From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN(CVL-29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Task Group 96.8
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet


Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
    (b) CNO ltr Op 345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950
    NDB 15 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 2-15 January 1951

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1), with Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN operated with TG 96.8 off the West Coast of Korea.

3. When enclosure (1) is detached downgrade to restricted.

Copy to:
ComCarDiv 15
PART I
NARRATIVE

Pursuant to orders of Commander SEVENTH Fleet of 1 January 1951, BATAAN, with USS MADDOX (DD-731) and USS SAMUEL M. MOORE (DD-747) as escorts, was detached from TF 77, then operating off the east coast of Korea, on 2 January to proceed via Tsushima Strait to the operating area off the west coast of Korea to join TG 96.8. At 0739, 3 January 1951 rendezvous with TG 96.8 was effected in the vicinity of Lat. 36°40'N Long. 125°20'E. Major units present were USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and USS SICILY (CVE-118) in formation 4R, screened by ships of DesRon 7. CTG 96.8 was Rear Admiral R. W. RUBLE, ComCarDiv 15 in BADOENG STRAIT, guide. TG 96.8 was then operating in accordance with ComCarDiv 15 OpOrder No. 16-50.

From 3 January through 7 January BATAAN operated with TG 96.8, conducting normal carrier task group air operations in support of the Eighth Army in Korea. These operations comprised normal Close Air Support, Armed Recco, and Task Group Combat Air Patrol missions.

During this period, each carrier and two or three destroyers of the screen were withdrawn from the Task Group by CTG 96.8 to join and replenish from TG 79.3 in the vicinity of Lat. 34°40'N Long. 124°10'E. SICILY, MAC KENZIE, TAUSSIG, and SMALL replenished on 5 January. At 2125 5 January BATAAN, BOLE, and LOFBERG formed TE 96.83, CTE 96.83 in BATAAN, and detached pursuant to orders of CTG 96.8 to join TG 79.3 for replenishment. At 0608 rendezvous was effected with the replenishment group consisting of USS CIMMARON (AO-22), OTC, USS POLLUX and USS CHARA and CTE 96.83 assumed tactical command. Formation 4F, USS CIMMARON guide was formed and replenishment commenced at 0812. Replenishment was completed at 1652, TG 79.3 was detached, and TE 96.83 proceeded to rejoin TG 96.8. As BATAAN and screen rejoined TG 96.8 at 2243 BADOENG STRAIT, HANSON, MOORE, and MADDOX were detached to replenish. BATAAN, SICILY and remaining destroyers then composed TG 96.8 and the Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN was designated OTC. BADOENG STRAIT and destroyers rejoined at 1958 and ComCarDiv 15 resumed OTC. At 2030 TG 96.8 left the west coast operating area and proceeded to Sasebo, Japan. On the morning of 8 January, while enroute to Sasebo, rendezvous with TG 79.3 was effected and BADOENG STRAIT and destroyers completed replenishment which had not been accomplished the day before.
At 0900 BATAAN arrived at Sasebo in company with other units of TG 96.8 and moored to Buoy 21 for a period of upkeep and provisioning. On 14 January, pursuant to orders of ComNavFE BATAAN reported to CTF 95 for duty.
PART II

CHRONOLOGY

2 January 1951  Departed TF 77, orders changed, ordered to rendezvous with TG 96.8, west coast Korea. No air operations.

3 January 1951  Rendezvoused with TG 96.8, off west coast of Korea, OTC Rear Admiral Ruble, ComCarDiv 15. Launched 4 offensive sorties, all CAS.

4 January 1951  Operating with TG 96.8. Launched 22 offensive sorties, all CAS.

5 January 1951  Operating with TG 96.8. Launched 20 offensive sorties, all RECON and 8 CAP.

6 January 1951  Replenished at sea with TG 79.3.

7 January 1951  Operating with TG 96.8. Launched 25 offensive sorties, all CAS.

8 January 1951  Operating with TG 96.8. Enroute west coast Korea to Sasebo, Japan for period of upkeep.

9 January 1951  Arrived Sasebo, Japan in company with TG 96.8.

10-14 January 1951  Sasebo, Japan for upkeep.

15 January 1951  CTG 96.8 departed Sasebo. BATAAN remained Sasebo and ordered to take DesDiv 72 under orders and depart for the west coast of Korea to relieve HMS THESEUS and screen as TE 95.11
PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND
EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Shipboard Material and Equipment

(a) As a result of frequent heavy seas over the bow, considerable difficulty was experienced with grounds in the exposed wiring of the forward 40 mm mount. Initially, this was traceable to deteriorated cable insulation and was corrected by renewal of affected cables. However, exposed cables continued to suffer damage from heavy seas with further grounds occurring. Renewal of cables appears to be the only remedy for this difficulty with the mount as now designed. It is recommended that in future automatic gun designs every effort be made to shield all cable of forward exposed mounts from the battering effect of the sea.

(b) No other difficulty with the ship's ordnance installation was experienced.

2. Aviation Ordnance

(a) During this period, despite the normal low temperature experienced, good results were obtained from the Napalm mixture by heating the gasoline to approximately 90°-95° in a mixer heating device on planes the PHILIPPINE SEA had used, satisfactory results were attained.

(b) Failures of HVAR's to fire and 100# bombs carried on the 100# bombrack assembly to drop were attributable to firing circuit discrepancies. Carrier landings made with unexpended HVARs and 100# bombs on wing rocket stations resulted in weakening and ultimate failure of rivets securing rocket launcher posts to the wings. Repairs were frequently required and necessitated grounding affected aircraft for refit or replacement of rocket launcher post assemblies. The frequency of damage was reduced by more careful attention to loading and the reduction of firing circuit discrepancies. However, no ready field fix was devised. It is anticipated that the installation of Aircraft Armament Service Change #52, when material is received, will correct this discrepancy.

(c) No other difficulty with aircraft ordnance was noted.
3. Ammunition expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 cal. AMG</td>
<td>59,200 rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>F51 Napalm tanks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>1,512 pounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>100# G.P.</td>
<td>149</td>
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<tr>
<td>500# G.P.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.0 HVAR</td>
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</table>
PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(A) Own

5 January, F4U-4 BuNo 97191 suffered one hit by 50 cal. bullet. Creased starboard wing 3 feet from tip but did not penetrate. Ground fire.

(B) Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts 3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Oxen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight Cars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated 138.
PART V
PERSONNEL; PERFORMANCE, and CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel was excellent. Shortages of radiomen, quartermasters and radarmen worked a hardship on these personnel in frequency and length of watches. It is anticipated that this condition will be relieved when additional personnel now ordered are received aboard, and when sonarmen are fully capable of handling the duties of radarmen on watch. Additional seamen still are needed to adequately man gunnery stations and handle deck details.

There were no personnel casualties during the period of this report.
1. Operations (General)

(a) It was noted that the majority of documents and despatches which required frequent reference and deserved prompt and wide dissemination during operations were over-classified for these purposes. Generally, the documents themselves contained no provision for downgrading at any time.

It is strongly recommended that every effort be made to keep the security classifications of operational information as low as possible and where initial classification necessarily is high, provision be made for downgrading as soon as possible after an operation is underway.

(b) At replenishment, the ammunition ship reported unable to commence replenishment at first light as requested due to late receipt of requirements and resultant delay in breakout. Delay in receipt of requirements was due to the short notice given to replenish and to normal delays in encryption and transmission of the requirements report.

It is recommended that replenishment plans reach individual ships at least thirty-six hours in advance of scheduled replenishment. This normally will ensure delivery of requirements in ample time for replenishment ships to complete breakout even in event the military situation permits breakout only during daylight.

(c) The codes used in TG 96.8 in reporting ammunition expenditures and receipts and in requesting ammunition for replenishment differed from those in use in TF 77. Neither code filled all needs in that fuzes and types of ammunition were not covered in sufficient detail.

In consequence it is recommended that one code be promulgated for use by all commands and that this code cover fuse types in detail and distinguish between the various types of ammunition of a given caliber.

(d) There appears to be need for both Anti-aircraft and Air Defense exercises on a group basis under the present
operating conditions which make it unpractical to conduct normal AA and Air Defense training exercises.

It is recommended that elements of the CAP be used as simulated targets for Air Defense exercises as the military situation permits and that tow planes be provided each carrier task force. In event tow planes cannot be made available it is recommended frequent "surprise burst" practices be conducted.

2. Air Operations

(a) The daily air ordnance plan generally specified one bomb fuzing only; instantaneous nose and non-delay tail fuzes. Pilots reported many instances in which short delay fuzes would have been more effective and they also reported instances where "daisy cutters" would have been very effective.

It is realized that in selecting the fuzing to be used not all contingencies can be provided for. However, since selective arming features are incorporated in aircraft ordnance systems, it is recommended that advantage be taken of this fact in specifying a broader choice of bomb fuze settings in future air plans.

(b) During this period of operations, the absence of TACP's at the battalion, company, and patrol levels prevented effective close air support. Flights which departed on close air support missions found it necessary to divert to general air support or armed recco to dispose of their ordnance loads when no controllers were available. This greatly reduced the efficiency of the flight and lowered pilot morale when no worthwhile targets could be found in the time available.

It is strongly recommended that when the ground forces are unable to maintain sufficient TACP's and TAC's in contact with the enemy that augmenting TAC's be provided by the carrier force itself.

3. C.I.C.

(a) Efficiency of CIC has been affected, in many cases, by replacement of experienced regular Navy personnel by reserves recalled to active duty and reporting directly to the ship. Many of these men have, either by inclination or circumstances, not maintained the minimum requirements for their respective rates or kept abreast of the developments affecting CIC equipment or organization.
Recommendation is made that insofar as is practicable all reserves recalled to active duty, especially petty officers, be thoroughly screened upon recall and, where necessary, be sent to various service schools for retraining prior to assignments to fleet units.

(b) The over-all training program carried on in CIC would have been helped considerably had all of the new men a more thorough knowledge and understanding of the true functions of CIC and its inter-ship and force relationship.

Recommendation is made that various service schools, apart from instructing enlisted students in the mechanical operation of various equipments, make an all-out effort to indoctrinate all men with the functions of CIC as a component of a task force or task group.

(c) An appalling number of radarmen have either little or no knowledge of aircraft types, recognition or performance of either U.S. or foreign aircraft. It is considered that recognition by type and performance is as important for radarmen as visual recognition is for lookouts. This deficiency is being taken care of in the ship's training program.

Recommendation is made that more stress be placed on aircraft recognition courses in the various service schools and that "performance recognition" of current aircraft types be included in proficiency tests for advancement in rate for radarmen.

4. Communications

(a) Direct communications from ship to shore for onward routing to the various FOX schedules appeared to be the most reliable and rapid means of passing messages to commands in adjacent operating area. Force and Group common circuits for the most part were overloaded with high precedence traffic almost continuously. It was not uncommon to receive a signal to the effect that "Your turn is number 7" when operational immediate traffic was on hand for transmission.

It is recommended that (1) the ship/shore guard for all ships in a group be assumed by the group commander who should accept all traffic originated within the group for relay over this circuit or such other circuits as available. This would eliminate considerable calling
and answering by individual ships and stations on the ship/shore series and, although it would cause considerable load on the group commander, it is believed that communications could be handled much more rapidly and effectively. (2) Individual ships should not attempt to clear traffic on force or group commanders circuits unless specifically directed by the group commander to assume guard for the group on the circuit, but the group commander should accept all traffic requiring relay over the group common circuit, or intership RATT circuit or by visual.

(b) The Group Common UHF RATT Circuit proved to be a most reliable and rapid means of exchanging messages between the larger ships in the group. Its amplified and continued use is highly recommended.

(c) A considerable number of messages of high precedence, containing extremely long headings, were received daily over "FOX" circuits, group commanders and other circuits. It was noted that a great number of dispatches containing as many as 20 addressees, with texts consisting of from 200 to 800 groups, were originated by some commands daily.

In the interest of traffic reduction and to speed up the internal handling of certain types of messages, it is recommended that Address Indicating Groups be assigned to cover certain types of messages, such as general situation reports, operational intelligence reports, search summaries, etc. It is further recommended that Commanders of Task Groups required to make daily high precedence reports concerning the above subjects, address them for action to the Force Commander with no information addressees and, further, that the Force Commander summarize these reports and transmit them to those commands who need to know in a single message. It is believed that such a system will greatly speed up messages handling in general and should relieve the cryptographic load considerably.

(d) Visual signalling remains the desirable means of handling communications within the group. Frequently, however, this ship was in receipt of long messages in both plain language and code of high precedence requiring relay during hours of darkness. Although delivery may be effected by "Nancy" the time and effort expended for the transmission and reception of long messages make it doubtful that "Nancy" is adequate for handling certain types of messages.
It is recommended that messages which require visual relay at night be limited to short or low precedence traffic during periods when radio silence is not in effect and messages of high precedence and of considerable length be delivered over group common CW circuit as task group commander "FOX" serially numbered message.
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
      (2) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 15 January 1951 - 7 April 1951; submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
     (b) CNO ltr Op345/a, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug. 1950,
         NDB 15 Aug. 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 15 January 1951 - 7 April 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1), with Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN operated with TG 95.1.

                             [Signature]

Copy to:
ComAirPac
ComCarDiv 15

CONFIDENTIAL
PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

On 15 January 1951 USS BATAAN with VMF 212 embarked report-
ed with DesDiv 72 to CTF 95 for operational control in
accordance with COM7THFLT Secret dispatch 110212Z. CO
USS BATAAN further reported to CTG 95.1, then Vice Admiral
Andrews, RN, for duty and was directed to take BATAAN with
VMF 212 embarked and DesDiv 72 under orders and sail from
Sasebo on 16 January for the west coast of Korea operating
area and on arrival relieve HMS THESEUS (CVL) and screen as
TE 95.11. BATAAN and escorts departed Sasebo at 0735 JTM,
16 January and relieved the THESEUS group at 1900 I in the
vicinity of Lat 36-30 N, Long. 124-54 E. OTC and CTE 95.11,
Captain E.T. Neale, USN, in USS BATAAN (CVL).

From 17 to 26 January, with the exception of 21 January
operations in support of the United Nations troops in Korea
were conducted from sunrise to sunset. The Task Element
Refueled and rearmed at sea 21 January. Operations were in
accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 11-50 and CO USS
BATAAN OpOrder 1-51.

The daily air plan called for forty sorties of which eight
were defensive CAP missions, and the remainder Close Air
Support (CAS), Armed Recco (A/R), and Target CAP (TCAP)
missions. The CAS missions covered Tactical Air Coordinators
of the various Army Corps as assigned by the Joint Operations
Center (JOC), Korea. Armed Recco missions had as their
primary task reconnaissance of the coast and off lying waters
from the bombline north to the 39th parallel in implementa-
tion of the UN blockade of Korea. These missions also
reconnoitered airfields at HAEJU, ONJIN, ONJONG-NI, and
SEOUl, all of which are adjacent to the coast. Secondly,
armed recco flights reconnoitered enemy land communication
routes as assigned by JOC Korea. Generally these were routes
between HAEJU, CHINAMPO, SARIWON, and SEOUL, which were
covered by returning coastal recco flights. In view of the
danger of encountering enemy jet type aircraft and in
accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 11-50 missions were
restricted to the area south of Lat. 39-00N.

Surface operations comprised those necessary to conduct air
operations, replenishment, and night steaming. The group
maintained formation 4R except during replenishment and en-
route to and from the operating area. On 21 January the
group replenished from USS PARACUTIN (AE18) and USS MISPIIIION
(AO105) in the vicinity of Lat. 36-15N, Long. 124-16E. High
winds, heavy seas, and generally bad weather prevailed and
delayed the replenishment 6 hours.

I-1

ENCLOSURE (1)
During this operating period the following noteworthy events occurred: On 18 January an F4U4 aircraft piloted by Captain R. G. Patterson, Jr., USMC, was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire during a Close Air Support mission. Capt. Patterson proceeded toward friendly territory but was forced to make a crash landing behind enemy lines near Suwon. He was uninjured and on clearing the aircraft took cover while other members of his flight formed a RESCAP (rescue combat air patrol) to prevent enemy troops from effecting his capture. An Air Force helicopter was called to the rescue from Pyongtaek and affected Capt. Patterson's rescue within 29 minutes after his landing. No difficulty was experienced in making the rescue.

On 19 January an F4U4 piloted by 1st Lt. Alfred Joseph Ward, USMC, was hit by enemy machine gun or rifle fire while making a strafing run on exposed enemy troops near Kumchon and crashed among the target troops. The aircraft exploded on impact. There was no chance that the pilot survived.

On 20 January an F4U4 piloted by Captain Alfred Hiram Agan, USMCR, was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire or by own bomb blast during recovery from a glide bombing attack on a target in Inchon. The pilot elected to head for a nearby island believed to be friendly to effect a forced landing necessitated by damage sustained from the hit. His alternate choice was to effect a landing on the beach south of Inchon in enemy held territory. He was forced to land in the water before reaching the island and was seen to leave the aircraft alive. However, the scene of the crash was about sixty miles from BATAAN and forty miles from the nearest land based rescue aircraft and although aid was dispatched from both, the pilot died from exposure in the cold water (water temperature about 40 degrees) before rescue could be effected. Initial attempt at rescue by helicopter dispatched from the USS BATAAN was made at 1320 but was unsuccessful due to the cold water. A second attempt was made at 1500 under adverse sea conditions and after considerable difficulty was experienced by the helicopter crew, the body was recovered and returned to the USS BATAAN. Full details of this incident were reported by the USS BATAAN on Medical Officers Report of Aircraft Accident OPNAV-53-339B Rev. 3-50 dated 2-51 and addenda thereto, pertinent parts of which are appended to this report.

When the loss of Capt. Agan is compared with the rescue of Capt. Patterson two days earlier, subsequent rescues effected during the period covered by this report, and others known to this command it is clear that it is better to risk a landing in enemy held territory than in cold water when it is in any way probable that rescue cannot be effected almost immediately.
In all incidents but one with which this command has been connected a RESCAP was formed and was able to keep the downed pilots safe from enemy action until helicopter rescue could be effected. In the excepted instance an Australian pilot landed in an area surrounded by enemy anti-aircraft batteries and at extreme helicopter range. His rescue was not possible before nightfall and AA fired forced the RESCAP to leave the scene, and he was presumably captured.

At 1900I, 25 January, 1951 BATAAN and escorts were relieved as TE 95.11 by THESEUS and escorts, and proceeded to Sasebo for replenishment and upkeep. The group arrived at Sasebo at 1450 26 January and the escorts reported to COM7THFLT for operational control. BATAAN engaged in upkeep and replenishment.

On 1 February ComDesDiv 162 with USS ZELLARS (DD777), USS MASSEY (DD778), and USS FORREST ROYAL (DD872) reported for duty as screen. At 0730 3 February BATAAN and screen departed Sasebo and proceeded to the operating area off the west coast of Korea to again relieve H.M.S. THESEUS and escorts as TE 95.11 in accordance with CTG 95.1. Confidential dispatch 311021Z Jan. Relief was effected at 1900I, 3 February. Air operations commenced at sunrise the following morning. The same general plan as for the previous operating period followed. The group replenished at sea from USS CIVARRON (A022) on 9 February in the vicinity of Lat. 36-00, Long. 124-30, without incident. The more northerly position selected for this replenishment permitted air operations against the enemy to be conducted during the replenishment period. Operations throughout were in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 11-50 and CTF 95 OpOrder 1-51 which was effective.

During this period the following noteworthy events occurred:

Airspot and CAP were provided daily for USS ST PAUL, USS HANK, and HMS BELFAST at Inchon during the period these ships were providing Naval Gunfire Support for the advance of the FIRST CORPS in that area. Both CAP and Airspot aircraft were provided with ordnance load as for close air support missions. It was found practicable to divert these planes from their primary missions long enough during their period on station to employ them with profit against enemy positions in the bombardment area. In many instances these aircraft were able to coordinate attacks on reverse slopes, inaccessible to naval gunfire, with the general fire support plan.

On 11 February Rear Admiral E. A. CRUISE, ComCarDiv 15 was flown to the ship from Itazuke Air Force Base, Japan, for a two day informal inspection and visit. RADM CRUISE departed 12 February and returned to USS BAIRKO, his flagship at
Yokosuka, Japan. Air transportation in TBM type aircraft between BATAAN and Itazuke AFB was provided by COMFAIRJAP.

At 1900I, 13 February BATAAN and escorts were relieved as TE 95.11 by THESEUS and escorts and proceeded to Sasebo for replenishment and upkeep in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential dispatch 110300Z. The group arrived at Sasebo at 1440I, 14 February, having conducted AA firing in Area George enroute. During the period 15 to 22 February the group engaged in upkeep at Sasebo.

At 0730, 23 February the group again sortied to relieve the THESEUS group in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential dispatch 180635Z. The group conducted AA firing and tracking exercises in Area George during the morning and at 1900, 23 February relieved the THESEUS group as TE 95.11. Air operations commenced at sunrise the following morning. A schedule of five ten-plane flights per day was attempted in view of the longer hours of daylight but it was found that the principal target area assigned, the vicinity of HOENGSONG near the center of the UN battle line, was too distant for the schedule to be maintained effectively. Accordingly, the forty sortie schedule previously employed was again used. During this period USS ST PAUL (CA 73) at Inchon requested aerial mapping and photographs of the north bank of the Han River west of Seoul. In the absence of a photo configured airplane an attempt was made to fulfill this request using a K-25 camera, vertically mounted in a homemade installation, for mapping and a hand held K-20 for obliques. Results were only partly successful but pointed the way to further improvements which were later incorporated and proved successful. A report of the installation is being made to cognizant commanders.

The group replenished at sea from USS GUADALUPE (AO 37) on 28 February in the vicinity of Lat 37-00 N Long. 124-00 E. A more northerly position was selected for this replenishment to permit air coverage of ships operating in Changson-Got. During this period no unusual events occurred. On two days, operations were curtailed because of extremely poor weather featured with low visibility and almost continuous snow showers. During this period operations were conducted in accordance with CTF OpPlan 1-51, CTG 95.1 OpPlan 1-51 and CO USS BATAAN OpOrder 1-51 (revised on 5 March 1951). On 5 March USS BATAAN put into Pusan, disembarked VMF 212 and embarked VMF 312 then proceeded to Sasebo arriving 13581 7 March.

The Task Element departed Sasebo 13 March enroute to the West Coast of Korea to relieve HMS THESEUS, commencing operations the morning of 14 March in accordance with CTE 95.11 and CO USS BATAAN Confidential Operation Order 2-51. During this
period Major Prestley was shot down 10 miles NW of Seoul and 1st Lt. Knowles was forced down behind enemy lines. Both pilots were rescued and returned aboard by helicopter. On 18 March units were replenished at sea by the USS PASSUMPSIC (AO 107) and resumed normal operations.

When relieved by HMS THESEUS, units of the Task Element departed the operating area on 22 March and proceeded to Yokosuka, arriving on 25 March. An administrative inspection of USS BATAAN was conducted by personnel of USS BARIOKO on 27 March. On 28 March USS BATAAN reported as a unit of CARDIV 15 by Confidential despatch 280500Z.

On 30 March the group departed Yokosuka in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential despatch 280455Z, relieving HMS THESEUS on station 1 April and commenced operations early morning 2 April. Misfortune befell the first morning when 1st Lt. Hauge was hit by AA fire and after fighting his plane back to vicinity of Inchon he was forced to bail out. He landed offshore and was recovered by a friendly boat; later returned to the ship by helicopter. The following day Captain W. MILLER, USN, prospective Commanding Officer, was flown aboard.

Misfortune struck again on 4 April when VMF 312 lost their Commanding Officer, Major D. P. Frame. Struck by AA fire, his plane caught fire and he attempted to bail out, but his parachute streamed immediately causing him to strike the tail. The chute eventually opened and a normal landing was made in enemy territory 10 miles south of SARIWON. RESCAP held enemy forces down until rescue was effected by helicopter. Major Frame died of injuries while in the helicopter enroute to SUWON.

Replenishment at sea was conducted by USS OBERON (AK 14) and USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) on 5 April after which normal operations were again resumed until 6 April when the Task Element departed the operating area for Sasebo in accordance with CTF 95 Secret Operations Order 2-51, Annex Baker.

END
ADDENDUM TO VAF-212, MAG 33, 1st. MAW, FMF OPNAV-53-339B Serial 2-51
dated 22 January 1951

Subject: Exposure Suit

1. On 20 January 1951 Captain Alfred Hiram AGAN, 013674, USMCR,
piloting a F4D4 sustained damage to his plane which caused engine
failure when he flew through his own bomb blast; however, the
possibility of his having been hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire
cannot be excluded.

2. On ditching aircraft at approximately 1210 the pilot was observed
to climb out of the cockpit, and after inflating life vest he began
to swim toward land. Very soon afterward he appeared to flounder in
the water being unable to swim farther. The temperature of the water
was approximately 35° F. and that of the air 20° F.

3. The rescue helicopter reached the pilot at 1320, one hour and ten
minutes after ditching aircraft. The crewman, wearing a BuAer Mark II
exposure suit entered the water, but because of a wrist strap which
broke when he tightened it, the suit immediately began to leak,
saturating his clothing worn beneath the suit. This made swimming
almost impossible and the rescue attempt was abandoned when the crew-
man was overcome due to exposure and ingestion of sea water. He
stated there was no sign of life in the body at that time, that the
extremities were rigid and the eyes fixed open. This crewman was
treated for exposure in the ship's sick bay.

4. The helicopter returned to the scene at 1500 with a crewman wear-
ing an underwater demolition suit. This was two hours and fifty
minutes after the accident. This crewman entered the water and secured
a line to the body without suffering any effects from exposure. He
was in the water approximately ten minutes. It was necessary to drag
the body about 300 yards to a nearby island and land the helicopter.
The body was returned to the ship at 1615.

5. On cutting away the summer flight suit and the exposure suit it was
noted that the long underwear worn beneath the suit was saturated with
water. The right wrist band was tightly secured, however, the left
cuff had been pulled out from under the wrist strap which was tightly
secured and this allowed water to enter suit. The neck draw string
was properly applied. There was approximately three or four quarts of
sea water in the suit. It is impossible to estimate the quantity of
water which entered due to dragging the body through the water; however,
the tension of the line on the body tended to hold the body out of
the water so it is felt that most of the water entered the suit before-
hand. The crewman also noted that there seemed to be large quantity
of water within the suit as he secured the line. There was superficial
abrasion over the left elbow but no other evidence of trauma. The
upper respiratory passages were full of water. The cause of death was
apparently drowning with contributory factor of exposure.
6. It is believed that the present Buler Mark II exposure suit is inadequate in design and construction. There is too great a chance for leakage of water at the neck and wrist, as well as possibilities of having torn areas in suit. The suit is cumbersome and tends to limit activity in the water, making swimming and gaining entrance to life raft more difficult. Particularly is this true if bulky clothing worn beneath suit becomes wet.

7. The underwater demolition suit affords much more protection against exposure to cold water and allows for more activity and freedom of movement in the water.

8. It is recommended that an exposure suit for pilots be designed along the lines of the underwater demolition suit. The following points are offered for consideration.

   A. The suit should fit rather snugly over garments worn beneath, for example long underwear, trousers and sweater or shirt. The possibilities of having several sizes of component parts, such as arms, legs, and trunk, which could be fitted to the pilot and then vulcanized together might be considered in order to afford a more satisfactory fitting.

   B. The possibility of having rubber gloves of lighter construction or detachable rubber gloves is to be considered.

   C. The possibility of having a high neck collar fastened at the back with an extension of the trunk zipper, and adjusted for comfort and water tightness by drawstrings should be considered rather than the open-faced hood.

   D. The possibility of providing some means of heat in case of submersion in water, possibly by chemical reaction or electricity, should be considered.

   E. The possibility of incorporating the life vest into construction of the suit should be considered. Pockets for survival gear, etc., within the suit might be possible; however, the external surface should be kept relatively free from apparatus which would offer resistance and obstruction to swimming.

   F. Water tight construction at the wrist should be similar to the underwater demolition suit, i.e., a wide elastic band; however, it is recommended that this be secured by a broad hook and buckle assembly rather than snaps.

W.H. JARVIS
LCDR, MC, USN
Squadron Flight Surgeon
PART II

CHRONOLOGY

15 Jan 1951  At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep.

16 Jan 1951  Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 72. 1900 assumed duties of TE 95.11.

17 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN (CVL-29). Launched 29 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 6 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

18 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 30 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP. F4U-4, pilot Captain R. G. PATTERSON, Jr., USMC, crash landed near Suwon after engine failure due to drop in oil pressure as a result of damage inflicted by enemy ground fire. The pilot was uninjured, rescue was effected by Air Force helicopter 29 minutes after landing.

19 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 32 offensive sorties, 24 ARMED RECCO, 6 RESCAP, 2 TCAP, and 8 CAP. F4U-4, pilot 1st LT Alfred Joseph WARD, USMC, crashed near Kumchon due to enemy machine gun and rifle fire during strafing run. Aircraft exploded on impact in approximately 30 degree dive leaving no possible chance of pilot survival; the body was not recovered.

20 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 29 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP. F4U-4, pilot Captain Alfred Hiram AGAN, USMC, crash landed in water south of Inchon after aircraft believed to have been damaged by own bomb blast. Pilot dead from exposure prior to arrival of rescue helicopter from this ship, which recovered the body.

21 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Replenished at sea from TG 79.3, USS MISPIILLION (AO-105) and USS PARACUTIN (AE-18). No air operations.

22 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Launched 28 offensive sorties, 18 CAS, 10 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

II-1
23 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 33 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 10 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

24 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 27 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

25 Jan 1951  Operating as before. Launched 28 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP. 1900 relieving as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and screening ships.

26 Jan 1951  Enroute Sasebo, Japan for short period of upkeep. 1940 ITEM arrived Sasebo, Japan.

27-31 Jan 1951  At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

01-02 Feb 1951  At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

03 Feb 1951  Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 162 less USS SPERRY; 1900 assumed duties of TE 95.11. Received two replacement aircraft from Taegu.

04 Feb 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 29 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 6 NGFS and 8 CAP. Naval Gunfire Airspot was provided for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon.

05 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Launched 31 offensive sorties, 21 CAS, 8 NGFS for USS ST PAUL, USS HANK and HMS BELFAST at Inchon, 2 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

06 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Launched 31 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 4 NGFS, for ST PAUL, USS HANK and HMS BELFAST at Inchon, 4 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

07 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Launched 34 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 6 NGFS, for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon, 2 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

08 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, 36 CAS, 6 NGFS, for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon, and 6 CAP.

09 Feb 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Refueled USS BATAAN and screen from USS CIMARRON.

II-2
Launched 13 offensive sorties, 5 CAS, 2 NGFS, for USS ST PAUL at Inchon, 6 ARMED RECCO and 5 CAP.

10 Feb 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Launched 37 offensive sorties, 27 CAS, 2 NGFS for USS ST PAUL at Inchon, 4 ARMED RECCO and no CAP.

11 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 36 offensive sorties, 32 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO, 2 ARMED ESCORTS for RADM CRUISE to Taegu and no CAP.

12 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 35 offensive sorties, 31 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO, 2 ARMED ESCORTS for RADM CRUISE to Taegu and no CAP.

13 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 52 offensive sorties, 50 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO and no CAP. 1900 ITEM relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and screening ships.

14 Feb 1951
Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep. 1440 arrived Sasebo.

15-22 Feb 1951
At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

23 Feb 1951
Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 162 less USS SPERRY. 1900 ITEM assumed duties of TE 95.11.

24 Feb 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 40 offensive sorties, 34 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 ESCORT for marine helicopter transfer to Pyongtaek, and 10 CAP.

25 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 41 offensive sorties, 35 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 PHOTO RECCO and 8 CAP. PHOTO RECCO to gain Naval Gunfire Target information for USS ST PAUL of area 3,000 meters deep north of Han River.

26 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 38 offensive sorties, 32 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 PHOTO RECCO and 8 CAP.

27 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO, 8 CAP and 2 Courier aircraft to Pusan and return.
28 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Refueled from USS GUADALUPE(AO-32). Launched 4 offensive sorties for pre-briefed strike on gun emplacements at Todang-ni, 3 ESCORTS for USS ST PAUL's helicopter carrying VIP, 8 CAP.

1 Mar 1951  Operating as before. No air operations due to foul weather including high winds, snow and low visibility.

2 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Air operations hampered by low visibility and snow showers. Launched 16 offensive sorties, 8 ARMED RECCO and 8 TCAP for HMS BELFAST in Changsan Got.

3 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Air operations were hampered by low visibility and snow showers. Launched 28 offensive sorties, 20 ARMED RECCO, 4 NGFS, 4 TCAP and 7 CAP. NGFS and TCAP for HMS BELFAST operating in vicinity of Changsan Got.

4 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 39 offensive sorties, 29 ARMED RECCO and 10 TCAP, NGFS for HMS BELFAST and DD's operating in Changsan Got. At 1900 relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and Screening ships.
Proceeded to Pusan to off-load VMF-212 aircraft, equipment, and personnel and load VMF-312. Launched 12 aircraft for Pohang. 2100 Major General Field HARRIS, Commanding General 1st MAW boarded for passage to Sasebo to observe carrier qualification of VMF-312 enroute. At 2200 completed loading VMF-312, departed Pusan for Sasebo, Japan.

Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep. 1400 arrived Sasebo.

At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

Conducted Carrier Qualifications for VMF-312 in local area NW of Sasebo. MASSEY and FORREST ROYAL provided screen and plane guard services. Returned to port to resume upkeep and replenishment.

At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep, and replenishment.

Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with USS HANK(DD-702), USS SPERRY(DD-697) and HMAS BATAAN(D-191). Launched 21 refresher flights. 1900 ITEM assumed duties of TE 95.11.

Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 43 offensive sorties, 29 CAS, 14 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

Operating as before. Launched 41 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 15 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP. 1101 ITEM USS BORIE(DD-704) reported for duty. 1129 ITEM HMS (D-191) was detached to proceed on assigned mission. F4U-4, pilot Major Frank H. PRESSLEY, USMCR, crash landed in Han River 30 miles NW of Seoul after engine failure due to enemy AA fire. The pilot sustained only minor injuries and rescue was effected by Air Force helicopter.

Operating as before; launched 43 offensive sorties, 24 CAS, 14 ARMED RECCO, 5 NGFS and 10 CAP. Naval Gunfire Airspot was provided for HMS BELFAST along NW coast from Chinnampo to Choppeki Point.
17 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 40 offensive sorties, 21 CAS, 19 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

18 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 8 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 2 CAP.

19 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, 22 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

20 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 40 offensive sorties, 20 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

21 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 39 offensive sorties, 22 CAS, 17 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP. F4U-4, pilot 1st LT Harold R. KNOWLES, USMC, crash landed 57 miles NW of Inchon after engine failure due to drop in oil pressure believed to have been result of enemy AA. The pilot received minor injuries and his rescue was effected by ship's helicopter which landed aboard after sunset.

22 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 43 offensive sorties, 12 CAS, 29 ARMED RECCO, 2 NGFS for HMS KENYA along NW Coast from Chinnampo to Choppeki Point and 10 CAP. 1900 ITEM relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESES and Screening ships.

23 Mar 1951  Enroute Yokosuka, Japan. 0344 ITEM USS HANK (DD-702) detached to proceed on assigned mission. 1544 ITEM USS BORIE (DD-704) detached to proceed on assigned mission.

24 Mar 1951  Enroute Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS SPERRY (DD-697).

25 Mar 1951  Arrived Yokosuka, Japan. 0800 ITEM preparation for administrative inspection by ComCarDiv 15.

26 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan preparing for administrative inspection.


28 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

29 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

30 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment. 1630 ITEM underway for operating west coast of Korea in company with USS SPERRY (DD-697).
31 Mar 1951  Enroute operating area.

1 Apr 1951  Enroute operating area.  USS BORIE (DD 704) and
USS ENGLISH (DD 696) rendezvoused, acting as
screen with the SPERRY.  1900 ITEM assumed duties
of TE 95.11.

2 Apr 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea,
CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN (CVL 29).  Launched 43
offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and
10 CAP.  F4U-4, pilot 1st LT D. B. HOUGE, USMCR
was hit by enemy AA fire in SARIWON Area.  Pilot
was able to fly aircraft over friendly territory w
here he was forced to bail out, landing near
Yongjondo Island where he was picked up by small
boat from LSD in Inchon Harbor and returned to
ship via ship's helicopter.  No injuries to pilot.

3 Apr 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 40 offensive sor-
ties, 20 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

4 Apr 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 43 offensive sor-
ties, 16 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO, 4 RESCAP, 3 pre-
briefed strike on Kongse-ri and 10 CAP.  F4U-4,
pilot Major D. P. FRAME, Commanding Officer VMF
312, crashed after being hit by enemy AA fire near
Hwangju.  Pilot bailed out and was picked up by
Air Force helicopter but pilot died enroute to
SEOUL.  It is believed pilot struck rear control
surfaces upon bail out.

5 Apr 1951  Replenished from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS
OBERON (AK 14).  No offensive air operations, no
CAP.

6 Apr 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 12 offensive sor-
ties, 4 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 Naval Gunfire Spot
for HMS BLACKSWAN in Haeju area and 2 CAP.  0295
ITEM departed operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

7 Apr 1951  Enroute Sasebo, Japan for replenishment.  0920
ITEM arrived Sasebo.

END
(e) 31 Mar - 7 Apr

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity/Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>50 cal A/C</td>
<td>124,400 rds</td>
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<tr>
<td>F51 Napalm tanks</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>3,015 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# Bombs</td>
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<tr>
<td>500# Bombs</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
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PART IV
BATTLE DAMAGE

(A) Own

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 81736 suffered one hit forward edge horizontal stabilizer. Bullet did not enter. Small arms.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 97352 hit left oil cooler, complete penetration. Small arms.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 96756 hit vertical stabilizer. Complete penetration. Hit fuselage, part penetration elevator. Stopped in battery compartment. 30 cal.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 80806 hit port wing, outboard. Complete penetration. Hit port wing, center, stopped in ammo can. Hit horizontal stabilizer, leading edge, complete penetration. 20mm and 30mm.

25 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 81736. Hit wing butt, left wing, penetrated wheel well. 50 cal.

4 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 81181. Hit right wing, complete penetration. Small arms.

5 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo. 97073. Hit right wing, complete penetration.

7 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 80806. Hit left wing blast tube and leading edge. Leading edge and blast blown out. 50 cal.

8 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 81181. Hit center right wing, complete penetration. Small arms.

25 Feb, F4u-4 BuNo 97128. Hit right wing, speed of projectile or own bomb blast, insufficient to effect complete penetration. Unknown.

25 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 97191. Hit fuselage, center, complete penetration. 50 cal.

26 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 97128. Hit right wing tip, complete penetration. Right wing bay, ammunition box, projectile entered ammo box causing other shells to explode. 30 cal.

26 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 80869. Hit high tension lead on harness push rod housing cylinder baffle. Broke nut on high tension lead on harness, dented push rod housing and tore a 1½" gash in cylinder baffle. 50 cal.
2 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96822. Hit propeller blade, 4" hole near tip of one blade. 20MM.

4 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 97073. Speed ring, dented skin, slightly torn. Wing butts, right and left, dented and slightly torn. Gun camera window, left wing, 1 3/4" hole below window. Leading edge left wing 5" x 3" hole. Radio antenna broken. Vertical stabilizer dented. Target explosion from rocket hit.

4 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96872. Requires complete right wing change. 20" jagged hole through wing. 40MM.

14 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81879. Hit bulletproof windshield, chipped and cracked. Portion of exploding shell.


16 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo. 82174. Hit starboard wing. Small arms.

16 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81770. Hit hydraulic lines, left wing. Hydraulic line to wheels. Small arms fire.

17 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81285. Hit propeller blade. Hole through prop blade two feet from end. Unknown.

20 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96949. Hit left wing, minor hole. Small arms.

2 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97128. Hit fuselage and severed hydraulic line to tail strut. Entered engine, severed accessory oil line. 30 or 50 cal.

3 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96949. Hit in belly tank. Minor damage.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo.81879. Hit in horizontal fin. AA 90 MM.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo.96979. Hit left wing; minor penetration. 20 MM.


4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97048. Hit left wheel well. Minor damage.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96804. Hit left aileron, foot from tip, fuselage 2 feet aft of cockpit. 30 cal.

IV-2
4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97121. Hit engine cowling, severed oil line, causing loss of oil - went into cylinder. Hit left wing. Small arms.

6 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96979. Hit fuselage, entered battery compartment. Hole in wheel well.

(B) Enemy

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animals</td>
<td>210</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armored Cars (vehicles)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Guns</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammo Dumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
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<td>RR Tunnels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boxcars</td>
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</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated - 1852
2 Apr. 1st Lt. Donald B. Houge, 027559, USMC, bailed out after being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. Suffered only minor abrasions and contusions trunk and extremities.

4 Apr. Major D. P. Frame, 07066, Commanding Officer, VMF-312, crashed after being hit by enemy AA fire near Hwangju. Frame bailed out and was picked up by Air Force helicopter but died enroute to Seoul. It is believe pilot struck rear control surfaces upon bail out.
Comment: During the period covered by this report bad weather prevented flying on only three days out of thirty-seven for which missions were scheduled. On two of these days it was possible to complete about one-third of the missions scheduled, despite the weather. The weather was bad enough on one replenishment day to have caused cancellation of air operations. In contrast, carriers operating off the east coast of Korea, and shore based air units in Korea and Japan were forced to cancel or severely curtail air operations about every fourth day because of weather. It thus appears that from a weather viewpoint the area to seaward of Inchon, in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00 N and Long. 125-30 E is most favorable for conducting air operations against Korea during the winter months.

Comment: The search and rescue incidents in which own aircraft were involved either as principal participants or in an assisting role emphasized the following points:

(a) RESCAPS must be promptly formed and vigorously maintained over pilots downed behind enemy lines. When this was done and rescue could be effected by helicopter the downed pilot was recovered in every instance.

(b) After ditching in cold water the pilot's (and aircrewmen's) first task after clearing the aircraft is to inflate and get in the life raft(s) provided. Too long a delay while in the water will cause the numbing of hands and arms, resulting in inability to inflate or get into the raft. In this connection aircrews must be sure that they carry the life raft with them when they leave the aircraft. It is usually difficult or impossible to reach back into the cockpit to recover a life raft left in the seat or other stowage.

(c) When it is known that rescue cannot be accomplished within ten minutes, and choice exists, it is preferable to land behind enemy lines rather than in cold water. This is particularly the case if RESCAP can be formed immediately.

(d) When RESCAP can be formed immediately by remaining planes of a flight, a pilot forced down behind enemy lines should select a landing area as much in the open as the exigencies of his landing will permit. This will facilitate the
RESCAP's locating and turning back any enemy attempting capture or injury of the downed aircrew.

Recommendation: It is recommended that above points be continually impressed upon all pilots in the combat area.

Comment: In view of the nature of the missions assigned, Close Air Support and Armed Recco, it was not generally possible to arm a flight to attack a specific or type target. After a certain amount of trial and error and with the limitations of the ship's magazines in mind, a standard split loading for each flight was settled upon. Half the aircraft (F4U-4s) scheduled were loaded with napalm tanks and half with 500 pound general purpose bombs. All were loaded with six 5" HVARs and two 100 pound general purpose bombs. "Daisy cutter" fuzes were used in the 100 pound bombs; 0.1 sec. delay nose and 0.025 sec. delay tail fuzes were used together in the 500 pounders. This was found to be a good standard load for use against a variety of targets. It also proved to be one which used small bombs and rockets from the magazines at an even rate with the magazines loaded to accommodate a maximum of each type of ammunition. Using the foregoing load the ship could operate at the rate of 40 offensive sorties per day for 8 days without rearming.

Recommendation: The foregoing loading is recommended for the type of general support operation in which this vessel has been engaged.

Comment: When "daisy cutter" fuzes were first employed in the "standard load" commented on in the foregoing paragraph, many "duds" were reported by pilots. Every effort was made to overcome this difficulty, but it was not until it was found that the duds were attributable to pilot technique that a solution was conceived. It was noted that duds occurred most often when bombs were dropped after several attacks with other ordnance had been made during which hard pull-outs were executed. It was assumed that the extension rods of the daisy cutter fuzes were bent by the imposition of "g"s during pull-outs and that when the bomb was dropped in a later dive the eccentricity of the extension rod prevented the fuze impeller from rotating at its normal rate, and slowed the arming of the fuze. On this presumption pilots were advised to use daisy cutter fuzed bombs first if practicable, but, if not, to avoid hard pull-outs and to release bombs so fuzed about 300 feet above normal release altitude. Pilots followed the above procedure and the percentage of duds was reduced immediately to normal.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the material discrepancy outlined above be investigated further.

VI-2
Comment: During the recent operations in the West Coast operating area, clearance of operational traffic on task force and task group circuits continued to be a major problem. These circuits have been overloaded with high precedence traffic and this condition has been intensified as a result of the instructions contained in "NAVFE 61-51" wherein commands are directed to exhaust all means for delivering messages locally or via TF or TG circuits prior to placing on fleet broadcasts.

Recommendation:

Senior commanders amend operation order requirements so that op-summaries and other operational dispatch reports be transmitted only to those few who need to know instead of the lengthy lists of addressees currently required.

Senior commanders direct commands in the op-areas to submit all administrative reports by speedletter or by dispatch only after clearing the op-areas.

General Recommendation:

Establish a communication security activity within the NAVFE area to function in accordance with USF 70(B), Art. 978 with emphasis on:

(1) Reduction or elimination of dispatch traffic through direct liaison with commands.

(2) Improvement of radio procedure and discipline on all major nets including TF and TG Commander Nets.

(3) Improved security practices.

Comment:

Intelligence dissemination from the principal area commands has been too voluminous and duplicative in some respects and too meager in others. The disparity appears due to the fact that much of the intelligence is not "slanted" to naval requirements. This, in turn, appears to stem from inadequate naval participation in such agencies as JOC Korea. Much improvement has been noted in the services rendered by JOC Korea since the establishment of a naval liaison desk there, but much remains to be accomplished.

Recommendation:

It is strongly recommended that Navy representation and participation in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Korea and similar
agencies be increased in order that the services rendered may continue to be improved. It is felt that if further communications security measures are imposed the present staff at JOC Korea will be unable to cope with the situation. Only the unrestricted use of plain language broadcasts has enabled adequate information to be passed in a timely manner between JOC Korea and forces afloat.

Comment: Intelligence received from ROK sources through CTE 95.12 has been exceptionally accurate and detailed. At first this information was received several days late, but since the establishment of Major Burke on Paengnyong Do Island it has been very timely.

Comment:

Requests from naval surface forces on the west coast for airspot services and immediate strikes against coastal targets frequently have been received with insufficient details to permit their being fulfilled promptly. Most frequently lacking are communications instructions, designation of the coordinating agency, strike clearance information, and time limitations. In some instances apparently urgent requests have caused flights to be diverted from targets which events later proved to have been more lucrative. In other cases, airspot requirements have caused considerable inconvenience in the rescheduling of flights.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that surface units requesting air assistance make timely requests which contain full details of requirements and as much target information as possible. This will permit the carrier to distribute its air effort to best advantage, to arm its aircraft adequately, and to brief its pilots fully, and will eliminate delays due to requests for additional information.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 95
      (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
      (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 8 April 1951 - 11 May 1951;
      submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
     (b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950,
         NDB 15 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 8 April 1951 - 11 May 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1),
   with parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN
   operated with TG 95.1.

W. MILLER

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ComAirPac
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PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

On 8 April 1951, Task Element 95.11, of truly United Nations aspect, comprised of USS BATAAN, with VMF 312 embarked, HMS THESEUS, and screening destroyers; USS ENGLISH (DD 696), USS SPERRY (DD 704), HMS CONSORT, HMCS BATAAN, HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMCS HURON sortied Sasebo at 0700, 8 April 1951 in compliance with CTF 95 Operation Order 1-51, to conduct operations on East Coast of Korea in accordance Annex Baker, CTF 95 secret Operation Order 2-51 and CTF 95.11 confidential Operation Order 2-51 Revised. CTF and CTF 95.11 Captain E. T. Neale, USN in USS BATAAN (CVL 29).

The Task Element arrived in the operating area night of 8 April and reported to CTG 95.2 for operational control at 2309 Item. Air operations were initiated early morning 9 April and continued through 15 April consisting of interdiction strikes, armed reconnaissance, air spot for naval gun-fire and combat air patrol. The primary physical objective was stoppage of enemy traffic, especially trucks, on the enemy's main supply route along the east coast of Korea in the vicinity of Wonsan, Hamhung, and Songjin. Surface operations conducted were those required for air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

During this period five aircraft and one pilot were lost to enemy action. On 9 April 1st Lt. J. S. Sumner of VMF 312 ditched his plane in Wonsan Bay after it sustained damage from enemy AA during an airspot mission in support of naval gun-fire against Wonsan by TE 95.21. Rescue units were immediately alerted and a timely rescue was made by a helicopter dispatched from USS MANCHESTER at Wonsan. 1st Lt. Sumner was uninjured and was returned to USS BATAAN the following day. Analysis of the pilot's report of this incident indicated that his immersion suit performed satisfactorily for a brief period but that thereafter a considerable quantity of water seeped through at the wrists and neck. In addition to increasing the discomfort of the pilot, the weight of the water within the suit made recovery by the helicopter difficult.

On 10 April a Sea Fury, operating from HMS THESEUS, piloted by Pilot III R. H. Johnson, was shot down by AA about 35 miles southwest of Wonsan in enemy territory. An extensive and thorough search failed to reveal any sign of the pilot and rescue efforts were abandoned. He was reported lost in action and presumed killed.
An unfortunate incident involving THESEUS aircraft took place the same morning when one land-based U.S. Marine Corsair, in a case of mistaken identity, attacked two Sea Furies south of Wonsan. Both Sea Furies were hit; one was extensively damaged. Fortunately, the pilots were not hurt and were able to complete a successful landing aboard the THESEUS. This incident was reported to Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing for appropriate action.

Two days later, on 12 April, a Firefly operating from HMS THESEUS was forced to ditch at sea 10 miles southeast of Hungnam after being hit by AA. Pilot and crewman were recovered uninjured by helicopters from BATAAN and THESEUS. The following day, 13 April, a Sea Fury piloted by Lt. J. S. Humphreys was damaged by AA and forced down on land 6 miles southwest of Hamhung. Rescue was effected by a helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. The pilot suffered a fractured right ankle, concussion, shock, exposure, and lacerations.

On 14 April, Capt. H. H. Hennenburger of VMF 312 was forced to land at Pohang when a gun blast tube in the port wing blew up during a strafing attack on enemy positions. The pilot was uninjured. The same day, a Sea Fury, piloted by Lt. I. L. Bowman, was hit by AA fire and forced to crash land 6 miles southwest of Hungnam. RESCAP was formed by other members of his flight and nearby BATAAN aircraft until rescue was effected by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. In performing the rescue, the helicopter was subject to considerable small arms fire. The pilot was uninjured, and was returned to THESEUS. The downed Sea Fury was destroyed by wingman's gun-fire.

During this operating period USS BATAAN launched 224 sorties, of which 218 were offensive and 26 were Combat Air Patrol. Of the 218 offensive missions 20 were for airspot in support of naval gun-fire conducted against Wonsan and Sonjin by TE 95.21 and TE 95.22 respectively. The other 198 missions comprised armed reconnaissance and air strikes against enemy installations and equipment found in the area.

USS BORIE (DD 702) joined the screen at 1515 Item, 10 April, and was detached at 1517 Item, 11 April with orders to proceed to Wonsan and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control.

Replenishment of the Task Element was conducted in three phases: Commonwealth destroyers were refueled in Wonsan area by PLATTE (AO 24) on 11 April; HMS THESEUS was replenished by WAVE CHIEF on 13 April, on completion of which she resumed flight operations; USS BATAAN (CVL 29), plus destroyers ENGLISH and SPERRY.
were replenished by NAVASOTA (AO 106) and LEO (AKA 60) on 14 April, on completion of which at 1330 Item, normal flight operations were resumed. Air operations were curtailed on 15 April due to fog.

Upon completion of air operations 15 April, 1630 Item, HMS THESEUS was designated CTE 95.11 at which time USS BATAAN, USS SPERRY and HMAS BATAAN (DD) were detached and departed operating area for Sasebo, reporting for operational control to CTG 95.1 at 1900 Item. HMS THESEUS and screen as CTE 95.11 proceeded West Coast of Korea, replenishing enroute as necessary.

USS BATAAN and screen arrived Sasebo at 1116 Item, 16 April for period of replenishment and upkeep.

At 0930 Item, 17 April, Captain W. Miller relieved Captain Edgar T. Neale as Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) during ceremonies held aboard USS BATAAN at Sasebo, Japan.

USS AGERHOLM (DD 826), USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786) and USS ROGERS (DDR 876) reported to USS BATAAN (CVL 29) for duty at 1633 Item, 17 April.

At 0700 Item, 19 April, USS BATAAN, with VMF 312 embarked, and screen composed of above destroyers sortied Sasebo in accordance CTE 95.10 confidential dispatch 170251Z to relieve HMS THESEUS and screen on west coast of Korea. USS BATAAN, upon arrival in the operating area, at 2000 Item, 19 April, assumed duties as CTE 95.11, OTC and CTE 95.11 Captain W. Miller, USN in USS BATAAN.

Operations were based on ComNavFE OpOrd 20-50, CTG 95 OpOrd 1-51 and CTG 95.1 OpOrd 1-51. Mission of CTE 95.11 derived from above orders and set forth in USS BATAAN OpOrd 3-51 consisted of enforcing the United Nations' blockade of the west coast of Korea, protecting sea communications in the Yellow Sea, and rendering air support to ground forces. An air plan providing for fifty sorties per day was promulgated. Surface operations consisted of those required for air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

During the seven days of air operations from early morning 20th April to evening 26 April, planes of VMF 312 operating from USS BATAAN flew 318 sorties of which 136 were for close air support of front line troops, 96 were reconnaissance missions, 18 strike, and 68 combat air patrol. Armed reconnaissance covered the Haeju-Chinnampo region and the area near Hanchon.
On 20 April Major Frank Presley, Commanding Officer of VMF312, was hit in the right leg while on an armed reconnaissance mission over enemy territory. Despite the injury, Major Presley managed to return safely aboard. Of exceptional note in this period was the destruction of three Yak planes, and the probable destruction of a fourth by Capt. Phillip C. DeLong and 1st Lt. Harold D. Deigh of VMF 312, about 0715 in the Chinnampo area 21 April. This action is described in detail in Appendix (1).

On the same morning 1st Lt. Godbey was forced to bail out on the mainland opposite Sokto-ri Island southwest of Chinnampo when his engine failed. He was covered by aircraft of his flight until rescued by ROK Marines' boat; later picked up by helicopter and returned to the ship. Lt. Godbey suffered injury to his left ankle. The following day, 22 April, Capt. John Rainwater was killed during a strike against Sariwon air-strip. Hit by AA, his plane burst into flames, dived into the ground, and exploded on impact. There was no possible chance of survival.

Rendezvous for scheduled replenishment was affected with USS KASKASKIA (AO 27) at 0619 Item, 23 April at latitude 36-30N, longitude 124-30E. Replenishment was completed at 0629 Item and air operations were immediately resumed. North Korean and Chinese forces had initiated a new drive on the west flank of UN forces a few hours earlier and troops ashore were in desperate need of close air support. During the ensuing four-day period maximum effort was devoted to close air support and a total of 136 such sorties were flown by pilots of VMF 312. A two-plane CAP was maintained over the task element and armed reconnaissance was reduced to the minimum requirement of one flight per day for coastal reconnaissance.

On 24 April Point Option was changed to 36-45N, latitude and 125-20E longitude for the express purpose of covering TE 95.12 during its replenishment, at the completion of which Point Option was moved to 37-00N latitude and 125-30E longitude.

Close air support, reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions continued until dusk of 26 April. At 2000 Item, 26 April HMS GLORY assumed duty as CTG 95.11, relieving USS BATAAN and screen on station. BATAAN and screen departed operations area and proceeded to Sasebo. At 0500 Item, 27 April USS ROGERS (DD) was detached to proceed Pusan reporting for operational control to CTG 95.2 in accordance with instructions from CTF 95 received enroute. BATAAN and remaining destroyers, USS AGERHOLM and USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON, continued to Sasebo, arriving at 1345 Item, 27 April. Upon arrival, USS AGERHOLM and
USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON were directed to report for operational control to CTF 95. USS BATAAN proceeded with scheduled replenishment and upkeep.

In order to provide maximum close air support for hard pressed United Nations' forces, the replenishment and upkeep period for USS BATAAN was abruptly terminated. At 0700 Item, morning of 1 May USS BATAAN with VMF 312 embarked, escorted by HMCS SIOUX (DD) and HMS COMUS (DD), sortied Sasebo to join HMS GLORY and screen off west coast of Korea to conduct joint air operations against the enemy. Routine anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were conducted enroute.

USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786) joined the formation at 1336 Item, 1 May and the formation arrived in operating area Mike at 012230 Item, where rendezvous was effected with HMS GLORY and Commonwealth destroyers. Capt. W. Miller, USN, in BATAAN (CVL 29) assumed duties as OTC and CTE 95.11 at 0001 Item, 2 May.

The formation was augmented by the arrival of USS PERKINS at 0520 Item, 2 May. TE 95.11 composed of carriers USS BATAAN and HMS GLORY with screen composed of Commonwealth destroyers, HMCS SIOUX, HMS COMUS, HMAS WARRAMUNGA, HMCS NOOTEKA, HMCS HURON, HMAS BATAAN and US destroyers ANDERSON and PERKINS, commenced air operations at dawn 2 May. At 0645 Commonwealth destroyers SIOUX and COMUS were detached to report for operational control to CTE 95.12.

Operations were conducted in accordance with current operation orders of ComNavFE, CTF 95, CTG 95.1, and CO, USS BATAAN Operation Order 3-51. Surface operations consisted of those necessary to support air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

Air operations during this period consisted of combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, and close air support, with special emphasis placed on close air support for front line troops. Adverse weather seriously hampered flight operations during this period. Low ceilings, poor visibility and intermittent fog patches were encountered on the morning of 4 May. Launching was delayed until 1045 Item; however, the planes were unable to reach the target area and were forced to return. Poor visibility and low ceilings made recovery difficult and hazardous; nevertheless, all planes were landed safely.

Poor weather prevailed the following day and flight operations were delayed until late afternoon, the first launch taking place I-5.
at 1635 King. On 7 May normal operations were conducted except for a delay of one half hour in launching the first flight. Poor weather again delayed launchings until 1400 King 8 May.

From early morning 2 May to afternoon of 10 May planes of VMF 312 flying off the USS BATAAN flew a total of 293 sorties; 244 offensive and 49 defensive. Bulk of the effort was directed against enemy troops in close air support of United Nations' front line forces.

One Sea Fury and one Corsair were lost during this period. Afternoon of 2 May, the pilot of a damaged Sea Fury crash landed in the mouth of the Han River 30 miles northwest of Seoul behind enemy lines. RESCAP was formed immediately and a timely rescue was made by helicopter. The pilot was flown to Seoul where he was placed in a field hospital and treated for exposure. A Corsair was lost when 2nd Lt. Smith, while on combat air patrol, experienced engine trouble and decided to bail out. Rescue attempts by helicopter failed when the pilot was unable to extricate himself from his parachute harness. Recovery was made by boat dispatched by the destroyer AGERHOLM. The pilot was later returned to USS BATAAN where he was treated for exposure and shock.

Afternoon of 4 May destroyers VAN GALEN and SIOUX joined the screen, reporting for operational control to CTE 95.11 at 040400Z and 040700Z respectively, at which time WARRAMUNGA and NOOTKA were detached to proceed as ordered making own movement reports.

USS AGERHOLM (DD 826) joined TE 95.11 at 1230 King, 6 May as a replacement for the VAN GALEN. The VAN GALEN was directed to refuel, upon completion of which at 1730 King she was detached to report for operational control to CTE 95.12.

TE 95.11 was now composed of USS BATAAN with VMF 312 embarked, HMS GLORY, Commonwealth destroyers SIOUX, HURON, and BATAAN; U.S. destroyers PERKINS, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM.

On completion of flight operations 2000 King 6 May, HMS GLORY with destroyers SIOUX, HURON and BATAAN, was detached to proceed Sasebo for period of replenishment and upkeep.

Replenishment during this period was conducted on 4 and 6 May. Commonwealth destroyers were refueled by the WAVE CHIEF on 4 May in vicinity of latitude 36-20N and longitude 125-30E. USS BATAAN and US destroyers plus the VAN GALEN were replenished on 6 May by NAVASOTA (AO 106) and DIPHDA (AKA 59) in latitude 36-30N, longitude 124-30E. USS AGERHOLM refueled prior to joining the screen. VAN GALEN was detached on completion of refueling.

I-6
Flight operations were resumed at 1450 King when refueling was completed.

A radar patrol to provide early warning of enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea at night was established during this period in accordance with instructions promulgated by ComNavFE. When a destroyer could not be provided by CTE 95.12 for this patrol a destroyer of TB 95.11 was detached at the end of the day's flight operations to proceed to a point approximately midway between Paengnyong Do island and the Shantung promontory to conduct a radar search as prescribed and rejoin the formation prior to the resumption of flight operations the next morning. Patrols were conducted by USS PERKINS during the nights of 2, 3, and 4 May; by the USS ANDERSON on the nights of 5, 6, 7, and 9 May; by the USS AGERHOLM on 8 May.

On the night of 5 May, USS ANDERSON intercepted a north bound vessel identified as the Greek freighter THENONI enroute from Kobe, Japan to Dairen. After establishing its identity, the vessel was allowed to proceed unmolested. On several occasions friendly native fishing vessels were found operating in restricted areas. These were warned to confine their activities to authorized fishing sanctuaries.

At the completion of Air Operations 10 May USS PERKINS and USS AGERHOLM were detached for Radar Patrol with orders to rendezvous the following morning with HMS GLORY. HMCS SIOUX joined TE 95.11 and in company with USS ANDERSON escorted USS BATAAN to Sasebo, arriving at 1500 King, 11 May. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were conducted enroute to port.
CAPT DeLONG was launched from the USS BATAAN at 0540 leading a four (4) plane flight of F4U-4's consisting of 1ST LT Harold D. DAIGH, 038633/7302, USMCR and Shelby M. FORRESTER, 028042/7302, USMCR and 2ND LT Robert E. HOWARD, Jr., 051397, USMCR. The mission of this flight was to conduct a reconnaissance from Choppoki Point to Onjong-ji along the west coast of Korea.

At about 0645 while flying over position XC 6535 a distress call was heard from 1ST LT William H. GODBEE, 026472/7302, USMCR who reported that he was bailing out due to engine trouble.

CAPT DeLONG made radio contact with the Combat Air Patrol flying over the USS BATAAN to relay a call for the helicopter to be dispatched to pick up LT GODBEE.

CAPT REILLY, the leader of LT GODBEE's flight was orbiting at 10,000 feet above the spot where the latter had bailed out. He established contact with the CAP also and relayed the position while the remainder of the flight, 1ST LT's Archibald W. MACLACHLAN 026773/7302, USMCR and Harry W. COIMERY, 039393/7302 USMCR, orbited over the downed pilot at 500 feet. At the request of the USS BATAAN, LT's FORREST and HOWARD were detached from CAPT DeLONG's Division and sent to the Island of Paengnyong-do to escort a rescue helicopter based there.

CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH were flying northeast towards a prebriefed target at XC 9992 where they were to jettison their load. This flight climbed for altitude over Hojiang-do XC 8983 in an open formation with LT DAIGH about 500 yards at 7 o'clock from CAPT DeLONG. Upon reaching an altitude of approximately 2000 feet, LT DAIGH observed four (4) aircraft approaching from the northwest and above his flight. These aircraft proceeded to make a run on CAPT DeLONG from the northwest and from approximately 5000 feet.

Flying in a loose right echelon the four (4) aircraft made a right then a left turn (at about 10 o'clock) toward CAPT DeLONG. This flight apparently did not see LT DAIGH. CAPT DeLONG's attention was first directed to this flight when the first two aircraft opened fire on him and a bullet hit his plane aft of the cockpit.

LT DAIGH pulled in behind the attacking aircraft and was able to follow their number three man, leaving their number four plane at 7 o'clock to LT DAIGH. LT DAIGH broke away from his position behind the number three man and dove to the left and below the number four man who was firing at him. LT DAIGH made a climbing 360 degree turn and opened fire on two (2) enemy aircraft with unobserved results. He then sailed in at 4 o'clock on another enemy plane; opened fire, hitting the tail, fuselage and wing. His hits caused the starboard wing of the enemy aircraft to break off and the plane crashed and burned.

I-I-1  Appendix I, Part I
Meanwhile, CAPT DeLONG, upon being hit, did a "Split S" to pick up speed and made a climbing turn to the left. Two (2) enemy aircraft made firing runs from astern, but overshot and turned wide while he pulled in behind and returned fire on the two (2) aircraft with unobserved results. While CAPT DeLONG was in a climbing left turn one (1) enemy aircraft crossed in front of CAPT DeLONG's plane crossing from right to left. At that instant an aircraft was seen by CAPT DeLONG to crash into the ground and burn. This was LT DAIGH's kill. The plane crossing CAPT DeLONG's nose was fired on by CAPT DeLONG sending the enemy plane spinning into the ground smoking. This second enemy aircraft crashed and burned about one-half mile west of the spot where the first plane was burning. 1ST LT DAIGH also observed this aircraft burning on the ground.

CAPT DeLONG turned to the left and headed eastward when he observed three (3) planes flying ahead of him also heading east. LT DAIGH was pursuing one (1) enemy aircraft, with the second enemy aircraft following to the left and turning right on to LT DAIGH's tail. CAPT DeLONG called LT DAIGH and told him to pull up as the enemy was on his tail.

LT DAIGH turned hard to the left and dropped under and astern opening fire on the enemy plane as it overran him. His fire started the enemy plane smoking out of both sides of the cockpit from around the wing roots.

CAPT DeLONG continued tailing the enemy lead plane and his opening fire started this aircraft smoking. The enemy attempted to evade the fire by turning to the south, and then to the west; CAPT DeLONG's pursuing fire caused the enemy plane to puff smoke. The enemy plane did a "Split S" and headed west. CAPT DeLONG followed through and continued to tail in on him firing. The enemy plane was observed to be smoking from both wings and the fuselage while fragments of the aircraft kept falling off. Papers were seen coming from the cockpit. Following this the pilot jettisoned his hood and then bailed out. The enemy aircraft went into the water. The pilot's parachute opened and he descended into the water apparently unhurt.

CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH then joined up and climbed to 6000 feet, orbiting over the downed enemy pilot's location. CAPT DeLONG called CAPT REILLY and requested that the helicopter which had been requested previously to pick up LT GODBEY also attempt to pick up the enemy pilot. The section orbited this area for about 10 minutes and then headed south toward Changleon.

The fourth enemy aircraft which LT DAIGH had started smoking was last seen climbing east into the sun smoking from both wing and roots. Further search for this aircraft produced negative results.

A rough engine in LT DAIGH's plane and smoke in the cockpit of CAPT DeLONG's aircraft compelled the flight to return to the Bataan. The flight landed without mishap at 0820.
RESUME:

The enemy aircraft were first sighted about 0715. The dogfight was over by about 0725. All the aerial action took place between 2000 and 3000 feet. This unexpected attack found both CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH's aircraft carrying a belly tank and a 500 pound bomb, or a napalm tank, which were not jettisoned until the combat was nearly over. Each plane, likewise, was carrying a wing load of six (6) HVAR rockets and two (2) 100 pound bombs which were not jettisoned until the flight headed for the ship.

The enemy aircraft were identified as either YAK 3's or YAK 9's.

The markings on the aircraft were white circles outlined in red and a red star in the center.

Those markings were located on the fuselage aft and below the cockpit, and on underside of left wing.

The aircraft was painted in camouflage that ran from silver to light green.

OPINIONS

It is the opinion of CAPT DeLONG and 1ST LT DAIGH that:

1. The attack by the enemy aircraft was very poorly executed, as they had numerical superiority and altitude advantage. They also had an opportunity to make the attack out of the sun, but didn't, instead made it 90° to the sun. Also the fact that they used all four aircraft to make an initial attack on only two aircraft.

2. The air discipline of the enemy was good as the effectively kept all aircraft together in the same area to be mutually supporting.

3. They pressed home their attack with determination and did not attempt to leave the area until they were smoking from hits.

4. Their marksmanship was poor on deflection shooting.

5. The F4U-4, even while loaded with droptank, 500 pound bomb or Napalm and full wing load of 6 HVARS and 2 100 pound bombs and 2400 rounds of 50 cal ammo is more maneuverable than the YAK-3 or 9, at speeds between 140 and 160 knots.

6. The YAK pilot were considerably inferior in flying ability to the Japanese in World War II.

7. The YAK is inferior in speed and rate to climb to the F4U-4. Maximum speed used by the YAK's was about 200 to 250 knots. Most maneuvering after the first pass was below 200 knots.

8. Since no effective evasive action was taken by the YAK pilot it is believed they either lacked training or experience or both.
7 April 1951  At Sasebo, Japan, for logistics.

8 April 1951  At 0700 Item departed Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area off east coast of Korea in company with HMS THESEUS and screening ships consisting of HMS CONSORT, HMAS BATAAN, HMCS HURON, HMCS ATHABASKAN, USS ENGLISH and USS SPERRY. Cts 95.11 in USS BATAAN.

9 April 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off east coast of Korea in Wonsan area. Launched 10 CAP and 34 of offensive sorties; 24 armed recco, 4 strike Songjin-Wonsan area, 6 naval gun-fire air spot for TE 95.21 at Wonsan and TE 95.22 at Songjin. An F4U 4, piloted by 1st Lt. J. S. Sumner, USMCR, was hit by small arms fire and ditched in Wonsan harbor. Pilot rescued by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. No serious injury to pilot.

10 April 1951  Operating as before. At 1515 the USS BORIE (DD 702) joined screen. Launched CAP and ASP provided by the THESEUS, 45 offensive sorties; 37 armed recco, 4 strike Wonsan area, 4 air spot for TE 95.22 in Songjin area. Two Sea Furys from the THESEUS damaged when attacked by two shore-based Marine Corsairs south of Wonsan. Both pilots were able to return and land aboard THESEUS uninjured. Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. R. H. Johnson, RN, shot down by enemy AA 35 miles southwest of Wonsan. Area searched thoroughly, no sign of pilot; search abandoned the following day.

11 April 1951  Operating as before. At 1517 USS BORIE detached for duty with TE 95.21 at Wonsan. Commonwealth destroyers refueled at Wonsan. Launched CAP and ASP provided by THESEUS, 7 offensive sorties; all armed recco. Weather conditions unfavorable for flight operations due to fog.

12 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 48 offensive sorties; 44 armed recco, and 4 to strike railroad bridges in the Yonghung area. One Firefly from THESEUS ditched at sea 10 miles southwest of Hungnam. The pilot and observer were rescued by helicopter from USS ST PAUL, no injury to personnel.

II-1
13 April 1951
Operating as before. THESEUS replenished from HMS WAVE CHIEF. Launched 2 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 35 offensive sorties; 27 armed recce, 8 airspot for TE 95.21 at Wonsan and TE 95.22 at Songjin. Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. J. S. Humphreys, RN, was shot down by enemy AA fire six miles southwest of Hamhung. The pilot, seriously injured, was rescued by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER.

14 April 1951
Operating as before. BATAAN, ATHABASKAN, SPERRY, and ENGLISH replenished at sea from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS LEO (AKA 14). Launched 2 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 20 offensive sorties, all armed recce. An F4U 4, pilot Capt. H. G. Henneberger, USMC, was forced to land at Pohang when a gun blast tube in the port wing blew up during a strafing run. The pilot was uninjured. A Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. I. L. Bowman, RN, was hit by enemy AA fire 10 miles southwest of Hamhung and crash landed in the same area with no injury to pilot. Rescue was effected by helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER.

15 April 1951
Operating as before. Launched 6 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 25 offensive sorties; 21 armed recce, 4 airspot for TE 95.22 at Songjin and TE 95.21 at Wonsan. Flight operations were curtailed due to fog in the operating area. Item the THESEUS and screen assumed duties of TE 95.11 and departed for west coast operating area; the BATAAN accompanied by HMAS BATAAN and USS SPERRY departed for Sasebo, Japan.

16 April 1951
Arrived Sasebo, Japan 1116 Item for logistic support.

17 April 1951
At Sasebo, Japan, for logistic support.

18 April 1951
At Sasebo, Japan, for logistic support.

19 April 1951
At 0700 Item underway Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area West Coast Korea accompanied by USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786), USS ROGERS (DD 876), and USS AGERHOLM (DD 826). At 2000 Item relieved HMAS THESEUS and screen as TE 95.11. CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN.

II-2
20 April 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off West Coast of Korea. Launched 31 offensive sorties, all Armed Recco, and 8 CAP.

21 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched 33 offensive sorties; all Armed Recco, and 10 CAP. 1st Lt. W. H. Godbey, USMCR, was forced to bail out southwest of Chinnampo, when the engine of his F4U 4 aircraft cut out. He landed near the coast opposite Sokto-ri Island where he was picked up by friendly Korean Marines who withdrew him in a small boat. He was subsequently transferred from the boat by helicopter to the island of Cho-do and later taken 50 miles south to island of Paengnong-do by an Air Force helicopter. There he was picked up by ship's helicopter. The only injury to the pilot was a sprained ankle.

After leaving two planes of his section to cover Lt. Godbey, Capt. Phillip DeLong and 1st Lt. Harold Daigh proceeded north of Chinnampo where they were surprised by four enemy aircraft which attacked from the northwest. In the ensuing encounter Capt. DeLong shot down two of the enemy planes and Lt. Daigh shot down one while the other fled the scene in flames, and is believed to have crashed 20 miles farther north, where parts of a YAK and the body of an enemy pilot were recovered several days later.

22 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched 8 CAP and 26 offensive sorties; 8 Armed Recco, 18 Strikes in the Chinnampo - Sariwon area. F4U 4, pilot Capt. Jack Rainalter, USMCR, was hit by enemy AA fire near Sariwon, crashed, and exploded, with no chance of survival by the pilot.

23 April 1951  Operating as before. Replenished from USS NAVA SOTA (AO 27). Launched 12 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 36 CAS, and 4 Armed Recco.

24 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 36 CAS, and 4 Armed Recco.

II-3
25 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 32 CAS, and 8 Armed Recco.

26 April 1951  Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 32 CAS, and 8 Armed Recco. 2000 Item, BATAAN and escorts relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS GLORY and escorts.

27 April 1951  Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and logistic support. 0500 USS ROGERS (DDR 876) detached for duty in Wonsan area in accordance with instructions received enroute Sasebo. 1520 Item BATAAN, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM moored Sasebo harbor.

28-30 Apr 1951  At Sasebo, Japan for logistic support.

1 May 1951  At 0650 Item departed Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with HMS COMUS and HMCS SIOUX to join HMS GLORY and screen.

2 May 1951  Captain W. Miller in USS BATAAN assumed duties as CTE 95.11 at 0001 Item. Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, the USS BATAAN and HMS GLORY were screened by HMCS SIOUX, HMS COMUS, HMAS WARRAMUNGA, HMCS NOOTKA, HMCS HURON, HMAS BATAAN, USS ANDERSON with the USS PERKINS joining at 0520 Item. CAP and ASP provided by the GLORY. BATAAN launched 43 offensive sorties, all Armed Recco. During afternoon air operations a pilot from the GLORY was hit by enemy AA fire north of Seoul and was forced to ditch in the Han River with no injury to pilot. Rescue was effected by an Air Force helicopter. 2000 Item PERKINS detached for duty as radar picket north of force returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

3 May 1951  Operating as before. Launched 11 CAP and 34 offensive sorties; 16 CAS and 18 Armed Recco. 0530 Item PERKINS rejoined screen. 2000 Item PERKINS again detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

4 May 1951  Operating as before. CAP and ASP provided by GLORY. BATAAN launched 10 offensive sorties; all Armed Recco. Flight operations were restricted due to fog. Refueled Commonwealth destroyers from HMS WAVE CHIEF. 1300 Item the
VAN GALEN of the Royal Dutch Navy joined the screen. At 1600 Item HMCS SIOUX rejoined the screen. At 1700 Item HMAS WARRAMUNGA and HMCS NOOTKA were detached to proceed on mission assigned. 2000 Item the ANDERSON detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

5 May 1951

Operating as before. Launched 2 CAP and 8 offensive sorties; all CAS. Flight operations again restricted due to fog. 2000 Item ANDERSON detached on duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning. 0030 Item ANDERSON reported investigation of Greek freighter THEMONI enroute from Kobe, Japan to Dairen.

6 May 1951

Operating as before. BATAAN, ANDERSON, PERKINS, VAN GALEN, and AGERHOLM who joined screen at 1230 Item, replenished at sea from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS DIPEDA (AKA 59). CAP and ASP provided by the GLORY. BATAAN launched 22 offensive sorties; 14 Armed Recco and 8 CAS. 1730 King the VAN GALEN detached to proceed on mission assigned. 2000 King the GLORY and screen detached to proceed to Sasebo, Japan for logistic support. BATAAN's screen consisted of the U.S. destroyers PERKINS, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM. 2100 King the ANDERSON was detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 King the next morning.

7 May 1951

Operating as before. Launched 11 CAP and 44 offensive sorties; 20 Armed Recco and 24 CAS.

8 May 1951

Operating as before. Launched 4 CAP and 19 offensive sorties; 4 Armed Recco and 15 CAS. 1738 King F4U 4, pilot D. W. Smith, USMCR, crashed near force as the pilot bailed out when his engine quit while flying CAP. Rescue of the pilot was effected by a boat from the AGERHOLM. The pilot was not seriously injured. 2100 King the ANDERSON was detached as radar picket returning at 0530 King the next morning.

9 May 1951

Operating as before. 0530 King to 1230 King furnished CAP for HMS ALACRITY and USS ALGOL (AKA 54). Launched 12 CAP and 38 offensive sorties; 4 Armed Recco and 34 CAS.
10 May 1951 Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 30 offensive sorties; 3 Armed Recce and 27 CAS. In the early evening HMCS SIOUX joined screen. 2000 King the AGERHOLM and PERKINS were detached to proceed on mission assigned; the BATAAN accompanied by ANDERSON and SIOUX departed for Sasebo, Japan. At about 2000 King HMS GLORY and screen assumed duties of TE 95.11.

11 May 1951 Arrived Sasebo, Japan 1500 King for logistic support.
PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Material and Equipment

Performance of ordnance material and equipment was satisfactory for this period.

2. Ammunition Expended

(a) 9 April to 16 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caliber .50 AMG</td>
<td>161,000 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F51 Napalm tanks</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>3,465 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) 19 April to 27 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caliber .50 AMG</td>
<td>150,000 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm tanks</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>5,715 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM</td>
<td>78 rds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) 1 May to 11 May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caliber .50 AMG</td>
<td>171,800 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# G.P. Bombs</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>1,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm tanks</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>5,520 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM</td>
<td>1,631 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 MM</td>
<td>240 rds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PART IV

**BATTLE DAMAGE**

(A) Own - F4U 4 BuNo's as shown

9 April 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>BuNo</th>
<th>Damage Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>97380</td>
<td>Hit in leading edge left wing; second hit port fuselage; no vital parts hit; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>96964</td>
<td>Hit in leading edge of right wing; bullet out top; bottom of right wing, out top; Caliber .30 and Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>81770</td>
<td>Hit in lower cowling, air scoop, engine, leading edge right wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>97207</td>
<td>Hit starboard wheel well door; hydraulic line; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>96916</td>
<td>Hit left wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire; second hit fuselage; minor damage; small arms fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>97225</td>
<td>Hit two feet aft of cockpit and into armor plate; minor damage fuselage; estimated Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>96979</td>
<td>Hit entered under side of elevator and came out through top side of elevator; minor damage; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>96916</td>
<td>Hit left wing; second hit fuselage or tail; engine failed. Ditched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>80869</td>
<td>Hit below right wheel well, right of skid board; second hit lower center cowling near #8 cylinder; third hit below center section wing outboard, wheel well door; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>97225</td>
<td>Hit right side fuselage; entered corner stowage box right console and then hit radio cord; second hit right wing outboard ammunition box, intercooler door, through water tank stopping at engine mount; Caliber .30 and Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 April 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BuNo.</th>
<th>Hit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80967</td>
<td>Hit right horizontal stabilizer; minor damage; estimated Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81879</td>
<td>Hit oil cooler; fairing wing spar; second hit left horizontal stabilizer; third hit battery compartment; all Caliber .30 or Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 April 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BuNo.</th>
<th>Hit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97191</td>
<td>Hit left wing center of wing; out through top of wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97207</td>
<td>Hit through belly tank; into wing and stopped; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96964</td>
<td>Hit fuselage; exploded in electrical system, damaging radio; second hit entered left wing and went out top side of wing; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96989</td>
<td>Hit through wing and top side of wing; second and third hits penetrated fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97380</td>
<td>Hit through wing and went out top side; two holes in fuselage; no vital parts hit; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 April 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BuNo.</th>
<th>Hit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82174</td>
<td>Hit fuselage aft of engine into primary air-duct; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96804</td>
<td>Hit through left aileron; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97084</td>
<td>Hit through fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97225</td>
<td>Hit entered fuselage, minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81789</td>
<td>Hit leading edge of right wing; minor damage; shrapnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV-2
14 April 1951
BuNo.
1. 96964 Hit in starboard wing; penetrated fabric; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

20 April 1951
1. 97380 Hit penetrated lower cowling; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2. 96949 Hit left flap rear; entered bottom of flap and came out top of flap; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
3. 82098 Hit right wheel-well door-brake assembly; Caliber .30 machine gun fire; brake assembly replaced; hit right wing; minor damage; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
4. 97380 Hit went through fabric in elevator; minor damage; small arms fire.
5. 96949 Hit left side of fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
6. 96779 Hit left inboard flap 3 inches from trailing edge; hole in flap; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

21 April 1951
1. 97380 Hit through left cowling, minor damage; second hit entered behind forward radio antenna APX 1 destroyed; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
2. 96949 Hit entered right cowling; seared spark-plug lead; passed on through; minor damage; small arms fire.

22 April 1951
1. 97225 Hit amidship; plane exploded, no sign of life noted; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.
2. 97207 Hit entered left wing, out through top of wing; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.

IV-3
23 April 1951
BuNo. 82165
1. Hit in elevator. Entered bottom, out through top; minor damage; small arms fire.

24 April 1951
1. 97121
Hit left side of engine, severed hydraulic line; minor damage; small arms fire.
2. 96949
Hit penetrated wing; minor damage; small arms fire.

25 April 1951
1. 97321
Hit through forward portion of port wing and out top of wing; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.

2 May 1951
1. 96818
Hit entered cowling; hit speed ring; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

3 May 1951
1. 81879
Hit leading edge of port wing 2 feet out, hit rib, came through top of wing; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2. 82018
Hit entered bottom side of right wing, came out through top of wing; minor damage; small arms fire.

7 May 1951
1. 96779
Hit penetrated vertical fin; minor damage; small arms fire.

8 May 1951
1. 97121
Hit top aft fuselage to bottom mid-fuselage; minor damage; small arms fire.

IV-4
9 May 1951

BuNo.

1. 81879 Hit entered bottom of right aileron, came out through top; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

10 May 1951

1. 80869 Hit entered oil cooler in the port wing butt and came out through top of wing along the fuselage; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.

2. 81181 Hit entered cowl ing, hit rear of prop hub and glanced off; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

(B) Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Disabled</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junk s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Motor vehicles 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rail cars 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail cars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Oxcarts 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sampans 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack animals</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Locomotives 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tanks 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field pieces</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Gun positions 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun emplacements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Floating crane 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel &amp; supply dumps</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>771</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated - 1920
PART V

PERSONNEL; PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel was excellent. However, under more strenuous operating conditions it would be difficult to train recalled reserve personnel "on-the-job" to use equipment and techniques which have been introduced in the fleet since the World War II demobilization. Some reduction in operating efficiency could be expected. To preclude this expectation it is recommended that mobilized reserve personnel be indoctrinated in new techniques and equipment and given the opportunity to "brush up" in their rates before being detailed to duty aboard a ship in the combat zone.

Personnel casualties were as follows:

9 April 1st Lt. John S. Sumner, 026090, USMC, crash landed in sea. He was picked up by rescue helicopter after about eleven minutes. The only injury suffered was a mild abrasion on right arm.

21 April 1st Lt. William H. Godbey, 026472, USMC, bailed out over land and was rescued by guerillas who put him aboard small harbor craft from which he was picked up by helicopter. He suffered only mild contusions to left foot.

22 April The plane piloted by Capt. William J. Rainalter, 020896, USMCR, was hit by anti-aircraft fire over his target. Aircraft burst into flames immediately and crashed into ground. There was no possible chance of pilot survival; pilot not recovered.

8 May 1st Lt. Darrell N. Smith, 026280, USMCR, bailed out over water after the engine of the plane he was piloting failed. He was rescued by helicopter and destroyer after being in the water about 13 minutes. He was unconscious for a very short while, but suffered only mild contusions and abrasions to trunk and extremities.
PART VI
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Comment: The operations of 8-15 April and 1-6 May were notable for their international aspect and provided valuable experience for the units of the nations participating. Considering that the United States and British carriers and their mixed United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands destroyer screen were operating together for the first time the operations went off remarkably well. The ability of these forces to join and operate effectively in company using the doctrines contained in the USF publications, particularly USF 4, emphasized the benefits to be derived from the standardization of doctrine and operating techniques throughout the naval services of the United Nations.

Recommendation: It is recommended that standardization of operating doctrines and techniques of United Nations naval forces be continued and that every opportunity be taken to train and operate these forces in company.

Comment: In plotting and reporting positions of surface and air contacts the CICs of British Commonwealth vessels normally use a rectangular grid coordinate system. The principal advantage of this system appears to be the elimination of conversion plotting between CICs. However, to facilitate operations during this period the British Commonwealth vessels in company used the U.S. polar coordinate system of plotting and reporting. They made this change without difficulty as they had formerly used the polar coordinate system and were equipped to use either method. If the need arose, however, it is believed U.S. vessels would have considerable difficulty converting to the British system with present CIC equipment which is designed exclusively for the polar coordinate method.

Another feature of the British reporting system is their method of designating contacts. All air contacts, including known friendlies, such as outgoing strikes, CAP, and ASP, are given track designations such as "Friendly twenty". In addition, blocks of numbers are reserved for certain type raids, such as numbers from one to ten for interforce raids. This system is designed to eliminate confusion between their air and surface control centers which are physically separated from each other, but it is somewhat confusing to their allies. In the final analysis, however, the CICs of the British and Commonwealth vessels were alert and reliable. In some respects, such as their use of the deck condition code contained in USF 15, and in the conscientious manner in which they reported contacts, they outshone the CICs of U.S. vessels in company.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a standardized system of radar plotting reporting be developed and utilized by naval forces.
of the United Nations, in order that all units may have a clear picture of the tactical situation at all times. Such a system should approximate, where feasible, the systems employed by the land based forces of the United Nations. In this connection the rectangular grid system of reporting contacts should be carefully considered as it appears more adaptable to joint use than the polar coordinate system. It is further recommended that until a standardized CIC doctrine is effective in United Nations forces all United States CIC personnel be familiarized with the methods utilized by the British and Commonwealth forces, and they with ours.

Comment: BATAAN has operated with a representative cross section of destroyers in the Korean area due to the policy of rotating destroyers between east and west coast duties. All destroyers with which she has operated have been given equal opportunity to control BATAAN's CAP. This policy has been highly beneficial from a training standpoint and has paid dividends on the occasions the carrier has suffered electronic casualties. However, in implementing this policy it has been noted that air controllers in destroyers are generally in need of more practice. The reasons for this deficiency are not definitely known, but it is understood that destroyers are not often enough afforded opportunities to control CAP.

Recommendation: It is recommended that destroyer CIC personnel be thoroughly indoctrinated and exercised in CAP control before their ships are ordered to the combat zone and that while in company with carriers destroyers be given every reasonable opportunity to control the CAP.

Comment: Radio Guam (George Fox) gave uniformly excellent results throughout the period. Radio Tokyo (Ratt Fox) continued to present a major communication problem. There were nightly periods when reception ranged from fair to impossible. Because this vessel was not generally in direct communication with others guarding this broadcast, a considerable amount of servicing resulted, usually conducted on the ship-shore nets direct to Radio Tokyo. It was also apparent from the number of service messages appearing on the Radio Tokyo (Ratt Fox) that other major commands in the Korean theater are experiencing the same reception difficulties.

Recommendations: It is recommended that:

1. Commanders in each operating area inform Radio Tokyo at three-hourly intervals of the readability of Radio Tokyo Ratt signals and request re-runs for ships in the area. Radio Tokyo should re-run missing numbers immediately after receiving a report of reliable reception.
37-30°N 125-30°E. The sky condition over ship at 0500 was overcast at 2000 feet and visibility 8 miles with light rain. At 1100 the ceiling was 2500 feet with visibility 3 miles. The visibility had decreased slowly throughout the morning.

The first two flights were cancelled but a third flight was launched about 1100. Planes airborne reported 1700-2000 foot ceilings with fair to poor visibility but proceeded on their mission. Around 1200 conditions worsened rapidly and the planes were recalled. When they landed aboard the ceiling was 300-400 feet and visibility 1/2 to 1 mile. Conditions remained bad with the rain ending shortly after mid-night, but followed by a heavy fog with visibility 0 to 1/2 mile which lasted until 1610 the next day.

The center of the Yellow Sea had proved to be a virtual mixing pot for the warm maritime tropical air mass from east of the Philippines, the continental polar air mass from eastern Siberia, and the warm air mass moving across southern China, from the Indian Ocean. Once again a cyclonic wave had formed on a slow moving front and a new storm was born. This wave slowly intensified and later, when located near Tokyo on the afternoon of 8 May, had a central pressure of 999 MB. deepening. This created a deep trough aloft extending southwest to the Formosa area which proved to be an excellent track for typhoon Iris between 8 and 10 May. The increase in the intensity of the high over Manchuria and the Yellow Sea behind this low also aided in preventing Iris from coming closer to Japan.

A further problem of an aerologist in this area is the general deterioration of visibility in the Spring. Heavy sea fog with visibility less than one mile sometimes will last well into the afternoon. Damp haze, which is characteristic of the warm air, is a prevalent restriction to visibility, but it does not reduce visibilities as much as does the fog. This haze has been observed to be heaviest two or three days after dust storms were observed southwest of Lake Baikal. It is surmised that with high winds aloft (about 50 knots) dust particles from the Gobi Desert may be carried eastward to the area of Korea causing frequent observations of haze aloft. Quite often, when the sea and sky blend due to a high scattering of light from suspended particles, pilots have reported visibilities of one mile when visibilities between ships have been as high as seven miles. Smoke or dust, especially in areas of heavy ground action, further increase the concentration of the suspended particles. Heavy smoke from fires set by the enemy for screening purposes has restricted visibilities to 0-2 miles and, very frequently hampered flight operations.
2. Radio Tokyo give immediate priority to requests for re-runs from ships or commands in the operating areas when a check shows that messages requested are addressed for action to those ships or commands.

Comment: Due to their nature Ratt broadcast files accumulate rapidly and require a large portion of the space available for the stowage of radio traffic files. At present it is required that broadcast files be retained on board for six months after receipt. In this period Ratt files alone fill all available space reserved for stowage of broadcast files in this vessel. While additional filing cabinets can always be installed it is felt that this is not the most desirable solution.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the period required for retention of Ratt broadcast files on board be reduced from six to three months, and that current filing instructions be amended accordingly.

Comment: It was particularly gratifying to note how successfully the CIC and aircraft VHF Nets were employed by the ships of five allied nations during the combined operations. Using standard crystallizations and frequency employments, combined channels were used for controlling U.S. and British aircraft. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient crystals for the C.I. primary and task element gunnery coordination and administrative nets because of the different types of equipment used. British and other allied ships used crystals operating on different fundamental frequencies than those utilized in U.S. Navy equipment. These ships do not have UHF equipment installed and it was not used during the operation. On the recommendation of the British CVL, the task element gunnery coordination and administrative net was very successfully used during hours of darkness to "patch" or service Fox broadcast messages between ships of the element, providing an efficient substitute for "Nancy" which was not available in British Commonwealth ships.

Comment: The primary tactical circuit (TBS) is deserving of special comment. On far too numerous occasions tactical communications were interfered with by the transmission of administrative traffic on the primary tactical circuit. Most of these transmissions emanated from destroyers and frigates operating independently in the area adjacent to the carrier operating areas, frequently at maximum voice range. The telephone, be it radio or landline, is a familiar, handy, and usually reliable device which to many represents the most natural and convenient way to communicate with persons not in the immediate vicinity, without regard for its "party line" properties.
Comment: Flight operations in the Wonsan-Hungnam-Songjin area were chiefly armed reconnaissance missions for the purpose of locating enemy vehicle concentrations and obtaining information on suitable interdiction targets such as bridges. Initially these missions were conducted at low altitudes, with the planes making several consecutive passes over likely targets for identification and attack. This method had been used successfully earlier during similar operations on the west coast of Korea. However, the first day's operation on the east coast resulted in the surprising total of ten planes hit by small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fortunately, none were seriously damaged, but it was apparent from the number hit that a change in tactics was necessary. Consequently the following tactics for armed reconnaissance missions were employed:

1. Armed reconnaissance patrols consisted of no less than four aircraft. This assured a strong R&ESCAP in event any member of the flight was forced down by anti-aircraft, and deterred minor and isolated enemy anti-aircraft positions from taking flights under fire, in anticipation of strong retaliation.

2. Known centers of enemy activity such as Hungnam, Hambung, and Wonsan were detoured in order to avoid known and probable concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery. It was estimated that there were numerous suitable, undefended, and untouched vehicles and interdiction targets in the surrounding areas and that until these were destroyed there would be little profit in attacking in the more heavily defended locations. This estimate was verified by the destruction of an estimated 120 vehicles in 6 days in undefended vehicle parks between Hungnam and Wonsan without a single plane being hit while in these target areas. Likewise, undefended bridges, the destruction of which would be equally as serious to the enemy as the destruction of bridges in heavily defended areas, were plentiful and four were destroyed. Targets such as these bridges were designated primary targets of the reconnaissance missions when practicable in order that heavy ordnance might be expended on them early in the flight, thus enabling the aircraft to proceed at higher speeds during subsequent reconnaissance of dangerous areas than would have been possible had full ordnance load been retained.

3. When an area on which there was no previous flak intelligence was to be reconnoitered, a preliminary sweep of the area at 2-3000 feet altitude was made in order to observe critical terrain features, the overall pattern of enemy activity, and to draw enemy fire so that anti-aircraft artillery locations could be spotted. If the area swept was deemed to be only lightly defended, low altitude sweeps to spot camouflaged vehicles, supply dumps, and other profitable targets followed. In more familiar areas surprise was guarded against in another manner, by half the patrol flying a low level reconnaissance while the other half flew...
high and in position to observe and warn the low flight of any apparent dangers ahead, or immediately to take under fire any anti-aircraft positions which opened up on the low flight.

4. The previous practice of making consecutive passes or orbiting likely targets during attacks was discontinued. Instead of pulling up in an immediate turn to get in position for attack when a target was spotted it became the practice for the flight to continue ahead maintaining speed until clear, then to effect rendezvous and return to make a "straight through" type of coordinated attack.

As a result of the foregoing modifications in armed reconnaissance tactics the number of planes damaged by small caliber anti-aircraft fire while engaged in reconnaissance was reduced.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 95
      (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
      (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951;
      submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
     (b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug. 1950,
         NDB 15 Aug. 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1),
   with parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN
   operated with TG 95.1.

W. MILLER

Copy to:
ComAirPac
ComCarDiv 15
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)

ACTION REPORT

(period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951)

PART I Narrative

PART II Chronology

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment and Ammunition Expenditure

PART IV Battle Damage

PART V Personnel; Performance and Casualties

PART VI Comments and Recommendations
PART I
NARRATIVE

During the period 13-18 May BATAAN replenished at Sasebo and made ready to operate against the North Korean and Chinese Communists from 20 May to 3 June, 1951, pursuant to the orders of CTG 95.1. At 0641 19 May, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, CTF 95, together with members of his staff, embarked and broke his flag in USS BATAAN. At 0700 King, BATAAN, with CTF 95 and VMF 312 embarked, and with HNMS VAN GALEN (DD) as escort, sailed from Sasebo for the west coast of Korea. At 0945 HMAS WARRAMUNGA (DD), which had sailed earlier from Kure, joined off the northern approach to Sasebo as an additional escort. From 1035 to 1145 all three ships participated in a pre-arranged AA firing exercise. The formation arrived in operating area MIKE at 191100Z at which time USS BATAAN relieved HMAS GLORY in TE 95.11, Captain W. Miller, USN in BATAAN becoming OTC and CTE 95.11.

TE 95.11 then comprised USS BATAAN, USS HUPERTUS (DD 851) with ComDesDiv 32 embarked, USS FECHTELER (DD 870), HMAS WARRAMUNGA (DD) and HNMS VAN GALEN (DD). The U.S. destroyers joined the formation at 200730 King in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00N Long. 125-00E where the task element operated daily during daylight thereafter.

Operations during the period 20 May - 3 June were conducted in accordance with CTF 95 OpOrder 1-51, CTG 95.1 OpOrder 1-51 and GO, USS BATAAN OpOrder 3-51 (revised). Surface operations comprised those necessary to conduct air operations, replenishment, and radar surveillance of the northern part of the Yellow Sea at night. Formation 4R was used throughout, with a circular screen during daylight and an anti-submarine screen at night.

Commencing 22 May radar patrol "Bugatti", to provide early warning of any enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea, was conducted nightly in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 1-51. This patrol formerly had been accomplished by CTE 95.12. As conducted by CTE 95.11 a destroyer was detached at the end of each day's flight operations to patrol along longitude 124-00E between latitudes 37-40 and 39-00 North, search as prescribed, and rejoin the formation prior to resumption of flight operations the next morning. U.S. destroyers only were used in view of their superior radar search capabilities. On the night of 31 May USS HUPERTUS reported a radar and RADCM contact initially evaluated as "possible submarine", later reevaluated as "doubtful submarine". This contact was reported to ComNavFE who concurred in the final evaluation. Results of other "Bugatti" patrols were negative.

I-1
Air operations comprised armed-reconnaissance, close air support, airspot, and combat air patrol missions. The primary task of armed reconnaissance was the interdiction of enemy shipping on the west coast of Korea. Emphasis was placed on the destruction of junks and sampans in the Taedong Gang estuary. Land transportation routes in the Hwanghae-Do region also were interdicted when feasible, with emphasis being placed on the systematic destruction of railway bridges and the location and destruction of vehicle parks. At the request of Commander First Corps, Eighth Army in Korea, the Han river estuary was kept under close air surveillance to detect any unusual activity that would indicate an enemy attempt to cross the estuary from the vicinity of Kaesong to the Kimpo peninsula above Inchon. Results of this surveillance were negative and it was discontinued as unnecessary after 26 May due to the advance of friendly ground forces north of the Han.

Close air support missions performed were those required to cover the various Army Corps sectors as assigned by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Korea.

Combat air patrol was maintained over TE 95.11 when weather permitted, and over United Nations forces conducting mine sweeping and diversionary amphibious operations on the Nampo coast near Ch'o Do Island during the period 20-22 May in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 3-51. Armed-airspot also was provided for the diversionary forces and, when feasible, was made an additional task of the combat air patrol furnished those forces.

Air operations were seriously curtailed by inclement weather, characterized by heavy rains and dense fogs, which made flights impossible on 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, and 30 May, and which curtailed operations on 3 June. Despite the bad weather 407 sorties were flown, of which 305 were offensive and 102 defensive (combat air patrol). Offensive sorties consisted of 159 armed-reconnaissance missions, 104 close air support missions, 14 combined armed-airspot and combat air patrol missions, and 28 strikes on railway and highway bridges. One pilot was lost during these operations when, on 28 May, 1st Lt. Austin "E" Brenneman was shot down one mile east of An'g, North Korea, while on an armed-reconnaissance mission. Witnesses stated that his plane was hit in the cockpit by 40 mm. flak after which it made a right gliding turn into the ground and exploded on impact. No radio contact with the pilot was established and he made no attempt to parachute after being hit. Witnesses stated that there was no possible chance of survival.

Replenishment operations consisted of refueling the various destroyers on 21, 23, 25, 28, and 31 May and refueling and rearming BATAAN on 25 May. BATAAN was refueled 31 May.
On 21 May, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to refuel from the British sizer WAVE PREMIER about 15 miles west of the Clifford Islands. HMCS SIOUX, which had been escorting WAVE PREMIER, joined the screen temporarily during the absence of WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN. At 1250 King, refueling completed, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined and SIOUX departed to resume escort of WAVE PREMIER. RUPERTUS and FECHTELER were detached at 0630, 23 May, to refuel from USS MANATEE (AO 58) in the vicinity of Lat. 36-30N, Long. 124-30E. and rejoin. On completion, about 0900, FECHTELER escorted MANATEE to Inchon prior to rejoining the formation.

On 25 May, USS DIPHDA (AKA 59), escorted by HMCS SIOUX (D 225) and MANATEE rendezvoused with the task element in the vicinity of Lat. 36-30N, Long. 124-30E at 0630. BATAAN rearmed from DIPHDA and all units refueled from MANATEE. On completion of rearming about 0930, DIPHDA and escort returned to Sasebo, and at 1220 refueling was completed and VAN GALEN was detached to escort MANATEE to a rendezvous with USS TOLEDO (CA 133) in the Inchon approaches. VAN GALEN rejoined at 2225 King.

On 28 May WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to refuel from WAVE PREMIER as before. They departed at 0540 and rejoined at 0855. The final refueling of all units took place, without interruption of flight operations, on the morning of 31 May from USS MANATEE in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00N, Long. 124-45E. Refueling was completed about 0930 and MANATEE returned to Sasebo.

Changes of command and composition during the period were as follows:

Pursuant to CTG 95.1 confidential dispatch 210134Z May, CTE 95.11, Captain W. Miller in BATAAN was designated OTC West Coast effective at 212100 King May.

On 24 May two TBM aircraft arrived from Itazuki AFB, Japan to provide airlift for RADM. Smith to Seoul for a conference with ranking Army and Navy commanders in the First Corps area. RADM. Smith departed at 1330 and returned at 1313 the following day, having remained overnight aboard USS ELDORADO (AGC 11) at Inchon.

On 28 May USS HENRY W. TUCKER (DDR 875) joined the screen at 0700. At 1308 RADM. Smith, CTF 95, hauled down his flag in BATAAN and, together with members of his staff, transferred to the USS FECHTELER. On completion of the transfer at 1320, FECHTELER was detached and proceeded to Pusan, Korea, under the operational control of CTF 95.

At 0200 King, 3 June, USS MASON (DD 852) joined the screen. At 0650, after mail had been passed between MASON, RUPERTUS, and TUCKER, RUPERTUS was detached pursuant to orders of CTF 95 to pro-
ceed to the east coast of Korea and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control.

At 1330 King, 3 June, flight operations were cancelled due to rain and fog. In view of the prevailing bad weather and its expected continuation for the remainder of the day, TUCKER and MASON were detached to conduct radar patrol "Bugatti" and, on completion the following morning, to join HMS GLORY. USS BATAAN, escorted by WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN, proceeded to Sasebo and, at 2100 King, was relieved in TE 95.11 by HMS GLORY and escorts as previously scheduled by CTG 95.1.

Between 0800 and 0845, 4 June, BATAAN, WARRAMUNGA, and VAN GALEN conducted a pre-arranged anti-aircraft firing exercise in the gunnery area off Sasebo. At 0945 King, while operating about 60 miles west of Fukukca, Japan, BATAAN launched all flyable aircraft of VMF-312 to proceed to Itami AFB Japan, by way of Itazuki AFB because of weather. At 1038 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to proceed to Kure, Japan as previously scheduled. BATAAN proceeded unescorted via the northern swept channel to Sasebo for logistics, and on arrival at 1250 King reported to CTF 95 for operational control. At 0700 King, 5 June, BATAAN sailed for Kobe, Japan to complete debarkation of VMF 312 personnel and equipment. BATAAN arrived at Kobe at 1030 King, 6 June, and departed for Yokosuka, Japan at 1300 King, 7 June. On arrival at Yokosuka at 1000 King, 8 June, a conference was held with representative officers of USS SICILY (CVE 118), which was enroute to the Korean operating area as relief for BATAAN in TG 95.1. The purpose of this conference was to turn over operational information and intelligence material to SICILY, as well as to arrange for the transfer of critical material items between the two vessels. This accomplished, SICILY sailed from Yokosuka the following afternoon.

On 11 June USS BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv 15 in conducting the annual administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO (CVE 115).

Meanwhile, during the period 8-12 June, BATAAN made ready to sail for the United States, and at 0800 King 13 June departed Yokosuka, Japan for San Diego, California.
13-18 May 1951 Sasebo, Japan for logistics.

19 May 1951
0645 Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, CTF 95, embarked and broke his flag in BATAAN.
0700 departed Sasebo, Japan in company with HMAS VAN GALEN (D803) enroute north of Quelpart Island and west of Makau for the operating area off west coast of Korea. 0945 HMAS WARRAMUNGA joined. 2100 relieved HMS GLORY and two British destroyers in TE 95.11. Captain W. Miller in USS BATAAN assumed duties as CTE 95.11.

20 May 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off the west coast of Korea.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 37 offensive sorties, including 25 Armed Recco and 12 Tar-Cap in support of TE 95.12 in the Manap-to area, near Cho Do Island.
0855 the USS FECHTELER (DD 870) and USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) joined. The Screen Commander was Captain Becher in WARRAMUNGA.

21 May 1951
Operating as before.
0730 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN proceeded to refuel from WAVE PREMIER.
0855 HMCS SIOUX joined the screen while the WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN refueled.
1250 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined, SIOUX departed to rejoin WAVE PREMIER. No flight operations due to dense fog in the operating area.

22 May 1951
Operating as before.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 33 offensive sorties, including 25 CAS and 8 Armed Recco.
2045 RUPERTUS proceeded on radar patrol "Bugatti" between Paengnyong-Do and the Shantung promontory for the purpose of detecting any enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea during the night.

23 May 1951
Operating as before.
0550 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night radar patrol negative.
0610-0915 RUPERTUS and FECHTELER refueled from USS MANATEE (AO 58).
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 36 offensive sorties, including 20 CAS and 16 Armed Recco.
2042 FECHTELER departed on night radar patrol "Bugatti".

24 May 1951
Operating as before.
0645 FECHTELER rejoined. Night radar patrol negative.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 32 offensive sorties including 16 CAS and 16 Armed Recco sorties. 1330 CTF 95, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, departed via TBM for a conference at Inchon. 2040 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

25 May 1951
Operating as before.
0545 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night patrol negative. 0700-1220 TE 95.11 refueled from MANATEE (AO 58) and BATAAN rearmed from USS DIPHDA (AKA 59). 1313 CTF 95 returned aboard. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area. 1955 FECHTELER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

26 May 1951
Operating as before.
0725 FECHTELER rejoined. Night radar patrol negative. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area. 2000 RUPERTUS departed on radar patrol "Bugatti".

27 May 1951
Operating as before.
0510 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night radar patrol negative. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area. 1900 FECHTELER departed on radar patrol "Bugatti".

28 May 1951
Operating as before.
0510 FECHTELER rejoined; patrol negative.
0540 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN proceeded to refuel from HMS WAVE PREMIER.
0630-2030 launched 10 CAP and 35 offensive sorties, including 20 CAS, 11 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Yongang - Ongung area. About 0730 an F4U4 piloted by 1st Lt. Austin E. Brenneman, USMC, was hit in the cockpit by enemy AA fire while reconnoitering the Anak area. The plane crashed with no chance of pilot survival.
0800 USS TUCKER (DDR 875) joined the screen.
0855 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined.
1308 RADM. Smith and staff transferred to FECHTELER. 1320 FECHTELER with CTF 95 embarked departed for Pusan.
2055 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

II-2
29 May 1951 Operating as before. 0504 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative. There were no flight operations due to fog in the operating area. 1900 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

30 May 1951 Operating as before. 0434 RUPERTUS rejoined. Reported encountering a possible submarine. ComNavFE informed. This contact later reevaluated as "doubtful submarine" on receipt of additional information. The task element was unable to replenish from USS MANATEE (AO 58) as scheduled due to dense fog in the operating area. MANATEE and escort remained within radar contact until the weather cleared. 1810 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

31 May 1951 Operating as before. 0445 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative. 0630-2030 launched 10 CAP and 28 offensive sorties, including 24 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Yonan area. 0645 TE 95.11 refueled from MANATEE, completing at 1050. 2012 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

1 June 1951 Operating as before. 0518 RUPERTUS rejoined; patrol negative. 0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 44 offensive sorties, including 40 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Haaju area. 0750 VAN GALEN proceeded to WAVE PREMIER for mail and topped off with fuel while alongside. 2023 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti". 1717 VAN GALEN rejoined.

2 June 1951 Operating as before. 0500 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative. 0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 40 offensive sorties, including 31 Armed Recco and 9 CAS. 2045 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

3 June 1951 Operating as before. 0207 the USS MASON (DD 852) joined the screen. 0530 RUPERTUS rejoined; patrol negative. 0647 RUPERTUS was detached to proceed to the east coast of Korea and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control.

II-3
0630-1330 launched 6 CAP and 19 offensive sorties, including 15 CAS and 4 combined CAP and Airspot in support of HMS GEYLOM in the vicinity of the Cho Do Island.
1410 BATAAN, escorted by WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN, proceeded toward Sasebo, and TUCKER and MASON were detached to patrol "Bugatti" with orders to join HMS GLORY and screen the following morning.
2100 GLORY and escorts relieved BATAAN, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN in TE 95.11. CO, HMS GLORY became OTC and CTE 95.11.

4 June 1951 Enroute Sasebo, Japan.
0800-0845 conducted AA firing exercises for all ships of the formation.
0945 launched 25 aircraft for Itami AFB, Japan. All planes landed at Itazuke AFB because of weather.
1038 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to proceed on to Kure, Japan.
1250 the BATAAN arrived Sasebo for logistics.

5 June 1951 0700 departed Sasebo, enroute Kobe, Japan to disembark VMF 312 personnel and equipment.

6 June 1951 Enroute Kobe, Japan.
1030 arrived Kobe. Personnel and equipment of VMF 312 off-loaded.

7 June 1951 0700 departed Kobe for Yokosuka, Japan.

8 June 1951 Enroute Yokosuka.
1000 arrived Yokosuka.

9 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan, made turnover to USS SICILY (CVE 118).

10 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan.

11 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan. The BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv-15 to conduct an administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO (CVE 115).

12 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan.

13 June 1951 0800 Underway for San Diego, California. U.S.A.
PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND
EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Material and Equipment

During this and the preceding two weeks operating period
Fuze Extension, M1, in combination with Noze Fuze AN-M103
was employed with 100, 500, and 1000 lb. GP bombs for anti-
personnel purposes in lieu of the Anti-Personnel Attach-
ment (daisy cutter) extension formerly employed. Pilots
reported that the new combination was definitely superior
in producing above ground bursts and that the percentage
of "duds" was much lower than with the old rod type "daisy
cutter". Whereas the old "daisy cutter" assembly required
careful handling to avoid bending the extension rod, the
new fuze extension was used by ordnance personnel as a
grip to assist in manhandling bombs, with no apparent ill
result. Moreover, since the fuze was attached to the for-
ward end of the extension instead of at its base it could
be set with a delay, if desired, without removing the ex-
tension. This feature permitted fuze settings to be
changed expeditiously on the fuses of bombs already loaded
on aircraft as required to obtain best results when last
minute changes in target assignments were made.

2. Ammunition Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cal. 50 MG</th>
<th>216,400 rds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>1,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 MM</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>5,715 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm tanks</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own

1. No damage was suffered by surface units.

2. Damage to aircraft by enemy anti-aircraft and small arms fire is summarized below. Details of these casualties were reported separately in Aircraft Vulnerability Reports, OPNAV-55-120-(7-50) forms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>No. A/C hit</th>
<th>Times Hit</th>
<th>Type Fire (Note 1)</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Recco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Minor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Heavy AW</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. Machine guns of Caliber .50 and smaller are reported as Light Automatic Weapons. Heavy Automatic Weapons comprise those firing 20 and 40 mm type ammunition.


3. No damage was incurred by aircraft assigned AIRSPOT or CAP missions.

B. Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Pieces</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animals</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railcars</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Boxcars</td>
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<td>Trucks</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sampans</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated 722
PART V

PERSONNEL; PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. The performance of all personnel was excellent.

2. Personnel casualties were as follows:

28 May 1st Lt. A.E. Brenneman, 039340, USMCR, crashed in enemy held territory when the plane of which he was pilot was hit in the vicinity of the cockpit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft exploded on impact and there was no chance of 1st Lt. Brenneman's survival.

31 May 1st Lt. R.D. Bianchi, 037254, USMC, received cuts on his right hand and the left side of his face from pieces of plexiglass when the canopy of the aircraft he was piloting was shattered by enemy light machine gun fire.
Comment: During the period of this report and on previous occasions some replacement pilots who had never qualified aboard a carrier, and others who had qualified over five years ago were received aboard. Under normal circumstances qualification and requalification would have been conducted in accordance with USF 50 and type commander's directives, but operational requirements and aircraft availability made this impracticable. However, it was found possible to conduct the qualification of replacement pilots in three phases without setting up special flights or interfering with combat operations.

The first phase, aircraft familiarization and field carrier landing drill, was conducted at a Japanese base by a Marine service squadron. In general the time spent by replacement pilots in this phase was less than the desirable minimum due to the urgent need for replacement throughout the Marine Air Wing and the lack of sufficient aircraft for training purposes. Except in one instance, the Landing Signal Officers assigned to the ship were unable to participate in this phase. Phase two consisted of a thorough briefing on carrier operations by cognizant ship and squadron officers, plus two days shipboard observation of actual operations. During this period replacement pilots were used only as taxi pilots to familiarize them with flight deck procedure. The third phase commenced with employing the new pilot on all combat air patrols except the dawn and dusk patrols. The landings made at the conclusion of these CAP flights were considered to be their qualification landings. Two successive satisfactory landings in connection with CAP missions were required before each new pilot was considered qualified to fly air support or armed reconnaissance missions in his regular turn. Even when flying on these missions however, each new pilot continued under critical observation and if his landing technique was below par he was again assigned CAP missions until his technique improved.

Between 15 January and 3 June 1951, sixteen replacement pilots were successfully qualified by using the method outlined. Only one pilot thus trained failed to qualify for unlimited employment. It is felt that by this method of careful briefing, deck training, preliminary flight training and incentive to "make the team", replacement pilots can earn while they learn. It is pertinent to observe that the method would not be feasible except under conditions of no aerial opposition expected. Under other conditions, the employment of a training carrier would be most desirable, in order that fully qualified pilots could be provided when needed, since it is undesirable that operating carriers be
burdened with the details of qualifying pilots either during operations or at the expense of time normally assigned for logistic replenishment, upkeep, or recreation.

Comment: Target information received from covert sources during this and previous operating periods proved to be both accurate and useful. Enough targets were recommended and described in detail to enable almost every armed reconnaissance flight to be pre-briefed on at least one "covert" target in the area assigned to reconnoiter. This was insurance against an unproductive mission. It also provided each flight leader a worthwhile target on which to expend external stores if it became necessary to "streamline" his flight in order to attain high speed to reconnoiter with reasonable safety a heavily defended area. Covert sources often reported results of attacks on the targets they had recommended. These reports were always heartening to the pilots who so often never learned whether their efforts had been really productive. They also provided a basis for correcting mistakes in technique or arming which may have been made in executing attacks.

Comment: Aircraft sometimes returned from flights with rockets "hung" on wing racks. As a result of arrested landings these rockets frequently dropped from their suspension pylons and skidded up the flight deck. The rocket fins sometimes engaged an arresting gear wire or a partially lowered barrier and thus brought the rocket to rest. Others lost their fins or failed to engage a wire and continued up the deck, endangering parked aircraft and flight deck personnel. In order to decrease the probability of wild rockets in the forward flight deck area, the forward elevator was lowered about eight inches during the recovery of aircraft with "hung" rockets. It was found that rockets which came adrift and were not otherwise stopped were almost invariably caught in the shallow pit thus imposed in their line of travel. The elevator structure suffered no significant damage due to this practice.

Comment: Comments on the inadequacy of the aviator's immersion suit Mark II, Mod 1, and recommendations for its improvement have been submitted in previous reports. During this period of operations a further difficulty associated with the immersion suit became evident as set forth below.

Water temperature in the operating area during the period averaged 53° F., for which temperature most survival manuals and instructions recommend immersion suits be worn. However, air temperatures at low altitudes over the target area averaged 65° F., and, together with the bright sunshine which frequently prevailed over the land, caused relatively high cockpit temperatures in aircraft engaged in close air support and armed reconnaissance missions. Since performance of these missions required unusual phy-
control the exercise as much as possible in order to train the
maximum number of personnel in the fundamentals of AA coordination.

Recommendation: This type of training exercise is recommended for
small formations. It is considered that the short period a star
shell remains visible in daylight furnishes an excellent criterion
of the alertness and effectiveness of condition watch gun crews in
taking a target under fire. Successive exercises showed marked
improvement in the performance of all ships.

Aerology:

Comment: Haze aloft was prevalent in the Korean theater two or
three days after dust storms, associated with the eastward move-
ment of a high pressure air mass, had been reported in the Gobi
Desert and Lake Baikal regions. This condition was experienced
twice during the period covered by this report and its occurrence
was forecast one of these times. At one time the dust blanket,
apparently extending from about 200 feet to 10,000 feet above the
surface, was clearly visible from the ship for several hours.

The principal characteristic of this weather phenomenon
is the high surface visibility which prevails (average 8-10 miles)
while at the same time air-to-air and air-to-surface visibility is
only 1-3 miles. When the haze prevailed, surface contacts were
obtained with the SPS-6B air search radar at ranges up to 200 miles,
the maximum scope range. These contacts included both ships and
terrain features. In one instance USS TUCKER (DD 875) was tracked
continuously while she proceeded on patrol to a distance of 103
miles from the formation and rejoined. The performance of the SG-6
and SP radar in detecting surface contacts was also improved, but
only to the extent of about 15% of normal range. No unusual ranges
were obtained on air contacts with any of the three radars named.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the weather phenomenon de-
scribed be brought to the attention of fleet aerological personnel
and that forecasters in the Korean theater indicate the probabili-
ty of exceptional radar coverage in their forecasts when the con-
ditions outlined above pertain.

Comment: During this and earlier operating periods the absence of
weather reporting stations to the westward of the carrier operating
area in the Yellow Sea made it difficult to forecast with accuracy
the time, extent, and duration of impending non-flyable weather.
Detailed information was lacking concerning orientation of fronts,
their direction and rate of movement, and the nature and extent of
frontal activity. The latter was very difficult to prognosticate
due to the Yellow Sea being a veritable "mixing pot" for weather,
particularly at this season of the year. The characteristics of
fronts changed during their passage over the area and complicated
forecasting. Consequently, on several occasions when the weather deteriorated earlier and to a greater extent than forecast, some difficulty was experienced in recovering flights which had been launched in anticipation of the weather remaining flyable for their scheduled duration. Most of these occurrences could have been avoided had it been possible to obtain reports of the weather 80 to 100 miles north and west of the carrier operating area as of 0600 and 1300 LST daily. The aerial weather reconnaissance made daily at 1130 by the Fifth Air Force covered the area satisfactorily, but the information obtained, although complete, was not timely from the carrier’s viewpoint. Commander Fifth Air Force was requested to modify his weather flight schedule to provide coverage at the times mentioned above, but as of the end of this reporting period the action requested had not yet been taken.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that weather flights be conducted along the China coast, as far north as the Shantung Promontory in the early morning and late afternoon, in order to provide data for forecasting the flying weather for the Yellow Sea. In event restrictions on aerial penetration of Chinese territory are lifted it is suggested that this area be used as a proving ground for the automatic weather transmitting station recently developed by Navy Electronics Laboratory. (See Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin, April 1951).

**Communications:**

**Comment:** While Commander, United Nations Blockade and Escort Force (CTF 95) was embarked in BATAAN communications operated at peak load. Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping up with traffic due to the overcrowded communication spaces, and overloaded equipment. The largest single deficiency was the lack of sufficient transmitters to handle the additional flag traffic. The six (6) high frequency transmitters available were already committed to circuits required by the task element communication plan. Despite special transmitter guard arrangements made with screening ships, adequate communications could not be maintained. Outgoing CTF 95 traffic was of such volume that delays in delivery resulted even though CTF 95 controlled his own (Task Force Commander’s) net.

Inadequacy of working space in Radio Central, the Main Communication Station, and the Crypto Room has been apparent since BATAAN was recommissioned. Enlargement of these spaces has been recommended by the Board of Inspection and Survey and approved by the Bureau of Ships for accomplishment during the next major overhaul of this vessel. Until modernization and expansion of present communication equipment and spaces is accomplished, it is considered that the communication facilities of the CVL 22 class carriers are woefully inadequate to accommodate a flag officer’s requirements.
Comment: Previous reports have commented on misuse of the tactical primary voice net (TBS) for passing administrative traffic. As a result of local representations to responsible commanders a great improvement in the use of this net was apparent during the period of this report. No administrative traffic was heard on the tactical net. In addition, tactical communications were much improved. It was evident that other commands present in the operating area had given this matter serious attention with the result that at all times the tactical net was clear for tactical use.
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 29 April through 11 May 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5400.1
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (revised)
(e) CTF 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 29 April through 11 May 1952 is submitted hereewith. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29) was OTC West Coast Korea and CTF 95.11 during this period.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 29 April through 11 May 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL-29), under the command of Captain H. K. FORREST, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron, M.A.-12 embarked, operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29) was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Element 95.11 from 21001 29 April to 21001 10 May 1952 at which time the command of the Task Element was shifted to the USS OCEAN and OTC shifted to Commanding Officer, HMAS XEYLON. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of USS BATAAN (CVL-29), and a maximum of three destroyers, HMCSS CATICA (DE-218), HMAS CONSTANCE (DE-71) and USS LOWRY (DD-770), acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. Each night one destroyer was ordered to CTF 95.12 to make a patrol of the islands south of Hanku. The code name for this patrol is Forthington. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol returning the following morning after fueling from a tanker located near Yeongdong Do.
SECURITY INFORMATION

a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

(1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
(2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
(3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
(4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
(5) Conduct air reconnaissance.
(6) Render close air support services to ground forces.
(7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

(1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
(2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
(3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haecho-Chinnampo region. (ONOJIN, HAEJU, and ONJONG-III).
(4) Provide airspot services to naval units on request.
(5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
(6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
(7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
(8) Render SAR assistance.
3. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Patrol Northington is reported by CTE 95.12.

4. During this operating period, WIA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pre-briefed Strikes and Air Spot for Naval Gunfire Missions as illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations were carried out for the entire eleven days scheduled. However, on 3 May, 24 flights and 10 May, 6 flights were cancelled due to weather. During these eleven days WIA-312 aircraft flew 419 combat sorties. Two flights aborted. There was a total of 890.6 combat hours flown for an overall average of 81 hours and 38.1 sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 20, the average aircraft on board 19, and the total average aircraft availability 16. Message drops at Paengnyong Do and Guard Tail pickups from K-16 were made in conjunction with the regularly scheduled CAP mission. Thus administrative flights were included in ship's CAP flights.

5. During this operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "K46" in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N. and 12° 30' E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

290702I The USS DATAAN with WIA-312 embarked was underway for Operating Area "K46" off the West Coast of Korea with HMS CAMUGA and HMS CONSTANCE in company. USS DATAAN was guide.

292100I Captain H. R. HORNET assumed command of TE 95.11 and duties OTC, West Coast of Korea.

30 April WIA-312 aircraft flew a total of 44 flights this date. Weather clear with haze patches, visibility 4 miles. Wind NW, 5 knots. Sea smooth.

ORDINANCE EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>24 - 500# GP</th>
<th>103 - HVAR</th>
<th>120 - 3.25&quot; Rocket</th>
<th>3 - Napalm</th>
<th>19,360 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Rocco</td>
<td>TARGAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECURITY INFORMATION

010536I Commenced launching aircraft.

010658I HMCS CONSTANCE returned from Worthington Patrol and refueling.

011500I HMCS CONSTANCE left formation to investigate small surface contact.

011513I HMCS CONSTANCE rejoined formation; contact friendly fishing craft. Ordered craft to fishing area.

011655I F-4J, BuNo 13866, with pilot, Captain John F. THOMAS, 02828h, USMC, crashed, going overboard at Frame 50, Port. Position 36° 55' N. and 121° 29.5' E. Lost: Aircraft and 2 life rafts. Damaged: Barriers No. 3 and 4, antennae No. 1 and 2, Gun Mounts No. 4 and 6 and catwalk in vicinity of Frame 50. FORREST, Richard H., 315 h, 05, AD3, USN was injured by flying wreckage. Treated for abrasions, both legs, calves, and shins. Returned to duty.

011659I Helicopter landed with recovered pilot. No injury to pilot.

011725I HMCS CAUGA retrieved 2 life rafts, and was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

011807I Completed recovery of last flight.

2 May VHA-312 aircraft flew a total of 32 flights this date. Weather cloudy, visibility 2-4 miles. Wind S, light variable. Sea slight.

ORNAMANCE FIREFIGHTING MISSIONS

18 - 500h GP
166 - HVAR
4 - Napalm
18,250 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.

020527I Commenced launching aircraft.

020751I F-4J, BuNo 8200, pilot, Captain William J. DAZENBIS, 237785, USMC, attempted wave off after cut and crashed into barriers, damaging No. 2, 3 and 4 barriers, aircraft sustained extensive damage. No injury to personnel.
SECURITY INFORMATION

020917I HMCS CAYUGA returned from patrol.

021138I FJW-4, HMK 82000, pilot Captain John (n) HAPKICH, 035020, USNCR, crashed into barriers No. 1, 2 and 4. Damage to plane: Extensive. No injury to personnel.

021707I USS LOWRY detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

021852I Completed recovery of last flight.

3 May VFA-312 aircraft flew a total of 20 flights this date. Weather cloudy, visibility 8 miles. Wind E, 18 knots. Sea moderate.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

| 5   | 1000# GP |
| 6   | 500# GP  |
| 72  | HVAR     |
| 32  | 3.25" Rocket |
| 5   | Napalm   |
| 14,550 | Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo. |

MISSIONS

| 6   | CAP |
| 6   | TARCHAP |
| 8   | Recco |

030530I Air Operations delayed due to weather.

031000I USS LOWRY returned to formation from Worthington Patrol.

031256I Commenced launching aircraft.

031739I HMS CONSTANCE detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

031828I Completed recovery of final flight.

4 May VFA-312 aircraft flew a total of 41 flights this date. Weather cloudy, visibility 8-10 miles. Wind N, 10 knots. Sea slight.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

| 2   | 1000# GP |
| 21  | 500# GP  |
| 12  | 260# Frag. |
| 24  | 100# GP  |
| 150 | HVAR     |
| 8   | 3.25" Rocket |
| 23,585 | Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo. |

MISSIONS

| 14 | CAP |
| 13 | TARCHAP |
| 14 | Recco |
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**040538I** Commenced launching aircraft.

**040620I** HSN CONSTANCE returned from patrol.

**041513I** FLW 4, BUNo 81254, pilot, Captain Frank Hoisette, USNCR, engaged barrier. Ship on course 025° (T), speed 22 knots. Wind over the deck 26 knots at 010° relative. Aircraft was stopped at No. 2 barrier; damage to plane slight, and damage to barrier negligible. No injury to personnel.

**041615I** HSN CAYUSA was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

**041831I** Completed recovery of final flight.

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**5 day**

**Aircraft** flew a total of 42 flights this date. Weather clear, visibility 10 miles. Wind E, 10-15 knots. Sea slight.

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**ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE**

| 7 - 1000# GP | 14 - CAP |
| 20 - 500# GP | 14 - TARCAP |
| 238 - HVAR | 10 - Recce |
| 2 - Napalm | 4 - NGS |
| 20,400 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo |

**MISSIONS**

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**050404I** HSN CONSTANCE left screening station to investigate fishing vessel bearing 005° (T) distance about 4 miles.

**050521I** HSN CONSTANCE returned to screening station.

**050532I** Commenced launching aircraft.

**050800I** Oriented the screen for gunnery exercises. USS LOMRY stationed ahead 1500 yards, and HSN CONSTANCE 1500 yards astern.

**050839I** Completed gunnery exercise. Ammunition expended: 31 rounds HET.

**051001I** HNS CAYUSA returned from patrol.

**051332I** Landed 2 OOD aircraft from Seoul.

**051423I** Launched 2 OOD aircraft for Itazuke.

**051600I** USS LOMRY detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

**051856I** Completed recovery of final flight.
SECURITY INFORMATION

6 May

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 13 flights this date. Weather high overcast, visibility 8 miles. Wind SE, 4 knots. Sea slight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32 - 500 lb GP</td>
<td>14 - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - 260 lb Frag.</td>
<td>12 - TARCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181 - HVAR</td>
<td>12 - Racco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 3.25&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>6 - Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Napalm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,725 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

060533I Commenced launching aircraft.

061030I USS LOWRY returned from patrol.

061607I HMS CONSTANCE detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

061834I Completed recovery of final flight.

7 May

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 43 flights this date. Weather partly cloudy, visibility 10 miles. Wind N, 12 knots. Sea slight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 - 500 lb GP</td>
<td>15 - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 100 lb GP</td>
<td>6 - TARCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168 - HVAR</td>
<td>13 - Racco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 - 3.25&quot; Rocket</td>
<td>8 - Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Napalm</td>
<td>1 - Abort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,020 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

070530I Commenced launching aircraft.

070855I HMS CONSTANCE returned from patrol and rejoined screen.

071540I Recovered 1 aircraft of VMA-312 with deferred emergency having a rough engine.

071619I HMS CAIYOA detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

071854I Completed recovery of final flight.

8 May

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 14 flights this date. Weather partly cloudy, visibility 10 miles. Wind N, 16 knots. Sea moderate.
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE**

- 4 - 1000 lb GP
- 27 - 500 lb GP
- 8 - 260 lb Frag.
- 31,600 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.

**MISSIONS**

- 14 - CAP
- 14 - TARGAP
- 16 - Recce

080531I Commenced launching aircraft.

080839I Commenced gunnery training exercises.

080911I Completed gunnery training exercises. Expended 16 rounds HET.

080910I HMS CUYUCA returned from patrol.

080950I HMS CONSTANCE and USS LOWRY left the formation to go alongside HMS WAVE PRINCE to refuel.

091056I USS CONSTANCE rejoined formation.

091125I USS LOWRY rejoined formation.

091550I USS LOWRY detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

091848I Completed recovery of final flight.

**2 May**

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 41 flights this date. Weather partly cloudy, visibility 4-6 miles. Wind E, 4-6 knots. Sea slight.

**ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE**

- 24 - 500 lb GP
- 18 - HVAR
- 25,200 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.

**MISSIONS**

- 12 - CAP
- 17 - TARGAP
- 6 - Recce
- 4 - Strike

090530I Commenced launching aircraft.

091015I USS LOWRY returned from patrol.

091328I F1U-4, BuNo 81243, pilot, Captain John B. Thomas, 028264, USNCR, crashed into the barriers after arresting cable broke when aircraft landed without flaps. Outboard paneling and hinge damaged by enemy AA fire. Damage to aircraft: Tail
hock torn off and propeller bent. Damage to ship: No. 2, 3 and 4 barriers damaged. Wind across the dock 23 knots at 005° relative. No. 1 wire broke causing injury to ANDERSON, Alvin B., 989 07 02, AN, USN. He was injured on catwalk, aft starboard side. Nature of injury: Lacerated scalp. Treatment: Cleaned and dressed; 6 sutures applied. Disposition: Admitted to sick list.


091551I Returning flight sent to K-6 because of fouled deck.


091841I Recovered five aircraft from K-6 as final flight.

10 May VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 36 flights this date. Weather partly cloudy, visibility 6-10 miles. Wind H, 7-12 knots.

100530I Flight operations cancelled due to weather over target area.

100625I USS LOUISE left formation to investigate and sink a floating barrel. Returned 1007051.

100745I Commenced launching aircraft.

100749I HMS CONSTANCE returned from patrol.

101445I Detached HMS CONSTANCE to go alongside HMS CEYLON (C1-30) for transfer of personnel.
SECURITY INFORMATION

101531I Detached USS LEXINGTON to Forthrington Patrol and USS CYCLON to proceed on duty previously assigned.

101743I HMC5 GARY detached to proceed and report to CTE 95.12.

101850I Completed recovery of final flight.

102100I The Commanding Officer of HMC GARY assumed CTE 95.11 and GTO West Coast of Korea passed to the Commanding Officer of USS CYCLON.

11 May Steaming enroute from Korea Operating Area "MAR" to Sasebo, Japan, in company with HMS CONSTANCE.

111116I Commenced Gunnery exercise, firing at towed screen.

111205I Secured from gun and gun control stations, having completed Gunnery exercise and expended 786 rounds of HE-T and 1/8 rounds of HE-T.

111232I Launched eleven aircraft of VA-312 for AFE, Itami, Japan.

111233I Detached HMC CONSTANCE to proceed to Kure, Japan.

111547I Hoisted to buoy No. 18, Sasebo, Japan.

PART - III PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION ACCIDENTURES

(A) Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.

1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

2. It is felt that there was an excessive number of hung rockets, in that, 137 HVAR and 27 WP failed to fire. Investigation revealed many severed electrical leads, due it is believed, to the cartridge clips being discharged from the .50 caliber guns when firing. One aircraft returned with all rockets due to electrical difficulties in the firing circuit.

3. Five 500 lb. GP, three 1000 lb. GP and two 260 lb. fragmentation bombs failed to explode. Investigation revealed that approximately 75% of the arming wires were returned. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient air travel to arm. Inspection of aircraft that did not return arming wires revealed faulty electrical circuits.
Four napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown.

5. Fusing on bombs listed in paragraphs 3 and 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>Nose Fuse</th>
<th>Tail Fuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 500&quot; GP</td>
<td>AN-I39A1</td>
<td>AN-I39A1 (5-15 sec.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 1000&quot; GP</td>
<td>AN-I39A1</td>
<td>AN-I202A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 260&quot; Frac.</td>
<td>MK-219</td>
<td>AN-I300A2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 - Napalm
   115 - Igniter, W.P.
   116 - Igniter, W.P.
   Two - 1157 Fuse

(B) Ammunition Expenditure

1. During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by WA-312 aircraft:

   24 - 1000" GP
   247 - 500" GP
   32 - 260" Frac.
   56 - 100" GP

265,000 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

(A) Own Battle Damage

1. None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.

2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

(B) Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

1. Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of the Task Element during the period covered by this report.

2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report.
(B) Ordnance

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a new type cartridge case and clip deflector be developed for use by the F6U-1B or a new type electrical lead from the rocket to the rocket launcher. In view of the added weight and drag of a shield, the latter would seem more feasible.

COMMENT: Cargo nets were rolled and placed across the flight deck forward of the aircraft barriers to form a rocket barrier. Though bulky and difficult to move rapidly without exposing a large number of men in the catwalks, this barrier was effective in stopping rockets that got by the arresting gear cables. A steel rocket catching net is being devised by the ship to operate on No. 4 barrier.

(C) Communications

COMMENT: It is felt that not all possibilities for the rapid delivery of vital information by radio are being exploited. Manual ship-shore and command nets are saturated with high precedence messages at the same periods of the day.

RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on high frequency radio teletype ship-shore circuits and circuits set up for the use of ships (other than high commands) which have equipment installed to utilize circuits in this manner. This is also the very obvious answer to the critical shortage of radio equipment which will continue to be a Navy-wide problem for some time to come.

COMMENT: The timely transmission of OPSUMS continues to be somewhat of a problem. A review of ship-shore circuit logs indicates that there is a general downward trend in operating abilities, borne out by the fact that communication ratings are now critical and that far too much circuit time is being required for the average message.
RECOMMENDATION: The training of speed key operators should be encouraged and speed keys should be used whenever possible under supervision.

(B) Flight Deck

COMMENT: 1. H-4 Catapult bridles

a. Four bridles became entangled on the tail wheels of F4U-1 aircraft during catapult shots. Two bridles dropped off in flight shortly after take off, the other two were so entangled that the planes were sent to an airfield ashore.

b. It has been noted that as the bridle is arrested at the end of the catapult, it has a tendency to bounce up in the path of the tail wheel, thus occasionally becoming entangled on the tail wheel assembly.

RECOMMENDATION: Due to the length of this report, it is being made directly to COMAIRPAC.

COMMENT: Three aircraft were brought aboard with varying amounts of oil on their windshields restricting visibility to the point where two of the pilots had no possibility of seeing the deck and had to be talked aboard. The F4U-1, HN-1, 51243, was lost over the side as a direct result of the pilot's inability to see the deck for this reason.

RECOMMENDATION: That a type of oil catcher be constructed over the nose area to reduce the amount of oil thrown back onto the windshield.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>CHIP</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>ARMID</th>
<th>FUEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>0530</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0530</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>Note 3</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RECOO (SW)</td>
<td>0530</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>Note 2</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP *</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>0935</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>0935</td>
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<td>B6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>0745</td>
<td>0935</td>
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<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>0935</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
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<tr>
<td>C8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0935</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>RECOO (SC)</td>
<td>0935</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>Note 4</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D10</td>
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<td>1125</td>
<td>1315</td>
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<tr>
<td>D11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
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<tr>
<td>E12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RECOO (SE)</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>F15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RECOO (ROAD)</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>Note 7</td>
<td>380 Gallons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Message Drop Paengyang-Do

**NOTE**
1. All A/C full load .50 Cal. Ammo ---- 13,675 lbs
2. 1-500# GP, DC Nose, .01 Tail, 8 HVAR ---- 15,280 lbs
3. 1-500# GP, .01 Nose, .025 Tail - 8 HVAR ---- 15,280 lbs
4. 1-500# GP VT Nose, .01 Tail - 8 HVAR ---- 15,280 lbs
5. 1-500# GP fus(e) - 8 HVAR ---- 15,280 lbs
6. 1-500# GP VT Nose, Inst. Tail - 8 HVAR ---- 15,280 lbs
7. 1-500# GP Inst. Nose, .025; WP ---- 14,615 lbs

Approved:  
J. D. McALLESTER  
Operations Officer

Submitted:  
J. A. DOWNS  
AirOps Officer

Copy to:  
DISTRIBUTION LIST
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 18 May through 30 May 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(c) CINC PACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(d) CTF 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 18 May through 30 May 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 18 May through 30 May 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL-29), under the command of Captain H. R. MCBEAN, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Attack Squadron (VMA 312) embarked, operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH FLIGHT in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29), was CTF, West Coast of Korea, from 19 May 1952 until DAWN SCOTTISHLEFT, RH, CTF 95.19 entered the area on 21 May 1952. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29), was Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 21001 19 May 1952 to 21001 28 May 1952 at which time the command of the Task Element shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN and a maximum of three screening vessels, HMS OCEAN (DD-20), HMAS YELT HEN (DD-805), and USS KIRSH (DE-699). The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. Each night one vessel was ordered to CTE 95.12 to make a patrol of the islands south of Haengju. The code name for this patrol is Worthington. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol returning the following morning after fueling from a tanker located near Taoyon.Do.
The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

1. Assist in enforcing the United Nations Blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
2. Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
3. Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
4. Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
5. Conduct air reconnaissance.
6. Render close air support services to ground forces.
7. Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

1. Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
2. Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
4. Provide airspot services to naval units on request.
5. Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
6. Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
7. Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
8. Render SAR assistance.

No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element, and therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of the Element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Worthington Patrol is reported by GTE 95.12.
Commenced launching aircraft.

HMS PIET HEIN returned from patrol.

One VMA-312 aircraft landed aboard with a rough running engine.

RAIM SCOTT-MONCRIFFT, RN, CTE 9519, in the HM CONSTANCE (DD-71) assumed OTC of the West Coast of Korea.

Landed one aircraft of VMA-312 from K-6.

Landed two aircraft for VMA-312 from Itazuke, Japan.

HM CONUS was detached on Worthington Patrol.

Recovered final flight.

22 May

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of 34 flights this date.

### ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

| 1 - 1000# GP | 12 - GP |
| 6 - 500# GP | 12 - TANGAP |
| 26 - 260# Frag. | 8 - Recce |
| 24 - 100# GP | 1 - Photo |
| 52 - HV.R | 1 - Other |
| 16 - WP | |
| 8 - Napalm | |
| 19,180 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo. | |

Commenced launching aircraft.

One F4U-4 piloted by Captain William J. BURRELLS, 037785, USMC, was shot down near Sukchon, Korea, while on armed reconnaissance. Captain BURRELLS landed his plane in a rice paddy and took cover nearby. His wingmates protected him from the enemy by strafing and directed an Air Force helicopter to the scene for the pickup which was made under heavy fire. Captain BURRELLS returned aboard for duty the following day.

One VMA-312 aircraft, EUMO 81955, landed aboard with three hung rockets one of which was dangling by an attaching lug. Upon landing all three rockets continued up the deck. One came to rest in the cargo not rocket barrier, the second hit a cross deck pendant and was deflected aft to a position near the LSO platform. The third continued up the deck bouncing...
SECURITY INFORMATION

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE
7 - 1000# GP
26 - 500# GP
8 - 260# Frags.
16 - 100# GP
220 - HVAR
2 - 50cal.
13450 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo

0532I Commenced launching aircraft.

0937I One aircraft of VM-312 made an emergency landing aboard. The aircraft approached a stall immediately after catapult shot. Pilot dropped load and landed aboard. Cause of incident was due to exceeding the maximum catapult weight of 15,800 lbs. This was caused by new rocket launcher, MK 14 Mod 5 replacing the old types MK 4 and 5 which added excess weight. Subsequent rocket and bomb loads were reduced to stay within maximum catapult limits.

1005I USS HARSH joined formation.

1214I One aircraft of VM-312 made deferred emergency landing aboard with oil leak.

1400I Detached three aircraft of VM-312 for K-6, one of which had hung bridle. Bridle was removed at K-6 and planes continued on assigned missions, landing aboard at a subsequent recovery.

1713I Detached HMMS PETE INSN to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

1857I Recovered final flight.

21 May VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 43 flights this date.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE
6 - 1000# GP
17 - 500# GP
52 - 100# GP
136 - HVAR
16 - 50cal.
3 - Napalm
18490 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.
During this operating period VM-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pre-briefed Strikes, Photo and Air Spot for Naval gunfire missions, most of which are illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations were carried out for the entire nine days scheduled, although somewhat curtailed by the following:

a. Weather held two aircraft at Itami, Japan for two days.
b. An engine change held one aircraft at Itazuke, Japan for two days.
c. Two aircraft, unfit for combat, were flown to Itami, Japan on 23 May 1952.
d. On 23 May twelve flights were cancelled due to weather.
e. 27 May sixteen flights were cancelled due to weather.
f. 28 May sixteen flights were cancelled due to weather.

During these nine days VM-312 aircraft flew 296 combat sorties and 1 photo sortie. Three flights aborted. There was a total of 645.9 combat hours flown for an over all average of 71.9 hours and 33.0 sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 20, the average on board 18, and the total average aircraft availability 13.

1. During this operating period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30'N, and 124° 30'E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

18 May
Twelve VM-312 aircraft were flown aboard after carrier qualification flights this date. Pilots were qualified without major damage to aircraft. The ship returned to Sasebo to top off fuel and Avgas.

1800
Moored to Buoy 18, Sasebo, Japan.

19 May
Enroute Korean Operating Area MAN.

0620
Underway for Operating Area MAN in company with HMS FRIEDRICH HEIN and HMS COMUS.

2100
Captain H. R. HORNBY, USN, assumed command of TE 95.11 and CTC West Coast of Korea.

20 May
VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 40 flights this date.
end over end and striking on the nose directly above #5 landing gear engine and exploded. Damage included plane towing tractors set afire, a three foot hole in the flight deck and major damage to the #5 arresting gear engine. Three men were injured by rocket fragments and one man received injuries taking cover.

1108I
HMS CHNS returned from patrol.

1550I
USS MARSH reported an unidentified sonar contact bearing 013° (T) 1600 yards from her.

1550I
USS MARSH and HMAS PLEIT HEIN detached to investigate.

1603I
Contact evaluated as non-submarine.

1644I
USS MARSH detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

1859I
Recovered final flight.

23 May
VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 32 flights this date.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

| 3 - 1000# GP | 10 - CAP |
| 6 - 500# GP | 12 - TARGAP |
| 25 - 260# Frag. | 8 - Reco |
| 50 - 100# GP | 2 - Other |
| 23 - HVAR | |
| 2 - Napalm | |
| 20,790 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo. | |

0532I
Commenced launching aircraft.

0744I
Two VM-312 aircraft detached to Itami via K-6. Aircraft unfit for combat.

1000I
Landed helicopter from Marine Air Wing One at K-6 for transfer of officer injured in rocket explosion of previous day.

1010I
LT Hollis (n) GODDARD, 305978/1310, USN, was transferred by helicopter to USS CONCLUSION at Inchon, Korea for observation and treatment. Diagnosis, IV (rupture traumatic liver).

1035I
USS MARSH returned from patrol.

1353I
One VM-312 aircraft proceeded to K-6 with inoperative tail hook.
1406I Landed two TBM's from Itazuke. Captain William J. R.MANNES, 037785, USMC, returned on board.

1438I HMM PIET MEIN was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

1534I Launched two TBM aircraft for Itazuke, Japan.

1631I Recovered final flight.

24 May

VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 43 flights this date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 1000# GP</td>
<td>11/ - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 500# GP</td>
<td>20 - T.N.GAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 260# Frag.</td>
<td>8 - Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 - 100# GP</td>
<td>1 - Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 - HV.R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - Napalm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,050 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0532I Commenced launching aircraft.

0733I One VM-312 aircraft returned from K-6.

0755I HMM PIET MEIN returned from patrol.

0938I Two VM-312 aircraft proceeded to K-13. One HU-1 had a hung 100 pound bomb. The two planes returned aboard at a later recovery.

1522I HMM COHUS was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

1902I Recovered final flight.

25 May

VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 41 flights this date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 - 1000# GP</td>
<td>12 - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 500# GP</td>
<td>24 - T.N.GAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 - 260# Frag.</td>
<td>4 - Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 100# GP</td>
<td>1 - Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - HV.R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - WP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - Napalm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,360 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79
HMS PIUT HEIN left station to investigate flares about 5 miles off starboard bow.

HMS PIUT HEIN returned to formation having identified the lights as those of fishing craft.

Commenced launching aircraft.

HMS COPUS returned from patrol.

One FHU-4 replacement aircraft, BuNo 81558, piloted by Captain J. D. JOHNSON, Jr., 031873, USMC, landed on board from Itami, Japan.

One FHU-4, BuNo 97116, piloted by Captain Baylor P. GIBSON, Jr., 022643, USMC, made an emergency landing at Chodo with engine trouble. No damage to aircraft but was unable to fly back during operating period.

USS MARSH was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

Helicopter UP 35 landed aboard from CTU 95.15 located at Paegangyong Do with 1st LT EWANS, USMC for the purpose of discussing close air support training exercises with the guerrilla forces which are in training on the island.

Navy Helicopter UP 35 left the ship for its base with SHARPE, M.T., 387452, SOT, USMC embarked for temporary additional duty in connection with repairs to FHU-4, BuNo 97116, at Chodo, Korea.

Recovered final flight.

VH-312 aircraft flew a total of 39 flights this date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDINANCE EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 - 1000#/ GP</td>
<td>14 - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 500#/ GP</td>
<td>15 - TANCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 260#/ Bred.</td>
<td>7 - Rocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 - 100#/ GP</td>
<td>3 - Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - HVAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 - WP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Hapalm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,120 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Commenced launching aircraft.
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0915I</td>
<td>One aircraft of VM-312 made deferred emergency landing aboard with oil leak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10h46I</td>
<td>USS MASH returned from patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133h1I</td>
<td>One aircraft of VM-312 made deferred emergency landing aboard with oil leak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13h2I</td>
<td>One aircraft of VM-312 launched as replacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1428I</td>
<td>NHMS PIET HEIN detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856I</td>
<td>Recovered final flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 12 flights this date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE</strong></th>
<th><strong>MISSIONS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 1000# GP</td>
<td>6 - CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 260# Frag.</td>
<td>6 - TARCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 - 100# GP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - Napalm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,890 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0530I</td>
<td>Air Operations delayed due to weather.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09h5I</td>
<td>HMS BELFAST (CA-35) and NHMS PIET HEIN joined formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110L1</td>
<td>Commenced launching aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11051</td>
<td>HMS BELFAST was detached to relieve HMS CEYLON as CTE 95.12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501I</td>
<td>HMS COMUS detached to investigate floating object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517I</td>
<td>HMS COMUS joined formation. Reported recovery of standard U.S. kapok-type life jacket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700I</td>
<td>HMS COMUS was detached to proceed on Worthington patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18h8I</td>
<td>Recovered final flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>VM-312 aircraft flew a total of 16 flights this date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part III - Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment Including Ammunition Expenditures

1. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

a. The rocket which exploded on the flight deck on 22 May was a standard 5.0-Inch Fin Stabilized HV&R Rocket. The rocket assembly consisted of a MK 6 MOD 1 Rocket Head, fitted with a MK 145 MOD 0 Base Fuze, and with a MK 149 MOD 0 Nose Fuze installed, and a MK 10 MOD 5 Rocket Body with tail fin assembly installed.

b. The rocket was noted to be hanging from one lug before the plane landed. It has not been definitely established whether this was the forward or after lug since accounts of eye witnesses conflict on this...
point. The rocket broke free when the plane was arrested by the cross-deck pendant and began tumbling up the deck with considerable velocity. It struck heavily against the dock in a nose down position, bounced and landed on the motor tail, bounced again, landed a second time in a nose down position and then exploded.

2. When the head exploded, the force of the explosion shattered the rocket motor into many fragments, most of which were blown over the side. Some pieces of the propellant grain were scattered about the flight deck. A few of these fragments burned as a result of the heat of the explosion but caused no appreciable damage. Fragments of the head or body casing were found after the explosion. These, however, were too small and distorted to permit identification of their source.

3. Thirty-two rockets (5.5%) failed to fire. All circuits were checked and found satisfactory. Since most hung rockets came off the planes during landing, it was not possible to determine whether pigtail had been severed prior to landing, but that is assumed to be the case.

4. Two 1000 lb. GP, three 500 lb. GP and one 260 lb. Fragmentation bomb failed to explode. Electrical failure was found in one third of the cases. It is estimated that the remaining two thirds were released too low to allow sufficient time for arming.

6. Fusing on bombs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMBS</th>
<th>NOSE FUSE</th>
<th>TAIL FUSE</th>
<th>DELAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 1000# GP</td>
<td>VT - T91</td>
<td>AN - M102A2</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 500# GP</td>
<td>AN - M139A1</td>
<td>AN - M102A2</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 500# GP</td>
<td>AN - M139A1</td>
<td>AN - M102A2</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 260# Frag.</td>
<td>AN - MK219DC None</td>
<td>Inst.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 - Napalm
2 - M157 Fuse
1 - M15 Igniters, WP
1 - M26 Igniter, WP

6. Ammunition Expenditure:

a. During the operating period covered by this report the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft:

| 39 - 1000# GP | 535 - HVAR |
| 98 - 500# GP  | 48 - WP 3.25" Rockets |
| 100 - 260# Frag. | 32 - Napalm |
| 147 - 100# GP | 93,650 - Rounds .50 Cal. Ammo |
PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own Battle Damage:
   a. None of the ships of Task Element 95.11 sustained battle damage.
   b. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

2. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:
   a. Ships of Task Element 95.11 inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of the task element during the period covered by this report.
   b. For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by the aircraft of Task Element 95.11, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Stacks</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>212</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent, fire fighting personnel were outstanding.

2. Casualties:
   a. On the morning of 22 May 1952, Major Neal E. BRENNSEN, O20285, USMC was injured when a rocket was shaken loose from the wing rack of a

b. LT Hollis (n) CODDARD, 305978/1310, USN was also injured in the rocket explosion. Nature of injury: Contusions, back and fracture of 10th rib.

c. HARGRAVES, Richard B., 412 13 01, AFC, USN was also injured in the rocket explosion. Nature of injury: Wound, lacerated left arm and chest.

d. BOVINO, Vito (n), Jr., 233 25 55, QUSN, USN, was injured while attempting to avoid the exploding rocket. Nature of injury: Wound, lacerated left forehead.

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. COMMENT: Examination of Part II will reveal that emergency landings and aborts started on the first day of operations and continued throughout the period. Three aircraft could not be flown aboard on departure from Sasebo due to material condition. In addition three suffered major damage from hard landings. Another three failed structurally from apparently normal landings immediately preceding the discovery of the failures. Another had a forced landing at Chodo and was not available for the remainder of the period.

This condition is attributed directly to the rotation of personnel in the squadron. The preceding important maintenance period was used for carrier qualification of new pilots. The aircraft were subjected to field carrier landing practice instead of getting the required maintenance. They were then subjected to carrier qualification landings off Sasebo in a flat calm with minimum wind the day before going to the operating area.

This continued turnover of personnel is reflected in other ways adversely affecting the over-all performance of the squadron.

RECOMMENDATION: That a plane-pilot ratio be established and that this group operate as a unit for a six month's period as is done in other carrier squadrons.

2. COMMENT: Three H-4 Catapult Bridles were carried away by the tail wheels of F6U-4 aircraft during catapult shots during this period. One dropped clear in flight; the other two were so entangled that the planes were sent to an airfield ashore. The one that dropped clear of the aircraft nearly caused a crash on take-off when one eye of the bridle fouled the tailwheel and the other eye fell over the bronze arrester.
severely jerking the aircraft before clearing the arrester. Following this near accident, use of the H-4 bridle arrester was discontinued and the H-4 bridle catcher, using the air cylinder, was substituted.

3. COMMENT: Under the circumstances discussed in Part III, Section 1, it is impossible to definitely determine the exact cause of the rocket explosion. However, several witnesses observed that the weather cap of the 119 Nose Fuze was still in place as the rocket traveled up the deck. This would tend to indicate that the nose fuze could not have been armed and consequently could not have contributed to the explosion. The most plausible explanation would be that the explosion was due to action of the 165 Base Fuze. The rocket struck nose down on the flight deck with considerable force. It is believed possible that this force was great enough to cause the inertia of the arming plunger to permit the plunger to part the shear wire and move forward, permitting the firing pin body locking ball to be released. This would have permitted the firing pin spring to force the firing pin body back, extracting the firing pin from the shutter. Since there would have been no set-back action, the shutter lock pin would not have been effective. The shutter spring could have then rotated the shutter, aligning the detonator between the firing pin and the booster, thus putting the fuze in a fully armed condition. When the rocket struck the deck nose down the second time, again with considerable force, the inertia of the firing pin would have moved the firing pin forward to strike the detonator and set off the explosive train.

H. R. HORENBY

5 JUL 1952
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.11
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(h) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 5 June through 16 June 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) CPRNAV INSTRUCTION 3400.1
(c) CINCHCFLT INSTRUCTION 3400.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) CTF 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 5 June through 16 June 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 6 June through 15 June 1952, the U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HOPKINS, Al175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the Operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.11.

2. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29) was OTC, West Coast of Korea, from 9001 6 June until 9001 15 June 1952. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29), was Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 9001 6 June to 9001 15 June at which time the Command of the Task Element shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMAS OCTAH. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29), and a maximum of three destroyers. At varying times HMAS WARRAMUNGA (D-123), HMAS CORINTHUS (D-20), U.S.S. ARNOLD J. ISBELL (DD-869), and HMAS CONSORT (D-76), acted as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. For Worthington Patrol one destroyer daily was ordered to CTF 95.12 to patrol the islands south of Haeju. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.
The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

1. Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
2. Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
3. Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
4. Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
5. Conduct air reconnaissance.
6. Render close air support services to ground forces.
7. Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

1. Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
2. Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
4. Provide airspot services to naval units on request.
5. Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
6. Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
7. Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
8. Render SAR assistance.

No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95,11 on Patrol Worthington is reported by CTE 95,12.
During this operating period, VM-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pro-briefed Strikes and Air Spot for Naval Gunfire Missions as illustrated by schedule closure (1). Flight operations were carried out for the entire nine days scheduled with only eight (8) sorties cancelled due to weather. During these nine days VM-312 aircraft flew 377 combat sorties. One (1) flight aborted. There was a total of 790 combat hours flown for an overall average of 87.77 hours and 1.41.9 sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 21, the average aircraft on board 19 and the total average aircraft availability 15.

During this operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area N/P in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N and 124° 30' E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

6 June 1952

Enroute Operating Area N/P from Yokosuka, Japan. At 1015 the BATMAN rendezvoused with HMS CONSORT. At 1520 the USS ISBELL joined the formation. At 2100 the Commanding Officer USS BATMAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11 and OTC West Coast of Korea.

7 June 1952

At 0505 began flight operations. Aircraft of VM-312 flew thirty-nine (39) sorties. Damage included 65 troops killed in action, hitting of supply dumps and attacking junk shipping. At 1017 HMS CONSORT joined the formation.

8 June 1952

Forty-one (41) sorties were launched. These missions included close air support, Armed Recce, Target GP and defensive CAP.

1st LT L. W. BENDLER, USMC, made the 25,000th landing aboard the BATMAN.

9 June 1952

Flight operations continued with forty-four (44) sorties flown. An F4U, piloted by Capt. J. KINNS, USMC, was shot down west of Chinnampo. The plane caught fire in mid-air but the pilot was able to parachute to safety, receiving second and third degree burns about the hands and face. Rescue was effected by helicopter in less than an hour and Capt. KINNS was transferred to a hospital in Seoul.

Gunnery firing exercises were held twice this date and simulated attacks were made on the Task Element during an air defense drill.

At 1700 OTE 95.19 assumed OTC West Coast of Korea. At 1716 HMS CONSORT was detached to proceed to Sasebo, Japan.
10 June 1952 -

Launched thirty-five (35) sorties. Armed Recon worked in the Chinnampo-Changnyong-Yonan area. A principal target of the day was the destruction and damage of forty (40) boats.

A Gunnery firing exercise and an air defense drill were held. At 0633 HMAS WARRAMUNGA joined the formation and at 1719 HMAS COMUS was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

11 June 1952 -

VM-312 aircraft totaled forty-six (46) sorties, destroying one large factory as a primary target. Four Naval Gun Spot sorties and one photo flight were among the missions of the day. At 0815 HMAS COMUS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1745 USS ISHEL was detached for similar patrol.

12 June 1952 -

Flight operations continued with forty-four (44) flights launched. Damage to the enemy included forty-five (45) troops killed and eight (8) gun positions damaged. Naval Gun Spot missions were again flown. At 0826 USS ISHEL rejoined the formation and at 1707 HMAS WARRAMUNGA was detached to proceed on Worthington Patrol.

13 June 1952 -

VM-312 flew forty-five (45) sorties this date. Armed Recon attacked 200 troops with unassessed damage. Other damage included one (1) observation post destroyed and seven (7) gun positions damaged.

The BATMAN held Gunnery firing exercises.

At 1145 HMAS WARRAMUNGA returned from Worthington Patrol and HMAS COMUS was detached for similar service.

14 June 1952 -

Launched forty-three (43) sorties including four Naval Gun Spot and five pre-briefed strikes. Primary targets were the destruction of ninety-five (95) buildings, two (2) gun positions and the killing of thirty-four (34) enemy troops.

General Quarters drill were held at 0649 and simulated attacks were made on the Task Element during an air defense drill.

One plane of VM-312 caught fire upon landing due to a hole in fuel tank. The hole was caused by flying brass from the plane ahead. The fire was quickly extinguished without injury to the pilot.

At 0857 HMAS COMUS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1558 USS ISHEL was detached to proceed on the Worthington Patrol.
On the final day of flight operations for the operating period VM-312 aircraft flew forty (40) sorties. Targets were hit from Han Chow to the Han River Estuary. Damage included 127 buildings and two supply dumps destroyed. One FMJ nosed up when brakes grabbed while taxiing to the catapult. Pieces of flying metal from the propeller and wheel guide of the catapult injured two men as reported under CASUALTIES in PART III of this report. At 1121 one FMJ dropped a hang rocket upon landing. The white phosphorous rocket bounced into the propeller. The flying particles of phosphorous caused a fire on the flight deck which was quickly extinguished by fire-fighting personnel.

At 1517 and 1859, respectively, the HMCS MOUNTAIN and USS ISEHOL were detached to patrol under orders of CTF 95-12.
At 2100 the Commanding Officer of HMCS COLUMBIA assumed Command of Task Element 95-11.

16 June 1952 -

Steaming enroute to Sasebo, Japan with HMCS CONQUEROR in company. At 0928 eight (8) VM-312 aircraft were launched for Itami, Japan.
At 1145 conducted AA gunnery practice in area George. Practice was ineffective due to late arrival of tractor plane, haze conditions and fishing craft.
### Statistical Summary of Flight Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/15</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average sorties per day: 42.9
Total combat hours: 790
Daily average: 87.77 hrs.
Average hours per sortie: 2.1
PART - III PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

(2) Four HVAR's and 12 white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. There were 4 cut pigtails, 3 hanging rockets, 1 bad igniter, 1 bad adapter and 7 dud rockets.

(3) Two (2) 500# bombs and one (1) napalm tank were lost during catapult shots during the operating period. Probable cause of the losses was due to the installation on some aircraft of pylons with a manual release mechanism which required rearward motion of the mechanism to release the ordnance stores. As pylons with a mechanism which required forward motion for release became available from dud aircraft the changes were made.

(4) Four 500# GP's, one 1000# GP and one 1000# GP bombs failed to explode. All A/C returned with one or both arming wires. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.

(5) Six napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown. All A/C returned with one or both arming wires.

(6) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph 4 and 5 above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMB</th>
<th>NOSE FUSE</th>
<th>TAIL FUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-500# GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M101A2 .025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-500# GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M101A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1000# GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M1012 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-100# GP</td>
<td>AN-M101A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M100A2 Non Delay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6-Napalm

1-H15 Igniter, W.P.
1-H16 Igniter, W.P.
2-T M157 Fuse
B. Ammunition Expenditure:

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1000#/ GP</th>
<th>500#/ GP</th>
<th>250#/ Frag.</th>
<th>100#/ GP</th>
<th>HVAR</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>Rocket</th>
<th>Rocket</th>
<th>NAPALM</th>
<th>20MM</th>
<th>.50 Cal rds.</th>
<th>rds.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>15,370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>20,790</td>
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<td>6/9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4050</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>23,900</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>17,880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6/13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>24,580</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2850</td>
<td>28,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>7,200</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23,100</td>
<td>181,500</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bomb total lbs. 43,000 67,000 21,040 86,000

Operating period, total lbs. 219,040

Bomb total tons 21.5 34.5 10.92 43.0

Operating period, total tons 109.92

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.

(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Mill</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pack Animal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Stacks</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>63,1</td>
<td>3,12</td>
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<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Revetments</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops KIA</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
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<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Post</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance:

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent, with performance of fire-fighting personnel during the two fires on the flight deck out-standing. During this period the average enlisted on board count of personnel was 1020 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

(2) The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the BT, HM, RM, YN and SK rates. A vigorous on-board training program to train personnel of the lower ratings to fill higher ratings
billets is working out most successfully and barring unforeseen detachments, the personnel situation should continue to be adequate.

(3) The X-2 division provides a five day orientation, training and indoctrination period which has helped in assigning men to billets by considering both their personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

B. Recreation:

(1) The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period:

(a) BATAAN NEWS, a daily newspaper

(b) BBC - Bataan Broadcasting Company provided news casts and recordings, both programmed and request.

(c) Radio Broadcasts were piped to BSO's throughout the ship.

(d) Divine services were held daily for catholics and weekly for protestants. One Jewish service was held. Bataan chaplain held services on several of the screening vessel's.

(e) The ship's library was open until taps.

(f) Sightseeing tours were provided to points of interest near Sasobe and were well patronized.

(g) Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO mess.

C. Casualties

(1) The below listed men were injured on the morning of 15 June when struck by flying particles of wood and metal caused by a propeller biting into flight deck and catapult spotting chocks:

(a) MOLTAND, Russell A., 388 71 16, AA, USN: Multiple, superficial abrasions. Treatment; cleaned - merthiolate applied.

(b) PILARCZYK, Charles (N), 954 98 17, AB3, USN: Wound, lacerated, back of head, superficial wounds on back left side. Treatment: Wounds cleaned and dressed. Admitted to sick list.
PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Gunnery:
COMMENT - The presence of small craft in Area GEORGE made firing on target runs extremely difficult. During the tow plane exercise the escorting DD got one firing run. The BATMAN was unable to fire on any of the runs.

B. Aerology:
COMMENT - This nine day operating period in the Yellow Sea was marked by unusually good weather in the month of June. Weak high pressure cells moved eastward over the Yellow Sea and Korea from China followed by weak polar troughs causing light shower activity. These troughs, one of which passed over the area on 10 June, occur every four to six days. The high cells tend to strengthen over the Sea of Japan and extend westward over Korea and the western Yellow Sea causing a prevailing south easterly wind which veers with each trough passage. Approximately two days after each trough passage, the polar air mass is marked by rising dew point temperatures and the consequent formation of coastal stratus and fog which persist over the coastal islands and waters until late morning or early afternoon. Ceilings and visibility were generally unlimited near point Oboe except during trough passages. Surface winds ranged in velocity from 4 to 12 knots and varied in direction. Temperatures remained in the high sixties and low seventies. Light sorties were cancelled because of stratus conditions over the target area during one early morning period.

H. N. HORNEY
11 JUL 1952
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
      (2) Commander Task Force 95
      (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
      (4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 23 June through 4 July 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
     (b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1
     (c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1
     (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
     (e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the Action Report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 23 June through 4 July 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 23 June through 4 July 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. MORREY, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commanding Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2100I 23 June to 2100I 3 July 1952. At 2100I 3 July Commander Task Element 95.12 assumed OTC West Coast of Korea and Command of Task Element 95.11 shifted to the Commanding Officer, HNS OCEAN. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN and a maximum of four screening vessels. At varying times HMSC INDIAN (DE-217), HMSC CRUSADER (DE-228), USS BRADFORD (DD-545), USS HARSH (DE-699) and USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-895) acted as screening ships. The screen was reduced to less than four ships when required by operational demands. For Worthington Patrol one destroyer daily was ordered to CTE 95.12 to patrol the islands south of Haeju. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.
 SECURITY INFORMATION

a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

(1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockades and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.

(2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.

(3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.

(4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.

(5) Conduct air reconnaissance.

(6) Render close air support services to ground forces.

(7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

(1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15 N.

(2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.

(3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haen-su-Chinnampo region. (CHJIN, HAEJU, and CHJONG-RI).

(4) Provide airspot services to naval units on request.

(5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).

(6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.

(7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.

(8) Render SAR assistance.

3. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Patrol Worthington is reported by CTE 95.12.
4. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol and Close Air Support, in proportions indicated in schedule, (enclosure 1). Flight operations were carried out eight of the nine days scheduled, but were sharply curtailed by weather. 100 sorties were scheduled, 162 (16.2%) were cancelled due to weather. During these nine days VMA-312 flew 236 combat sorties. Four (4) flights aborted. There was a total of 513.0 combat hours flown for an overall average of 57.1 hours and 26.2 sorties per day. The squadron allowance was 24, average on board was 24 and the average aircraft availability 20.

5. During the operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area NAM in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30'N and 121° 30'E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

23 June 1952 -

Left Sasebo, Japan, in company with HHCs IROQUOIS (DE-217) with intentions of conducting carrier qualifications. However, the effects of Typhoon DINA were felt before leaving the Sasebo swept channel. Heavy seas and high winds were encountered and aircraft were ordered to remain at Nizuko, Japan. Typhoon Condition 1 was set and in accordance with dispatch of CTO 95.1 the formation steamed to and remained along the western side of Tsushima in the Korea Strait. 1840I set Typhoon Condition III and at 2300I commenced steaming southward toward carrier qualification area near Jii Shima.

24 June 1952 -

0755I secured from Typhoon Condition III. During the day fourteen VMA-312 aircraft were brought aboard, bringing onboard total of VMA-312 aircraft to twenty-four (24). Carrier qualifications for eleven (11) reporting pilots were partially completed. Damage to aircraft: one broken tailhook. Qualifications were discontinued when the second aircraft went down, leaving a full hangar deck with one non-flyable aircraft on the flight deck. This eliminated the clear deck necessary for further qualification. 0930I formation set course for operating Area NAM. At 1515I the BATAAN held an abandon ship drill. 1650I HHCs CRUSADER (DE-228) joined the formation. 2100I Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN assumed command of Task Element 95.11 and OTG West Coast Korea.

25 June 1952 -

0025I USS BRADFORD (DE-595) joined the formation. 0535I launched aircraft as scheduled. 0948I the Operations Officer of USS OCEAN came aboard by helicopter for the purpose of observing operations aboard the USS BATAAN. 1541I USS HARSH (DE-699) joined the formation. 1555I HHCs IROQUOIS was detached on Worthington Patrol.
Forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched this date. Damage inflicted included the destruction of 103 buildings and three (3) gun positions. Seven (7) rail cuts were made.

26 June 1952 -

First flight was launched before sunrise to provide TARGAP for GTF 95.12.4. Forty-five (45) sorties were launched during the day with 107 buildings destroyed as principal targets.

At 0520 I a surprise gunnery firing exercise was held. During the morning HMCS IROQUOIS returned from Worthington Patrol and in the afternoon HMCS CRUSADER was detached for similar patrol.

27 June 1952 -

Forty-four (44) aircraft of VM-312 were launched against the enemy with good results. One flight of four discovered 1000 enemy troops, killing and wounding over 300.

At 0831 I HMCS CRUSADER returned from the daily patrol and at 1012 I the USS BRADFORD was detached for patrol service.

28 June 1952 -

Flew four (4) Close Air Support missions this date. Sorties were limited to twenty (20) for the day due to inclement weather in the afternoon. The morning flights accounted for twenty-four (24) troops killed in action. Another principal target was the closing of a rail tunnel.

At 0730 I one VM-312 aircraft floated into a barrier and flipped over on its back. Strike damage to aircraft; no injury to personnel.

At 1051 I the USS BRADFORD rejoined the formation, having been on Worthington Patrol. At 1733 I the USS BRADFORD departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

29 June 1952 -

Poor flying weather continued throughout the day forcing the cancellation of all flights.

At 1054 I the MARSHP returned from patrol. At 1136 the USS BRADFORD was detached from TE 95.11 to join its squadron organization. Her position in the screen was taken by the USS JOHN R. CRAIG who joined the Task Element at 1142 I. At 1730 I HMCS IROQUOIS departed on patrol.

30 June 1952 -

Poor flying conditions continued to exist until late afternoon with the result that only 12 sorties were launched this date. Principal targets included three (3) railroad bridges and one (1) transformer station damaged.
At 0828 I HMC S INQUOIS returned from patrol and at 1755 I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

1 July 1952 -

Flying weather in the Yellow Sea and over the target areas continued poor, causing the cancellation of one half of the forty-four (44) scheduled sorties. During the short periods when the target areas were open the TARAIAP and RECOO flights inflicted damage on the enemy, including the destruction of eight (8) railroad cars and the damaging of nine (9) boats. At 0532 I held surprise gunnery firing exercise. 0632 I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from patrol and at 1758 I HMC S CRUSAIDER departed on Worthington Patrol.

2 July 1952 -

Poor flight conditions persisted through-out the day with only four (4) sorties being launched. At 1340 I HMC S CRUSAIDER returned from patrol. 1616 I HMC S INQUOIS departed for a similar mission.

3 July 1952 -

Full flight operations were resumed on the final day of the operating period. VM-312 pilots flew forty-six (46) combat sorties which resulted in considerable damage to the enemy. A principal damage included eight (8) rail cuts.

At 0651 I CTE 95,11 held General Quarters Drill and gunnery firing exercises. Between scheduled launches in the afternoon the prospective commanding officer VM-312 in an H4U, and one TBM from E-6 made carrier qualification landings.

At 1257 I HMC S INQUOIS returned from patrol. At 1755 I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG was detached on Worthington Patrol and further duty with CTE 95,11 with HMC S OCEAN.

At 2001 Command of Task Element 95,11 shifted to HMC S OCEAN and CTE 95,12 became OTC West Coast of Korea. 2332 I the USS HARE was detached for duty with Task Element 95,11.

4 July 1952 -

Steaming on route to Sasebo, Japan from operating Area X.M.N. At 1352 I one aircraft of VM-312 was launched for Itami, Japan. 1700 I moored buoy H/8 Sasebo, Japan.
### Security Information

### Statistical Summary of Flight Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>RECCO</th>
<th>TARGAP</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>ABORTS</th>
<th>ENGINE RUN-IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6/26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average sorties per day 26.2

Total combat hours 523.6

Daily average 57.1 hrs.

Average hours per sortie 2.18

* Does not include engine run-in
PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

(2) Sixteen (16) white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. There were four (4) cut pigtails, one pigtails disengaged from the igniter and eleven (11) dud rockets.

(3) A 500/- bomb was dropped from the aircraft port pylon bomb rack during catapult shot on two different occasions. The catapult bridle striking the manual release mechanism on the rack is believed to be the cause. Corrective action was taken by placing a fairing on the inboard side of the port pylon and no further incidents have been experienced.

(4) One (1) 500/- GP, one (1) 1000/- GP and one (1) 100/- bomb failed to explode. All aircraft returned with one or both arming wires. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.

(5) Two (2) napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown, both aircraft returned with one or both arming wires.

(6) On two occasions a total of five (5) bombs (100/- GP) were returned to the ship. Since the racks checked out on the deck, cause was evaluated as pilot error.

(7) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph 4 and 5 above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMB</th>
<th>NOSE FUSE</th>
<th>TAIL FUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-500/- GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 .01</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1000/- GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 .01</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-100/- GP</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M139A1 Inst.</td>
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<td>2 Napalm</td>
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<td>1-ML25 Igniter, WP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-ML26 Igniter, WP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Ordnance Expenditures

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1000# GP</th>
<th>500# GP</th>
<th>260# Frag.</th>
<th>100# GP</th>
<th>UP Rocket</th>
<th>Napalm</th>
<th>20mm</th>
<th>50 Cal.</th>
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<tr>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>11,500</td>
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<td>6/26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>6/27</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>6,650</td>
<td>11,200</td>
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<td>6/28</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>2,100</td>
<td>11,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>8,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>10,150</td>
<td>63,000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bomb total lbs. 114,800 24,300 2,600 89,700

Operating period, total lbs. 150,500

Bomb total tons 22.6 17.25 1.3 31.17

Operating period, total tons 75.25

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Station</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animal</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Stacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops KI1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
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<td>Bunkers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance:

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent. During this period the average on board count of personnel was 1017 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

B. Casualties:

(1) No casualties.
PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Air Intelligence:

Comment: Air Intelligence functions were hampered during the
NATC's earlier cruises in the Yellow Sea due to inexperience of the Air
Intelligence Officers. A period of T.D at JOC, Korea was considered help-
ful in this respect.

Recommendation: That carriers being ordered to duty in the
Yellow Sea area arrange for their Air Intelligence Officers to make one of
the last cruises of the carrier being relieved before a period of T.D at
JOC, Korea.

B. Aerology:

Comment: During the first three days of the operation the area
was under the influence of a weak high pressure cell centered in the Sea of
Japan. Early morning hours were marked by coastal fog and stratus over the
bay areas which dissipated during early afternoon, leaving high broken
clouds and good visibility over the target areas.

On the morning of 28 June a stratus overcast from the west, an
increasing southeasterly wind and a rapidly falling barometer were all
indicators of a deep low approaching the area from interior China, so flight
operations were suspended near midday. Ceilings lowered rapidly to 300 feet
and visibility decreased to near one-quarter mile in fog and rain. Surface
winds increased to 35 knots from the southeast and south. As the ship
moved southward to escape the center of this intense storm, the winds
veered to westerly and maintained a velocity of 30 to 35 knots. The
weather improved only slightly in the warm sector of the storm and these
weather conditions, low ceilings and poor visibility, continued until the
passage of the cold frontal system accompanying the storm early on the
morning of 30 June. A subsequent deterioration of ceiling and visibility
accompanied by rain and fog and a wind veering from northwest to east
indicated a formation of a secondary wave on the cold front. The weather
cleared over the operating area very late on 30 June, but the target areas
were marked by low stratus and fog thru the second of July.

On 3 July a cool high pressure area pushed east over the Korean
peninsula following the low pressure area into the Sea of Japan and caused
excellent flying conditions over both the operating and target.
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 12 July through 23 July 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

End: (1) Simple Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 12 July through 23 July 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 12 July through 23 July 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) under the command of Captain H. R. HONEY, 6L75/310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VM-312 embarked through 21 July, operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN was Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2200 12 July until 2100 21 July at which time the command of the Task Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN was OTC West Coast of Korea from 2100 13 July until the Commanding Officer HMS NEWCASTLE assumed OTC West Coast of Korea at 2100 21 July 1952. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) and a maximum of four (4) escort vessels. At varying times, the USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-885), USS NICHOLAS (DE-449), HMS BATAAN (D-191), HMS IROQUOIS (DIE-217) and HMS WARRAMUNGA (D-123) acted as screening vessels. One vessel of the screen was released daily for night patrol as assigned by CTE 95.12. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.
The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

(1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations Blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
(2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
(3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
(4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
(5) Conduct air reconnaissance.
(6) Render close air support services to ground forces.
(7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

(1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
(2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
(3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haenam-Chirnampo region. (ONGJIN, HAEJU, and ONJONG-NI).
(4) Provide air spot services to naval units on request.
(5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC, KOREA)
(6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
(7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
(8) Render SAR assistance.

No enemy air forces were encountered by this Task Element and therefore, no air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating against the island of Changik Do, in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Worthington Patrol as reported by CTG 95.12.
4. During this operating period, VM-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol and Pro-briefed Strikes, most of which are illustrated by schedule (enclosure 1). Flight operations were carried out on eight of the nine days scheduled, although somewhat curtailed by weather. On 18 July, weather caused cancellation of entire day’s scheduled operations. During the eight flyable days, VM-312 aircraft flew 278 combat sorties. Two (2) flights aborted. There was a total of 553 combat hours flown for an overall average of 61.4 hours and 30.9 sorties per day for the nine day period. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the average aircraft on board 21.5 and the average aircraft availability 16.

5. Harlex exercises scheduled from 4 to 8 August and 16 to 22 August required that the BATAN be available, for the first exercise, to accommodate eleven (11) helicopters from HMR 161 and a battalion of assault troops. To accomplish this VM-312 was directed to operate as TE 95.11 from King 6, during the periods normally scheduled for the U.S. Navy carriers to be on the Korean west coast. They were further ordered to continue operations at King 6 as TE 95.11.1 during the periods when the British carriers were in the operational area. By directions from CN 95.1 VM-312 aircraft were flown off on the last operating day. The remainder of the personnel and supplies and spare parts to maintain the squadron ashore were off loaded at Inchon the following morning.

6. During this operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area NUN in the vicinity of Latitude 37°30'N. and 124°30'E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

12 July 1952 -

Enroute to Operating Area NUN from Sasebo, Japan in company with HMAS WARRAMUNGA. Low ceilings at Itazuke, Japan caused delay of tow plane for the scheduled gunnery exercise. By the time the target tow plane arrived on station the formation had passed beyond Area George, forcing cancellation of the exercise.

At 2100Z the Commanding Officer, USS BATAN assumed Command of Task Element 95.11.

At 2315Z the USS JOHN R. CRAIG joined the formation.

13 July 1952 -

Forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched from the BATAN on this first day back in the operating area. Primary targets included buildings, 113 of which were destroyed.
At 0650 the USS NICHOLAS joined the formation. At 1320I a VM-312 Corsair, piloted by Capt. Hart G. MacK, USMC, stalled on a landing approach. The plane spun, struck the water, and sank immediately. Captain MacK swam clear and was picked up by the E.getMessage helicopter. Injuries suffered by the pilot are reported under CASUALTIES in Part V of this report. At 1717I HMCS WARABINGA departed on Worthington Patrol. Captain H.R. Hormey assumed CTC West Coast of Korea at 2015I, by direction of CIG 951.

14 July 1952 -

Poor flying weather in the afternoon forced the cancellation of twenty (20) flights. The twenty-six morning sorties accounted for 172 enemy troops killed in action and the destruction of a command post as principal targets.

At 0520I the USS NICHOLAS was detached for Yokosuka, Japan. At 0537I the CTE 95.11 held Rogor gunnery firing exercises.

At 0816I HMCS WARABINGA returned from patrol.

15 July 1952 -

Forty-six (46) flights were launched this date with part aiding in the defense of the island of Changan Do. At 0944I a report was received from CTE 95.15 that 300 North Korean troops were invading the island of Changan Do (this figure was subsequently reduced to an invading force of 200) and a request for strike and TARCHAP support was made. Scheduled aircraft were diverted immediately and the remainder of the day's schedule revised to render all possible aid. Sixty (60) troops were killed in defense of the island. Twenty (20) additional troops were killed and twelve (12) gun positions damaged as the result of some of the day's efforts.

After being diverted to K-6 as an escort for a wingman with damaged ailerons, Capt. Guy A. MacLaury, USMC, rearmed and attempted to take off on another mission against the invaders at Changan Do. The engine of his F4U failed and the plane crash-landed and burned. Captain MacLaury was burned to death.

At 1056I HMCS IROquois joined the formation. At 1713I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed on Worthington Patrol.

16 July 1952 -

Forty-four (44) VM-312 aircraft were launched with main effort directed to the retaking of Changan Do. Seventy-nine (79) troops were killed in retaking the island. The total for the day came to one hundred eighty (180) troops killed. Other principal targets included two (2) gun positions destroyed and two (2) damaged.
At 0636I a VH-3D2 pilot made a forced landing at Paengyong-Do, effected temporary repairs and later returned to the ship. At 0646I an F4U piloted by Capt. Charles L. DUNGIN, USMCR, was damaged by gunfire at Changin Do and forced to ditch off the island. The pilot used his life raft and was later picked up by a small boat from HMS AMETHYST. Captain DUNGIN suffered no injuries and was returned by Worthington Patrol two days later.

At 0755I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1708I HMS WARRAMUNGA was detached for similar service.

17 July 1952 -

With the securing of Changin Do on the morning of the 17th, planes from the BATAN returned to a normal schedule of G.P., TARCAP and Recco flights. Marginal weather in the TARCAP and Recco areas forced the cancellation of all afternoon flights. Fifty (50) buildings destroyed and fifteen (15) damaged comprised the principal damage of the flights which were able to work the target areas.

At 0610I CTE 95.11 held a Roger gunnery firing exercise. At 0611I the WARRENGAN returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1706I HMS ISQOIS departed on a similar patrol.

18 July 1952 -

All flights were cancelled due to warm frontal weather with low ceilings in the operating and target areas.

At 0645I HMS ISQOIS returned from Worthington Patrol and at 1703I departed for similar service.

19 July 1952 -

Full flight operations resumed as the weather improved. Forty (40) sorties were launched with major damage to a railroad station being a principal target.

At 0825I HMS ISQOIS returned from patrol and at 1712I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

20 July 1952 -

Weather again caused cancellation of all afternoon flights with the result that only twenty-four (24) of the forty (40)
21 July 1952

The final day of flight operations with VM-312 aboard the BATMAN was hampered slightly by low ceilings in the target areas. Twenty-six (26) sorties were launched with pilots reporting one (1) power plant damaged and four (4) rail cuts. The last two flights of the day did not return to the BATMAN but proceeded on to King-6. Six (6) flyable duds were ferried to King-6 with only one (1) VM-312 aircraft being left aboard to be off-loaded in Sasebo.

HMAS WARRAMUNGA returned from Worthington Patrol at 0621. 1652 HMAS IROQUOIS and HMAS BATMAN were detached on assigned duty. HMAS WARRAMUNGA and the USS JOHN R. CRAG were detached for duty with HMAS OCEAN at 23301. Immediately after detaching the two vessels the USS BATMAN set course for Inchon, Korea.

At 21001 the Commanding Officer, HMAS OCEAN assumed Command of Task Element 951.1 and OTC West Coast of Korea shifted to the Commanding Officer of HMAS NEWCASTLE.

22 July 1952

Steaming independently for Inchon from Operation Area

ANCHORED

Anchored in Inchon Harbor at 08011 and began off-loading VM-312 gear and personnel. Completed off-loading and got under way for Sasebo, Japan at 12031.

23 July 1952

Steaming independently from Inchon to Sasebo, Japan. At 09451 conducted a gunnery exercise with towed sleeve in Area George.

14401 Moored Buoy #18 Sasebo, Japan.
## Security Information

**Statistical Summary of Flight Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Total Combat Sorties</th>
<th>Armed Recco</th>
<th>T/A/CAP</th>
<th>Pre-Briefed Strikes</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>ABORTS</th>
<th>FLY-A-Ways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>7/14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7/16</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>7/17</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7/18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>7/20</td>
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<td>7/21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**

- Total Combat Sorties: 278
- Armed Recco: 28
- T/A/CAP: 24
- Pre-Briefed Strikes: 64
- CAP: 92
- ABORTS: 2
- FLY-A-Ways: 6

Average Combat Sorties Per Day: 30.9

Total Combat Hours: 553

Daily Average: 62.44 hours

Average Hours Per Combat Sortie: 2.0
PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

(2) Three (3) white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. These were returned as hanging rockets.

(3) Two (2) 1000#/ GP and three (3) 500#/ GP bombs failed to explode. All aircraft returned with one or both arming wires, with the exception of one (1) 1000#/ GP. The aircraft carrying it returned to K-6 and no report as to arming wires was received. It is possible that the bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.

(4) One (1) 100#/ GP bomb was returned to the ship and stayed on the aircraft during landing. The bomb rack checked out satisfactorily.

(5) One (1) napalm dud was reported. The reason for its failure to explode is unknown. The aircraft returned with both arming wires.

(6) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph (3) and (5) above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMB</th>
<th>NOSE FUSE</th>
<th>TAIL FUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 500#/ GP</td>
<td>VT - T91E1</td>
<td>AN-M10A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 500#/ GP</td>
<td>AN - M132A1 .01</td>
<td>AN-M10A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 500#/ GP</td>
<td>AN - M132A1 Inst</td>
<td>AN-M10A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 1000#/ GP</td>
<td>VT - T91E1</td>
<td>AN-M10A2 .01</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 - Napalm</td>
<td>1 - M5 Ignitor, W.P.</td>
<td>1 - M6 Ignitor, W.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 - T 10.57 Fuse</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

B. Ordnance Expenditure

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>1000# GP</th>
<th>500# GP</th>
<th>260# Frag</th>
<th>100# GP</th>
<th>WP Rocket</th>
<th>Napalm</th>
<th>20mm rds.</th>
<th>.50 Cal. rds.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>13,500</td>
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<td>7/14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>17,150</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>11,200</td>
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<td>7/16</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>11,200</td>
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<td>7/17</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**

| 37    | 108     | 80      | 870      | 144     | 40        | 26,000  | 82,950    |

**Bomb total**

- lbs. 37,000 54,000 20,000 87,000

**Operating period, total lbs.** 198,000

**Bomb total**

- tons 15.5 27.0 10.4 13.5

**Operating period, total tons** 27.5
PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.

(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridge</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Post</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Carts</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox-Carts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
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<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops KIA</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformer Station</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
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<td>Wagons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio-Radar Station</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10
PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personal Performance

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent, with the work of the catapult personnel especially commendable. Since arriving in Far Eastern area 2233 catapult launches were made from the H-2 and H-4 catapults without incident.

(2) During this period the average enlisted on board count of personnel was 1024 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

B. Casualties

(1) Captain Ewart G. Dick, USNCR was injured on 13 July 1952 when his aircraft stalled and spun into the water on the landing approach. Nature of injury: Fracture, simple, left clavicle. Laceration one inch on chin. Laceration one inch on forehead.

(2) Captain Guy A. McClary, USMCR, was burned to death when the engine of his F4U quit on take off. The plane crash-landed with ordnance and napalm aboard.

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Aerology

During this operating period two tropical storms were conceived in the Ryukus area. The first, labelled "Freda", moved slowly northward and dissipated over southern Kyushu on 15 July. This period in the Yellow Sea was marked by much instability manifested by frequent rainshower activity and large cumulus build-ups over the target area, although generally ceilings and visibility remained within operational limits.

The second tropical storm, called "Gilda", moved slowly west-northwestward and finally entered the China coast just south of Shanghai on 19 July. A ridge of high pressure moved west across Korea from the Sea of Japan causing a zone of convergence along the Korean peninsula. This gave all the aspects of frontal weather causing cancellation of flights due to low ceilings and rain squalls in the target area. This condition continued during the remainder of the operating period, making the target area weather variable and generally marginal.

H. R. HORNEY
10 SEP, 1952
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 15 February through 26 February 1953

Ref: (a) Article 0705 U.S. Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period 15 February through 26 February 1953, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORNBY, 61175/1310, USN, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VM-322 embarked, began her third Far Eastern tour operating as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100L, 15 February to 2100L, 25 February 1953. At this time the command of the Task Unit shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY; CTU 95.1.2 in HMS NEWCASTLE assumed OTC West Coast of Korea. During this reporting period, TU 95.1.1 consisted of the USS BATAAN (CVL 29) and a maximum of five (5) United Nations' escort vessels.

3. During this operating period, ships of TU 95.1.1 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "N" in the vicinity of Lat. 37°-30'N and 121°-30'E. Refueling of the screen was normally accomplished by detaching one destroyer in the early afternoon for rendezvous with a tanker located at Lat. 37°-40'N and 125°-41'E. Ships returned to the Task Unit late in the evening of the same day.

4. Enemy surface forces or action
   No enemy surface forces were encountered by this Task Unit, therefore, no surface action is related.

5. During this operating period, VMA aircraft (FwU) flew Combat Air Patrol, Target Combat Air Patrol, Armed Reconnaissance, Pre-Briefed Strikes, ResCap and Air Spot for naval gun firing missions as illustrated by a typical schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations conducted during the ten (10) day period totaled 3h3
combat sorties. Forty-three (43) flights were cancelled due to weather; five (5) were cancelled due to non-availability of aircraft. Four (4) flights aborted. The following averages are listed: A total of 723.0 combat hours were flown for a daily average of 72.3 hours. The average number of sorties per day was thirty-four (34) and the length of sortie was 2.1 hours. The number of pilots assigned was thirty-four (34) and the number of pilots on board was thirty-one (31). The number of pilots available on board was thirty (30). The squadron had an average of twenty-three (23) aircraft assigned with a daily availability of seventeen (17). The percent aircraft availability was 76.3. Two hundred forty-two (242) offensive and one hundred-one (101) defensive sorties were flown.

6. The mission of the Task Unit was to assist in enforcing the United Nations' blockade in the defense of the friendly islands off the West Coast of Korea. The assigned tasks were:

   a. Provide TARCAP aircraft for one event each day for TU 95.1.
   b. Provide TARCAP for Task Units of TG 95.1 when inshore operations so required it.
   c. Provide air spotting services as requested by naval units of TG 95.1.
   d. Provide Combat Air Patrol for TU 95.1 and friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
   e. Provide air strikes as requested by units of TG 95.1, guerrilla organizations and JOC Korea.
   f. Provide close air support upon request.
   g. Provide daily armed reconnaissance of the coastal area between the Han River and Taedong Estuary, and on alternate days, the coast north of the Taedong Estuary up to Hankon.
   h. Provide convoy cover as requested by CTF 90.
   i. Provide armed reconnaissance strikes and interdiction throughout the assigned area.
   j. Render SAR assistance.
   k. Act in accordance with current directives of CTF 95.1.

7. Shortly after the commencement of operations in Area MAN, it became apparent that some action should be taken to avoid unnecessary contact reports made by screening vessels in accordance with CINCPEL Instruction 003360.2A. Due to unusual sonar conditions in the area, numerous contacts were made on sunken wrecks and other bottom objects such as ridges, etc. To prevent these unnecessary reports and in view of the fact that it was unlikely that all units of a five (5) ship force could be sunk prior to getting off an evaluated report, the following message was sent to all screening ships of TU 95.1.1:

"PRESENT PHENOMENAL SONAR CONDITIONS HAVE LED TO MANY PREMATURE REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CINCPEL INST 003360.2A AND A CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF UNNECESSARY ALERTS X WHILE PRESENT CONDITIONS EXIST UNITS OF THIS FORCE WILL HOLD REPORT UNTIL PROPER EVALUATION IS MADE BY UNIT COMDR X THIS IN NO WAY MODIFIES ACTION TO BE TAKEN OTHER THAN REPORTING".

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

15 February 1953

En route to operating area "N" from Sasebo, Japan.
accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 1402152 of February 1953 in company with HMSCS CRUSADER (DE 228).

At 1036I scheduled gunnery exercises commenced on a towed sleeve in Area George. How and Uncle type runs were made, with marked improvement shown over all previous exercises conducted.

At 2100I Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/310, USN, Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) assumed Command of Task Unit 95.1.1 and CTG West Coast of Korea.

16 February 1953 -

At 0218I the USS McCORD (DD 534) joined the formation.
At 0500I the USS BATAAN in company with HMSCS CRUSADER and the USS McCORD arrived in operating area "N".
At 0545I HMCS ANZAC (DD 37) joined the formation.
At 0750I the first flight was launched and the BATAAN began her third operating tour off the West Coast of Korea.
At 0817I the USS HANNA (DE 119) joined the formation.

Thirty-three (33) sorties were flown, of which twenty-three (23) were offensive and ten (10) defensive. Flight operations were restricted due to low aircraft availability, causing cancellation of five (5) missions.

Damage to the enemy included twenty-three (23) buildings destroyed and two (2) road cuts made.

In other damage inflicted, one (1) road bridge was damaged and seven (7) revetted buildings were destroyed.

Sudden and heavy snow showers with visibility less than one (1) mile at sea forced cancellation of the morning Han River Reconnaissance flight. Ten aircraft airborne at this time were diverted to K-6 for landing. With clearing weather, the final flight of the day involved five (5) F6U's with six (6) MIG's in an exchange of head-on firing runs. No hits were observed for either side.

A total of twenty-eight (28) sorties were flown, twenty (20) offensive and eight (8) defensive. One naval gun spotting flight was flown. Primary targets included six (6) buildings damaged, one gun position damaged and three (3) road cuts made.

At 1800I HMSCS CRUSADER was detached for refueling.
At 1946I the USS McCORD held a sonar contact 093°, seven (7) miles from the BATAAN.

At 1900I the USS McCORD returned to her screening station having evaluated the contact as non-submarine.

17 February 1953 -

Sudden and heavy snow showers with visibility less than one (1) mile at sea forced cancellation of the morning Han River Reconnaissance flight. Ten aircraft airborne at this time were diverted to K-6 for landing. With clearing weather, the final flight of the day involved five (5) F6U's with six (6) MIG's in an exchange of head-on firing runs. No hits were observed for either side.

A total of twenty-eight (28) sorties were flown, twenty (20) offensive and eight (8) defensive. One naval gun spotting flight was flown. Primary targets included six (6) buildings damaged, one gun position damaged and three (3) road cuts made.

At 1500I HMSCS CRUSADER was detached for refueling.
At 1946I the USS McCORD held a sonar contact 093°, seven (7) miles from the BATAAN.

At 1700I the USS McCORD returned to her screening station having evaluated the contact as non-submarine.

18 February 1953 -

At 0002I the USS HANNA was detached to proceed to Sascho, Japan, on mission assigned.
At 0028I HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation.

At 0506I the USS McCORD was detached for refueling.

Flight operations continued in good weather over the target area with thirty-nine (39) flights launched. Pilots reported "warning" fires were burning upon entering the area south of Ranchon. Corsair pilots left four (4) buildings burning in a parking area and destroyed one (1) gas storage area. One build-up area was heavily damaged. Other scores for the day included sixteen (16) buildings destroyed and eight (8) damaged. Two (2) road cuts were made and one (1) barracks area was hit heavily.

At 1711I the USS McCORD rejoined the formation.

At 1934I the USS McCORD held sonar contact 3000 yards from the USS BATAAN.

At 1947I contact was reported as doubtful; the USS McCORD made two (2) depth charge attacks.

At 1949I contact was evaluated as non-submarine and the McCORD rejoined the formation.

19 February 1953 -

Under excellent flying conditions pilots of VM-312 flew thirty (30) offensive and ten (10) defensive missions. A total of nine (9) road cuts were reported and two (2) road bridges were destroyed; seven (7) bridges were damaged. Five (5) large brick buildings were destroyed in a possible stowage area. Pilots returned with several good photographs which proved valuable in assessing damage to those targets.

At 0730I Gunnery Exercise: "All Roger" was conducted.

At 1100I Air Defense Exercise, "Warning Magneto" was conducted, returning planes simulating surprise attacks. An emergency landing due to an oil leak, was made by Major Grover R. BENZER, USMC, 01378/731, Bureau Number 63005, and reported the "Warning Magneto" air defense exercise.

At 1552I Captain CUTFLEITZ, USMC, made the 27,000th landing aboard the BATAAN, which was celebrated with the traditional cake.

At 1557I HMJS ANZAC was detached for refueling.

At 1659I the USS McCORD had a sonar contact evaluated as a possible mine.

At 1752I the contact was identified visually as a dropped "bolly" tank and was sunk by HMCS CRUSADER, the assisting ship.

At 1755I the USS McCORD and HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation.

At 2308I HMJS ANZAC rejoined the formation.

20 February 1953 -

A series of mechanical failures were the cause of the following mishaps to VM-312 pilots today; One (1) aircraft "limped" into K-11 with an oil leak, which caused an engine change. Another F7U suffered extensive damage in a wheels-up landing at Paengyong-Do; engine failure was again the cause. In a touch and go situation at the ship, one plane was landed aboard with a badly smoking engine. All personnel involved in this emergency displayed excellent teamwork. There were no injuries to personnel in any of these incidents. All aircraft were given a thorough check and no causes other than routine wear and tear could be determined. Ten (10) defensive and thirty (30) offensive flights
were flown. Two (2) flights aborted. A total of thirty-seven (37) buildings were hit in today's strikes; figures showed twenty-nine (29) reported destroyed and eight (8) as damaged. Two (2) rail cuts were made at either end of a tunnel and two (2) railroad bridges were damaged. Pilots reported one (1) supply area severely burned.

At 1441 Commodore L. George DUBLUGER, RN, Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Far Eastern Services, arrived on board by J-50 aircraft on a tour of the West Coast operating area.

At 13281 HMS NEWCASTLE joined the formation to receive Commodore L. George DUBLUGER, RN, by helicopter.

At 14501 the transfer was completed and HMS NEWCASTLE departed.

21 February 1953 -

At 07301 conducted gunnery exercise "Saint Barbara", readiness firing of anti-aircraft batteries.

At 07001 the first flight was launched in excellent flying weather which extended over the target areas. Forty (40) sorties were flown; twenty-eight (28) offensive and twelve (12) defensive. One mechanical failure resulted in a deferred emergency aboard the USS BATTLE. The prize target of the day was a communist artillery field piece which the Checkerboard marine pilots destroyed with 500 pounders and napalms. In a troop housing area, twenty-seven (27) buildings were destroyed and twenty-five (25) damaged. One (1) supply building was damaged and eight (8) road cuts were made.

At 15221 HMS CHUBBER was detached for refueling.

At 16161 HMS W.ESI. ANZAC was detached to proceed on mission assigned.

At 16501 HMS COCKADE (DE 34) joined the formation as relief for the ANZAC.

At 23001 HMS CHUBBER rejoined the formation.

22 February 1953 -

At 07301 CTU 95,1,1, OCE, conducted gunnery exercise "AA Roger".

The ship's chaplain made two helicopter trips to ships in the area to hold divino services.

The marine pilots of VM-312 took advantage of perfect flying weather by holding "field day" on the communist troops with destruction of fifty-nine (59) buildings in a troop housing area. One Corsair pilot, Captain Malcolm A. HILL, had a near fatal hit when communist small arms fire passed under the pilot seat and emerged from the right side of the cockpit.

In an attack on a railway line south of Sarison, six (6) railroad cars were damaged and one (1) secondary explosion was observed. One (1) gun position was reported damaged. Excellent photographs were obtained on this mission by a BATTLE "jury rigged" P-56 camera, using a surveyed PUI "bally tank" as a camera pod. From these photographs several new targets were found in the area.

At 15361 the USS MCROYD was detached for refueling.

At 23551 the USS MCROYD rejoined the formation.
23 February 1953 —

At 0748I HMSC HAIDA (DD 215) joined the formation as relief for HMSC CRUISER.

At 0825I CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY, RCH, and two staff members landed aboard HMSC HAIDA by helicopter. The admiral, on a visit to the West Coast Operational Area, observed carrier landings and was given a tour of the ship by the Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN, Captain H. H. HODNEY, USN.

At 0915I the USS HANSON (DDR 832) joined the formation. At 1054I CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY and staff members were transferred to HMSC CRUISER by helicopter.

At 1127I HMSC CRUISER departed on mission assigned, flying the flag of CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY.

At 2337I HMSC COCKADE rejoined the formation.

Today's flying activity was climax by brilliant team work in an air spotting flight with HMSC CRUISER acting as controlling ship. Coached by marine pilots, four (4) direct hits were reported made by the CRUISER on enemy troops and coastal gun positions. Later these same pilots destroyed buildings in a village nearby. A total of thirty-nine (39) sorties were flown during the day against troops housed in revetted buildings and in villages. Thirty (30) buildings were reported destroyed and ten (10) damaged. One supply dump was burned and two (2) road bridges were hit.

24 February 1953 —

At 0628I the USS HANSON (DDR 832) was detached to rendezvous with CTU 95.1.2 for the purpose of conducting passive electronic countermeasures and the surveillance of two areas to be designated by CTU 95.1.2.

At 1459I HMSC HILD. was detached for refueling. Marginal weather which lowered ceilings to 400 feet in rain and snow caused the cancellation of twelve (12) afternoon sorties.

At 1035I Major David (n) CLEELAND, CI65761, USMC, on his one-hundred-one (101) mission, was knocked down by enemy ground fire ten (10) miles north of Haenju and crashed-landed on the frozen Anyong reservoir. Many communist troops were in the area, but Major CLEELAND's flight held them off by effective strafing runs. The RESCAP also bombed and napalmed the hill from which the enemy was firing on the downed pilot. At 1035I the USS BATAAN launched six (6) planes as relief for the RESCAP over the downed aircraft and moved quickly northward to close the distance. This proved to be a very timely action since several of the aircraft returned with as little as fifteen (15) gallons of fuel. At 1055I these aircraft arrived on the scene at the precise moment the RESCAP was out of ammunition. The pilot was rescued by the timely and courageous action of the helicopter pilot flying from K-1h after having been under fire from ground troops for nearly an hour. The plane was partially destroyed with rockets and dropped through the ice.

Checkerboard pilots observed a large secondary explosion following their attack on a shipyard, the primary target for the day. Four (4) road bridges were damaged and one (1) destroyed.

25 February 1953 —

At 0105I HMSC HAIDA rejoined the formation. Flight
operations today were limited to eighteen (18) sorties by an overcast with a cloud base variable from 100 to 600 feet in the morning, becoming broken to scattered in the afternoon. Twenty-two (22) flights were cancelled due to weather. Pilots reported twenty-two (22) buildings and one (1) warehouse destroyed in a strike thirteen (13) miles southwest of Haeju. On the last flight of the day five (5) F4U's departed the target area for R-3 to receive maintenance and compass corrections.

At 2100I the Commanding Officer of HMS GLORY assumed duties as CTU 95.1.1. The Commanding Officer of HMS RENCASTLE assumed duties OTC West Coast Korea at 2100I.

At 2336I the USS McCORD and HMCS HAIDA were detached to join HMS GLORY, CTU 95.1.1

26 February 1953

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan, from operating area "N" in company with HMS COCKADE.

At 1200I conducted gunnery exercises on a towed sleeve. George, How, and Uncle type runs were made. Firing was extremely accurate.

At 1639I the USS BATAAN moored to buoy eighteen (18) in Sasebo harbor.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. The expenditure and performance of air ordnance for Marine Squadron VMF-312 during this reporting period was as follows:

1. Expenditure:

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<th>260#</th>
<th>250#</th>
<th>1000#</th>
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<th>Napalm</th>
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<td>GP</td>
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<td>361</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>26100</td>
<td>64900</td>
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</table>

BOMB TOTAL 83.95  TONS
2. Performance

No unusual difficulties were experienced in the handling or performance of ordnance material or equipment.

a. Guns

(1) 20 MM Guns

Of the thirty-two (32) cases of malfunctioning which occurred, 34% was due to telescoped rounds.

11 Telescoped rounds
4 Faulty chargers
4 Link chute stoppages
5 Ammunition link separation
2 Broken cannon plug
1 Broken front mount
2 Feeder stoppages
1 Charger lug override
1 Broken driving spring retainer
1 Broken rear bullet guide, 20mm feeder mechanism

(2) 50 Caliber Guns

Electrical failure caused 40% of the malfunctioning.

3 Link stoppage
1 Broken firing pin
1 Faulty driving spring
3 Time and headspace
6 Electrical failure
1 Frozen firing pin extension spring

b. Hung Rockets

(1) 5" HVAR

There were thirty-four (34) 5" hung rockets.

15 Faulty rockets AERO 14A launchers
11 Faulty rockets MK 9 launchers
5 Broken igniters MK 9 launchers
2 Electrical failures MK 9

(2) 3.25" W.P.

There were twenty-two (22) (3.25" W.P.) hung rockets.

8 Faulty rockets 14A launchers
2 Faulty rockets MK 9
12 Separated pig tails

c. Hung Bombs

Sixteen (16) hung bomb incidents were reported; 25% of which were attributed to pilot error.
SECURITY INFORMATION

(1) 100# GP
   1. Faulty MK 55 rack
   2. Circuit-breaker out AERO 14A
   3. Pilot error
   4. Faulty wiring MK 55

(2) 250# GP
   2. Hung bombs reported (MK 55 racks), cause undetermined.

(3) 260# Frag.
   1. Sway braces too tight
      d. Dud Bombs
      Only one dud bomb (500# GP) was reported during this period; this was
      caused by failure of the solenoid to arm.

B. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA practice.
   1. 40mm cartridge (AA)
      A total of 2,973 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises.

C. Performance of ship's ordnance and material.
   1. The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major
      material casualties occurred during this period.

   2. During exercises "St. Barbara" and "Warning Magenta" all ordnance equip-
      ment and crews functioned excellently. Gunnery exercises on towed sleeves showed
      marked improvement. Direct hits carried the sleeve away on one firing run.

   PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own battle damage
   1. Surface
      None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

   2. Air
      For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnera-
      bility Report submitted for this period.

B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy
   1. Surface
      Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating
      as a part of TU 95.1.1 during this period.

   2. Air
      For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this
Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of reported damage is as follows:

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<th>TARGETS</th>
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<td>Buildings</td>
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<td>Gun Positions</td>
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<td>Gas Stowage Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warehouse</td>
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<td>Sluice/Gate</td>
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<td>Shipyard</td>
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PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. An outstanding example of teamwork and high morale was shown in the handling of several emergency landings. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 986. The total number of squadron (VMA-312) personnel, officers and men, was 1148. There were thirty-two (32) enlisted men received and eleven (11) transferred.

2. A general shortage of personnel in the higher ratings exists, however, the situation is not critical. The current shortages are in EM, FM, FA, SD, AN and AA rates. A vigorous on board training program to train personnel of lower ratings to fill these higher ratings is in effect and working successfully.

3. The X-2 Division provides a five (5) day orientation, training and indoctrination period which helps in assigning men to billets by consideration...
of their personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

B. Recreation

1. The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period:

   a. A daily newspaper, the Bataan News, was distributed to all ships in the formation on all helicopter guard mail trips.

   b. Radio broadcasts were piped to REO'S throughout the ship.

   c. The Bataan Broadcasting Company (BBC) provided daily newscasts and recordings.

   d. The crew's library was open each evening until taps.

   e. Sightseeing tours were conducted to points of interest in the Sasebo area during the in-port period.

   f. Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO Mess.

   g. A monthly birthday party was held in the wardroom, for all officers having a birthday during the month, featuring a special dinner and music by the Bataan "Hill-Billy" Band.

   h. A total of sixty-seven (67) persons went on R&R during the in-port period.

2. Athletics

   a. The operating schedule does not permit participation while at sea, however, during the in-port periods the BATAAN has intramural tournaments in basketball when facilities are available. A bowling tournament was organized for the in-port period.

3. Hobbies: The BATAAN has no official hobby shop but keen interest exists in model airplane building and leather working. The ship's "Hill-Billy" band continues to provide entertainment on all special occasions.

C. Legal

1. There was no court-martial case held during the period of this report.

D. Education and training

1. Advancement in rating examinations were held during this period for 1st and 2nd Class Petty Officers. Eighteen (18) men took the test for 1st Class and sixty-eight (68) for 2nd Class. Adding these to the number trying for 3rd Class (207) and 360 (18) earlier in the month results in a total of three hundred-eleven (311) or nearly one-third of the crew.
2. Special emphasis has been placed on enlisted correspondence courses recently with good results. Those men who felt they would fall below standards on the rating examinations have been encouraged to enroll, to insure doing better next fall. Some courses are not available at present due to revision, but several of the relatively new ones are being requested.

E. Divino Services

1. Daily Mass was held during the week at 1600. The Rosary was recited each day just before and after each mass. A bible discussion class was held each Tuesday, Thursday, and Sunday evening at 0830 in the crew's library.

2. On Sunday, 15 February, three (3) services were held on the BATAN, two Catholic Masses and one general divine service. The Church of Christ also held services under the direction of a lay leader. Ash Wednesday ashes were blessed and distributed.

3. On Sunday, 22 February, divine services were held aboard two (2) of the screening ships by the BATAN's chaplain who was transported by helicopter. Catholic Masses and general divine services were also held aboard the BATAN.

F. Casualties

See PART VI paragraph (F)(7) of Medical Report

PART VI - COMMENTS

A. Air Department

1. Flight Deck
   Only two mild snow storms affected flight deck operations. In each instance, the snow immediately turned to slush negating the use of snow removal equipment. No flight deck icing occurred.

2. Catapults
   The H-2 catapult was out of commission for 1 launch, due to failure of an electrical solenoid controlling No. 2 oil gear pump. No serious difficulties occurred during this reporting period.

3. Arresting Gear
   There was no damage to the arresting gear during this period and all equipment worked satisfactorily.

4. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

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<th>RESCAP</th>
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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

(continued)

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<tr>
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<td>2/23</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>97</td>
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</table>

No. Carrier Landings 340
No. Catapult Shots 341
No. Barrier Crashes 0

B. Engineering Department

1. Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment

   a. There were no engineering casualties to the Main Propulsion Plant, Auxiliaries or electrical equipment during the operation. Minor repairs and upkeep were accomplished in a routine manner.

2. Electronics

   a. Operation of electronics equipment was generally good. Two major electronic failures occurred during the operation.

   (1) AN/UPX-1 (MK 10 IFF)

       On 16 February, the MK 10 IFF pulse transformer (T-101) failed and resistor (R-137) was found to be open. Since no replacement for (T-101) could be made from spare parts on board an attempt to use (T-102) was made, but this could not be accomplished due to an open winding on (T-102). The transformer (T-101) was then rewound but proved unsuccessful; good indications were received on mode 2 but modes 1 and 3 were inoperative. The equipment was still inoperative on return to port.

   (2) YE-1

       On 24 February, rotation of the YE-1 antenna became erratic and jumpy, indicating faulty contacts. Repairs were not attempted since it would require securing other essential equipments on the mast before sending men aloft. YE guard was assumed by the USS Record for operations 25 February. After detachment of the Record, the YE antenna was again started and used until completion of operations. Operation of the antenna was somewhat erratic but proved satisfactory. A complete check of the equipment was started on return to port.
(3) TBS

Minor difficulties were experienced with TBS transceivers. The primary circuit 72.9 MC presented a garbled cutting out effect when receiving. Examination of both TBS-1 transceivers revealed no trouble in the equipment. It is believed most troubles were caused by improper tuning, volume control settings, and feedback.

C. Gunnery

1. During the period of this report no abnormal difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition.

D. Operations Department

1. Communications

a. Radio

Communications were much better than during the previous tour in the third and fourth quarters of 1952. It is believed that the use of separate CW and voice circuits between JOC, Korea and the West Coast Carrier Unit has contributed much toward the improvement. Classified and total traffic volume remains heavy but is slightly less than that during the BATAAN's last report.

b. Personnel

Training of circuit operators has continued and is necessary in order to maintain the required number of qualified operators to man the circuits.

c. Post Office Transactions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Dispatched</th>
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<tr>
<td>Air Mail and First Class Pouches</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Mail and First Class Letters</td>
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<td>6338</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>for a total of $9359.34</td>
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</table>

2. C.I.C.

a. Radio:Notes

(1) A new 5th Air Force Radar Warning Net is a great tactical improvement over previous methods of air warning and surveillance reporting. It is subject to the usual CW static, and general noise of most MF circuits. It is also being subjected to an ever-increasing amount of administrative traffic. Recommendation:

That administrative and all other traffic except radar reporting and emergency messages be kept off this net.
(2) A Gunnery and Administrative net appears to be a waste of one transmitter/receiver. It is used less than 5% of the time (dawn alert - U.S. Carriers only), and most destroyers must secure some other net to come up on it. Recommendation: That this net be abolished - substituting the C.I. Net.

(3) No helicopter - Ship common VHF channel is designated in CTU 95.1 Communication Plan 2-52. The frequent drops of mail and personnel to vessels of the screen and other vessels joining indicates the need for a common frequency during helicopter operations. Recommendations:
That one common VHF channel from existing aircraft channelization be designated, preferably button (8) (T).

b. Material

(1) Spare parts for MK X IFF. The transformer which burned out pointed up the serious need for a spare parts program for Mark X. As yet none exists. Hand winding of the transformer was not successful where tolerances in micro seconds were involved.

c. Electronics Counter Measures

(1) While operating in area NAD as CTU 95.1.1 during the period 18-25 February 1953, the USS BATWAN conducted passive ECM intercepts each night between 2100 and 0500Z. An Electronic Emission Control Plan with intermittent operating plan was promulgated by CTU 95.1.1 and used satisfactorily by the Task Unit.

(2) From the great number of intercepts made and the difficulty in evaluation, it became apparent that the requirements of paragraph 2(b) of ComNavFE Instruction 003521.1, dated 7 July 1951, would be impractical. Recommendation:
That the above Instruction be modified to require dispatch reports of only those signals positively identified as enemy. All other unidentified signals could then be reported by letter.

(3) Evaluation of the diversity of signals received was difficult because of the lack of a current table of friendly U.N. radars in the area. CNO serial 0020, 15 P 32 of 15 August 1950 is the most recent publication of all nation's radars held.

3. Air Operations and Intelligence

a. In January, prior to completion of H/K exercises, four (4) officers from the Operations Department were given TAD orders to permit an Indocritination and Familiarization Tour of our forthcoming operation as a unit of CTG 95.1. This tour carried the four (4) officers to various units of TF 95 as well as to the Joint Operation Center in Seoul, Korea. The tour soon proved to be invaluable, for the BATWAN was given a very short "turn-over" period when relieving the USS RIOLONG STRAIT as the American carrier operating on the West Coast of Korea. When carriers are to be assigned to duty on the West Coast of Korea, such
a trip is highly recommended for members of the Operations Department, particularly the Operations Officer, Air Operations Officer and the Air Intelligence Officer.

b. Photographic intelligence was limited during the major portion of the cruise due to the lack of a trained photo interpreter and cameras capable of vertical photography. However, this condition has been partially remedied by the skillful rigging of an F-56 camera in a surveyed "belly tank" and the return of an enlisted man from TAD to the Photo Readers and Air Intelligence Schools at N.A.S. Alameda. The K-25 cameras fitted in pods for wing mounting were of dubious value since this permitted only oblique photography. Photo coverage requested from the 5th Air Force over a relatively large area was delivered with excellent service.

c. There is reason to believe that AF Control Points are not designated by the same letter as Navy. It is recommended that NLO, JOC, Korea promulgate a cross index of all control points.

d. In the case of downed pilots the arrangement whereby one pilot stays at altitude to relay information to the ship has again proved to be a good procedure. Preferably the radio should be kept on the "Both" position.

4. Aerology:

a. Weather in the area was, in general, average or better for flying, being dominated by a high pressure cell moving slowly southeastward across the Yellow Sea and Korea. Snow showers accompanying a polar trough passage reduced visibility at sea to less than one mile on the morning of the 17th. Light and variable winds marked the passage of the center of the high pressure cell on the afternoon of the 22nd, while the southerly winds on the west side of the high plus a marked warm front passage on the morning of the 25th resulted in undesirable flying weather, in the form of overcast low clouds with bases less than 1000 feet, and considerable fog during the afternoon of the 24th and morning of the 25th.

5. Supply

1. Priority "A" Material Requests

   Dispatch requisitions were submitted as follows for material urgently needed for ships operations during the period 15-25 February, 1953 inclusive:


   b. February 1900132 TO CTG 92.1 INFO CTG 92.5 CVL29/9360-53-3 PRIORITY "A", DDD IMMEDIATE, MODULATION FUSE TRANSFORMER FOR INOPERATIVE MARK 10 IFF - AIR SHIPMENT REQUESTED.

   As of the date of completion of operations, delivery of the above material had not been made, although in the latter case the invoice covering issue of the material was received via regular mail.

   Recommendation:

   That measures be taken to coordinate urgent line operation material
requests with COD operations.

2. Disbursing
Concur with the recommendation contained in USS Kearsarge (CVA-33) Action Report, 6 December 1952 through 8 January 1953, concerning facilities for the exchange of YEN and MFC at Pearl Harbor, T.H. for ships on duty in the Far East.

F. Medical Department

1. There has been no shortage of medical supplies over the period covered by this report.

2. There were two men of the medical department carried on temporary additional duty during the last operational period, one to U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, for treatment and one on emergency leave.

3. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's officers and men
   a. The morale of the Air Group and of Ship's officers and men was at a high level during the last operational period.
   b. There were no epidemics or unnecessary illnesses. One pilot was grounded for medical reasons and nine patients were admitted to the sick list.

4. Medical statistics summary; Air Group and Ship's company
   a. Admitted to the sick list 2
   b. Total sick days out of 25,300 possible work days 24
   c. Officers admitted to the sick list 0
   d. Total patients' visits to sick call 230
   e. Total medical treatments 297
   f. Patients transferred to the hospital 0
   g. Number of minor injuries treated 18
   h. Minor surgery procedure 1
   i. Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis: Total: 2
      (1) GC 1  (2) Chancroid 1
      (3) Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure 0

5. One plane was lost due to enemy action. The pilot was recovered by helicopter and taken to a base hospital in Korea.

6. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 1
   Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation 0
   Pilot availability 99.005%  

7. There was one aircraft casualty. Major David (a) CLELAND, 016576, USNC, flying a Corsair, Bureau number 97120, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire while on a mission over enemy territory. He was rescued by helicopter from a
Shore based activity. He received a gunshot wound in the left leg. Major CLEELAND is now hospitalized at the U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

H. R. Horney

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CHO (advance) (2)
CINCPACFLT (advance) (2)
COMSILVEM (advance) (1)
CG, FIFTHPAC
CG, DIR FIFTHPAC
CTF 95
CTF 77
CTG 95.1
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFLP EVALUATION GROUP
COMINPAC (5)
CONSLNIPAC
COMFAIRJAP
COMFAIRHAMAII
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
CONCAR DIV 15
CONCAR DIV 17
USS TENDA (CVE-114)
USS RAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS RADOGO STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS POINT CAYU (CVE-119)
CO, VMA-312
CO, FIFTHPAC (2)
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 6 March through 16 March 1953

Ref: (a) Article 0705 U.S. Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(c) CINC PACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period 6 March through 10 March 1953, the USS BATAAN (CVL-29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1310, USN, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1. At 1540Z, 10 March 1953, Captain S.S. MILLER, 61159/1310, USN, relieved Captain H. R. HORNEY as Commanding Officer of the USS BATAAN and continued to operate as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of CTG 95.1 until 16 March 1953.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100Z, 6 March to 2100Z, 15 March 1953. At this time the command of the Task Unit shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY; CTU 95.1.2 in HMAS ANZAC (D1-37) assumed OTC West Coast of Korea. During this reporting period, TU 95.1.1 consisted of the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) and a maximum of five (5) United Nations' escort vessels.

3. During this operating period, ships of TU 95.1.1 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "N" in the vicinity of Lat. 37°-30'N and 121°-30'E. Refueling of the screen was normally accomplished by detaching one destroyer in the early afternoon for rendezvous with a tanker located at Lat. 37°-40'N and 125°-41'E. Ships returned to the Task Unit late in the evening of the same day.

4. Enemy surface forces or action

No enemy surface forces were encountered by this Task Unit, therefore, no surface action is related.
5. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft (FXU) flew Combat Air Patrol, Target Combat Air Patrol, Armed Reconnaissance, Pre-Briefed Strikes, Photo Reconnaissance, Weather Reconnaissance, and Air Spot for naval gun firing missions as illustrated by a typical schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations conducted during the nine (9) day period totaled 282 combat sorties. Seventy-two (72) flights were cancelled due to weather; five (5) flights were cancelled due to non-availability of aircraft. Four (4) flights aborted. One flight was cancelled due to a shortage of parts. The following averages are listed: A total of 522 combat hours were flown for a daily average of 58.0 hours. The number of sorties per day was thirty-one (31) and the length of sortie was 1.8 hours. The number of pilots assigned was thirty-two (32) and the average number of pilots on board was thirty (30). The average number of hours flown per pilot was 17.04. The average daily time per pilot was 1.9 hours for the nine day period. The squadron had an average of twenty-two (22) aircraft assigned, with a daily availability of sixteen (16). The percent aircraft availability was seventy-eight (78). One hundred eighty-nine (189) offensive and ninety-three (93) defensive sorties were flown.

6. The mission of the Task Unit is contained in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

6 March 1953

Enroute to operating area "N" from Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 041002Z March 1953.

At 1030I scheduled gunnery exercises commenced on a towed sleeve in Area George. Two (2) each, of George, How and Uncle type runs were made.

At 1036I rendezvoused with HMCS CHISLER (DD-228).

At 1102I recovered six (6) squadron planes from Itami AFB.

At 2100I Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1210, USN, Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29) assumed Command of Task Unit 95.1.1 and OCE West Coast of Korea.

At 2355I the USS HANSON (DDR-832) joined the formation.

7 March 1953

At 0600I the USS BATAAN in company with HMCS CHISLDER and the USS HANSON arrived in operating area "N".

At 0549I HMCS ANGEL (DD-37) joined the formation.

At 1540I HMCS CHISLDER was detached for fueling.

At 1547I the USS McCORD (DD-534) joined the formation.

Low clouds and fog made flying conditions undesirable until 1340I, at which time the first flight was launched. Eighteen (18) sorties were cancelled due to the weather and one (1) sortie was cancelled due to non-availability of aircraft. One (1) sortie aborted after an electrical short circuit caused a fire in the aircraft.

The primary targets hit were gun positions; three (3) of which were damaged. Two (2) secondary explosions were reported. Seven (7) houses, probable troop billeting areas, were destroyed. One (1) rail bridge
was reported damaged. At 1720I Captain C. M. GREEN, USMC, flying an F4U with a badly damaged wing, made an emergency, wheels-up landing at Punggyong-Do. The wing was damaged by medium automatic weapons fire. Captain GREEN was not injured.

At 2350I HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation.

8 March 1953

At 0700I conducted gunnery exercise "AA Roger".

At 1530I the USS HANSON was detached for fuelling. After fuelling, the HANSON reported to CTU 95.1.2 for ECM assignment. Results of ECM mission are the subject of separate reports by the HANSON. Thirty-five (35) sorties were flown; twenty-three (23) were offensive and twelve (12) were defensive. Pilots reported twenty-six (26) buildings destroyed and nine (9) damaged. In addition, ten (10) buildings were left burning. A petroleum dump and two (2) troop billeting areas were hit. In this attack, three (3) buildings were damaged and troops strafed. One (1) sortie aborted due to a rough running engine.

At 1848I the Task Unit headed 270° toward the Shantung Peninsula for the purpose of conducting passive electronic countermeasures and surveillance of this area. Two radar intercepts were reported to ComNavFE.

9 March 1953

At 0700I conducted gunnery exercise "AA Roger".

At 1035I Air Defense Exercise, "Warning Lantenta" was conducted, returning planes simulating surprise attacks.

At 1530I HMCS ANZAC was detached for fuelling. Marine pilots of VM-312 flew thirty-six (36) sorties in good flying conditions. Twenty-six (26) offensive and ten (10) defensive sorties were flown. Low aircraft availability caused cancellation of four (4) sorties. A total of nineteen (19) buildings were reported hit. Eleven (11) revetted buildings were reported destroyed and five (5) damaged. Pilots reported two (2) buildings destroyed in a supply area. In addition, two (2) large brick buildings were damaged. Two (2) rail bridges were destroyed and one (1) rail cut was made in another rail bridge attack. Nine (9) troops were strafed and wounded.

At 2246I HMCS ANZAC rejoined the formation.

10 March 1953

At 0213I the USS HANSON rejoined the formation. Low overcast and freezing rain caused severe icing of aircraft, which forced the cancellation of twenty-two (22) afternoon sorties. Twelve (12) offensive sorties were flown against revetted buildings. Pilots reported ten (10) buildings destroyed. One (1) road bridge was damaged.

At 1315I the USS McCORD was detached for fuelling.

In Change of Command Ceremonies at 1530I, Captain S.S. MILLER, 61159/1310, USN, relieved Captain H. R. HONEY, 61175/1310, USN, as Commanding Officer, USS BAINN.

At 2052I the USS McCORD rejoined the formation.
large camouflaged buildings was destroyed and one (1) was damaged. Five (5) buildings were destroyed in a troop billeting area. Three (3) road bridges were destroyed and two (2) gun positions strafed, which wounded three (3) communists.

At 1800I Captain Leonard L. Orr, O35685, USMC, made a perfect "dead-stick", "wheels-up" landing at Paengyong-Do. Captain Orr was not injured. The landing was made due to engine failure.

15 March 1953 -
At 0133I the USS HANSON rejoined the formation.
At 0700I conducted gunnery exercise "A. Roger".
At 0710I HMCS GUSADER was detached for fueling.
At 0725I HMAS ANZAC rejoined the formation.
At 0940I conducted gunnery exercise, "Warning Bagota".
At 1235I the USS HIGBEE rejoined the formation.
At 1240I HMCS HAIDA was detached to proceed on mission assigned.
At 1258I HMCS GUSADER rejoined the formation.
At 1414I HMAS ANZAC was detached to proceed on mission assigned.

In perfect flying weather, marine pilots of VMA-312 inflicted the heaviest damage of this reporting period on the North Korean Communist Forces. Prize targets for the day were rail cars and tracks. Eight (8) rail cars were destroyed three (3) miles northeast of Haeju when they were spotted four (4) miles from a tunnel entrance. One (1) rail cut was made and ½ mile of railroad track was destroyed. Two (2) possible radar towers were destroyed and one (1) transformer was reported destroyed. Pilots estimated twenty (20) troops were killed when trenches were strafed. Three (3) medium automatic weapons positions were neutralized. In further damage inflicted, three (3) buildings were destroyed and two road bridges were knocked out.

At 1540I four (4) planes departed from the target area for maintenance and compass swinging ashore.
At 2100I the Commanding Officer, HMAS GLORY assumed duties as CTU 95.1.1. The Commanding Officer HMAS ANZAC assumed duties as OTC West Coast Korea at this time.
At 2311I HMCS GUSADER and the USS HIGBEE were detached to rendezvous with CTU 95.1.1 in HMAS GLORY.

16 March 1953 -
Steaming onroute Sasebo, Japan, from area "N" in company with the USS HANSON. Small drone firing, scheduled for 1200I, was cancelled due to high seas and poor visibility.
At 1206I the USS HANSON was detached to rejoin CTU 95.1.1 and the USS BATMAN proceeded independently from area "GEORGE" to Sasebo, Japan.
At 1744I moored to buoy eighteen (18) in Sasebo harbor.
III. PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. The expenditure and performance of air ordnance for Marine Squadron VMJ-312 during this reporting period was as follows:

1. Expenditure:

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<th>260#</th>
<th>250#</th>
<th>100#</th>
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<th>W.P.</th>
<th>20mm</th>
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TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 140.40

2. Performance

The performance of ordnance equipment and material was considered normal with the exception of the dud bombs and napalm reported. Faulty arming circuits were found to be the cause of fourteen (14) dud 100# GP bombs.

Four (4) 250# GP bombs were reported as duds with the cause undetermined.

Five (5) napalm failed to explode from undetermined cause.

a. Guns

(1) 20 MM

1. Link chute stoppage
2. Tablet rounds
3. Ruptured rounds
4. Broken feeder
5. Ammunition link separation
6. Feeder stoppage
7. Broken gas cylinder spring
8. Charger lug jumpped breech block
9. Faulty sear spring

(2) .50 Caliber

1. Telescoped rounds
2. Cut of headspace
3. Receiver jam
4. Link chute stoppage
5. Broken feed pawl.
(2) .50 Caliber (continued)

1 Broken extractor
1 Improper charging

b. Hung Rockets

(1) 5" HVAR

3 Broken igniters across 14A launchers
1 Broken igniters MK. 9 launchers
3 Faulty rockets MK. 9 launchers

(2) 3.25 W.P.

2 Faulty igniters across 14A launchers
8 Faulty rockets across 14A launchers
1 Cut pigtail across 14A launchers
2 Pilot error across 14A launchers

c. Hung Bombs

(1) 100%/ GP

2 Pilot error on across 14A rack
1 Faulty 14A rack
1 Faulty MK. 55 rack

(2) 500%/ GP

One aircraft with a MK.8 bomb rack went to K-6 with a hung 500%/ GP bomb. Sway braces were reported to be too tight. The manual release was bent and made inoperative; this was possibly due to the catapult bridle hitting one of the release braces.

d. Dud Bombs

(1) 100%/ GP

Fourteen (14) dud 100%/ GP bombs were reported. Faulty arming circuits were found to be the cause.

(2) 250%/ GP

Four (4) dud 250%/ GP bombs were reported; cause undetermined. All arming wires returned on the aircraft.

e. Napalm

Six (6) napalm failed to explode
1 Faulty arming solenoid
5 Cause undetermined
B. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA practice

1. 40MM cartridge (AA)
   A total of 1709 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises.

C. Performance of the ship's ordnance and material

1. The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major material casualties occurred during this period.

2. During exercises "St. Barbara", "AA Roger" and "Warning Wagenta" all ordnance equipment and crews functioned excellently.

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage

1. Surface
   None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

2. Air
   For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report, submitted for this period.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

1. Surface
   Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of TU 95.1 during this period.

2. Air
   For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of reported damage is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Secondary Explosions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxcars</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revetted buildings</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridge</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Area</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUMMARY:

Total: 8
B. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA practice

1. 40MM cartridge (AA)
   A total of 1709 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises.

C. Performance of the ship's ordnance and material

1. The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major material casualties occurred during this period.

2. During exercises "St. Barbara", "AA Roger" and "Warning Magenta" all ordnance equipment and crews functioned excellently.

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage

1. Surface
   None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

2. Air
   For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report, submitted for this period.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

1. Surface
   Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of TU 95.1.1 during this period.

2. Air
   For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of reported damage is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxcars</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revetted buildings</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridge</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Area</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TARGETS | DESTROYED | DAMAGED
--- | --- | ---
Oxen | 1 | 
Mess Hall | 1 | 
Grass Houses | 4 | 4
Radar Towers | 2 | 1
Ferry Crossings | | 1
Storage Buildings | 1 | 
Railroad Track | 1/2 Mile | 

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. The average on board count of enlisted personnel was 988. The number of officers was eighty (80). The total number of squadron (VA-312) personnel, officers and men was 188. There were no enlisted men received and three (3) men were transferred during the nine day operating period.

2. The shortage of petty officers has been aggravated by the loss of twenty-four (24) third class petty officers, transferred during the in-port period. The Engineering Department suffered most with twenty (20) men lost. Out of this group, four (4) ET3's and one (1) ET3W were transferred. Other rates lost during this period included two (2) QM1's and two (2) BD1's.

3. In an exchange of personnel, five (5) men from HMS GLORY were aboard during this period to observe our methods of Air Operations, Communications, and the various phases of Navy life aboard a U.S. carrier. The BATAAN, in turn, sent six (6) enlisted men and two (2) officers to HMS GLORY to observe operations. The BATAAN's ECM officer was on TAD to the USS HANSON (DDR-832) to observe ECM operations.

B. Recreation

1. The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period.

a. A daily newspaper, the BATAAN NEWS was distributed to ships in the formation on all helicopter guard mail trips.

b. Radio broadcasts were piped to RBO's through-out the ship.

c. The Bataan Broadcasting Company (BBC) provided daily newscasts and recordings.

d. The crew's library was open each evening until tap.

e. Sight-seeing tours were conducted to points of interest in the Sasebo area during the in-port period.

f. Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom.
and one in the CPO Mess.

g. A total of fifty-five (55) persons went on R&R during the in-port period.

2. Athletics

a. The operating schedule does not permit participation while at sea, however, during the in-port periods the BATAAN has intramural tournaments in basketball and other seasonal sports when facilities are available.

b. The BATAAN basketball team went to Yokosuka, Japan, on TAD to the Regional Tournament held there.

C. Legal

1. There has been a slight increase in disciplinary action over the last reporting period.

2. One Summary Court-Martial was held during this period.

D. Education and Training

1. Special emphasis has again been placed on enlisted correspondence courses with good results.

E. Divine Services

1. Catholic mass was held each week day at 1600. Bible classes met three times a week at 1830 in the crew's library. Church of Christ services were conducted on Sunday at 1600 in the crew's library by a lay member. General Divine services were conducted at 0930 each Sunday.

2. On Sunday, 8 March, General Divine services and two masses were held on screening vessels by the BATAAN's chaplain. On Sunday, 15 March, chaplains were exchanged with a Canadian ship and two Catholic masses were held on Australian and Canadian vessels of the screen. The Canadian ship provided the services of a Presbyterian minister for the BATAAN.

3. The Chaplain was at flight quarters for most launches and recoveries.

F. CASUALTIES

See PART VI paragraph (f) (6) of Medical Report

PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Air Department

1. Catapults and Arresting Gear

There were no outstanding maintenance problems encountered nor was any damage sustained by the catapults or the arresting gear. On 15 March 1953,
2. CIC

a. Comment

ECM information is improving slowly, primarily through this ship's efforts to compile a list of friendly radars in our operating area. Many previously unidentified contacts now are eliminated as friendly. Much information is still lacking on friendly radars in the West Coast area.

Recommendation
That CIC compile a list of all friendly U.N., Army, Navy, A.F., and P.I.R. radars in the West Coast area.

b. Comment

The 5th AF West Coast Radar Reporting Net has improved somewhat, but much time is still lost when the frequency is changed.

Recommendation
The Net Control Station should promulgate the time of frequency change as far in advance as possible, i.e., while communications are still good on the frequency in use.

c. Comment

Fishing boats in the non-fishing area increased the radar tracking workload of CIC tremendously. The Group CIC officer necessarily had to promulgate orders to "watch" all surface contacts tracking less than 5 knots to keep from saturating tracking facilities. It is impractical both from a tactical viewpoint and due to language difficulties, to detach screening vessels to investigate or warn fishing boats out of the area.

Recommendation
Stronger enforcement of the orders regarding the non-fishing area.

d. Electronic Counter Measures

Passive ECM training was conducted daily. Due to the location of the operating area, intercepts of enemy radar signals in Korea were very unlikely. On the night of 8 March this Task Unit retired to westward within 12 miles of the China Coast. During this night, two radar intercepts from the Chinese Mainland were made and the signals were thoroughly analyzed.

Proper evaluation of ECM intercepts made in area U.N. is difficult due to the lack of information on the location and types of radar emissions from our U.N. forces in the general area. During this period of operations, information concerning the characteristics of shore based radar at Cho do, Paengnyong-do, and Yong Kyong-do was obtained by the USS HANSON by sending...
Captain R. KUEHL, USNCR, VM-312 was launched from the H-2 catapult, making the 7,000th catapult shot from the H-2.

2. Flight Deck

Two hail storms of short duration were the only adverse weather conditions affecting flight deck operations during this nine day operating period. Moderating winter weather in the Yellow Sea accounted for considerably less discomfort to exposed flight deck personnel.

**STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>NAVAL ARMED GUN CAP SPOT</th>
<th>PHOTO</th>
<th>PRE-BRIEFED STRIKES</th>
<th>WEATHER RECOO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of carrier landings 283

Number of catapult shots 285

Number of barrier crashes 0

Number of planes damaged (major) two (2) wheels-up landings on emergency landing strip.

B. Engineering Department

1. Main propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment.

   a. There were no casualties to the main propulsion plant or auxiliaries during the operation. Minor repairs and upkeep were accomplished in a routine manner.

2. Electronics

   a. Performance of electronic equipment was below the standard expected after making allowance for routine tube failures, etc. The following major failures occurred during the operating period:

   (1) **AN/SPS-6B**

   On 7 March, the **AN/SPS-6B** antenna stopped rotating. The
armature shaft of the antenna drive motor had broken and the driver gear was damaged. The gears in this unit were manufactured by the USS "J.M.X" and were installed by the R.T.M.'s crew prior to leaving port on 6 March. It is believed the failure was due to a bad fit between the key and key way of the pinion gear. A new motor and set of gears were ordered from the USS PISTON; action was taken by CG 92.1 forwarding a request for delivery by COD. A set of gears were machined and installed by the ship's force and the antenna was restored to operation on 7 March. On 9 March delivery of parts for field change No. 13 was made by COD. On 10 March the gears manufactured and installed by the ship's force failed, evidently due to use of mild steel in manufacturing. This was the best material available on board at the time. On 11 March field change No. 13 was installed and the AN/SPS-6B was restored to normal operation.

(2) YE-1
On 7 March, rotation of the YE-1 antenna became erratic. A contact in the antenna drive unit was found to have worked loose and was not making contact properly. Ship's personnel machined a new contact holder to lock the contact in place after setting, and the YE-1 was restored to normal operation on 8 March.

(3) SP Radar
On 7 March when the SP radar was put in operation the antenna began hunting at rotational speeds above 3 RPM and gave erroneous bearings 180 degrees out of phase. At 3 RPM and below, operation was satisfactory. a The ship's electronic personnel were unsuccessful in their attempts to locate the trouble prior to entering port.

(4) DBM-1
On 13 March, the low frequency antenna control cable for the DBM shorted out, limiting operations of the DBM-1 to the high frequency antenna. Preparations were made to install a new cable after entering port.

3. The assistance of a META has been requested to assist ship's personnel in a complete check of all electronic equipment during the up-keep period in port and all defects should be corrected prior to the next operating period.

C. Gunnery Department

1. During the period of this report no abnormal difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition.

2. During the in-port period the following ammunition and ammunition components were loaded aboard as replenishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100# Bombs</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260# Bombs, Frag.</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# Bombs</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11&quot;,75 Rocket Heads and Motors</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nose Fuzes, N219</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nose Fuzes, M39</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Description | Amount
--- | ---
Tail Fuzes, ML00 | 625
Tail Fuzes, ML01 | 75
IOM Heit | 2000 rds.
IOM BLT | 3000 rds.
WP Ignitor, External | 31
WP Ignitor, Internal | 38
.50 Cal. Cartridges | 59,000

Total time required for loading - 6 hours and 9 minutes.

Total working party - 163 men, 9 Petty Officers

3. On 28 February, sixteen (16) faulty igniters WP ML6 were received from HWO/DESE Sasebo, Japan. The cavity in the grenade was too small in diameter to receive burster tube C8KL of M57 fuse. BUORD was notified by dispatch.

D. Operations Department

1. Communications

a. Radio

On 1 March, all ships operating under CTG 95.1 were directed to shift broadcast from Guam Fox to Hong Kong Fox Easy. No difficulty was experienced during the transition period. Reception of the Hong Kong Fox Easy in the Yellow Sea seems much improved over the Guam Fox in the same area, despite the fact that Hong Kong transmits more words per minute on the Fox Easy. Speed varies between 27 and 30 WPM, but the signal is usually clear and strong. Ship/shore traffic to Hong Kong radio was difficult due to the necessity of using a calling frequency and a working frequency with the same station. However, when communications are established, traffic is cleared expeditiously. Ship/shore communications were poor on one night only; then it was necessary to clear traffic through Radio Guam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total messages handled</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total classified messages</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total plain language</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coded groups</td>
<td>40,952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Post Office Transactions

(1) Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class pouches</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class letters</td>
<td>9,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel post bags</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Dispatched

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class pouches</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class letters</td>
<td>4,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
personnel ashore on these islands to confer with local authorities. This information will be valuable in future patrols for training as well as operational purposes. It will not be possible to evaluate all radar intercepts made however, until up-to-date information is received, giving characteristics of airborne radars operating in the Korean Area. Information on friendly airborne radar equipment at present is very meager.

The USS HANSON demonstrated a useful tactical employment of radar intercept. After having been detached from the unit for 36 hours, the HANSON was steaming to rejoin during darkness. She picked up radar emissions from the Task Unit at a distance of about 30 miles, evaluated the emissions at this unit, took a bearing, changed course, and in a short period of time had the Task Unit on her radar scope.

3. Air Operations and Intelligence

The Air Operations Officer left the ship on TAD to JOG Korea to confer on certain operational and administrative matters pertaining to liaison between TU 95.1.1, 5th AF, and NLO-JOC Korea.

4. Aerology

Poor visibility, due to dust in the lower 7000 feet of the atmosphere, restricted air operations on the 7th and 8th of March. Improved visibility and generally good flying conditions plus light and variable winds signified the passage of the center of a high pressure cell on the 9th. Increasing low cloudiness, light to moderate rain, and severe icing above 3000 feet accompanied a warm frontal passage on the 10th, followed by good flying weather in the warm sector of an open wave on the 11th. Rain, sleet, and snow showers, followed by clearing skies and good visibility marked the passage of the cold front during the morning of the 12th. Continual good flying weather in the cold, high pressure cell, which moved over the area subsequent to the cold front passage, prevailed throughout the remainder of the period.

E. Supply Department

1. Aviation Stores

   a. AOOG Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT ON ALLOWANCE</th>
<th>HLUS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEET CONTROLLED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. The AOOG was for 1 each: Generator, R86-EC-914-15A, for FLUS, BuNo. 63005.

   c. The AOOG dispatch was released to USS JUPITER (CVS-4) 9 March, DDD immediately.

   d. 407 line items of aviation stores were ordered from NSD, Yokosuka, to support operations for the period of this report. 276 items, or 67% were supplied.
2. Commissary

a. Replenishment of provisions in Sasebo was effected by the USS WARRICK (AKA-89) and the USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29). Fifty-five (55) line items were requested of which thirty-three (33) were supplied, a percentage of 66%. Approximately 50% of the provisions were not left in cargo nets, as directed by COMSERVTHREE INSTRUCTION 4/60.1 of 9 February 1953.

b. Non-availability of items such as soda crackers, syrup, and cornmeal continues to exist.

3. General Stores

a. Replenishment of stores was effected by the USS YANKEE (AKA-93). Six hundred-four (604) line items were requested, of which, three hundred forty-seven (347) were supplied, a percentage of 57%

4. Disbursing

a. Exchange of MPC and YEN. This vessel concurs with the recommendation of the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) made in Part VI paragraph (5) (c) (2) of the Action Report for period 6 December to 8 January 1953.

5. Ship's Store and Clothing and Small Stores

a. Replenishment of ships store and clothing and small stores in Sasebo was effected from the USS WARRICK (AKA-89) and the USS YANCEY (AKA-93). Ninety (90) items were requested, of which, sixty (60) items were supplied, a percentage of 66 2/3%

b. Essential items of C&CS continue to remain NIS, such as black leather gloves, dress blue jumpers, dungaree jumpers, and black cotton socks.

6. The handling of priority material and cooperation of VR-23, COD detachment at Itazuke, were considered outstanding.

F. Medical Department

1. There has been no shortage of medical supplies over the period covered by this report.

2. One enlisted member of the medical department was on temporary additional duty with the ship's basketball team during this operational period. The Medical Department was at 90.9% of full strength.

3. Medical evaluation of the Air Group and of Ship's Officers and men

a. The morale of the Air Group and Ship's Officers and men was at a high level during the last operational period.
b. There were no epidemics or unnecessary illnesses. There were no pilots grounded for medical reasons.

h. Medical statistics summary, Air Group and Ship's company

a. Admitted to the sick list 30
b. Total sick days out of 11,574 possible work days 40

c. Officers admitted to the sick list 0
d. Total patients visits to sick call 368
e. Total medical treatments 400
f. Patients transferred to the hospital 0
g. Number of minor injuries treated 3

h. Minor surgery procedures 0

i. Venera disease cases and non-specific urethritis; Total: 17
   a. GC 4
   b. Chancre 13
   c. Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure 0

5. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 0

Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation 0

Pilot availability 100%

6. There were no casualties this reporting period.

PART VII - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CIC


b. Need for promulgating in advance, frequency changes on 5th AF West Coast Radar Reporting Net. Part VI (D) Operations Para. (2) (b).

C. Fishing boats in non-fishing area. Part VI (D) Operations Para. (2) (c).

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CIO (advance) (2)
CHCICACFLT (advance) (2)
COMAWE (advance) (1)
CO, FMFPAC
CG, DBR FMFPAC
CTF 95
CTF 77
CTF 95.1
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 11 April through 20 April 1953

Ref: (a) Article 0705 U.S. Navy Regulations
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3180.1
(c) CINCPOW COMMAND AND MISSION
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In compliance with references (a) through (d), the Action Report for the period 11 April 1953 through 20 April 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. During the period 11 April through 20 April 1953, the USS BAYAN (CVL-29), under the command of Captain S. S. Miller, E1349/1310, USN, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VM-312 embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95 under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

b. The Commanding Officer, USS BAYAN, was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 11 April until 2100 19 April 1953, at which time command of the Task Unit shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY (CVL-62). The Commanding Officer, USS BAYAN, was OTC West Coast of Korea from 2100 11 April until 1800 18 April 1953, at which time CTU 95.1.9 in HMS NEWCASTLE (CL-76) assumed duties as OTC West Coast of Korea.

c. During this operating period, ships of TU 95.1.1 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "N" in the vicinity of Lat. 37°-30'N and Long. 124°-30'E. Refueling of the screen was normally accomplished by detaching one destroyer in the early afternoon for rendezvous with a tanker located at Lat. 37°-40'N and Long. 125°-41'E. Ships returned to the Task Unit late in the evening of the same day or the early morning of the following day.

d. Enemy surface forces or action:
   No enemy surface forces were encountered by this Task Unit, therefore, no surface action is related.
During this operating period, VM-312 aircraft (FJU) flew Combat Air Patrol, Target Combat Air Patrol, Armed Reconnaissance, Pre-Briefed Strikes, Close Air Support, and Air Spot for naval gun firing missions as illustrated by a typical schedule, enclosure (1).

**STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>ARMED RECO</th>
<th>TANGAP</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>PRE-BRIEFED STRIKES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/16</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/17</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of combat sorties flown: 308
No. of offensive sorties flown: 196
No. of defensive sorties flown: 112
No. of flights cancelled due to weather: 12
No. of flights cancelled due to non-availability of aircraft: 0
No. of flights abortive: 0
No. of carrier landings made: 209
No. of catapult shots: 308
No. of barrier crashes: 2
No. of planes lost: 0
No. of planes damaged: 1
Total combat hours flown: 611.7
Average No. pilots available to fly: 23
Average sorties per day: 38.45
Average length sorties: 1.98
Average daily hours flown: 76.46
Average No. of pilots assigned: 20
Average No. of pilots on board: 0
Average hours flown per pilot: 26.6
Average daily hours flown per pilot: 3.3
Average No. aircraft assigned: 23
Average daily availability aircraft: 18
Percent aircraft availability: 78

The mission of the Task Unit is contained in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

**PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS**

11 April 1953
Enroute to Operating Area "N" from Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 0901.30Z of April 1953.
At 0917J rendezvoused with HMSS ANZAC (DD-59) at 1152J recovered seven (7) aircraft from Itazuke AFB.

At 1314J conducted refresher landings for seven (7) pilots newly assigned to VMF-312.
At 2100J Captain S. S. MILLER, 61H59/1310, USN, Commanding Officer, USS RATTAN assumed command of Task Unit 95.1.1 and OTC West Coast of Korea.

12 April 1953 -

At 0015J the USS HIGBEE (DDR-806) and HMCS Haida (DDE-215) joined the formation.
At 0600J the USS RATTAN in company with HMCS HAIDA, HMSS ANZAC and the USS HIGBEE arrived in Operating Area "N".
At 0727J the USS H. J. THOMAS (DDR-833) joined the formation.
At 1526J HMSS ANZAC was detached for fueling.
At 0600J the first flight was launched. A total of forty-eight (48) sorties were flown which included thirty-two (32) offensive and sixteen (16) defensive missions. Pilots attacked many different targets during the day. An area of camouflaged stores was hit and left burning. During an attack on buildings in a troop housing area, troops were observed running from two (2) buildings destroyed with bombs and rockets. Nine (9) small camouflaged boats (15-25 ft.) and five (5) revetted buildings were strafed.

Pilots reported destroying three (3) tractors, four (4) oxen, two (2) ox carts, and twenty (20) barrels of fuel. Two (2) railroad bridges were cut.

13 April 1953 -

At 0127J HMSS ANZAC rejoined the formation.
At 0605J HMCS Haida was detached for fueling.
At 1615J the USS H. J. THOMAS was detached to proceed on mission assigned.
At 1622J HMCS Haida rejoined the formation.
Marine pilots of VMF-312 flew forty-eight (48) sorties in excellent flying weather. Pilots reported destroying sixteen (16) houses and damaging seven (7) others in villages where troops were housed. Trenches were strafed and two (2) gun positions were also strafed and damaged. One (1) thirty (30) foot boat was reported damaged. In a shipyard area seven (7) buildings were damaged and boats were strafed. In an area just north of the CHONG CHON river, trucks were observed along a road and in revetments; pilots destroyed two (2) trucks and damaged seven (7).

At 1423J Captain Westrick NORRIS, O31361, USNR, made the 26,000th landing aboard the RATTAN. This event was celebrated with the traditional cake ceremony.

14 April 1953 -

Low overcasts and fog in the target area cancelled the first twelve (12) sorties of the day. As the weather improved in mid-morning, operations were continued and thirty-six (36) missions were flown.
Corsair pilots hit a boat storage area and destroyed seven (7) houses, and one (1) beached boat. Four (4) houses and one (1) boat were also damaged in this attack. Troops and villages were attacked with the following results: nine (9) buildings destroyed, eight (8) houses destroyed, ten (10) supply stacks left burning, and one (1) secondary explosion observed. Pilots reported starting fires in two (2) supply buildings.

At 1308 I Captain Leonard Leroy OER, J36655, USNR, landed his F4U at PAGONGYONG DO when hydraulic failure caused one wheel to stick in the up position. Captain OER was uninjured and the plane received only minor damage.

At 1600 I refueled the USS HIGEE alongside.

15 April 1953 -

Flight operations were limited to defensive sorties in compliance with an order received from CONSEVENTHFLT. In order to prevent any incidents from arising during the transfer and exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, offensive operations were ordered cancelled except under specific instructions as contained in this order. Sixteen (16) defensive sorties were launched.

At 0758 I the USS HIGEE was detached to proceed on mission assigned.

At 0810 I the USS ULVERT M. MOORE (DE-442) joined the formation for duty.

At 1505 I HMK ANZAC was detached for fueling.

16 April 1953 -

At 0118 I HMK ANZAC rejoined the formation.

At 1533 I the USS MOORE was detached for fueling.

VM3-12 Corsair pilots received a "well done" for twenty-four (24) close air support missions flown along the EIGHTH Army bomb-line. These sorties were conducted under the operational control of JOG Korea. Aircraft from Task Unit 95.1.1 were diverted to this operating area due to restrictions incident to the sick and wounded prisoner of war exchange convoy along the West Coast main supply route which borders CSS 95.1 normal operating area. Mosquito (TACP) planes reported the EIGHTH Checkered pilots inflicted the following damage on targets hit: four (4) gun positions destroyed, four (4) bunkers destroyed, one gun position damaged, two (2) direct hits with napalm on caves and bunkers, three (3) caves damaged, and 150 yards of trenches destroyed. Other trenches were also reported damaged.

17 April 1953 -

At 0117 I the USS ULVERT K. MOORE rejoined the formation.

At 1524 I HMK II.T.M. was detached for fueling.

Twenty-four (24) close air support missions were flown along the EIGHTH Army front. All reported damaged was assessed by mosquito (TACP) aircraft. Marine pilots damaged four (4) bunkers and seven (7) automatic weapons. Four (4) mortars were destroyed and two caves damaged. Two (2) large fires were started and 135 yards of trenches were destroyed.
18 April 1953

At 0059I the USS MOORE was detached for fueling.
At 0100I HMS HAIDA rejoined the formation.
At 0115I the USS COVELL was detached for fueling.
At 0145I the USS MOORE rejoined the formation.
At 1800I CTU 95.1.9 in HMS NEWCASTLE (CL-76) assumed duties of OTC West Coast of Korea.
At 1818I the USS COVELL rejoined the formation.
At 18391 the USS MOORE was detached to proceed on mission assigned.

Pilots of VM-312 were directed on target by radar bombing procedure when low clouds covered the bombline in the early morning. In late morning the target area cleared and pilots located three (3) enemy tankers: one (1) tank was destroyed and one (1) was damaged. Mosquito (TACF) planes reported four (4) automatic weapons damaged, ten (10) M1A 50cal, seventy-five (75) yards of trench damaged, and two (2) caves closed. The last flight of the day was directed against enemy gun positions which had fired on SOK-TO, a friendly island off the West Coast of Korea. Pilots reported one (1) gun position damaged, one (1) observation post bomb and strafed, and two (2) caves damaged in this attack, which was executed in the face of heavy automatic weapons fire. Two (2) returning planes had received many hits from these weapons. Bombing restrictions, imposed on this area by CONSEVENTHFLT for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoner of war convays, were lifted to permit suppression of these enemy guns.

19 April 1953

Operations against enemy gun positions threatening friendly held islands were continued. Thirty-four (34) offensive sorties were flown. Pilots reported strafing four (4) gun positions and damaging one (1) observation post. Troops in trenches and bunkers were strafed and bombed with several NKK reported KTL and WLA. One (1) command post received a direct rocket hit. Further damage included three (3) railroad cars destroyed and two (2) tractors damaged.

At 1630I HMS ANZAC was detached to proceed on mission assigned.
At 2100I the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY (CVL-62) assumed duties as CTU 95.1.1.
At 2327I the USS COVELL was detached to rendezvous with CTU 95.1.1 in HMS GLORY.

20 April 1953

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan, from Operating Area "W" in company with HMS HAIDA.
At 1030I conducted BOM window dropping exercise as authorized by CNO and CONSEVENTHFLT.
At 1730I moored to Yokos. fuel pier Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.
PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

a. The expenditure and performance of air ordnance for Harim Squadron VM-312 during this reporting period was as follows:

(1) Expenditure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>500% GP</th>
<th>500% SAP</th>
<th>260% FRAG</th>
<th>100% GP</th>
<th>5&quot; HVAR</th>
<th>5&quot; ATAR</th>
<th>350% DC</th>
<th>20MM Rds</th>
<th>50Cal. Rds</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>4,000</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>3,300</td>
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<tr>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/19</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29,800</td>
<td>42,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL WEIGHT OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 169.2

(2) Performance:
The performance of ordnance equipment and material is considered normal. With the exception of hung 5" HVAR's there were fewer malfunctions than during the last reporting period.

(a) Guns

1 20MM

9 Snubbed rounds
2 Failure to extract
1 Ammunition link separation
1 Broken extractor spring pin
2 Broken breech block lock
2 Broken firing pin
2 Charger lug override
3 Feeder mechanism stoppage
1 Faulty scar spring pin

2 .50 Caliber

2 Ammunition link separations
1 Receiver jam
1 Faulty charger

(b) Hung Rockets

1 5" HVAR

18 Faulty rocket Acre 1st launcher
8 Faulty igniter, Aero 14; launcher
1 Returned unplugged Aero 14; launcher
3 Faulty rocket MK 9 launcher
2 Faulty igniter MK 9 launcher
6 Electrical system failure in aircraft

(c) Dud Bombs
1 500# GP
2 Undetermined (arming wires returned)
1 Faulty tail arming solenoid

(d) Dud Napalm
1 Pilot failed to arm
1 Undetermined (arming wires returned)

b. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA Practice

(1) 40MM Cartridge (A1):
A total of 481 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises.

c. Performance of ship's ordnance and material

(1) The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major material casualties occurred during this period.

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

a. Own battle damage

(1) Surface:
None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

(2) Air:
For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report, submitted for this period.

b. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy

(1) Surface:
Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of Task Unit 951.1 during this period.

(2) Air:
For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of damage is as follows:
PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

a. Performance

(1) Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. The average on board count of enlisted personnel was 161L The number of officers was 73. The total number of Squadron VM-312 personnel, officers and men was 196.

(2) Personnel were again exchanged with HNS GLORY. Eleven (11) enlisted men from GLORY came aboard and observed operations aboard the BATLION.

(3) In anticipation of BATLION's return to U.S., efforts are being made to obtain housing in San Diego for the married men. A large percentage of the men have already forwarded requests.

b. Recreation

(1) The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period:

(a) A daily newspaper, the BATLION NEWS was distributed to ship's
company; and to ships in the formation on all guard mail exchanges.

(b) Radio broadcasts were piped to KBO's throughout the ship.

(c) The "Bataan Broadcasting Company" (BBC) provided daily newscasts and recordings.

(d) The crew's library was open each evening until taps.

(e) Sightseeing tours were conducted to points of interest in the Sasebo area during the in-port period.

(f) Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO mess.

(g) There were two (2) picnics held during the in-port period.

(h) Several fishing trips were made to the IWOJUO (99) Islands. This was the first period in port when the weather was warm enough to make these trips desirable.

c. Legal

(1) There was an increase in disciplinary action necessary with the awarding of five (5) Summary Courts-Martial and two (2) Special Courts-Martial. Six of these were for AOL. The increase in AOL's might possibly be attributed to the change in Sasebo Instructions which now does not permit overnight liberty to 3rd Class Petty Officers and below. During the last Far East cruise of BATHAN overnight liberty was permitted for 5% of the crew regardless of rate.

d. Divine Services

(1) Sunday Services:

(a) Two Catholic masses each Sunday at 0645 and 1600

(b) General Divine Services each Sunday

(c) Church of Christ held services each Sunday under the direction of a lay member.

(2) Daily Services:

(a) Catholic Mass each day at 1600

(b) Rosary recited before and after Mass

(c) Confessions heard before Mass and on Saturday evening

(d) Morning prayers over the ship's P.A.
(e) Bible classes held three (3) times weekly in the crew's library at 1930.

(3) Services on escorting vessels:

(a) The ship's chaplain conducted Sunday services on escorting vessels in the formation.

e. Casualties:
See PARt VI paragraph f of Medical Report.

PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Air Department

(1) On 13 April, 1953, a FJU-4B, BuNo 81008 being flown aboard for delivery to VM-312 failed to engage a cross deck pendant due to a faulty tail hook dash pot. This barrier crash was the first crash occurring on board BATAAN since VM-312 came aboard in February. A total of 1065 FJU landings without a barrier crash had been made up to this time. It is to be noted that the pilot was not attached to VM-312. Numbers 2, 3, and 4 barriers were engaged resulting in damage to both wings of the plane and to both cables of number 2 barrier. Subsequent inspection disclosed the following conditions which are believed to be contributing factors to the accident:

(a) No fluid in tail hook dash pot.
(b) Aircraft equipped with pneumatic tail wheel.
(c) Pressure less than 100 PSI in landing gear tires.

Recommendation:
Planes should be inspected by the delivering unit prior to being flown aboard to insure compliance with ComAirPac General Technical Bulletin No. 15 regarding servicing and inspection of tail hook dash pots. In addition, it is recommended that FJU's being delivered to carriers be equipped with solid rubber tail wheels and that the main landing gear tires be inflated to 160 PSI.

(2) On 17 April a FJU-4, BuNo 62916 engaged No. 8 cross deck pendant and then engaged Number 2 and Number 3 barriers. Although the top cable on both barriers required replacement the plane received only minor damage. VM-312 pilots had completed 1203 landings without a barrier crash up to this time.

(3) During this operating period 81,977 gallons of gasoline and 1,194 gallons of lubricating oil were used.

(4) On 13 April the forward gasoline pump failed to deliver gasoline to the flight deck. This loss in pressure was attended by pump chatter. Inspection showed the gravity tank provided sufficient hydrostatic head. The
voids around the tank were aired for about 2½ hours and a man sent in with
an air hose on a gas mask and gagged down the port float valve. A test of the
pump then showed normal operation. Apparently, for some unknown reason, both
float valves were stuck in the closed position. During the next in-port period
the starboard float valve was also gagged open. Further investigation cannot
be made until the tank is entered.

b. Engineering Department

(1) Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment:

(a) There were no engineering casualties to the main propulsion plant, auxiliaries or electrical equipment during the operation.

(2) Electronics:

(a) The operation of electronics equipment was generally good
with no major failures.

(b) In addition to routine maintenance the following repairs and
changes were accomplished by ship's force:

1. YE-1 Radar Beacons:
   Keying relay K-103 failed to key equipment properly. Re-
   placed K-103 and returned equipment to normal operation.

2. TDE Radio Transmitter:
   Flexible coupling for power amplifier tuning coil broke
   and prevented tuning transmitter. Ship's force fabricated and installed new
   flexible coupling to return equipment to normal operation.

3. AN/SPS-6B Radar:
   Modification of the Sensitivity Time Control (STC) circuit
to extend maximum STC action to 40 miles range was completed in accordance with
COMAIRPAC ltr ser 73/6620 of 26 March 1953. R-2035, 10,000 ohm resistor, was
changed to 100,000 ohms; C-2029, 56 microfarad capacitor was changed to
100 microfarads. Tests on close-in land targets and on window dropped
from aircraft in active ECM exercises revealed a slight improvement in PPI
scope presentation.

c. Gunnery Department

(1) No gunnery exercises were held in transit to or from the operating
area due to an ECM window dropping exercise conducted while enroute to base
and qualification landings for new pilots while enroute to the operating area.

(2) Several star shell gunnery practices were conducted during the
"on the line" period. The 481 rounds of 40MM AA ammo mentioned in PART III,
b, (1), were expended during these practices.
During the in-port period the following ammunition and ammunition components were loaded aboard as replenishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500# Bomb GP</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# Bomb GP</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 Inch Rocket Heads</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00 Inch Rocket Motors</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze Nose, AN-M101.1</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze Tail, AN-M101.2</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze M-57-W/Burster</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze Tail, AN-M101.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuze Nose Rocket, MK 114</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primer Det., M15, .01 Sec. Delay</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primer Det., M15, .025 Sec. Delay</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arming Wires, M1, single</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igniters, M15, WP</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igniters, M16, WP</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Tanks, F51</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total time required for loading and stowing — 6 hours

Total working party - 183 men

d. Operations Department

(1) Air Operations

Comment:
Offensive sorties were cancelled on 15 April, 1953 due to the movement of sick and wounded POW exchange convoys. On 16 April, 1953 offensive sorties were resumed and close air support was provided along the bomb-line. Aircraft were under positive control of mosquito aircraft.

(a) Air Intelligence

Comment:
The increased activity of small boats and reports of numerous boats being beached on the mud flats adjacent to enemy territory was the source of considerable concern during this patrol. Normally, boats beached on enemy territory are subject to attacks. Due to the extreme area of the mud flats in this case, the decision to attack those boats was withheld until clarification was received. The following dispatches are believed to be self-explanatory:

Confidential Naval Dispatch 181325Z from BATH: PASS TO CCRK X COASTAL RECONNAISSANCE APPROX 181530I REVEALED MANY BOLTS ON MUD YB 6083 X PEOPLE APPARENTLY DIGGING CLAMS X BS 3779 TWO BEACHED BOATS X BS 3861 TWO BEACHED BOATS X BS 3781 LARGE BEACHED BOLT WITH NIT X REQUEST EVALUATION BOLTS AND ACTIVITY THIS AREA.
Confidential Naval Dispatch 1901502 from CERAK: CITE NLO 295 X YOUR 1813252 X ALL BOATS FRIENDLY

Recommendation:
Further clarification of restrictions and attack instructions concerning beached boats should be included in current directives.

(2) Communications

(a) Radio:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total messages handled</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unclassified and visual</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total classified messages</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of coded groups handled</td>
<td>75,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Post Office Transactions:

1. Received:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class pouches</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class letters</td>
<td>9,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel Post bags</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered articles</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Dispatched:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class pouches</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mail and first class letters</td>
<td>4,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcel Post bags</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered articles</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Finances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stamp sales</td>
<td>$150.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp purchases</td>
<td>$73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money orders</td>
<td>220 issued for a total of $19,032.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Aerology:

A weak wedge of high pressure dominated the weather during the period 12 April through 19 April. Uniformly good flying weather, with clear skies and better than average visibility prevailed except for considerable coastal fog on 14 April and again on 19 April when the high pressure wedge moved across Korea and southerly winds prevailed over the Yellow Sea.
c. Supply Department

(1) Aviation Stores:
   (a) ACOG Requests:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT ON ALLOWANCE</th>
<th>MIS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (b) One aircraft was ACOG because of three items; two wind-
        shield side panes stock numbers R 82-CV2S-49264-L-R and -L and one vacuum
        pump stock number R 86-PE-3P19F4.

(2) Commissary:

   (a) Replenishment of provisions in Sasebo was effected by the
        USS HEROPI (AF-38), USS YANCY (AKL-93), and USS ALSTEDE (AF-48). Sixty-six
        (66) line items were requested of which forty-four (44) were supplied, a
        percentage of 67.

(3) General Stores:

   (a) Replenishment of general stores in Sasebo was effected by the
        USS TPNB-24. One hundred sixty-five (165) line items were requested of
        which one hundred five (105) were supplied, a percentage of 63.

(4) BuShips Electronics:

   (a) Replenishment of BuShips electronics material was effected
        by the USS PROTON (AK-28). Seventy-one (71) line items were requested of
        which fifty-two (52) were supplied, a percentage of 73.

(5) Ship's Store and Clothing and Small Stores:

   (a) Replenishment of ship's stores items was effected by the
        USS YANCY (AKL-93). Forty-two (42) line items were requested of which twenty-
        three (23) were supplied, a percentage of 55.

   (b) Replenishment of clothing and small stores was effected by
        the USS YANCY. Eighteen (18) line items were requested of which thirteen (13)
        items were supplied, a percentage of 73.

f. Medical Department

(1) There has been no shortage of medical supplies over the period
    covered by this report.

(2) The Medical Department has been at full strength for this re-
    porting period.
(3) Medical evaluation of Ship’s Company and Air Group: There were no epidemics or illnesses during this operational period.

(4) Medical statistics summary, Air Group and Ship’s Company:

(a) Admitted to sick list

(b) Total sick days out of possible 11,750 work days

(c) Officers admitted to the sick list

(d) Total patient visits to sick call

(e) Total medical treatments

(f) Patients transferred to the hospital

(g) Number of minor injuries treated

(h) Minor surgery procedures

(i) Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis

1 GC

2 Chancroid

3 Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure

(5) There were no planes lost and no casualties during this period.

(6) Pilot availability:

(a) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons

(b) Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation

(c) Total days all grounded pilots

(d) Pilot availability

PART VII - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Planes should be inspected by the delivering unit prior to being flown aboard to insure compliance with ComAirPac General Technical Bulletin No. 15 regarding servicing and inspection of tail hook dash pots. In addition, it is recommended that FhU’s being delivered to carriers be equipped with solid rubber tail wheels and that the main landing gear tires be inflated to 160 PSI. (PART VI, a, Air Department).

b. Further clarification of current directives should be made in regard
to distinction between boats beached on enemy territory and boats beached in
and flats adjacent to enemy territory. (PART VI, d, (1), Air Intelligence).

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (Advance) (2)
CINC PAC (advance) (2)
COMMVEE (advance) (1)
CG, FMFPAC
CG, DIR FMFPAC
CTF 95
CTF 77
CTG 95.1
CINC PAC EVALUATION GROUP
COMMVEE EVALUATION GROUP
COMAIRPAC (5)
CONSEVPAC
COMAIRJAP
COMFAIRMAI
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMAIRDIV 5
COMAIRDIV 17
USS MENDOA (CVE-114)
USS RAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS SADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
CG, VIA-312
CG, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 27 April through 6 May 1953

Ref: (a) Article 0705 U.S. Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3400.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3400.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In compliance with references (a) through (d), the Action Report for the period 27 April through 6 May 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. During the period 27 April through 5 May 1953, the USS BATAAN (CVL-29), under the command of Captain S. S. MILLER, 61459/1310, USN, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95 under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

b. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN, was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100I 27 April until 2100I 5 May 1953, at which time command of the Task Unit shifted to the Commanding Officer, USS GLORY (CL-62). The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN, was OTC West Coast of Korea from 2100I 27 April until 2100I 5 May 1953, at which time the Commanding Officer, USS BIRMINGHAM (CL-19) assumed duties as OTC West Coast of Korea.

c. During this operating period, ships of TU 95.1.1 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "N" in the vicinity of Lat. 37°-30'N and Long. 126°-30'E. Each day one destroyer of the Task Unit was ordered to join TU 95.1.2 to patrol the friendly islands south of Haeju and off the West Coast of Korea. Ships were detached in the late forenoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker anchored in the vicinity of Taechong-Go.

d. Enemy surface forces or action:
No enemy surface forces were encountered by this Task Unit, therefore no action is related.
During this operating period, VIA-312 aircraft (FUO) flew Combat Air Patrol, Target Combat Air Patrol, Armed Reconnaissance, Pre-Briefed Strikes and Close Air Support missions as illustrated by a typical schedule, enclosure (i).

The statistics for this reporting period are broken down into two sections due to the end of the month falling within the reporting period.

**STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS**

27 April through 30 April 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>ARMED RECO</th>
<th>TARCAP</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>PRE-BRIEFED STRIKES</th>
<th>CLOSE AIR SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4/29</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of flights scheduled
No. of combat sorties flown
No. of flights cancelled due to weather
No. of flights cancelled due to non-availability of A/C
No. of offensive sorties flown
No. of defensive sorties flown
No. of carrier landings made
No. of catapult shots made
No. of barrier crashes
No. of planes lost
No. of planes damaged
Total combat hours flown
Average length of sortie
Average pilots assigned
Average pilots available to fly
Average daily hours flown per pilot
Average aircraft assigned
Average aircraft on board
Average daily availability of aircraft
Percent aircraft availability

1 May through 5 May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>ARMED RECO</th>
<th>TARCAP</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>PRE-BRIEFED STRIKES</th>
<th>CLOSE AIR SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The mission of the Task Unit is contained in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

27 April 1953 -

Enroute to Operating Area "N" from Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 250326Z of April 1953, in company with HMCS HAIDA (DDE-215).

At 1230I ECM exercises (window dropping) scheduled for this time were cancelled due to low ceilings.

At 1320I recovered two (2) aircraft from Itazuke AFB.

At 1549I HMCS HAIDA was ordered alongside for transfer of freight, mail and personnel.

At 2100I Captain S.S. MILLER, 6H59/1310, USN, Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL-29) assumed duties as OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1.

At 2152I the USS THOMAS (DDR-833) and the USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743) joined the formation for duty.

28 April 1953 -

At 0130I the USS BATAAN in company with HMCS HAIDA, the USS THOMAS and the USS SOUTHERLAND arrived in Operating Area "N".

At 0605I HMCS HAIDA was detached to proceed on mission assigned.
At 0915 I HIS CONSORT (DD-76) joined the formation for duty.

At 1130 I the USS THOMAS was detached for fueling and to proceed on mission assigned. No flight operations were conducted this date due to heavy fog throughout the Operating Area.

29 April 1953 -

At 1127 I LCS ATHABASKAN (DDE-219) joined the formation for duty.

At 1152 I the USS THOMAS rejoined the formation. At 1233 I the USS SOUTHERLAND was detached for fueling and to proceed on mission assigned.

No flight operations were conducted this date due to fog and rain.

30 April 1953 -

At 1024 I the USS SOUTHERLAND rejoined the formation.

At 1119 I HIS CONSORT was detached to proceed on assigned patrol and to refuel.

Forty-eight (48) sorties were launched as the weather cleared and permitted the first flight operations in two (2) days. Thirty-two (32) offensive missions were flown. Two (2) morning flights were diverted to aid partisan troops under fire from mortar positions. Pilots bombed and strafed troops in trenches; observation posts and mortar positions were also hit in these strikes. Two (2) strikes conducted against supply stores in villages resulted in seventeen (17) buildings destroyed and eight (8) damaged. Two (2) road bridges and one (1) pumping station were reported damaged. VMA-312 pilots destroyed one (1) tractor and one (1) automatic weapons position. Three (3) enemy troops were killed in this attack. Two (2) barrier crashes occurred with no injuries to either pilots involved. One (1) plane suffered minor "D" damage; one (1) received class "C" damage.

1 May 1953 -

At 1128 I HIS CONSORT rejoined the formation.

At 1154 I LCS ATHABASKAN was detached to proceed on assigned patrol and to refuel.

Pilots of Marine Squadron 312 attacked a variety of targets during the day's operations. Forty-six (46) sorties were launched with thirty-two (32) offensive missions being flown. Troops in villages, caves, trenches, and bomb shelters were attacked with an undetermined number of casualties being inflicted, however, the following damage was reported on these attacks: Eleven (11) houses were destroyed and ten (10) were left burning. Four (4) caves were closed and two (2) secondary explosions observed. Gun emplacements were bombed and rocketed with two (2) reported destroyed. Attacks made upon supplies in villages resulted in seven (7) buildings destroyed and three (3) damaged. Further damage included two (2) tractors and two (2) large buildings destroyed. One field piece was reported destroyed and two (2) beached boats were damaged.
2 May 1953 -

At 1215I the USS THOMAS was detached to proceed on assigned patrol and to refuel.

At 1225I HSCS ATHABASKAN rejoined the formation. Thirty-two (32) offensive and fourteen (14) defensive sorties were launched. Marine pilots of VM-312 struck hard at enemy troops and gun positions causing heavy damage to the communists. Troops and stores in villages were rocketed and bombed; three (3) villages were left burning and six (6) buildings were destroyed. Four (4) revetted buildings were destroyed, and three (3) damaged. Two (2) gun positions were n ePub and rocketed with pilots reporting fifty (50) troops killed. In addition, three (3) gun positions were heavily damaged. One afternoon flight which furnished support for members of the First Partisan Infantry Regiment destroyed nine (9) houses where troops were lodged. One pump house was reported damaged.

At 1413I Major Grover R. BETZER, 03728, USMC, was shot down twenty-five (25) miles southeast of Haeju. Major BETZER’s plane was seen to crash in a dive and pilots reported there was no chance for survival. Captain Walter R. CLINTON, 03600T, USMC, wingman on the flight, was also hit and suffered minor injuries. He was hospitalized upon his arrival at K-11.

The squadron suffered further loss with Captain Lee Edward HOILAY, 03719, USMC, another member of this same flight, ground looped on take-off from K-11 causing major damage to the aircraft and minor injuries to the pilot.

3 May 1953 -

At 1030I the USS THOMAS rejoined the formation.

At 1155I the USS SOUTHERLAND was detached to proceed on assigned patrol and to refuel.

For the second consecutive day BATTAL I Marine pilots were shot down as a result of increasing enemy ground fire. At 0830I Captain Lyle V. TOPF, 03859, USMC, was hit by enemy ground fire fifteen (15) miles south of Ch’o-do and forced to ditch his aircraft. Captain TOPF was picked up by a helicopter from Paengnyong-do at 0831I. Captain TOPF suffered minor injuries. The aircraft sunk after the ditching.

At 1210I Major Terus E. ARCHER, 027518, USMC, was shot down by enemy AA (37mm) twenty (20) miles southeast of Haeju. Major ARCHER crash-landed on a tide flat and was picked up by a helicopter from K-11. Major ARCHER’s flight destroyed the plane with napalm and rockets. The pilot suffered minor injuries.

Twenty-eight (28) offensive and sixteen (16) defensive sorties were flown. The primary target was troops in villages. Pilots reported ten (10) enemy troops killed in action and nine (9) buildings destroyed. Two (2) gun positions were damaged and three (3) boats destroyed. On these attacks upon troops in villages pilots reported extremely effective results were obtained by dropping napalm and fragmentation bombs with D/C fusing. The fragmentation bombs spread the napalm over large areas.

4 May 1953 -

At 1215I the USS SOUTHERLAND rejoined the formation.

At 1231I HMS CONSORT was detached to proceed on
assigned patrol and to refuel.

VM-312 pilots flew thirty-four (34) sorties and inflicted the following damage on enemy forces: Thirty-two (32) buildings were destroyed and four (4) houses were damaged. A mess hall was attacked and damaged. Two (2) 20MM gun positions were damaged. In addition two (2) AA positions were reported burned out with napalm and rockets in the course of an attack on troop billeting areas.

5 May 1953 -

At 0858 IHS CONSORT rejoined the formation. At 1027 I the USS THOMAS was detached to proceed on assigned patrol and to refuel.

Low clouds and fog at sea delayed operations until 1100 I and cancelled flight operations at 1530 I. Only eighteen (18) sorties were flown with sixteen (16) being cancelled due to fog. Three (3) 105MM gun positions were bombed and rocketed. One (1) supply area was damaged and four (4) supply buildings were destroyed. Pilots napalmed and rocketed IVA VIP's in response to a strike request from the First Partisan Infantry Regiment.

At 1530 I six (6) aircraft were diverted to land at K-6 due to fog conditions at the ship.

At 1627 I the USS BATAAN in company with IHS CONSORT and the USS SOUTHERLAND began steaming enroute to Sasebo, Japan, from Operating Area "W".

At 2000 I the USS SOUTHERLAND was detached to rendezvous with IHS GLORY (CVL-62).

At 2100 I the Commanding Officer, IHS BATAAN assumed duties as OTC West Coast of Korea and CTU 95.1.1, was shifted to the Commanding Officer, IHS GLORY.

6 May 1953 -

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan, from Operating Area "N" in company with IHS CONSORT.

At 0810 I recovered six (6) aircraft from K-6.

At 1201 I anchored in Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.

At 1257 I the USS BATAAN chopped to CONRAFPE in preparation for transit to CONUS.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

a. The expenditure and performance of air ordnance for Marine Squadron VM-312 during this reporting period was as follows:

(1) Expenditure from 28 April through 30 April 1953

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>500#</th>
<th>500#</th>
<th>100#</th>
<th>HAPALM</th>
<th>5&quot; HVAR</th>
<th>20MM</th>
<th>50ICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4/28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/29</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5400</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 26.0

(2) Expenditure from 1 May through 5 May 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1000#/</th>
<th>500#/</th>
<th>250#/</th>
<th>100#/</th>
<th>260#/</th>
<th>NAPALM</th>
<th>HVAR</th>
<th>20MM</th>
<th>50Cal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>30,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 112.0

b. Performance:
   The performance of ordnance equipment and material is considered normal.

Report of Ordnance Malfunctioning 28 April through 30 April 1953

(1) Guns
   (a) 20MM
       3 Snubbed rounds
       1 Charger lug override
       1 Faulty solenoid

(2) Hand Rockets
   (a) 5" HVAR
       2 Faulty rocket Aero L/A launcher

(3) Dud Bombs
   (a) 500#/ GP
       1 Undetermined (arming wires returned)

Report of Ordnance Malfunctioning 1 May through 5 May

(1) Guns
   (a) 20 MM
       3 Snubbed rounds
       3 Charger lug override
       1 Faulty sear
       1 Faulty charger valve
       1 Broken breech block lock
TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 26.0

(2) Expenditure from 1 May through 5 May 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1000#/</th>
<th>500#/</th>
<th>250#/</th>
<th>100#/</th>
<th>260#/</th>
<th>NAPALM</th>
<th>HVAR</th>
<th>2012#:</th>
<th>500Cal.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>FRAG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>5/3</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>30,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL WEIGHT OF ALL ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN TONS 112.0

b. Performance:

The performance of ordnance equipment and material is considered normal.

Report of Ordnance Malfunctioning 28 April through 30 April 1953

(1) Guns

(a) 20MM

3 Snubbed rounds
1 Charger lug override
1 Faulty solenoid

(2) Hang Rockets

(a) 5" HVAR

2 Faulty rocket Aero 1/4A launcher

(3) Dud Bombs

(a) 500#/ GP

1 Undetermined (arming wires returned)

Report of Ordnance Malfunctioning 1 May through 5 May

(1) Guns

(a) 20 MM

3 Snubbed rounds
3 Charger lug override
1 Faulty sear
1 Faulty charger valve
1 Broken breech block lock
(b) .50 Caliber

1 Faulty charger
1 Link chute stoppage
1 Failure to extract

(2) Hung Rockets

(a) 5" HVAR

3 Faulty rocket ACRO 14A launcher
3 Faulty rocket MK. 9 launcher
2 Cut pigtail MK. 9 launcher

c. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA practice

(1) 40MM Cartridge (AA):
A total of 350 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises during dawn alerts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Performance of ship's ordnance and material

(1) The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major material casualties occurred during this period.

**PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE**

a. Own Battle Damage

(1) Surface:
None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

(2) Air:
For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report, submitted for this period.

b. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

(1) Surface:
Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of JV 35.1.1 during this period.

(2) Air:
For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of reported damage is as follows:
(a) Period 28 April through 30 April 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumping Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Period 1 May through 5 May 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>REPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revetted Buildings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Explosions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Pieces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

a. Performance

(1) Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. The following on board count is listed for this period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ships Company</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Squadron VMA-312</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Eleven (11) enlisted men from HMS GLORY (CVL-62) came aboard and observed operations aboard the BATAAN.

(3) There has been little activity as far as the transfer of personnel is concerned. Many orders are coming through for transfers to be effected on our return to COMJS. Ten (10) firemen and fifteen airmen have been ordered to report to the ship shortly after we arrive in San Diego.

(i) Tests have been ordered and men are being processed in preparation for the advancement in rating examinations to be held in August 1953.
b. Legal:
There have been ten (10) Captain's Masts which have resulted in the awarding of four (4) Courts-Martial. There has been some increase in the number of requests for legal information pertaining to domestic troubles.

c. Recreation

(1) The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period:

(a) A daily newspaper, the BATAAN NEWS was distributed to ship's company, and to the ships in the formation on all guard rail exchanges.

(b) Radio broadcasts were piped to REO's throughout the ship.

(c) The "Bataan Broadcasting Company" (BBC) provided daily newscasts and recordings.

(d) The crew's library was open each evening until taps.

(e) Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO mess.

(f) Bingo games were held in the crew's mess hall; all proceeds over the cost of prizes given is to be contributed to the Damon Runyon Cancer Fund.

d. Divine Services

(1) Sunday Services:

(a) Catholic Mass was held aboard the BATAAN at 1600.

(b) Catholic Mass was held aboard the HMCS ATHABASCAN at 0800 and aboard the USS SOUTHERLAND at 1000 by the BATAAN's chaplain.

(c) A Protestant chaplain from HMCS ATHABASCAN was aboard the BATAAN for services at 0815. Exchange of chaplains was by helicopter.

(d) Church of Christ services were conducted by a lay member at 1600.

(2) Daily Services:

(a) Catholic Mass each day at 1600.

(b) Rosary recited before and after Mass.

(c) Confessions heard before Mass and on Saturday evening.

(d) Morning prayers over the ship's F.A.

(e) Bible classes held six (6) times in the crew's library at 1830.
PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Air Department

(1) Catapults and Arresting Gear:
There were three barrier engagements: two (2) occurred on 30 April and one (1) on 1 May. The only casualty to the barriers was the replacement of two (2) cables on number two (2) barrier. A tail hook assembly failure, a bouncing tail hook and one late cross deck pendant engagement were the causes for the crashes.
No casualties or maintenance problems were experienced with the catapult machinery.

(2) Aviation Gasoline and Lubricating Oil:
During this operating period, the following amounts of aviation gasoline and lubrication oil were expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Gas</td>
<td>60,142 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubrication Oil</td>
<td>880 gals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Engineering Department

(1) Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment

(a) During the operation a casualty occurred to number eight (8) forced draft blower. Although maximum power available was affected, flight operations were not interrupted. The top bearing on number eight (8) blower overheated requiring the blower to be slowed, air pressure was maintained by speeding up number seven (7) and nine (9) blowers. The bearing was found to be wiped and was replaced by a bearing from ship's spares.

(b) Minor repairs and upkeep were accomplished in a routine manner.

(2) Electronics:
Electronics performance was good during this period except for the YE-1 Sector Coded Naming Beacon which experienced erratic antenna rotation and faulty keying. These difficulties were corrected by fuse and contact replacements.

c. Gunnery Department

(1) No gunnery exercises were held in transit to or from the operating area due to an ECM window dropping exercise being scheduled enroute to the operating area, the necessity for arriving in Casaboa early on the return trip in order to meet the ship's employment schedule. Gunnery exercises are scheduled for Area "L" enroute from Casaboa to Yokosuka, Japan. This exercise was cancelled due to weather.

(2) Three (3) star shell gunnery practices were conducted during this period. The 350 rounds of 40mm AA ammou mentioned in PART III, c, (1) were expended during these practices. Firing showed marked improvement and on the last firing day, 4th, one burst hit the star shell.
d. Operations Department

(1) Communications

(a) Radio:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total messages handled</td>
<td>1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unclassified and visual</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total classified messages</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coded groups handled</td>
<td>59,404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Post Office Transactions from 27 April through 30 April 1953

1 Received:

- Air Mail and first class pouches: 1
- Air Mail and first class letters: 650
- Parcel Post bags: 5
- Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 25
- Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 5
- Newspapers: 75
- Registered articles: —

2 Dispatched:

- Air Mail and first class pouches: 3
- Air Mail and first class letters: 2,017
- Parcel Post bags: —
- Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 18
- Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 22
- Registered articles: 24

2 Finances:

- Stamp sales: 28.17
- Stamp purchases: —
- Money orders - 17 issued for a total of 213.49

(c) Post Office Transactions from 1 May through 6 May 1953

1 Received:

- Air Mail and first class pouches: 9
- Air Mail and first class letters: 4,650
- Parcel Post bags: 29
- Packages (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 160
- Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post): 117
- Newspapers: 200
- Registered articles: 40

2 Dispatched: 12
Air Mail and first class pouches 5
Air Mail and first class letters 3,413
Parcel Post bags 4
Packets (Air Mail and Parcel Post) 125
Flats (Air Mail and Parcel Post) 42
Registered articles 60

2 Finances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stamp sales</td>
<td>360.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp purchases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money orders</td>
<td>100 issued for a total of 6,159.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Aerology:
Widespread advective fog which had formed over the northern Yellow Sea on 26 April prevailed until the passage of a weak cold front on the morning of 29 April. Light to moderate rain showers and rapid clearing accompanied the frontal passage at sea while the target area remained overcast with low stratiform clouds until early in the morning of 30 April. Average to good flying conditions with some haze and variable high cloudiness was experienced until 4 May when the southerly winds in the western sector of a high pressure cell again started the formation of advective fog, which became quite dense and widespread by the afternoon of 5 May.

c. Supply Department

(1) Aviation Stores:
The continued non-availability of direct AVS replenishment of aviation stores resulted on one AOG aircraft, F2U (BuNo. 97313) for lack of replacement propeller.

During the latter part of the previous operating period the entire allowance of five (5) propellers (recently increased by the ship from three) was issued. Upon arrival Sasebo at the close of that period it was learned from COMFTRWJAP Staff, Yokosuka that it would not be possible to obtain the propellers necessary to fill allowance using a priority "B" and since there were no aircraft AOG at that time, the designation of a priority "A" would not be justified.

The above mentioned AOG was relieved by the receipt of two (2) propellers via COD from MAG 12.

Recommendation:
That consideration be given to direct AVS replenishment on a regular schedule.

(2) Commissary:
Replenishment of provisions in Sasebo was effected by the USS YANCEY (AKA-93), USS DPHDA (AKA-59), and the USS ALSTORF (AF-48). Eighty-one (81) line items were requested of which sixty-five (65) were supplied, a percentage of 80.

(3) General Stores:
Replenishment of general stores in Sasebo was effected by the USS
Eighty-three (83) line items were requested of which fifty-nine (59) were supplied, a percentage of 71.

(4) BuShips Electronics:
Replenishment of BuShips electronics material in Sasebo was effected by the USS ELECTRON (AKS-27). Forty-four (44) line items were requested of which twenty-three (23) were supplied, a percentage of 52.

(5) Ship's Store and Clothing and Small Stores

(a) Replenishment of ship's store items in Sasebo was effected by the USS DEPUDA (AKA-59) and the USS YANCEY (AKA-93). Twenty-two (22) line items were requested of which ten (10) were supplied, a percentage of 45.

(b) Replenishment of clothing and small stores was effected by the USS DEPUDA (AKA-59) and the USS YANCEY (AKA-93). Twenty-two (22) line items were requested of which eighteen (18) were supplied, a percentage of 82.

f. Medical Department

(1) There has been no shortage of medical supplied over the period covered by this report.

(2) The Medical Department has been at full strength for this reporting period.

(3) Medical evaluation of Ship's Company and Air Group:
There were no epidemics or illnesses during this operational period.

(4) Medical Statistics Summary, Ship's Company and Air Group for the period 27 April through 5 May 1953:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admitted to the sick list</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sick days out of a possible 11,394 work days</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers admitted to the sick list</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total patients visits to sick call</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total medical treatments</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients transferred to the hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of minor injuries treated</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of minor surgery procedures</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chancroid</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) There were four (4) planes lost during this period. Three (3) were hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire, one of which crashed straight into the ground and burned, killing the pilot. In the other two (2) cases the pilots ditched their aircraft and were rescued by helicopter. One (1) plane was lost after the pilot ground looped on take-off from a friendly air field. All three (3) of
these pilots suffered multiple abrasions and lacerations but no serious injury. They were grounded for three days. The proper use of safety equipment prevented more serious injury and worked satisfactorily in all cases.

(6) Pilot Availability:

(a) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 7
(b) Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation 0
(c) Total days all pilots grounded 15
(d) Pilot availability 92.7%

PART VII - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That consideration be given to direct AVS replenishment on a regular schedule basis. (PART VI, e, (1) Supply Department).

S. S. MILLER

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (advance) (2)
CHICPACFLT (advance) (2)
CONNAVFLY (advance) (1)
CG, PFPAC
CG, HIR PFPAC
CTF 95
CTF 77
CTG 95-1
CHICPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
CONNAVEE EVALUATION GROUP
COMAIRPAC (5)
CONNAVFLY
CONAIRJAP
CONAIRHAWII
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
CONCANDY 15
CONCANDY 17
USS KENDOVA (CVE-114)
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS BALAOING STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
CO, VI-312
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
## AIR OPERATIONS SCHEDULE

**3 May 1953**

### EVENT | LAUNCH | LAND | A/C | MISSION | AMMO | REMARKS
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
A1 | 0515 | 0735 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
A2 | 0515 | 0735 | 4 | STRIKE | Note B |  
B3 | 0730 | 0930 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
B4 | 0730 | 0930 | 4 | TARGAP | Note B (2 A/C) |  
D7 | 1115 | 1335 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
D8 | 1115 | 1335 | 4 | HAIN HOCO | Note B (2 A/C) |  
E9 | 1330 | 1525 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
E10 | 1330 | 1525 | 4 | STRIKE | Note B (2 A/C) |  
F11 | 1520 | 1715 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
F12 | 1520 | 1715 | 4 | STRIKE | Note F |  
G13 | 1710 | 1900 | 2 | CAP | Note A |  
G14 | 1710 | 1900 | 4 | STRIKE | Note C |  

### NOTES:
1. Fuel - all A/C full internal plus 100 gal. in belly tank.

### TARGETS:
2. Troops in village, XC 7416
3. Troops in village, XC 6640
4. Troops in village, BS 4492
5. Camouflaged trucks, BS 4687
6. Supplies, XC 8896
7. Sluice Gates, YB 6096
8. Road Bridge, XC 1601

### AMMO:
A. All A/C full MG Ammo
B. 1 Napalm, 8 HVAR
C. 1 500# GP inst/.01, 6 100#/ GP inst/.01
D. 1 500# GP DC/MD, 4 260#/ Frag. DC/MD
E. 1 500#/ GP inst/MD, 6 100#/ GP inst/MD
F. 1 Tiny Tim, 4 HVAR

**A/C Weight**

- 13,800
- 15,620
- 15,015
- 15,385
- 15,015
- 15,510

**Approved:**

[Signature]

**Submitted:**

[Signature]

**Enclosure (1)**