and during a period when radar silence was ordered.

(3) SK radar was in operation during the entire period but was seldom used due to the fact that its performance in detection of air contacts is far below that of the SPS-6B. It was used only as a standby.

(4) SM radar was inoperative the whole period. This unit is one of the few left in active service and there seems to be an insufficient familiarity and lack of technical information on the equipment by the technicians aboard. Added to this is the lack of sufficient spare parts aboard to keep the gear operating.

b. Communications:

(1) Rendezvous with TF-77 was accomplished without any voice communication difficulties. A short time later the CI receiver failed but was restored to normal service within two hours. The ship experienced a considerable amount of feed-over on the CI net from the Screen Common and Primary Tactical Nets. This condition is being looked into and is probably due to the location of this transmitting equipment. It is expected this discrepancy will be rectified during the period in port.

(2) The CI secondary has exceptionally good range and power as was proved during the SAR exercise conducted for a downed pilot from the ship. The ship was able to render assistance by relaying information from other ships in the force to rescue units off the beach when those ships could not seem to communicate this distance.

The FAD equipment also has good range and readability. The ship is extremely short of radio technicians and the maintenance requirements on radio equipment used by CIC seem enormous. Possibly this is due to the remote location of CIC and the extra wiring required between RFU's and transmitters.

(3) CIC interprets all signals coming in on the Primary Tactical and Screen Common and sends their interpretations to the bridge via JS sound powered phones as an aid and check for the Officer of the Deck.
c. General

The ship has lost many experienced enlisted personnel through release from active duty and is conducting an active training program for the newer non-rated personnel. Time in port will be used to good advantage in carrying out a concentrated training course to insure getting more men qualified as quickly as possible.

7. Air Operations

a. Electronics Equipment: At this time it is difficult to give a fair evaluation of the electronics equipment assigned for use by Air Plot due in main to the short period of operation. It is, however, worthy of note that in this three day period that difficulty was experienced in maintaining the YE gear in an operational status; approximately three (3) man hours labor per day were expended on this equipment to keep it in air operational status. It is anticipated that this figure will be materially decreased upon completion of maintenance presently planned for the period of the ship's next stay in port.

b. Operating statistics for the battle operating period 23 June through 25 June 1952:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original missions assigned</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions aborted</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions cancelled by CTF 77</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dud aircraft/maintenance</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final missions assigned/completed hop</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final tally of missions assigned</td>
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<tr>
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Sorties by type

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<td>VA 75</td>
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c. During this operating period one F4U-4 was lost over Korea presumably to enemy ground fire; there were no operational losses for the same period. This period accounted for the BON HOMME RICHARD's 22,000th carrier landing.

B. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Aircraft Handling

a. During the period of this report, a special spot was used in launching deck load strikes. With 35 jets from two jet squadrons and one photo detachment on board, 24 jets were parked in Bays 1 and 2 of the hangar deck. The remaining 11 jets were dead-packed all the way aft on the flight deck. The 16 AD-4's scheduled were spotted across the flight deck forward of the jets, while 16 F4U-4's were spotted forward of the AD-4's. As marginal wind conditions were experienced during the three days of this report, and aircraft had maximum commensurate loading, all the F4U's and some AD-4's were catapulted. Upon the conclusion of the prop launch, 24 to 28 jets were respotted and catapulting commenced 30 minutes after the commencement of the prop launch for a coordinated attack by the two types on the target.

b. Inasmuch as this ship does not have jet blast deflectors installed, the jet spotting area of the flight deck will be critical with 12 to 16 jets scheduled when all prop aircraft are on board during the time that normal Korean-type air operations are conducted. In order to spot jets as closely together and as expeditiously as possible and yet make provisions for weeding out duds, spotting plates of 1/8" x 6" x 8" aluminum were screwed to the flight deck for the nose wheel and starboard wheel. While setting up the spotting of these plates, consideration was given to the following:
(1) Movement of duds spotted forward when wings are spread.

(2) Jet blasts.

(3) Spreading of wings of all jets when excessively high and gusty winds are encountered. (Reason stated under "Aircraft Maintenance" below).

(4) Location of tie down cleats in relation to landing gear.

2. Catapults and Arresting Gear.

a. During the period of this report 223 catapult launches were made, of which 132 were F9F, 65 were F4U, and 26 were AD. No difficulty was experienced with the catapults, even though the maximum permitted pressure of 3500 lbs. was utilized during almost all of the jet launches.

b. During this operating period the armament on the F9F's had to be reduced because of the light winds. Although Catapult Change No. 36 (maximum pressure 4,000 lbs.) was installed on both catapults during this vessel's yard availability in February, pressures in excess of 3,500 lbs. are still prohibited for F9F-2's because of the fact that the new, stronger launching pendant has not been made available to the fleet.

c. Because of the increase in the basic weight of the AD-4 over the earlier models of the AD, the ordnance-carrying capability has been considerably reduced. The basic weight of the AD-4 is 13,038 lbs. This includes 618 lbs. of armor and two additional 20 MM guns. Allowing 2250 pounds for gasoline, 576 pounds for ammunition, 240 pounds for oil and 200 pounds for the pilot, a total of 16,334 pounds is arrived at prior to adding the bomb load. Crowded deck space, combined with low wind conditions makes it necessary that some AD's be catapulted; hence, the bomb load is limited by the maximum catapulting weight of 20,500 pounds, making the maximum bomb load 4,156 pounds.

d. A total of 261 landings, all day, were made, of which 132 were F9F, 64 were F4U and 65 were AD. All landings were normally arrested with no barrier engagements.

e. During the refresher operating period in the Hawaiian area and prior to the Operational Readiness Inspection, a large number of F9F tail hook droppings was experienced as the jets taxied forward from the Fly 3 area after landing, resulting in the Davis barriers and barricade being torn. On one particular recovery, tail hooks dropped on three jets which required the replacement or rerigging of the Davis barriers or barricade each time and which resulted in a total time delay of 15 minutes. Naturally, this delay is not acceptable, particularly when low-state jets are airborne. Although pilots were repeatedly cautioned as to the proper techniques to employ in coming out of the gear and crossing the barrier area, it is believed that occasional tail hook dropping will occur. To prevent this, this command now houses tail hooks completely in the Fly Three area immediately after the cross-deck pendant has become disengaged from the tail hook. Contrary to the first impression, this increased delay in obtaining a ready deck for the next jet is not appreciable—maximum of 5 seconds—after personnel are experienced. It is considered that this procedure is definitely superior to that of placing the tail hook in the "stringer" position inasmuch as there can be no possible delays in the recovery caused by tail hooks dropping.

3. Aircraft Maintenance

a. The new type of wing jury strut for the F9F-2, Part No. GR-GT-521 is considered to be inferior to the old type, Part No. GR-GT-491 as far as securing the wing properly when folded. The new type does not prevent the wing from going up further than its normal folded position. During periods of high, gusty winds, particularly with winds on the port bow or beam, it is possible for the wing to be damaged by either being blown up beyond the normal fold position and beyond the vertical and to end up inclined toward the fuselage or to be blown up sufficiently beyond the normal fold position to permit the yoke of the new type jury strut to become disengaged, thereby permitting the wing to drop.
In either case, the wing fold actuating cylinder will become damaged. Although the new type jury strut is easier to remove prior to launching than the old type, it is recommended that the new type not be used on board ship.

4. Aviation Ordnance

a. On 24 June during the catapulting of AD-4, BUNR L29005, a 2000# GP AN M 66 on the center Douglas bomb rack broke off and was lost over the bow. The MK34 suspension band was recovered and examination revealed failure at the weld near the belt flange. The weld appeared to be poor in spots. A RUDABE is being submitted. The aircraft was damaged structurally aft of the midsection and requires either a major overhaul or is a strike.

C. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in rendering supply support to combat aircraft during the current cruise. Specific areas or instances of trouble and recommendations to relieve them are as follows:

   a. Although CVG-7 planes had just come out of O & R prior to being deployed, approximately 500 more line items have been requested in the six weeks (including three days of combat operations) the air group has been aboard than were drawn by CVG 102 in the first twelve weeks (including three weeks of combat operations) of last year's cruise. Last minute scrambles for materials were caused since many of the parts requested were not listed in the applicable section "A" or "B" Allowance Lists and were not carried on board because of no prior usage; also, operational spares on hand were seriously depleted because of the volume of use. It is recommended that all aircraft be placed in first class operating condition prior to deployment and that proper maintenance checks be allowed to insure that this is so.

   b. Requests for Section "H" and Section "U" material have been much larger than could be anticipated from past usage. It is recommended that squadrons be required to have a full allowance of this material prior to coming aboard ship.

   c. It was necessary to provide the initial allowance of field shoes for all aviators with a resultant charge of their cost to the ship's operating allotment. Since ships having to operate in the combat zone have a hard time staying within their monetary limitations, it is recommended that a special allotment be authorized to meet this requirement.

   d. Survival equipment is extremely hard to procure in the forward area and is usually received from some other ship departing WestPac. This means that the gear is some that has already been used and in most cases it is not RFI. It is recommended that air group personnel be allowed and be required to obtain an original allowance from the supporting air station prior to deployment.

   e. Procurement and issue of exposure suits has presented quite a problem. Since these suits are scarce in the forward area and must be individually fitted, it is recommended that initial issues be made in CONUS.

   f. Quantities of flight deck clothing requested greatly exceed those allowed in the Section "A" Allowance List for both initial outfitting and replacements. It is recommended that the allowance of flight deck clothing be revised to allow two original outfits per man (except for shoes) plus sufficient quantities for replacements.

   g. Several oxygen regulators, stock number B83-PR-2867-Al, issued to date have been found to be defective. Although BuAer advised that regulators with serial numbers of 500 and below were defective, those issued had serial numbers in the 1200 and 1400 series. It is recommended that oxygen regulators again be screened to determine if additional ones should not be issued.
To date, there have been 13 failures of the F9F wing fold actuating cylinder, stock number R33-GR-13,095. It is recommended that an attempt be made to determine the cause of these failures and that the results be promulgated to other ships and units deploying to WestPac since replacements are not available in the forward area.

Main landing gear wheel assemblies on F4U-4 aircraft have been broken in landings 11 times so far. It is recommended that other ships be informed of possible high usage on this item for future planning.

The ship has been unable to obtain certain essential Section "B" spares such as H33S-1 main rotor assemblies, main rotor blades and tail rotor assemblies. It is recommended that special effort be exerted to make items such as these available to the fleet.

Since personnel of the ship cannot anticipate special needs and requirements of an air group before it comes aboard and because many supplies are not available beyond the CONUS, it is strongly recommended that the CVG material officer and one aviation storekeeper be required to report to the ship at least two months prior to leaving for WestPac. The material officer should be cognizant of the items which the air group will require, especially critical and high usage items of each squadron, in order that all essential material can be on board before the ship departs the states.

D - ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. The current task force directives state that tubes not be blown on boilers during daylight hours.

   a. It is recommended that a re-evaluation of the circumstances be considered. Since aircraft carriers cannot blow tubes when the wind is across the flight deck from the starboard side, it is necessary to request a course change from the OTO, to put the wind on the port beam. Many times the situation is such that this cannot be done. This results in long periods of 24 to 36 hours in which tubes have not been blown.

   b. After 12 to 16 hours of steaming without blowing tubes it is extremely difficult to accelerate, at the high speeds required to launch jet aircraft, without making smoke. This can only be done by using a great amount of excess air which, in turn results in very difficult steaming conditions. Also, failure to blow tubes for long periods results in continuous discharge of soot postiles from the stack at higher steaming rates.

   c. Frequent blowing of tubes will result in a discharge of black soot for a very short period which may be more acceptable during daylight hours than longer periods of smoky steaming.

P. W. WATSON

DISTRIBUTION:

Original - CNO (plus 4 for chain of command)
CNO (2 advance)
ComAirPac (10)
CinCPac (5 advance)
CTF-77 (2 advance)
ComCarDivONE (2)
ComCarDivTHREE (2)
ComCarDivSEVENTEEN (2)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV-21) (1)
CO, USS Kearsarge (CV-33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CV-34) (1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV-37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) (1)
CO, USS ANTIETAM (CV-36) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV-9) (1)
ComCarAirGruONE (1)
ComCarAirGruTWO (1)
ComCarAirGruFIVE (1)
ComCarAirGruELEVEN (1)
ComCarAirGruFIFTEEN (1)
ComCarAirGruNINETEEN (1)
ComCarAirGruONE HUNDRED (1)
ComCarAirGruONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
ComCarAirGruSEVEN (1)
ComCarAirGru (ATU) ONE (1)
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
     (2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
     (3) Commander, Naval Forces Far East
     (4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 2 July through 4 August 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group SEVEN letter dated 6 August 1952

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 2 July through 4 August 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Confidential dispatch 3006062 of June 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), CAPTAIN PAUL W. WATSON, USN, Commanding, with Staff ComCarDiv ONE and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for the operating area on 2 July 1952.

At 0525 I, 3 July 1952 the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in SUGAR AREA, in the Sea of Japan near the Thirty eighth Parallel and ComCarDiv ONE, Rear Admiral Herbert E. ROGAN, USN, embarked and broke his flag. The Task Force was commanded by ComCarDiv THIRTEEN, Rear Admiral A. SOUDZ, USN, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21). In addition to the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) the Task Force was composed of the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

On 7 July 1952 ComCarDiv THIRTEEN departed the Task Force in the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) for Yokosuka, Japan. Command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was assumed by Rear Admiral Herbert E. ROGAN, USN, ComCarDiv ONE, aboard this ship.

On 4 August ComCarDiv THIRTEEN arrived on the U.S.S. BOXER and assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) with ComCarDiv ONE and CVG SEVEN embarked departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 030142Z for scheduled period of upkeep at Yokosuka, to arrive on 7 August 1952.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN is in accordance with CTF 77's Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

Carrier Air Group SEVEN is commanded by Commander G. B. BROWN, USN and consisted of the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft:

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<th>PILOTS</th>
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Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons, and are assigned as follows:

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* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons, and are assigned as follows:

VF-71  2
VF-72  2
VA-75  4

CAG and Staff Operations Officer's fly both AD's and F9F's

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

7/2/52: The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) left Sasebo after six days in a Ready Carrier status, and proceeded to the Operating area to commence her first full tour of duty on the line since leaving San Diego on 20 May.

7/3/52: Jets and props launched from the deck of the BHR, attacked Kyosen #1 and Kyosen #2 hydro-electric plants, part of the power complex raided in late June by the four-carrier Task Force, which included the BHR. Kyosen #1 received a direct, 500 pound bomb, hit on its transformer yard and the rupturing of two pentostacks. Two hits on the power house and one on the transformer yard of Kyosen #2 caused smoke and dust to obscure the targets, thereby preventing any assessment of damage to that target. The purpose of these and subsequent attacks were part of a program to totally destroy power plant complexes in North Korea. AA defenses were silenced during the attack.

7/4/52: This National Holiday was another working day for the ship and her air group. A half-ton bomb hit on a railroad bridge was followed in quick succession by rail cutting, armed recce, a combined prop and jet strike on troop concentrations, supplies, and a truck park in the Wonsan Valley. 50 loaded boxcars in the marshalling yard north of the center of Wonsan were attacked by BHR planes, resulting in 3 being blown completely into the air and heavy damage to the others.

7/5/52: The CHARLIE UNCLE sector south of Wonsan again offered the Air Group lucrative targets in supply dumps and a troop concentration area. Many fires were observed and at least 3 buildings within the target area were destroyed. Secondary explosions rocked buildings nearby, resulting in major damage to several. Flak suppression was very effective, a 10 gun heavy battery and many smaller positions being silenced.

7/6/52: The day was spent in replenishing the Task Force. Flight operations were not conducted.
7/7/52: The first event of the day was a jet strike on a storage area in the DOG VICTOR sector of North Korea. One large warehouse was completely demolished, and eight others were left burning. Props diverted to rail strikes by weather conditions were successful in cutting rails in 2 places and dropping a span of a railroad bridge. 2 F9F-2's, called to assist a destroyer under fire from the beach, expended 1100 rounds of ammunition on and silenced a coastal gun. There were no further attacks on the surface craft. Again the troop concentration south of Wonsan was hit, the planes attacking an estimated 100 buildings housing troops, leaving in their wake 2 huge fires that were visible for more than 15 miles.

7/8/52: Kyosen #2, one of the hydro-electric plants in the power complex, was the principal target for this day. The AD's and FwU's scored 2 direct hits on the power house and cut 4 penstocks, the pipe line that carries the water from the surge tank to the turbine. A total of 17 rail cuts, a new high for the air group, made the day a success despite foul weather throughout most of North Korea.

7/9/52: The morning hecklers started the day off by damaging 6 sampans, burning 3 box cars, and cutting rails in 2 places. A repeat performance was made on the supply area south of Wonsan, the AD's and FwU's completely destroying 2 of the principal targets. The remainder of the day was taken up with rail-cutting, CAP, and ASP. At C455 this date, an AD-4 flown by LCDR G. C. BURBER, 123679/14310, was launched and ditched ahead of the carrier. The ship's helicopter picked the pilot out of the water and returned him, uninjured, to the carrier.

7/10/52: Flight operations were not scheduled this date, all efforts being devoted to replenishment.

7/11/52: The big event of the current operating period to date was the combined Armed Forces bombing of Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. Faced by extremely intense fire from an estimated 48 heavy AA guns and numerous automatic weapons, the jets and props of this carrier joined with those of the Princeton to suppress Flak and attack pre-selected targets in the Communist North Korean Capital. These strikes were followed by attacks on other targets by planes of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marines, the Australian Air Force and Her Majesty's Royal Navy. According to photographic reports following the single attack BHR planes destroyed a railroad roundtable, 2 locomotives, 5 large van-type trucks, 5 other vehicles and heavily damaged a roundhouse, 3 other large buildings and 3 vehicles. Flak suppression by the jets was reported to be very effective and the assigned gun positions were bombed and strafed effectively. However, one AD-32 piloted by Lt. E. P. Cummings #1401897/1315 and carrying aircrewman L. L. Tooker, ATL, 748 19 OS, USN, was shot down over the target area. The pilot and aircrewman are officially listed as missing in action.

The Pyongyang Operation was conducted under adverse weather conditions. Although the target area was clear, weather in the Sea of Japan and the Eastern inland sectors of Korea was marginal. Jets returning from the strike landed at friendly fields in Korea under a ceiling of 200-400 feet. The props returning to the ship landed under a ceiling of 500 feet and poor visibility conditions. Subsequent strikes scheduled for Pyongyang were cancelled because of these conditions. At 0920C an F9F-2 piloted by LTJG E. E. Conrad, 505750 failed to maintain power after being catapulted and was ditched within the Task Force. The pilot was recovered by the ship's helicopter and landed aboard the Princeton because of visibility conditions but returned later in the day to the BHR.

7/12/52: A day of relative quiet after the action of July 11, the BHR launched only morning hecklers in addition to the usual CAP and ASP. The hecklers napalmed buildings in the Fusen power complex area, damaging eight. All other scheduled operations were cancelled because of bad weather over the coastal area.
7/13/52: Scattering lumber piles, cutting rails, and strafing sampans were only a part of the day’s work. A new mission for CVG-7, close air support, was given a 90% coverage by the TACP and killed an estimated 60 Red troops. A Princeton pilot, the TACP said "very effective and well done". On a strike diverted to cutting rails, one F4U-4, piloted by ENSIGN D.W. LONGWORTH, 540104/1325, was struck by medium flak, forcing the pilot to ditch in the Sea of Japan, approximately 4 miles off shore. Within an hour he was picked up, uninjured by the United States Destroyer HOLLISTER.

7/14/52: There were no flight operations conducted this date due to replenishment.

7/15/52: The usual wet July weather for the Sea of Japan was with the BHR today. Low ceiling, poor visibility, and generally unfavorable flying conditions prevented any but CAP and ASP from accomplishing their missions. A special RESCAP was launched to assist in the attempted rescue of a downed Princeton pilot; however, he was not contacted due to an inaccurate May-Day fix.

7/16/52: The same poor flying conditions prevailed as on the 15th. An early morning RESCAP was sent out, but was diverted to a weather recco flight when notified of the successful pickup of the Princeton pilot by the helicopter of the USS IOWA. All other events were cancelled.

7/17/52: A combination of bad weather and the anticipated visit of the Chief of Naval Operations directed that replenishment of the force take place this date. No flight operations were conducted.

7/18/52: Fog in "SUGAR" area prevented the launching of any aircraft.

7/19/52: Aboard to witness air operations were the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fochteler, Vice Admiral Robert O. Briscoe, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, and Rear Admiral Tom B. Hill, Chief of Staff, CINCPACFLT. Unfortunately there was little respite in the poor flying conditions that had plagued the Task Force since July 15. Only one strike was launched, this against Chosen #3 power plant. Five direct hits were scored on the transformer yard of this plant.

7/20/52: The one strike launched was unusually successful. 35 F4U’s, AD’s and F9F-2’s heavily damaged 6 bridges north of Wonsan, destroyed 4 and damaged 20 buildings in the same area before the ceiling dropped to non-operational level.

7/21/52: Replenishment and drills were the order of the day.

7/22/52: The first good flying weather in a week found the BHR unleash destruction upon many assorted targets in North Korea. The principal targets, a roundhouse and a locomotive repair shop in Wonsan, were thoroughly "clobbered" by BHR planes. Flak suppression was most effective, resulting in the silencing of 5 gun positions. No planes were hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. A frustrated close air support mission, diverted from the bombline by unfavorable weather, turned northward and expended its ordnance on 15 loaded railroad cars in a marshalling yard. All cars were damaged and 5 were blown completely off the track. The jet recco rocketed and destroyed the control house of a radar station in Songjin. Night hecklers destroyed 3 trucks and damaged 13. An F9F-2 BuNo 127117 piloted by LCDR Gordon C. Ruhrer, 123697/1310 was ditched because of fuel depletion while in the groove for landing. The pilot was recovered by the ship’s helicopter.

7/23/52: Armed recco was only incidental to the big strikes of the day. "Blown sky high and leveled" was the official estimate of damage inflicted upon a Thermal Electric Plant at Wonsan. Photographs showed this target completely destroyed by the attack. 35 good boxcars seen by the same flight called for a special event to follow-up. The AD’s destroyed 20, blowing 8 completely off the rails and damaged 15. A large 3 story warehouse in the vicinity of the boxcars came in for heavy punishment and total destruction, the resulting large secondary explosions testifying to the probable storage of ammunition or other explosives. The night hecklers, surprising a convoy of trucks damaged 15, leaving a path of flames and rubble in their wake. General Glenn O. Barcus, CG 5th AF in Korea came on board this date to observe flight operations.
7/24/52: Today was one of the most successful in the current operating period for the pilots of Air Group 52. The major strike of the day, against bridges and rail repair facilities in the Hamhung area, was an outstanding success. The primary targets, 2 railroad bridges and a railroad repair shop, were completely destroyed, as was the secondary target, a transformer station. Three other bridges were damaged. The hecklers as usual had their choice of targets, sighting at least 200 trucks within a 30 mile radius of Wonsan. Final tabulated results showed at least 3 definitely destroyed and 21 damaged. Close Air Support, striking the 68th Division of the CCF, rocketed and strafed artillery positions and troops with excellent results.

7/25/52: The efforts of the ship were directed toward replenishment and general drills.

7/26/52: Damage to 4 bridges and 13 railcuts were the results of today's interdiction operations. The attacks on power plants continued, with Puryong #3 bearing the brunt of the day's raids. Two direct hits on the power house and one out on a penstock caused additional damage to the already badly shattered hydro-electric plant.

7/27/52: The morning hecklers opened the day's operations with a well coordinated attack on a locomotive and three cars ten miles northeast of Tanchon. Closing a tunnel entrance behind the train and cutting the rails ahead, the BHR planes bombed and rocketed it, destroying a boxcar with a direct hit which set off a heavy secondary explosion, and severely damaged the locomotive. The train, stopped dead in its tracks, was finished off by a destroyer dispatched to the scene. Later in the morning the power plant at Puryong #2 was given a terrific pounding which left only one wall of the power house remaining. At Puryong #2 the power house and two other buildings were damaged and cuts were made in the penstocks, in three places. A strategic zinc and lead plant located 25 miles north of Tanchon was the final target for the day. Flak suppression was effective, accurate bombing and strafing taking its toll in communist gun positions. The AD's dropped all their bombs in the target area, destroying or badly damaging the main plant and heavily damaging the transformer and other buildings in the vicinity.

7/28/52: Again the hecklers trapped a locomotive and 3 cars. Following prescribed doctrine, the rails were cut and the train attacked. Direct hits on the boiler stopped the engine leaving it stalled for a later Princeton flight to destroy. Later in the morning a string of boxcars was rocketed and strafed in a routine maneuver, but a tremendous secondary explosion, probably from a load of ammunition completely destroyed all 5 cars. The remainder of the day was gainfully spent in attacks on supply storage areas, bridges and targets of opportunity over North Korea.

7/29/52: All efforts were devoted to replenishment. No flight operations were conducted.

7/30/52: Unfavorable flying conditions over the operating area caused the cancelation of all flights.

7/31/52: With two days of rest, the BHR pilots went out after a variety of targets. Oxcarts, boxcars and trucks were available targets for the jets, while the props went after the hydro-electric power plants at Nojo #3 and a hitherto undamaged one north of the Changjin Reservoir. Many direct hits were observed in the area of the power plants, but an accurate assessment of damage was impossible due to smoke and dust. On the second launch of the day, an F9F-2 of VF 71 piloted by Ensign B. L. McBride, Jr., 394626/1325, was catapulted from this ship. The jet failed to become airborne and was ditched ahead of the carrier. The pil was recovered by a helicopter and brought back to the ship. Upon admission to sick bay his injuries were diagnosed as a compressed fracture of the fifth vertebra.

8/1/52: With the morning spent in replenishing the Task Force, 5 events were launched later in the day by the BHR. The first strike was against the hydro-electric power plant at Chosen #2. Flak suppression was effective, destroying or silencing 6 heavy and medium gun positions. Because of the location of the power plant at the base of a mountain, and intense anti-aircraft fire surrounding the plant, the flak evasive tactics required to be used resulted in negligible observed damage. The night hecklers reported destruction of 11 and damage to 15 trucks in the Wonsan area.
8/2/52: The well-planned three carrier strike against strategic targets at Chongjin was launched at 0500, with planes from the Princeton and Essex leading off. By 0800, before the first scheduled event of the BHR, weather over North Korea was non-operational, forcing the cancellation of this ship's offensive sorties. Only six planes were launched, two weather reconnaissance and four anti-submarine patrol.

8/3/52: This, the final day of flight operations in the operating period, was one of great satisfaction to the air group and the ship. The power plant at Kyosen #2, one of three Bon Homme Richard targets in the late June strike on North Korean power complexes, was delivered the coup de grace by the props and jets of Air Group SEVEN. The previously damaged transformer and switch yard were completely destroyed, the power plant was heavily damaged, as was a warehouse in the area. Four (4) cuts in the penstocks were final testimony to the accuracy of Navy bombing. In the CHARLIE UNCLE area 2 54s on naval gunfire spot destroyed 3 buildings and damaged 2 identified as steam plants. The hecklers, in their last night of flying for this period, found choice targets in trucks in the Wonsan area. Bombing and strafing vehicles pinpointed by flares, the night flyers destroyed at least 9 and damaged 25 trucks. The final blows of the evening were direct bomb hits which severely damaged a highway bridge and exploded an ammo dump.

8/4/52: At 0500 the Task Force rendezvoused with the replenishment force, and at approximately 1400, in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 030142, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed the Task Force and proceeded toward Yokosuka, Japan via Tsugaru Strait.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Material

(a) Numerous casualties occurred to ordnance and Fire Control equipment. All were of a minor nature and well within capacity of ship's force to correct expeditiously. Hydraulic seals and gaskets continue to be the greatest source of trouble.

(b) Five one ton carrier type chain falls have been rendered unservicable in the 2600 lb bomb magazines due to the fact that the mono-rail is a five inch "T" beam instead of standard seven inch mono-rail. Work requests for correction of this condition were urgently requested prior to and during the last availability in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. These requests were disapproved. Additional safety measures have had to be taken to safe guard personnel working in these magazines to minimize possibility of injury.

2. Ammunition Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMBS</th>
<th>ROCKETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170 2000# G.P.</td>
<td>34 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433 1000# G.P.</td>
<td>1260 ATAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516 500# G.P.</td>
<td>57 HVAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1490 250# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>965 100# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>856 260# Frag.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 350# D.B.</td>
<td>232,357 20MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 100# Incon.</td>
<td>167,560 .50 Cal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 500# Butterfly Cluster</td>
<td>271 Parachute Flares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123 Fire Bombs Nk. 78-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Dock Evolutions - Replenishment

(a) During this period, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside 22 replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, etc and received alongside 50 destroyers for refueling, guard mail, passengers, freight, etc., without mishap.

(b) The cargo handling capacity at station No. 3 has been increased by adding fittings which will accomodate a wire or manila highline: or a modified house fall rig. To accomplish this, a one inch pad eye fitted with a 1" X 8" "U" shackle was welded to the auxiliary director wiring trunk even with top
of hangar deck curtain frame '72. This station is extremely helpful but a little slow due to location of 5" ammunition hoist, wiring trunk and exhaust blower which allows only seven and one half feet space to clear loading area.

4. Personnel - Gunnery Department

(a) Critical shortage of first and second class petty officers in Fire Control, Gunners Mate and Boatswains Mate ratings precludes proper supervision of maintenance and repair work. This lack of petty officers is seriously handicapping the effort to train and instruct new and inexperienced men in the practical phases of their duties and to qualify them for advancement in rating.

(b) The overall shortage of personnel permits the manning of essential primary battle stations only. Auxiliary directors and emergency telephone circuits cannot be manned and are used only during special drills.

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None

B. Damage to Aircraft

35 planes were hit and damaged by flak and bomb bursts. For details concerning this see enclosure (1).

C. Loss of Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu. No.</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/9/52</td>
<td>VA-75</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>128969</td>
<td>Deck launch - Pilot technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/11/52</td>
<td>VO-33</td>
<td>AD3Q</td>
<td>122863</td>
<td>(Insufficient flying speed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/11/52</td>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123398</td>
<td>Enemy Anti-aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/13/52</td>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>977020L</td>
<td>Catapult shot - Loss of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/21/52</td>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>127117</td>
<td>Enemy Anti-aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/31/52</td>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>127091</td>
<td>Fuel exhaustion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/31/52</td>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Catapult shot - violent swerve on leaving catapult resulting left wing tip stall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings (other)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (highway)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (railroad)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun positions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power houses (hydro-electric)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surge Tanks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control house (dam)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power line towers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Posts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round Houses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Switch Yards  
Water Towers  
Supply Storage Areas  
Piers  
Lumber Piles  
Truck Parking Areas  
Rail Cuts  
Troops Killed  
Bunkers  
Dam  
Radar Station

PART V

E. "The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks weather, flak, or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, fires, and bombings obviously may never be known.

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

The overall performance of personnel from the very beginning has been highly satisfactory and showed steady improvement with operating experience. At the commencement of this action period, a major portion of the crew and air group had only three days of prior actual combat operating experience. A certain amount of confusion and inefficiency was therefore to be expected. But, in the course of thirty days the green and inexperienced joined with their more seasoned shipmates in welding the Bon Homme Richard into a highly efficient and effective fighting unit.

Despite the necessity of operating under adverse weather conditions and against heavily defended enemy targets, combat damage and losses were surprisingly low for such a relatively extensive operating period. These factors coupled with the destruction inflicted on the enemy is a certain indication of the high operating proficiency and combat readiness of the Air Group.

The improvement in the morale of the crew has been noteworthy since the ship departed from Pearl Harbor. There has been a noticeable decrease in mast cases for non-rated personnel both during "in port" and "at sea" periods. During the final days of this operating period the operating efficiency and morale of all hands, especially for the Air Group has reached a very high level.

One discouraging element which tends to effect morale has been the poor mail delivery service. Mail has arrived at irregular intervals and in small amounts. In general, deliveries have been far below ordinary expectations and on one occasion seven bags of mail arrived in a soaked and generally unreadable condition.

B. Casualties

LIEUTENANT E.P. CUMMINGS, 485992/1315, USN: The AD3Q, piloted by Lt. CUMMINGS, was hit by flak during his dive on a target at Pyongyang, Capital of North Korea, on 11 July. Part of the tail surface was blown off and the plane was seen to crash about a mile from the target. Lt. CUMMINGS is listed as "missing in action".

L.L. TOOKER, AT1, 748 19 08, USN: TOOKER was a crewman aboard the plane flown by Lt. Cummings. He is listed as "missing in action".

ENSIGN B.L. McBRIDE, 294 26/1325: On 31 July Ensign McBride was catapulted but ditched ahead of the ship. He was recovered by helicopter and admitted to sickbay with a diagnosis of fracture compression vertebrae, lumbar fifth.
PART VI
GENERAL COMMENTS

A. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Recreation

Due to operations it was not always possible to show movies on the hangar deck. To offset this, double features were shown on nights of replenishment. Movies were also shown in the Flag Mess, Wardroom, Ready Room Four, Warrant Officers' Mess, and the CPO Mess.

Publication of the weekly ship's paper, which had been discontinued while in the United States, was resumed. A daily press news was also published. Plans are now being made for the publication of a cruise book which is to be printed in Japan.

Since there is no crew's lounge, the Library was kept open until 2130 each night and was crowded to such an extent that men sat on the deck. Reading was one of the major recreations. Thirty-six hundred paper bound books have been distributed since leaving the United States. Magazines in bulk were purchased when last in port and distributed during this operating period.

The Hobby Shop continued to provide a popular form of recreation, an estimated 10% of the personnel on board making use of this facility. Purchases were unusually heavy so that little is now in stock, pending receipt of orders that have been placed some time ago.

Reservations for rest hotels in Japan were requested and obtained. One hundred and two officers requested reservations, one hundred were obtained. Five hundred and eighty-three enlisted reservations were requested, one hundred and forty-three were obtained.

Extensive plans for in-port recreation and athletics have been made. Fifteen beach parties are scheduled, two vaudeville shows, and several sight-seeing parties. Athletics will include competition with the USS Princeton in baseball, softball, tennis, bowling, golf, and horseshoes. Softball will be the major intramural sport, with 20 teams participating. An Athletic Council was formed to promote the Athletic Program.

2. Religious Services

Sixteen religious services were held each week, including Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Christian Science, and Latter Day Saints. A Novena Service was started during this period and a Protestant Choir was organized. Prayers are said each night over the loudspeaker system at Taps, the Catholic and Protestant Chaplains alternating. Graces is said before meals in the wardroom.

B. NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT

1. The Navigation Department desires to note its appreciation for the two new loran stations 2H0 and 2H1 located on the Japanese Islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. They were invaluable as a means of rapidly determining an accurate position at any time of the day or night during this period (the Monsoon Season) when the opportunity for celestial observations were few and far between.

2. As the tables for these stations have not been published it is necessary to utilize loran chart No. VL30-17R (1st edition February 1952). This ship found it very advantageous to transfer the lines of position from the loran chart to the chart used on the DRT, chart No. 3320 (Consec N A6763). After this transfer was completed, it was only a matter of three or four minutes to take a loran reading on the two stations, mark the position of the bug on the DRT, plot in the loran lines of position with the aid of an interpolator (H.O. Misc 11, 691), figure set and drift, and correct the bug. When it was possible to check the accuracy of these loran fixes by celestial or visual means, they were never found to be in error more than a mile or two. This method of determining position while operating with Task Force 77 in the Japan Sea is highly recommended.
1. Air Intelligence

a. Intelligence Spaces

On the advent of Carrier Division ONE aboard, the intelligence units of the ship and staff were shifted. The ship intelligence office was assigned to the flag and the ship's office re-established in space 02-122-1 on the 02 deck, formerly occupied by the Photographic Interpretation and Photographic detachment. The latter were moved to new spaces on the 2nd deck.

Enclosed racks had previously been built on the 0-2 deck for the stowage of unclassified maps and charts. Cabinet space existed in the new AI office for stowage of classified and ready issue materials. Target Dossiers and Air Target Folders were placed in the custody of the Registered Publications Office, where ample space existed for their stowage.

Lack of adequate display space was overcome with the construction of sliding panels in the new AI office, which increased display surface to 300 square feet. With this notable addition, the space and facilities provided Air Intelligence are considered very satisfactory.

b. Dissemination of Information

The Air Intelligence Office is operated on the principle that useful information is useless unless properly disseminated. Charts and overlays on every phase of activity are maintained in the air intelligence office. These are copied or distributed to squadron AI's for separate briefings in each ready room.

An eleven page current Information Bulletin composed of instructions orders and procedures applicable to Korean Operations was compiled and distributed as a basis for briefing. This bulletin covers pertinent information on Search and Rescue, SAR Facilities, Evasion and Escape, Flak Intelligence, Communications, Bombing and Attack Restrictions and Precautions, Ordnance, Undersea Warfare, Heckler Missions and Weather, Close Air Support and other mission procedures. Changes to this basic information are disseminated in the Daily Intelligence Brief, generally a four or five page document, which is mimeographed and distributed to all AI's and key officers of the ship. This brief is comprehensive enough to encompass all missions scheduled in the daily Air Plan for the day. Annotated charts, photographs and city plans pertaining to strikes supplement the brief.

From time to time training notes and material are distributed with the view of improving the briefing and debriefing process. An intelligence summary is prepared and distributed periodically to keep AI's and other officers abreast of all current developments.

c. Flak

The heavy concentration of AA defenses along the principal rail routes and around target complexes with the enemy's ability to quickly shift defenses gave ominous warning that an extensive flak intelligence program must be pursued if operations were to be conducted successfully and with reasonable safety. The flak problem was, therefore, approached from many angles and every available source of information was sifted and analyzed to present a complete and current flak picture at each briefing.
At the start of operations, pilots were carefully lectured on enemy AA tactics and practices and impressed with the fact that flak is a danger inherent in every mission over Korea. They, therefore, became flak conscious and eager to receive any information that might be helpful in detecting, evading or suppressing it.

The following methods were used in presenting flak data:

(1) Whenever possible and as early as practical before flights, annotated 1:50,000 maps, photographic and target mosaics were distributed to each pilot for recognition and orientation purposes and to present the location, types and strength of weapons for planning the best approach to the target and the intricacies of the attack.

(2) A plot of flak along the principal rail lines was maintained on 1:50,000 charts. The starting point of this plot was the touraides. These were supplemented by later photographic reconnaissance reports, pilot observations and the Carrier Division Flak Supplements. Each night the flak was replotted on an overlay and used in briefing the following day's rail strikes. Touraides were brought up to date and passed out to each pilot.

(3) A "deck to overhead" plot on a 1:250,000 chart was maintained, pinpointing the location, type, strength and disposition of AA defenses and the accuracy and relative strength of air defenses in a particular area. This plot was intended primarily for the briefing of reconnaissance and heckler missions and the required portions were copied by the AI's for briefing purposes, when necessary.

(4) For attacks on target complexes a 1:50,000 overlay was prepared and copied by the squadron AI's for briefing. In addition the flak was plotted on City Plans, when these were available, for orientation and planning purposes.

(5) Known GLR positions were maintained on a special chart for briefing hecklers, coordinating the electronic reconnaissance program and making the final identification and location of electronic sites.

The sources of the aforementioned plots were as follows:

(1) Photographic Interpretation Reports and flak studies made by the Navy and the U.S. Air Force.

(2) Pilot observations taken from the flash reports of the Bon Homme Richard and other carriers.

(3) The Carrier Division Flak Reports, Supplements and Touraides.


(5) Various POW interrogation and intelligence reports.

d. Touraides

On arrival of the ship in the operating area, the touraides provided were outdated, some of them by as much as three months. None of the information available gave an accurate picture of the current flak situation. It is felt that the benefits derived from the use of touraides is greatly offset by the burdens imposed in their preparation and distribution and in-keeping them current. As an outgrowth of study by the BHR, a far superior system appears to be a mosaic of each route size 16" X 20" scale 1:12,000 and
gridded but not annotated, with flak information provided by frequent photographic coverage and flak studies. These would be supplemented by pilot observations. It is recommended that such a system be established to replace the system of touraides.

e. Target Selection

The major portion of targets selected and assigned on this tour had a noticeably gratifying effect on the morale of the pilots. Targets were generally diverse and selected to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Several targets, however, were of an unappealing nature, particularly some of those in the Wonsan Valley. These were so carefully concealed they were difficult to attack, so small they were left unscathed by the best bombing of a whole flight, so heavily damaged beforehand that they could only be broken up into smaller pieces, or so scattered or vaguely described that it is doubtful if they were hit at all. The consequences of attacks on targets of this kind must inevitably tend toward careless bombing, particularly when the targets are in heavy flak areas.

There are known to be important targets in comparatively flak free areas, in North Korea. Destruction of these would be a severe blow to the enemy and should be accomplished before the enemy has an opportunity to strongly defend them. It is recommended that attacks not be made in heavily defended areas except when the results expected are commensurate with the risks involved.

f. Enlisted Personnel

A.I. Operations commenced with two yeoman 3/c and a yeoman striker. A fourth man, a seaman apprentice recently was added to this group. Unfortunately, only one man, a yeoman 3/c had the benefit of the air intelligence training course conducted by PATRILAMEDA. It was necessary, then, to train the remainder "on the job"; and a comprehensive training program was instituted to qualify all men as intelligence specialists with the secondary job code assignment of 9926. Since the training is conducted under actual combat conditions rather than with simulated problems, it is hoped they may be fully qualified for this code assignment in the very near future.

Yeomen and strikers assigned to intelligence are, in many respects, placed at a distinct disadvantage. While their experience and capabilities along intelligence lines are broadened, they are limited in preparing for advancement in their primary rate by the long tedious hours spent on the job over extended periods of time. Moreover, the men assigned to intelligence are isolated, in a large degree, from the duties involved in their primary rate and the diversified experiences of intelligence work are of negligible, if any, value, to them in preparing for advancement. Generally, the men assigned to intelligence are a select group, who through application and training gain a specialized capability which enhance their value to the Navy in a particular field. To further interest in the field, and to give it recognition, it is recommended that a primary rate for intelligence specialists be established; that the training in intelligence for specialists be continuous and that advancement be based on knowledge of the intelligence field exclusively.

As might naturally be expected, keen interest has been shown in search and rescue procedures and evasion and escape techniques. With the institution of positive means of recognizing friendly assistance, much of the skepticism concerning this phase of activity which previously prevailed amongst pilots has been removed and pilots are more assured of evasion and escape with a better than an even chance of ultimate rescue.
Search and Rescue procedures and information on SAR facilities are, of course, of great importance to pilots; who are always anxious to have the very latest word on this subject as well as the latest equipment. With respect to SAR, it is recommended that a standard set of air to ground and ground to air signals be devised for joint and allied use; and, that the AN/GRC-7 radio be provided to all units operating in the combat zone.

h. Photographic Interpretation

77 Photographic sorties of a scheduled 138 were flown during this period. The balance 61, were cancelled primarily because of bad weather. The missions consisted of rail reconnaissance, target search, damage assessment, airfield surveillance, coastal search and photo mapping for the surface bombardment groups. In good weather photo planes averaged 6 sorties per day. The photography resulting from these missions required analysis of an average of 800 photographs daily.

Many important targets, previously unnoticed by visual reconnaissance, were discovered through the free lance photography of pilots when the primary or secondary targets were weathered. These were pointed out in the daily photographic interpretation report for future attack. Other interesting and worth while bits of information were gleaned and among these were the following:

(1) Many new storage areas along the North-South Coastal rail lines were detected. These were generally in valleys approximately one and one half miles from the coast at points which would escape the photographing of rail lines for touraid construction purposes.

(2) In the see-saw battle of destruction and reconstruction of rail lines, cuts are being restored at most within 36 hours.

(3) The concealment and camouflage techniques employed have been intriguing. Storage buildings and barrack structures have been moved or built in gullies so that the configuration blends in with the surrounding terrain. Pill boxes, ammo storage dumps and gun emplacements are cleverly "planted" with bushes and grass. Shelters have been built over machinery within factory buildings of which only the framework is standing so as to make the impression on pilots overhead that the building is demolished and not worth attacking. Much activity was noted around buildings of this kind.

The demand for photography in the combat area has ascended to an all time high. Only providential bad weather enabled the heavily overworked photographic interpretation unit composed on one officer and one striker assistant to keep abreast of the work load during this period. Had all photographic missions been fulfilled, the minimum personnel required to carry the work load efficiently and expeditiously would be two officers and four enlisted assistants. One trained petty officer is due to report aboard in the near future to join the PI unit. An additional two enlisted men, preferably men who have been trained in photographic interpretation will be required to carry the contemplated work load during the remaining months and throughout the balance of this tour. It is therefore recommended that the PI units of all CVs be staffed with 2 officers and 4 enlisted assistants when assigned to the West Pac area.

The use of K-25 strike photography for intelligence purposes is nil. The obscuration of the target area by dust and smoke generally prevents an accurate assessment of damages and frequently gives a false impression of the results of the attack. Such photography is seemingly excellent for publicity purposes because of the large demand made for photographs of this kind. It may be desirable then under certain conditions to carry the camera for this purpose.
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 2 Jul-4 Aug 1952, Part 2
1. Miscellaneous

It is strongly recommended that the following information be provided to each ship for briefing purposes on first arrival in Yokosuka:

(1) Overlays of Recco routes and rail sections on 1:250,000 scale.

(2) Complete information on the current flak situation.

(3) Current information on orders, directives and procedures pertaining to operations. Procedures on NGF and Close Air Support and operational frequencies are especially desirable. All current available information on Search and Rescue procedures and facilities are essential.

(4) The three latest issues of the Far Eastern Air Force Round-up, the Fifth Air Force Intelligence Summary and the Intelligence Summary issued by the United Nations and Far East Command.

(5) Latest intelligence brief and current information bulletin of the ship being relieved.

It is recommended that all photographs and mosaics pertaining to operations be dated and that if practical, the scale be shown.

Reproductions of Prisoner of War camp markings are difficult to obtain and even more difficult to reproduce aboard ship because of coloring involved. It is suggested that these be reproduced ashore and distributed to vessels deploying to the combat area in quantity.

City plans of North Korea, even though outdated, have been found excellent for orientation briefing on target complexes. It is suggested that a larger quantity of these be issued to ships deploying to the forward area.

(The Air Intelligence Office wishes to note its appreciation for the cooperation extended it by the Staff, Carrier Division ONE)

2. Aerology

a. General

During the period, there were two polar outbreaks preceded by weak frontal systems which slowed down and stagnated over the operational and target areas.

These frontal systems accounted for 11½ days of non-operational weather, four of which were over the operating area.

b. Summary of Aerological Data

Air Temperature: average 70°

Air Temperature: average 70°

Winds; prevailing direction:

Southerly 31% of period
Easterly 27% of period
Winds over 20 knots; 4 hours
Calm winds; 3 hours
Average wind velocity; 10 knots
Strongest wind; north northeast 24 knots

Sea Temperature:

Average for period 75°
Average Daily Maximum 76°
Average Daily Minimum 72°
Minimum 69°
Maximum 82°
Communications

As previously reported, with the embarking of ComCarDiv ONE, the communications load has more than tripled. Since the last period, traffic has continued to increase. This Flagship is handling an average of 875 dispatches per day, more than many minor shore based relay stations in the NMX system. Although many of the dispatches handled are relays, the load is still excessive. An approximate daily average of traffic handled is broken down as follows:

- 2000 George Fox (CW)
- 190 MDT MOKON Fox (RATT)
- 110 S/S RATT
- 153 UHR RATT
- 90 FL 45, JOC Korea
- 60 G16 7th FLT, Command Circuit (CW)
- 75 O4,30 TP 77 Admin. Net (CW)

Equipment

Only through the constant maintenance effort of ship’s technicians has the operation of the main transmitters (low and high frequency) been satisfactory. Operating on borrowed time, these transmitters are badly in need of thorough and complete preventative maintenance.

Personnel

Of primary concern in communications is the acute shortage of qualified personnel. By August 7, unless replacements for 6 rated men ordered are received, this command will have a complement of 6 rated radiomen and 4 rated quartermasters, whereas ship’s allowance is 21 rated radiomen and 12 rated quartermasters. Such a critical shortage normally would and may result in failure to meet communications commitments. Replacements are mandatory for continued combat operations. Shortage of personnel has necessitated placing the leading CPO and traffic chief on circuits in order to meet circuit commitments, thereby causing a severe loss of supervision and training of strikers.

Combat Information Center

Radar Performances

The SPS-6B again proved its reliability for long range air search and as the medium for aircraft control. Returning prop strikes were detected at 60 miles without using MK/10-IFF. Single props, such as the OOD, were picked up 45 miles from the force. The use of MK/10-IFF appears mandatory to conduct a successful intercept of jets at any distance beyond 35 miles.

By the use of MK/10-IFF friendly aircraft could be spotted on the radar scope up to 150 miles from the force although there is seldom any necessity to control aircraft at that distance.
MK/10-IFF serves another vital function in identifying various groups of planes when returning from a strike. This is done by requesting Mode 1 and Mode 2 in order to associate the pips on the radar scope with the correct voice calls.

The emergency indication produced by MK/10-IFF is quickly spotted. Recently during an SAR operation, the strike controller vectored the Rescap directly and quickly to the position of the downed pilot slightly over 100 miles from the ship by closing the MK/10-pip to the Rescap on to the Mayday presentation on the scope.

The SG-1 was used entirely for station keeping and for close range surface search. It has an effective range of 15 miles. Only one failure occurred in this equipment. This required replacement of the magnetron which caused the set to be out of operation for thirty minutes.

The SM radar has been restored to operating condition by the persistent efforts of the ship's technicians and one civilian technician (Mr. R. A. Schmidt, Philco Field Engineer) who is temporarily assigned to the ship. His services have been invaluable. Accurate altitude information on air targets can now be obtained. Prior to its restoration, CIC depended on other ships in the force for altitude data. It is noteworthy to report that every conceivable and possible effort was made to obtain the needed spare parts and technical assistance to get the SM in commission prior to leaving the continental United States, again at Pearl Harbor and at Yokosuka. The availability period at Sasebo did it. There, the BHR had the good fortune to fall in with the HMS OCEAN. As a result of a change of calls and social activities, it became known that the HMS OCEAN and the BHR were perhaps the only ships in their respective services that had installed, and were attempting to keep in operation, an SM radar. An exchange of necessary parts was speedily effected and with the "know how" learned by the ship's technicians and the able assistance of Mr. Schmidt, it can proudly be reported that the SM on this ship has given satisfactory and dependable service for the past two weeks. The BHR is greatly indebted to the HMS OCEAN not only for assistance electronic wise but also for her generous spirited social contribution befitting the occasion.

b. Voice Radio Communications

The air controllers are using a split phone, consisting of one headphone on the AN/ARC receiver and the other on an RCX receiver. This arrangement allows positive reception from controlled aircraft at all times on at least one headphone. Previously it was noticed that one or the other of these receivers faded at certain ranges, possibly due to the location of their antennas or the direction of the transmitting planes from the ship. Voice contact can usually be maintained out to 80 miles subject to variations produced by certain weather conditions and/or the altitude of the aircraft.

c. Lookouts

Training lookouts, a unit of the OI Division, has become an acute problem and is being actively pursued. Adequate training aids are on hand but there is not satisfactory space available for training while the ship is underway. The wardroom has been used on occasion in the afternoon for training lookouts in basic lookout procedures and recognition.

Underway lookouts are regularly stationed alongside the stacks in the lookout tubs and in the bow. Their primary function is that of surface lookouts. They man the JL sound powered telephone circuit which is also manned by a talker on the bridge and a talker in CIC.
who maintains a written log of circuit transmissions and relays tactical interpretations of signals from CIC to the bridge. Sky lookouts under Condition III are provided by the Gunnery Department and man the 5 JP sound powered phone circuit. At General Quarters, 8 lookouts supplement the sky lookouts and are stationed in air defense forward and air defense aft. Because there are only 12 regularly assigned lookouts, the Condition III lookout watches are supplemented by a total of 35 men from the navigation, supply, and administration departments. The regular lookouts stand a two section watch from 0430 to 2000 daily and are relieved by the supplementary lookouts. These supplementary lookout have been thoroughly trained in proper lookout procedures and in the recognition of fifteen types of aircraft most likely to be seen in this area (including Russian aircraft). Each of these supplementary lookouts stands a two hour watch every other night.

5. Photography

a. Enlisted Personnel

There are only 23 men assigned to the photographic laboratory, six are maintained on the day crew and five on the night crew for processing photographs. The remainder are assigned other duties such as flight deck photography, compartment cleaning, and P.P.O. Due to the tremendous load of work during operations, it is recommended that the complement of the laboratory be increased by at least six men.

b. General

During this period a total of 60,400 eight by ten inch prints were produced by the photographic laboratory, 58,406 being by contact and 1994 by projection. The maximum output in a 24 hour period was 8200 eight by ten inch prints. 350 rolls of gun camera film, 300 feet of 16mm film, and 290 feet of 35mm film were processed.

c. Equipment

(1) The photographic laboratory is equipped with two new K-10-A film dryers. These new dryers have speeded up operations considerably. However, it has been found that the heating elements draw 15 amperes whereas the switches for these elements are designed to carry a load of only 15 amperes. The switches have been replaced. It is suggested that other laboratories using the K-10-A dryer check this condition.

(2) A K-17 24" camera capsule was manufactured and completed toward the end of the period. This was used on three occasions with excellent results. The photography produced surpasses that of the K-25 in quality and image size. Moreover its use is a safety factor to the pilot taking strike photos because of its efficiency at higher altitudes. It is recommended that the use of the K-25 be discontinued and more emphasis be placed upon use of the K-17 24" camera. Several modifications to the plans submitted to ComAirPac by UU-7 had to be made by the Aviation Metal Shop of the BHR, as the type of water bomb specified in the plans is not available west of San Diego. The metal shop is making a set of modified plans. These will be submitted to ComAirPac as soon as possible.

6. Air Operations

a. General

In the conduct of Night Carrier operations, hooker control has proved invaluable and is standard practice aboard this vessel under all lighting measures. Even when operating under ideal conditions (good visibility, null defined horizon, etc.) the mere presence of hooker control contributes greatly to the pilot's confidence, and under conditions of reduced visibility it is a must in the control of Jet
traffic in the landing pattern. Landing Signal Officers are, by
the nature of their work, usually well-qualified to serve as hooker
control, and since there are currently five embarked it imposes no
particular hardship on them to serve in this capacity.

D. ENGINEERING

1. The shortage of Engineering Petty Officer ratings is considered critical;
which is further aggravated by Petty Officer fatigue, resulting from the use
of the few aboard for watch standing, machinery repair, and training of
personnel. Operating with jet aircraft requires either(6) boilers, (speeds
up to 30-31 knots), which demands a competent watch if a serious material
casualty is to be avoided. Most machinery repairs can be accomplished only
at night when fifty per cent of the boiler power has been secured, and in order
to complete these repairs and machinery tests one section must be dropped
from the watch rotation for making repairs, and the other two sections must
continue on watch and watch basis. This has become typical for the "B"
Division's operations. This situation is not caused by lack of the total
number of men, but by the lack of technical competence.

2. In order to alleviate conditions, officers supervise jobs normally handled
by CPO's, and officer personnel are more actively involved in the details of
the training program on levels previously handled by 2nd class petty officers.
This, of course, can only partially compensate for the severe shortage of
technical talent.

3. The accelerated training program is reaping rewards, in that newly made
third class petty officers are "getting sharp" on watch standing, some in
a robot manner, but some are beginning to think for themselves. Preventive
maintenance is lagging seriously, with no solution in sight except to con-
centrate on major units; however, it is a known fact that a great percentage
of major casualties start from the failure of a small unit, setting off a
chain of events that quickly gets completely out of control. When adequate
preventative maintenance overhaul work cannot be completed on the multitude
of governors, regulators and control devices, a hazard is always present.

4. By taking full advantage of the extended period in port it is hoped that
everything of consequence will get at least a "once over lightly", and a number
of the men will get a chance to see, for the first time, the working parts of
equipment they have only seen on the pages of their text books.

5. The Engineering Department is fortunate in having experienced officers of
high calibre, who have kept morale at a high level and the defeatist attitude
from cropping up, which could be disastrous.

6. One unusual condition exists which is worthy of comment. The "B" Division
officer is an ensign, commissioned 6/1/51 from the NROTC program, who has
proven more capable and efficient than his two predecessors who were Lieutenants.
During his eleven months aboard it is estimated that he has spent six of them
in the bilges tracing systems and gathering information.

D. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Catapult and Arresting Gear
   a. During hot days (75°-85°) it was noted that the catapult hydraulic
      pumps required a few additional seconds to bring accumulator pressures up
to the desired level.

   b. During the fourth week of operations internal failure was experienced
      on two hydraulic pumps of the port catapult. These pumps had been in use
      since the ship was commissioned in 1944. One pump had been in operation
during 4523 shots, the other for 4540 shots. Failure of these two pumps
      necessitated a time lag of one minute and fifty seconds to pump up to
      3500 psi with the remaining two pumps. This delay was reduced when less
      pressure was required and in the case of conventional aircraft amounted
to only a few seconds.
c. On 12 July an AD-4W was given a two finger turnup prior to being launched from the starboard catapult. On reaching full power the holdback release unit broke probably from the tension ring rupturing prematurely, permitting the plane to go forward. Aircraft were spotted on the port side forward. The pilot later stated that he was so busy keeping the plane on a straight heading to miss the planes on his port side that he did not have time to apply brakes. The pilot in effect made a "deck launch" and as the plane passed over the bow dipped slightly below the flight deck level, but the pilot managed to keep it airborne. Inasmuch as the relative wind was 26 knots at the time, it is believed that this "deck launch" of 150 feet may be something of a record for the AD-4W type aircraft.

d. Frequent repairs to yielding elements were necessary as a result of damage inflicted by F9F tail skids during landing operations.

e. Four deck-edge fair lead sheaves were replaced on the after cross-deck pendants. The bronze bushings in the sheaves showed considerable wear despite frequent lubrication. It is recommended that a steel roller bearing be considered for use in the deck-edge fair lead sheaves.

f. During operations it was necessary to replace one of the first three cross-deck pendants every third day because of wear and broken strands.

2. Aircraft Maintenance

a. Considerable trouble has been experienced during this operating period with rough running engines in the AD-4 type aircraft (R-3350-26WA). The high power settings required for operations with heavy ordnance loads have contributed to the breakdown of the reconditioned RB19 spark plugs between 25 and 45 hours of operation. Use of new RB19 spark plugs has raised the useful life to over 90 hours. It is believed that the high lead content of aviation fuel now in use is, to a degree, responsible for the spark plug breakdown.

b. The maintenance work load has been increased considerably during this period because of the requirement of drop checking the landing gear on F9F-2 type aircraft at each periodic check. This additional workload will be lessened with the forthcoming delivery of the chrome-plated lock and plunger parts for the main landing gear.

c. The shortage of AD-4 SEC kits has increased the time required for engine changes for this type aircraft.

d. It was necessary to transfer a F9F tip tank to one of the emergency landing fields in Korea. This was accomplished by threading a 3/8 inch cable through the attaching lugs of the tank and hanging the tank from the bomb rack shackles of an AD.

e. The portable hydraulic test unit, model HTS4-GE, using the four cylinder Waukeeshaw engine has been a source of considerable trouble due to the arrangement of the carburetor and intake manifolds when stopped after running for a period to 15 to 30 minutes. It has been determined that the heated manifold causes a vapor lock which prevents restarting until the engine is cooled or priming directly into the cylinders has been affected. It is recommended that some type of hydraulic unit be developed which would utilize electric power to drive the hydraulic pump. At present there is none listed in the standard stock catalogue.

3. Aviation Ordnance

a. Installation of MK 34 suspension bands on 2000# GP bombs are required for AD-4 aircraft having service change #298 as the MK 10 type band will not fit the center bomb rack. This requires many additional man hours because of the time required to install the MK 34 bands. These bands are installed on the hangar deck on replenishment day when 2000# GP's are received. Time does not permit installation when these bombs are broken.
out from the magazine on strike days. It is recommended that the armor plate around the Douglas bomb rack suspension gooks be modified so MK 10 suspension band lugs will fit.

b. Assembled 6.5" ATAR's are too long to fit the bomb elevators on this ship whereas the new MK 32 ATAR can be hoisted assembled. Heads and rocket motors of the 6.5" ATAR's must be sent up separately and assembled on the flight deck. Loading a 12 Jet Recco, requiring 72 6.5" ATAR's, creates considerable congestion on the flight deck with the limited space available when all aircraft are spotted forward. The MK 32 ATAR reduces this problem.

c. MK 1, M2 and M3 fin lock nuts are used on all bombs assembled on this ship. No reports have been received of fins coming off in flight.

d. For bombs carried by night Heckler aircraft a strip of luminous tape (stock no. 17-L-22150) is secured to the arming wire. This is for the purpose of obtaining a positive check that arming wires are in place on any hung bombs returned aboard during periods of darkness.

4. Aircraft Fueling

a. The first serious encounter with high frequency radio induction in aircraft parked on the flight deck was experienced during this period. While moving napalm equipment it was noted that on contact with the surfaces of one aircraft a shock was experienced. Sparking was also in evidence. The metal tie-down reels were checked and found to produce an arc when moved. The cause was quickly traced to the aircraft being in the proximity of the high frequency radio transmitting antenna which were in the "up" position. Investigation proved that the induction hazard was reduced to a minimum when the antennae were placed in the "down" position. In the future aircraft parked adjacent to either the forward or after antennae will not be serviced until the antennae are in the down position.

5. Training

a. The need for schooling for members of the flight deck fire fighting and crash detail is great and at every opportunity during in port periods personnel have been sent to available firefighting schools; however, none of the schools attended have offered a situation as might actually exist on board a carrier. It is suggested that firefighting schools incorporate in their training a device similar to an actual flight deck with hoses, foam hoppers and other equipment placed as might be found aboard ship. Such situations as barrier crash fires, pack fires, catwalk crash fires, plane on fire jettisoning, and pilot rescue techniques could be practiced. The need for simulating wind across the deck is most important. This could be simulated by aircraft turning up with the slipstream directed at the fire. Another important technique that should be given is the maneuvering of a burning plane by means of grappling hooks. Such a program of training must necessarily go beyond the basic principles of firefighting and would require more time in the development of definite techniques peculiar to flight operations; however, it is felt that the results of such a program in just one instance might tend to fully justify the effort expended.

F. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. Admission to the Sick List During 33 Day Operating Period

a. 121 patients admitted to the sick list.
b. Total of 592 sick days out of a possible 92,697 work days.
c. .6% of possible work days lost to sick days.
d. One pilot admitted to the sick list. Diagnosis: Fracture, simple, Compression L-5.
e. There were 14 patients admitted to the sick list from other vessels with a loss of 110 sick days.
2. Treatments accomplished - Non-Admission
   a. Medical - 3171
   b. Surgical - 288
   c. Veneral Disease
      (1) Ship's company in Main Sick Bay
          (a) Gonorrhea - - - - 14
          (b) Chancroid - - - - 4
      (2) Air Group in Main Sick Bay
          (a) Gonorrhea - - - - 2
      (3) Ships Total - - - - - - 20
      (4) From Transfer
          (a) Lymphogranuloma Venereum - - - - 1
          (b) Syphilis - - - - - - - - - - 1
      (5) Total - - - - - - - - - - - - 22

3. Pilots and Crewman Status
   a. Killed in Action
      (1) Pilots - - - - - - 0
      (2) Crewman - - - - - 0
      (3) All others - - - 0
   b. Missing in Action
      (1) Pilots - - - - - - 1
      (2) Crewman - - - - - 1
      (3) All others - - - 0
   c. Disposition
      | Physical | Psychological |
      | No. - Days | No. Days | No. Days |
      | Crewman Grounded | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 |
      | Pilots Grounded | 13 39 | 3 7 | 0 0 |
      Total Pilot Days Possible | 4,851 |
      Total Pilot Days Lost to Grounding | 46 |
      0.9% Pilot Days lost to Grounding |

4. Accidents involving Plane Loss and Injury or Death
   a. Combat
      (1) On 11 July an ADBQ piloted by Lt. Edward P. CULLINGS with Harck L. TOOKER, ATL as crewman, was observed to crash during a strike on Pyongyang. Both men were declared to be missing in action because of lack of evidence of death. Survival and Safety equipment employed unknown.
   b. Operational
      (1) On 9 July 1952 a heavily loaded ADB, piloted by LCDR Gordon C. BUHRER, CVG-7, stalled on take-off and crashed off the bow resulting in moderate contusions, sprains and abrasions. H-3 Helmet Shoulder Harness, Safety Belt and MK-2 Life Vest functioned well. Helicopter rescue was made more difficult because pilot was twisted with wet parachute.
      (2) On 11 July 1952 an F9F-2, piloted by ENS Eugene S. CONRAD, VF-72, crashed shortly after takeoff because of power failure. He employed H-3 Helmet, Shoulder Harness, Safety Belt, and MK-2 Life vest, but sustained mild shock abrasions to head, neck and extremities on impact. Helicopter rescue was made.
McBride, VF-71 crashed off bow following catapult shot. Pilot experienced difficulty in evacuating cockpit, his gear being caught on a projection. He employed successfully, H-3 Helmet, Shoulder Harness, MK-2 Life Vest and Safety Belt but sustained compressed fracture 5th Lumbar Vertebrae on impact. He experienced difficulty moving after entering helicopter sling.

On 31 July 1952 an F9F-2, piloted by ENS. Bryant L. McBride, VF-71 crashed off bow following catapult shot. Pilot experienced difficulty in evacuating cockpit, his gear being caught on a projection. He employed successfully, H-3 Helmet, Shoulder Harness, MK-2 Life Vest and Safety Belt but sustained compressed fracture 5th Lumbar Vertebrae on impact. He experienced difficulty moving after entering helicopter sling.

On 31 July 1952 an F9F-2, piloted by ENS. David W. Longworth, VF-74, was ditched off Mayang-do Island after flak had damaged engine and power was lost. No injury to pilot who employed H-3 Helmet, Shoulder Harness, MK-2 Life Vest, Safety Belt, PK-2 Raft with gear. Rescue was made by USS Holister, (DD 788)

On 22 July 1952 an F9F-2, piloted by LCDR Gordon C. Buhler, CVG-7, returning from Photo-escort mission over Korea ditched one mile aft of ship on recovery when fuel exhaustion occurred. H-3 Helmet, Shoulder Harness, Safety Belt, MK-2 Life Vest employed successfully. Rescue was made by Helicopter. No injuries sustained.

b. Operational

None.

6. All planes are equipped with aeronautical first aid kits, Stock #9-196-650. Each pilot and crew member have been issued individual aeronautical first aid kits, Stock #9-197-675, containing morphine sulfate syrettes for use in connection with the contents of PSK-1 survival kits and there are also three ammonia ampules kept in handy location in each plane cockpit for use by pilot when needed to prevent loss of consciousness.

7. The only aviation technician who was attached to ship's company was detached 19 June 1952 and the ship has been without one since. There has been one ordered to fighter squadron Seventy-One who is expected to report about 7 August 1952. It is recommended that an optical dispensing technician be assigned to this vessel for duty.

8. Air Sea Rescue

In conjunction with the HU-1 detachment on board a course of first aid training for the HU-1 crew members and training as crew members of helicopter rescue team for hospital corpsmen and flight surgeons attached to the ship has been instituted. To implement the program a special kit for first aid work which is considered to be reasonably complete for most types of injuries likely to be encountered has been prepared and is kept immediately available at the flight deck battle dressing station. Weight of this kit complete is approximately 24 pounds.

It is noted that during the last week to 10 days of the period covered by this report the entire ship's company especially the air group pilots, ordnance crews and aircraft maintenance crews began to show definite signs of chronic fatigue. For this type of operation it is the opinion of the Medical Officer that approximately three weeks would be a maximum time during which peak efficiency can be maintained.

G. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

The Dental Department occupies an area approximately 19 by 14 1/2 feet on the third deck and has adequate facilities for the treatment of two patients simultaneously.
It is the policy of the department that local anesthesia be given for all dental work. More than 500 carpules of 2.25 cc procaine hydrochloride were used for this purpose during July. The rubber dam is used as a matter of routine on all patients. The corpsmen are well trained to adjust this most useful and valuable time saver. There are instances where the clamp, dam and holder have been placed on the patient in 45 seconds. A small rubber tube attached to the handpiece permits the patient to supply air on the tooth while the dental work is being done. The use of the dam not only has a good psychological effect on the patient but saves the work ordinarily done by corpsmen and permits him to accomplish other tasks.

It is the practice of the department to keep extractions to a minimum and to save the tooth if at all practicable. Only 39 teeth were extracted this month. Abscessed front teeth are rarely removed but the roots are extracted. This expedient factor of endodontia is considered to be a morale factor.

During the month of July the Department recorded 864 patient visits. Among these were two officers on TAD orders, who required essential dental work. Occasionally men are transferred to the ship for emergency treatment such as on 12 July 1952 when the following dispatch was received from the USS CUNNINGHAM (DD-752) "Upon commencing fueling desire transfer one man to you to have tooth pulled X Request you return him prior completion fueling." Fueling was scheduled for completion within one hour. The patient was taken aboard by highline and brought to the dental office, where an X-ray was taken, an anesthesia, codein and penicillin administered. The nerve canal was cleaned and filled, the root amputated and the infection removed. The patient was returned to his ship within 35 minutes, still with all his teeth and a healthier and happier man.

This department feels that time in the area is spent in maximum effort. It functions seven days a week. Thus, the record for this period is among the highest attained by any DENTAL ACTIVITY in any area, and it is believed the highest figures ever attained on the BOW HOMER RICHARD.

The following indicates the volume of work completed in one month, July:

- Fillsings------------------1120
- Extractions----------------39 (mostly complex wisdom teeth)
- Teeth Cleaned--------------49
- Trench Mouth Cases--------12
- Total Sittings-------------864

All this was done with exact regard for the greatest detail and accuracy.

This record is a source of deep pride to Corpsmen and Dentists. It is realized that only by mutual cooperation and hard work, can the highest type of work be rendered to the greatest number of personnel.

H. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

The USS JUPITER AVE-8 was detached without relief during this operating period leaving no mobile supply support available for aeronautical material. In addition the JUPITER had off-loaded and depleted much of her stock in anticipation of returning to the states, causing her to pass a great number of CV-31 requisitions to ASB, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. Although ASB, Yokosuka assumed the JUPITER'S supply responsibilities, the time required to pass and
double process requisitions, plus unexpected high usage has created a situation whereby many items which were originally requested on a routine basis are now urgently required. It is recommended that an aeronautical supply vessel be made available for on the line replenishment at least once during each normal combat period.

Approximately 467 requisitions for 1134 aeronautical items have been prepared during this period. As of this date, outstanding requisitions submitted since arrival in West Pac number 538 and contain approximately 1561 items. This has occurred even though approximately 120 days operating spares were on board at time of deployment from CONTUS based on prior six month tour in West Pac.

Although many items have been used at a higher rate than was expected it is believed that knowledge of high usage during this period of items listed below may be helpful to other ships for future planning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Number</th>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Quantity Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R23-V-310</td>
<td>Vest, Life MM2</td>
<td>12 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R82-MA-EE-4350</td>
<td>Motor Cowl Flap</td>
<td>3 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R82-CVVS-47407</td>
<td>Strut Assy Shock</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R82-GR-132860-L</td>
<td>Tank Assy Wing Tip</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R82-GR-132860-R</td>
<td>Tank Assy Wing Tip</td>
<td>6 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R82-SKY-510-10-2102</td>
<td>Blade Assy</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R83-T-11975</td>
<td>Tube 24 x 5.5 MIG F9F</td>
<td>39 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R83-T-5828-1</td>
<td>Tire 24 x 5.5 MIG F9F</td>
<td>51 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R83-GR134095</td>
<td>Cylinder Assy. Wing fold left and right</td>
<td>8 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R83-NAP-312670-2</td>
<td>Parachute, QFS 28 ft.</td>
<td>9 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R86-H-3520</td>
<td>Harness Assy. Ignition AD-4</td>
<td>5 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R86-HEM-7000</td>
<td>Cutout, Generator</td>
<td>6 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R88- A-351-11</td>
<td>Altimeter F9F</td>
<td>5 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R88-A-409</td>
<td>Amplifier</td>
<td>5 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R88-C-583-11</td>
<td>Clock, Aircraft 12 hr dial</td>
<td>6 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R88-I-1350-11</td>
<td>Indicator Gyro Horizon</td>
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<tr>
<td>R9L-SPD-83337</td>
<td>Charger, Gun .50 Cal</td>
<td>19 ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>R9L-L-160510</td>
<td>Launcher MK 9 Mod 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>R9L-S-8005-505</td>
<td>Switch Pressure 20MN</td>
<td>8 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9L-V-10000</td>
<td>Valve, Gun Charging</td>
<td>6 ea</td>
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</table>

Also all items of flight deck clothing have been requested in quantities which exceed those allowed. It has been found that each man requires to wear flight deck clothing requires four outfits except for shoes.

Although it is realized that fleet controlled material is in short supply, it is recommended that these items be made available on ships
in the area. This would save the time now required to transport fleet controlled spares from Yokosuka to the area and would be invaluable when AOG's are involved.

It is recommended that CID planes operating from Japan be utilized more frequently to transport high priority freight to the task force. Many high priority items now take several days to get to the area from Japan because of being sent out by surface vessels.

It is recommended that support activities be required to obligate or pass on requisitions for items not in stock or not carried instead of cancelling them, causing the ship to have to resubmit identical requisitions at a later date.

2. Provisions Replenishment

This vessel has replenished provisions four times during this tour on the line.

The first replenishment, from the Alstede AF 48, was accomplished the day prior to sailing from Sasebo on 1 July 1952. We received 4000 lbs. of lettuce, were charged for 2000 lbs. because of its condition, and the lettuce actually usable was 400 lbs. The 1600 lbs. additional had to be surveyed.

The second replenishment was also from the Alstede AF 48 on 14 July 1952. Twenty three items of fresh and fresh frozen were requested and of those requested, only the following items and quantities were received:

- F F Corn on Cob 943 lbs.
- F F Peas 2,010 lbs.
- Cabbage fresh 3,000 lbs.
- Onions dry 990 lbs.

This replenishment presented no problem except lack of provisions.

By the time of the third replenishment on 25 July 1952 from the Graffias AF 28 there were no fresh provisions remaining on board and only few fresh frozen. We requested twenty one items including meats, butter, and avocado. A total of 83 tons was requested; partial delivery of all items was made. All items were received in excellent condition; however, only 66 tons were delivered.

The fourth replenishment of provisions was on 4 August 1952 from the Graffias AF 28. A total of 83 items, 144.3 tons, were requisitioned; delivery of 46 items and 97.2 tons resulted. The majority of this tonnage was taken within two hours, however it was necessary to spend an additional ½ hour alongside to await delivery of the last few sling loads.

This vessel used five sleds, 5 tractors and 150 hand working party to accomplish the latter two replenishments. At no time was the receiving area blocked, and when sleds were not available the full cargo nets were towed away from the receiving area. The operation progressed satisfactorily as far as the intership exchange was concerned, however, the internal operation was considerably slower.

Provisions were towed aft to bay three of the hanger deck and stacked in the vicinity of the respective strike down hatches. Chutes were employed to move the material vertically below; however, stores must be man-handled horizontally on the second and third decks. This latter movement can be greatly increased through the use of light weight roller conveyers. Based on actual measurements, it is recommended that 355 feet of this type conveyer be included in the allowance list for this class vessel. Standard stock type conveyers
are not satisfactory, being too heavy for facile handling through hatchways. In addition, action is being taken to procure three additional sleds which, it is believed, will more than meet the needs of replenishment.

One of the greatest morale sustaining factors during periods of pro-
longed operations is the service of fresh fruit and vegetables in various combinations at the salad bar. It is the opinion of this command that greater quantities of fresh items should be made available to vessels actually operating on the line. The ships on the line should be given first preference up to and including their maximum capacity to stow.

It is recommended that BuSandA endeavor to develop a plastic bag or inner lining for crates, similar to those which are available for use in domestic refrigerators. These bags have lengthened considerably the storage life of fresh vegetables in the home.

P.W. Watson

Copy to:

CNO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CONSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
CONCARDIV ONE (1)
CONCARDIV THREE (1)
CONCARDIV FIVE (1)
CONCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
CO, FAIREDUPAC (2)
CO, USS ANTIETAN (CV 36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV 21) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV 9) (1)
CO, USS Kearsarge (CV 33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CV 34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47) (1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV 37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV 45) (1)
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE 116) (1)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE 115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119) (1)
CO, USS RENDova (CVE 11A) (1)
CO, USS STILWELL (CVE 118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) (1)
CO, VF-73 NAS, QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
COMAIRLANT (1)
COMCARIROGRU TWO (1)
COMCARIROGRU FIVE (1)
COMCARIROGRU ELEVEN (1)
COMCARIROGRU FIFTEEN (1)
COMCARIROGRU NINETEEN (1)
COMCARIROGRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
COMCARIROGRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
COMCARIROGRU SEVENTEEN (12) (For Squadron and parent VC Units)
COMCARIROGRU (ATU) ONE (1)
COMFAIRQUONSET (1)
COMSERVPAC (1)
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 7-18 Aug 1952
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST  
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report for the period 7 August 1952 through 18 August 1952  
Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951  
(b) CinCPacFlt INSTRUCTION 3480.1A  

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 7 August 1952 through 18 August 1952 is hereby submitted.  

PART I  
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION  

While enroute to Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, for a scheduled period of upkeep, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD received CONSEVENTHFLT Confidential dispatch 061326Z August and CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 061920Z August which directed the transfer of CONCARDIV 1, Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, USN, to the USS PRINCETON upon arrival at Yokosuka, and the USS BON HOMME RICHARD to proceed immediately to rejoin Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE about 0911001 August. The BHR was to relieve the USS BOXER, which had been seriously damaged by fire.  

The USS BON HOMME RICHARD entered Yokosuka Harbor at 06401, 7 August 1952, and anchored at 07201. CONCARDIV 1 and staff transferred to the USS PRINCETON in the morning, and at 12151, in accordance with the dispatches cited, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, with Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the combat area via Van Dieman Straits. General Drills were held and anti-aircraft firing conducted en-route.  

At 08031, 9 August 1952 the BHR joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in TARE area in the sea of Japan. The Task Force was commanded by CONCARDIV 3, Rear Admiral A. Soucek, USN, embarked in the USS ESSEX. In addition to the ESSEX the Task Force was composed of the BON HOMME RICHARD and various heavy support and screening ships.  

The mission of the ship was derived from Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order No. 22-51. During this period, the BON HOMME RICHARD devoted
its major efforts to strikes on coastal gun emplacements on Hodo Pendo Peninsula, the coastal rail system northeast of Hungnam, large scale attacks on troop and supply areas south of Wonsan, at Kilchu and Pukchong and Close Air Support missions near the bombline.

The composition of Carrier Air Group Seven during this period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ALLOW. &amp; OPERATIONAL</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE A/C 8/9 8/18</td>
<td>8/9 8/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCVG-7</td>
<td>CDR G. E. Brown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>CDR J. S. Hill</td>
<td>16 14 16 24 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>LCDR A. W. Curtis</td>
<td>16 15 16 24 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>CDR C. D. Fonvielle Jr.</td>
<td>16 16 15 24 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-75</td>
<td>CDR H. K. Evans</td>
<td>16 15 16 24 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-4 Det 41</td>
<td>LCDR E. S. Ogle Oic</td>
<td>4 4 4 5 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-12 Det 41</td>
<td>LCDR C. H. Blanchard Oic</td>
<td>3 3 3 6 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-33 Det 41</td>
<td>LCDR R. Hoffmeister Oic</td>
<td>4 5 5 6 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61 Det Kan</td>
<td>LT G. H. Yeagle Oic</td>
<td>3 3 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons. Two each are assigned to VF-71 and VF-72 and 4 are assigned to VA-75. CAG and Staff Operations Officers fly both AD's and F9F's.

In accordance with CTF Confidential dispatch 181305I, August 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed from the combat area and proceeded via Tsugaru Straits to arrive at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan at 0600I, 20 August 1952.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/9/52: The ship replenished. Gunnery exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

8/10/52: The Air Group commenced operations with an attack on pre-selected targets in Hamhung. Preceded by flak suppressing jets, AD's and
FL+UTs attacked and further damaged RR By-Pass Bridges on the Songchon River and then, in quick succession, heavily damaged or destroyed a series of warehouses, barracks buildings and a billeting area creating many secondary explosions and fires. Simultaneously, other jets struck the Sindok Lead and Zinc Mines inflicting further damage on the already battered factory area. In other attacks, jets and FL+UTs destroyed trucks, a supply storage tent, a gun position, inflicted 12 rail cuts and damaged 8 boxcars in the Dog Victor Sector. The principal event of the day was a coordinated jet-prop strike against warehouses, barracks buildings and an ammunition dump at Pukchong. Bombing was reportedly accurate and secondary explosions rocked the area. Large fires, started at nine distinct points, were visible hours later. In addition jet photo planes flew within a few miles of the North Korean border to secure valuable photography.

8/11/52: A total of 52 jets and props struck troop concentrations and supply areas in the heavily defended Wonsan Valley throughout the day. Results were difficult to determine because of the undergrowth, but at least three gun positions were silenced, twenty two fires started and one large secondary explosion caused. Jets also struck in the vicinity of Pocheonpyong destroying one lumber mill, damaging another mill and three buildings. Continuing with the interdiction program, jets and props accounted for seven rail cuts and damage to a RR tunnel. NGF planes heavily damaged a large factory building and 2 other buildings at Chongjin. Two F4U-5NL hecklers destroyed a large shore battery on the Hodo Pando Peninsula which had reportedly been bombarding friendly ships in the area. Six photographic sorties obtained good coverage of assigned areas.

8/12/52: Attacks against Hodo Pando Peninsula continued and 4 coastal guns were destroyed. In the forenoon, jets on armed recco heavily strafed 50 vehicles, damaged 6 supply buildings, 3 boxcars, 2 large warehouses, 8 barracks buildings and a steam shovel. AD's and FL+UTs effectively saturated large supply areas in the vicinity of Kamiong-Dong south of Wonsan. On interdiction, BHR planes made 20 rail cuts, destroyed a highway bridge and a RR bridge and also blew 1000 yards of track and repair sheds down the hillside at Package 2. Other flights accounted for the destruction of 9 buildings and damage to 14 vehicles. An estimated 31 troops were killed by strafing and fragmentation bombs.
8/13/52: At sea; the task force replenished. The night hecklers, which had been launched the night before, operated from friendly fields in Korea throughout the day spotting for "Monte Carlo" in Wonsan Harbor and surveying the rail lines along the main coastal route. Foul weather hampered scheduled operations but the hecklers succeeded in damaging 2 warehouses and another building, cratering a highway and damaging the approach to a railroad bridge. They also bombed the Wonsan Airfield.

8/14/52: Jets were off at a early hour to attack supply centers far to the north. 2 warehouses were destroyed and 1 heavily damaged; 3 other buildings and 4 trucks were damaged. AD's and F4U's attacked troop billeting areas and supply buildings at Kilchu. 11 buildings and 2 repair quarters were destroyed, 2 buildings were heavily damaged and left in flames, 3 boxcars were damaged. On a Close Air Support mission, AD's and F4U's greeted with the words of controller River Rat Willy, "We'll get some action now, here comes the Navy", destroyed 2 gun positions which had been harassing units of the 1st ROK Corps in the Eastern Sector of Korea. On another close air support mission BHR planes blasted and destroyed 3 gun positions and 6 bunkers in the Tenth U.S. Corps Sector. Large fires followed the attack and secondary explosions shook the area. In the afternoon AD's again assisted "Monte Carlo and destroyed another coastal gun at a cave entrance on the Hodo Pando Peninsula. After the attack "Monte Carlo" said "Anyone in that cave will have to be carried out".

8/15/52: Weather over the target areas hampered operations and the majority of strikes were cancelled. A Close Air Support mission again provided support to the 1st ROK Corps in the Eastern Sector and the controller reported 90% coverage. Results of other missions consisted of 5 rail cuts, 1 highway bridge and 1 building destroyed; 3 buildings, 1 factory, 2 boxcars and 1 highway bridge damaged.

8/16/52: Foul weather precluded air operations over the target areas. Sorties were limited to combat air and anti-submarine patrols, weather recce and ferry hops.

8/17/52: Major efforts were devoted to replenishment. Gunnery exercises were conducted in the afternoon.
8/18/52: Typhoon "Karen" which had been slowly moving north from Okinawa reached the southern tip of Korea, and weather over North Korea was non-operational. A scheduled strike by the Bon Homme Richard, the Princeton and the Essex against the Choson hydro-electric complex was cancelled. General drills and Gunnery exercises were conducted.

Because of the likelihood of bad weather for several days, the Bon Homme Richard was detached during the afternoon from Task Force 77, instead of on 20 August 1952 as scheduled, to return to Yokosuka for a belated period of rest, recreation and upkeep.

PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Expended

**SHIP**

5"/38 Caliber
40 MM

77 Rounds
1500 Rounds

**AIRCRAFT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2000# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>1000# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>500# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>250# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>343</td>
<td>100# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>477</td>
<td>260# Frag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>100# Incend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MK 78-0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Deck Evolutions

During this period, the BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside six (6) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies and received eight (8) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers and freight. All transfers were accomplished expeditiously and without casualty. The cooperative spirit and teamwork displayed by replenishing vessels is considered commendable.

3. Hung Ordnance

Of 409 rockets expended by F9F type aircraft, the following malfunctions are listed. This is exclusive of 2 dropped on the catapult and 2 dropped during arrested landings:

- Broken electrical leads: 6
- Rockets becoming unplugged: 4
- Dud rockets: 16
- Total Casualties: 26
The following malfunctions are listed from the expenditure of 36 rockets by F4U type craft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malfunction</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broken electrical leads</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets becoming unplugged</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dud rockets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Casualties: 5

Malfunctions on rockets expended by AD's are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Malfunction</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broken electrical leads</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets becoming unplugged</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dud rockets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Casualties: 2

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Damage to Ship

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Plane No.</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>123949</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D-3 Flak, vertical fin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97082</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3 Empty brass hit leading edge, port wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123419</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D-3 37mm direct hit on starboard wing and droop snoot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>80795</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 Flak, port aileron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97370</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 Flak, both wings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81006</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 Minor flak, starboard elevator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123416</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 Flak, starboard wing, tip tank, fuselage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81985</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 One 30 cal. bullet hole port aileron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>129008</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3 One 50 cal. bullet hole starboard wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123484</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3 Two rockets, fired simultaneously, collided ahead of plane and detonated. Fragment entered tip tank.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Operational Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Buno</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>127123</td>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Port landing gear folded on landing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Loss of Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu. No.</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/14/52</td>
<td>VF-7 A</td>
<td>F4U</td>
<td>97372</td>
<td>Crashed during diving attack over Korea. Presumed to be hit by flak.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Buildings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks Buildings</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam Shovel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockhouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Post</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Mills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Dumps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Tent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Storage Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Crew Quarters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Plants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke Stacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animals (killed)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (killed)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craters to Highway</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Bridge Approaches</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, flak or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

Although the anticipation of the scheduled in-port activities was dampened by the directive to turn around at Yokosuka and proceed immediately to the line, the officers and men of the Bon Homme Richard were exceptionally sympathetic to the need to relieve the Boxer and accepted the additional
period of combat operations involved in splendid spirit. A large delivery of mail at Yokosuka bolstered morale considerably.

Ninety-three calendar days have passed since the Bon Homme Richard departed from the states. Of these, there were only 16 days on which liberty could be granted. The average number of times for liberty, taking into account restrictions as ready carrier at Sasebo and the normal liberty schedule, would not exceed seven.

The Bon Homme Richard has now been at sea for 50 consecutive calendar days. Thus, this is the longest period of sustained operations since its recommissioning in January 1951.

Definite indications of chronic fatigue have been noted among the crew and especially ordnance and flight deck personnel. All hands are naturally looking forward to rest and relaxation in port.

On arrival in the combat area 9 August 1952, the ship was greeted with the following dispatch from CTF 77:

"YOU ARE A FRIEND INDEED X QUICK TRIP OUT HERE AND YOUR READY STATUS MOST CREDITABLE!"

The following dispatch was received from CTF 77 as the ship departed the combat area on 18 August 1952:

"YOUR PERFORMANCE AS RELIEF PITCHER WAS GREAT X FOR INNING COMING UP TAKE TWO AND HIT TO LEFT"

Needless to say, the foregoing dispatches were greatly appreciated by the Officers and Men of the Bon Homme Richard.

2. Casualties

On 15 August 1952 while on a strike mission, Ensign Donald E. Adams, USN, 505123 went into a dive from 8000 feet at a 30 degree angle and descended toward the target. The plane continued on down to the ground, crashed and exploded. The pilot was presumed to be killed.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

4. NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT

During the summer months when the weather is hot and humid and the typhoon season is at hand, it is recommended that ships proceeding to and from the Task Force and Yokosuka be routed via Tsugaru Kaikyo, the strait between the Japanese Islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. This route is consid-
crably cooler and one or two hundred miles shorter (depending on departure or
arrival point in area "Sugar"). There are less restricted waters, fewer
fishing fleets to encounter, and the route requires the service of an escort
for a shorter period of time. It also offers a change of scenery from the
Van Dieman route and trains and indoctrinates CIC and bridge personnel in
the available navigational aids and geography of an additional part of Japan.

B. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Air Intelligence

a. General

During this period, two photographic reconnaissance pilots of the Fifth
Air Force were aboard for indoctrination in Carrier Operations. From them,
it was learned that the Charlie Uncle and Charlie Tare Sectors of North Korea
are photo-mapped weekly by the Air Force and mosaic maps of these areas are
made for photographic interpretation purposes. Such material would be of
inestimable value to the ships and air groups for briefing, orientation,
photocomparison and planning purposes. It is therefore suggested that
arrangements be made with the Fifth Air Force for the distribution of copies
of these mosaics to the operating carriers.

2. Combat Information Center

a. Intercept Control

CIC had control of either strikes or CAP daily during this period. This
provided good training for the newer Air Controllers in conducting air inter-
cepts. Either a section or division of CAP was used against friendly strike
units returning to the force. Permission to do this was generally granted by
the Flag CIC Officer. This was not only good training for the Air Controllers
but also for the pilots as it helped to familiarize them with air intercept
technique and standard voice procedure. The pilots on CAP missions prefer
exercise of this kind rather than spend the entire airborne period orbiting
over a fixed area.

b. Talkers

CIC, on this ship is located on the number 7 deck which isolates it from
the bridge, air plot and primary fly. This situation has made it imperative
that CIC have properly trained talkers on sound-powered telephones and this
presents a continuing training task. Every effort is made to pass and receive
the major part of information within the ship via the sound-powered telephones
and to use the MC circuits for emergencies or as little as possible in order to keep the noise level low so as not to impair the operating efficiency of CIC.

3. Aerology

During the period covered, there were two and one half non-operational days. A cold front oriented EAST-WEST stagnated over North Korea at about latitude 40°N causing multiple overcast over most of the target areas.

Typhoon "Karen" moving slowly northward was off the southwest tip of Korea on the 17th of August. The Task Force took evasive maneuvers by steaming 300 miles to the east of the Operating Area. The typhoon then accelerated and made a quick passage of the Korean Peninsula. In doing so, the intensity of the storm was reduced from 80 to 50 knot winds. After the period of this report the storm diminished in intensity and moved rapidly north-east across the Sea of Japan.

4. Photography

Photo missions were flown on four days with an average of five sorties per day consisting mostly of target search and photo mapping missions. The work load was greatly increased over normal and "around the clock" operations in the photo lab were necessary to satisfy requirements. The maximum production for one day was 11,349 8 x 10 inch prints. During the period, a total of 32,143 8 x 10 inch prints were produced. This number is more than half of the total production during the month of July.

It should be pointed out that this production took place during an unscheduled tour on the line. Consequently, there was an unexpected drain on inventories and supplies.

Moreover, Budget planning was based on the normal schedule periods of operation. Photographic requirements have been increased over the budget planning base and this factor plus the unplanned expenditures during the additional tour will probably require an increase in budgetary allowances.

C. ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. In scheduling operational periods and upkeep availabilities it is recommended that due consideration be given to the probable Engineering Department preventative maintenance work load, the necessity to complete a great number of mandatory ship's force repair items prior to further operation,
and the great and urgent need for Engineering Department personnel to receive adequate rest and relaxation. It is considered that personnel fatigue in this department is considerably greater than in other departments for the following reasons:

a. A greater percentage of personnel are standing watches on a relentless one in three in oppressively hot spaces.

b. A greater percentage are standing watches on a one in two (watch and watch) basis to permit one section to work on urgent machinery repair.

c. Shortage of petty officers causes a critical strain on rated personnel who must stand watches, supervise repairs, and conduct a vigorous training program.

d. Mandatory in-port repairs requires the same key personnel to forego much needed liberty and recreation to which they are entitled.

2. The following paragraphs supply supporting data for this recommendation:

a. From the departure of the ship from San Diego on 20 May until arrival in Yokosuka 20 August 1952 the ship has operated at sea 80 days out of a total of 93. During the 13 days in port the engineering department (ship) has been on 12 hours sailing notice.

b. In order to continue sustained operations, maintenance had to be accomplished on replenishment days and at night when less than full boiler power was required. Some repairs, however, could not be completed while the ship was underway. Continued use and wear on equipment causes rapid multiplication of the number of repairs required, and an increase in the manpower required for night work, eventually reaching a status where a routine night maintenance crew was employed.

c. This department maintains a complete Projected Ship's Force Work List by divisions, for all outstanding repairs, and an account of man-days expended for the week past. Following is the summary for the past two weeks; based on a 7-hour day, 6-day week:

**SUMMARY OF MAN-DAYS EXPENDED FOR WEEK ENDING FRIDAY, 8 AUGUST 1952**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>AVAILABLE M/D</th>
<th>EXPENDED M/D</th>
<th>OVERTIME M/D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>471.0</td>
<td>547.8</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>936.0</td>
<td>1356.0</td>
<td>420.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>522.0</td>
<td>682.0</td>
<td>160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>570.0</td>
<td>739.0</td>
<td>169.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>516.0</td>
<td>612.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>234.0</td>
<td>296.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>3249.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4233.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>981.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY OF MAN-DAYS EXPENDED FOR WEEK ENDING FRIDAY, 15 AUGUST 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>AVAILABLE M/D</th>
<th>EXPENDED M/D</th>
<th>OVERTIME M/D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>494.0</td>
<td>558.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>924.0</td>
<td>1512.0</td>
<td>528.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>576.0</td>
<td>643.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>600.0</td>
<td>906.0</td>
<td>306.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td>358.5</td>
<td>106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>540.0</td>
<td>639.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3446.0</td>
<td>4647.3</td>
<td>1171.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. The estimate of man-days to complete all outstanding repair and work items listed to date is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>ESTIMATED M/D REQUIRED</th>
<th>AVAILABLE NEXT UPKEEP (20 AUG - 2 Sept)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>700.0</td>
<td>979.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>2038.0</td>
<td>2046.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>796.0</td>
<td>756.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1031.0</td>
<td>1155.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>435.0</td>
<td>1001.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>782.0</td>
<td>484.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5782.0</td>
<td>6421.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. The above man-day availability is based on eleven (11) days times the number of men (total) in the division, and does not subtract compartment cleaners, mess cooks etc. Also, leave and liberty has not been considered. It is obvious that the granting of leave and liberty in the Engineering Department must be at the expense of uncompleted repairs. Repair items requested for completion by a tender or the Ship Repair Facility, are not included in the above. Therefore, items disapproved for completion by these facilities will increase the ship's force work load.

D. AIR DEPARTMENT

a. Operations Ashore

On 12 August, the day prior to a scheduled replenishment day, the VFN's and VFN's of VC-4 and VC-33 respectively were launched for a flight to K-18. The purpose of this flight was to put planes over the target while the task force replenished and provide NGF for "Monte Carlo" at Hodo Pando. The advantage of having planes over the target during nights prior to and after replenishment day, and during the day is unquestioned; however, operating carrier planes from fields ashore for brief periods of time presents many problems.

The lack of ordnance at K-18 necessitated loading the aircraft prior to the launch from the ship. Subsequent ordnance loading required a flight to K-6 a distance of 100 miles from K-18. In both cases a landing with an
ordnance load had to be made at K-18, a strip made of Marston Matting, and, therefore, somewhat rough. The lighting facilities at this strip are at a bare minimum for night operations in that no taxi lights are provided.

Communications between CTF 77 and the aircraft were handled by dispatches via JOC Korea. The lack of adequate communications facilities at K-18 made communications between the task force and the VC planes unacceptably slow, and in some instances it failed altogether. It is recommended that CTF 77 employ an MHF circuit with K-18 for expeditious instructions.

The gasoline at K-18 is suspected of contamination because of the poor stowage and handling facilities. The carburetor of one aircraft had to be changed upon return to the ship due to impurities found in the gasoline.

The lack of parts, ordnance handling equipment, and qualified maintenance and ordnance personnel is not conducive to safe and efficient operations.

There is no briefing data available including weather, maps, and authentication tables.

The living accommodations at K-18 are not adequate. Flying with the task force on operational days and from a base ashore on replenishment days does not afford the VC pilots and crewman the rest gained by other pilots of the Air Group.

When the VC planes are absent from the ship while based ashore, the ship has actually lost control of them. A weakness in protection to the task force has been brought about because of the non-availability of VFN aircraft for the setting of conditions of readiness for launching during hours of darkness.

It is believed that until such time as better facilities and trained and adequate personnel can be established ashore, the advantages of basing VC aircraft ashore during replenishment periods is offset by the many disadvantages now existing.

K. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Operations
   a. Close Air Support

Small scale charts are considered highly desirable if frequent close air support operations are to be conducted. At present, 1:50,000 charts are the smallest scale available.
Considerable trouble has been experienced on close air support missions in establishing communications with mosquito planes on assigned channels. Initial contacts have been made with TACP without trouble. It is recommended that all commands engaged in this type of operations check the accuracy of crystal frequencies before flying these missions.

b. *Use of Yodo Island*

During the reporting period one AD-4 landed at Yodo Island after losing power, and immediately after the landing the engine froze. However, the aircraft was not damaged except for requiring an engine change.

2. *Ordnance*

a. *Rockets*

There have been several instances of 6.5" AT&AR MK 2 and 5.0" AT&AR MK 25 rockets making erratic flights:

1. Rockets streaming a mass of sparks in their wakes.
2. Rockets suddenly deviating from their line of flight.
3. Rockets or rocket motors exploding ahead of the aircraft at approximately three or four hundred yards.
4. On one occasion, rockets when fired in pairs, collided and exploded ahead of the aircraft, and in some instances metal fragments have struck the launching aircraft with sufficient force to enter fuel tanks or to pierce the skin of the aircraft.

3. *Oxygen, Parachutes and Survival*

a. *Oxygen*

On the unmodified *ESSEX* type aircraft carriers oxygen replenishment is accomplished by use of the Walter Spen oxygen cart. This process has proven to be slow and wasteful because of the clumsiness and size of the cart, movement of which around the ship, whether by tractor or manually, is difficult due to the limited space between parked aircraft. Waste of oxygen occurs due to the fact that it is virtually impossible to drain the pressure in the cart cylinders below 900 PSI.

b. *Parachutes*

Parachute packing space aboard this type CV is inadequate for anything other than repacking one chute at a time. Very limited storage space is available and no provisions are made for repairs to survival equipment such as MK 3 exposure suits. Only one sewing machine is available, thus requiring parachute riggers to work in relays in order to accomplish the minimum sewing required.
c. Survival

Adequate space for hanging of MK 3 exposure suits during periods of warm weather is lacking on this type ship, and efforts should be made to obtain stowage spaces. Suitable hangers for these suits have been improvised from 3/4" plywood. These hangers provide the necessary strength and shape required for repair for neck seals, while at the same time present no rough or sharp edges which might tear the seals.

The CRC-7 radio, while still the best available rescue radio that the Navy has, is inadequate. Many failures have occurred during the first period of operating on the line.

The ADSK-1 droppable survival kits has required much work and modification. This kit is designed only for cold weather survival. In order to adapt it to summer survival some items have been removed and other items added. The entire contents of the kit have been placed in a canvas container to facilitate removal when dropped to a downed airman.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items Removed</th>
<th>Items Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winter Helmet</td>
<td>Additional Rations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter Boots</td>
<td>Mosquito Headnet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter Pants</td>
<td>Four extra MK 13 Modo Flares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter Coat</td>
<td>One Qt. Canteen of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRC-7 Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/C Type First Aid Kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One roll of toilet paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ADSK-1 has been carried exclusively by AD's in this Air Group, and during the first operating period, due to malfunctions in the ordnance wiring, five kits were dropped involuntarily. This situation has been remedied by connecting wing station #12 directly to a switch located on the starboard cockpit console and disconnecting it from the outer-station cockpit selector. Since this modification, no ADSK-1's have been lost due to inadvertent releases. The ADSK-1 is carried only on station #12 of those aircraft that have been modified in the above manner.

3. Personnel

a. One photographic rating in VA-75 is not sufficient to handle the work required. More and more AD aircraft are doing photo work, and at least one and possibly two trained AF11's should be assigned to handle the work load.
1. Admissions to the Sick List during 9 day Operating Period

a. 19 patients admitted to the sick list.
b. Total of 66 sick days out of a possible 23,712 work days.
c. 0.2% of possible work days lost to sick days.
d. Three pilots were admitted to the sick list.

Diagnosis: (1) Cyst, pilonidal - 3 days
(2) Redundant Prepuce - 1 day
(3) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme - 0 days

e. There was one patient admitted to the sick list from another vessel and three were carried forward on the sick list from other vessels with a total loss of 30 sick days.

2. Treatments Accomplished - Non-Admission

a. Medical ————-293
b. Surgical ————-170
c. Veneral Disease ———— 2
   (1) Gonorrhea ———— 2

3. Pilot and Crewman Status

a. Killed in Action
   (1) Pilots ———— 1

b. Grounded Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Post Accident</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Disp. Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crewman</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td>11 31</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Pilot days possible ———— 1,080
Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding ———— 31
3% pilot days lost to sick days and grounding.

4. Accidents involving plane loss, injury or death

a. Combat
   (1) The sole loss during this period occurred on 15 August 1952 when
   USN Donald E. ADAMS, VP-74, in an F4U-4, continued on down in an
   attack dive crashing, exploding and burning upon impact. Survival
   was not considered possible.

5. Condition of the Crew

The continuous and rapid rate of operations has resulted in an increased
strain on personnel to the extent that an increase in minor accidents was not
iceable. It is again recommended that three weeks be the maximum for operations
of this type.
1. **Training**

During this period, the department, in its continuous training and improvement program, stressed time and motion factors, technical procedures and economy maintenance. Definite progress in training has been made.

2. **General**

405 patients were treated during the period with a total of 544 tooth restorations. This figure is inclusive of two emergency cases from the USS Mount Baker.

3. **Radiological Film Badges**

In accordance with the Radiological Defense Bill of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, the Dental Officer is responsible for the Photodosimetry Laboratory, the issuing of film badges, and the keeping of records of personnel exposure. These badges are to be issued to all personnel aboard ship which now totals 3,042. This collateral duty was undertaken on this tour. The technique and details concerning the badges as developed by Glen Penrose Moffat, DN are included herein as they may prove beneficial to other units.

The badge is plastic 2 x 3 inches and of .02 thickness and waterproof. A card insert containing the name, rate and serial number of the holder is 1 1/2 x 2 inches. The film is 1 5/8 x 1 1/2 inches (X-ray standard dental X-ray periapical). The foil is 2" long.

The badges are produced as follows: Two pieces of plastic are laminated on three sides with the identification card therein. One side is left open for insertion of the X-ray film. The plastic with card enclosed is then heated for 30 seconds and cooled for 120 seconds. The film is then inserted in the packet with the foil wrapped over one end. The top side of the packet is then sealed by acetone and a grommet is inserted in the top for added strength and for a means of attachment.

The estimated time for the production of 3,042 badges is broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cutting of plastic</td>
<td>6 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting of cards</td>
<td>6 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting of tabs</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamination</td>
<td>120 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing of cards</td>
<td>30 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insert of films and foils</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Operating Statistics

### A. Summary of Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>P2F</th>
<th>FLU</th>
<th>FAN</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>ADN</th>
<th>ADW</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike/Recco</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo/Photo Escort</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM Recco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TarCap</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResCap</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGF Spot</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hecklers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF/AWM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gator</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WX Recco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc Slow Time</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferry Abort etc</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Sorties Scheduled 553
Total Sorties Flown 552
% Total Scheduled Sorties Flown 99.8%
Total Hours Flown 1198.1
Days of Operations 7
Average Hours per Operating day 171.2

### B. Analysis of Flak Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>P2F</th>
<th>FLU</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (heavy/AW)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits per 100 sorties</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>.86%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (SA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (SA) per 100 sorties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>.86%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hits</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hits/100 sorties</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Lost</td>
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<td>1*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.2</td>
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* Aircraft lost over enemy territory. Loss is believed due to flak.

F.W. Watson
CNO (2) Advance
CINCACFLTLT (2) Advance
CINCACFLTLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CONNAVFLE (1) Advance
COMSEVENHFLT (1) Advance
COMNAVFLE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMFAIR/LAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVWAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
CO, FAIRBROTHERPAC (2)
CO, USS ANTietM (CV 36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV 21) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV 9) (1)
CO, USS Kearsarge (CV 33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CV 34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47) (1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV 37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV 45) (1)
CO, USS BADONG STRAIT (CVE 116) (1)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE 115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119) (1)
CO, USS RENDEZVOUS (CVE 114) (1)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE 118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) (1)
CO, VF-73 NAS QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
COMAIRLANT (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU TWO (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU FIVE (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU ELEVEN (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU FIFTEEN (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU NINETEEN (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
COMCAR AIRGRU SEVEN (25) (For Squadron
and parent VC Units,)
COMCAR AIRGRU (ATU) ONE (1)
COMFAIRQUONSET (1)
COMSEVPAC (1)
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST  
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 20 August through 28 September 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951  
(b) CINC PACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 20 August through 28 September 1952 is submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Upon arrival in Yokosuka at 06001 on 20 August 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD entered a period of upkeep and repair. During this period pilots of VC-61 Detachment NAF field qualified in the newly acquired F2H2P's.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 290502 of August 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), Captain Paul W. WATSON, USN, Commanding, with COMCVDIV ONE, Rear Admiral Herbert E. ROGAN, USN, and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area via Van Dieman Straits at 07021 on 2 September 1952.

At 0500 on 4 September 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE. Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was then commanded by COMCVDIV THREE, Rear Admiral A. SOUCED, USN, aboard the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9). In addition to the U.S.S. ESSEX, the Task Force was composed of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

COMCVDIV ONE, Rear Admiral H.E. ROGAN, USN, assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 15421, 4 September 1952, and shortly thereafter the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) and the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) with COMCVDIV THREE embarked departed the force.

At 18271, 21 September 1952 the command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN passed to COMCVDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. HICKET, USN.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

<table>
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<th>UNIT &amp; C.O.</th>
<th>ALLOW. &amp; OPERATIONAL A/C</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
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<td>AD-4NL</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC-61 Det Nan</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT G. H. Yeagle OinC **</td>
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<td>F2H-2P</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Staff pilots fly with CVC-7 squadrons. Two each are assigned to VF-71 and VF-72 and 4 are assigned to VA-75. CAG and Staff Operations Officers fly both AD's and F9F's. ** LT. B.R. SMITH now in charge.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 2711022 the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 1332I on 28 September 1952 to arrive at Yokosuka 30 September 1952 for a period of upkeep and repair.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/20/52 to 9/1/52: On 21 August 1952 VC-61's Photo Unit Nan was temporarily based ashore at NAS Atsugi, for a ten day period for transition of pilots from F9F-2P's to F2H-2F's. As the Banshee was completely new to all but Unit Nan's OinC, LT G. H. Yeagle, two F2H-2 experienced maintenance men were loaned to that unit by VF-71 and work was begun immediately after the reciprocal transfer of aircraft with Fasron 11.

Flight operations were delayed for three days while 120 hour checks and de-preservations were accomplished and the first aircraft reached an "up" status on 24 August. As each plane was readied for flight it remained airborne almost continuously from sunrise to sunset on such varied missions as familiarization, cruise control, photo and FCLP; combining, when conditions permitted, as many mission combinations as possible between take off and final landing.

On 30 August, the three Banshees were flown to Kisarazu for loading onto barges and subsequent transfer to the Bon Homme Richard. The following day Photo Unit Nan returned aboard with all five pilots field-carrier qualified and an average of thirteen hours each in the Banshee.

9/2/52: Enroute to the combat area. General Drills were conducted.

9/3/52: Enroute to the combat area. Anti-aircraft firing was conducted.

9/4/52: The ship rejoined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE at 0500I. The scheduled replenishment was deferred because of rough seas.
9/5/52: Most of the forenoon was devoted to replenishment. At 1230I aircraft were launched to strike at rail targets between Wonsan and Kowon. The mission was completed and the Corsairs and Skyraiders made twenty-eight rail cuts, knocked out two rail bridges, and damaged at least three rail cars.

9/6/52: Interdiction was the principal mission of the day. Dawn hecklers struck targets in the coastal area northeast of Hungnam. They were followed by jet reccos and a prop strike in the same general area. When the smoke and dust cleared, results were assessed as one bridge destroyed by five direct hits, two bridges damaged, fourteen rail cars damaged and one destroyed, rails cut in seven places and several trucks shot up. Four Tarps were flown over salvage ships attending the sunken tug SARS, off of Hungnam. These also hit targets of opportunity. Among the results claimed were two buildings, one gun position, six sampans, eight rail cars and two bridges damaged or destroyed. An afternoon Close Air Support mission attacked troops and installations opposite the U.S. X Corps front, destroying ten bunkers, four mortars, and 1/5 yards of trenches in addition to causing several secondary explosions. The approval of the ground forces was evident in the following dispatch, received later in the day:

"FOR INFORMATION X BRIGGEN SWEEZY ARTY CMNDR 10 CORPS ADVISES HE OBSERVED 1230I STRIKES OF TRUSTFUND 52 and 53 X PARTICULARLY FINE STRIKES AND VERY EFFECTIVE X ALSO A VERY GOOD JOB OF CONTROL AND IDENTIFICATION BY MOSQUITO FILCHINO"

During the afternoon photo pilots flew qualification hops in the Banseees.

9/7/52: In attacks from Wonsan to Chongjin, dawn hecklers damaged eleven buildings, one gun emplacement, one truck and one bridge approach. In addition, highways were cratered in several places. During the day jet reccos and strikes ranged up and down the East Coast supply routes, damaging thirty-eight boxcars, six trucks and eight buildings. The early prop strike hit an important rail bridge, inflicting serious damage, and went on to cut rails in eight places. Later, Corsairs and Skyraiders blasted the Sinpo boatyard, where they damaged at least five buildings, scattered lumber, and started one fire. In addition, props destroyed eight buildings and damaged four in a supply area. They also damaged eight boxcars. Eight props on Close Air Support in the I Corps area on the western sector killed 8 troops and wounded 33, destroyed 1 and damaged 1 bunker, destroyed 1 and damaged 1 mortar and destroyed 140 yards of trenches. For the first time pilots of VC-61 Detachment NAN flew photo missions in the F2H-2Fs.

9/8/52: The Task Force replenished and no flights were launched. Drills were conducted in the afternoon.

9/9/52: One of the most effective missions flown from the BHR on this tour was the jet and prop strike on industrial targets at Purynq. The importance of the target may be inferred from the fact that the activity within the target area was so classified that it was not divulged to the pilots. The strike was a big success with the principal building being leveled and destroyed, and six of eight smaller buildings destroyed and 2 badly damaged. Moving over to a nearby carbide plant, the pilots of Air Group Sevan gutted the main building and demolished or badly damaged all but one of the other buildings in the target area. In other flights, a morning BRF vectored fire from the OLA JUDD to effectively the ship called their spotting "the best we've had since we've been out here." Jet reccos and strikes during the day claimed a total of thirty-two buildings damaged and three destroyed, twelve rail cars damaged and one destroyed, five rail cuts, one bridge destroyed and one damaged, one railroad crane damaged and one truck destroyed. Two Close Air Support flights lent assistance to the II ROK Corps and both achieved good results. Night Hecklers completed the day's operations by destroying four trucks damaging four, and probably damaging several others.

9/10/52: In the first event of the day, jets on recco northwest and northeast of Hamhung destroyed five boxcars and twelve excavators causing a secondary explosion. They also destroyed two bridges and damaged two. In a coordinated strike of Panthers, Corsairs and Skyraiders, Kyosen hydro-electric plant number 1 received heavy damage. The large number of anti-aircraft guns present plus the repair activity underway attested to the importance of the plant, but reconstruction was set back months when three direct ATAR hits
and several bomb hits by the props demolished one-third of the powerhouse and caused probable severe internal damage. The flak was effectively suppressed by the Panthers. Meanwhile an NF flight at Wonsan achieved the day's most spectacular effect when, in destroying three buildings, it set off a huge explosion which the pilots said mushroomed and billowed like a minor atomic explosion. In the afternoon props and jets teamed up to inflict heavy damage to the locomotive and several cars of a train which had previously been stopped by FRIDELTON planes north of Wonsan. At the same time, the main prop effort was being directed at supply areas and a factory near Kowon. Thirteen buildings were destroyed in the supply areas and four others were damaged. The factory was partially demolished and seven other buildings at that location were damaged or destroyed.

9/11/52: Due to inclement weather, operations for the day were cancelled, and the Task Force replenished. No flights were launched.

9/12/52: Dawn hecklers hit the Sindok lead and zinc mining facilities destroying two buildings and damaging three, and then went on to damage a four story factory and four other buildings northwest of Wonsan. In addition they scored three rail cuts and damaged a large boat. An early jet recco attacked a transformer yard near the Fujon Reservoir, causing the equipment to arc wildly for over five minutes. The yard was left billowing smoke. The same flight hit another jackpot a few minutes later when they surprised a large number of troops loading seven boxcars. When the shooting stopped, all seven cars were damaged and an estimated fifty casualties lay on the ground.

In the morning prop strike, one large and two smaller buildings were destroyed at the Taegui factory near Kowon. With their remaining ordinance the pilots sought out the train stopped on 10 September. Although the enemy had camouflaged it, it was detected and further damaged. In other morning flights, jets attacked lumber mills and a variety of targets with good results. The props turned to soft spots in the enemy coastal rail system on the afternoon strike, and 100 feet of track were buried and a tunnel entrance damaged near Pukchong. South of Songjin, another 100 yards of track were ripped up. Three additional cuts were made and twelve boxcars damaged.

9/13/52: The BOM HOMME RICHARD teamed up with the FRIDELTON to strike with full strength at military installations, supply areas, transportation facilities, and industrial targets at Hoeoryong near the Manchurian border. Both morning and afternoon strikes caught the enemy by complete surprise, and BHR planes hurled over 700 bombs down on pre-selected targets. A partial assessment of damage inflicted by BHR planes included a supply area and vehicle park demolished, three barrack areas heavily mauled, a marshalling yard cratered, two supply areas heavily hit, a large warehouse badly damaged, and fires started throughout the city. Near Hoeoryong, a loaded troop train was stopped by morning flights and the locomotive, railcars and passengers were heavily strafed, causing severe damage to the locomotive and cars and an undeterminable number of casualties. The afternoon strike returned to the same train and inflicted further damage with bombs and machine gun fire.

Some uneasiness was caused among the pilots on both strikes when the U.S.S. HULZ reported many bogies orbiting fifty miles to the east of the target. These planes were presumably a Soviet local defense force. At the conclusion of operations OFF 77 sent the following dispatch:

"IN THE FACE OF TODAY'S DIFFICULT AND EXACTING SCHEDULE THE PERFORMANCE OF BOTH SHIPS AND AIR GROUPS WAS OUTSTANDING X A HEARTY WELL DONE TO ALL HANDS"

9/14/52: Corsairs and Skyraiders took off at dawn to work over a busily operating electro-metallurgy plant at Sungjibaegam in a mountainous mining area inland from Kilchu, evincing a high degree of bombing skill, the flyers leveled the factory and wrecked six nearby storage buildings. With the remaining ordinance, they entered tracks in the adjacent marshalling yard in twelve places, hit a stack of supplies which blow up with a violent explosion, and knocked out a turntable. During their return to the ship the pilots riddled a switch engine and shot up twenty sampans. A jet recco made the biggest news of the day when it caught a 130 foot naval-type vessel in the vicinity of Wonsan. After serious damage had been inflicted by rockets and 20 millimeters, three near misses broke the hull and the ship settled to the bottom. Jets and props struck the Kojo number 3 hydro plant and damaged the power house and penstocks. The same strike destroyed 25 rail cars in the vicinity of Wonsan.
9/15/52: The Task Force replenished and no flights were launched. General drills were held in the afternoon.

9/16/52: Two strikes of Corsairs and Skyraiders virtually leveled the ore processing plant at Chonghak-tong, ten miles inland from Songjin. Attacking both morning and afternoon, the props scored several hits on the main plant and then went on to destroy eleven barracks or supply buildings and damaged ten to fifteen others. Another strike was directed against the fishing industry at Chaoho in an effort to cut off a source of food supplies for enemy troops. The entire area was thoroughly worked over, and several large buildings plus an uncountable number of small buildings were demolished. An estimable number of troops were undoubtedly killed or injured. In other flights throughout the day, down hecklers carried out marauding attacks from Yangdok to Songjin, shooting up trucks, bombing bridges and warehouses, blowing up oil storage tanks, and cutting rails. Jet recceos picked up where the hecklers left off and were particularly tough on oxcart farms. Their final score was twenty-one destroyed. They also made sixteen or more rail cuts, damaged twenty oxcart farms, and destroyed or damaged four trucks and six buildings.

9/17/52: Pilots of the BON HOMME RICHARD teamed up with those from the newly arrived REAR ADATE in another of the concentrated attacks which began with the raids on the power plants in June. This day the mission was against pre-selected targets in the city of Tanchon. Attacking behind a wave of flak suppressing Panthers, the Skyraiders and Corsairs smashed at supply buildings, headquarters buildings, repair shops and other installations. Excellent coverage of the assigned areas was achieved, and several large fires were started. At nightfall the targets plus were still smouldering. Later in the day, railroad repair shops in Hamjikon were the targets for a prop strike. The two main buildings at that site were utterly demolished, and two other buildings were damaged. Ten to twelve small buildings at Chaoho were also battered. Meanwhile, other props destroyed a bridge at Wonsan and scored several rail cuts. Jets and night hecklers found good hunting on the highways. Panthers destroyed a total of twenty-two oxcart farms and hecklers shot up twenty-five or more trucks, among other damage.

9/18/52: In the morning, props smashed at machinery repair shops and fishing facilities at Sinpo as a continuation of the effort to cut off supplies of fish to enemy ground forces. In an attack which severely battered buildings and installations throughout the area, Corsairs and Skyraiders completely destroyed the repair shops and eight nearby buildings, damaged or destroyed numerous buildings in the waterfront area, and started twelve fires. Later in the day, props hit a mining area about twenty miles east of Pukchong. In a highly successful attack, the pilots destroyed a dozen or more buildings and obliterated wide sections of the target area.

9/19/52: The Task Force replenished and no operations were conducted. General drills and anti-aircraft practice were conducted in the afternoon.

9/20/52: In the principal event of the morning, props and jets attacked a large supply area in the vicinity of the Changjin Reservoir. While Panthers worked over flak positions, the props blanketed the target with bombs. At least seventy percent of their ordnance fell in the area, and a majority were effective. Several second-class explosions were touched off, and two large fires were started. An afternoon jet recce north of Changjin found lucrative targets along the railroad. Attacking rail targets, repair shops, barracks and storage buildings, the jet pilots knocked out five to ten boxcars, made nine rail cuts and destroyed or damaged three or more buildings. The late prop strike destroyed over twenty buildings in an iron mining area twenty-five miles northwest of Tanchon. In addition, a large fire was started in an oil storage dump.

9/21/52: Corsairs and Skyraiders, diverted by weather from their primary target, struck at an iron mining area northwest of Tanchon, destroying nine and damaging two buildings. Secondary explosions followed the attack and clouds of black smoke billowed into the air. An afternoon prop strike hit the hydro-electric plant at Kyosen 1 once again. The plant had been damaged by previous strikes but was believed capable of being repaired. The capability was markedly reduced when the pilots blasted a large part of the
violent evasive maneuvers necessary to avoid serious accuracy in bombing. In spite of efforts to suppress flak in the area, the planes were harried by intense automatic weapons fire. No damages were suffered. At the same time, props hit a supply area just south of the border town of Hoeryong. Five buildings were destroyed, another was left burning and one was damaged. Three rail cuts were made. During the day jet attacks made three rail cuts, damaged a highway bridge, seven buildings, two boxcars and destroyed four trucks.

9/22/52: The featured strike of the morning attacked pre-selected targets at Toedok-tong near Hoeryong, destroying a transformer and switching station and damaging or destroying several other buildings in the area. A large fire and secondary explosion followed the attack. Meanwhile, the first close air support mission in several days smashed two gun positions and fifteen bunkers in an attack on enemy installations opposite the IX U.S. Corps. One secondary explosion was caused. Coverage and effectiveness were rated at ninety percent, and the controller gave the performance a grade of excellent. A NGF flight working with the British destroyer OLDFIELD in the vicinity of Tanchon destroyed seven buildings and left three burning. Later in the day the principal afternoon prop strike divided its attentions between railroad repair facilities about twenty-five miles north of Hamhung and a factory area at Chuuronjang. Five buildings were destroyed at the former target, while at Chuuronjang a foundry and eight other buildings were damaged or destroyed. Huge explosions were set off, and clouds of orange smoke swirled to 3000 feet. While photographing flak positions south of Wonsan, a Banshee piloted by LT C. H. Yeagle, Officer-in-Charge of VC-61 Detachment NAM, suffered a direct 37 millimeter hit. The projectile penetrated the aircraft and exploded in the vicinity of the cockpit, causing a compound fracture of the pilot's right elbow and wounding him with shrapnel. The plane's electrical, radio, and landing gear actuating systems were knocked out, but LT Yeagle was able to pilot it to the closest friendly field and affect a wheels-up landing. The pilot was later reported to be in good condition. Night hecklers capped an active day by shooting up traffic on the highways. One of the pilots caught a stream of ammunition trucks crossing a bridge at Hamhung, and his expert attack resulted in an even dozen violent explosions in rapid succession.

9/23/52: The Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted. Drills were held in the afternoon.

9/24/52: The scheduled departure for port was cancelled. The BNH remained on the line to permit the ESSEX to go to Sasebo for catapult repairs. With General Mark Clark, Commander in Chief United Nations Forces and Vice Admiral Robert F. Briscoe, USN, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, witnessing operations from the deck of the LEXINGTON, Corsairs and Skyraiders of the BNH took off at dawn to hit a highway bridge and a supply dump in "Death Valley" south of Wonsan. Attacking without benefit of flak suppression by jets, the planes were met in their dives by an eruption of fire from over twenty multiple automatic weapons positions and at least ten heavy guns. At one time smoke from 350 to 400 terminal bursts hung in the air. The violent evasive maneuvers necessary to avoid serious losses prevented accuracy in bombing and in flak suppression; consequently after the initial run the flight was diverted to interdiction work. Two Skyraiders suffered flak damage in the attack but were able to return to the Task Force and land aboard. Dawn hecklers and jets took turns in working over a locomotive and twelve boxcars which had been stopped during the night near Songjin. Rails were cut fore and aft, several cars were heavily damaged, and the engine was badly shot up, when finally one of the jet pilots scored a direct rocket hit on the locomotive, causing serious damage. A later jet flight added to the destruction. At the end of the day the following dispatch was received:

"THE PERFORMANCE OF TF 77 DURING THE VISIT OF CINC UNITED NATIONS WAS MOST GRATIFYING X THE BOMBARDMENT BY IOWA WAS FINE EXAMPLE IN PRECISION WORK X THE CARRIAGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE WAS MOST EFFICIENT AND EXCELLENT X GENERAL CLARK PRaised THE WORK OF ALL HANDS X WELL DONE X VICE ADML CLARK"
9/25/52: Bad weather prevented the conduct of flight operations.

9/26/52: BHR pilots returned to action in spite of marginal weather in many localities. Hecklers started the day by attacks on targets of opportunity along the highways and rail lines. Two bypass bridges were cut, twelve buildings damaged or destroyed and highways cratered in several places. In a busy day of operations, Corsairs and Skyraiders virtually demolished a supply area near Chongjin during the morning, and in the afternoon delivered a severe battering to an important and active tungsten mine at Kiju, southwest of Wonsan. An afternoon jet recco scored a direct hit on a powerhouse in the reservoir district and went on to rocket three buildings at a saw mill, shoot up an estimated thirty fishing boats, and demolish two excavators.

9/27/52: Air Group SEVEN and the BHR finished the period of operations with prop strikes on two more mining areas. At an iron mine near Chaho, Corsairs and Skyraiders demolished at least 12 buildings and damaged 17. Numerous other hits were observed but damage could not be assessed because of smoke, dust and shadows from the mountainous terrain. Later in the day the props, aided by flak suppressing panthers, struck at the Sindok lead and zinc mining facilities northwest of Songjin, destroying at least 10 buildings and causing violent secondary explosions. Other damage at the target was obscured by smoke. On the return to the carrier one of the planes scored a direct hit on a railroad bridge dropping 1 span.

PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Material

Numerous casualties occurred to A/C power drive equipment and sound powered telephone circuits. Casualties were attributed in most cases to insulation breakdown in electrical cable. All casualties were corrected by the Ship's Force.

The MK11 Computer #2 was out of commission for four days during the operating period for the purpose of eliminating large generated bearing rate errors.

Fifteen cases of unserviceable tail fuzes AN-K 102A1 were received from replenishment ships. These fuzes had been repacked by McAllister M.A.D., January 1952 without arming vanes and shipped to the forward area.

2. Ordnance Expended

SHIP

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<td>Napalm Fire Bombs</td>
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During this period, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside fifteen (15) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies, and received twenty-nine (29) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers and freight. All transfers were accomplished expeditiously and without casualty. The need for a station to station phone circuit has been noted when replenishing from an AF.

4. Training

Three A.A. practices were conducted with satisfactory results.

A continuous program of training including on the job training has been followed. This training has been accelerated in an attempt to remedy the critical shortage of First and Second Class Petty Officers.

**PART IV**

**OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE**

1. Damage to Ship

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

21 planes were hit and damaged by flak during this period. Three planes were damaged by bomb blast.

3. Loss of Aircraft

None

4. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp Mill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Mills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grainery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Station</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Repair Buildings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Post</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerhouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turntable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch Yards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Ship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox carts</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Tanks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke Ovens</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Dam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ore Stations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bypass</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Repair Car</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, flak or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage, but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

The overall performance of personnel during this period was excellent and gave promise of even further improvement. In spite of the serious shortage of rated personnel and the continual discharge or replacement of trained men by raw recruits, the level of efficiency was very high. The total absence of serious operational accidents, the high percentage of availability, the expeditious conduct of deck operations, the high level of maintenance and the small number of malfunctions of ordnance are clear indications of the outstanding performances by the maintenance, flight deck, and ordnance crews, as well as of the pilots themselves.

The steady improvement of personnel performance from the mediocre level, in the pre-deployment period, to its present high state is largely to be attributed to the intensive training program instituted at the time of departure for the forward area.

Air Group SixZ continued and even improved the quality of its operations. This is evinced not only by the impressive amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy but to the low number of casualties and plane losses from all causes.

2. Casualties

An exceptional display of fine airmanship and cool courage was displayed on 22 September when Lt. Carl H. Yeagle, Officer-in-Charge of the W-61 Photo Unit, aboard the Son Homme Richard, received a direct hit on his plane from an automatic gun position south of Wonsan along the heavily defended rail route.

The shell exploded in the cockpit's right console, demolishing all electrical connections in Lt. Yeagle's Banshee and scattering shrapnel throughout the cockpit. The canopy glass was blasted out with the shattered pieces cutting his face, Shrapnel buried in his right arm fracturing his right elbow and causing profuse bleeding. Part of the control cables were sheared by the blast and only limited control of the aircraft was possible. His parachute was shredded in several places.

Displaying admirable coolness and a determined will to stay conscious, Lt Yeagle piloted his crippled Banshee south towards the front line U.S. Strip at K-18. Since his radio gear was only a mass of twisted metal he had no way of communicating his difficulty to his escort or to ground emergency facilities. However, his alert escort, Lt Frank Cronin of VF-72, flying an F9F-2 Panther, quickly realized the situation and after closely observing the plane and Lt. Yeagle in the cockpit, went into immediate action. Lt. Cronin alerted the rescue stations and crash facilities at K-18 and closely escorted Lt. Yeagle to the strip. Because of Lt. Yeagle's condition
Lt. Cronin refused to land first on the single strip field although he knew the crash landing of the photo plane might prevent a clear runway for his aircraft.

Upon arrival at K-18, Lt. Yeagle weakened by loss of blood and suffering from pain from his broken arm, exhausted all means to lower his landing gear and flaps. Bracing his useless right arm between the stick and his stomach he brought his plane in for a necessarily fast, wheels up, no flaps approach. With precision he brought his crippled Banshee over the strip, flying it into a smooth emergency landing. Sliding down the Marston matting, he displayed cool headwork to the very end by skidding his aircraft off the left side of the runway surface to allow his escort, dangerously low on fuel, a clear strip for landing.

The entire incident was a sterling example of combat flying at its best, graphically illustrating the teamwork, precision, and courage that has made carrier Naval Aviation what it is today.

PART VI
GENERAL COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Intelligence

a. General

(1) The early shift of emphasis from the see-saw battle of interdiction, which had a strong tendency to engender an attitude of futility among pilots, to the apparently more effective— and certainly more interesting— program of wrecking the industrial potential of North Korea, has had a noticeably profound effect on the morale of pilots. The feeling of accomplishment, so seldom present in former operations, is now ever present.

Credit for this is due in no small measure to Commander Carrier Division ONE and his staff in obtaining and effectively utilizing all sources of intelligence, especially that obtained from photographic missions. With few exceptions, all missions were well planned and coordinated, resulting in stinging blows to the enemy.

(2) It is noteworthy that no pilots or planes were lost during the period. This is especially gratifying in view of the number of missions flown and the large number of anti-aircraft weapons in use by the enemy. Success in the avoidance of losses may be attributed to careful briefing and planning of missions, to the high quality of leadership and pilot performance, to effective flak suppression and evasion tactics, and to rigid adherence to the rules of safety which have been developed and tested both in World War II and in the present war in Korea.

b. Photographic Interpretation

During this period, target photos and mosaics were provided to every pilot on every strike mission. A comparatively large quantity of mapping was done of cities, power plants, and industrial areas. The use of 9 X 18 inch photography proved very beneficial in that prints containing more coverage with less runs and a larger scale were obtained.

Through photo interpretation, numerous lucrative targets were located and later successfully attacked by Task Force aircraft. Among these were a suspected underground storage area which was photographed at an exceptionally large scale and targeted. Later, this target was hit by aircraft of the U.S.S. ESSEX and resulted in secondary explosions with flames rising to 4000 feet. Another such target was a storage building at the Carbide factory at Puryong which, when hit by a single rocket, caused a tremendous secondary explosion that completely demolished and eliminated any trace of the building.

At least two underground factories were detected and later attacked.
Numerous unknown targets were located by assigning photo-pilots to photograph any suspicious or promising areas. Mines, transformer stations, factories and storage areas were located in this manner and many of them later successfully attacked.

An example of the efficiency of photographic interpretation was displayed after attacks on selected targets at Hoeryong, on the Manchurian border. Photographs were taken after the first morning strike, developed and analyzed one and one half hours after the photo plane returned. These clearly showed that damage was not so great as the pilots had reported. As a result, a second strike was launched and the job was completed.

Because the Communists have recently fortified the power plants, mines, and storage centers with many new flak positions, the peripheral areas of intended targets have been photographed, as well as the targets themselves, so that flak suppression could be successfully utilized in coordination with the strikes.

c. Flak

ComCarDiv ONE has developed a method of distributing flak information which graphically shows the general flak situation in Korea. All confirmed gun positions, 37 Mm. or larger, are plotted on a 1:250,000 scale chart. This chart is then photographed and 8 by 10 inch reproductions are distributed to all ship's intelligence offices. Although it is impossible to pinpoint gun positions on a chart of this scale, the plot can be used advantageously by squadron AI's in briefing Recco Missions and in showing heavy flak concentrations to be avoided. An Index giving a complete list of the coordinates of all gun positions shown on the flak map is also provided. Flak is also listed by rail and recce routes. This Index makes it possible to plot the positions on a 1:50,000 scale chart for use in briefing pilots on flak suppression and strikes. It is felt that ComCarDiv ONE has taken a definite step toward the solution of the problem of flak distribution with this method.

2. Combat Information Center

a. Radar

During this period all radar and IFF equipment operated satisfactorily except for three minor interruptions that were quickly rectified by the technicians and caused no serious effects on the normal functioning of CIC. The AI's have consistently done an excellent job of preventive maintenance on all electronic gear and are largely responsible for the very few periods that any of these units have been out of service.

The 36 Radar that has been totally unreliable for the past year has finally reached a stage of reliability. The radar technicians have finally solved the mysteries of this ancient piece of equipment and during the last 26 days of operations with TF-77 the 36 has been in operation 95% of the time.

b. Training

A syllabus has been arranged for the indoctrination training of CIC personnel exchanged from other types of ships in accordance with ComAirPac Instruction 3560.1. To date there have been 3 officers and 4 enlisted men from destroyers in the Task Force who have been aboard and familiarized with the operating procedures and equipment in this ship's CIC. Upon completion of 3 or 4 days TAD in witnessing a CV type CIC and actual flight operations, these personnel gain considerable knowledge and insight of Carrier CIC operations. A similar indoctrination program has been in effect during the past two months for all JODD's aboard this ship. Such training will provide a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of CIC to deck watch officers.

Personnel, both officer and enlisted, are being rotated between CIC and Air Operations (Air Plot) in order to widen the scope of their training and make them available for watch standing in either CIC or Air Operations.
a. General

The period of this report embraces the transitional period from the southern to the northern monsoon seasons. As a result weather conditions became more conducive to flying with only three non-operational days for the entire period.

On September 6, about forty eight (48) hours after the passage of typhoon Mary across the Sea of Japan, streaks of sea fog were encountered. It is believed that winds from the storm caused upwelling of cold water which resulted in the formation of fog and marginal flying conditions in the operating area.

Two other non-operational days were experienced with the passage of frontal systems across the Sea of Japan.

b. Aerological Data

Winds

 Prevailing Direction and Percent of Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average wind velocity 12 knots

Calm winds 8 hours
Wind over 30 knots 10 hours
Wind over 20 knots 33 hours

Strongest wind north northeast 35 knots

Air Temperature

Average for period  69° F
Average Daily Max.  71° F
Average Daily Min.  67° F
Max. for period  77° F
Min. for period  59° F

Sea Temperature

Average for period  75° F
Max. for period  86° F
Min. for period  70° F

Ceiling

Unlimited  46%
10,000 or higher  24%
Below 10,000  30%

Percent of Ceiling Below 10,000 Feet

5,000 to 10,000  22%
2,500 to 5,000  35%
1,000 to 2,500  30%
Under 1,000  13%
USS Bon Homme Richard (CV 31) 20 Aug-28 Sep 1952, Part 2
Photo missions were flown on fourteen days with an average of five sorties per day using F2H-2F aircraft. The scheduling of three F2H-2F aircraft, each flying two sorties per day and carrying three cameras, considerably increased the amount of film used.

The use of K-18 and K-38 cameras with A-8 magazines modified to recycle in 1.6 seconds and 390 foot rolls of film resulted in many camera malfunctions. On nine sorties a camera either failed to operate or failed in the middle of a photo run. One or more cameras or magazines required major repairs daily. Since the A-8 magazines have been the major cause of breakdowns, it is recommended that all A-8 magazines be replaced with A8-B magazines as soon as possible. The lack of adequate space for the large cameras and the increased amount of repair work considerably handicapped all camera repair personnel. The following parts were worn and had to be replaced. They were not available and were necessarily manufactured aboard to keep the cameras in operation.

- 6 Cam Rollers for the A8 Magazine
- 2 tripping studs on the Cam and tripping lever, of the K-18 camera shutter.

In addition 1 ratchet drive assembly and 1 ratchet assembly for a K-18 case drive had to be case hardened.

Photographic print production for this period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 x 10 inch prints</td>
<td>3742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 x 5 inch prints</td>
<td>2618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 9 inch prints</td>
<td>1108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cut prints</strong></td>
<td><strong>7468</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 18 inch some prints</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 9 inch some prints</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total some prints</strong></td>
<td><strong>83,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total some Footage</strong></td>
<td><strong>89,250</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total Prints</strong></td>
<td><strong>90,468</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average number feet of some paper per day (17 operating days) 5250

Largest single days production of some paper (feet) 8344

A bottleneck in photo lab production was the drying of some paper and aerial film. This was partly alleviated by installing rubber squeegees and Infra-Red lamps on the A 10A dryer used for some paper. However, some paper and aerial film drying with two A 10A dryers continues to be a major bottleneck. For the quantity of work now being done, four A 10A dryers are needed. Only two are aboard. Two more are on order.

Throughout this period, squadron VA-75 has continued to take strike photographs with a K-17, 24 inch camera mounted on the wing of a Skyraider in a 1000 lb. water filled bomb pod. None of these photographs have been sharp and attempts are being made currently to insert rubber pads between the pod and its mount to correct this condition.

B. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Flight Deck
   a. Nylon tie-downs, as developed by the VALLEY FORGE (CO, USS VALLEY
FORGE 1TR SER 1352 OF 23 MAY 1952), WERE EVALUATED DURING THIS PERIOD.

WERE FOUND TO BE SUPERIOR TO THE WIRE REEL AND MANILLA TIE-DOWNS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. EASIER TO ATTACH AND REMOVE.
2. WILL NOT JAM UNDER TENSION.
3. EASIER TO STOW.
4. STRONGER.
5. WILL NOT BECOME HOT IN JET BLASTS.
6. EASIER TO HANDLE BY PLANE CAPTAIN AFTER REMOVAL FROM AIRCRAFT DURING LAUNCH

HOWEVER, AT LEAST ONE REEL TIE-DOWN IS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NYLON TIE-DOWNS ON JETS ON THE FLIGHT DECK TO PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY GROUND FOR THE PLANE FOR GASING.

2. CATAPULTS

A. CATAPULT CHANGE NO. 36

1. DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD CATAPULT CHANGE NO. 36 (PERMITTING 4,000 PSI PRESSURES) WAS UTILIZED FOR THE FIRST TIME. ALTHOUGH THE CHANGE WAS INCORPORATED DURING THE LAST YARD AVAILABILITY OF THE SHIP IN FEBRUARY, ITS UTILIZATION FOR F9F AIRCRAFT WAS DELAYED DUE TO\nRECEIPT OF THE NEW F9F FORGED-EYE LAUNCHING PENDANTS AND F9F CATAPULT BULLETIN NO. 93. BOTH THE PENDANTS AND THE BULLETIN WERE RECEIVED DURING THE LAST IN-PORT PERIOD OF THE SHIP.

2. THE USE OF THIS CHANGE HAS DEFINITELY INCREASED THE BATTLE EFFICIENCY OF THE F9F AIRCRAFT ON CV-9 CLASS CARRIERS HAVING H-3 CATAPULTS. THE F9F AIRCRAFT CAN NOW BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENT OF TRUE WIND FOR ALL EXTERNAL ORDNANCE LOADINGS UP TO 1100 LBS.

3. THE UTILIZATION OF THIS INCREASE IN CATAPULTING PRESSURE WAS INVALUABLE DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD, PARTICULARLY DURING THE FIRST WEEK WHEN AN UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF CALM OR LIGHT AND VARIABLE WIND DAYS WERE ENCOUNTERED. DURING THIS PERIOD 196 CATAPULT SHOTS OF F9F'S IN 23 LAUNCHES WERE MADE IN WHICH THE VELOCITY OF THE RELATIVE WIND WAS SUCH THAT ACUMULATOR PRESSURES ABOVE 3500 PSI WERE REQUIRED WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE SHOTS BEING MADE AT 4000 PSI. IF CATAPULT CHANGE NO. 36 HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR USE, SOME OR ALL OF THE EXTERNAL ORDNANCE WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE REMOVED TO CATAPULT THE F9F'S.

4. WITH AN EXTERNAL ORDNANCE LOADING OF 1100 LBS IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT A MINIMUM OF 31 KNOTS RELATIVE WIND IS REQUIRED TO LAUNCH THE F9F-2 AT 4000 LBS PSI AT 70°F.

5. THE BUNGEE PENDANT ARRESTERS FOR THE FORGED-EYE PENDANTS ASSEMBLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CATAPULT BULLETIN NO. 93 WERE FOUND TO BE ENTIRELY UNSATISFACTORY. THE SEIZING, SECURING THE ENDS OF THE SIX STRANDS OF 5/8" BUNGEE, DID NOT HOLD DURING THE FIRST FEW LAUNCHES, RESULTING IN PARTED ARRESTERS AND LOST PENDANTS. IT WAS FOUND MORE DESIRABLE TO SEIZE THE ENDS OF EACH STRAND SEPARATELY RATHER THAN TO SEIZE THE ENDS OF ALL STRANDS TOGETHER. ARRESTERS SO CONSTRUCTED HAVE NOT PARTED DURING LAUNCHES. HOWEVER, ONE STRAND OF BUNGEE DID PART ON FOUR DIFFERENT ARRESTERS USED, BUT THESE STRANDS WERE EASILY REPLACED. TWO ARRESTERS HAVE BEEN USED FOR 46 LAUNCHES EACH WITHOUT FAILURE OF THE SEIZING OF BUNGEE. A LETTER WILL BE SUBMITTED RECOMMENDING THIS CHANGE.

3. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

A. RB19-R2 SPARK PLUGS, BOTH NEW AND RECONDITIONED, HAVE BEEN USED IN EXCESSIVE NUMBERS DURING THIS OPERATING PERIOD. THE TOTAL NUMBER USED WAS 1186. THE BELOW LIST INDICATES USAGE BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>AVG. AV. LIFE HOURS</th>
<th>AVG. LIFE HOURS</th>
<th>AVG. LIFE HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9U-4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9U-5N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-LH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-LN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>70-80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
b. Some ignition manifold trouble has been experienced, but not more than normal. RUDMs have been submitted.

c. The supply of aircraft parts has improved during this period. However, the length of time for delivery from CONUS has caused lengthy AOG periods for some aircraft.

d. The Aviation Metal Shop has set up a small O&R for surfaces. All minor and some major parts have been successfully fabricated to keep aircraft available.

4. Aviation Ordnance

a. The armor plate around the center Douglas bomb rack on the AD-4 aircraft has been modified so the MK 10 suspension band can be used with 2000 lb. GP bombs. However, during this period the MK 10 band has not been available on replenishment.

b. M-1 fin lock nuts have been used only on bombs for jet aircraft due to the limited quantity available.

C. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

a. Divine Services

Twenty-two services were held each week: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Christian Science, and Latter Day Saints. Special services were held for Jewish personnel in observance of the High Holy Days. Personnel contributed $780.40 for the support of a Japanese orphanage, the greatest portion of this amount being contributed at services on one Sunday.

b. Welfare and Recreation

Motion pictures continued to be the main form of recreation. Seven showings were scheduled each night. Reading was also popular. A daily press news and a weekly paper were published. Approximately 1,000 pocket books and 16 boxes of current magazines were distributed. Eroute to port, a combination Happy Hour and Smoker was held. A daily two hour disc jockey show, followed by two hours of recorded radio programs proved very popular. A boxing and wrestling team is being formed and rifle and pistol teams are preparing for matches while in port. Other in port recreation plans include sightseeing tours, a Japanese variety show, departmental or divisional beach parties, and the completion of inter-divisional softball league play.

During this operating period, work was begun on the Ship's Cruise Book, which is to be printed in Japan and delivered in December. Each person on board will receive a copy, the cost being borne by the Recreation Fund.

Due to the uncertainty of the operating schedule, it was not possible to request rest hotel reservations as far in advance as would have been desirable. No reservations for either enlisted or officer personnel could be obtained. Some spaces at Camp Yokohama were obtained but these are inferior to those of the rest hotels. The lack of rest hotel reservations will be offset to a degree by the fact that personnel may be granted leave to stay at Japanese operated hotels, but the cost of such hotels is considerably greater than for rest hotels.

D. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

a. Flight Deck Jerseys

The extreme shortage of flight deck jerseys created a situation which called for prompt action. The problem was solved by sewing colored patches on M-1 Foul Weather Jackets. This also saved a considerable sum of money. The requirement involved 382 jerseys @ $2.20 each; the cost of the bunting used in the patches is $182.05 thereby effecting a savings of $1755.95. A photograph of these modified jackets is printed on the inside of the back cover of this report. The accomplishment of the above is not yet completed, however, it is expected that the jackets will be ready for use for cold weather operations upon return to the operating area.
b. Personnel

During the previous and current operating periods it has been necessary to serve meals at odd hours to coincide with the flight schedules. This procedure has increased the workload of the S-4 division beyond all expectations. The situation is further aggravated by the over-all shortage of stewardettes on board. The S-4 division has maintained an admirably low sick list percentage, which has helped the situation somewhat; however the strain is beginning to show in the fumbling of mess gear and resultant breakage and a general slow down in work performance. It is recommended, that if feasible to do so, the complement of the S-4 divisions of carriers on the line be kept up to at least the full allowance, even if at the expense of other vessels which have less active wardrooms.

c. Procurement

This vessel has experienced considerable difficulty in procuring supplies by priority "C" requisitions. If the material is not carried or not in stock at the supplying activities, the requisitions have been automatically cancelled by the issuing activities instead of being pressed to the next echelon of supply or obligated against stock due. This has increased the paper work of the Supply Department due to the fact that a new requisition must be submitted for the same material and results in further delay in obtaining needed material. In a great many instances, the new requisition has received the same treatment. As a consequence, this method of handling requisitions forces the use of higher priorities, when in fact they are not justified until the need for the item concerned becomes critical. When the item does become critical the time involved in shipment from CONUS is too lengthy to satisfy the immediate need and causes undue strain on the lines of communication as well as unsatisfactory supply support. A secondary, but equally serious result is that demand data of supporting activities is understated by the failure to record legitimate obligations of stock.

d. Banshee and Photographic Parts

The critical shortage of F2H-2F section F2R spares, as well as related photographic equipment and supplies, in Westpac has caused considerable concern and has, on several occasions, generated extreme apprehensiveness in conjunction with carrying out assigned missions. Ingenuity and substitution has saved the day in all instances so far to date.

e. Provisions

Requisitions submitted to the ALCHEE for provisions, during the present tour, have only been filled approximately 40% of the total requested. In addition most of the fresh provisions which were received were in an advanced stage of ripeness. The delivery of provisions in the above state is considered a waste of time, money and manpower.

In the port of Yokosuka there is a bountiful supply of fresh provisions available from vendors who have been certified as complying with required sanitation standards. It is felt that procurement of such local produce by the Service Squadron to augment the stocks now available to them would greatly increase the quality of service to the operating forces and at the same time effect considerable economy of cost, labor, time and shipping space. Losses of highly perishable items, such as tomatoes, could be greatly reduced if local produce were utilized to the maximum extent.

f. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

a. General

During this period the dental department carried on its normal work load plus 2 emergency cases from the USS SKIGET (AK 105) on which 2 apicoectomy, surgery, 2 root canal therapy and 2 fillings were accomplished.

F. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

a. Admission to the Sick List during 38 day Operating Period
(1) 286 patients admitted to the sick list.

(2) Total of 603 sick days out of a possible 119,010 work days.

(3) .5% of possible work days lost to sick days.

(4) One pilot was admitted to the sick list.

   Diagnosis: (a) Fracture, Compound, n.e.c. right radius, radial nerve involvement, no artery involvement. 0 days.

(5) There were four patients admitted to the sick list from other vessels with a total loss of 27 sick days.

b. Treatments Accomplished - Non-Admission

(1) Medical 2,271

(2) Surgical 518

(3) Veneral Disease 103

c. Pilot and Crewman Status

(1) Killed in Action

None

(2) Missing in Action

None

(3) Wounded in Action

One

(4) Grounded Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Post Accident</th>
<th>Disb. Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical No. Days</td>
<td>Psychological No. Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crewmen</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td>14 25</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Pilot days possible 5,092

Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding 25

0.4% Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding

d. Accidents Involving Plane Loss, Injury or Death

(1) Combat

(a) On 21 September 1952, an F2H-2P plane piloted by Lt. Carl Howard Yeagle, VAM Detachment VC-51 was struck by an anti-aircraft projectile which penetrated and exploded in the cockpit, producing a compound fracture of the bones of his right forearm and a minor laceration above his left eye. The plane was damaged sufficiently to prevent extension of the landing gear and flaps, but he managed to fly the plane with his broken arm, to a friendly airfield where he executed a successful wheels up, flaps up landing.

(2) Operational

None
Condition of the Crew

With the advent of cooler weather the expected rise in upper respiratory infection has occurred among the pilots and other personnel.

G. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Operations

(a) Great deal of unnecessary radio conversation could be avoided if the "Carrier One Letter Signals" were used. ASF pilots attempting to use such signals have found few DD's that understand the meaning of the signal. Consequently, confusion and greater radio traffic results.

The following signals are suggested as being of interest to ASF flights:

(a) KING - Proceed on mission assigned.
(b) EASY - Conduct ../S patrol in accordance with doctrine.
(c) MAN - Obtain more positive identification of vessel reported.
(d) PEETER - Discontinue search - Remain near ship.
(e) MIKE - Proceed to home base or base designated.

Use of these signals would improve radio discipline. At present there seems to be little effort directed toward even the simplest of security measures.

(2) The 3-8 magazines are considered unacceptable for use on K-18 or K-38 cameras modified for 1.6 seconds recycle. Since a major percentage of magazine and camera malfunction could be eliminated by exclusive use of the 3-88 magazines, it is recommended that a sufficient number of these magazines be obtained for each photo unit.

(3) Naval units along the North Korean coast and most control ships in the area consistently direct pilots to targets giving them UTM coordinates in plain language. It is recommended that all commands use the shrinkle system when using VHF as the UTM grid system could be used by the enemy to alert the AA in the proposed target area, and in addition, could be used to vector interceptors if he so desired.

Similarly, the constant use of the same code name for control ships in specific areas tends to alert the AA batteries when the strike leader complies with CTF-77's directive of reporting in and out with "CLANSHAN" or "FORTES CARLO." It is recommended that these code names be changed periodically as the code names have undoubtedly been compromised.

(4) UCM flights provided a great deal of information and should continue to be scheduled. Although the crewmen continue to gather UCM information during night heckler hops, it is found that much can be accomplished by two plane flights scheduled each day. The crew on each carrier can supply one two-plane flight daily without decreasing its availability or tiring its crewmen or pilots. In addition the flight aids in maintaining pilot and crew member proficiency.

(5) Armed reconnaissance missions require the RASCO ROUTES be covered at low altitude for better target sighting. A relatively high power setting is required to reduce vulnerability from AA fire. This combination coupled with heavy ordnance loads is conducive to high fuel consumption. If targets worthy of attack with heavy ordnance are not sighted early on the assigned route only partial coverage of the route results.

To alleviate this situation, it is recommended that where feasible, heavy ordnance be expended against a pre-assigned target early in the flight. This system would be particularly applicable where the route to be covered does not include rail lines. When rail lines are included as a portion of the route, it is recommended that flights be planned so as to cover that portion first,expending heavy ordnance early in the flight on targets of opportunity.
and/or rail cuts, as the 20MM has proved adequate for destruction of vehicles on the roads. It is considered that flash reports of lucrative targets that might be sighted after heavy ordnance has been expended, and diversion of future RECCOs to these targets, adequately covers this situation. It is further recommended that RECOO assignments involving more than one route be composed of routes close enough together so that the flights can be flown as round robin flights without requiring back-tracking.

(6) It is recommended that pre-dawn strikes scheduled against heavily defended priority targets, be coordinated to hit the targets at times when there is ample light for accurate bombing and sufficient darkness for spotting heavy gunfire on the ground, making flak suppression more effective. If the same target is to be hit by a strike later in the day, more accurate flak positions from pre-dawn observation will be available.

(7) During the past tour ComCarDivOND commenced using a procedure at the daily morning conference that proved both informative and beneficial to the Air Group. In addition to receiving the Air Plan for the following day, tentative target plan was presented for two days in advance. The Air Group representatives were then able to discuss with their squadrons the various aspects of the Air Plan, such as numbers of planes, ordnance loading, etc.

On the following day well considered and constructive comments and suggestions were then offered, and were considered by the CarDiv Staff and used as practicable in preparing the final Air Plan.

It is believed that this procedure not only allowed the Air Group the advantage of thorough advance planning and briefing, but also enabled the Air Group to be part of a well integrated team.

(8) The design of the black boards in squadron ready rooms were considered inadequate. Many unnecessary items were included, resulting in wasted space. A new design has been very satisfactory. See the inside of the front cover of this report for a diagram of this board.

2. Ordnance

a. General

Of a total of 5,676 bombs expended (exclusive of incendiaries and napalm) the following malfunctions occurred:

- Dropped on catapult launch: 17
- Dropped when aircraft landed on board: 3
- Hung bombs: 2

(1) All malfunctions occurred on F9F aircraft. 23

(2) All malfunctions occurred from the MK 55 Mod 0 bomb racks.

(3) All bomb rack malfunctions occurred with 250 lb GP bombs suspended except three and those were 260 lb fragmentation bombs.

(4) The Mark 55 Mod 0 bomb rack is considered dangerous and undependable. The steps taken to increase its reliability are as follows:

(a) Spot welding strap iron to the sway braces to increase their bracing effect on 250 lb GP bombs.

(b) Tighten down the sway braces when the wings of the aircraft are extended just prior to catapulting.

(c) Insure that the suspended bomb is sway braced so that its longitudinal axis is parallel with the bomb rack.

(5) Two hundred and fifty pound general purpose bombs drop on the catapult from MK 55 mod 0 bomb racks with greater frequency on low or no wind...
day conditions when more catapulting pressure must be exerted to launch aircraft safely.

(6) Very little difficulty has been experienced with the Aero 14A bomb rack. It has been discovered that practically all the attention this rack requires is that it be operated by hand daily when not being used. This hand action will serve to loosen the bearing and pivot points of the rack enabling it to function smoothly. Another desirable feature of the rack is its rocket launching capabilities. The following benefits are derived from this design:

(a) Less wear and tear on electrical fittings (and consequently less electrical trouble) by eliminating the necessity of making and breaking electrical connections each time a bomb rack is removed to be replaced by a rocket launcher or "vice versa", to meet operational requirements.

(b) Reduces stowage and supply problems.

(c) Valuable time saved by eliminating the time necessary to accomplish the exchange of two pieces of equipment to meet the operational requirements of schedules.

(7) Rockets expended: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1746</th>
<th>A.R.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XR</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of a total of 1766 rockets expended the following malfunctions occurred:

- Duds: 54
- Pig tails becoming unplugged: 4
- Broken pig tails: 23
- Aircraft circuit: 6
- Total: 87

Of the above malfunctions seventy-three (73) occurred on jet aircraft. The greater number of rocket malfunctions occurring on jet aircraft is believed due to the speed. The rocket now in use was designed for lower speed aircraft.

To reduce the number of dud rockets on jet aircraft the following field fix has been developed. A loop of the rocket pig tail is dipped through the after tunnel lug of the rocket. The ignitor or free end of the pigtail is then dipped through the loop to form a knot. After the ignitor plug is inserted and locked in the ignitor the knot is then pulled through the tunnel lug so that the slack cable will trail to the rear of the rocket. To insure that the pigtail is not tightened excessively between the wing of the aircraft and the rocket tunnel lug, the after end of the rocket is pulled downward as the slack is removed from the pigtail.

The following ammunition expenditures were made:

- 20mm: 289,092
- 50 Cal: 208,320

With few exceptions 50 cal. and 20 mm guns have performed satisfactorily under the air group maintenance policy. No exceptionally great usage or breakage of gun parts has occurred other than that which would be normally expected in the fulfillment of a heavy operational program. However, with the return of cold weather it is anticipated that maintenance problems will increase, requiring greater effort on the part of the squadrons to keep abreast of the increase in gun malfunctioning. The F9F aircraft 20mm gun malfunctioning is centered in the two inboard guns due to short link shutes causing link jams. This condition coupled with the unsatisfactory performance of the Davis Feed Mechanism account for about 50 percent of 20mm gun stoppages. The Oldsmobile Feed Mechanism gives much better results. It maintains its operational tension for longer periods of time when using the new M67L ammunition links. The Oldsmobile Feed Mechanism is unobtainable in this area.
MK 6 Mod 0 aircraft fire control system is not being used by the pilots of this Air Group for the following reasons:

(a) The pilot is normally strafing at the same time and on the same run on which rockets are launched. It is much simpler to use the fixed sight and correct for mil leads on the graduated mil scale.

(b) Pilots have not been sufficiently trained in the use of this sight system prior to arrival in this area. This condition is partly influenced by the lack of spare parts and trained fire control men at home bases.

2. Electronics

a. Performance

The performance of airborne electronics during this period was very satisfactory. It is felt that this condition is primarily due to the high degree of competence of Air Group and ship's company electronics technicians. No major maintenance problems were encountered.

b. Allowance Lists

Allowance lists for various types of electronic equipment are below that required to maintain all equipment in service under combat conditions. A list of required electronic equipment not on any allowance list was submitted to Aviation Supply for action. Through their assistance the most critical pieces of electronic material were obtained, including parts for AN/GRC-1 transceivers, AN/AR-2, and AN/FPX-6 equipment. It is felt that a review should be made of the allowance lists for combat squadrons in order that a sufficient allowance can be furnished to ships initially. It is also felt that inadequate allowance lists have been allotted in the case of control panels for electronic equipment in the new type of AD-4 (127 series and beyond) aircraft.

c. Countermeasures

Extensive and valuable use has been made of electronics countermeasure equipment in AD-4NL aircraft. The BONHOMME RICHARD now utilizes ECM intelligence data supplemented by Navy, Marine and Air Force intelligence sources. ECM intelligence is now considered an integral part of Air Intelligence particularly in regard to flak information. So far, only passive countermeasures have been used by the airborne ECM unit (VC-33 Detachment 4) based aboard. However, it is felt that valuable long range benefits, and better tactical information, could be realized if specially configured ECM aircraft were used on primary mission ECM flights.

4. Personnel

a. General

Since the deployment of the Air Group from San Diego a total of fourteen enlisted personnel have been transferred to shore duty in accordance with BuAer orders. Of these, twelve were higher rates occupying key positions in the squadrons and their transfer has had an adverse effect on combat efficiency.

Prior to deployment, each squadron in the Air Group was over allowance. All men were interviewed and screened carefully before requests were made to AirLant for the transfer of excess personnel in order that the Air Group could deploy with the authorized enlisted allowance, and with a crew that could be expected to remain stable during the combat tour. Following the transfer of excess men, the complements of the squadrons were frozen by AirLant with the result that the Air Group deployed with a well-trained and carefully apportioned enlisted rate structure. Replacements for most of the fourteen men have either been received from AirPac or have been ordered to the Air Group. However, the time factor involved in effecting the transfers to the Air Group, and the fact that the replacements are usually not familiar with type aircraft, squadron organization and personnel characteristics have tended to reduce squadron efficiency.
ComairPac's efforts to prevent personnel in the combat area from being transferred to shore duty (except for extremely urgent and isolated cases) are greatly appreciated and it is hoped that B/Uers will concur.

5. Material

a. General

One F4U-4, BuNo 80822, was AOG for fourteen (14) days of this period for a front windshield panel, R82 CVWS 37830, and for a left slide panel, R82 CVWS 37831-L. The parts were finally received from the USS KIRKLAND on 23 September. Evidently the stocks in this area are sufficient for large canopy Corsairs but not for those with small canopies. Six out of the sixteen aircraft in this squadron have small canopies.

6. Maintenance

a. General

(1) Three F9F flame-outs were experienced during the operating period, two at 20,000 and one at 30,000. In each case the flame-out was caused by a sticking aneroid shaft in the Bendix TJ-Cl Fuel Control. Successful air starts were obtained.

(2) J62 Turbo-Jet Engine Bulletin #90 provides for the replacement of the aneroid shaft and bushing assembly in the fuel control with a new, corrosion-resistant type designed to prevent the shaft from sticking. However, the new type parts are not yet available in the supply system. As an interim measure, all fuel controls are being inspected every ten hours, and faulty aneroid shaft and bushing assemblies are being replaced with new parts of the old type.

(3) In order to exercise the aneroid shaft, it is recommended that part of each combat air patrol flight be conducted at 30,000 feet. This procedure will help reduce the possibility of sticking shafts until replacement parts are available.

(4) During the twenty-four (24) days in the operating area, there was a total of fifty-four (54) aircraft days lost due to non-availability of parts (A.O.G.), broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days A.O.G.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB-4L</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJ4-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2H-2P</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Survival

a. Recommendations

(1) It is recommended that units operating in the Korean area replace the solar stills or desalting kits currently provided in FK-2 parachutes with two (2) pint cans of water. It is felt that the small amount of sunlight experienced during summer months in the Japan Sea and the unsuitability of solar stills on land warrant their removal from the raft kits. Desalting kits are of little or no value to pilots forced to evade the enemy in Korea.

(Note: One hundred and fifty of these sealed pint cans of water were requested from Commander Fleet Air Japan in August and immediate delivery was promised, but as of this date no cans of water have been received.)

(2) It is recommended that the 24-foot parachutes be retained and modified for use on A/SK-1 kits. The present 12-foot parachute permits a too rapid descent which has resulted in mutilation of equipment dropped to survivors.

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It is recommended that all items of survival equipment provided on life vests be equipped with "tie-ties" both top and bottom, and that sufficient loops be attached to the bottom of the vests during construction to insure proper securing of such items. At present only makeshift methods are used for securing items to prevent facial injuries to pilots in the case of bailout.

It is recommended that pilots engaged in combat flights over enemy territory discard the blue liner of the MK 3 anti-exposure suit and wear forest green winter flight gear which provides suitable warmth and greater camouflage protection. It is felt that evasion or escape would be difficult if the downed pilot is clad only in the MK 3 anti-exposure suit and its accompanying liner. It is further recommended that, in case a pilot goes down in enemy territory and is forced to evade, the legs of the MK 3 suit be cut off just above the knees, the crotch cut out and the wrist and neck seals removed. This alteration will leave a waterproof jumper and allow freedom of movement. A knee-type boot can be created by turning down the bottoms of the cut trouser legs.

Technical Note 20-51, paragraph 4, line 2, mentions a check valve designed to prevent entry of water into the anti-blackout suit in case of emersion. Information concerning the availability of the check valves was requested from ComFair Japan by dispatch on 8 September, but as yet no answer has been received. Until such time as the check valves are provided for all anti-blackout suits, it is recommended that the oral inflation tube (normally carried in the left breast pocket of the suit) be attached to the "G" suit extension by means of a strong, light line. The oral inflation tube should hang not more than six inches away from the end of the "G" suit extension and in case of emersion it may be easily fitted to the extension forming a water-tight plug.

The ADSK-1 kit containers have been excessively dented by the sway braces of the Aero MK 14A bomb racks, and when installed for long periods the thin shell of the container would eventually be punctured. To remedy this defect, a metal strip was welded to all available kit containers covering the area that contacts the sway braces. (NOTE: A RADM was submitted recommending that this modification be made to all ADSK-1 kits prior to issue.)

With the approach of cold weather it was realized that if use of the PK-2 life raft was required, paddles would be needed to keep the hands from freezing. Two aluminum paddles have been made for each raft and inserted in the equipment compartment.

Suggestions

It is suggested to parachute riggers fitting MK 3 anti-exposure suits that when cementing the boots onto the legs of the MK 3 anti-exposure suit that a 514 cubic inch oxygen cylinder be used in lieu of the wooden plugs. After the boots and the cuffs are lined up on the cylinder, the inside seams of the cuffs are cemented. Then the cuffs are turned back and cemented along with the tops of the boots and the cement is allowed to set for the required time before the cuffs are folded back over the boot tops for the final bond. This method eliminates the troubles experienced when using the method recommended by the manufacturer. (It is mandatory that the hands be entirely free of cement when the rolling action takes place.)

PART VII - OPERATING STATISTICS

1. Summary of Sorties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>F2H/F9F</th>
<th>F4U-4</th>
<th>F4U-5H</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>ADW</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike/Recco</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>253</td>
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<tr>
<td>Photo/Photo esc.</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>JESGAP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Net Recco</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ME MISSION

F2H/F9F FLU-4
F9F/FLU-SN
AD
AN
ADW

TOTAL

16
11
69
48
46
0

16

NGF
AdM Recce
Huckler
ASF/AdW
Gator
WX Recce
Misc. (Slow Time)
(Ferry, etc)

(1829)
(1779)
(97.21%)
(4019.6)
(17)
(236.45)

2. Flak Damage Analysis

SORTIES

FLU-A
FLU-5N

AD

AD

ADW

TOTAL

14
1
1
11
39
1
47
3
21
18
46
0
12
17
14
10
72

876
373
52
368
79
47
1795

Aborts

DECLASSIFIED

T. W. WATSON

DECLASSIFIED
USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA 31) 30 Sep-5 Nov 1952
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

7 November 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 September 1952 to 5 November 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951
(b) CINC PACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 30 September 1952 to 5 November 1952 is submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Upon arrival in Yokosuka at 09091 on 30 September 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD entered a period of upkeep and repair.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 0913102 of October 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), Captain Paul W. Watson, USN, Commanding, with COMCARDIV ONa, Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, USN, and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area via Van Dieman Straits at 06141 on 10 October 1952.

At 10151 12 October 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TAR6. The Task Force was then commanded by COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. Hickey, USN, aboard the USS KAARSARGE (CVA-33). In addition to the USS KAARSARGE, the Force was composed of the USS USS SSEX (CVA-9), the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37), the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral H.E. Regan, USN, assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 13411, 18 October 1952, and shortly thereafter, the USS KAARSARGE with COMCARDIV FIVE embarked departed the Force.

At 17311, on 1 November 1952, the USS KAARSARGE rejoined the force and the command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN passed to COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. Hickey, USN, aboard the USS KAARSARGE.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) and CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52 except during the period 12–16 October 1952 when the Force operated in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 25A-52.

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; C.O.</th>
<th>ALLOW. &amp; OPERATIONAL A/C</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE A/C</td>
<td>9/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCV-7</td>
<td>CDR G.B. Brown</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF 71</td>
<td>CDR J.S. Hill</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>LCDR A.W. Curtis</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VF-74  CDR. C.D. Fonvielle Jr.  F4U-4  16  16  16  23  23
VC-75  CDR. H.K. Evans  AD-4  16  16  16  24  24
VC-4 Det 41  LCDR E.S. Ogle CINC  F4U-5N  4  4  4  4  4
VC-12 Det 41  LCDR C.H. Blanchard CINC  AD-4W  3  3  3  6  6
VC-33 Det 41  LCDR R. Hoffmeister CINC  AD-4NL  4  4  4  4  4
VC-61 Det Nan  LT E.R. Smith CINC  F9F-2  3  3  3  4  4

* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons.

In accordance with CTF SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential dispatch 041OZ, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 21031 4 November 1952 for Yokosuka via Tsugaru Straits. In the meanwhile, Typhoon Agnes which originated approximately 300 miles northwest of Guam changed course to parallel the East Coast of Japan. To obviate encountering this storm CTF SEVENTY SEVEN by Confidential dispatch 050010Z directed the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD to proceed via Van Dieman Straits vice Tsugaru and to arrive Yokosuka, Japan, 8 November 1952 for a period of upkeep and repair.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

9/29/52 to 10/9/52: The ship was moored to Piedmont Pier, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan for a period of upkeep and repair. The F2H-2F's of VC-61 Photo Unit Nan were offloaded for ultimate transfer to the USS O'HIGGINS. Pilots of VC-61 Unit Nan operated from NAS Atsugi accepting and flying familiarization hops in 3 F9F-2P aircraft.

10/10/52: Enroute to the combat area. General Drills were conducted.

10/11/52: Enroute to the combat area. Gunnery and anti-aircraft exercises were conducted.

10/12/52: The BON HOMME RICHARD launched early morning pilot proficiency flights and joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN north of the Thirty-Eighth parallel at 10151. In the afternoon, both prop and jet strikes were launched against bridges southwest and west of Wonsan. Corsairs and Skyraiders knocked two spans out of a railroad bridge and silenced two anti-aircraft positions. Meanwhile, a twelve plane jet strike was having one of the most successful jet missions of recent months. Attacking a total of five highway bridges, the pilots destroyed two, damaged two, and obstructed the last by causing a landside. One Corsair received minor flak damage. In the final strike of the day, night hecklers destroyed at least nine trucks and damaged seven or more. The results of attacks on thirty-one other trucks were unobserved. In addition, one road bridge was damaged.

10/13/52: This was D minus 2 day for the landings at Koj in, and BM aircraft spent the day softening up the enemy along the front lines in the vicinity of Koj in, and on the transportation lines leading to the objective area, jets attacking southwest of Wonsan damaged two highway bridges and pounded a supply area, destroying or damaging thirteen buildings. Later in the day the jets hit another supply concentration in the same general area and started large fires.

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Corsairs and Skyraiders on the afternoon strike in the vicinity of Kojo hit supply dumps and billeting areas, destroying at least twenty-three buildings and starting many large fires. One Skyraider received serious flak damage but was able to reach Yodo Island (Briscoe Field) in Wonsan Bay and effect a successful landing. Hecklers wound up the day by destroying three or more trucks and damaging at least ten others. Many additional trucks were attacked but darkness prevented damage assessment.

10/14/52: The BON HOME RICHARD was host to Admiral McGregor, First Lord of the British Admiralty, Vice Admiral CLARK, and Rear Admiral HICKEY, who came aboard while the flagship KANSAS was replenishing. In the morning, Corsairs and Skyraiders struck at supply targets in the vicinity of Kojo, destroying nearly thirty-five buildings, starting ten large fires, and setting off two violent secondary explosions. Throughout the day jets attacking the rear areas damaged or destroyed a total of seven bridges. In addition, they knocked out two automatic weapons. Hecklers scored one of the most damaging blows of the day when they exploded a truck as it moved into a fuel dump. The resulting fires spread over an area the size of a square block. An hour later it was still burning furiously and was visible for more than twenty miles. The hecklers also destroyed eight or more trucks and damaged over twenty.

10/15/52: This was to have been D-Day, but at the time the landings were scheduled to take place heavy rain and low visibility made flight operations impossible. H-Hour was therefore postponed until 1400, and in spite of high winds and heavy seas support flights were launched shortly afterward. Both props and jets smashed at the beaches and their approaches in anticipation of a landing. In addition to pummelling strong points, the flyers destroyed twelve buildings, blew up an ammunition dump, and caused a large secondary explosion in a fortified area. Meanwhile, the landing craft headed for the beach, but upon reaching a point about one thousand yards out they turned and retired. Shortly afterwards, the operation was officially termed an exercise. One Skyraider received a direct hit in the wing from medium flak but was able to ditch safely. The pilot, Lt(jg) Walter Alt, was picked up in good condition by the helicopter of the USS IOWA.

10/16/52: Continuing operations in the former objective area around Kojo, props and jets attacked supply dumps, troop billeting areas, and camouflaged installations. They destroyed a total of twenty buildings, started twelve fires, caused several large secondary explosions, and closed the mouth of a supply storage tunnel. An afternoon jet recoo attacked interdiction targets west of Wonsan and near Kowan, damaging two highway bridges, making four rail cuts, and shooting up five boxcars. One Panther was hit by flak at Kowan and ditched in Wonsan harbor. The pilot, Lt(jg) W. G. Moore, was picked up suffering from a compound fracture of one ankle and multiple lacerations of the face. His condition was later reported to be satisfactory.

10/17/52: The ship received avgas in the morning and was able to resume flight operations at noon. Once again the major effort was directed against targets in the former objective area. Some flights were hampered by threats of enemy strike attack over the target areas and by the necessity for flying reseap for a downed ESSEX pilot, but at least twenty-eight buildings were destroyed or damaged, ten rail cuts were made, four highway bridges were damaged, three ox carts were blown up, and five trucks were destroyed or damaged. One FIJNL received serious flak damage and was forced to land at Yodo.

10/18/52: The Task Force replenished.

10/19/52: The day was marked by attacks on small, scattered, camouflaged supply dumps in the Wonsan area which were not only difficult to see and to hit, but upon which it was almost impossible to assess damage inflicted. In addition to these attacks, the prop aircraft damaged seven bridges. An afternoon jet recoo, vectored to the port of Najin to investigate unidentified ships, was unable to locate anything but friendlies, but while scouting the area close to the Soviet border the pilots discovered a large radar station on a nearby North Korean island. Making an attack they scored ten hits with eleven bombs and caused considerable damage.

10/20/52: Dawn hecklers lead off the day with attacks on a variety of targets from Wonsan to Chongjin. They destroyed at least four trucks, battered
five bridges, smashed eight buildings, and cut a power line. The morning prop
strike hit storage areas at Wonsan, destroying at least thirteen buildings and
and damaging six others. Several fires were started and two secondary explosions
were set off. On this mission flak suppressing jet aircraft blew up one building
and stopped an armored car. Later in the day, in an attack on supply dumps about
forty miles northwest of Wonsan, the props and their jet escort smashed more
than twenty-six buildings, scattered and probably destroyed many stacks of
supplies, and started three fires.

10/21/52: Bad weather over the beach held the force to a half day of offen-
sive operations, but unusually successful morning strikes helped to make up for
the shortened work day. Dawn hecklers struck at the MiG's indirectly when
they heavily damaged a radar station north of Wonsan. In other attacks, the
hecklers destroyed or damaged eighteen buildings near Kilchu. The first jet
recco also landed heavy blows when it smashed a total of fourteen buildings near
Hungrang. The primary target for the main strike was weathered in but successful
attacks were made on targets of opportunity in the general area of Songjin.
Fourteen buildings were destroyed and ten damaged, rails were cut in twelve
places, two rail bridges were damaged, and thirteen boxcars were wrecked. To
this total the jet escort added nine boxcars damaged, two rail cuts, and a dozen
explosions were caused. Meanwhile, props pounded at enemy frontline positions opposite
Hyesanjin. Their controller reported a very effective attack and credit for
ripping up 300 yards of trenches, destroying six mortar positions, four artillery
positions, and destroying six and damaging twelve bunkers.

10/22/52: Scheduled replenishment was postponed because of heavy seas.
General drills were conducted.

10/23/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted.
Gunnery and Anti-aircraft exercises were conducted.

10/24/52: On the principle morning strike, EHR pilots returned to the task
of attacking strategic targets in the rear of the enemy front lines. The
objectives were pre-selected transportation, industrial installations, and
government buildings in the Yalu River town of Iyesanjin. In the attack, Cor-
sairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers heavily damaged one large railroad repair
building, and leveled twelve smaller structures. A turntable was damaged by a direct
hit. In addition, two large government or headquarters buildings were heavily
damaged and fourteen other buildings of various types were destroyed or damaged.
A total of three secondary explosions were caused. In the afternoon the major
effort was directed to close air support of the US IX Corps. Assisted by flak
suppressing jets, the prop aircraft achieved 100 percent coverage of the as-
signed area and started many fires. Shortly after the attack, an ammunition
dump went up in a violent explosion. Meanwhile, a large jet recco ranging west
and north of Wonsan damaged three bridges; hit three buildings; made three rail
cuts, silenced an AA position, and shot up sixteen boxcars. Might hecklers
damaged or destroyed nineteen trucks.

10/25/52: The principle morning strike attacked Yongpyong-ni, a heavily
defended rail center about forty miles west of Wonsan. Although the strike
was hampered by the large number of aircraft making simultaneous runs on the
target area, the Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers effectively suppressed flak
and heavily damaged a turntable, coal loading facilities, supply buildings, and
billetting areas. The afternoon prop strikes destroyed an important rail bridge
near Yonghung, damaged another bridge at Wonsan, and smashed repair facilities
northwest of Songjin. Might hecklers destroyed or damaged more than twenty-nine
trucks; many of which exploded; and in addition, heavily damaged five buildings.

10/26/52: The Task Force replenished and no operations were conducted.
Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

10/27/52: Dawn hecklers found good hunting on the East Coast highways. They
destroyed eighteen trucks and damaged seventeen trucks. The efforts of both
jets and props were devoted almost exclusively to attacks on both sides of the
bomblines extending entirely across Korea. In making one-run attacks on troop
concentrations, gun positions, supply dumps, and vehicle shelters, the pilots
blanketed the targets with bombs, but damage assessment was impossible to make

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due to dense clouds of dust and to the nature of the targets. The level of effectiveness, however, is estimated to be considerably below that normally achieved by ordinary close air support.

10/28/52: In response to a rush call from the HMS CRUSADER which had stopped a train near Songjin, the morning Corsair hecklers diverted from their primary sector to damage twelve boxcars, six of which they blasted from the rails. In addition, they plowed up sixty yards of track and damaged a nearby tunnel mouth. Both props and jets of the morning strike smashed at electric power facilities, factories, and supply buildings at Churumang. A transformer station was attacked, causing a large secondary explosion, and a thermal power-house was damaged. In addition, the pilots destroyed ten factory and supply buildings. In the afternoon, Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers resumed the program of massive attacks on enemy frontline positions with a strike on targets opposite the US IX Corps. As on previous attacks, the targets were difficult to see and to hit, and though all bombs landed in the immediate area results were impossible to assess.

10/29/52: The main strike of the morning smashed at supply areas and factory building at Pukchong, destroying one large factory building and fifteen smaller supply buildings. Two additional factory buildings were damaged, thirteen fires were started, and three secondary explosions were caused. In a nearby area, a long rail bypass bridge was cut in four places. In the afternoon, the strike effort was divided between three separate target areas. A large radio or radar station near Chongjin was knocked out when Corsairs and Skyraiders leveled five buildings housing equipment, generators, supplies, and personnel. In a second attack near Songjin, the props destroyed a rail bridge, ripped up the tracks in three places, and damaged a tunnel mouth. The third strike group worked over a rail bridge northwest of Wonsan, cutting the bridge in three places and plowing up one approach.

10/30/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

10/31/52: In a morning hampered by bad weather over the beach, the main strike hammered Tanchon. Although good targets were sparse, the props and jets damaged or destroyed at least eight large buildings, started one large fire, and set off a secondary explosion. Other areas were blanketed but no assessment of damage was possible. Corsairs on another flight made one bridge cut and damaged a radar station. Meanwhile, a jet recce destroyed or damaged fifteen buildings, made three rail cuts, and shot up fourteen boats. Another recce started a brisk fire in a supply area and hit a boxcar loaded with ammunition which blew up violently.

11/1/52: Heavy seas prevented flight operations.

11/2/52: BHR aircraft led planes of the newly-arrived CRISKANY into action in two massive attacks against enemy frontline positions. In the morning, the objective area was near Pyonggang, apex of the Iron Triangle, where the XV CCF Corps opposes the 7th US Infantry Division. The attack was carried out against determined AA resistance and four AD's received minor damage. The planes pounded the enemy positions with telling effect, causing at least one secondary explosion. On the same event, a Joint BHR-CRISKANY ECM flight blasted a large and important radar station near Chongjin. The afternoon strike saw jets hitting a collection of buildings west of Pyonggang while props attacked supply targets a few miles to the east. Both targets were severely battered. Might hecklers finished the day with one of the most successful missions of the entire cruise when they destroyed or damaged fifty to sixty trucks. About forty of these were hit when L5 trucks were discovered north of Wonsan lined up almost bumper to bumper with their lights on. Other targets hit included a radar station, five buildings, and a gun position. Rear Admiral N. D. JOHNSON relieved Rear Admiral H. E. REGAN as Commander Carrier Division ONE at 0100Z this date.

11/3/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

11/4/52: The morning strike blasted supply dumps and personnel shelters southwest of Wonsan. The area of the target was well covered and two violent secondary explosions were set off and two large fires started. Four supply
buildings were smashed. In Wonsan proper a large warehouse was heavily damaged. Later in the day, a jet strike hit the Wonsan area again. In this attack at least six buildings were completely leveled, two revetments sustained direct hits, four fires were started, and two secondary explosions were set off. At the same time another jet flight jumped a T-34 tank near the Changjin Reservoir. One 250 pound bomb hit was scored and the tank was severely damaged. Four separate close air support missions were flown in the afternoon and all achieved worthwhile results. A partial assessment of damage includes sixteen bunkers, eighteen personnel shelters, and over sixty yards of trenches destroyed. Night hecklers finished the day, and the operating period, by destroying or damaging over nineteen trucks.

At 21031 in compliance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 0407102 the U.S.S. HOM HOM HOM RICHARD left the operating area.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Material

All ordnance and fire control material casualties during this period were minor in nature and were within capacity of ships force to repair. Insulation breakdown in electrical cable continues to be the major source of trouble.

Of thirteen bomb handling one-ton chain falls tested during the last in part period in Yokosuka, six failed to pass the test and are recommended for survey.

2. Ordnance Expended

**SHIP**

5"/38 Caliber

- 16 2000# G.P.
- 554 1000# G.P.
- 842 500# G.P.
- 3238 250# G.P.
- 1499 100# G.P.
- 4632 260# Frag
- 12 Napalm Fire Bombs

40MM

- 2669 Rounds

**AIRCRAFT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>554</td>
<td>736 5&quot; &amp; 6.5&quot; ATAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>200#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99,270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GUN AMMO**

- 267,542 .50 Cal.

**PARACHUTE FLARES**

- 394 MK6

3. Dock Evolutions

During this period the U.S.S HOM HOM HOM RICHARD was alongside fifteen (15) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies, and received thirty-one (31) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers, patients and light freight. All transfers were effected without personnel injury or material casualty.

DECLASSIFIED
2. **Damage to Aircraft**

25 planes received minor damage by flak and bomb bursts.

3. **Loss of Aircraft**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/15/52</td>
<td>VA 75</td>
<td>AD4</td>
<td>127875</td>
<td>Enemy Anti-Aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/52</td>
<td>VF 72</td>
<td>F9F2</td>
<td>123423</td>
<td>Enemy Anti-Aircraft fire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Damage Inflicted on the Enemy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerhouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (HWY)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (RR)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Storage Facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Storage Facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Posts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round House</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Turntables</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Stations and/or Radio Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangars</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Mills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Antenna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighthouse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Loading Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Storage Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Shelters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Traps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenches Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Tracks Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>360 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60 yards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, smoke, flak or time prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage, but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of Bombline missions, numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

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Reliability of communications has markedly increased since discontinuing
1. Performance

The performance of personnel of both air group and ship's company remained at a very high level. Only one serious accident occurred during this period, (discussed under Operational Casualties below), and it has not been established that this accident was caused by avoidable personnel errors.

VC-61, Photo Unit NAN, VC-4, Detachment 41, and VC-33, Detachment 41, should be singled out for special comment. Photo Unit NAN has shown from the earliest days of the cruise a high degree of proficiency in spite of two changes of aircraft type. It has successfully carried out photographic missions over the most dangerous flak areas in East Korea, making repeated runs at constant altitude, course, and speed, and the quality of their performance is responsible to no small degree for the successful operations of the Air Group and Task Force in general.

Both night heckler detachments have again and again demonstrated that their efforts can be as productive as many full-scale daylight strikes, even in the adverse conditions under which they operate. This is indicative not only of the effectiveness of the type of operation, but also of the skill and accuracy of the pilots.

2. Casualties

a. Combat

LTJG William Glenn MOORE, Jr., 487129/1310, USN (Attached to VF-72 USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) at approximately 1325, 16 October 1952, was flying a F9F-2 jet aircraft on a routine combat mission. While pulling out from a dive, his plane was struck presumably by a 37mm shell which penetrated the floor of the cockpit between the rudder pedals. At this time he received a compound comminuted fracture of the left fibula. Due to rapid loss of blood he elected to ditch in Wonsan Harbor instead of proceeding to an emergency landing field. During the ditching he sustained the following wounds: lacerated right hand, chin, and forehead; contusion, eyes bilateral, with subconjunctival hemorrhage, and concussion of the brain. He was immediately recovered from the water by DE 535 and transferred to the USS TOLDO (CA-133) for treatment and further transfer to USNH, #3923.

b. Operational

LT Richard E. LUEHR, 472014, USN (Attached to CAG-7 USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)) was on duty on the flight deck during landing operations. An F9F-2 in landing engaged two wires and the tail hook failed. The aircraft crashed through the barriers and into the after end of the island structure, During the crash one 20mm gun fired. One shell penetrated Repair Station Eight. A fragment of this shell struck Dr. LUEHR Lacerating his right forehead and eye lid and causing contusion of the right orbit. RINGHARD, David E., 373 44 72, AT3 USN was struck on the right buttock by a small fragment causing superficial abrasion. He was treated and returned to duty.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Intelligence

a. Kojo Operation

Having no indication whatsoever that the projected "landing" was not genuine, the BON HOMME RICHARD and Air Group SAWAN spared no effort to make the Kojo Operation a success. Consequently, when the real nature of the operation was disclosed, many of those concerned felt let down.
An important consideration in this connection is the distinction in safety factors and policies between an exercise and a real landing. The critical role of air power in an actual amphibious operation places accomplishment of mission far above the element of pilot safety, and pilots are often caused to expose themselves to greater risks than in ordinary attack missions and far greater risks than in exercises. It is strongly recommended that in future exercises of this type Air Intelligence Officers and pilots be informed of the bogus nature of the proceedings or that clear and forceful instructions be issued to the effect that all customary precautions and safety measures continue to be observed.

"Fireball", a map-booklet, containing 57 9 X 9 inch 1:50,000 maps of the objective area, was issued for use in the Kojo Operation. This booklet also included a title page and two pages of annotated reproductions to be used as an index to the maps. Pilots found this booklet to be impractical. The small ground area covered by each individual page made proper orientation difficult. After the first day of operations, holes were punched and rings were used to replace the staple-type binding of the booklet. This alteration was made to facilitate turning of pages as desired. For future operations of this type a loose leaf arrangement should be used and the charts be doubled in size. If the area of operations is small enough, that is, if the area can be covered by less than eight maps, uncut 1:50,000 maps should be used with an annotated 1:250,000 chart provided as an index.

2. Photographic Interpretation

a. General

Due to the reversion from the Banshee to F9F-2P aircraft the photo pilots were again required to fly at hazardously low altitudes over mountainous Korean terrain. This was necessary due to the fact that the F9F-2P is limited to a maximum focal length of 12 inches and in order to produce the required scale photography suitable for photo interpretation.

The entire Kojo invasion area was mapped at 5,000 feet and completely analyzed by photo interpreters for all guns, trenches, firing positions, barbed wire, mine fields, vehicles, bunkers, storage, troops and other installations. Photo coverage at a scale of 1:5000 of the rail routes Hazel and Helen which lie in the heart of Wonsan Valley, was also requested and flown at 5,000 feet.

These missions are well-known to be very hazardous in straight and level flight. When aircraft which can carry a camera of greater focal length than 12 inches are available in the area, it is recommended that they be assigned to these heavy flak areas in lieu of F9F-2P aircraft.

b. Locating Radar Stations

One enemy radar station has been definitely verified by photo interpretation on the basis of previous electronic search of the area. Photo coverage on two other enemy radar stations on the basis of previous intelligence revealed pairs of low frequency type radio masts and nearby buildings. Later investigations showed that at one of these stations pilots sighted, visually and unmistakably, bedspring type radar antennae perched atop radio masts. Photo coverage in this case was done under poor atmospheric conditions, and therefore, no radar antennae were revealed.

A number of other attempts were made to locate radar installations by mapping areas suspected to contain such installations. Since no radar was located in these instances, it is believed that either the radar installations were not located in the suspected area, the installations were too small to see on 1:5000 scale photography, or the radar is extremely well camouflaged. It is felt that better results might be obtained with longer focal length cameras.

3. Communications

a. General

Reliability of communications has markedly increased since discontinuing
the use of speed keys on most circuits. Overall speed of clearing traffic has risen from approximately 4.5 wpm to approximately 10 wpm on manual circuits.

The decrease in speed of transmission on the Guam Fleet Broadcast from 28 wpm to 20 wpm since the last tour of duty in this area has been of great assistance, considering the shortage of qualified strikers copying this circuit.

4. Photography

a. General

The number of K-25 strike photographs taken this period increased considerably. About three additional rolls per day were taken with excellent results. The best photographs were of targets which were not heavily defended by AA and permitted lower flying. An urgent requirement exists for a camera with a longer focal length, such as a K-25 camera modified for a 15 inch lens, which would permit larger scale photography at higher altitudes.

During the mock invasion at Koja, exposed and unexposed aerial film was packed in ATAR cans with Kapok life jackets attached and successfully dropped by a Skyraider in the water alongside the U.S.S. MCKINLEY in the invasion beach area. The photo planes landed on board at 1610 from their mission and the film, in the ATAR cans, was loaded on the bomb racks of an AD and ready to go at 1639.

In recent tests of Model "O" Eyemo camera mounted in a X-C56Z motion picture camera capsule and attached to the bomb racks of AD and F4U aircraft, it was found the pilots were reluctant to carry the capsule in lieu of large bombs. Due to the relative lack of experienced pilots in photography it is considered desirable that photo planes be modified to carry, interchangeably, forward firing cameras such as a K-25 15 inch and a 35mm motion picture camera. This could be used, when permissible, for combat recording of invasions and large strikes.

The use of a K-17 24 inch camera, mounted in a modified 1000 lb water filled bomb pod and carried on the bomb racks of AD aircraft, was discontinued during this period, since no satisfactory method has been found to eliminate camera vibration sufficiently.

5. Combat Information Center

a. General

CIC faced its greatest challenge during the first few days of this period. The large amphibious landing feint held at that time involved more ships and aircraft than this unit has ever before operated with. It was a considerable task to keep an accurate account of the additional aircraft during the time this ship was strike control carrier and it was equally difficult to maintain an up to the minute, comprehensive picture of the location and identification of all the various surface units scattered in groups within our radar range.

b. Personnel

The loss of two officer air controllers and eleven enlisted personnel during the previous in-port period was felt for the first two weeks. Enlisted replacements have been obtained and are undergoing intensive training.

c. Training

A training program is underway to indoctrinate all CIC watch officers in the duties of the CIC underway. They are particularly to observe capabilities and limitations of the bridge radar equipment and the necessity for close cooperation between the bridge and CIC.

d. Operations

Pilots on several Combat Air Patrol missions from this ship have complained
of the controllers inability to provide CAP with accurate altitude information while conducting air intercepts on bogies. The bogies in nearly all cases were identified as returning strike groups. The complaints have not only been made against this ship's controllers but against all the controllers in the force at one time or another. The SN radar is the only means available to this ship to obtain altitude on an aircraft. The maximum accuracy varies from plus 1,000 feet to minus 1,000 feet of the target's actual altitude. This accuracy can only be attained out to a range of 35 miles. For the controller to effect a successful intercept, closer accuracy is always required on bogle altitude but is rarely available with the present installation.

R. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Forged eye pendants

a. Days of low surface wind conditions again required the use of the forged eye pendants for F9F launches. The bungee arrester, as modified by ship's force, continued to give satisfactory service. (CG, HOMMÉ RICHARD (CVA-31) to Chief Bureau of Aeronautics ltr ser 2626 of 25 October 1952) One arrester has been used for 136 shots of which 90 were during this operating period. However, two broken bungee strands were replaced on the arrester during this time.

b. Of the ten pendants originally received, five have been lost over the bow prior to the modification of the bungee arrester, four have been damaged beyond use, evidently by being struck by the tail skag of the F9F, and one is still in use.

2. Barricades

a. During landing operations an F9F crashed into the island structure and the starboard barricade stanchion after its tail hook failed from a double pendant engagement. Damage to the stanchion required its replacement. Damage to the actuating equipment caused by the barricade shear pins falling to shear was extensive. The piston rod, cylinder support bushings, bumbered bracket, piston rod terminal and pin required replacement by locally manufactured parts. Other damaged parts were repaired as required. The adjoining deck, bulkhead and cylinder support base were sprung out of alignment and will require shipyard repairs. To correct for this misalignment, the piston rod terminal and pin were modified to permit free movement of the cylinder lever and piston rod linkage. It is felt that had the stanchion shear pins sheared, the damage sustained by the actuating equipment would have been negligible. Actual damage to the shear pins was negligible. A RUM is being submitted.

3. Bomb and rocket barrier

a. In an attempt to minimize the danger to equipment and personnel, due to hanging bombs and rockets jarring loose during landings, a bomb barrier has been developed and installed for trial. It is constructed of old barricade nylon webbing and rigged between number two and three barriers. The webbing consists of six horizontal nylon straps seventy-five feet long to which are sewn vertical straps three feet long. This webbing net is supported at the top and bottom by two ½ inch steel cables which are secured at each end to the four foot high stanchions constructed of angle iron. The stanchions are hinged at the bottom and can be locked in the down position. They are raised manually and are held in the up position by the wind across the deck. The bomb barrier lies flat on deck during launches and recoveries and can be raised expeditiously when required. It is considered that the barrier is of sufficient strength to stop or slow down appreciably any bomb up to and including a 250 lb. G.P. and 260 lb. Frag. No engagements were made during this reporting period. In two instances when the bomb barrier was rigged, hung ordnance became detached on landing. In one, a 250 lb. G.P. bounced ever
the barrier and in the other an ATAR skidded under the barrier. A report on the effectiveness of this bomb barrier will be made at a later date when evaluation is more complete.

C. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

During this period there were only two aircraft AOG for lack of parts. These parts were coded PI and are not allowed to be carried; therefore it is considered that this lack of material is beyond the control of the Ship's Supply Department. This fine showing is partially due to the excellent supply support afforded by the COD method of delivery of Priority ships and Baker requisitions.

Not all important freight was forwarded so expeditiously. Special launching pendants were down to two on board when a shipment of 30 arrived at Sasebo from CONUS; however instead of being forwarded directly to this vessel via Fleet Freight or COD, material was back-hauled by rail to Yokosuka for delivery next in-port period. While lack of this material did not prove serious, it could very easily have adversely affected jet operations. Action taken by the cognizant activities is not fully understood in view of the long back-haul involved. It is recommended that freight which arrives in Sasebo, usually after months of waiting, be delivered direct to vessels on the line.

A series of dispatches has been sent between ComFairJap, CTF-77, ComSeron3, and Divisions and units of TF-77 in an attempt to arrive at the best method of requisitioning and receiving aviation materials from the CHOURRE (ARV-1). This command has recommended to CTF-77 that the following procedure be used:

a. Base the CHOURRE at Sasebo,
b. Submit routine requisitions to CHOURRE via vessels of the replenishment force (CTF-92.11)
c. CHOURRE provide required routine material either by replenishment on the line or by sending it via the replenishment force.
d. Submit emergency requisitions to CHOURRE via dispatch.
e. CHOURRE fill emergency requisitions by COD shipment where practicable, otherwise via the replenishment force.
f. Vessels in the port of Yokosuka fill their requirements direct from ASB, NS Yokosuka with a copy to CHOURRE for inventory control purposes.

It is the considered opinion of this command that the above method of supplying aviation requirements would be furthering the principle of mobile support as enunciated by CNO and CinCNAF Flt. It would also considerably improve supply availability for the following reasons:

a. Routine requisitions would reach CHOURRE in less time than at present.
b. Requisitions could be filled with a minimum of transportation delay by basing CHOURRE at the base nearest to the Task Force.
c. A steady workload would be presented to CHOURRE rather than a peak load during in-port period of requiring vessels.
d. Requirements would be filled on the line, where and when they are needed, rather than in port after the immediate need has passed.
e. CHOURRE and carriers would receive valuable mobile-support training.
f. Difficulties incident to mobile support would be discovered, allowing such corrective action as necessary to be taken.
g. Items which the CHOURRE cannot fill would be passed sooner, resulting in earlier shipment from CONUS.

DECLASSIFIED
On 9 October 1952, 3,000 gallons of reconstituted milk were received from Camp Yokohama Ration Distribution Center via covered van, kept under refrigeration by flaked ice. This milk was placed in the refrigerator spaces in less than one hour after being received.

Reconstituted milk was used for the first time during this operating period. An average of 150 gallons was consumed by the General Mess each day, and on 26 October the last was used.

Recommended life expectancy is considered to be 28 days, however, the milk used on the 16th day was considered "good". During this period all milk was kept at 38-40 degrees. It is not recommended that reconstituted milk be carried beyond a 16 day period due to a slight difference in flavor.

This milk provided a welcome addition to the menu and brought forth many favorable comments from the crew. It is recommended that this item be placed on the list of items available from the reefer during replenishment on the line.

A considerable number of requisitions have been returned to this ship marked "Cancelled-NIS" or "Cancelled-NC". This despite the fact that such requisitions were inscribed "If NIS or NC procure." ComServPac Instruction L220.2A states in part:

"5g. Ship’s Requisitions

(1) Ship’s requisitions will contain instructions regarding the action to be taken by the supply activity, if requisitioned items are not in stock, as follows:

(a) 'If NIS or NC, procure and ship' or

(b) 'If NIS or NC, cancel unless delivery can be accomplished prior to (date)."

The same instruction also reads:

"5f. Screening

(1) General

(a) Requests for material will be submitted to the activity indicated in enclosures (2), (3), and (4). The activity receiving such requisitions will issue the desired material if available, or, if not available, will:

1. Substitute, if appropriate, or

2. Obligate against stock due, or

3. Pass or forward to FRCO, or other appropriate activity, for action."

Despite these provisions, which require supplying activities either to obligate against stock due or pass for action NIS or NC requisitions, supplying activities continue to cancel them in disregard of these instructions. Such action not only delays ultimate receipt of the material by requiring vessels, but also makes for considerable unnecessary work, not only by the supplying vessel who must reorder, but also by the supplying vessel who must reprocess the reorder. The final result is often a re-repetition of this cycle. This undesirable situation is most commonly met in the case of priority "C" requisitions. The ultimate result is that as the need becomes more and more critical due to non-receipt of the material the priority must be raised to "A" or "B". This results in the use of emergency methods of supply and the use of premium transportation, and negates the foresightedness of the ordering activity which originally placed the priority "C" requisition in sufficient time to enable it to be filled by routine supply action and by routine non-premium transportation methods. The number of priority "A" and "B" requisitions could be materially
reduced if supplying activities would comply with the requirements of
Instruction 4220.2A partially quoted above.

I. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Religious Services

Twenty-two services were held each week during the operating period. Pro-
testant and Catholic services were held in the Wardroom while Jewish, Christian
Science, and Latter Day Saints' services were held in the library or the train-
ing room. Attendance at services continued to be excellent. Opportunity was
again given to contribute to an orphanage in Japan. A total of $727,70 was
donated.

2. Welfare and Recreation

Preparation of material for the cruise book was completed and forwarded to
the printing company in Tokyo. The work of printing and binding will be com-
pleted in December.

There was an enthusiastic response to an "Ugly Han Contest." Votes, at
5¢ each, are being sold to raise a fund to be given to a suitable charity upon
the return of the ship to the United States.

A request for 332 rest hotel reservations was made and 315 were obtained.
On a percentage basis, this is the largest number of reservations the ship has
received. As has been true during previous operating periods, movies and read-
ing were the main forms of recreation. The disc jockey program was increased
to four hours a day. The additional two hours consists of the playing of radio
program transcriptions. A weekly football contest in the ship's paper has
proven popular, averaging 150 entries each week.

II. Medical Department

1. Admissions to the Sick List during Operating Period

a. 228 patients admitted to the sick list.

b. Total of 382 sick days out of a possible 55,560 work days.

c. .006% of possible work days lost to sick days.

d. One pilot was admitted to the sick list.

Diagnosis: Fracture Compound, Comminuted, right Fibula, with artery and
nerve involvement. (3010) EK "C" SL "R"

e. There were 7 patients admitted to the sick list from other vessels with
a total loss of 42 sick days.

2. Treatments Accomplished Non-Admission

a. Medical 3585

b. Surgical 3

c. Veneral Disease Cases 61

3. Pilot and Crewman Status

a. Killed in Action

None

b. Missing in Action

None

c. Wounded in Action

One (1)
4. Accidents involving plane loss, injury or death
   (Please refer to Casualties Part V, paragraph 2)

5. Condition of the crew
   a. The general physical and mental condition of the ships company continues to be excellent. The accident rate for this action period has been much lower than for any previous operating period. The venereal disease rate has shown a decrease of 44.5% over the previous period.

F. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

1. General
   During this period the Dental Department carried on the normal work load plus the treatment of four emergency dental patients transferred from destroyer by highline. Treatment involved filling of 18 teeth, and the removal of three teeth. Among the patients was an Ensign of the Republic of Korea Navy.

G. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Operating
   a. With the advent of the one hour and fifteen minute flights, jet flak suppression launches must be very closely coordinated with the prop launches. The following table is a suggested guide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Miles to Target</th>
<th>Time for Props (3 miles per min.)</th>
<th>Time for Jets (6 miles per min.)</th>
<th>Between Last Prop &amp; Jet Launch Time Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 miles</td>
<td>33 min.</td>
<td>18 min.</td>
<td>15 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125 miles</td>
<td>40 min.</td>
<td>20 min.</td>
<td>20 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 miles</td>
<td>50 min.</td>
<td>25 min.</td>
<td>25 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175 miles</td>
<td>59 min.</td>
<td>29 min.</td>
<td>30 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. In the current operating period, the abuse of the emergency VHF channel (guard) has increased considerably. The emergency frequency should be left clear of all traffic other than bona fide emergencies. Aviators are not the only offenders. Both ship and shore stations have used the channel for various extraneous transmissions.

2. Ordnance
   a. Douglas Bomb Ejector

   From October 12th to the 31st, 6 bomb ejector foot assemblies R94-DG-4212337 and six piston assemblies R94-DG-4218338 were fired from Douglas Bomb Ejectors, due to the failure of the retaining keys R92-DG-22552531 and the clamp assembly R94-DG-4256913 to retain the bomb ejector foot when the bomb ejector cartridge Mark I Mod 2 was fired to release bombs over targets. While the losses of the assemblies have been covered in HUDDN's, their replacement remains a critical problem as parts for the Douglas Bomb Ejector are not stocked by the ship's Supply Department. A new bomb ejector must be requisitioned and the needed assemblies removed and installed in the ejector mounted in the aircraft as the ejector suffers little damage due to the loss of the foot and/or piston assemblies. To replace an entire ejector with a new one would require from three to four hours, depending on the difficulties encountered, compared to three or four minutes to install one of the missing assemblies. In view of the above it is recommended that spare foot, piston
key and clamp assemblies be made available and furnished to applicable Departments on a ratio of one of each of the assemblies per four Douglas Bomb Ejectors carried in stock.

b. Gun Barrels

Various attempts have been made to explain the sudden bursting of 20MM, and sometimes a .50 Cal. gun barrel during aerial firing runs. The most popular explanation offered is prolonged firing bursts. Recently a 20MM mounted on an AD aircraft shredded its barrel approximately a foot from the muzzle. At first it was assumed that the pilot had been firing prolonged bursts. However the pilot estimated that he had fired about thirty rounds when the accident occurred. Later a pilot of an F9F reported an explosion in the nose section of his aircraft. An inspection of the guns of his aircraft disclosed that a 20MM round was fired in one of the guns while the breech block was not entirely locked forward in the firing position. The resulting explosion caused the block to be blown to the rear and as the cartridge case was withdrawn from the supporting walls of the firing chamber it burst upward, rupturing and exploding the new cartridge held in the feed mechanism. When the barrel of the gun was examined the projectile of the first cartridge was found in the barrel 14 inches from the firing chamber where it had been forced by the gasses of the exploding cartridge case. Had the cartridge case of the first cartridge not exploded the cartridge in the feed mechanism, it is conceivable that it would have been fed into the chamber and fired with the next return of the breech block. It is believed that such an occurrence would cause the barrel to rupture at the position the first projectile occupied whether the second projectile was explosive, ball, incendiary, or armor piercing.

3. Ordnance Statistics

Of a total of 7,114 bombs expended during this period on the line (exclusive of incendiaries and napalm) the following expenditures are listed by month together with the malfunctions which occurred each month:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6,319</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catapult</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on board</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung bombs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Break-down is as follows:

1 occurred on a Aero 14A rack. Electrical lead to solenoid broken.
5 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 0 rack. All malfunctions electrical in nature.
1 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 0 rack with a 250 GP bomb when its sea brace loosened and allowed the bomb to rotate and bind the rack release mechanism.
1 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 1 bomb rack. The rack failed to release its 250 lb G.P. bomb due to a bound release solenoid. This rack was one of 60 Mark 55 Mod 1 racks issued to the USS DON HUMPHREY RICHARD just prior to leaving Yokosuka.

The low number of bomb rack malfunctions for the number of bombs carried is a tribute to the perseverance, initiative and hard work on the part of the Air Group ordnancemen who by constant and meticulous maintenance were able to eliminate any but the unusual malfunctions.

Of a total of 814 rockets expended during this period on the line, the following expenditures are listed by month, together with the malfunctions which occurred each month:
The following expenditures of 20mm and 50 caliber ammunition were made during this period on the line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duds</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigtails becoming unplugged</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken pigtails</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft circuit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All 50 caliber machine guns are equipped with stillite lined barrels. The performance of these barrels, under combat conditions, has been excellent.

4. Survival

a. There have been numerous complaints about the awkward fit of the parachute harness. For some pilots the sling is very tight, even with the straps let out all the way. It is recommended that an extra large harness be available in the combat area because of the extra personal survival gear worn. Many pilots have voiced a need for a back pad that rides low enough to give support to the small of the back. Something on the order of the old kidney shape pad would be ideal.

b. A recommendation has been submitted to the Bureau of Aeronautics that consideration be given to the design of winter flight clothing suitable for overland, cold weather survival. This clothing should be comfortable with or without the Mark III or Mark IV exposure suit (VA-75 ltr ser B76 dtd 27 October 1952).

c. There is an obvious need for additional pockets on flight gear, and it is recommended that a study be made of the subject. At the present time pockets of all shapes, sizes and material are sewn on the outside of the flight suit which are used for additional flares, blood chits, emergency survival items, sheath knives, etc. While answering the need for a place to stow these additional items, the big question in both the aviator's and the parachute rigger's minds is, "will the pockets stay on, and will the equipment stay in during an emergency parachute descent?"

If additional pockets are approved after study, it is further recommended that a ready made standard pocket about three sizes, of the same material as the flight suit, be made available through the supply system. Mass production methods of manufacture would be a saving in material and time.

In addition there is a need for a standard cartridge holder long enough to hold either twelve or eighteen rounds of ammunition. The holster has been issued for the Naval aviator for the .38 caliber pistol has been without a means of carrying extra ammunition. The holder could be of the type where loops are sewn directly on the leather, or the type where loops are sewn on a canvas holder that can be slipped onto the leather shoulder strap.

d. The Air Group has used an inventory sheet when checking the ALSK-1 because of the many items involved. Included on the sheet are extra items, carbine number, local identification number of kit, check date, and check date of radio. Thus if missing items are noted, the items can be ordered and when the items are received they can be placed in proper kits.

e. Rubber strips have been cemented on the inside of the ALSK lid to form a lip. This has been done on an experimental basis to keep the pilot chute and mainsail from being exposed to the elements, and to prevent a possible premature release.
f. To enable pilots to slip in and out of their anti-exposure suits, a few of our riggers have hit upon the idea of using old "avoset" bottles, cleaning them up and punching holes in the lid. The bottles are then filled with talc or seepstone.

g. It has been noted that Mark III Anti-Exposure suits by Willis and Geiger, Inc. have more circumference in the leg at the point of boot attachment than the suits made by International Latex Corporation. If this is not taken into account when first cementing on the boots, time will be lost due to having to put on additional coats of cement. This in no way makes the suit unusable but it does waste a lot of time.

h. It is recommended that the face curtain of the ejection seat be stocked aboard ship in limited quantities. The effect of the elements on fabrics is the basis for this recommendation.

i. After T.O., 105-52 was received by this Air Group a check was made on all parachutes using the Go-No-Go gauge. It was found that all parachutes met the required width. All parachutes had been packed using the old packing methods.

It is believed that the extra material spread on the outside of the Pack frame will result in nothing more than a weakened container. Regardless of the general shape of the seat type parachute container when leaving the loft, it will conform to the general configuration of the bucket seat after being put into use.

5. Electronic Countermeasures

The comments on electronic countermeasures for this period have been classified "SECRET" and are being distributed as a supplement to this report under separate cover, on a need to know basis.

PART VII

1. Summary of sorties 12 through 31 October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>PWF</th>
<th>FAL</th>
<th>PAUSN</th>
<th>ADF</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike/Recco</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo/Escort</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCK/PLR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>LRM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Sorties Scheduled 1462
Total Sorties flown 1438
Percent of Schedule Flown 98.33%
Total Hours 3,173.1
Days of Operation 15
Average Hours per day of Operation 211.5

2. Summary of sorties 2 and 4 November

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>PWF</th>
<th>FAL</th>
<th>PAUSN</th>
<th>ADF</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike/Recco</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo/escort</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED

18
### MISSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F8U</th>
<th>FLUSN</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>ADN</th>
<th>ADM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 85 37 7 13 7 190

Aborts 3 193

Total Sorties Scheduled 198
Total Sorties Flown 190
Percent Scheduled Sorties Flown 95.9%
Total Hours Flown 430.9
Days of Operation 2
Average Hours Per Day 215.5

Average Hours per pilot for entire tour including November flight time 31.6 Hours

### Flak Damage Analysis (12 October to 4 November)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F8U/F8U-5N</th>
<th>AD/AD-LNL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>556</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.36%</td>
<td>.82%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>.93%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.54%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>.54%</td>
<td>.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>.18%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.27%</td>
<td>.15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copy To:

CNO (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMM VAF (1) Advance
COM SAVNMTFLT (1) Advance
COMM VAF EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CTF 77 (1) Advance
CON AIRAC (5)
CON AIRALANADA (1)
CON AIRHAWAI (1)
CON AIRJAPAN (1)
NAV COLLEGE (1)
CON AIRDIV ONE (1)
CON AIRDIV THREE (1)
CON AIRDIV FIVE (1)
CON AIRDIV SIXTEEN (1)
CO, FAIRFAMAC (2)
CO, USS ANTLANT (CVA 36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CVA 21) (1)
CO, USS MISSIX (CVA 9) (1)
CO, USS KOSSAR (CVA 33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA 34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47) (1)
CO, USS FRICKSON (CVA 37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA 45) (1)
CO, USS HARRY S TRUMAN (CVE 116) (1)
CO, USS BAREKU (CVL 115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CUSTER (CVE 119) (1)
CO, USS RANDOVA (CVE 114) (1)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE 118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) (1)
CO, VF-73, NAS QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
CON AIRPLANT (1)
CON AIRGRIU TWO (1)
CON AIRGRIU F1W (1)
CON AIRGRIU ELEVEN (1)
CON AIRGRIU EIGHT (1)
CON AIRGRIU MAMOTH (1)
CON AIRGRIU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
CON AIRGRIU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
CON AIRGRIU SEVEN (25) (for Squadron and parent VC Units)
CON AIRGRIU (TU) ONE (1)
CON AIRQONSERT (1)
CON AIRPAC (1)
MLO JOG KOREA (1)

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force Seventy Seven
     (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
     (3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
     (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 8 November 1952 to 18 December 1952
      (Final Report)

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 of 1 Jul 1951
     (b) C-NCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A of 2 Jul 1952

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 8 November 1952 to 18 December 1952 is submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Upon arrival in Yokosuka at 06461 on 8 November 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD entered a period of upkeep, repair, rest and recreation.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 181222Z of November 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, Captain Paul W. WATSON, USN, Commanding, with CARDIV ONE Staff, and Carrier Air Group Seven embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area via Tsugaru Straits at 14491 on 21 November 1952.

In the vicinity of Tsugaru Straits, on 23 November 1952, the BON HOMME RICHARD participated in joint training exercises with the 39th Air Division Defense, U.S. Air Force. At 0915 on 24 November 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD joined Task Force Seventy Seven in area SUGAR. At 16201 on 24 November 1952, Rear Admiral W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE arrived on board. The Task Force was then commanded by COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. HICKY, USN, aboard the USS KEARSARGE (CVA33). In addition to the USS KEARSARGE, the Task Force was composed of the USS ESSEX (CVA9), the USS BON HOMME RICHARD and various heavy support and screening ships.

COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral W. D. JOHNSON, USN, assumed command of Task Force Seventy Seven at 17251, 25 November 1952, and shortly thereafter the USS KEARSARGE with COMCARDIV FIVE embarked departed the Force.
The USS Kearsarge rejoined the force and at 13201, on 18 December 1952 the command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN passed to COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. Hickely, USN, aboard the Kearsarge.

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT &amp; C.O.</th>
<th>ALLOW. &amp; OPERATIONAL A/C</th>
<th>PILOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE/ A/C</td>
<td>11/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCVG-7</td>
<td>CDR G.B. Brown</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>CDR J.S. Hill</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>LCDR J.W. Curtis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>CDR C.D. Forvielle Jr.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL-75</td>
<td>CDR H.K. Evans</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-4 Det</td>
<td>LCDR E.S. Ogle Cinc</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-12 Det 41</td>
<td>LCDR C.H. Blanchard Cinc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-33 Det 41</td>
<td>LCDR R. Hoffmeister Cinc</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61 Det Man</td>
<td>LT. B.R. Smith Cinc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 140056Z, December the U.S.S. Bom Poole Richard departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 13221, 18 December 1952 for Yokosuka, Japan via Van Diemen Straits to arrive 20 December 1952 for final preparation for the ship's return to the United States.
PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

11/8/52 – 11/21/52: The ship was moored to buoy 11, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan for four days, after which it moved to Piedmont Pier for a period of upkeep and repair. The F9F-2Ps of VC-61 Photo Unit NAV were off-loaded and were replaced by F9F-5Ps. VC-61 Photo Unit NAV operated from NAS Atsugi, accepting and field-qualifying in the new aircraft.

11/22/52: Enroute to the combat area. Anti-aircraft firing and general drills were held.

11/23/52: Enroute to combat area. In the vicinity of Misawa AFB near Tsugaru Straits, the BON HOMME RICHARD participated in joint training exercises with the 39th Air Division Defense of the U.S. Air Force, Japan Air Defense Force. In addition to flight operations, General Quarters drill and anti-aircraft tracking exercises were held. The following dispatches relative to the Misawa exercises were received:

From CG Japan Air Defense Force:

YOUR EXERCISE ON 23 NOV WITH NORTHERN AREA AIR DEFENSE WAS OUTSTANDING FOR THOUGHTFUL PLANNING AND PRECISE EXECUTION X SPIRIT OF COOPERATION THROUGHOUT WAS SPLENDID X WELL DONE X GENERAL SPIVEY SENDS

CG JAPAIR DEF FOR 240658Z NICE WORK X CTF 77 SENDS

I HAVE NOTED WITH PLEASURE CG JAPAIR DEF FOR 240658Z X THE OUTSTANDING EXECUTION OF THIS EXERCISE IS TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF PERFORMANCE BY THE BON HOMME RICHARD X COMCARDIV ONE SENDS

11/24/52: The ship joined Task Force 77 in area SUGAR at 09151. The Task Force replenished and no air operations were held. COMCARDIV ONE Rear Admiral W.D. Johnson arrived on board.

11/25/52: Bad weather hampered operations but in the afternoon jets were launched to hit targets in CHEROKEE Strip. Their results were assessed at 90 percent coverage and 75 percent effectiveness. At the same time, prop aircraft hit a troop training area near Wonsan, dropping nine out of ten bombs in the target area and starting two large fires. Smoke, dust, and shadows prevented further damage assessment. Night hecklers destroyed 14 trucks and damaged 12, destroyed or damaged 7 buildings and made several road and rail cuts. COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral W.D. Johnson assumed command of Task Force 77 at 17251.

11/26/52: In the morning Corsairs and Skyradlers hit troop and supply areas at Hambung. With the aid of excellent flak suppression from the jets, these aircraft started a total of 11 fires in the area, some of which were
still burning in the afternoon. An accurate estimate of destruction was impossible due to huge clouds of dust and smoke. One of the jet recco flights during the day jumped an enemy tank and destroyed it with bombs and rockets.

11/27/52: Flight operations were prevented by inclement weather. Steering casualty drills were held in the afternoon.

11/28/52: The Task Force replenished. No air operations were conducted.

11/29/52: Dawn hecklers led off the day's attacks by destroying 6 and damaging 13 or more trucks. Bad weather at both the primary target and the weather alternate forced one of the morning prop strike groups to attack targets of opportunity. The pilots destroyed one and damaged three factory buildings, made four bridge cuts and one rail cut, and damaged one boat. The other prop aircraft strike group attacked a supply and building area, blanketing it with bombs and starting three fires. A CAS flight received a score of 100 percent coverage from the controller and the afternoon prop strike hit troop targets in the CHEROKEE Strip, rating 80 percent coverage and 60 percent effectiveness.

11/30/52: Dawn hecklers operations were hampered by poor visibility and radar bombing runs on industrial areas were necessitated. Two search mission were flown for an Air Force C-47, missing since the previous night. Further flight operations were canceled due to weather.

12/1/52: Inclement weather prevented flight operations this date.

12/2/52: Replenishment scheduled for this day was canceled due to heavy weather.

12/3/52: The Task Force replenished. Special search missions were unsuccessful in their effort to find an Air Force C-47 which was missing since 29 November.

12/4/52: In the morning, prop aircraft were launched against rail targets near Songjin and a mining area near Hyesanjin. Extensive damage was inflicted on all targets. A jet recco jumped three tanks or self-propelled guns and succeeded in destroying or heavily damaging one. Later in the day, a major strike hit a strong point in CHEROKEE Strip, destroying 200 yards of trenches and several gun positions. In addition six bunkers were damaged.

12/5/52: Hecklers resumed operations early in the morning and attacked twenty-three trucks along the main supply routes. Of these, six were destroyed and eleven were damaged. Prop aircraft on the early strikes applied heavy pressure to the snow-hampered rail net by knocking out two rail bridges, ripping up 300 yards of track, and cutting rails in eight places. In the afternoon, a full-scale strike of Panthers, Sky raiders, and Corsairs hit troop targets in CHEROKEE Strip. Results were not assessed. On this attack, an AD-4, piloted by CDR H. K. Evans, Commanding Officer of VA-75, was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed behind friendly lines. The pilot was lost due to his apparent inability to bail out.
12/6/52: The main strike of the day, a coordinated effort of jets and props, hit a supply area in CHEROKEE Strip. Damage could not be assessed. Other strikes throughout the day continued the recent emphasis on rail targets. Two locomotives were badly battered, several bridges were knocked out, and rails were cut in fourteen places.

12/7/52: The Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery practice was held.

12/8/52: The two principle strikes of the day hit targets in CHEROKEE Strip. The morning strike started three fires and caused one secondary explosion in enemy positions across from the I U. S. Corps. Later in the day, prop and jet aircraft struck at troop targets in front of the II ROK Corps, destroying at least five buildings and causing one fire and one secondary explosion. Jet reccos attacked a large concentration of boats in the Wonson area and destroyed a total of fifty. The night hecklers found the highways crowded with Communist trucks, and before their bombs and ammunition ran out they set a record for the cruise. At least 46 trucks were destroyed and 19 damaged.

12/9/52: In an effort to smash railroad repair facilities which the enemy had developed in border areas hitherto protected by attack restrictions the Task Force unleashed maximum effort air assaults against selected targets in Northeast Korea. The 6B HOME RICHARD was assigned a large and active railroad center near Yusan, and two full-scale coordinated attacks inflicted the following destruction: a roundhouse with a capacity of twenty locomotives was ninety percent demolished, three important repair shops were obliterated, a powerhouse was badly damaged, seven to fourteen locomotives were destroyed or damaged, several smaller shops, barracks, and miscellaneous buildings were smashed, and extensive stretches of track were ripped up. This was one of the most effective and important missions of the entire cruise. At the end of the day's operations the following dispatches were received:

From: CGN7THFLEET
CONGRATULATIONS FOR DELIVERING MANY DAMAGING BLOWS TO THE ENEMY ON DEC 9TH X WELL DONE X VADM CLARK SLANDS

From: CTF 77
A HEAVY SUSTAINED SCHEDULE WAS GIVEN YOU TODAY AND YOUR RESPONSE WAS MAGNIFICENT X THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED HEAVY DAMAGE X WELL DONE X RADM JOHNSON SLANDS

12/10/52: Another important and appealing target in Northeast Korea was hit by 6B HOME RICHARD aircraft. A maximum effort attack struck a large munitions factory near Rashin. At least twelve buildings were destroyed and an additional five heavily damaged. During the time of the attack, a TACAP patrolling just south of the Soviet border squared off against several MiG's on patrol just north of the border. The MiG's made threatening maneuvers in an apparent but unsuccessful effort to draw the TACAP across the border. Neither side violated the frontier, however.
12/11/52: The Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted.

12/12/52: The morning hecklers found the highways crowded with trucks and their attacks accounted for more than forty damaged or destroyed. The principle strike efforts of the day were directed against tactical targets near the western end of the battlefront. Both close air support and CHEROKEE strikes were flown. Among the assessed results were 75 yards of trenches destroyed, several caves and bunkers destroyed and two secondary explosions set of. One of the latter was the largest and most violent yet seen by Air Group SEVEN pilots.

12/13/52: After many weeks of recuperating from the effects of last summer's heavy attacks, some of the hydro-electric plants were showing signs of partial recovery. To keep pressure on the enemy's electric supply, Corsairs and Skyraiders of the BON HOMME RICHARD smashed at Kyosen, one of the plants whose reconstruction was most advanced. When the attack was over, internal explosions had bulged the walls and knocked out large sections, all penstocks were cut, the transformer yard was heavily damaged, and the plant was in worse shape than ever. A morning CAS strike hitting enemy front line positions on Big and Little Nory achieved an assessment of 95 percent coverage and 95 percent effectiveness in one area and 100 percent coverage and effectiveness in the other. After the attacks, the controller made a low pass over the target and announced dramatically, "There is the smell of death down there."

12/14/52: Once again hecklers found good hunting on the East Coast highways. In attacks from the bombline to the Hambung area, they destroyed or damaged forty-five trucks. Later in the day, propeller aircraft and jets teamed up to hit supply and billeting areas at Chunonjang, near Chongjin. Accurate bombing destroyed or damaged a total of fifty-eight buildings.

12/15/52: The Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted.

12/16/52: In a day cut short by bad weather over most parts of Korea, the BHR sent prop and jet aircraft to the vicinity of the Manchurian border to hit a large and busy factory engaged in the manufacture of construction materials. The main buildings of the plant were heavily damaged and several fires and secondary explosions were observed in neighboring target areas. A full assessment of damage was impossible due to heavy smoke.

12/17/52: Commencing the final day of operations, hecklers sighted and fired upon an enemy light plane near Wonsan. Visible only by the glow of its exhaust, the bandit flew at an extremely low altitude in an area of rough terrain, making attack difficult and hazardous. Nevertheless, one night Corsair pressed home a firing run before losing contact. The result was impossible to assess. Later in the day, a coordinated strike of jets and props hit the large munitions plant at Taeyu-dong. Heavily damaged in a previous BHR attack, the factory was virtually wiped out as the pilots blasted nearly all of the remaining buildings and set off at least four violent secondary explosions.
12/18/52: Vice Admiral J. J. CLARK, Commander, SEVENTH Fleet, presented decorations and awards in special ceremonies on the hangar deck. COMCARDIV FIVE relieved COMCARDIV ONE of command of the Task Force. The BHR was relieved and departed the force at 1320 enroute for Yokosuka.
PART III
ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Material

The only ship ordnance material failure occurring was the firing motor field winding burned out in the 40MM Mount No. 13. This unit was rewound and reinstalled by ship's force.

2. Aviation Ordnance Material

See Air Group comments in Part VI
PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Damage to Ship

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

A total of 5 aircraft were damaged by flak during this period. Ten planes received minor damage from bomb blast and falling debris. Three planes were damaged in operational accidents.

3. Loss of Aircraft

On 5 December, one A-4, Bureau Number 128965, was hit by automatic weapons fire and crashed, killing the pilot and destroying the plane. This was the only aircraft lost and fatality that occurred during this reporting period.

4. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>309</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerhouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (Highway)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridges (Railroad)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ox-carts</td>
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<td>Transformer Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roundhouse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turntable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar and/or Radio Stations</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Towers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangar</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Repair Building</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Lighthouses</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Damage inflicted on the Enemy (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Storage</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Trap</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,200 yards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trench Destroyed</td>
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<td>425 yards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops Killed</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, smoke, flak or time prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Damage inflicted by Close Air Support missions could rarely be assessed, and results can only be reported in terms of coverage and effectiveness. The specific effects of these CAS missions may never be known.
PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

In spite of the relatively low number of combat experienced personnel in both the Air Group and the ship's company at the beginning of the cruise and the necessity for replacement of many trained persons during the cruise, the overall personnel performance of the ship and Air Group began on a high level, continuously improved throughout the tour, and ended in an extremely high state of efficiency. The extent of damages inflicted upon the enemy, the low number of battle casualties, the almost total absence of serious operational accidents, and the degree of efficiency with which flight operations were conducted combine to form a record that should compare favorably with the best in the Navy.

2. Casualties (Enemy Inflicted)

COMMANDER HILFORD K. EVANS, O86236/1310

On 5 December 1952, while Commander Evans was leading his squadron, VA-75, in an attack against troop targets in CHUNGWON Strip, his aircraft was struck by automatic weapons fire and heavily damaged. Commander Evans attempted to fly the plane to a nearby friendly field, but shortly after reaching friendly lines the plane burst into flames. He announced to his wingman that he was going to bail out but for some unaccountable reason was unable to do so and crashed with his plane.

3. Casualties (Operational)

KENNETH A. BEANE, 102, 807 07 42

On 23 November 1952, a jet blast caused a starting jeep to skid, pinning Beane against the outboard railing of No. 2 elevator. An emergency operation for multiple fracture of the pelvis and a ruptured bladder was immediately performed. He was later transferred to, USNH, Yokosuka, Japan. The last report received by the ship indicated Beane's chances of recovery were good.

THOMAS NICKENS, A54, 297 41 78

On 8 December 1952, a loose tow bar, which had been whirled from the control of the handler, hit and fractured Nickens' leg. The man was treated by the ship's medical department.
PART VI

DECLASSIFIED

GENERAL COMMENTS

At OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1: Intelligence

a. Flak and Target Intelligence

The final period of operations continued the development and refinement of flak and target intelligence techniques. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the methods initiated during the last phase of the cruise was the frequent use of stereo mosaics in familiarizing pilots with flak defenses and target details. Stereo pairs had been used intermittently since the beginning of the cruise, but at the last, efforts were being made to establish their use as a regular procedure in briefing important missions. Since the duration of the program was too short to give any clear-cut indication of results, no recommendations can be made, but it is suggested that the method be given a further trial aboard other aircraft carriers in the Korean area.

During the past six months of combat operations, the scope and effectiveness of flak intelligence increased remarkably. Photo interpretation reports and pilot reports were at first often not distinguished from one another in the plotting of flak; revisions of flak summaries were neither frequent nor comprehensive; an excessive degree of emphasis was placed upon machine guns; the expensive and time consuming touraid program encumbered the whole system. Changes in the pattern of the war afforded opportunities to discard outworn methods, and improvements were seen to follow. Flak summaries followed one another at frequent intervals and revisions were made daily. The touraid program was discontinued. More rational methods of plotting were adopted. In the latter part of the cruise, it was unusual for BVR aircraft to receive anti-aircraft fire from unplotted positions. The effectiveness of the flak intelligence program of this ship is reflected directly in the low number of casualties and aircraft losses suffered by Air Group Seven.

b. Personnel

At the commencement of the cruise, every officer and most of the rated men assigned to the Air Intelligence Office was experienced combat phases of Air Intelligence. The office was thereby enabled to rise quickly to a high level of operating efficiency. As the cruise progressed, each of the original officers and all except one of the veteran enlisted men were replaced. A continuing process of training and frequent changes of individual duties and responsibilities were necessitated. Contrary to expectations the quality of performance did not decline, but instead rose as a result of a constant infusion of new ideas and personalities. There was never any tendency for the rigor mortis of fixed routine to set in.

Early in the cruise, the Air Group AIO was assigned to the Ship's Intelligence Office as Senior Assistant Air Intelligence Officer.
In addition to augmenting the complement of the Office, he was able to gain valuable experience for higher intelligence duties. At the beginning of the final tour on the line he was able to take over the billet of Ship's Air Intelligence Officer with no impairment in the performance of the Intelligence organization. The arrangement has been completely satisfactory, and had it not been made, his replacement of the former Ship's AIO at a crucial time might have caused serious consequences. This integration of Group AIO into the Ship's Organization is highly recommended for carriers deploying to WESPAC.

It is recommended that whenever possible every Air Intelligence Officer, regardless of rank, begin his Intelligence career in a squadron billet. Since the squadron is the spearhead of air operation, it is essential that every officer in Air Intelligence have a thorough knowledge of the scope, nature, techniques, and requirements of both Intelligence and combat operations at that level. The only good opportunity to gain that knowledge is afforded by service in the billet itself. Past experience as a combat aviator is not a complete substitute.

The need for the creation of an Intelligence Specialist or Intelligence Yeoman rate, often recommended in the past by persons familiar with the problem was apparent aboard this ship during the cruise. Yeomen assigned to Air Intelligence found little opportunity to develop proficiency in rate.

c. Facilities and Equipment

In order to satisfy security requirements, Intelligence offices should be equipped with heavy gage steel doors with strong locks, preferably of the three tumbler combination type. The doors of the Intelligence Office of this ship could have been opened with a crow bar in less than thirty seconds. In port the ship often swarms with civilian laborers who not only have the tools and the time, but also repeated opportunities and possibly the desire to break into the office. To insure that security was preserved while at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, it was necessary at all times to have a watch in the office, a situation which has sometimes caused considerable inconvenience. A further improvement in security could be brought about by equipping Intelligence offices with large file safes and other lockable storage facilities.

2. Photo Interpretation

a. General

Photo missions have consisted of railroad reconnaissance, target search, damage assessment, airfield surveillance, coastal search, and mapping for surface bombardment forces.

Almost all camouflage observed in North Korea has been directed towards deceiving pilots, not photo interpreters. Storage and barracks buildings
are placed so that they blend into the surrounding terrain and are not seen by aviators. Pill boxes, ammo storage dumps, gun emplacements are cleverly planted with bushes and grass. Shelters are built over machinery within gutted factory buildings. Of course, this is to delude the pilots into believing that the building has been demolished and is not worth attacking. Much activity was noted around buildings of this kind. It is suggested that in the future, sample stereo pairs of camouflaged targets be made up for distribution to the air group by the photo interpreters prior to departure from CONUS to WESPAC. Not only will pilots derive a better conception of the terrain, but they will be able to actually see a camouflaged target. Such instruction would also show the aviators how much can actually be seen in photographs, thereby increasing their confidence in photo interpretation.

Because of the recent build-up in flak around many target areas, complete flak studies are being made, not only of each target area but also of its environs, so that a comprehensive flak picture may be obtained for briefing and flak suppression.

Several photo searches have been made for radar positions. Two positions previously located by BSH were verified in this manner. However, lack of greater success is attributed to the fact that these positions are easy to conceal and are very difficult to see. A scale of 1:2500 should be employed for this purpose.

The use of wing-mounted camera strike photography as a source of intelligence material has almost been abandoned. Smoke and dust from bomb explosions generally prevent accurate assessment of damage and frequently give false impressions leading to erroneous reports. Only occasionally can good photographs, useful to Intelligence, be obtained by this manner. Normally it is considered good for combat recording only.

COMAIRFIC letter serial 10/02314 of 29 October 1952 stated that the Photo Interpretation Unit, Atsugi, Japan, is expected to be of "great benefit to carrier Photo Interpreters and will increase the capacity of the operating forces to produce photographic intelligence." To date however, the Atsugi Interpretation Unit has been of little benefit to the photo interpreters of this ship. Although nothing has been requested, officially, from Atsugi, no material has been received from there. Since carrier photo interpreters are occupied solely with producing P.I. Flash reports and since the distance separating the Unit from the operating forces is so great, this Unit is not considered, at present, at least, to be of any real benefit to carrier photo interpreters in the operating area.

Early in December, for the first time during this cruise in the Far East, the photo interpreters had an opportunity to study photographs of snow covered terrain. Trackage in the snow disclosed numerous activities
around buildings, caves, truck parking buildings, and other objects which, heretofore, had not been considered to be, militarily, very active. It is recommended that the Interim Photo Interpretation Unit, Atsugi, Japan make an extensive study of such photography and furnish fleet photo interpreters with stereo pairs of the more unusual types of facilities being utilized by enemy forces.

On 9 and 10 December aerial photographic operations almost reached the ultimate which could be desired during any carrier strike. On the two occasions, a strike on the Musan railroad facilities and on the ammunition plant located on the northeast border of Korea, complete photographic coverage was obtained which provided sufficient combat records (except motion pictures) and intelligence photographs for press releases and detailed damage assessment. Large scale oblique and vertical 9 x 18 inch photographs as well as K-25 pictures of excellent quality were taken of both installations. The 9 x 18 inch photographs were taken prior to, during, and after the strike. This provided the photo interpreters with adequate material to produce an excellent post-strike analysis and post-strike damage assessment. One of the most interesting features of the damage assessment photographs taken by the K-25 camera (carried on the wing of the attacking aircraft) was that buildings were shown receiving extensive machine gun hits. Vertical photographs did not show any. The buildings receiving the machine gun hits would not have been assessed as damaged without strike photographs.

During seventy photographic operating days, 30,759 photographs (20,248 9 x 9 inch and 10,511 9 x 18 inch) were interpreted. An average of 439 photographs were interpreted per day, with the maximum for any one day being 900. On forty-six of these operating days two photo interpretation officers were used for this work. It is considered highly desirable that either two photo interpretation officers and two photo readers or one officer and three photo readers be allowed for each CVA in WESPAC.

3. Communications

a. General

(1) Radio communications continued to be satisfactory for the current operating period. No new problems were encountered. An effective preventative maintenance program is the answer to communications equipment operating problems.

(2) Training - The results of the vigorous training program, both formal and on the job, were encouraging. Over the entire operating period the following were accomplished:

14 Men were qualified as Fox operators
16 Men were qualified as CW circuit operators
7 Men were qualified as Classified write-up men
2 Telemen were qualified as Navy Mail Clerks
21 Men were advanced in rating
(3) Visual Communications - Visual methods were used extensively for administrative traffic. Good liaison between Main Communications and the Signal Bridge proved effective in utilizing visual communications to a great extent without exceeding the limitations of equipment and personnel.

4. Photography

a. General

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3150.6 requires the use of geographical coordinates in the titling of all aerial film. It has been common practice for activities in the Far East area to use the UTM grid system which is considered to be superior to the geographical system. It is therefore recommended that the instructions be revised to permit use of the UTM grid system in titling aerial film.

Considerable difficulty has been experienced by this Command in obtaining either camera repair services or replacement cameras for those in need of repair. Previously it was possible to turn aerial cameras in to an Air Force repair facility in Tokyo via NSD, Yokosuka, for repair. However, during the period of 8 to 20 November 1952 attempts were made to follow this system and, also, to turn them in to the Navy Supply Depot, Yokosuka, in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3150.6, and draw replacements. Both attempts were fruitless due to current negotiations for a new contract by the Air Force; and NSD, Yokosuka, advised that that activity had no authority for issuing replacement cameras for those turned in for repair as required by OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3150.6. It is understood that a Navy camera repair facility is being established at Atsugi, Japan. It is strongly recommended that NAS, Atsugi, be furnished sufficient cameras to permit the immediate issue of replacement cameras to the fleet via COD when necessary.

Throughout the cruise in the Far East this ship has experienced a considerable number of camera failures which required immediate camera repair in order to meet operational requirements. It is strongly recommended that all CVAs departing for the Far East have on board a well-trained camera repairman with tools and adequate space for repairing large aerial cameras.

One print each of all aerial photography has been furnished to each carrier operating under CTF 77, in addition to prints supplied to other activities. Such photography received from other carriers by this ship has only been useful for the preparation of strike target photos. Recently Commander Carrier Division ONE has been furnishing carriers with all target photos. If this procedure is adopted as standard practice by CTF 77, it is recommended that the furnishing of aerial photographic prints to all carriers be discontinued, thereby conserving considerable photographic material and reducing the work load of the carrier photographic laboratories.
Photographic Planes.

It is recommended that the F9F-5P photo plane be modified to facilitate rotation of the forward camera in a similar manner to the after camera. This would provide a much more versatile aircraft, permitting oblique photography after all film in the after camera has been expended. The K-17, 12 inch, rotating camera in the middle bay of the F2H-2P aircraft was used on numerous occasions for oblique photography.

A MOD has been submitted on the plastic meter roller drive gear and the metering roller gear contained in the two new A8 Baker magazines received from ComFairJap on 17 November 1952. On the first flight which an A8B magazine was used, both plastic gears broke. It is not considered that these gears are strong enough for the magazines, particularly when 390 foot rolls of film are used.

Since 2 September 1952, a period of three and a half months including three tours on the line, Unit NAM of VC-61 has been required to operate with different aircraft each tour (F2H-2P, F9F-2P and F9F-5P). Of the three types of aircraft, the F2H-2P is considered to be, photographically, highly superior for the following reasons:

1. An additional camera (K-17, 6 inch) can be carried for use in obtaining small scale verticals thereby facilitating the laying of small scale mosaics.

2. Both the 12 inch and the 36 inch cameras rotate permitting obliques from either camera.

3. Cameras and magazines can be removed and replaced in the F2H-2P with much greater ease because of the side openings, rather than the top opening which necessitates a ladder on the F9F-5P. Two men have been required to load and unload cameras in the F9F-5P whereas only one is required on the F2H-2P.

On several occasions during December ice formed on K-25 camera capsule lens windows while in flight, thereby obscuring the photographic subjects. It is recommended that a heating element be installed in all camera capsules.

During the final period mid-flight malfunctions occurred in the A8B magazines. The difficulty was traced to the use of slightly bent flanges on the 400 foot film spools which was preventing the take-up spool from functioning properly, allowing the film to pile up on the take-up side of the magazine. It is recommended that all activities be cautioned to check for bent 400 foot film spools prior to their use and that action be taken to provide future 400 foot spools with stronger flanges.

On numerous occasions between 25 November and 17 December, film from the A8B magazines was exposed to light. Light leaks were traced to the areas around the locking bolt and where the magazine connects with the K-38 camera. The light leaks were intermittent and usually occurred when the camera was in an oblique position. In the F9F-5P aircraft this would be the position where the sun would strike directly on the magazine.
Unavailability of the following items were considered to be major deficiencies in photographic operations during the period of this cruise in the Far East.

(1) 24 and 36 inch 9 x 18 inch cameras, or their equivalents with image motion compensation. The current jet photo planes are too fast for the presently available K-17 and K-38 cameras.

(2) A small (4 x 5 inch or 7 x 7 inch) camera with a long focal length for bomb rack mounting on the wings of attack type aircraft.

(3) A small compact 35mm motion picture camera with a long focal length for bomb rack mounting on the wings of attack type aircraft for combat recording. This camera should be compact enough for mounting on outboard bomb racks of this type aircraft. The X-C4A2 motion picture camera capsule is too large and requires the use of center station bomb racks.

(4) Equipment suitable for more rapid processing of aerial film and Sonne paper. This equipment should be of the continuous strip type and suitable for use with rapid developers such as Navy Rapid Developer No. 7.

(5) A more effective camera repair system. This to include a well-trained aerial camera repairman on board each CVA, and adequate supply of spare parts, and replacement cameras readily available to forces afloat.

5. Combat Information Center

a. Radar Performance

CIC was plagued with more failures and breakdowns of radar equipment during the last period on the line than it had experienced during the entire preceding five months. In all instances, the cause was attributed directly to the failure of various component parts. The power transformer of the automatic frequency control unit of the AI/SPS-6B radar failed and a thorough search of the Yokosuka area revealed that no such replacement part was available locally. On 18 November, a dispatch requisition was sent to NSC, Oakland, California, requesting the vital part. Two days later it was air mailed from the States and was received aboard via COD aircraft on 3 December. After installation the radar was back in full operation the following day. The AI/SPS-6B was out of commission in the operating area for eleven days of the operating period due to unavailability of a power transformer in the forward area.
b. Air Intercepts

Unidentified swept-wing jets and "contrails" were sighted over North Korea by our aircraft on at least four occasions. These were later evaluated as enemy MIG's but were never within range to vector CAP to effect an air intercept. The nearest reported "bandits" were over Wonsan, at the time 75 miles from Task Force 77, but were never held by our radar. Practice intercepts were constantly run using CAP to intercept returning strike and photo flights but there was frequently a lack of accurate altitude information which is a prerequisite for running any sort of successful intercept. The SK radar used by this ship has an error of about 1,000 feet on air targets from 5,000 to 20,000 feet altitude and its maximum detection range is 30 miles on a section of jets. Altitude radar guard has usually been assigned to another carrier in the force having an SX height finder but even with this more advanced radar the altitude information is frequently erroneous and usually not obtainable on targets beyond 35 miles from the force. There is a definite need for some radar equipment capable of producing rapid and accurate altitude on air contacts at a greater range than is presently possible if the Combat Air Patrol is to be utilized to its maximum degree of effectiveness as a defensive weapon.

c. Inter-Ship CIC Officer Training

A total of seven junior officers from other ships in Task Force 77 have been assigned temporary duty under instruction in CIC duties and in control of aircraft during the entire period in the operating area.

6. Aerology

a. Facsimile Reception

Facsimile reception ranged from poor to good, good being the exception. Observation shows that reception is poor when the ship is in a storm area and when there is a front between the operating area and Tokyo. About seventy percent of the facsimile maps received were unreadable and very little advantage could be taken of the information transmitted.

b. Weather

On 2 December this ship encountered the so-called snow line for the first time.

During the morning, the following conditions were noted: Overcast skies with a 1500 to 2000 foot ceiling, visibility two to five miles in light snow showers, winds northeast 20 to 25 knots. Radar and ASP reports showed the line to be oriented north-northwest and south-southeast over the Task Force and extending inland over Korea at Songjin.

While steaming in a southerly direction, the force slowly passed under the line in an east-west direction, about 1300. During passage, a light
snowfall and a brief but intense hail storm was experienced. Sea smoke prevailed during the passage and persisted for a period of about twenty-four hours. Very soon after passage, sky conditions became scattered to clear with unlimited visibility. The wind backed to the northwest and increased to thirty knots, remaining so for two hours.

B. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Catapults

a. With two jet squadrons embarked during this six months operating period in Korean waters, catapult operations have been extensive. Until September when the new forged-eye pendants were received, launching pressures could not exceed 3500 psi due to limitation of the old type pendants. This often forced the removal of some external ordnance from jet aircraft during days of low wind conditions. However, since September, launching pressures up to 4000 psi have been utilized and removal of external ordnance has been held to a minimum. Only when 30 knots of relative wind could not be maintained, were external ordnance loads reduced. The minimum wind over the deck required to catapult an F9F-2 with 1100 lbs of external ordnance at 4000 psi pressure at 60° F has been determined to be 30 knots.

b. The bungee arrester for the forged-eye pendant, manufactured locally in accordance with Catapult Bulletin #93, did not prove satisfactory. Four pendants were lost overboard due to parting of the seizing wire and bungee. After some experimentation it was found that bungee strands seized individually provided a more secure and dependable arrester. This method has been employed ever since. Over 100 shots were fired using one arrester constructed in this manner and none has been lost over the side. However, out of a total of over 600 catapult launchings, 18 forged-eye pendants were deformed (developed permanent kinks) which prevented further use. The track cover plates at the forward end of the catapult and the shuttle hook have been struck and dented to some extent by the pendant as it rebounds after the shot. It is evident the forged-eye is causing this damage. Use of the forged-eye pendants along with Catapult Change Number 36 should greatly increase the war making potential of carriers having H4B catapults by permitting the catapulting of heavier jet aircraft.

c. With the utilization of higher launching pressures, failure of the aluminum liners in the towing and retrieving fairlead sheaves has been more frequent. Eight 38" P.D. towing sheaves and four 48" P.D. retrieving sheaves were replaced because of broken liners or loosened rivets during the first five months of the tour. During the last in-port period the new cast aluminum sheaves were received and installed throughout the fairlead system. This has been a most welcome change as delay in operations due to sheave liner failures can now be forgotten. More man hours were expended in replacing damaged sheaves than in performing any other catapult maintenance. These higher launching pressures create greater vibration of the catapult machinery, which tends to cause some leakage in various pipe fittings and failure of oil line brackets.
d. Shuttles were removed during in-port periods and inspected. Replacement of the Phenolic shuttle slippers was required periodically.

e. Two oil gear hydraulic pumps were replaced because of internal failure and one pump was replaced for not meeting the minimum volume requirement. The new pumps were installed by SRF, Yokosuka, in August and have required no maintenance since installation. The hot temperatures experienced during the warmer months and the light viscosity of the hydraulic oil are believed contributing factors to pump failures.

2. Aircraft Handling

a. Flight Deck

(1) During the last Navy Yard availability in CONUS, the majority of the Douglas fir planking in the landing area was replaced with teak, while three sections on the port side by number 2 cross-deck pendant had Enrup installed for evaluation. The Enrup has held up exceptionally well, much better than either the fir or teak. Tail hooks have no effect on the Enrup, whereas they dig into the fir and teak.

(2) The standard flight deck spot used for launching was AD's, four to a row, across the deck aft with the F4U's, five to a row, forward of the AD's. In order to expedite the jet spotting for launch, aluminum plates were secured to the flight deck for positioning the right and nose wheels of each jet which permitted proper clearance for the jet blast and possible wing unfolding when the jury struts were removed. On recoveries the jets and/or F4U's were spotted forward to starboard of the center line and the AD's forward to port.

b. Hangar Deck

(1) Previously, it was the opinion that No. 1 elevator was of little or no use during flight operations; hence, it was secured to enable the spotting of sixteen F9F aircraft in Bay one (frame 40-79). With the advent of flak suppression jet launches, following immediately after the piston strikes, this elevator was required to expedite the movement of jets to the flight deck. This reduced the number of jets that could be parked in Bay one to fourteen, but permitted a much faster respot to be made by using the Deck Edge and No. 1 elevators.

3. Arresting Gear

a. During this combat tour, operation and maintenance of the arresting gear has been normal. Four double pendant engagements by F9F aircraft resulted in hook failures with attendant barrier engagements. The Davis barriers have worked well in stopping these aircraft, and only on two occasions was the barricade partly engaged. In every case the Davis barriers arrested the aircraft. Only one full barricade engagement has been experienced since installed. This occurred when the fuel control unit of an F9F-5P stuck and restricted the deceleration of the power to 70% at the "cut". The aircraft bounced over the first Davis barrier, nosed under the second and was fully engaged by the barricade.
b. During the training period in the Hawaiian area, F9F tail hooks on numerous occasions dropped to the deck from the stinger position and tore up the Davis barrier and barricade webbing as the planes taxied forward out of the gear. This was corrected by housing the hooks while in the gear. Although a few additional seconds were required for this operation, the time saved in not having to replace barrier webbing assemblies and barricade shear pins more than made up for the time required to house the hooks.

4. Aircraft Maintenance (Ship's)

a. General

(1) The overall aircraft maintenance during this combat tour has been highly satisfactory. The cooperation between the ship and Air Group VII maintenance personnel was outstanding. The V-4 division was handicapped initially, due to the lack of experienced engine build-up personnel, but the cooperation of the Air Group maintenance personnel soon overcame this deficiency.

(2) The shortage of critical spares in Aviation Ready Issue resulted in numerous AOG's during the first period on the line. This was overcome by closer adherence to the allowance lists and follow-ups on requisitions by the Supply Department.

b. All jet engines were changed with the crane attachment for Clark Utility Lift (BuShips stock No. S-69-T-9500-10 Model No. 609040). This attachment has proved invaluable because of its maneuverability, and the platform makes it usable for any work that has to be accomplished in the overhead of the hangar deck, e.g. painting, replacing light bulbs, and the stowage of gear.

c. The crane attachment on the Clark Lift was utilized to change propellers, thereby completely eliminating the need of chain hoists for this work.

d. A total of 5472 RB-19-R2 (1054 overhauled and 4018 new) spark plugs were issued. For a period of about six weeks from early September to the middle of October, a high usage of RB-19-R2 spark plugs occurred. During this 6 week period, the average life of plugs in the AD type aircraft was approximately 50 hours for new plugs and 40 hours for overhauled plugs. In the F4U type aircraft, only new plugs were used and the average life was 66 hours. Inspection of the used plugs revealed heavy deposits of carbon and lead on the electrodes. It is believed that the aviation gasoline in use had an exceptionally high lead content. However, to insure the maximum life possible, all pilots reviewed the proper engine idling techniques and COM-AIRPAC GEB #13. Since this one period of high usage, the average life of new spark plugs has returned to approximately 80 hours in the AD and 120 hours in the F4U aircraft.
e. Aviation Electronics

(1) Throughout this period the ship's aviation electronics personnel generally maintained test equipment, shop arrangements, and handled supplies while the Air Group personnel performed maintenance and repair work on all aircraft electronic equipment. This arrangement worked very well and few difficulties were encountered.

(2) Test equipment was adequate with the exception of two items.

(a) The UPM-8 portable IFF MK-X test equipment had very little operational use, primarily because of a short in one of the windings of the pulse transformer, T-102. The pulse transformer T-102 could not be replaced since there was no QR allowance for such a replacement part. An additional UPM-8 was obtained in Yokosuka. Shortly after this UPM-8 was delivered on board the same malfunction of the pulse transformer T-102 occurred. Consequently, the second UPM-8 was off-loaded in Japan. Neither UPM-8 test equipment has been replaced since.

(b) It is recommended that the Hickock Model 540 tube tester be replaced with the Hickock Model 547A tube tester. The model 547A checks a greater variety of tubes currently supporting electronics equipment for carrier aircraft. The model 547A design is also favored because of the speed and ease of checking tubes.

5. Aircraft Service

a. Aviation Ordnance

(1) Munitions assembly and Delivery

The upper stage bomb elevators B1B, B2B, and B3B on this vessel are of limited size and capacity. Dimensions are 8 x 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) ft., and the load limit is 2500 pounds. A typical strike of 24 piston and 12 jet aircraft requires 278 bombs of various sizes and 42 5\(\frac{1}{2}\)" ATAR's. Careful planning and maximum utilization of all three upper stage bomb elevators is required to get these bombs and rockets from the 3rd deck to the flight deck so that all the squadron ordnance loading crews are furnished bombs as rapidly as they can load aircraft. Briefly the following procedure was used: An ammunition breakout list is made up from the daily air plan, and the petty officer in charge of the 3rd deck bomb supply follows this list in assembling bombs, rockets and fuzes for the day's operations. Fuzes are assembled by types and delays, as required, and sent to the flight deck in a MK-5 adaptor mounted on a MK-1 bomb skid, one to each squadron. This system has the advantage of having each squadron's fuzes available to be moved to any part of the flight deck where fuzing operations are being conducted.

b. Aviation Gasoline and Lube Oil

(1) The ship's lube oil pumps were unable to supply oil to the flight deck at a pressure sufficient to insure maximum output from the gasoline/oil proportioners. This difficulty was completely overcome by installing a
standard Navy de-fueling pump at the ship's oil outlet ahead of the proportioner thereby boosting the oil pressure to that desired for optimum operation of proportioners.

(2) When a static bond inspection (Reference NavShips 250-332) was conducted, a number of hoses failed to show a closed circuit from flange to flange. In the interest of conservation, this discrepancy was alleviated by inserting a copper wire through the faulty hoses and soldering it to the inside of the terminal fittings.

6. Safety

a. General

(1) During the entire cruise the safety record of the Air Department has remained excellent. Three accidents have occurred which resulted in serious injury to three personnel, but with no fatalities. One accident was the result of a hook failure on an F9F-2. The airplane crashed into the after part of the island at Repair 8. A 20mm cannon discharged one round into the island when the nose of the plane smashed into the bulkhead of Repair 8, and flying metal fragments struck the eye and forehead of the Air Group Flight Surgeon who had retreated into the compartment. As a result of this accident, further emphasis was placed on the evacuation of all possible personnel from danger areas during flight operations. Another accident occurred when an F9F-2, with its wings not fully spread, was taxied off the deck edge elevator during a jet launch. The combination of relative wind and tailpipe blast from a jet turning up on the port catapult rotated the plane in such a manner as to direct the tailpipe blast directly upon personnel and a starter jeep on the deck edge elevator. One man received internal injuries when the starter jeep pinned him against the guard rail due to the force of the blast. Lacking the protection of blast deflectors, this ship has found it necessary to observe special precautions in the movement of all aircraft during jet launching operations. This however was the only serious accident of this nature occurring during the entire cruise.

(2) A broken leg resulted from a tow bar accident. The tow bar had just been released from the tractor which was pulling an AD aft. Before the aircraft came to a complete stop, the port wheel struck a cross-deck pendant sheave housing which caused the plane to spin with the tow bar still attached to the tail wheel. As a result, the tow bar was wrenched out of the hands of a handler, swung, and struck a plane pusher across the legs. Tow bars have accounted for several other less serious injuries, most of them too feet and toes when the tow bars were inadvertently dropped.

(3) One minor accident occurred in which a "hook runner" was run down by a crossdeck pendant. This illustrates the hazards of an eager crew cutting corners to gain seconds. The man observed an F9F-2 land in position to catch an early wire. He started out on deck and discovered too late that the tail hook had slipped. He was run down by a later wire which the aircraft did catch. Luckily, he received only bruises and abrasions.
(4) Numerous ship and Air Department instructions have been promulgated in the interest of safety. Among the most important of these is a ship's instruction which sets forth procedures for abandoning the 02 level in the event of fire on the hangar deck. Another ship's instruction directs the abandoning of the 02 level aft whenever an aircraft with a hung bomb is to be landed aboard. An Air Department instruction sets forth detailed procedures regarding the unloading of guns of returned aircraft.

(5) The elevators continue to entice personnel to take unnecessary chances. Despite continuous and forceful condemnation of all known violators, personnel will try from time to time to make an elevator at the last possible moment. There have been no injuries resulting from this practice during the past six months, although there have been several close calls. All operators have been repeatedly cautioned to actuate the controls only upon proper signal and the directors have been most careful in controlling elevator movements.

(6) A common malpractice is the throwing of chocks at a wheel instead of shoving them into place properly. Rare instances of throws from six feet or more have been observed. Not only is this destructive to the chocks, but misses can do damage to hydraulic lines, wheel fairings, and, in extreme cases, to personnel if the chock bounces off the tire.

(7) Adrift safety wire, nuts, bolts, pins, rags, ammo links, fuze tags, and items of every description are a constant source of danger on the flight deck. The tendency to be neglectful of small articles about the deck produces a hazardous missile condition when aircraft are turned up. Repair 8 personnel have conducted inspections before each launch for loose gear. This inspection is most important after a rearming operation has been completed. The number of accidents thus prevented is inestimable, but the impressive weight of debris which have been collected and thrown over the side indicate the practicability of such a program.

(8) Oil on the flight deck, and particularly oil on the hangar deck, has caused falls. None have resulted in serious injury, but the conditions must be guarded against.

(9) It has been observed that the first few days of flight operations following a period of inactivity are the most dangerous. To re-emphasize safety precautions to all personnel in the Air Department, a memorandum to all division officers has been issued following each in-port period requiring them to review all pertinent safety precautions and procedures with their men, and to report completion prior to the first day of flight operations. The tenor of these memoranda is informal and includes a resume of the dangerous practices and accidents which occurred during the previous period of operations. They are aimed toward making each person safety-conscious and at motivating the individual to feel responsible not only for his own safety, but for the safety of others who may be imperiled by his negligence.

(10) To combat safety violations, a strict policy of refusing to neglect any infraction is observed. Every violator is ordered to report to the Air
Officer immediately upon report or observance of an accident or dangerous practice. Ordinarily he is accompanied by his supervisory petty officers and division officer. The reasons for the incident are determined and responsibility assigned. If the fault is found to lie in policy or established procedures, new instructions are issued to correct the situation. It is considered that this policy of immediate follow-up has been instrumental in establishing and maintaining safety consciousness among all Air Department personnel and has had its influence throughout the ship.

C. SUPPLY CLEARANCE

1. Aviation Stores

During the period 8 Nov to 18 Dec the Aviation Supply Group processed a total of 8456 stub requisitions, submitted 1354 stock replenishment requisitions, and prepared 835 invoices for class 265 material. High usage was experienced in the following items:

R86-BG-RB19R-2 Sparkplugs 5702 Ea
R17-I-7402 Inverters 12 Ea
R17-I-7475 Inverters 12 Ea
R82-P-580000-534 Hook points 200 Ea
R82-DG-5256004 Wings, AD 1 Ea
R82-CVVS-37013-1-L Wings, F4U 4 Ea
R82-CVVS-37013-2-R Wings, F4U 4 Ea
R82-GR-GSR-402-10-L Wings, F9F-2 2 Ea
R82-GR-GSR-402-11-R Wings, F9F-2 1 Ea
R83-GR-134095-R Wing Fold Cylinders 30 Ea
R87-APD-P-100017 Propeller AD 23 Ea
R87-NS-24F-60-45 Propeller F4U-4 14 Ea
R87-NS-21P-10005 Propeller F4U-5 4 Ea
R83-T-12660 Tubes 32 Ea
R83-T-5581-1 Tires 32 Ea
R83-T-11956 Tubes 22 Ea
R83-T-5874-1 Tires 19 Ea
R83-T-11975 Tubes 266 Ea
R83-T-5828-1 Tires 137 Ea
R82-GR-132860L Drop Tanks, Left 12 Ea
R82-GR-132860R Drop Tanks, Right 13 Ea
R83-GR-134194L Cylinder, MLG 12 Ea
R83-GR-134194R Cylinder, MLG 14 Ea

2. Clothing and Small Stores

It has been the experience of this vessel that the propensity to consume clothing is greater in the forward area than is usually the case in CONUS. Sales greatly exceeded average usage tables, consequently the demand for clothing was greater than that which could be supplied by the supporting vessels. This was especially prevalent in underwear, socks, dungarees, and white hats.
1. Religious Activities

Protestant, Catholic, Christian Science, and Mormon services were conducted regularly during the operating period. Special services were held at Thanksgiving. The number of Jewish personnel serving on board became so small that Jewish services were discontinued. Evening prayers before Taps and grace before meals in the wardroom were continued. During the period of approximately six months that this vessel was in Far Eastern waters, 366 services were held with an attendance of 37,612. During the same period the chaplains delivered 32 moral lectures with an attendance of 3,808.

2. Welfare and Recreation

In summarizing the recreational program while in Far Eastern waters, several points are noteworthy:

a. There is a heavy demand for reading material. The library was well patronized and, in addition, large quantities of magazines and over 8,000 pocket books were distributed.

b. The difficulty in using the hangar deck for movies can be partially offset by having double features when possible and by showing movies to small groups in other locations.

c. Comparatively little interest was shown in athletics due to the shortness of in-port periods and the lack of space and time for workouts while at sea. Basketball, baseball, softball, boxing, and skeet teams engaged in intra-mural or intra-ship competition with success, but interest did not compare to that shown in the States.

d. Rest hotels were not as popular as last year, possibly due to the increase in hotel charges.

3. Information and Education

The Information and Education Office has worked consistently to fulfill its functions. Working closely with the Chaplains and the division officers, the office has presented moral lectures, lectures on the danger of venereal diseases and numerous movies on citizenship and conduct, in compliance with the informational goals of the I and E program.

In the July Navy-wide advancement examination, there were 495 candidates for petty officer third, 72 candidates for petty officer second, and 39 candidates for petty officer first. Of this total of 606 candidates, 481 were advanced in rating.

In the United States Armed Forces Institute program, 62 USAFI General Education Development tests of high school level, 17 General Education Development tests of college level, 21 end-of-course tests, and 3 2CX (2-year college level) examinations were administered. Individuals enrolled in 206 USAFI courses and 18 courses from cooperating colleges,
bringing the total enrollment to over 800 personnel.

E. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

1. During this period the dental department carried on seven day week routine dental treatment.

2. On 3 December the Dental Officer gave palliative treatment by radio to a patient on the USS EPPERSON (DD719).

3. There is still a large demand for dental work. A gradual build up in the work load has been noticed throughout the cruise. The Dental Department, USN Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan, has been of great assistance in prosthetic cases.

4. It is recommended that a third Dental Officer be placed on ships of this type when an air group is embarked. It is further recommended that prosthett facilities be installed.

F. MEDICAL

1. Condition of the Crew

With cold weather operations, an increase in upper respiratory infections has been noted, particularly in aviation personnel. This has caused an increase in the number of pilots grounded, and in the length of time they have been grounded.

2. Narrative Summary

Since leaving the United States, the health of the crew has remained excellent. No major epidemics have occurred. The venereal rate has remained well below the 7th Fleet average.

On two occasions after extended operating periods, the minor accident rate rose sharply. It is believed that in this type of operation three weeks is the maximum period crew and pilots can operate with maximum efficiency and safety.

No deaths occurred from disease or injury other than combat losses during the entire cruise. 1,090 personnel were admitted to the sick list for a total of 2,728 sick days. Total treatments rendered (sick call visits) were 21,946.

The functioning of the Medical Department was somewhat hampered by lack of personnel, especially in higher rates, and by the fact that much of the equipment is overage and in poor working order, requiring excessive maintainence. Supplies have been adequate in all categories except a few items where an overall shortage exists.
1. Condition of Readiness
   a. With exception of brief periods in Condition ONE, the entire time
      the vessel was in the operating area was spent with Condition THREE set and
      X-RAY and YOKE fittings closed. In this condition, strict compliance with
      the authorized two openings for each section of the ship would have seriously
      impaired the operating efficiency of the vessel. Access to storerooms and
      other spaces for breakout of provisions, spare parts, etc., would have been
      so restricted that many normal functions of the ship would have become dis-
      rupted had not deviation from the prescribed setting been made.

   b. The difficulty was eased by developing a schedule for routine break-
      outs of provisions, supplies and ships store stock which authorized a mini-
      mum number of additional openings at specific times on certain days. This
      procedure, however necessary, was not in compliance with the directives of
      COL AIRPAC's Standard Ship's Organization Book nor did it take into account
      the numerous additional unscheduled openings that were required daily and
      which could not be predicted.

   c. It is recommended that Chapter 20, Article 2017, of the Standard
      Ship's Organization Book for Vessels of Air Force Pacific Fleet be revised
      to permit enough latitude for commanding officers to authorize openings
      adequate to the demands of the situation. To this end, it is suggested
      that the revision establish the optimum desired by COL AIRPAC with provision
      for deviation in individual vessels according to the recommendation of the
      Damage Control Board in each case.

2. Training
   a. It should be emphasized to each carrier preparing to deploy that
      full scale damage control training periods are not possible while in the
      operating areas in WESTPAC. There, the concentration must be placed on
      training small groups and exercising repair parties. Ships should take
      maximum advantage of every opportunity that presents itself for training
      the damage control organization as a whole prior to deployment and while
      onroute to and from R & R ports.

3. Repairs
   The ship's force was fully able to accomplish all repairs that were
   required during the operating periods. The facilities of the tenders and
   JMF Yokosuka were adequate to accomplish the work during the availability
   periods which was beyond the capacity of ship's force. The most diffi-
   cult problem in hull maintenance has been controlling leakage from the
   flight deck. Jet blast and heavy loads combine to destroy the watertight-
   ness of the seams, and the heavy loads in addition cause numerous plank
   securing studs to snap out of the deck plating tearing pieces of the
   plating away as they do. It is believed that the only solution to this
   problem will be to install heavier deck plates and more strength members
   to adequately support the planking and accommodate the excessive loads.
1. Loran

The value of loran as a means for determining the ship's position while in the Sea of Japan cannot be over-emphasized. Loran stations 2HØ and 2HL are always available, day or night, good weather or bad, for rapidly determining an accurate position. As tables for the above stations have not been published, it is necessary to utilize loran chart No. VI30-17R (1st Edition, February 1952). It was found very advantageous to transfer the loran lines of position for these stations from the loran chart to the chart used on the DRT (HO 3320, CONSEC No. A6753). These lines of position were inked on the chart in different colors; red lines for 2HØ and blue lines for 2HL. A sheet of transparent "dulcelf" was then placed over the chart. It was then only a matter of a few minutes to take a loran reading on the two stations (ground waves were practically always available), mark the position of the "bug" on the DRT, plot in the loran lines of position with the aid of an interpolator (HO misc 11,691), figure set and drift, and correct the bug to the new fix. When it was possible to check the accuracy of these loran fixes by celestial or visual means, they were never found to be in error more than a mile or two. This method of determining position while operating in the Sea of Japan is highly recommended.

2. Mark 5 Bubble Sextant

The use of the Mark 5 bubble sextant for determining position at night when no horizon was available proved to be surprisingly accurate, contrary to popular belief. With practice and averaged observations, sights were usually reliable to an accuracy of about three to five miles.

3. Yokosuka Degaussing Range

The degaussing range at Yokosuka was run on three different occasions and the condition of the degaussing gear was reported satisfactory. The BON HOUL RICHARD was the first CVA to run the new range.
I. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Ordnance

a. Glide and Dive Bombing

(1) The Navy is in great need of a simple bombing aid which will coordinate angle of dive, air speed, and altitude during dive and glide bombing runs. This information need be supplied only to the pilot and not fed into some complicated automatic releasing mechanism. At present pilots are required to estimate angle of dive, which at best, is sufficiently inaccurate as to cause many misses. The pilot is required to take his attention away from the target to determine his air speed and altitude, which further interrupts his run. A simple device for coordinating and presenting these three basic and essential factors of an accurate bombing run should be developed. (Refer to CO, VA-75 Confidential ltr ser 045 of 25 November 1952 to CNO).

(2) Information is also needed on the MIL lead to use when dropping the 500 pound cluster fragmentation bomb, M29al and the 100 pound cluster incendiary bomb, AN M12.

b. Ordnance Safety Regulations

There should be a standard set of Ordnance Safety Regulations, which apply to all aircraft carriers. It is believed these regulations would not only be of great value to the Navy as a whole, but to air groups in particular. When air groups are deployed aboard a carrier for operations, their ordnance handling is governed by the current safety regulations of that particular carrier. This often creates a situation confusing to the air group, because a regulation that may be strictly enforced on one carrier may be considered unimportant or ignored on another. For instance, one carrier permits fusing bombs on the third deck, while another insists that bombs be fused only after they are loaded on aircraft. On some carriers, rockets are not plugged in wing receptacles until the aircraft engine is turning up; others permit rockets to be plugged in after the aircraft has been checked for stray voltage.

It is believed that full coverage of ordnance safety on board a carrier could be obtained by requiring all carriers to submit copies of their current ordnance safety regulations to a central command which could screen them and submit CVA type standard safety regulations to BuOrd for approval and promulgation.

If modification of a particular safety regulation was considered necessary to permit more efficient operation on a particular carrier, permission to modify the regulation in question should be requested.

c. Bomb-Fuse-Target Selection

A chart showing the most effective use of aviation ordnance against various targets is needed. The chart should be approximately 6 X 6 feet and colored for eye appeal. It could be hung in pilot ready rooms where it...
would be readily available for study. All targets as well as the bombs and suitable fuzes for each should be illustrated. Although a pilot can acquire this knowledge with experience, it is believed that an attractive chart, graphically illustrated would increase his effectiveness to an appreciable degree at an earlier date, allowing him to make better use of his ordnance when confronted with targets of opportunity.

d. Aero 14A Hydraulic Gun Charging System

Since incorporation of the AERO 14A hydraulic gun charging system, no casualties have occurred which could be traced to the gun charger or its components. Prior to the installation of this modified gun charging system, over 50% of all casualties were attributed to the standard, or AERO 13A gun charger and its components.

As of this date, the F9F squadrons have fired 560,076 rounds of 20mm ammunition at a rate of 1400 rounds per casualty. A breakdown of casualties in the order of highest percentage of malfunction is as follows:

1. Link jams . . . . . . . 30%
2. Broken solenoid leads . . 30%
3. Broken parts . . . . . . 20%
4. All others . . . . . . . 10%

e. Boresighting (F9F-2)

A sighting gage has been made to assist in maintaining a more accurate alignment of the gunsights in F9F aircraft. This unit fits in the cockpit. The sighting references are aligned to coincide with the optical gunsight of a plane whose sight is known to be correctly boresighted. After the sighting tube on the gage has been rigidly secured, the unit can be moved from plane to plane and the alignment of each sight checked in a matter of a minute or two. This gage is similar to the boresight gage which was issued with the "Helldiver", during World War II, for aligning the sight in boresighting the aircraft. The template has proven accurate and it is believed that gages of similar pattern can be developed locally for all type aircraft which are equipped with cockpit canopies mounted on tracks. As this gage can be used only to align the sight, the guns of the aircraft must still be positioned using orthodox methods.

f. Boresighting (AD-4)

The AD-4 E&M Manual advocates boresighting the inboard guns to converge at 1800 feet and the outboard guns at 2100 feet in azimuth. This was not felt to produce a practical pattern because ordinarily a pilot pulls out of his dive long before reaching these ranges from the target. Strafing is usually done as a flak suppression measure during bombing runs. Most bombing is done in a 45° - 50° dive with a 3000 feet release point, which is approximately 4300 feet to the target. In order that the strafing be most effective just prior to and at the release point, VA-75 aircraft were boresighted with the inboard guns converging at 3600 and the outboard guns at
5000 feet. This has given very satisfactory results and is recommended for consideration by all AD squadrons.

g. AERO 13A HYDRAULIC GUN CHARGING SYSTEM (AD)

Many 20MM stoppages were due to malfunctions of the hydraulic gun charger system. These failures were the result of leakage at the low pressure valve of the hydraulic pressure switches and at the inlet valve of the four-way valve. Leakage at the low pressure valve of the pressure switch bled air into hydraulic lines and so offset switch adjustment that early closure of the four-way valves' exhaust valve was effected with enough pressure remaining in the charger line to prevent the charger from moving fully forward to "ready". Pressure leakage at the inlet valve of the four-way valve, occurring after both the charging and exhaust cycles had been completed and the system returned to normal, allowed increasing pressure to flow to the charger and pressure switch. When this leakage from the AD's 3000 pound hydraulic system raised charger line pressure as high as 90 psi the charger piston would begin to move toward "safe", causing a cushioning effect against the forward motion of the bolt toward battery. This condition resulted in a light blow of the firing pin being delivered to the cartridge primer causing misfires.

Squadron RUDMs have recommended that design of the faulty valves, "O" ring seals, and plunger and seat assemblies be improved so as to reduce malfunctioning due to leakage. It is believed that failures of this type will continue to occur despite better valve design as long as moving the charger lug fully forward and keeping it there depends on perfect exhaust of pressure line. Completion of the exhaust cycle is vulnerable to the leakages described above, and even after line pressure has dropped to normal a weak charger spring often results in the charger failing to reach ready position. What is needed is a gun charger system which provides positive pressure for both phases of the charging cycle. With such a system it is estimated that AD type aircraft 20MM gun malfunctions would be reduced 40%.

The outboard Aero 14A rack on the starboard wing (wing station 12) was selected for the suspension of the AD3K-1 survival kit or the K-25 camera pod. This station was cut out of the armament system at terminal panel 25 (post 35) and so rigged that it would be fired only through actuation of a special toggle switch. The new wire comes off the Outer Station Latch circuit breaker and therefore the Master Armament Switch must be "ON" to fire the rack.

In order to carry the K-25 camera pod on wing station 12 an additional alteration was necessary at the Aero 14A rack. This alteration was made on five aircraft which thereafter have carried only the camera pod on wing station 12. At the rack, the lead to the rack release solenoid was cut and led to the K-camera motor. Thus the power which would normally release the camera pod runs the camera motor.

h. Gun Lubricants

It was found after operating in the combat area a few weeks that the highly corrosive qualities inherent in the low temperature lubricant, E-51, greatly increased the workload of the ordnancemen. Too much of the ordnancemen's time was being utilized in combatting rust which resulted from use of
E-51 lubricant, leaving less time available for maintenance on other ordnance equipment. Because of the nature of the mission and the relatively mild temperatures encountered, the squadrons experimented with other lubricants, the most satisfactory of which was SAE-1010 engine oil. This lubricant has been used exclusively since August with a resulting increase of gun dependability and a decrease in the amount of superficial gun maintenance required. The squadrons were advised by a BuOrd representative (Mr. Warner) in December of this year that in view of the results based on actual ammunition expenditure figures the squadrons should continue to use this lubricant until a newly developed non-alcoholic low temperature oil becomes available to operating activities, or until extremely low temperature makes the use of the less desirable E-51 lubricant imperative. To maintain a close check on high altitude performance of 20MM machine guns and to avoid increasing the work load of the ordnancemen the last CAP flight on the day prior to replenishment fired their guns at 30,000 feet altitude, visibility permitting. This firing took place just prior to their return to the ship.

1. Hand protection for aviation ordnancemen

Cold weather experience in Korean operations has indicated the urgent need for satisfactory protection for the hands of personnel performing rearming duties on the flight deck. Mittens are unsatisfactory since the handling of fuzes and arming wires requires freedom of the fingers. Leather gloves soon become saturated with oils and greases causing them to become soggy and slippery, and when dried they harden and crack.

It is recommended that gloves of neoprene or some durable material which is impervious to lubricants be procured and worn with light weight wool inner-liners.

2. Rocket Launchers AERO 14A

During the first tour on the line, ejected .50 Cal. cartridge cases frequently cut the rocket pigtails on FAU-4 aircraft. There were also incidents of the rocket pig-tail becoming disconnected from the wing igniter during flight. The cutting of the pigtails was eliminated by the addition of an "L" shaped piece of metal tubing bolted to the wing bomb rack pylon, thereby moving the position the igniter from the surface of the wing to a position about one inch above the base of the rocket. Only one inch of the pigtail was then exposed to the ejected brass. Taping the pigtails and igniters together with masking tape prevented them from becoming disconnected in flight.

k. MK 9 Mod 2 Rocket Launcher

Early experience with this launcher indicated the need for close post-flight checks. In several instances pilots reported that rockets fell from launchers on high speed pull outs due to the weight of the rocket head applying a torquing effect to the launcher. Subsequent inspection disclosed
that in these incidents the rocket had torn the launching plate from the launcher. Inspection of other launchers disclosed loose, broken or missing screws, which were intended to secure the launching plate to the skin of the launcher. Close daily checks and replacement of faulty launchers have completely eliminated the loss of rockets in high speed pull outs.

1. AD Rocket Loading

In the past, cases of cut rocket pigtails have occurred which were suspected to have been caused by ejected 20MM brass. During this operating period rockets were not loaded on wing stations 5, 6, 7 and 8 which are adjacent to outboard brass ejector chutes. As a result, no cases of cut pigtails were experienced. It is recommended that stations, 5, 6, 7 and 8 never be loaded with rockets unless necessitated by the number of rockets to be carried, or that a suitable brass deflector be designed for these stations.

m. Ordnance Statistics

Of a total of 5419 bombs expended during this period on the line (exclusive of incendiaries and napalm) the following expenditures are listed by month together with the malfunctions which occurred each month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped on catapult launch</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung bombs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bombs which dropped on catapult launch were carried on MK 55 Mod 0 bomb racks. The racks were worn out but had to be used until they could be replaced by the MK 55 Mod 1 racks.

Two hung bombs occurred on MK 55 Mod 1 bomb racks. The racks failed to release their 250 lb, GP bombs due to bound release solenoids. As three such incidents have occurred, Fighter Squadron Seventy Two has submitted a RUDF # 63-52 covering the subject thoroughly.

Three bombs hungs on AERO 14A bomb racks. It is believed that the first cold weather caused flight carbon deposits in the three malfunctioning racks to bind the release mechanisms so that they could not be tripped by their release solenoids. The racks operated satisfactorily after they had been cleaned with stoddard solvent.

Of a total of 466 rockets expended during this period on the line the following expenditures are listed by month together with the malfunctions which occurred each month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duds</td>
<td>9/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigtails becoming unplugged</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken pigtails</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35
The following expenditures of 20MM and 50 Caliber ammunition were made during this period on the line.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>50 Caliber</th>
<th>20MM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52,340</td>
<td>203,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. MAINTENANCE

a. Cold Weather Operations

(1) With the advent of cold weather, all pilots, plane captains and maintenance personnel were refreshed in cold weather starting procedures. By use of auxiliary power units, plane captains started and warmed up cold piston engines prior to the time for pilots to man planes. In the case of jet aircraft, the daily preflight specific gravity check of the batteries was augmented by pilot checks of the battery potential on the cockpit voltmeter prior to start. If the voltage was not up to a specified minimum, an A.P.U. was employed to supplement the aircraft battery. Of the five starting jeeps available, only one was equipped to supply both jet starting power and aircraft service power, necessitating the employment of additional men to operate the A.P.U.s. To prevent rapid battery discharge, the necessity of operating the engine above generator cut-in speed was strongly emphasized.

(2) Reference was frequently made to the information presented in various technical publications pertinent to cold weather operation, especially ACL 54-49, TN 84-45, TN 23-50 and ComAirPac Instruction 03470.1A. The use of grade 1065 lubricating oil in piston engines when surface temperatures were below 50°F, as specified in TO 25-52, was not possible, as the only oil available was grade 1100. However, no difficulties due to lube oil were experienced and, although temperatures as low as 22°F were encountered, oil dilution was never necessary.

(3) Plane captains' winter gear should include gloves similar to stock number R37-G-2500-20 (wool liner) and R37-G-2505-20 (leather covering). The mittens provided are unsatisfactory, inasmuch as such simple operations as installing and removing tie-downs, jury struts, etc., cannot be accomplished while wearing them.

b. Specific Problems

(1) Flame-outs caused by sticking aneroid shafts and bushings continued to be experienced by the jets, even though the shafts and bushings were inspected after every ten hours of flight. The improved aneroid shaft, part number 187539, was never made available.

(2) Heavy duty wing-folding cylinders, F9F service change 177, were finally received on 21 November 1952, after being badly needed since June. The crutch and pin type jury strut in use, however, still necessitated extra securing of the wings when folded during high wind conditions. This
was done by fabricating a wing tie-down fitting from a piece of 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) inch steel stock, threaded on one end to screw into the mount for the MK 55 bomb rack, and fitted with a large ring on the other end. A tie-down line is led from this fitting to the deck.

(3) Increasing the pressure of the F9F-2 main landing gear tires from 200 psi to 225 psi prolonged tire life considerably. Tire life averaged 51 landings per main landing gear tire for the entire combat tour.

(4) The painting of a wing tip fueling ladder aligning stripe on F9F tip tanks greatly reduced the previously excessive breakage of tip tank lights.

(5) RP19R-2 spark plugs have continued to be unsatisfactory, particularly in the R3350-26 engine in AD aircraft. Thorough review of maintenance and operating procedures has improved the situation slightly, but the specified life of the plugs was never closely approached.

c. Comments and Recommendations

(1) The aircraft maintenance control system used on the BON HOMME RICHARD is heartily endorsed and recommended for all CVAs. An Air Group maintenance representative was stationed in Flight Deck Control to keep the air department informed of constantly changing aircraft availability, to coordinate with the air department, and to carry out the needs of the squadrons for maintenance spots, wing spreads, turn-up, etc.

(2) It is strongly recommended that a thorough study be made of the problem of space assignment for air group maintenance personnel and equipment. This Air Group has been based on board eight carriers in the past three years, and the maintenance spaces available have varied considerable between ships. Invariably, it has been a case of getting by with inadequate, make-do spaces. The increasing complexity of aircraft and their components requires constantly increasing numbers of technically trained personnel and increased quantities of tools, special equipment, technical publications, etc. There have been no real provisions made for additional spaces for these personnel to do their work or stow their equipment. On the contrary, the trend seems to be toward reducing their spaces.

(3) It is recommended that two vacuum cleaners be provided on each CVA for cleaning cockpits and the inside of the fuselages. Such cleaning is especially necessary after drilling or cutting operations in aircraft and after plane has landed at an emergency field ashore.

(4) The support furnished by the Supply Department to the air group was considered outstanding. The number of aircraft operating days lost to AOG aircraft during the final tour on the line was negligible.

(5) The excellent services rendered by the FASHON 11 detachment at K-18 in the repair of damaged or partially disabled aircraft, enabling their early return to the ship, was greatly appreciated. It is recommended that a small supply of high usage items for currently operating carrier aircraft (particularly mounted tires and arresting hook points) be maintained at this field.
Nylon tie-downs, as developed by the VALLEY FORGE (CO US3 VALLEY FORGE ltr ser 1352 of 23 May 1952) have been used and found to be superior to either the wire reel or manila tie-downs. They are easier to install and remove, easier to stow, and stronger, and will not become too hot to handle in jet blasts. One tie-down reel is used at all times on each aircraft to provide an electrical ground.

3. OPERATIONS

a. Tactics and Doctrine (lesson learned in Korea)

(1) Coordinated Attacks

Coordinated attacks by jet and propeller driven aircraft should be practiced by carrier air groups frequently prior to deployment to the forward area. Precise timing, vitally necessary in the coordination of flak suppression for bombing attacks can be realized only by constant training.

The jets primary offensive mission has been flak suppression. Jets are launched after the props, timed so as to overtake them at a predesignated rendezvous point on the Korean coast and provide cover inland to the target. On the attack the jets split up, half of them preceding the bombers by about 30 seconds, and attack reported flak positions. The other half go in with, or just behind, the bombers and attack observed flak positions. This procedure was developed when it was discovered that the enemy would not fire on the jets but hold their fire for the main attacking force. Furthermore, a flak suppression run should be made, immediately following the prop attack, on guns which can be brought to bear on prop recovery. If sufficient jets are available some of them should be held above for this task. If there are not sufficient jet aircraft to be assigned separately, initial flak suppression aircraft should recover and make another run immediately following, or with, the last props making the attack. Experience has shown that the propeller aircraft offer the best target on retirement, when altitudes are lower.

(2) Armed Reconnaissance by Jet Aircraft

A four plane division is considered to be optimum for an effective jet Recco. Reconnaissance should be flown at an altitude not lower than 2500 feet above the terrain, maintaining a gentle section weave over the route at about 300 knots indicated. Frequent changes in altitude and speed further complicate the tracking problem. The second section should coordinate its weave with the first and maintain a relative position above and aft. Flight integrity is thereby maintained in a defensive formation, and in event of attack by enemy aircraft, mutual support can be given immediately. The primary function of a wingman on reconnaissance is to maintain position on his leader and to maintain a vigilant lookout for enemy aircraft. Navigation and visual search is the primary responsibility of the division and section leaders. Upon sighting a target of opportunity both sections should climb to a sufficient altitude (8000 feet) for a standard coordinated run (30 to 40 degree dive, 425 knots). The second section should maneuver so as to coordinate the attack on the opposite side from the lead section with approximately a five second interval. This will allow the second section to observe the hit.
of the lead section. If the lead section appears to have obtained direct hits on a relatively small target, the second section may elect to hold its fire and ordnance for future targets. The most important requirement for a successful attack is sufficient altitude for the type of attack to be delivered. The attacks should be deliberate, unhurried, and coordinated. By careful execution of their attack, pilots can accomplish complete destruction of the target on the first run. Armed reconnaissance should be flown with the cabin pressurization "off" to preclude fire entering the cockpit in the event of a plenum chamber fire. This procedure also permits the pilot to hear AA fire, which in turn serves as a reminder to "jink" and maintain proper altitude. The enemy has a system of green flares or smoke to alert gun positions along popular routes. When these signals are observed, pilots should keep a sharp lookout for flak and maintain a minimum altitude of 2500 feet to stay out of the effective range of small arms fire.

(3) Jet Rendezvous

It has been found that the rendezvous for jet aircraft can be made most effectively at low altitudes, regardless of mission and number of aircraft involved. Although more fuel is burned per minute at low altitudes, the time saved in quick rendezvous saves fuel in the long run and more time is available for the mission. Further, when rendezvous is accomplished below the overcast it permits positive control by CIC on the climb through.
b. Pilot Training

The following suggestions are extended to squadrons and air groups expecting to be sent to Korea.

(1) If possible, pilots should be worked up gradually to flying the assigned aircraft in the load configuration which will be encountered in Korea. Carrier take-offs in particular are the critical phase of this indoctrination.

(2) As indicated in the AirLant-AirPac Training Manual, group work should be stressed in Phase III training. Individual training in bombing, rocketing and strafing so the pilots can hit at all angles of dive and at any altitude and airspeed should be accomplished in Phase I and II as far as possible. In Phase III, individual bombing practice should be considered secondary to section and division bombing in coordinated attacks on a target. Realistic problems involving an attack by two or more squadrons on targets similar to ones which are encountered in North Korea would be the most productive training-wise. A good target for this type of attack with flak suppression can be built by adding two or three bullseyes in the vicinity of a practice bombing target to simulate gun positions.

(3) More group formation all weather work, particularly in climbing and letting down through overcast, should be attempted when ceiling permits safe recovery altitudes and other safety considerations can be met.

(4) Navigation training in general, and terrain navigation in particular is excellent preparation for Korean flights. Flights which navigate by terrain only, over unfamiliar routes, and terminate in an actual or simulated attack on a designated target are particularly recommended. The use of large scale charts and practice in transition from one scale to another should be accomplished during this phase.

(5) Less emphasis should be placed on VA dive bombing training. Glide bombing has been employed almost exclusively during the combat tour. Various release altitudes should be incorporated by squadrons while in their training stage. These release altitudes should vary from 2500 feet to 8000 feet. Recovery altitudes should be correspondingly varied with an absolute minimum of 1500 feet strictly adhered to.

(6) Jet squadrons should place more emphasis on pilot training in bombing, map reading, and low level (below 6000 feet) navigation with the use of maps only.

(7) The principles of jinking should be taught all pilots before entering the combat zone, and proficiency in keeping a division together throughout violent jinking maneuvers should be attained.

c. Radio Discipline

(1) Improper communications procedures and poor radio discipline
continue to be a problem of major proportions. This phase of a pilots training must begin on his first flight with an operational squadron. It is recommended that squadron commanders demand and insist on good radio discipline during all training phases and that drastic measures be taken against persistent offenders.

(2) To alleviate confusion on seriously overloaded strike-control frequencies, a relatively clear channel, usually the land-launch channel, was used by this Air Group for communications in the target area, and squadron tactical calls were substituted for the more cumbersome standard JANAP call signs.

(3) Improper use of Guard Channel (121.5) by all military units in the Korean area is still prevalent, although some improvement has been noted since a conference on this subject was conducted by Commander, Seventh Fleet. SAR operations are frequently hampered by unwarranted chatter on Guard channel. It is believed that if all units could be contacted on established reporting in and out frequencies many needless transmissions on Guard channel could be eliminated. It has been one experience of this Air Group with both forces ashore and afloat that it is virtually impossible to establish such contact without resorting to the use of "Guard."

d. Close Air Support

(1) The close air support training of pilots is not consistent with the actual practice carried out in the Korean theater. When carriers are being deployed to the Korean theater the air groups are given an ORI inspection and one part of this exercise is a air support problem. On this problem the GTOREF system is used and the pilots are under the direction of a ground controller who has them orbit over the "enemy forces" until each pilot has positively identified the target before the attack commences. The flak situation on the Korean front precludes this type of target identification and makes release altitudes higher than those normally practiced advisable. In addition, the UTX coordinate system is used exclusively in the Korean theater.

When Navy pilots are on close air support along the front, the aircraft orbit over friendly territory until the target is marked by a mosquito pilot who is familiar with the terrain and the exact location of friendly forces. This type of target marking provides adequate safety measures to insure that our aircraft do not bomb friendly forces and it provides protection from anti-aircraft fire until our aircraft are actually on a "dive" bombing run. In view of these facts, it is recommended that the close air support training given to Navy pilots be consistent with the actual procedure carried on in a combat theater.

e. Intelligence

(1) Intelligence Lectures for enlisted Personnel - It is recommended that a series of intelligence lectures to enlisted personnel be initiated upon arrival in the operating area.
Enlisted personnel form a vital link in operations against the enemy. The ordnancemen, mechanics, electronics specialists, and others work long hours maintaining aircraft in order to enable pilots to carry out their assigned missions. It was discovered that a large majority of the men did not understand the reasons for fighting in Korea, and very few of them knew what results were achieved by the aircraft on which they had spent their time and energy. In the combat zone there is no time for any large educational program along these lines. However, small scale maps of the Korean peninsula were placed in the crew's berthing spaces and upon it the targets for each day were annotated. Pictures of the targets were posted nearby. In addition, on the way to port after each operating period, the Intelligence Officers gave lectures on the squadrons' operations during the preceding period and impressed upon the men the fact that their efforts were making the end results possible. During the lectures the men were shown pictures of the targets before and after they were attacked. Post strike photographs, taken by the pilots with K-17 or K-25 cameras, were featured. Gun camera film taken of attacks during the period were also shown, with pilots often acting as narrators.

The men were very receptive to this type of information. No one was required to come to the lectures, but at every lecture there was nearly one hundred percent attendance. The effect upon morale was excellent, since each man was impressed with the fact that he personally had something to do with every successful attack.

(2) Enlisted Assistants

It is impossible for the AIO to give proper attention to work affecting pilot safety and the success of missions and to keep himself abreast of current intelligence produced daily when a large percentage of his time is devoted to reports, recognition training, and routine matters. In order to carry out his assignment successfully, the AIO should be able to devote all his efforts to matters that affect the mission of Task Force 77. It is therefore recommended that each AIO be assigned a permanent enlisted assistant to handle reports and general office work.

(3) SAR Facilities

In general the SAR facilities in the Korean theatre are excellent. There is one additional facility, however, that would greatly extend the coverage in North Korea. When large strikes are conducted in the northeastern part of North Korea, a cruiser with a helicopter is stationed in the vicinity of the target, but when small strikes are sent into the area day after day the nearest helicopter is usually stationed near Wonsan. It would be highly desirable to station a helicopter permanently between Wonsan and Chongjin. If that were done, a pilot would be within range of a helicopter in all but the most inland parts of North Korea.

(4) Camouflage Detection

It is felt that the effectiveness of attacks against concealed targets could be greatly increased by intensive pre-deployment training in
camouflage detection. In Korean operations, most pilots gradually develop a facility for spotting enemy attempts at deception, but before that faculty can become general, many bombs, much time, and sometimes whole missions are wasted. Lives can be lost by pilots who are forced to reconnoiter heavily defended areas for excessive lengths of time or at excessively low altitudes in order to see a concealed target. In addition to classroom studies in the techniques of camouflage, pilots should be enabled to study examples of camouflage from the air. These examples could be constructed on almost any large military reservation by units of other services being trained in the art of camouflage.

(5) Map Kits

Before deployment to the Korean area each pilot should prepare a map kit composed of one complete set of 1:500,000 USAF Pilotage Charts, covered with Frisket paper and folded in such a way as to permit navigation from one chart to another by merely turning folds; a complete set of 1:250,000 Approach Charts, arranged in logical order; and an index of 1:250,000 charts annotated on a 1:3,000,000 chart. These should be placed in a legal-size folder. The folder may be covered with 1/32 inch cellulose acetate to form windows into which target photos, 1:50,000 target maps, and other necessary strike information may be inserted.

f. Miscellaneous Recommendations

(1) It is recommended that jets be utilized less for recce purposes and more for pre-briefed all-jet strikes, preferably on targets outside the normal operating area of the props. This procedure would utilize to advantage the best characteristics of jet attack bombers, namely, speed and surprise. Targets found on a jet recce route can seldom be hit immediately. Most of them necessitate a turn of at least 180 degrees. The time lost in this turn is time gained by the enemy to conceal himself or his equipment. With previous target area photo coverage, an all-jet strike can be completely briefed in detail as to specific targets in the area, direction of run, altitudes and all the other details which must be covered to assure a smooth and effective strike. While the jet recce may have accomplished much in the earlier days of the war when the enemy evidently moved much more during the day, it is particularly ineffective now that the enemy moves almost entirely at night. The enemy's AA fire has increased in intensity and accuracy during the last few months. Seldom does a coordinated jet and prop strike go in on a target without receiving flak. One reason for this is the length of time necessary to set up an attack. All the AA guns are manned by the time the jets go in on a flak suppression run. With an all-jet strike group, however, the run in could be started as much as twenty miles from the target and the jets, traveling at maximum speed could hit the target and retire before the enemy's AA defenses were fully alerted.

(2) In over 1200 combat missions, the V. squadron did not once utilize the APS-19 radar. The external radar "bombs" were removed when the aircraft were initially hoisted aboard. This equipment requires an excessive amount
of stowage space, and since it is not utilized by attack AD's in this area, it is recommended that each squadron be equipped with only six complete sets.

(3) During all the operations of this Air Group with F9F aircraft, there has been one multiple wire engagement in about every 500 arrested landing. In nearly all cases this type of engagement resulted in a broken hook point or hook point mounting bolt and a subsequent barrier engagement. Either the arresting hook should be redesigned to prevent this type of engagement, or the hook point components should be strengthened sufficiently to stand up to the additional loads.

(4) Operational Losses

It is worthy of note that there was not one operational fatality during the entire cruise.

4. AVIATION EQUIPMENT AND SURVIVAL

a. MK III Anti-exposure Suit and Winter Flight Gear

(1) The Air Group did not find it necessary to wear the MK III anti-exposure suit in the Korean Area until its return to the line on 25 November. During the remainder of the cruise the sea water temperature was below 60 degrees, and all pilots were required to wear the suits. The cold weather gear to be worn under the anti-exposure suit was optional, since the regular liner bound at the crotch and armpits, was too short in the arms and legs, was improperly colored for safety in evasion incidents, and was generally impractical for use ashore. In lieu of the liner, most pilots elected to wear one or two pairs of heavy woolen underwear, a heavy wool shirt, WL-1 winter flight trousers, two pairs of socks (at least one of which was woolen), and N-1 field shoes. Many of the pilots wore the summer flying suit over the MK III suit to lessen the danger of snagging the suit and to provide readily accessible pockets for carrying gear needed during the flights. Summer flight gloves worn over the nylon and rubber gloves, worn with the waterproof liners, restricted finger movement to an excessive degree. Most pilots wore the parka hood on all flights, usually draped around their necks, but a few actually wore it over their crash helmets and found it to be comfortable.

(2) The tearing of neck and wrist seals imposed major difficulties in the maintenance of the suits. Between 25 November and 17 December 1952 it was necessary to replace 55 wrist seals and 13 neck seals of the 114 MK III suits worn by pilots and aircrewmen. Although care in putting the suit on and taking it off greatly reduces the attrition rate of the seals, it was necessary to strengthen the edges by turning back approximately one-quarter inch and cementing it securely, thus forming a more durable ring. During the period of trial, this proved to be satisfactory. To facilitate this process and to aid in the replacement of neck seals, the parachute
riggers of Air Group SEVEN developed a flat metal neck form. When replacing the seals they found that by separating all seams four inches down from the neck and cementing and rolling each section individually, an excellent seal can be accomplished. Although this method takes longer than the recommended method, it results in a factory-neat job.

(3) Another vulnerable part of the Mk III suit is the seat. Constant movement of the pilots' buttocks during operation of the aircraft caused greater wear in the seat than at any other place. A double layer of material, or a stronger fabric, might eliminate the fault.

(4) Only one-quarter to one-third of a turn is possible in screwing on the cover of the "G" suit opening of the Mk III suit. To obtain more threads, some pilots removed the "O" ring, took off the outer plastic face piece, and then replaced the "O" ring and cover. A snug, watertight fit is still obtainable and there is positive assurance that the cover will remain in place.

(5) The Mk IV anti-exposure suit, which has several decided advantages over the Mk III suit, was made available after Air Group SEVEN departed CONUS, but no apparent effort was made to equip groups already in the Korean area. Although trial of the new suit was not possible, inspection of it disclosed many of the faults found in the Mk III suit. No provision has been made for the incorporation of the necessary clothing and equipment worn and carried. The bulkiness of the suit, together with that of the liner, additional heavy clothing, and survival equipment, continue to restrict movement of the pilot and make successful ejection extremely difficult. The liner to be worn with the Mk IV suit appears impractical for evasion and survival ashore. It is suggested that in the future development of anti-exposure suits an effort be made to incorporate satisfactory land survival features.

(6) Pilots often complained that the Mae West lifejacket pressed down uncomfortably on their necks, which were protected only by the thin rubber neck seals and nylon scarfs when they were wearing the Mk III suits.

(7) It is recommended that half ounce tubes of petrolatum be carried in the pocket of the anti-exposure suit by all pilots and aircrewmen. The ointment could be used for smearing the face in the case of water emersion in the same manner that Channel swimmers grease themselves before entering the cold water.

b. Parachute Harnesses

The present Standard QFS parachute harnesses (stock # R83 NAF 312670-2) are an unsatisfactory size. The body harness is not large enough to provide a comfortable fit for the larger pilots when they are wearing winter flight gear. More important, the leg strap snap and veering connection to the body harness is so far to the pilot's rear that it does not allow pilots in anti-exposure suits and heavy clothing to buckle and unbuckle the leg straps with one hand. Both hands are required to perform the operation, and in an emergency such as ditching, it would be difficult to get rid of the parachute.
It is recommended that a unit departing CONUS for duty in the Korean area during winter months obtain as many oversize quick-fit harnesses (stock # R63-NAF-602825-10) as possible prior to departure.

Because of the increased amount of survival equipment carried by pilots, it has become apparent that conservation of cockpit space is needed. The present cushion (Stock # R63-NAF-47565-24) or SP-1 seat pan assembly is so thick that the pilot has difficulty in seeing the upper part of the instrument panel. It is suggested that a thin foam rubber pad (½” thick) be incorporated into the top of the para raft or the para raft kit container. With some revision, the H-2 Oxygen Bailout Cylinder could be placed in the para raft or in a special pocket on the para raft container itself.

Considerable speculation arose over the amount of effort and time required to get out of the nylon parachute harness during a water landing or parachute descent into water, due to the added survival equipment carried in combat. In cold weather the hands become numb and the nylon, when wet, becomes very stiff and slick. It is believed that a very simple quick disconnect box, incorporating the quick fit hardware, may be the answer to this problem. In any case, a better release method is needed than the present snaps and vee rings now employed on all Navy parachute harnesses worn by carrier pilots.

c. ADSK-1 Droppable Survival Kits

The items included in the ADSK-1 are very useful for cold weather survival, and most items are useful in warm weather. However, in summer months some items in the kit should be replaced with warm weather survival items. For this reason, it is recommended that the ADSK-1 kits be issued in the United States prior to departure, thus permitting sufficient time to make any required modifications before entering the combat area. It is recommended that as many self-heating "Hotcan" rations as possible be added to the ADSK-1, thereby providing an evacuee with an occasional warm meal, and some much needed heat.

During this tour on the line, one ADSK was unintentionally dropped and was seen to function properly. Rubber stripping placed on the inside of the cover plate of the kit has proven to be very effective in keeping the pilot chute and the main sail in the container.

d. Summer Flight Clothing

It has become apparent that the summer flying suit now available to pilots is unsatisfactory for operations in the Korean area. It was necessary for pilots to make many modifications to the suit due to its non-durable construction, inadequate pockets and poor camouflage characteristics.

It has been recommended that a new combat summer flying suit of more durable material be procured.
Camouflage characteristics and provisions for comfortable and efficient stowage of survival items should be important considerations in any new design.

c. C-1 Survival Vest

Most pilots have worn the C-1 survival vest during the entire tour (with and without the anti-exposure suits). Though fairly bulky, it is considered the most efficient means of carrying survival equipment. This vest, and any other survival equipment carried, should be inventoried by each pilot prior to departure for the line from each in-port rest period. (It is possible that during the in-port periods rations may become inedible and other items may be lost). Some pilots incorporated survival gear into leggings, and a few pilots managed to carry survival gear in their pockets or in pockets sewed on the flight suit, but the survival vest was the only solution for the majority of the pilots. Since there is a tendency to place more and more equipment on the pilot's chest, in the vicinity of the Mac Vest, this area has become over-burdened. Other means and places should be found to carry equipment. (Refer to C.G-7 ltr ser 499 of 24 September 1952 to BU&ER).

d. AN/PRC-17 or the AN/CRC-7 portable radios must be checked at frequent intervals. Air Group SEVEN has found, on routine inspections, as many as 54 out of 117 radios inoperative due to weak batteries or faulty parts. Of all their survival equipment, pilots value these radios second only to the parachute and they should be issued for each aircraft. Unfortunately, the unsatisfactory size, weight, and shape of the radio makes it necessary to carry it in the PK-2 raft pack, and in an emergency, the radios could be unintentionally abandoned. A new type of personal survival radio should be designed that is small, light, and flat, so that the pilot can carry the radio on his person without danger or discomfort. It is suggested that a radio such as the Air Force URC-4 be investigated for possible procurement by the Navy.

e. Chart Board

A change in the design of chart boards would be desirable for future Va type aircraft. Chart boards should be at least one inch in thickness, since it is customary for many pilots to carry air navigation charts, close air support grids, etc., inside the chart board for easy and quick accessibility. (Refer VA-75 letter serial 495 of 11 December 1952 to BU&ER).

f. Ejection Seat

Most jet pilots feel that the face curtain features of the ejection seat are unsatisfactory and would prefer the "arm rest" type of ejection seat.
Trigger. Restriction of arm movement caused by the 1k III anti-exposure suit makes it extremely difficult to reach the face curtain. In addition, a tall (six foot or over) pilot must first pull the face curtain up before he can bring it over his helmet and down to fire the seat. The leading edge of the curtain may thus be exposed to the slipstream and could be blown out of the pilot's hands.

g. Safety belts

It is recommended that a standard safety belt testing machine be made available to carriers for testing the tensile strength of safety belts. The type outlined in Technical Note 1-42 of 9 January 1948 is inadequate and will not stand any great usage.

5. VC DETACHMENTS

a. Photo Unit - VC-61 Unit MAN

(1) Unit MAN of Composite Squadron SIXTY-ONE, the only Air Pac unit assigned Air Group SEVEN, joined the Air Group in San Diego just before deployment. The unit consisted of five pilots and 19 men. Its original aircraft complement was three F9F-2P's. After the first tour on the line the unit received three F2H-2P's and spent the in-port period checking out in the new aircraft. None of the pilots had any previous time in the Banshee. Seventy-five combat missions were flown in the Banshee during the next tour on the line. Upon the completion of the second tour on the line the F2H-2P's were transferred to the Photo Unit on the ORISKANY and Unit MAN reverted back to the F9F-2P's. This transition presented no unusual difficulties. For the last tour the Photo Unit received three F9F-5P's and spent a large portion of the in-port period in familiarization and FCLP. Fifty-eight combat missions were flown in F9F-5P's. This was the first time that the F9F-5P's were flown in combat.

(2) Recommendations

On the basis of this unit’s experience with three different types of photo-configured aircraft, it recommended that all photo units deploying to VMF-314 should be self supporting and capable of performing their own aircraft maintenance. The advantage of a small, integral group, completely familiar with several aircraft can not be overemphasized.

(3) Aircraft

The F9F-2P was an O & R modification of an F9F-2B and was the best interim photo plane available until the arrival of the F2H-2P and F9F-5P. In general, the Banshee is a far superior photo plane to the F9F-5P. Operationally, it has greater range, better stability as a photo platform, and excellent carrier landing characteristics. Photographically, it has greater versatility with three rotatable camera bays versus two bays, only one of which is rotatable, in the F9F-5P. Furthermore, the camera bays on the Banshee were very accessible on the deck. Specific discrepancies on the two planes are listed as follows:
FW-2P

(a) Interval controllers failed in two aircraft.

(b) Manual operation was dependent on the interval controller and main inverter. Failure of either prevented any photo coverage.

(c) When first received, three of the camera mounts would not rotate and the vacuum motors ran continuously even with the camera power switch in the off position.

(d) The following parts burned out on the view finder assembly:
(a) circulating air motor, (b) motor for rotating view finder, (c) grid lights.

F9F-5P

(a) The forward camera bay which houses the 12" focal length camera was not designed to rotate, requiring all obliques to be taken by the longer focal length camera in the rear bay. This is an extremely impractical arrangement.

(b) The cameras are dependent on the interval controller and main inverter for manual operation. Failure of either prevents any photo coverage.

(c) Dzus buttons on the camera windows should be fastened and unfastened only with a dzus screwdriver. This unit has secured a special dzus screwdriver inside the camera compartment of each aircraft making it readily accessible.

(d) The view finders are unsatisfactory because sighting through them is difficult, as the pilot must keep his head in a definite position to obtain any view finder vision. In addition, the center grid lines are off center.

(e) The camera bays are reached only from the top of the nose section, necessitating a ladder for routine magazine changes. A camera davit must be utilized to remove cameras. This is very impractical especially on a windy and cold flight deck.

(4) Photographic Equipment

(a) The unit experienced twenty-three camera failures. Fifteen of these occurred in A8 and A8 modified magazines and in the camera case drive. The latter was caused by the breakdown of the magazines.

(b) The A8 magazines should not be used with cameras that have 1½ second recycle time. In fact, the A8 magazine should be considered obsolete for all practical purposes.
(c) The A8 Baker magazine should be further modified before issue to operating units. Modification simply consists of replacing the plastic gears with metal ones. Plastic gears in A8 Baker magazine No. 1331 failed on the first exposure taken with the new magazine.

(5) Recommendations for Camera Repair

(a) Each carrier should establish an adequate camera repair shop on board with necessary tools, testing equipment, and spare parts.

(b) At least one camera repairman should be included in the ship's complement. His main duties would be to make minor adjustments, tests, repairs, and preventative maintenance on all photo equipment. (Fortunately this unit had a skilled camera repairman whose efforts were solely responsible for keeping a workable number of cameras in an operating condition).

(c) A camera repair facility should be established in the Far East area. This facility should stock sufficient photographic equipment as replacements for that which is turned in for repairs. In this way, ships could request replacement of defective equipment by dispatch and receive timely action. It is illogical to establish elaborate procedures to maintain aircraft and not provide facilities to maintain in serviceable condition the equipment for specially configured aircraft. With the constantly increasing demand for photo reconnaissance, definite steps should be taken to improve the present weak camera repair system.

(6) General Recommendations

Photo aircraft have progressed much more rapidly than aerial cameras. Consequently the limiting factor in jet photography is the camera. Speed must be decreased because of slow shutter speeds and amount of coverage is lessened by magazine capacity. Until a camera designed to utilize the capabilities of jet aircraft is available, progress in photo reconnaissance will remain at a standstill.

b. VC-12 (AS & AEW)

(1) The limitations of APS-20A radar carried in the AD/M are not fully appreciated by some controlling ships. A snorkel submarine can be detected at a maximum range of 35 miles under ideal conditions but the range is markedly reduced in high sea states. The sea return on the APS-20A also becomes
appreciable under high sea conditions, often exceeding 30 miles at a search altitude of 1000 feet. Reduction of sea return necessitates the use of special circuits which in turn reduce the chance of target detection. However by careful attention to altitude, range, and special circuits, the radar operator will utilize the maximum target detection capabilities. The search altitude and radius of the "box pattern" type of search over the Task Force can best be determined by the pilot after he becomes airborne. In this way the force could be held on the radar scope free from clutter at all times, a condition sometimes impossible to attain when maintaining a constant distance of 20 miles from the force.

(2) The use of an additional AD4W for AEW radio relay in addition to the ASP is recommended under the following circumstances:

(a) When night hecklers are airborne. A great amount of weather information is requested of night hecklers and the standard practice has been for the ASP to relay this weather. This procedure has been very unsatisfactory because of the altitude (1000' - 1500') and the distance (20 miles) the ASP normally operates from the Task Force makes radio contact and relay with distant hecklers either impossible or very unreliable.

(b) When day strike groups are scheduled for inland northern targets or any targets beyond reliable radio contact with TACC or SAR facilities, an AD4W on off-the-coast-barrier offers a radio contact or relay which, because of factors of range, altitude, and terrain, the previous mentioned facilities are unable to maintain.

(c) When the Task Force is launching from a considerable distance at sea. In this case the AD4W can provide what it was designed for - AEW. In addition it can assist CIC in vectoring returning strikes, relaying, and locating surface vessels at a greater range than can the ASP.

(3) When such AEW or radio relay flights are scheduled, the communication plan should be included in the Air Plan. Difficulty has been encountered in the past due to confusion about the frequency guarded by the AEW plane, resulting in unnecessary relaying and radio traffic.

c. VC-33 (Night Attack)

In order to insure smooth night operations a thorough understanding of the details of night operations is most essential, and must be clearly
understood by the detachment and ship. These details include hours of operations, armament requirements and capabilities, ship's lighting, catapult and deck launch procedures to be used at night, special berthing and messing requirements, and the general capabilities of each VC detachment, including such items as ECM, radars, VHF middleman, radar bellhop, and other features that will aid both the detachments and the ship.

It is firmly believed that a major amount of damage can be inflicted on the enemy by increasing night operations, preferably by adding a night carrier to the force. In the Navy sector, enemy movements are virtually unrestricted for a period of 6 to 9 hours a night depending upon the season. Night hecklers from the carriers prove their worth by stopping and destroying enemy transportation of troops and materials, but they are limited in the extent of their efforts by the demanding day schedule.

d. VC-4 (Night Fighters)

(1) Comments

(a) Night Fighter detachments have two basic missions in this combat theater:

1. Defense of the Task Force against enemy air attack during the night and during periods of low visibility.

2. Night attacks against the enemy's transportation system.

(b) In regard to defense of the Task Force, it is seriously questioned whether the F4U-5N in Condition Four is capable of a successful intercept against an enemy aircraft other than a slow patrol plane. It was found during World War II that, with a night interceptor of limited speed and rate of climb, Condition One was the only defensive state of readiness.
other than that of an airborne CAP, which allowed a reasonable chance of successful interception of enemy aircraft prior to the completion of their mission. It is further felt that the effectiveness of night interceptors depends not only upon the individual ability of the pilots and directors, but especially upon the degree of teamwork between these individuals, which can be developed and maintained only by frequent practice. No practice all-weather intercepts nor test alerts from Condition Four have been made during the entire tour of this detachment in the Korean area.

(c) It has already been stated many times that night detachments have not been given a full opportunity to accomplish their mission of night attack because they are not launched during the night hours when North Korean traffic is at its heaviest. Of the average hour and a half that the night hecklers spend over the beach on each mission, considerable time is wasted because during daylight hours enemy traffic rarely moves.

(2) Recommendations

(a) It is recommended that the potentials of night fighters maintained in Condition Four be thoroughly investigated and that, regardless of which condition of readiness is considered most advantageous, night fighters be launched as frequently as possible to maintain the individual proficiency of those involved, to develop teamwork between CIC and pilot, and to train the ship and night fighter personnel in rapid night launch techniques.

(b) It is well understood that twenty-four hour operations (or close to that) are impossible aboard a carrier which operates steadily over an extended period of time. Yet it is recommended that a greater night effort be made, either by having a night carrier on the line from time to time or by periodically emphasizing night operations at the expense of day operations.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Transfers

It is strongly believed that squadron officers and men should be frozen in their billets during combat tours. Squadrons should be able to operate at peak efficiency during combat operations, and the loss by transfer or detachment of even a few officers and men obviously affects adversely the ability of squadrons to maintain the high standards of availability and maintenance required to operate successfully in this theater. No personnel eligible for discharge to inactive duty should accompany squadrons being deployed to the combat area unless they re-enlist or extend. As mentioned in a previous Action Report, it is hoped that the Bureau of Naval Personnel will refrain from transferring men to shore duty during combat tours, for while replacements are provided by ComAirPac or ComFairPac, the time lag and break in continuity result in a decrease of operating efficiency.

b. Use of Manpower

It is believed that the officer personnel allowance of CVC-7 squadrons
is sufficient, providing that the staff of the Air Group Commander contains a qualified Maintenance Officer, Ordnance Officer, Electronics Officer, Operations Officer, Administrative Officer, and Flight Surgeon. If such officers are not provided the Air Group Commander, it is essential that they be furnished at the squadron level. It is felt that one thoroughly qualified Maintenance Officer on the CAG Staff, for example, with the assistance of squadron pilot-maintenance officers, can adequately fulfill all maintenance requirements without the need for a ground maintenance officer assigned to each squadron.

Squadron allowances for rated personnel are considered reasonably adequate for combat operations, particularly in view of the revised allowances for ordnancemen. Based on the old allowances, however, the ordnancemen of this Air Group have been consistently overworked due to the sustained and heavy operating schedule. The necessity for each squadron to provide mess cooks, compartment cleaners, laundrymen, etc., to the ship has cut down to a serious degree the number of "working hands" available to the squadrons. However, it is doubted if corrective measures can be taken, since lack of berthing space of Essex class carriers precludes an increase in either allowance or complement of seamen, and the squadrons cannot sacrifice rated men in order to obtain more seamen.

c. There has been no morale problem of any kind within the Air Group during the entire cruise. The morale of both pilots and enlisted personnel remained at a high level throughout the cruise and was at its peak during the last and final tour on the line.

7. AVIATION ELECTRONICS

a. General

(1) ARN-6 Loop Antenna difficulties were encountered when low wind conditions required 4000 psi accumulator pressures to be employed on the H4B catapults. The high "G" forces imposed on the loop antenna mounting rack caused it to tear loose from the aircraft frame. A report of the difficulty plus the temporary fix employed was made to BuAer and all other interested commands.
PART VII

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

A. STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE PERIOD 6 NOVEMBER 1952 TO 18 DECEMBER 1952

1. Medical

a. Admissions to the Sick List

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sick days</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible work days</td>
<td>85,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of work days lost to sick days</td>
<td>.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots admitted to sick list</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients treated from other vessels</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sick days</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Treatments Accomplished - Non-Admission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
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<td>Venereal Disease</td>
<td>45</td>
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</table>

c. Grounded Flight Personnel

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Post Accident</th>
<th>Disp. Board</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. Days</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crewnen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Pilot days possible</td>
<td>3,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of pilot days lost to sick days and grounding</td>
<td>.7%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2. Air Operations

a. Sorties Flown in Operating Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F4U-4</th>
<th>F4U-5N</th>
<th>AD-4</th>
<th>AD-4NL</th>
<th>AD4-W</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRIKE/RECCO</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO/PHOTO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>ESCORT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCN SPOT</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
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<td>HACKER</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>AST/AEM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
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<td>GATOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>RECCO</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>TAR CAP</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISC. (slow</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time, ferry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abort, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>697</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Minus Aborts   | -10 |
| Total Sorties  | 1451|

- Total Sorties Scheduled: 1474
- Total Sorties Flown: 1451
- % Total Scheduled Missions Flown: 98.4
- Total Hours Flown: 323?1
- Days of Operations: 15
- Average hours per operating day: 215.1
3. Operational Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>BuNo</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123407</td>
<td>LW2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Farrier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123409</td>
<td>LW2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Landed with port gear folded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-5F</td>
<td>125321</td>
<td>LV1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Barricade engagement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Battle Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>BuNo</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov</td>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>124759</td>
<td>3T2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, port stub wing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123400</td>
<td>3T</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Flak, stbd flaps stabilizer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Dec</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>124965</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Shot down.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123409</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, nose section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123400</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, port stub wing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>128962</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Flak, port wing leading edge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81006</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>.50 Cal. holes, port flap.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123498</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Flak, stabilizer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>80905</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, port wing leading edge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81985</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Stabilizer hit by tail fuze spindle.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>127101</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, stbd wing leading edge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123413</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, port elevator.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123422</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, port wing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123416</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, nose section.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>127200</td>
<td>1T1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Bomb blast, wings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Analysis of Flak Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>F9F/F9F-5F</th>
<th>F4U/F4U-5N</th>
<th>AD/AD-4NL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (heavy/AA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits per 100 sorties</td>
<td>.37%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.62%</td>
<td>.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (Small Arms)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits per 100 sorties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.32%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.065%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hits</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DECLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>F9F/F9F-5P</th>
<th>F4U/F4U-5N</th>
<th>AD/AD-4NL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total hits/sorties</td>
<td>.37%</td>
<td>.32%</td>
<td>.62%</td>
<td>.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost/100 sorties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost/100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.31%</td>
<td>.085%</td>
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</table>

6. Ordnance Expended

a. Ship

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/38 ALC</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40MM</td>
<td>1,805</td>
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b. Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>528</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2000# G.P.</td>
<td>3.5&quot; Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1000# G.P.</td>
<td>5&quot; &amp; 6.5&quot; ATAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>50# SAP</td>
<td>Gun Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1000# SAP</td>
<td>203,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>683</td>
<td>260# Frag</td>
<td>52,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 Cal.</td>
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</table>

### Pyrotechnics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
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</table>

MK 6 Parachute Flare
B. STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE ENTIRE CRUISE IN FAR EAST (21 June - 18 December 1952)

1. Personnel
   
a. Average Sorties and Flight Time Per Pilot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Average No. Pilots</th>
<th>Sorties Per Pilot</th>
<th>Hours Per Pilot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>183.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA-75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Flight Personnel Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>enemy</td>
<td>Oper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-74</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF-71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-12</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Medical Statistics

- Patients admitted to sick list: 1,090
- Total Sick days: 2,728
- Total treatments rendered (sick calls): 21,946
d. Dental

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>During period</th>
<th>Average per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patients treated</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sittings</td>
<td>4,603</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restorations</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractions</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apicoectomy</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Air Operations

a. Missions in Operating Area (21 June thru 18 December 1952)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MISSION</th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F4U-4</th>
<th>F4U-5N</th>
<th>AD-4</th>
<th>AD-4NL</th>
<th>AD-4W</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRIKE/RECO</td>
<td>1786</td>
<td>1233</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>4234</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/P</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO/PHOTO ESCORT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>PESCAP</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCF SIOT</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>HECKLER</td>
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<td>161</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>321</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>202</td>
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<tr>
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<td>75</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL SEARCH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM RECO</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAR C.A.F.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH NET RECO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISC. (Slow time ferry, abort, etc.)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>7370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minus aborts = 53
Total sorties flown = 7317
a. **Missions in Operating Area (cont'd)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sorties Scheduled</td>
<td>7572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sorties Flown</td>
<td>7317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Scheduled Missions Flown</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sorties Flown</td>
<td>7317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Offensive</td>
<td>5512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Defensive</td>
<td>1441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Misc.</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours Flown</td>
<td>16,025.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of Operation</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hours per operating day</td>
<td>200.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Sorties (CRI)</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CVG 7 landings</td>
<td>7529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVG 7 landings (CRI)</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total Carrier Landings (including qual.)</td>
<td>3202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of COD landings 73
Total emergency landings of aircraft from sister ships.

```
Total aircraft landed: 9820 360
```

b. **Number of aircraft Catapulted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starboard Catapult</td>
<td>2421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Catapult</td>
<td>2232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. **Aviation Gasoline used**

3,650,931 gallons

d. **Aviation Lube Oil used**

73,002 gallons

e. **Alcohol used**

120 gallons

f. **Barrier Crashes and Engagements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE / A/C</th>
<th>Repaired on Board</th>
<th>Major O/H</th>
<th>Strike</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-5P</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4/4L</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT. L</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
g. Aircraft Lost, Operational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Aircraft Damaged Beyond Shipboard Repair, Operational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-5P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Minor Damage Repaired on Board, Operational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4ML</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2H-2P</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Analysis of Flak Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>F9F/Photo</th>
<th>F4U/F4U5N</th>
<th>A/A/D/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>2378</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>1521</td>
<td>5512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (Heavy/AW)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits / 100 sorties</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (Small Arms)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits (Small Arms)/100 sorties</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hits</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hits/100 sorties</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost/100 sorties</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
k. Aircraft Availability

2 July to 20 August

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2F</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Sept to 28 Sept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>91.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>85.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2H-2F</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Oct to 5 Nov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2F</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Nov to 17 Dec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-5F</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entire Combat Period (21 June - 18 Dec)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>91.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4W</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4NL</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ship's Operations

a. Ship's Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On the line</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days to and from the</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operating area</td>
<td></td>
<td>77.3% (at sea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alongside Piedmont Pier</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka, Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moored to Buoy Yokosuka, Japan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moored to Buoy Sasebo, Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.7% (in port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Ship's Operations (Cont'd)

b. The data given below has been compiled from Engineering records and covers the period from time of mooring at Yokosuka on 18 June 1952 through 2400 on 18 December 1952:

(1) Amount of NSFO onboard 2400 18 June 1952: 1,284,305 gallons or 30,579 barrels

(2) Total NSFO received onboard during period: 10,775,688 gallons or 265,564 barrels

(3) NSFO expended underway: 8,492,856 gallons or 202,163 barrels

(4) NSFO used at anchor: 320,144 gallons or 7,623 barrels

(5) NSFO delivered to DD's (34)*: 1,538,181 gallons or 36,623 barrels

(6) NSFO on hand 2400 18 December (by figures): 1,708,812 gallons or 40,686 barrels

(7) On hand 2400 18 December (soundings): 1,693,778 gallons or 40,328 barrels

(8) Loss by inventory

(9) Number of hours underway: 3,354.2 hours

(10) Number of hours at anchor: 1,037.8 hours

(11) Engine miles steamed: 55,169.0 miles

(12) Water distilled ship's tanks: 7,276,002 gallons

(13) Water distilled to Reserve Feed Tanks: 3,565,368 gallons

(14) Water received from outside source: 3,737,919 gallons

(15) Average gallons/ capita: 18.7 gallons

(16) Average gallons Feed Water per mile: 55.0 gallons

(17) Average gallons Feed Water per hour at anchor: 419.0 gallons

(18) NSFO gallons per mile underway: 153.9 gallons (average)

(19) NSFO gallons per hour at anchor: 30.5 gallons (average)

* This figure includes 132,400 gallons or 3,152.4 barrels delivered to four DD's on 16 June 1952 while enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

4. Ordnance

a. Total Ordnance Expenditures

(1) Ship

5"/38 Caliber

878 rounds

40MM

8,519 rounds
a. Total Ordnance Expenditures (Cont'd)

(2) Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>460</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,241</td>
<td>4,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,220</td>
<td>250# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,217</td>
<td>100# G.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>500# SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1000# S.A.P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>260# Frag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>350# T.B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Incendiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>Frag Clusters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3.5&quot; Solid</th>
<th>5&quot; &amp; 6.5&quot; ATAR</th>
<th>5&quot; HVAR</th>
<th>Gun Ammo</th>
<th>Fire Bombs</th>
<th>Pyrotechnics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,226 - MK 6 Farachute Flares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# G.P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# SAP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# S.A.P</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260# Frag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350# T.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frag Clusters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aircraft ammunition listed above represents a total tonnage of 6,264.35 short tons.

b. Ordnance Malfunctions

(1) Bombs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F4U</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hung</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped on arrested landings</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped during catapult shots</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Rockets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F4U</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duds</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unplugged</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Pigtails</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circuit failures</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Ordnance Material Failures and Repairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Casualty</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 LCK MK 14-8</td>
<td>Out of adjustment</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 LCS MK 15</td>
<td>Out of adjustment</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Limit stop MK Fuze setter</td>
<td>Broken</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Ordnance Material Failures and Repairs (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Casualty</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Elev. Rec. Reg Synchro MK 5-2</td>
<td>Burned out</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Stroke Generators MK Power drive</td>
<td>Burned out</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable - KTOP-10 (40MM Mts 40-6 and 40-13) 200 feet.</td>
<td>Grounded out</td>
<td>Renewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable - DCOP-4 (Firing lead cable Mts. 55, 56 and 58) 75 Feet.</td>
<td>Open leads</td>
<td>Renewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Firing motors</td>
<td>Burned out</td>
<td>Rewound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cooling motors</td>
<td>Burned out</td>
<td>Rewound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Starting switches</td>
<td>Burned out</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Total Damage Inflicted on the Enemy in Terms of Targets noted as Follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerhouses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toats</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Ship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridges (Highway)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges (Railroad)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Storage Facilities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Storage Facilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Stations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Posts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundhouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Turntables</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar and/or Radio Stations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangars</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Mills</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Antennae</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighthouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Loading Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Shelters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Traps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Damage inflicted on the Enemy (Cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Construction Equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penstocks</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surge Tanks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Houses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Towers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Line Towers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch Yards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Facilities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Parking Areas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp Mill</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grainery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke Oven</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cre Station</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Storage Facility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Casualties</td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>607</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenches Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td>785 yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Tracks Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,260 yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, smoke, flak, or time prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Damage inflicted by Close-Air-Support missions could rarely be assessed, and results could only be reported in terms of coverage and effectiveness. The specific effects of these CAS missions may never be known.

6. Ship's Records Established During the Cruise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
<th>No. Aircraft</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
<th>Average Intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Min  Sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Launch</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.6 Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop Launch</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.6 Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Launch</td>
<td>42(15J, 27P)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19.4 Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet Landing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26.4 Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Landing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24.9 Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Landing</td>
<td>28(4J, 24P)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25.8 Sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Photographic Product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGATIVES PROCESSED</th>
<th>18 to 27 June 4 Aug</th>
<th>26 June to 4 Aug 18 Aug</th>
<th>5 Aug to 18 Aug</th>
<th>19 Aug to 26 Sept</th>
<th>29 Sept to 5 Nov</th>
<th>6 Nov to 18 Dec</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 x 5 inches*</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2159</td>
<td>2895</td>
<td>2155</td>
<td>9888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 x 10 &quot;</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 9 &quot;</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>6635</td>
<td>3604</td>
<td>5738</td>
<td>8493</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>25577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 x 18 &quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6740</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4461</td>
<td>11251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1031</td>
<td>9028</td>
<td>3794</td>
<td>14927</td>
<td>11614</td>
<td>7785</td>
<td>48179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINTS PROCESSED</th>
<th>Contact prints</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Average per Op Day</th>
<th>Largest single days</th>
<th>Enlargements</th>
<th>8 x 10 inches</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 x 5 inch</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>3615</td>
<td>4804</td>
<td>3093</td>
<td>14561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 x 10 &quot;</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>3699</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>4253</td>
<td>3749.</td>
<td>7343</td>
<td>20446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>5929</td>
<td>1477</td>
<td>7868</td>
<td>8553</td>
<td>16536</td>
<td>35007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION PICTURE FILM</th>
<th>Processed</th>
<th>16mm P&amp;W</th>
<th>35mm B&amp;W</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>16mm Kodachrome film forwarded to NPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>850(^1)</td>
<td>1450(^1)</td>
<td>550(^1)</td>
<td>850(^1)</td>
<td>0(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1450(^1)</td>
<td>550(^1)</td>
<td>720(^1)</td>
<td>1349(^1)</td>
<td>0(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1450(^1)</td>
<td>550(^1)</td>
<td>1800(^1)</td>
<td>872(^1)</td>
<td>1250(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2650(^1)</td>
<td>3750(^1)</td>
<td>7650(^1)</td>
<td>24621(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Included K-20, K-25, and sheet film.

1. F9F-2P photo planes operated two days and flew six sorties.
2. F9F-2P photo planes operated seventeen days and flew seventy-two sorties.
3. F9F-2P photo planes operated five days and flew twenty-one sorties.
4. F2H-2P photo planes operated seventeen days and flew seventy sorties.
5. F9F-2P photo planes operated fourteen days and flew fifty-eight sorties.
6. F9F-5P photo planes operated fifteen days and flew fifty-eight sorties.
8. Communication Traffic

a. Communications Traffic Handled by Visual Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2473</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Communications Traffic Handled by Electrical Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sent</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>On TF Circuit and Relay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Originated</td>
<td>NDT Fox</td>
<td>George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>2716</td>
<td>2196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>7750</td>
<td>6968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>7964</td>
<td>6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>8668</td>
<td>6497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>6872</td>
<td>5681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>5894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>7056</td>
<td>6350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8303</td>
<td>48526</td>
<td>40088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total of messages sent and received electrically: 110,553

c. Post Office Turnover

(1) Incoming
- Mail bags: 2,504
- Letters: 750,000
- Parcels and newspapers: 60,000

(2) Outgoing
- Mail bags: 3,405
- Letters and small parcels: 700,000
- Large items: 525

(3) Stamp sales: 18,630.80

(4) Money Orders sales: 54,926.34
REPLENISHMENT STATISTICS - All replenishment operations were conducted without incident or casualty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF SHIP</th>
<th>NO. THIS PERIOD</th>
<th>NO. ENTIRE TOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO, AE, AF &amp; AKA DD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>TIME ALONGSIDE</th>
<th>TIME ALONGSIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100 hrs, 1 min.</td>
<td>2 hrs, 56 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>59 hrs, 8 mins.</td>
<td>1 hr, 50 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 hrs, 32 mins.</td>
<td>1 hr, 30 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5 hrs, 58 mins.</td>
<td>1 hr, 59 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>169 hrs, 40 mins.</td>
<td>2 hrs, 21 mins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MATERIAL TRANSFERRED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Av. Gas.</td>
<td>3,331,042 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSFO</td>
<td>197,275.1 bbls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>1,210.4 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo</td>
<td>5,912.4 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CONAVFE (1) Advance
CONSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CONAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, USS ANTETAM (CVA36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CVA21) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA9) (1)
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47) (1)

CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) (1)
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE116) (1)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE119) (1)
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE114) (1)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL29) (1)
CO, VF 73 NAS, QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
COMAIRLANT (1)
COMCARAIRCRU TWO (1)
COMCARAIRCRU FIVE (1)
COMCARAIRCRU ELEVEN (1)
COMCARAIRCRU FIFTEEN (1)
COMCARAIRCRU NINETEEN (1)
COMCARAIRCRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
COMCARAIRCRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
COMCARAIRCRU SEVEN (25) (for Squadron and parent VC Units)
COMCARAIRCRU (ATU) ONE (1)
COMPAIRQUONSET (1)
COMSERVPAC (1)
HLO JOG KOREA (1)

P. W. WATSON