From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1  
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951  

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations  
(b) OPNAV INST 3480.4  
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1  
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised)  
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51  

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule  
(2) Chart showing area of operations  
(3) USS BADOENG STRAIT ltr serial 1341 of 20 November 1951  

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during this period.

2. The report is divided into 6 parts, as listed below:

- Part I General Narrative.  
- Part II Chronological order of events.  
- Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.  
- Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.  
- Part V Personnel performance and casualties.  
- Part VI Comments and recommendations.

Part I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951, the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) under the command of Captain Roy L. JOHNSON, 62606/1310, USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. GRAY, 06207/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer, operated as a
of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

(1) The Commanding Officer, USS BADOENG STRAIT, was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 17 December to 2130 29 December 1951, at which time the Command of the Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMIS SINDY (CVE-17). During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of three destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct air operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), and to render search and rescue assistance as required.

(2) The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in enemy-held North Korea. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element, when directed, or as targets of opportunity.

(3) During this operating period VMF-212 aircraft flew armed reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pre-briefed Strikes, Airspot for Naval gunfire, and Photo Reconnaissance missions as illustrated by schedule in enclosure (1). Of the 11 days in the operating area only one entire day was lost to inclement weather, thus giving a total of 10 days of air operations. During this period VMF-212 flew 274 sorties of which 2 aborted. There was a total of 598.2 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 59.82 hours per day and 27.2 missions per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft flyable on board 23.1, and the total average aircraft availability 21.1.

(4) During this operating period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in Korean Coastal areas, Nan and Mike, in the vicinity of Latitude 38-00N and Longitude 124-00E as a point OBOE. The screen consisted of the HMCS ATHABASKAN (D-29), HMIS CHARITY (DDE-29), and the USS PORTERFIELD (D6-682). On 27 December 1951, the USS HANSON (DD-832) relieved the USS PORTERFIELD.

Part II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

170656/Dec - The BADOENG STRAIT got underway for the Yellow Sea area, with VMF-212 embarked, in company with HMCS ATHABASKAN in accordance with CTG 95.1 directive, from Sasebo, Japan.

171100/ Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to the operating area.

172022 USS PORTERFIELD joined the screen, as previously directed. This ship had been operating with HMIS SINDY; "turn over" notes were passed by high-line.

172100 Relieved the HMIS SINDY (CVE-17) and assumed CTE 95.11.
Part II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (Cont'd)

18 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD.

HMS CHARITY joined the screen, as previously directed. A total of 41 flights (14 of which were defensive) were flown on this date. The weather was generally good. Major R. F. STUEBING, 020335/7302, USMCR, encountered ground fire while on an armed reconnaissance mission and his aircraft received a direct hit by a 20MM shell which exploded in the engine accessory section, causing a fire to break out. The pilot was able to get two miles out over TAEDONG INLET before bailout. He received minor cuts and burns and was rescued by a helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER (CL-82) patrolling that area.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 500 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>14 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 3.5&quot; rockets</td>
<td>4 Airspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,200 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>15 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 December - HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMS CHARITY refueled from the BADOENG STRAIT.

191725/ HMS CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area. The remainder of the force retiring southward for the night.

A total of 42 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown on this date. Weather was generally good.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>11 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>1 Photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Weather reconnaissance plane from VP-SIX, based in Japan, reported sighting 30 un-identified trawlers at Latitude 36-20N, Longitude 123-00E.

Commander Task Force 95 directed CTE 95.11 to investigate.

HMCS ATHABASKAN and USS PORTERFIELD detached from the screen to conduct search for reported trawlers.

HMCS ATHABASKAN and USS PORTERFIELD rejoined formation at first light. Results of search negative.

CTE 95.11 was directed to furnish CAP for coastal convoy onroute to Inchon.

Refueled USS PORTERFIELD and HMCS ATHABASKAN.

USS PORTERFIELD detached to carry out night patrol assigned in the PAEGNYONG-DO area. The remainder of the force retiring southward for the night.

A total of 39 flights (18 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather in general was good.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>18 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>21 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,700 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USS MANCHESTER, with USS EVERSOLE as escort, joined with TE 95.11 at Latitude 38-25N and Longitude 124-10E.

CTE 95.11 conferred with Rear Admiral DYER, CTF-95, aboard the USS MANCHESTER.

Major R. F. STEUBING, USMCR was returned from the USS MANCHESTER via helicopter.

USS MANCHESTER and USS EVERSOLE departed.

HMCS ATHABASKAN was detached to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

Only 2 flights (these being CAP) were flown this date. Weather remained foggy all day.
22 December - Refueled HMCS ATHABASKAN, and CHS CHARITY.

A total of 12 flights (2 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather remained foggy until early afternoon.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>2 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>2 Airspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,700 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>4 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD

A total of 35 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather was excellent.

231701/ Detached USS PORTERFIELD to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>6 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>19 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 December - Refueled HMCS ATHABASKAN.

A total of 42 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather was excellent.

241710/ HMCS ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>12 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORDNANCE EXPENDED

61 3.5" rockets
4 Napalm bombs
38,500 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

25 December - HMCS CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

No flight operations conducted due to rain and fog that continued all day. A Merry Christmas was had by all.

26 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD and HMCS CHARITY.

USS PORTERFIELD detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

Only 10 flights (2 of which were defensive) were flown, due to inclement weather.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>8 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>8 Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 3.5&quot; rockets</td>
<td>15 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

271706/ HMCS ATHABASKAN departed to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

28 December - USS HANSON temporarily detached to join TU 90.82.7 as convoy screening ship and CAP control. However, due to reduced visibility in the convoy area, CAP was not launched. The HANSON returned to TE 95.11 about 1230.

USS HANSON and HMCS ATHABASKAN refueled during the day.

281650/ USS HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area and directed to join the HMCS SIDNEY who assumed GTE 95.11 on 29 December 1951. The USS HANSON also carried the "TURNOVER" notes that were to be passed.
to HMAS SIDNEY. The BADOENG STRAIT with HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMS CHARITY in company, and VMF-212 embarked, took departure from the operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

281922/ HMCS ATHABASKAN detached to proceed to the port of Kure, Japan independently.

282130/ The Commanding Officer, HMAS SIDNEY, assumed command of Task Element 95.11 in area MIKE. The BADOENG STRAIT continued course for Sasebo, Japan in company with HMS CHARITY.

Inclement weather curtailed flight operations this date. 8 flights (all of which were combat) were flown.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

- 8 500 lb. GP bombs
- 62 5" HVAR rockets
- 4,800 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to Fleet Activities, Sasebo.

29 December - HMAS CHARITY detached to proceed independently to Kobe, Japan.

291723/ Moored at buoy #18, Sasebo harbor, to remain through 6 January 1952 for replenishment and recreation.

Part III - **PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE**

A. The gasoline heating unit for mixing NAPALM, as described in enclosure (3), was evaluated operationally during this period. The results proved extremely satisfactory and a separate report is under preparation pointing out the capabilities and applicability of the equipment as designed.

B. The assembly, arming, and stowage of Mk 77 Mod 0 Fire Bombs presented several problems. Assembly was time consuming due to the care that must be exercised in tightening the tie-rod nut to the prescribed 425 in/lbs. torque. Of the 36 bombs used, tie-rod threads were stripped on 4, making the entire bomb useless in all four cases. An additional three bombs separated while planes were being catapulted. This was believed to be caused by the stripping of the tie-rod threads also.

C. The disengaging of hung-rockets during arrested landing created an awkward situation. The most efficient method involved, to prevent damage to the ship or other aircraft by these rockets traveling down the flight deck was the innovation and use of the "Fredericks Barrier". This consisted of lashing...
six cargo nets together - forming two sections of three nets each. These two sections were strung across the flight deck just aft of the forward elevator to serve as a deck-level barrier in which wandering rockets were caught and then jettisoned. After landing an aircraft with hung-rockets the nets were pulled apart, gate fashion, to allowing taxing forward. Ten plane handlers were required to open and close the nets. A total of 74 hung-rockets were returned to the ship during this operational period.

D. The fire-power umbrella of this ship does not extend the full 360 degrees around the ship. There exists a vacant 20 degree sector on the bow, 10 degrees on either side. This was caused by the authorized removal of the forward 40MM mount.

E. The fire control system is not completely adequate for night radar firing as the computer system installation has no direct method of designation of air targets from CIC to the Gun Control Platform.

F. Facilities are not available for developing gun camera film aboard the CVE-105 type carrier. Damage assessment is consequently a matter of memory or personal evaluation at de-briefings.

G. The ASW allowance of Mk 24 mines, that is required to be carried, consumes valuable storage space that could otherwise be used to advantage to store armament more in line with the mission of the ship during this type operation.

H. Ammunition expenditures:

1. During the operating period covered by this report the following ordnance was expended.

   **BY VMF-212 AIRCRAFT**
   
   1000 lb. GP bombs 19
   500 lb. GP bombs 140
   5" HVAR rockets 1,266
   3.5" rockets 181
   Napalm (Fire Bombs) 36
   6.5" ATAR rockets 24
   .50 Cal. (Belted) 195,400

   **BY USS BADOENG STRAIT**
   
   40MM 4,472
Part IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own battle damage -

1. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.

2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 338.5 Revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.

B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy -

1. Ships of this task element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of the screen during the period covered by this report.

2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 338.3 Revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

Part V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in the general high standard of the Navy and Marine Corps.

B. Casualties -

1. On 18 December 1951, Major R. F. STUEBING, USMCR, was forced to bail out over water after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. He was recovered by helicopter. He suffered minor burns and lacerations on the face.

C. The recommended wartime complement as submitted by this command to COMAIRPAC on 10 October 1951, reflects CVE-105 personnel requirements for this type operation. Comments from individual departments are as listed below:

1. Executive Department: Requires 1 additional YNT2, as legal yeoman; 1 typewriter repairman.

2. Air Department: Total numbers adequate. Recommend dropping 1 ADC, 3 AD1, 4 AD2, and 6 AD3, totaling 14 men, to be replaced by 7 AN's and 7 AA's.

3. Dental Department: Recommend the allowance of dental officers on CVE's be increased to 2.


5. Supply Department: Inadequate. Additions required are 1 DK1, and 5 non-rated men.

6. Gunnery Department: Recommend 12 more non-rated men in order to more efficiently maintain Condition THREE watches.
7. Operations Department:

a. Under the present method of having Quartermasters and Signalmen considered as one rating, it is recommended that the present allowance of 17 QM's be increased to 20 ratings to include 12 ratings with Signalmen qualifications (NJC 0230-0239), in order that continuous around the clock watches may be stood.

b. That the photographer allowance be increased by 3, to total 6 (1 PH3, and 2 AN(PH) additional).

c. Increase of three RD3 and three radarman strikers.

Part VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. The operation of the BADOENG STRAIT and VMF-212 as part of TE 95.11, in conjunction with other surface units, was considered to have been most effective in the enforcement of a seaward and coastwise blockade of the West Coast of Red held Korea between latitudes 37-30N and 38-50N. The tactical advantage afforded by CTE 95.11 closing to within 33 miles of the enemy coastal area for daily launchings made it possible to schedule two hour missions, each composed of from six to eight aircraft, continuously during daylight hours. A veritable shuttle on "demand" targets was conducted in the face of the continual threat of "hit-and-run" attacks by Manchurian based Red air forces.

B. The employment of VMF-212 fighter-bomber F4U-4 aircraft as CAP for troop convoys proceeding along the West coast of Korea detracted to a great degree from the primary mission of TE 95.11. Fully realizing the need for this CAP, it is believed, however, that carrier planes of this type could be more profitably employed wherein their armament carrying capabilities were exploited against the enemy.

C. At the present time CIC has no satisfactory means of positively identifying friendly aircraft. In the event the enemy elected to launch token or all-out air attacks against TE 95.11, the situation would become quite critical with the enemy in an excellent position to strike the first blow and thus temporarily take command of the situation.

D. The maximum number of screen ships available during daylight hours was three. At darkness, and until dawn, the size of the screen was automatically reduced to two ships, as the third was diverted to night patrol around islands lying off the Red held coastline. A definite submarine threat would pose a very difficult problem with such an inadequate ASW screen.

E. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Weather prognostications were so difficult as to try the patience of the best, because reports from the westward were simply non-existent.

RECOMMENDATION: Employ aerologists with experience in the Yellow Sea area. Equip carriers operating in the Yellow Sea area with Rayinsonde and Facsimile Transceivers.
2. Intelligence data of all types is continually pouring in, requiring accurate interpretation and evaluation at all hours of the day and night.

RECOMMENDATION: A minimum of two officers and six enlisted personnel who are graduates of advanced schools of Combat Intelligence should be made available to carrier task element commanders.

3. Panoramic photo intelligence was not available upon deployment and was a great hindrance in the debriefing analysis. After every fresh snow fall the features of the target areas would take on new profiles. Present AMS (1:50,000) charts, though accurate and detailed, became as confusing as adolescent finger-paintings.

RECOMMENDATION: That photo aircraft and pilots be assigned to each carrier. A detachment of two of the type planes employed by the squadron embarked would suffice on a CVE carrier.

4. A lack of pre-deployment training in close-air support and target interdiction work, where available shipboard intelligence plays a major part, created a temporary difficulty in understanding many problems of the embarked squadron.

RECOMMENDATION: Coordinate training with Marine Squadrons based at El Toro prior to deployment to the Far East area. The practice of the relieving carrier, arriving from CONUS, sending key personnel on the last period of operations to embark on the carrier in TF-95 is considered an extremely sound and essential practice.

5. The projection of enemy air and submarine attacks against this small task element would very radically alter the present, almost complete freedom of action enjoyed.

RECOMMENDATION: That additional escort vessels for air defense and ASW be assigned insofar as practicable in order that the current freedom of action would not be curtailed in the event of overt attacks.

Copy to: (ADVANCE)
CNO ComMarCorps CINCPACFLT COMNAVFE COM7thFLT CTF-95 CTG-95.1 COMAIRPAC COMCARDIV 17
CGairFMFPac CGFMFPac CG1stMAW USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) USS BATAAN (CVL-29) USS SICILY (CVE-118) USS RENDOVA (CVE-114) CO MAG-12 CO VMF-212

AUTHENTICATED:
G. R. PALUS Commander, U.S. Navy
U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California  

DECLASSIFIED  

27 January 1952

SUNRISE 0749

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR  
27 January 1952

SUNSET 1805

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Ammo.</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0925</td>
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<td>580 gals.</td>
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<td>A-3</td>
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<td>F-18</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
1. All A/C full load .50 Cal. 
2. Maintain 2 A/C on Condition 11 after each launch from one-half hour before sunrise until sunset.  
3. 500# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR  
4. 4 A/C with 1000# GP/DC, 8-HVAR  
   2 A/C NAPALM, 8-HVAR  
5. 2 A/C - 500# GP/DC, 8-WP  
   2 A/C - N.PALM, 8-WP  
6. 500# GP/DC, 8-HVAR  

Approved:  
G. R. PALUS  
CDR, USN  
Operation Officer  

Submitted:  
A. S. IRISH  
LCDR, USN  
Air Oper. Officer  

Enclosure (1) to USS BADOENG STRAIT 1tr Serial 005 of
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
To: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
Via: Commander Carrier Division SEVENTEEN

Subj: Mixing of Napalm in Cold Weather

Ref: (a) COMAIRPAC 1tr serial 30/14896 of 30 August 1951

Encl: (1) Photograph of Strainer Shell
(2) Photograph of 5/8" Copper Tubing (Coiled)(three prints)
(3) Photograph of Baffle Plate welded to coils
(4) Photograph of Header (two prints)
(5) Photograph of Temperature Gauge (Well type)(two prints)

1. It is the purpose of this letter to describe, in response to reference (a), a napalm heater unit developed by this ship.

2. The basic idea of the heater, as developed, is that the gasoline is heated by steam directly rather than by means of water. The heating system is prepared in a reamed out strainer shell as pictured in enclosure (1). The two coils of 5/8" copper tubing total 90 feet in length, 50 feet in the larger coil and 40 feet in the smaller coil as pictured in enclosure (2). A baffle plate is welded in the center of the coils causing the flow of gasoline to circulate properly throughout the length of the unit to give the desired increase in temperature for heating of the gasoline as pictured in enclosure (3). The header with a baffle plate is used to control the flow of steam from the inlet to the discharge point as pictured in enclosure (4). Enclosure (5) pictures the unit installed, and the location of the well type temperature gauge and hand valve to control the steam entering the unit. This unit uses a steam pressure of 35 pounds in the copper coils with 65 pounds of gasoline pressure from the pump room. The increase of gasoline temperature under test was 45° with 35 pounds at the mixing hopper which is believed to be sufficient for mixing of napalm under most adverse weather conditions.

3. It is believed that the heater described has the following advantages:

   a. Greater safety. Complete drainback is accomplished. Any leaks will introduce steam (water) into the gasoline which does no harm.

   b. Greater accessibility. Units can be easily installed at any fueling station desired, either flight or hangar dock. This permits napalm tanks to be invariably filled on the planes and eliminates the handling of filled tanks.

Enclosure (3) to CVE-116 letter ser 005 of

d. Greater speed. A minimum of equipment to handle. The number of heating units can be increased to permit mixing napalm in a minimum length of time.

J. C. ALDERMAN
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
     (2) Commander Task Force 95
     (3) Commander Seventh Fleet
     (4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
     (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet


Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
     (b) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
     (c) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1
     (d) C.T.G. 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised)
     (e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule 17
     (2) Chart Showing area of operations 17
     (3) CTE 95.11 dispatch 177382 of February 1952 17

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c) and (d) the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the periods 7 January - 16 January 1952 and 25 January - 6 February 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADENNG STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during these periods and this report therefore does not cover the time between the two subject periods, when the ship was in Sasebo for replenishment and recreation.

2. The report, divided into six parts, as listed below, is appended,

   Part I  General Narrative
   Part II Chronological Order of Events
   Part III Remarks on Performance of Ordnance Material, and equipment, including Ammunition Expenditure
   Part IV Summary of Own and Enemy Battle Damage
   Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties
   Part VI Comments and Recommendations
e. During the period 7 January 1952 through 6 February 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT under the command of Captain ROY L. JOHNSON, 62606/1310 USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212, LT. COL JOSEPH A. GRAY O6207/7302 USMC, Commanding, embarked, operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95,1.

(1) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT, remained Commander Task Element 95,11 from 2140 on 7 January 1952 to 2223 on 16 January 1952 and from 2145 on 25 January to 2100 on 6 February 1952. The Commanding Officer H.M.A.S. SYDNEY (CVL-17) assumed CTE 95,11 from 2223, 16 January until 2145, 25 January and at 2100, 6 February the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was relieved as CTE 95,11 by the Commanding Officer H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19). During the periods of this report Task Element 95,11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of three destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships at various times due to demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct air operations in support of the United Nations blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army, Korea (Busak), and to render search and rescue assistance as required.

(2) The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. No enemy naval forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface action took place. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the west coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element when directed, or as targets of opportunity.

(3) During these operating periods VMF-212 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pre-briefed Strikes, Airspot, and Photo Reconnaissance missions, as illustrated in enclosure (1). During the period 8 January through 16 January there were 9 days in the operating area and flight operations were conducted on all nine days. On two of these days however, flight operations were curtailed due to inclement weather. During this period VMF-212 flew 336 sorties of which 4 aborted. There was a total of 714.1 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 79.34 hours per day and 36.89 missions per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft on board was 23.6 and the total average aircraft available 22.4. During the period 25 January through 6 February there were 12 days in the operating area with 2 days of flying lost due to inclement weather and 4 other days on which flight operations were reduced by inclement weather. During this period VMF-212 flew 344 sorties of which 4 aborted. There was a total of 662.7 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 66.27 hours per day and 34.4 missions per day. The Squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft on board was 22.92, and the total average aircraft available was 20.92.
(4) During these periods in the operating area ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in geographical areas Nan and Mike, with the average Point Oboe at 38° - 00N, 124° - 00E. The following ships were assigned to the screen at various times during the two periods of operations:

(a) H.M.S. CHARITY (D-29)
(b) H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN (DD-803)
(c) U.S.S. HANSON (DDR-832)
(d) H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN (DDE-219)
(e) U.S.S. MARSHALL (DD-676)
(f) H.M.C.S. CAYUGA (DDE-218)
(g) H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71)
(h) U.S.S. RADFORD (DDE-446)
(i) H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34)

Part II Chronological Order of Events

7 January In accordance with CTE 95.1 Dispatch 060757Z of January 1952, the U.S.S. BADENG STRAIT (CWE-116), with VMF-212 embarked got underway for the Yellow Sea area in company with H.M.C.S. CAYUGA (DDE-218), and H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71). Relieved the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY (CVL-17) and assumed CTE 95.11.

2140/ 8 January H.M.S. CHARITY joined the screen as previously directed. H.M.C.S. CAYUGA and H.M.S. CONSTANCE detached to proceed to CTE 95.1 for duty on coastal blockade force.

1135/ 21 January U.S.S. HANSON (DDR-832) joined the screen as previously directed. The CTE 95.11 turnover notes from the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY were passed to the BADENG STRAIT at this time.

1351/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN (DD-803) joined the screen as previously directed. A total of 32 flights (4 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was generally good.

1510/ VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>4 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 6.5&quot; ATAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,080 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1715/ H.M.S. CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-Do area. The remainder of the force retired southward for the night.

9 January H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined and resumed screening duties.

1710/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-Do area.
A total of 41 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was generally good throughout the day.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 10K# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>19 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,500 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 January  Refueled H.M.S. CHARITY and U.S.S. HANSON. Only 8 flights (these being CAP) were flown this day. The weather remained marginal around the ship and bad in the target area all day.

H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN remained in Paegnyong-Do area because CTE 95.11 had retired to the south in order to provide air cover for a troop convoy.

11 January  H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN rejoined and resumed screening duties. A total of 38 flights (9 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 10K# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>9 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>14 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>8 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>7 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,400 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1715/  U.S.S. HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.

12 January  U.S.S. HANSON rejoined and resumed screening duties.

1420/  U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124) with U.S.S. COLETT (DD-730) as escort joined with TE 95.11. CTE 95.11 conferred with Rear Admiral Dyer, CTF 95, aboard the U.S.S. ROCHESTER.


1720/  H.M.S. CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 39 flights (14 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The number of CAP flights was higher than usual due to the fact that TE 95.11 provided air cover for a troop convoy during the day. The weather was excellent.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>14 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>13 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>2 Air Spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>6 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 January

1038/ H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined and resumed screening duties. Received a dispatch from U.S.S. ROCHESTER which stated that F4U-4, side number LD-15 on a Strike Mission, had crashed in the sea. The pilot, Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, U.S.M.C. bailed out and was recovered by helicopter.

1420/ U.S.S. ROCHESTER informed CTE 95.11 by radio that Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, U.S.M.C. was dead due to drowning when recovered by helicopter. Herased H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN and H.M.S. CHARITY.

1714/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area. A total of 46 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>6 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>6 Air Spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>22 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23,600 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 January

0724/ U.S.S. HANSON refueled

0755/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN rejoined and resumed screening duties. H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN came alongside U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT and with Honors transferred the remains of Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, USMC.

1520/ U.S.S. HANSON detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area. A total of 36 flights (8 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather which was good in the morning, gradually deteriorated to marginal and below in the afternoon.

-5-
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>14 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 January  
U.S.S. HANSON rejoined screen.
1711/  
U.S.S. HANSON detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.  
A total of 46 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown on this day. The weather, in general, was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>18 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,200 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 January  
H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN and U.S.S. HANSON refueled.
1210/  
U.S.S. HANSON rejoined screen.  
A total of 46 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was generally good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>16 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1607/  
U.S.S. HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area, and directed to join the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY who was to assume CTE 95.11 on 17 January 1952. The U.S.S. HANSON was further directed to pass to the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY the "turn-over" notes.

1722/  
Took course for SASEBO, JAPAN in company with H.M.S. CHARITY and H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN.

2223/  
The Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. SYDNEY, assumed command of Task Element 95.11 in area Mike. The U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT continued course for SASEBO, JAPAN.
17 January

H.M.S. CHARITY detached to proceed independently to KOBE, JAPAN.

1102/
Commenced AA Gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in area "George" enroute to SASEBO.

1545/
Moored to buoy #18 Sasebo harbor Japan, to remain through 24 January 1952 for replenishment and recreation.

25 January

Underway for Yellow Sea operating area in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN.

1110/
H.M.S. CHARITY reported for duty as screening unit.

1203/
Conducted AA gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in Area "George".

2145/
Relieved the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY as the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT assumed CTE 95.11.

26 January

On a TarCap mission, Captain J. D. NADELHOFER, USMCR bailed out of his aircraft over Kirin-Do island.

Message relayed from Sea Air Rescue helicopter stated that Captain J. D. NADELHOFER 03797L, USMCR was dead when it arrived on scene.

1721/
U.S.S. RADMORR joined the screen as previously directed.

This ship had been operating with the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY, and therefore had "trun over" notes, which were passed to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT.

1741/
H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 25 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this day. The weather deteriorated to unsuitable flying conditions in the afternoon.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance Expended</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>6 C.F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>7 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,700 Rounds 150 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 January

H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN rejoined screen

H.M.S. CHARITY detached to proceed on night patrol in Paegnyong-Do area.

1630/
An unidentified aircraft approached the force, and the report contained in enclosure (3) was made.

A total of 33 flights (8 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was marginal throughout the day and curtailed flight operations.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED** | **MISSIONS**
--- | ---
4 1000# G.P. bombs | 8 CAP
19 500# G.P. bombs | 8 TarCap
168 5" HVAR Rockets | 4 Armed Recco
23 3.5" Rockets | 14 Strike
3 Napalm bombs |  
15,600 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo |  

28 January
H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined the screen
U.S.S. RADFORD detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 26 flights (6 of which were defensive) were flown this day. Poor weather again curtailed flight operations.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED** | **MISSIONS**
--- | ---
4 1000# G.P. bombs | 6 CAP
14 500# G.P. bombs | 10 TarCap
32 3.5" Rockets | 4 Armed Recco
125 5" HVAR Rockets | 6 Strike
2 Napalm bombs |  
12,800 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo |  

29 January
U.S.S. RADFORD rejoined screen
H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.
1628/
U.S.S. RADFORD refueled from U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT. A total of 47 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED** | **MISSIONS**
--- | ---
7 1000# G.P. bombs | 12 CAP
15 500# G.P. bombs | 24 TarCap
32 3.5" Rockets | 11 Strike
247 5" HVAR Rockets |  
14 Napalm bombs |  
23,200 Rounds 150 Cal Ammo |  

30 January
U.S.S. MARSHAL (DD-676) and U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) joined the formation. The U.S.S. PORTERFIELD transferred 2 medical patients to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT for treatment, and departed to the coastal blockade area. The U.S.S. MARSHAL remained as part of the screen to relieve the U.S.S. RADFORD.
0847/
U.S.S. RADFORD detached to duty previously assigned with TF 95.1 in the coastal blockade group.
H.K.C.S. ATHABASKAN rejoined screen.
U.S.S. MARSHAL detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 43 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>7 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,200 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 January
H.K.S. CHARITY rejoined the screen
H.K.S. CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 48 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>24 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 February
U.S.S. PORTERFIELD, departed, having transferred a medical patient to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT to operate on coastal blockade.

1608/
H.K.C.S. ATHABASKAN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area to remain with Task Element 95.12 until the morning of 2 February as Task Element 95.11 was proceeding southward to provide air cover for a troop convoy on 2 February.
A total of 16 flights (4 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was marginal and curtailed flight operations.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>4 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>6 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>3 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>2 Air Spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,400 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 February  The weather remained unsuitable for air operations throughout the entire day.

3 February  H.M.C.S, ATHABASKAN joined the screen.

1625/ U.S.S, MARSHAL detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 38 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was good until late afternoon when it became marginal to below.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>19 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>7 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Napalm bomb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 February  U.S.S, MARSHAL rejoined the screen.

1526/ H.M.S, CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.

There were no flight operations this day due to continuous snow throughout the day.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>18 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,700 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 February  H.M.S, CHARITY rejoined the screen.

1545/ H.M.C.S, ATHABASKAN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

VMF-212 completed their 2000th consecutive barrier-free carrier landing.

A total of 32 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general, was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>18 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,700 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 February  U.S.S. MARSHAL detached to report to CTF 95.1 for duty in the coastal blockade group.

1500/  H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN rejoined.
1517/  H.M.S. CHARITY detached to rendezvous with H.M.S. COCKADE, then proceeded on previously assigned mission in Paengnyong-Do area. This ship also carried the turn-over notes to be passed to the H.M.S. GLORY.
1541/  Took course for SASEBO, JAPAN in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN.
2010/  H.M.S. COCKADE joined screen.
2100/  The Commanding Officer H.M.S. GLORY, assumed CTE 95.11.

A total of 32 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was generally good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 Cap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>18 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>2 Air Spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,500 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 February  H.M.S. COCKADE detached to proceed independently to Kure, Japan.
1336/  Rendezvoused with U.S.S. CHARA (KA-58) for test of Alderman-Rig for replenishment at sea.
1833/  Moored to buoy #18 Sasebo, Japan.

8 February  Underway for Kobe, Japan in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN in accordance with ComServRon Three dispatch 071199Z of February 1952.
1118/  Chopped to CTF 95 from CTG 95.1.
1125/  Completed launching all remaining VMF-212 aircraft for fly-away to ITAMI Air Force Base, Japan.
1130/  H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN was detached to return to Sasebo.
1206/  Conducted AA gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in area Fox.

9 February  Moored starboard side to, pier 4, Kobe, Japan for transfer of aviation spare parts, material, and turn over notes and information to U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), who was relieving the U.S.S. BADONG STRAIT in TG 95.1.
1750/  All remaining personnel of VMF-212 were disembarked to proceed to ITAMI Air Force Base, Japan.

11 February  Transfer of material and information to U.S.S. BAIROKO completed this day.
12 February Underway for YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.

13 February Chopped to ComNavFe for Operational Control.

14 February Underway for Pearl Harbor, T.H. in accordance with ComNavFe 110708Z of February 1952.


1. The MK 77 Mod 0 Fire Bomb is still considered to be unsatisfactory due to time consumed in assembly, and the tendency of the tie-rod threads to strip, both during assembly, and after assembled, and when hung on the aircraft. Several leaks as a result of the forces exerted on them by the catapult launch, and some separated completely. This was especially true during low wind condition launches.

2. Hung rockets on returning aircraft continued, but the percentage involved was less than on the previous operation. A very effective rocket catcher (described as the "Fredericks Barrier" in Commander Task Element 95.11's Action Report serial 005 dtd 5 February 1952 by CO, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT) is in use by this vessel, but it is still felt that the best solution to this problem would be the installation of a device for jettisoning rockets from aircraft when firing fails to release them.

3. The ASW allowance of MK 24 mines that is required to be carried at all times consumes valuable storage space that could otherwise be used to store armament more in line with the primary mission of close air support or interdiction.

4. Ammunition expenditures.

   a. During the operating periods covered by this report the following ordnance was expended:

      1. 7 January through 24 January 1952

         | By VMF-212 Aircraft | By USS BADOENG STRAIT |
         |---------------------|----------------------|
         | 63 1,000# G.P. bombs| 1,680 Rounds of 40MM |
         | 148 500# G.P. bombs |
         | 1,509 5" HVAR Rockets|
         | 394 3.5" Rockets    |
         | 31 6.5" ATAR Rockets|
         | 41 Napalm bombs     |
         | 239,700 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo |
2. 25 January through 31 January 1952

By VMF-212 Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>34</th>
<th>1000# G.P. bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>500# G.P. bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Napalm bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113,500</td>
<td>Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By USS BADOENG STRAIT

1,742 Rounds 40 MM

3. 1 February through 8 February 1952

By VMF-212 Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28</th>
<th>1000# G.P. bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>500# G.P. bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338</td>
<td>3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Napalm bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,600</td>
<td>Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By USS BADOENG STRAIT

3,170 Rounds 40MM

Part IV Summary of Own and Enemy Battle Damage.

1. Own Battle damage.

a. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.

b. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 3480.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.

2. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.

a. The ships of this task element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as a member of this task element during the period covered by this report.

b. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 3480.3 revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in keeping with the high standards of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is considered worthy of special mention that during the subject operations, VMF-212 completed their 2000th barrier-free carrier landing.
2. Casualties.

a. On 13 January 1952, Captain Charles Clinton SCHWARTZ 021191/7302/0110, USMC was forced to bail out over water after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. Captain SCHWARTZ was picked up by helicopter and taken to the U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CV-124) where at 1315 he was pronounced dead of drowning and internal injuries.

b. On 26 January 1952, Captain John D. NADELHOFFER, 037971/7302 USMC, was forced to bail out over the friendly island of Kirin-Do after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. Captain NADELHOFFER's aircraft was trailing smoke and was at an altitude of 2000 feet when he abandoned it. His parachute was not seen to open by his wingman. The aircraft crashed on the island and Captain NADELHOFFER was observed by his wingman to be lying 100 yards from it. The SAR helicopter arrived within 15 minutes of the bail out, and the crew reported that Captain NADELHOFFER was dead when they arrived. It is believed that the pilot hit the horizontal stabilization of his aircraft during the bail out attempt and was either killed or rendered unconscious at that time. Captain NADELHOFFER's remains were wrapped in his parachute and buried on Kirin-Do island.

Part VI Comments and Recommendations

1. The comments and recommendations submitted as part six of Commander Task Element 95.11's Action Report for the period 17 December 1951 through 6 January 1952 apply also to the operating periods covered by this report.

2. A breakdown of the carriers air search radar; when all the other ships operating with her are allied destroyers, would seriously effect the defensive capabilities of the force, since the destroyer's radar are in many ways inadequate. This is particularly true for the Common Wealth destroyers.
   Recommendation: That care be exercised to insure that screening vessels are assigned that have capable airsearch radar installed.

3. The failure of the high voltage generator for the TCZ transmitter caused serious difficulties.
   Recommendation: That the spares allowance for radio transmitter be reviewed.

4. The A.B. Dick mimeograph machine is a very important piece of equipment. It was new when this vessel left the United States in September 1951. Due to its high usage however, numerous small easily replaced parts have worn out.
   Recommendation: That spare parts for the mimeograph machine be authorized and carried in stock by vessels having such machines on board. The parts can easily be installed by ship board personnel.
5. Visual signals with Allied Ships in the screen was impossible at night thereby causing delay and possible error by the necessity of sending coded radio signals.
Recommendation: The Allied ships operating with U. S. ships be supplied with "NANCY" gear in order to minimize the delay in sending night messages.

6. Small arms ground fire resulted in the ditching of two aircraft and the necessity of the pilots to bail-out. Both pilots were killed as a result of their bailing out.
Recommendation: That additional emphasis be placed on bail-out procedures, prior to deployment of a squadron, and the survival techniques for the area of employment be stressed.

7. In communications there were two ever present problems (1) A tendency by all commands to over classify traffic and (2) the use of too high precedence attached to traffic. The combination of the two tended to bog down traffic and place an excessive burden on the communication personnel.
Recommendation: That judicious screening of all traffic for over classification be instituted. The promulgation of the recent directive, whereby encrypted traffic, under some conditions, may be referred to without classifying a reply will undoubted help alleviate this situation. There should be a concerted effort by every one concerned to lower the precedence assigned to traffic. The efforts of one unit to lower the precedence attached to his traffic would not help the overall situation.

8. The Section Baker Allowance for spare parts as modified by increased quantities of reported high usage items was in itself adequate for support of maintenance and repairs. However, there were too many critical items which, if it had not been for Carrier-on-Board delivery of overdue shipments, could have seriously reduced the availability of aircraft. Even so, one AOG for seven (7) days and another for three (3) days were caused by delay in receipt of original outfitting quantities. One was due to a port wing assembly that was 42 days overdue on delivery. The other was due to magnetos 37 days overdue. The fact that many critical items of spare parts, when requisitioned from the U. S. S. JUPITER (AVS-8), had to be passed to as many as three (3) supply activities in CONUS before available stocks of them could be obtained caused an increase in communications traffic that was unacceptable as a combat condition.
Recommendation: Accordingly, it is recommended that increased levels of high usage items, especially surfaces, magnetos, generators, and instruments, be maintained by aviation supply activities supporting the forward areas. Further, it is recommended that the Carrier-on-Board delivery system be adopted as a permanent facility in aviation supply support, augmented by a vigorous follow-through on delivery overland to the point from which deliveries leave.

9. Finally it is felt that no action report would be complete, especially when it involves Allied units, unless some mention were made of the benefits, lessons learned, difficulties, if any, derived from operating with Allied units.
It is interesting to note that the Allied units operating with this unit were woefully lacking in a good gun laying fire control system for shore bombardment attested to by the air spotters and subsequent questioning.

b. The non use of white phosphorus shells by shore bombardment ships to mark the initial fall of shot. This was confirmed by questioning.

c. On the positive side of the ledger it was heartening to see and experience the progress which has been made in the almost universal knowledge and adoption of joint maneuvering, screening, communication and replenishment, evolutions by all units.

CopyDev: (ADVANCE)
GNO
COM MAR CORPS
CICIRCPACFLT
CMNAVFE
COM7thFLT
CTF-95
CTG-95.1
COMAIRPAC
COMCARDIV 17
CGAIRFMFPAC
CGFMFPAC
CG1stMAW
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
CO MAC-12
CO VMF-212

AUTHENTICATED

G. R. PALUS
CDR, USN

-16-
# Flight Schedule for Sunrise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Amm.</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 gals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>COAST RECCO</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 4</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAF</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Note 3</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RIVER RECCO</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 4</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTER:**

1. All A/C full load .50 Cal.
2. Maintain 2 A/C on Condition 11 after each launch from one-half hour before sunrise until sunset.
3. 500# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR
4. 1000# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR
5. 2 A/C - 500# GP/DC, 8-WP
6. 2 A/C - NAPALM, 8-WP

**Approved:**

G. R. PALUS  
CDR, USN  
Operations Officer

**Submitted:**

A. S. IRISH  
LCDR, USN  
Air Oper. Officer

**Enclosure (1)**
AT 2717351 AND 2718001 A SINGLE AIRCRAFT B-29 TYPE MADE TWO APPROACHES OVER THIS FORCE IN POSIT LAT 37-32N LONG 124-18E X NEGATIVE MK THREE IPP X UNABLE TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS X ALTITUDE ABOUT 2500 FT X SIGHTED VISUALLY FROM THE SHIP THROUGH BREAKS IN OVERCAST AND HAZE X DISAPPEARED OFF RADAR SCOPE TO THE NORTHWEST X UNABLE TO ESTABLISH IDENTIFICATION THROUGH KNOWN AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS IN AREA NOR AFTER INQUIRY THROUGH JOC OF FEAR BOMCOM MOVEMENTS.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 76.7 (Commander Carrier Division SEVENTEEN)
(2) Commander Task Force 76 (Commander Amphibious Group THREE)
(3) Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force 7 (Commander SEVENTH Fleet)
(4) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for 9 October through 16 October 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1
(d) CTF 90 and CTF 76 Op Plan No. 101A-52
(e) CTG 70.3 Op Plan No. 22-52
(f) CTG 76.7 and CTF 76.53 Op Plan No. 21-52

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) the action report of the BADOENG STRAIT for the period from 9 October through 16 October 1952 is submitted herewith.

2. The report is divided into six parts, as listed below:

Part I General Narrative - appendix I
Part II Chronological Order of events - Appendix II
Part III Ammunition expenditures - Appendix III
Part IV Summary of our and enemy battle damage - Appendix IV
Part V Personnel performance and casualties - Appendix V
Part VI Comments and recommendations - Appendix VI

H. L. Ray

[Signature]
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COMNAVFE Evaluation Group
COM7thFLT (1) Advance
CTF 76 (2) Advance
COMAIRPac (5)
COMSEVPAC (1)
COMFAIntJAP (1)
Naval War College (1)

CCD-15
CO, FAIRBABYUPAC (2)
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29) (1)
U.S.S. REDEY (CVE-114) (1)
U.S.S. BALIKO (CVE-115) (1)
U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118) (1)
U.S.S. POINT CRUZ (CVE-119) (1)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. COLE
CPO, USN
Operations Officer
1. During the period 9 October 1952 through 16 October 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT under command of Captain H. L. Ray, 62691/1310, USN, and with VS-931, Commander F. V. Kennedy, 084253/1310, USN, Commanding, embarked; operated as a part of SEVENTH Fleet and Task Force 76 and successively under the operational control of Commander Task Group 70.3, Commander Task Group 76.7 and Commander Task Element 76.53. Commander Carrier Division 17 embarked in the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was the immediate operational commander in each instance.

2. The mission of the BADOENG STRAIT during this period was:

(1) To conduct ASW flight operations in support of Commander Task Group 76.7, Commander Task Element 76.53, and Commander Task Group 70.3.

3. The Task Element of which the BADOENG STRAIT was a part, reported for duty with CTG 76.5 at U'ARU, Japan, departing on 9 October, to area TARE in the objective area, below WOONG, Korea, departing therefrom on 16 October 1952. The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and the so-called Volunteer Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. This Task Unit performed the tasks set forth in the mission. VS squadron 931 flew 278 day and night hours during this time. On 16 October Task Group 76.7 was detached to resume its normal designation of Task Group 96.7.
OPERATION PLAN
CTG 70.3 No. 22-52

Chart and Map Reference: Air Navigation Chart V30-17

Task Organization
70.3 ASW Group

(a) 70.30 Carrier Element
    BADOEN STRAIT (CVE-116) CAPT H.L. RAY (1362) 1 CVE
    VS-931
    Plane Guard(s) as assigned

(b) 70.31 Screen and Destroyer Element
    Destroyers as assigned

(c) 70.3.1 Surface Attack Unit One
    Destroyers as assigned

(d) 70.3.2 Surface Attack Unit Two
    Destroyers as assigned

ADAM C.E. EKSTROM (212)

U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT, Flagship
Yokosuak, Japan
1 October 1952
OPERATION PLAN
CTG 76.7/CTE 76.53 No. 21-52

Chart and Map References: (Refer to ComPhibForFE OpPlan No. 101A-52)

Task Organization

76.7 ASW Group
76.53 ASW Element

(a) 76.7.1/76.53.1 Surface Attack Unit One
Destroyers as assigned

(b) 76.7.2/76.53.2 Surface Attack Unit Two
Destroyers as assigned

(c) 76.7.3/76.53.3 Carrier Unit
BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) Capt H.L. Ray (1362) 1 CVE
VS-931 Cdr F.V. Kennedey (5420) 18AF
Plane Guard(s) as assigned.

(d) 76.7.4/76.53.4 Screen and Destroyer Unit
Destroyers as assigned
9 October 1952

082130Z Arrived OTARU, Hokkaido with CTG 96.7 and VS-931 embarked.

090430Z Underway from OTARU, Hokkaido with CTE 76.53 and VS-931 embarked.

090505Z Launched 2 ASW teams for ASP using search plan 1 HIME for Anti-Submarine coverage during sortie of CTF 76.5.

090750Z Recalled all aircraft and cancelled further air operations due to weather.

10 October 1952

091800Z CTG 76.5 reported pinacle (enemy radar at bearing 300°).

091915Z Launched One (1) team for ASP.

092010Z Aircraft investigating 3 KADIT reports bearings indicated "A" (232°), "B" (010°), and "C" (307°). Aircraft encountered heavy rain while investigating pinacle "A". The BADOENG STRAIT and the HARRY L. HUBBARD attempted to coordinate by triangulation on these pinacles but the baseline between the ships was too short to give a reasonably good position of the source of RENT.

092020Z The HARRY L. HUBBARD reported pinacle "C" as RENT 8800/200/1/unknown/300°T. Evaluated as possible enemy submarine.

092023Z Pinacle "C" faded.

092025Z Pinacles "A" and "B" faded.

092100Z 5 Kneehigh (BADOENG STRAIT aircraft call) reported APS -20 radar out of commission. 5 Kneehigh was recalled. 4 Kneehigh was ordered to search, under positive control, ahead of the Task Group.

092140Z The FRANK KNOX in station 5 reported sonar contact 235°/8000 yards. The HOLLISTER assisting. The Task Group made an emergency turn 20° right.

092148Z Sonar contact evaluated as school of fish by the HOLLISTER. The FRANK KNOX concurred.

092251Z 4 Kneehigh returned from search and landed.

100134Z CTG 70.5 reported RENT 8565/700/1/unknown. This was evaluated as HK-34 fire control radar or possible SS radar.
100258Z Launched one team for ASP.

100407Z BARDING STRAIT exercised at General Quarters for abandon ship drill.

100558Z Launched search team for ASP.

100601Z Recovered search team launched at 100258Z.

101045Z Recovered search team launched at 100558Z.

11 October 1952

101837Z ASP cancelled due to weather.

102340Z The HARRY E. HUBBARD reported HUNT 4350/410/2/unknown/unknown. No evaluation could be made.

1100002 Launched one search team for ASP Plan 3L.

110120Z 7 and 8 kneehigh reported a disappearing radar contact. 8 Kneehigh (attack aircraft) was unable to drop sonobuoys due sonobuoy dispenser failure. 22 Kneehigh was launched to replace 8 Kneehigh. 8 Kneehigh was directed to conduct visual search ahead of the screen.

110256Z Launched 3 and 4 Kneehigh for ASP.

110312Z Contact reported by 7 and 8 Kneehigh evaluated as non-submarine.

110343Z Recovered 7, 8, and 22 Kneehigh.

110400Z The BARDING STRAIT exercised at General Quarters for "A" bomb defense.

110606Z Recovered 3 and 14 Kneehigh.

110700Z Launched two teams - 9 and 10 Kneehigh first team and 4 and 15 second team for ASP search plan 4L.

110710Z 9 Kneehigh reported his APS-20 Radar out of commission. 5 Kneehigh was launched as replacement.

110933Z The HARRY E. HUBBARD reported HUNT 2340/700/2/10/165°.

111053Z 4, 5, 10, and 15 Kneehigh recovered.

12 October 1952

111800Z Launched 9, 14, 7, and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.
111855Z BADOENG STRAIT obtained MT 116/60/5/3/unknown.

111907Z Task Group 76.5 dissolved. Task Group 76.7 was formed under command of Commander Carrier Division 17, with BADOENG STRAIT, VO-913 embarked, and the DDs UHLWANN, KIDD, WADDLEBURN, and HOPEWELL.

111930Z General Quarters - set Condition ONE.

112100Z Launched 5 and 10 Kneehigh and 3 and 4 Kneehigh for ASP.

112145Z 9, 14, 7, and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

112340Z 3 and 4 Kneehigh reported disappearing radar contact 6 miles East of ULUNG-IO. Sonobuoys were dropped with no results.

120000Z Launched 2, 19, 7, and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

120100Z 5, 10, 3, and 4 Kneehigh recovered.

120256Z Launched 12, 15, 10, and 17 Kneehigh for ASP.

120313Z Launched 5 Kneehigh to replace 17 Kneehigh whose radar was reported out of commission.

120411Z CTF 77 reported 20 enemy aircraft over ULUNG.

120411Z CTF 77 reported enemy aircraft headed Northwest.

120700Z 12, 15, 10, 5, and 17 Kneehigh recovered.

120830Z Launched 7 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

121112Z 7 and 22 Kneehigh recovered.

13 October 1952

121800Z Launched 7 and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.

122031Z Dawn alert - set Condition ONE.

122049Z BADOENG STRAIT obtained MT 8710/800 to 900/1 to 3/4.

122052Z Launched 4 and 11 Kneehigh for ASP.

122127Z 7 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

122215Z Fueled WADDLEBURN (DD-684).

122320Z Fueled UHLWANN (DD-867).

APPENDIX II-3
13 October 1952 (Continued)

130000Z  Launched 5 and 14 Kneehigh for ABP. 5 Kneehigh reported APS-20 radar out of commission. 7 Kneehigh launched as replacement for 5.

130035Z  4, 5, and 11 Kneehigh recovered.

130040Z  Fueled KILD (DD-661).

130150Z  Fueled HOPSWELL (DD661).

130206Z  7 Kneehigh reported disappearing radar contact bearing 115/18 miles dropped investigating sonobuoy. Later evaluated as school of porpoises seen in the area.

130310Z  Launched 17 and 20 Kneehigh for ABP. 17 Kneehigh could not retract landing gear so 19 Kneehigh was launched as replacement.

130337Z  14 Kneehigh had barrier crash necessitating engine and propeller change.

130400Z  8, 10, 17, 5 Kneehigh recovered.

130400Z  BAODENG STRAIT obtained KENT 8795/1575/25/unknown/unknown.

130415Z  BAODENG STRAIT obtained KENT 885/1785/25/2/unknown.

130407Z  Both 19 and 20 Kneehigh IFF inoperative. They were then assigned to search south of the force, under positive control.

140455Z  Launched 6 and 9 Kneehigh to replace 19 and 20 Kneehigh on ABP in vicinity of contact area.

130620Z  Task Group 76.7 dissolved and Task Element 76.53 reactivated with same forces under command of Commander Carrier Division 17.

130620Z  17 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

130756Z  Launched 10 and 19 Kneehigh for ABP.

130836Z  6 and 9 Kneehigh recovered.

131026Z  Joined Task Group 76.5.

131110Z  10 and 19 Kneehigh recovered.

131455Z  Haddy & Hubbard (DD-768) reported KENT 1450/50/15/5.

APPENDIX II-4
14 October 1952

131805Z Launched 2 and 9 Kneehigh for ASP.

131947Z UHLMANN (DD-687) reported sonar contact, doubtful submarine 130°/2175 yards.

131953Z Task Group made emergency turn to starboard.

132014Z UHLMANN evaluated contact as school of fish.

132035Z EAGLE (PF) in the slow tractor group reported sonar contact, evaluated as submarine, North of ULUNG-DO. ROGERS assisting. 2 and 9 Kneehigh vectored to investigate.

132100Z Launched 8 and 17 Kneehigh for ASP.

132123Z 8 and 17 Kneehigh relieved 2 and 9 over contact area.

132135Z 8 Kneehigh dropped 2 sonobuoys then dispenser jammed, 17 Kneehigh reported his APS-20 radar inoperative.

132140Z 2 and 9 Kneehigh recovered.

132205Z Launched 12 and 19 Kneehigh to replace 8 and 7 Kneehigh. After several attempts at working the dispenser 8 Kneehigh finally succeeded in laying a complete pattern. Cavitations were heard but were evaluated as caused by adjacent ships. The contact was evaluated as school of fish.

132255Z 12 and 19 Kneehigh directed to search in close proximity of Task Group.

140003Z Launched 11 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

140050Z 8, 12, 17, and 19 Kneehigh recovered.

140150Z General Quarters. Unidentified aircraft in the area.

140207Z Aircraft identified as friendly. Secured from General Quarters.

140300Z Launched 5 and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.

140630Z Launched 9 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

140704Z 5 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

141018Z 22 kneehigh recovered.

141018Z 9 kneehigh crashed over port side after failing to engage an arresting wire. HOLLISTER and STABLE assisting in search for new members.

APPENDIX II-5
14 October 1952 (Continued)

141042Z Crew of 9 Kneehigh composed of 4 men, recovered by HOLLISTiR small boat and returned to BALDING STRAIT. Crewmen received only minor injuries. 9 Kneehigh sank.

15 October 1952

141900Z CTE 76.53 chopped to CJATF-7 to become CTG 70.3 with BALDING STRAIT VS-31, WEISER, UHLMANN, HOPWILL, KIDD, FRANK KNOX, and HOLLISTiR.

142030Z General Quarters, dawn alert.

142100Z Weather unsatisfactory for flying. Air Operations held in abeyance on one half hours notice.

150220Z "H" hour set as 151400ITgM by CTG 76.5.

150245Z Launched 4, 17, 5, 8, 2, and 11 Kneehigh for ASP. IFF inoperative on 4 and 17 Kneehigh.

150315Z Launched 1 and 10 Kneehigh to replace 4 and 17.

150332Z 4 and 17 Kneehigh recovered.

150335Z 1 and 10 Kneehigh IFF inoperative directed to search in vicinity of own carrier under positive control.

150400Z Fueled HOPWILL (DD-661)

150420Z 5 and 8 Kneehigh reported disappearing contact 220°/60. Sonobuoy pattern laid and machinery noises received. Contact designated as GOBLIN ABLE.

150425Z LOS ANGELES and CHAIG reported to be close to contact area, possible source of machinery noises.

150455Z Fueled WEISER (DD-684)

150516Z TE 70.31, NAU-1 composed of HOLLISTiR and FRANK KNOX departed screen for contact area. HOLLISTiR in command.

150528Z 8 Kneehigh reported sonobuoy pattern lost due to high seas.

150540Z Fueled KIDD (DD-661).

150545Z 8 Kneehigh laid new sonobuoy pattern. Still receiving machinery noises, but no movement of target.

150623Z Launched 3, 20, 12, 7, 14, 19 Kneehigh for ASP. 55 Knots of wind across the deck. Flew aircraft off with full load, did not use catapult.

APPENDIX II-6
150657Z 1, 8, 10, and 5 Kneehigh recovered.
150720Z 2, 5, and 11 Kneehigh recovered. All aircraft recalled because of high winds and heavy seas.
150850Z 3, 7, 12, 14, 19, and 20 Kneehigh recovered.
151040Z CTG 70.3 chopped to TF 76 to become CTG 76.7 to provide ASP for TG 76.4 on movement to P'OHANG-DONG.
151100Z Contact Cold. SNU-l composed of FRANK KNOX and HOLLISTER chopped to CTE 76.4.

16 October 1952

152000Z Launched 5 and 12 Kneehigh for ASP.
152336Z Launched 4 and 11 Kneehigh for ASP.
160000Z 5 and 12 Kneehigh recovered.
160202Z Fueled UNLMAIN (DD-867).
160125Z Fueled HOLLISTER (DD-788).
160225Z Fueled STABLE (DD-644).
160337Z 4 and 11 Kneehigh recovered.
160400Z Fueled OZBOURN (DD-846).
160700Z Fueled FRANK KNOX (DDR-742).
160755Z Operations having been terminated for this group CTG 76.7 chopped to COMNAVFE to resume its normal designation of CTG 96.7.

APPENDIX II-7
No ammunition was expended during the period of this operation.
SUMMARY OF OUR AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

The BADONG STRAIT did not engage the enemy. No battle damage resulted. No ammunition was expended in battle.
There were no casualties. The performance of personnel was deemed to be satisfactory in all respects under the conditions that existed. The effectiveness in full combat of the ship's batteries and repair parties with fractional complements and frequent personnel changes remains to be seen.
1.**Naval Operations**

a. **Surface**

(1) **Tactics**

The formation was protected by a bent line screen. Formations 92R, 92V, and 922 were prescribed for TF 76.5. In 92R (the formation normally used) this ship was assigned 8A-K-42 as its station. The SOA of the group was 15 knots, thus leaving a 4 knot speed differential for the carrier to take position for the conduct of flight operations and return to station. This necessitated the carrier having to leave station approximately one hour early under wind conditions that usually existed to position itself for flight operations by method 8A-K-42. It would be preferable for conducting air operations to leave one station in each quadrant on the outer circle unassigned, giving the carriers the option of selecting a station which would facilitate operations.

**Recommendations:**

When formation 92R is used or a similar formation is prescribed, assign to the carriers one station in each quadrant, on the outer circle, for occupancy at its option, depending upon existing wind.

b. **Air**

(1) **Day - Night**

It is believed that this is the first time a CVE has attempted to operate with a full VS complement of 18 AF-2 Type aircraft under war time conditions.

When eighteen (18) aircraft are carried, eight (8) can be carried on the hangar deck and still allow sufficient space for the helicopter and the tournapull. Ten (10) aircraft can be operated and handled on the flight deck. Nine (9) aircraft were spotted forward of the barriers, thus permitting recovery of the tenth aircraft.

Under adverse deck conditions, or during night recovery operations, a longer landing interval for the last few aircraft was necessary in the interest of safety. Spotting operations in the very close quarters forward of the barriers was necessarily slow. Furthermore, this longer interval between aircraft enables plane crews and spotting personnel to clear the area forward of the barriers prior to the next aircraft's recovery, a most important measure of safety.

c. **All Weather**

On October 14th and 15th a low pressure wave formed with surprising rapidity in the objective area. The attendant high winds caused
a choppy sea which soon developed heavy grounds swells. It was necessary to cancel flight operations because a severely pitching deck increased the possibility of a landing aircraft damaging the tightly spotted aircraft forward. A further consideration was the possibility of serious damage to the Mark IV arresting gear due to the weight of the AF aircraft.

D. Anti-Submarine

(1) Surface

Standard bent line screens were ordered employed. No unusual anti-submarine tactics were used.

(2) Aircraft

The tactics used by aircraft were in accord with published doctrine. The armament carried was one (1) Mk-24 Mine, two (2) Mk-54 depth charges and four (4) 3.25" rockets. This combination of armament would permit the attack plane to press a Class "A" attack anywhere within the area to be covered, the Mk-24 mine to be used only when well clear of friendly forces.

Recommendations:

None.

(3) Air/Surface

At 150420Z one team reported a disappearing radar contact. A standard five (5) buoy pattern was laid and machinery noises were heard and reported. The contact was 60 miles from the Task Group. A Search and Attack Unit consisting of the HOLLISTER and FRANK KNOX was dispatched to the Datum. High seas prevented the SAU from steaming at full speed, therefore, the time late was excessive. By this time the pilot had used all his smoke lights in trying to keep his pattern marked. He could only maintain his position in the general area by radar plotting from known positions on the beach. The SAU arrived in the area, however, and commenced a spiral search plan.

At 151100Z the contact was reported as still cold. The SAU was ordered to abandon the search.

Recommendations:

(a) Advanced training should be provided to develop the ability by airborne radar operators to interpret targets through heavy sea returns.

(b) A long burning smoke light of at least two hours should be employed.
In early July of this year it was decided to install the MK-10 IFF on this vessel, then scheduled to sail on 19 July. A hurried installation of UPX-1 equipment was made by the Naval Station, San Diego. This equipment was installed for use with the SK radar. This installation is unsatisfactory in that it is non-directional and the reliable range is limited to about 20 miles. One test with aircraft was made prior to departure west coast. There was no opportunity to use this equipment until the period of this operation. The indication on the scope is a complete circle that coincides with the target being interrogated. This indication is satisfactory only when two targets do not appear simultaneously at the same range, and there are relatively few targets on the scope.

Recommendation:

The complete SPS-6 and UPX-1 equipment should be installed at the earliest opportunity.

7. ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

During previous Hunter/Killer operations an experimental installation of AN/APR-9 equipment was made to determine the extent of improvement of this equipment over the standard shipboard ECM equipment of limited frequency range. A motor generator from the AN/AR-7 was used to obtain the necessary 115V AC 400 cycle power for the equipment. A motor generator from the AN/APX-1 was used for the 28V DC supply. The AN/APR-9 was installed in the ship's ECM Room, and connected so that it could be supplemented by the ND-J pulse analyzer, NDP Panoramic adapter, and the DAF direction finder for further evaluation of contacts. The ECM antenna was used with the TN-128 and TN-129 tuning heads. Excellent bearings were obtained on the primary frequency in passive ECM exercises on a submarine 5V radar out to 30 miles without having to worry about harmonics. On higher frequencies, such as the SS radar uses, a standard "Y" (KS-45 KS/APR) antenna was used. This was necessary since the sensitivity of the ECM antenna at these frequencies was so high that the ECM scope was completely saturated, and no bearings could be obtained. The NDP and RDJ were used to further evaluate contacts. The RDJ was used successfully in determining pulse width. The RDJ was used to determine the repetition frequency without much success. The best repetition rates were obtained by the operator using earphones. The ship evaluates the installation as highly successful, the most important feature being that of the frequency range of the APR-9. The installation was transferred on 18 October to the U.S.S. SICILY.

Recommendations:

The APR-9 equipment should be made available for installation on an interim basis, as described above, until permanent equipment is procured for shipboard use.
a. Bureau of Aeronautics

(1) Catapults and Arresting Gear

The H-4C catapult was used almost exclusively due part of the time to low wind conditions and part of the time to the unavailability of the H-2 mod 1 catapult. The AF aircraft spotted fairly easy, considering its size and weight. It is essential, however, that a tail wheel steering bar be used to expedite lining the tail wheel forward and aft along the catapult tail wheel guide. Low wind conditions reduced the usefulness of the H-2 mod 1 catapult. The average launching pressure used was 2850 psi. This exerted high shock loads on the reeling and sheave system. Consequently, in addition to routine checks, careful inspection during non-operating periods was required to insure proper operation of the bearings and spacers for the high speed towing sheaves.

The Mk-4 arresting gear with the Mk-4 CPV and the Fisher limited lift valve operated normally throughout the period, with only one difficulty being encountered. Although wind over the deck was often as low as 18 knots, the mean was about 24 knots, there was little difficulty in arresting the AF in favorable seas. Aircraft were scheduled for three hour flights and were loaded, during daylight hours with one (1) Mk-24 mine, two (2) Mk-54 Depth Charges, four (4) 3.25" rockets and a full load of fuel. Occasionally, due to adjustments of the flight schedule it was necessary to recover the AF2S in a slightly overloaded condition. When this became necessary the average overload was 200 lbs. No difficulty was encountered, however, in arresting the aircraft in this condition and no ill effects were noted in the arresting gear. Three instances occurred wherein aircraft pulled out close to the maximum available purchase cable. These times occurred during low wind conditions with the flight deck steady. The average runout experienced was approximately 117 feet.

H-2 mod 1 Catapult

A malfunction occurred when the 30-inch speed sheave on the piston end froze. Disassembly and inspection of the sheave and bearings revealed that the roller bearings had broken down, possibly due to high shock loads, resulting in excess friction and binding of bearing surfaces. Temporary repairs were made by the ship's force, and the catapult returned to an emergency standby status. Inspection of the 30-inch speed sheave on the crosshead revealed that it was also beginning to break down. While operating with AF's most launchings were made at pressures near 2900 psi. This caused unusually high shock loads to be exerted on the sheaves. All sheaves were receiving ample lubrication.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAODING STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SWATH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 29 October 1952 through 12 November 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft usage and availability; chart of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 29 October 1952 through 12 November 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAODING STRAIT, was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 30 October until 2100 on 10 November of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   PART I General Narrative
   PART II Chronological Order of Events
   PART III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
   PART IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   PART V Personnel performance and casualties
   PART VI Special comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VMA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for November 1952.

   PART I

   GENERAL NARRATIVE

   (1) During the period 29 October 1952 through 12 November 1952, the U.S.S. BAODING STRAIT, under the command of Captain H.L. RAY, 62691/1310, USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312, Lieutenant Colonel R.E. CALDERON, 07207/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer, embarked, operated as a unit of the U.S. SWATH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.
(2) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAODONG STRAIT assumed command of Task Element 95.11 at 2100, 30 October 1952 upon arrival in the operating area and was relieved upon departing at 2100, 10 November 1952 by Commanding Officer, H.M.S. GLORY. During the period of this report Task Element 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and from three to four destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to two or three ships nightly to provide one vessel for close inshore patrol under the direction of Commander Task Element 95.12.

(3) The mission of Task Element 95.11 was to conduct air operations essential to the maintenance of the blockade of the West Coast of Korea. The Task element was assigned certain tasks which are briefed in order of priority as follows:

(a) To provide by day a 2 aircraft TACCAP over TU 95.12.1 in the CHODO-SOKTO area to strike active enemy artillery, protect against enemy piston-driven aircraft, to patrol the local coastal area, and provide air spot.
(b) To provide air spot for other units of TE 95.12.
(c) To provide combat air patrol for TE 95.11.
(d) To provide air strikes requested by TE 95.15, guerilla organizations and JOC, Korea.
(e) To provide armed reconnaissance of the coast line from the Han river to HANCHON.
(f) To provide armed reconnaissance, strikes and interdiction throughout the assigned southwestern Korean land area.
(g) Provide close air support.
(h) Provide convoy cover on request.

(4) The enemy forces were the North Korean People's Army and the so-called "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. No enemy naval forces were encountered by this vessel. Enemy small craft operating in the rivers and estuaries together with numerous enemy installations ashore were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element.

(5) The BAODONG STRAIT with VM-312 embarked and H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) in company departed Sasebo, Japan on 29 October 1952 for the Yellow Sea in compliance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 271355Z October 1952. Gunnery exercises were conducted enroute in area GDKG5.

(6) Eight VM-312 aircraft which had been placed ashore for use in Field Carrier Landing Practice by newly arrived pilots landed aboard the ship from K-6 on 30 October 1952. A total of 53 carrier qualification landings were made throughout the day to qualify 6 pilots and to requalify 5 pilots who had had no recent carrier experience.

(7) Combat air operations commenced at 0630I on 31 October 1952 and dusk to dusk operations continued throughout the patrol. Five deck load launches were made daily at 1 3/4 hour intervals, since this method was considered best suited to fulfill tasks assigned. Each launch comprised approximately 50 percent of available aircraft. First priority was given to maintaining the TACCAP over TU 95.12.1. Availability permitted increasing the number
of aircraft from two to four. This increase was considered highly desirable since, when targets were not available over the Task Unit, as was frequently the case, the TARCAP was given permission to absent itself temporarily to strike in other areas when lucrative targets existed. Thus the TARCAP was always briefed regarding alternate targets and often made strikes on inland areas. It was sometimes diverted northward to make the armed reconnaissance of coastal waters to HwACHUN under cover of Air Force F-86 sweeps. Second priority was given to providing a two plane CAP for TE 95.11 after which the remaining aircraft were assigned various missions such as armed reconnaissance strikes, interdiction, and support of TE 95.15 and guerrilla organization. No special requests for air spot and convoy escort were received. Aircraft available during this patrol would not permit offering aircraft to JOC, Korea for close air support missions. In fact, during the period 3 through 7 November, flyable aircraft decreased to such an extent that the CAP was reduced to a 2 plane dawn and dusk CAP in order to maintain the 4 plane TARCAP together with adequate reconnaissance of coastal areas and estuaries.

(8) The Task Element operated continuously for 11 days in the Yellow Sea area. Combat flight operations were conducted on all 11 days. Weather conditions were generally good and limited flight operations to a slight degree only. During this patrol VMA-312 flew 350 sorties. A total of 736.7 combat hours were flown for an average of 66.97 hours per day and 31.81 sorties per day.

(9) Upon commencing air operations on 30 October 1952, there were 23 aircraft of the 24 allowed VMA-312 aboard. A series of accidents, largely operational, reduced this with the result that the average number on board ship during the patrol was 20 of which 4 had received strike damage. An average availability of 13 aircraft was achieved only by extensive structural repairs to several damaged aircraft among the 16 which remained. The maintenance organization of the squadron functioned in an outstanding fashion under an extremely heavy work load during this patrol. Aircraft assignments, availability and daily sorties are shown graphically in enclosure (2).

(10) During this patrol ships of TE 95.11 operated in geographical area N4N and W80°E with Point OB05 in the vicinity of 37°30′N 124°30′E. The following listed ships were assigned to TE 95.11 for screening purposes at various times during the period.

U.S.S. LYNX K. SMITHSON (Du-729)
R.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71)
R.M.S. Cricket (D-29)
R.M.S. OomaCK (D-57)
U.S.S. TURCH (Du-699)
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

29 October
0848I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 271353Z of October 1952, the U.S.S. BALOGH STRAIGHT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 and HU-1 detachment aboard, got underway from Sasebo, Japan for Korean operating areas "MAW" and "NKE," off the West Coast of Korea.

1250I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) joined as previously directed.

1315I/ Conducted 40mm AA firing at a towed sleeve.

1340I/ Completed AA firing.

30 October
0912I/ Commenced first period of carrier requalifications, recovered eight VMA-312 aircraft from K-6.

0925I/ Captain Webb C. JALL caught a late wire and engaged a barrier during landing qualification. Aircraft suffered a damaged propeller.

0947I/ Completed first period of requalifications.

1046I/ Commenced second period of requalification landings with seven aircraft airborne.

1123I/ One aircraft suffered class "B" damage as a result of a hard landing. Port wing center section buckled.

1150I/ Second Lieutenant A. D. HOWAN D, USMC, suffered amputation of one finger, serious cuts in two fingers and a back injury when the plane he was flying engaged the barriers during an attempted landing and nosed over to the inverted position. Aircraft failed to catch an arresting wire and was damaged beyond repair when it engaged all four barriers. Ship's bridge suffered minor damage from starboard wing of the aircraft.

1236I/ Completed second period of carrier requalifications.

1539I/ Commenced third period of requalifications with nine aircraft airborne.

1630I/ Completed third period of requalifications. A total of six pilots were qualified and five pilots were requalified with a total of fifty nine landings.

2100I/ Relieved H.M.S. OCAN and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2330I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWANSON (DD-729) and H.M.S. CHARITY (D-29) joined the Task Element as previously directed.
31 October

0630I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack warehouses near ULLIVUL. Flight damaged one warehouse and observed light AA fire during the attack.

0830I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group diverted from pre-briefed target due to weather and proceeded to cut a road bridge at KUSIGA. AA fire was observed during the attack. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack a tunnel reported as housing a grenade factory. Tunnel was damaged and two aircraft suffered minor damage from enemy small arms fire.

0910I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1015I/ Two plane CAP and three plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack a radar station at ORIP'O-RI. Planes damaged a radar antenna and one building.

1028I/ Commenced recovery of 0830I launch.

1100I/ Captain Robert C. WHITTEBREAD, USAF, suffered bruised back muscles when aircraft he was flying engaged four barriers during a landing attempt. Tailwheel and tailhook assembly were sheared off of the plane when the hook engaged the arresting gear. Aircraft suffered class "B" damage in collision with the barriers.

1230I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troops and buildings near BIN'GI. One building was destroyed with an estimated twenty troops killed and thirty wounded. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed three buildings near ONGJIN.

1248I/ Recovered 1015I launch.

1330I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCap to attack a command post on hill 291 overlooking CH'I'-DO Island. All ordnance was expended with unassessable damage.

1345I/ HMS. CHAUNTY (D-29) detached to CT E 95.12 for WORTHINGTON patrol.

1402I/ Recovered TBM aircraft with spare parts from Itazuke, Japan.

1441I/ Recovered 1230I launch.

1550I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troops near TOK-TOONG. Troops were strafed with unassessable damage and two road cuts
were made at ONSU-RI. STRIKE group attacked troop village of PINYANG-DONG destroying twelve buildings and damaging one.

1615I/ Recovered 1330I launch.
1738I/ recovered 1550I launch.
1755I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TARCHAP area until noon. Low scattered clouds gradually increased to broken with a ceiling of 2000 feet by 1500I. Visibility was unrestricted until 1400I, then gradually reduced to six miles with haze. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots, during the period.

Mission Summary:
Twelve CAP, twenty three TARCHAP and eleven STRIKE for a total of forty six sorties.

1 November
0630I/ Two plane CAP, three plane TARCHAP, and three plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCHAP to attack a large boat which was sunk near PI-DO. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near NóJUK destroying six buildings and damaging one. Small arms fire was observed during the attack.

0658I/ Launched TBS to return to Itazuke, Japan.

0845I/ Two plane CAP & three plane TARCHAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCHAP to attack a road bridge near CHAEKYONG-GONG-NI which was damaged by the flight. One plane suffered minor damage from 20 MA & fire.

0919I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCHAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCHAP for pre-briefed armed reconnaissance. Flight destroyed four buildings and damaged one near SINCHEON-NI. Four buildings were destroyed with secondary explosions near IDO-NYON and three buildings destroyed at DBOWONG-NI.

1130I/ H.M.S. CHARIITY (D-29) rejoined from CTI 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol

1135I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTI 95.12 for WORTHINGTON patrol.

1141I/ Recovered 0845I launch.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCHAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCHAP to attack gun positions near CH'INHWAMP. Three gun positions were damaged and small arms fire was observed
during the attack. Two aircraft landed at K-53, one to remove hung ordinance, before returning to the ship.

1348I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1545I/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaRCaP and three plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCaP to attack troop village near CHUNG-DO. Four buildings were destroyed with secondary explosions and flight made a reconnaissance of TaEDONG River before returning. STRIKE group attacked a rail tunnel near CHANGYON. The tunnel was heavily damaged and five rail cuts made. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-53 to remove hung ordinance.

1621I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1746I/ Recovered 1545I launch.

1748I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TaRCaP area with visibility of twelve to thirty miles during the period. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CaP, eighteen TaRCaP and six STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

2 November

0630I/ Two plane CaP, three plane TaRCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village near SUNWI-DO. Four buildings were destroyed with an estimated seven troops killed and ten wounded. One plane suffered minor damage to a wing from small arms fire. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a gun position, four buildings and a small boat near P'UNG-DO. One aircraft landed at K-53 with an oil leak.

0830I/ Two plane CaP, three plane TaRCaP, and three plane STRIKE launched. One aircraft returned to the ship with a rough running engine. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCaP to attack troop village and bunkers near SUNWI-DO. Seven buildings and a concrete blockhouse were destroyed with an estimated thirty-five troops killed. One plane was damaged by 20MM AA fire. Major Marshall C. GREGORY, USAF, attempted a landing at K-53 to remove hung ordinance. Aircraft struck a hole in the runway and cartwheeled resulting in strike damage.
Pilot was uninjured. STRIKE group spotted for naval gunfire and attacked troops in support of a guerrilla operation from SUNWI-DO Island. Eleven buildings were destroyed with four damaged and enemy troops were strafed.

0858I/ Recovered one aircraft from 0830I launch due to a rough running engine.

0949I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1025I/ H.M.S. CHERITY (D-29) rejoined from GTE 95.12 WORTHINGTON patrol.

1030I/ Detached U.S.S. LYNX K. SWANSON (DD-729) to GTE 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four planes TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies near ULLYUL. A large amount of supplies and a road bridge were destroyed.

1145I/ Recovered 0830I launch.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four planes TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village near CHANGYON. Seven buildings were destroyed and one rail cut made.

1336I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1545I/ Two plane CAP and five planes TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near TULCH'ON-NI. Five buildings were destroyed, four damaged and a command post damaged. A fire was observed during the attack.

1556I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1635I/ H.M.S. WARRIOR (D-57) joined Task Element as a relief for H.M.S. CHERITY (D-29).

1718I/ Commenced recovery of 1545I launch.

1729I/ An aircraft moving forward out of the arresting gear collided with three parked aircraft. One aircraft suffered class "B", one class "C", and two class "D" damage.

1733I/ Completed recovery of 1545I launch.

1733I/ Completed recovery of 1545I launch.

1738I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.
Weather Summary:
Clear skies and unlimited visibility provided excellent flying conditions. Winds light and variable three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CaP, twenty TaRCaP, and five STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

3 November 0630I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions and buildings near CHAIANG-WI. Revetments and trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and eight buildings were damaged.

0820I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions near SONGHWA. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage. A road bridge was damaged, a road cut made and two ox carts destroyed.

0853I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

0945I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol.

1000I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions near SONGHWA. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and one road bridge was damaged.

1038I/ Recovered 0820I launch.

1055I/ U.S.S. ANDSH (DE-699) joined Task Element as previously directed.

1145I/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCaP to attack a gun position firing on a minesweeper near P'UNGSAHN. Gun position was neutralized and flight spotted for naval gunfire directed at enemy troop positions. Subsequently, the following dispatch was received from CTU 95.12.1:

THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT, SKILL, AND DESIRE TO HELP DISPLAYED BY TaRCaP CALLED DOWN TO ASSIST SHIPS BEING FIRED UPON THIS AFTERNOON WAS SPLendid. WE ARE BOTH IMPRESSED AND GRATEFUL.

One road bridge was destroyed enroute to the ship.

1202I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol

1207I/ Recovered 1000I launch.
Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP for reconnaissance north of CH'INNAMPO. Four buildings were destroyed with a large secondary explosion occurring, two buildings were damaged one road and a railroad cut near CH'INNAMPO. Intense AA fire was encountered during the attack.

Recovered 11451 launch.

Two plane CAP and six plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a command post near P'UNGSAN. Flight damaged two buildings, a rail tunnel, a command post, and destroyed three ox carts with oxen. A plane flown by Captain Charles A. WILLIS, USMC, was hit four times by AA fire. An emergency landing was made at K-53 and during the landing roll-out the aircraft suffered class "B" damage as a result of nosing up in soft sand. The pilot was uninjured.

Recovered 13151 launch.

Recovered 15151 launch.

Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operational and TARCAP area clear until noon when gradually increasing cloudiness formed a ceiling of 2500 to 4000 feet. Winds were light and variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary
Ten CAP and twenty-six TARCAP for a total of thirty-six sorties.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack gun positions firing on a minesweeper near P'UNGSAN. Gun positions located in a village were attacked with four buildings destroyed and one damaged. A road bridge, a boat and a command post were damaged. 20MM AA fire was observed in attack on gun positions.

Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village of CHOTAUNG-DONG. Three buildings and grain storage areas damaged.

Recovered 06301 launch.

Four plane TARCAP launched. One plane made an emergency landing at K-53 due to a gas leak. CTU 95.12.1 released remaining TARCAP to attack troop positions near CHANGYON. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and a building of sheet metal construction was destroyed.

Recovered 08201 launch.
H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) rejoined from CTE 95.12 WHITEHEAD patrol.

H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

11501/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to
attack troop village and positions at TACHON-NI. Ten buildings
were destroyed and two gun positions damaged.

12171/ Recovered 10001 launch.

13301/ Two plane TARCAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1
released four plane TARCAP for reconnaissance of railroad to
CH'ANGYON. Three buildings were destroyed and one damaged near
T'ACH'ON-NI. AA fire was encountered during the attack. CTU
95.12.1 released two plane TARCAP to attack troop village near
SONGWHA. Two buildings were destroyed with one building and a
fire control bunker damaged.

13421/ Recovered 11501 launch.

15301/ Two plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 re-
quested flight to attack a building surrounded with gun positions
near CH'ANGYON. One building was destroyed with unassessable dam-
age to gun positions. AA fire was observed during the attack.

16041/ Recovered 13301 launch.

17301/ Recovered 15301 launch.

17311/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operating and TARCAP area clear with visibility varying from ten
miles to unlimited during the period. Winds were light and
variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Four CAP and twenty-five TARCAP for a total of twenty-nine
sorties.

5 November
06301/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1
requested TARCAP to attack troop village and positions that had
been firing on CH'10-DO Island. Ten buildings were destroyed and
eight damaged. Light AA fire was encountered. Two small boats
were destroyed and four damaged.

08151/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack
a troop village of YALI-DONG. Eight buildings were destroyed
with six buildings and a small boat damaged.
08381/ Recovered 06301 launch.

10001/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village of SONG-HIPI-DONG. Twenty-five buildings were destroyed with fifteen damaged and four oxen pulling carts were destroyed.

10151/ Recovered 06151 launch.

11401/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) rejoined from CTU 95.12.1 WHITEHEAD patrol.

11451/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village of HAHYN-DONG. Eight buildings were destroyed and five damaged with an estimated five troops killed, ten wounded, and nine oxen killed.

12051/ Recovered 10001 launch.

12281/ U.S.S. HAMSH (DE-699) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

13301/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI. Nineteen buildings were destroyed. Light AA fire was encountered during the attack.

13481/ Recovered 11451 launch.

15201/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCaP to attack troop village and trenches near CHANGYO. Twenty-five buildings were destroyed and three gun positions damaged. Light AA fire was observed.

15361/ Recovered 13301 launch.

16051/ One BADOZONG STRAIT officer transferred to LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) to observe destroyer operations.

17191/ Recovered 15201 launch.

17241/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Ceiling was 2000 feet with low broken clouds and visibility of three to fifteen miles. Winds were variable from eight to thirty knots and heavy seas producing marginal flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Four CAP and twenty-four TaRCaP for a total of twenty-eight sorties.
09001/ One plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack warehouses near CH'INNaMPO. Two warehouses were damaged. Light AA fire was observed. Two aircraft, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-6.

10101/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village and gun positions near CH'INNaMPO. Four buildings, two rail cars and two oxen were destroyed with one gun position damaged. A plane flown by Major Edward O. ALSIP, USMC, suffered major damage to the right wing from rocks blown into the air by a secondary explosion while attacking ox carts. Major ALSIP was escorted to K-6 for landing.

10251/ A plane flown by Captain Francis R. CRAWFIELD, USMC, suffered class "B" damage as a result of a hard landing. Port landing gear sheared off and port wing buckled.

11081/ Completed recovery of 09001 launch.

11201/ U.S.S. TARSH (DE-699) rejoined from CTE 95.12 WHITBREAD patrol.

12001/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

12001/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGYON. Sixteen buildings were destroyed, three damaged, and four oxen, pulling carts, were killed.

12121/ Recovered remaining two aircraft of 10101 launch.

13301/ Three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack railroad bridge near CHAKHYONG. A railroad locomotive was damaged, one ox killed and one rail cut made.

13531/ Recovered 12001 launch plus two aircraft that diverted to K-6 from 09001 launch.

15301/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. TARCAP joined by two aircraft previously diverted to K-6 from 10101 launch. Damaged plane was replaced by a new aircraft. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI. Twelve buildings were destroyed, nine damaged, two rail cuts made, one gun position destroyed and an estimated fifteen troops killed.

15411/ Recovered 13301 launch.

17301/ Recovered 15301 launch including the two plane from K-6.
Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operation and TaRCaP area clear with visibility of fifteen to forty miles. Winds varied from fifteen to thirty knots. The first scheduled launch was cancelled due to high winds and a pitching deck. Rough seas continued throughout the day.

Mission Summary:
Three CAP and twenty-one TaRCaP for a total of twenty-four sorties.

7 November
08001/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a road bridge near KOHO-NI. Three bridges were damaged and six oxcarts were destroyed.

10081/ Recovered 08001 launch.

11021/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11361/ Six plane TaRCaP launched. Flight was unable to proceed inland due to a ceiling of 200 feet. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village near KONGGUMP0-RI and a total of ten buildings were destroyed.

12011/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

13211/ Recovered 11361 launch.

15201/ Two plane CAP launched.

15281/ One BADOENG STRAIT officer transferred to the LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) by helicopter to observe destroyer operations.

17001/ Recovered 15201 launch.

17211/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Frontal weather with large swells and low ceilings in target area limited number of sorties flown. Ceiling varied from 0 to 1500 feet with winds variable at ten to thirty knots.

Mission Summary:
Two CAP and ten TaRCaP for a total of twelve sorties.
8 November
06451/ Two plane C*P and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CH'ANGYON. Two buildings were destroyed and two damaged.

08151/ Two plane C*P and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CH'ANGYON. Flight destroyed nine buildings, damaged five and then flew reconnaissance of coast to CH'INNAMPO.

0841/ Recovered 06451 launch.

10001/ Two plane C*P and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack building and railroads near SARIWON. Four buildings were destroyed and a rail car damaged then flight flew along the coast to CH'INNAMPO photographing target areas.

10301/ Recovered 08151 launch.

1112/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11501/ Two plane C*P and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge near CH'INNAMPO. Three buildings were destroyed and a railroad bridge, railroad bridge, and two ox carts damaged. Twenty-five troops were killed and ten wounded north of CH'INNAMPO.

12101/ H.M.S. COSBACK (D-57) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1211/ Recovered 10001 launch.

1317/ One B.006NG STRAFT officer returned aboard by highline from LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) having observed WHITBREAD patrol operations.

13301/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge near SARIWON. Rail bridge was damaged and two rail cuts made. Three ox carts were destroyed, four buildings damaged, and three road cuts made. One plane was hit by 37MM AA fire with minor damage to tail section and external fuel tank.

14031/ Recovered 11501 launch.

15151/ Two plane C*P and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a road bridge near SARIWON. Bridge was destroyed, however, one plane was hit by 37MM AA fire and was escorted to K-6 for a landing. Pilot was uninjured but plane suffered strike damage. Pilot returned by helicopter. Remainder of flight destroyed a bridge and four buildings near CH'ANGYON.
Recovered 1330I launch.

Remaining planes of 1515I launch recovered.

Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies with visibility of fifteen to thirty miles. Wind variable five to fifteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP and twenty-four TARCAP for a total of thirty-four sortie

9 November

0645I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released to attack a warehouse containing 7000 bags of rice near ALSON-H-DONG. The warehouse was destroyed and two observation posts damaged.

0820I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supply buildings near CH'INMAFO. A large amount of supplies and an ox cart were destroyed.

0837I/ Recovered 0645I launch.

1005I/ Three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop area near P'UNGSA. Damage was unassessable as targets were difficult to locate due to cumulus clouds.

1023I/ Recovered 0820I launch plus one aircraft diverted to K-6 from 1515I launch of the previous day.

1115I/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1150I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supply buildings in CH'INMAFO area. Six buildings and two ox carts were destroyed with three buildings damaged.

1200I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1201I/ Recovered 1005I launch.

1345I/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack boat construction yard at CHOCH-ON. Four boats were destroyed and boat building sites were damaged.

1358I/ Recovered 1150I launch.
Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a radar station near SOK. Station was attacked with unassessable damage. 20mm and 37mm AA fire was encountered. One rail cut and a road cut was made while returning to ship.

Recovered 1345I launch.

Recovered 1520I launch.

Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operating area clear, cumulus clouds in target area with bases at 2000 to 6000 feet. Winds light and variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP and twenty three TARCAP for a total of thirty-one sorties.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge near SONGHW. Railroad bridge and three buildings were destroyed.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge at HANOK. One railroad bridge was destroyed, two rail cuts made and a grain elevator damaged.

Recovered 0645I launch.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troops in trenches near CHANGNYON. An estimated ten troops were killed then a railroad bridge was attacked with unassessable damage.

Recovered 0820I launch.

H.H.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREED patrol.

One B4DOENG STRAIT officer came aboard by highline from LYMAN K. SWENSON having observed a WHITBREED patrol operation.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a rail overpass near CH'INNAMPO. Overpass was damaged, a rail cut made and a building damaged. Photos were made of possible future targets in CH'INNAMPO area.

U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON chopped to CTE 95.12.
12061/ Recovered 10101 launch.
12201/ Four personnel transferred to U.S.S. MAARSH (DE-699) by highline for transportation to the United States.
13401/ Two plane CnP and six plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack gun positions that had been firing on ships near Ch'0-DO Island. Damage to gun position was unassessable. One rail cut was made and a rail siding damaged.
14061/ Recovered 11451 launch.
15151/ Two plane CnP and five plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a power transformer near CHAEHYONG. The transformer and one building were destroyed. A road bridge and one ox cart were destroyed.
15491/ Recovered 13401 launch.
17071/ Recovered 15151 launch.
17161/ Set a course for Sasebo.
18301/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) detached with instructions to rendezvous with H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).
21001/ Relieved as CTIS 95.11 by H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
Area was clear during the morning with cumulus clouds forming at 2500 feet in target area during the afternoon. Visibility was five miles and winds were variable at five to fifteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Twelve CnP and twenty-seven TaRCaP for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

11 November
00321/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to rendezvous with H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).
16021/ Transferred one officer by helicopter to U.S.S. MAARSH (DE-699) for transportation to United States.

12 November
07011/ U.S.S. MAARSH (DE-699) detached to proceed independently to Yokosuka, Japan.
12171/ Moored to buoy number 18 in Sasebo, Japan.
1. Hung ordnance was a serious problem for this operating period. When time permitted, planes with hung ordnance were directed to land at K-53 emergency landing field. Three of these landings ended in major damage to the planes because of soft spots resulting from water erosion of the beach. As a result of these experiences, planes with hung rockets and 100# bombs were landed aboard and only those with larger bombs were sent to K-6 for dearming.

2. The 100 pound G.P. AN-30-Al bombs with different lugs were not segregated when received aboard. This resulted in great difficulty locating the usable bombs to load on the MK-55 bomb racks. The single suspension lug on the 100 pound G.P. was not modified for the Mark 9 launcher, making a standard load impossible.

3. The performance of and results obtained by the use of napalm bombs were excellent. The few instances of duds are believed to have been caused by igniter faults. MK-23 igniters and two MK-173 fuzes were used on each MK-78 hod-1 tank. The threaded receptacle for the fuze in many tanks was bent out of shape, resulting in the inability to install fuzes. This was due to rough handling prior to delivery to this ship.

4. On one occasion, a HVam which was jettisoned over the side of the ship exploded several seconds after contact with the water. This rocket had failed to fire while carried by an aircraft and had detached itself from the aircraft during the arrested landing. The reason for exploding when jettisoned could not be determined. No damage to the ship resulted.

Recommendations:

A. A wooden plug should be installed in the tank fuze receptacle prior to shipment in order to avoid damaging it.

B. Either the single suspension lug on the 100 pound G.P. AN-N30-Al should be modified to fit the MK-55 bomb rack or the aero 144 racks should be installed on the aircraft.

5. Ammunition expenditures

a. During the operating periods covered by this report the following ordnance was expended:

- 29 October through 12 November 1952
- By VAM-312 aircraft
- 21 1000# GP Bombs
- 107 500# GP Bombs
- 238 100# GP Bombs

- By USS BADENGE STRAIT
- 760 Rounds 40MM Ammunition
5. Ammunition Expenditures (Continued)

By VNA-312 aircraft

84 260# Frag Bombs
3 250# GP Bombs
950 5" 2V4R Rockets
125 3.5" Rockets
120 Napalm Bombs
52,740 Rounds 20mm Ammo
35,500 Rounds 50 Cal. Ammo
PART IV

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Own battle damage
   a. None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
   b. Battle damage received by Vm-312 aircraft:
      31 October 1952  2 a/c received small arms hits,
      1 November 1952  1 a/c hit by 20MM fire; minor damage.
      2 November 1952  2 a/c hit by small arms fire; minor damage.
      3 November 1952  1 a/c received minor damage by small arms fire.
      6 November 1952  1 a/c hit with small arms fire; minor damage.

   For detailed damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Reports. (OpNav 3480.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.

2. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.
   a. The ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as a member of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.
   b. Damage inflicted on the enemy by Vm-312 aircraft follows:

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<td>Reveted buildings - 4</td>
<td>Reveted Buildings - 8</td>
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1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in the general high standards of the Navy and Marine Corps.

2. Casualties

   a. At 0925 on 30 October 1952, 2nd Lieutenant A.D. HOWARD, USMCR, while landing aboard the U.S.S. BALDING STRAIT during carrier qualification, failed to engage an arresting wire and crashed through three barriers. The aircraft came to rest in an inverted position against the island superstructure. 2nd Lieutenant HOWARD had his left hand injured to the extent that the 5th digit was severed.

   b. At 1100 on 31 October 1952, Captain Robert C. WHITEHEAD, USMC, while landing aboard the U.S.S. BALDING STRAIT on return from a strike flight, lost his tail wheel and hook on making contact with the deck and crashed into the barriers as a result, the pilot sustained a strained back. He was transferred to a naval hospital two days later.
1. During the first few days of this operating period there were several serious aircraft accidents aboard ship attributable to lack of training and experience on the part of both pilots and landing signal Officers. It was necessary to conduct carrier qualifications on the first day of this period. During these qualifications, two aircraft were damaged to such an extent as to be beyond repair aboard ship, despite the unusual competence of the squadron maintenance personnel in effecting repairs. Two additional landing accidents occurred aboard ship in which the aircraft suffered strike or major overhaul damage. On another occasion an aircraft taxied out of the landing area and crashed into aircraft parked forward of the barrier, damaging three of these planes, one seriously, and with serious damage resulting to itself. The procedure of shipping pilots to the forward area to qualify and obtain experience in carrier operations seems unduly expensive in terms of damaged aircraft. In this instance it also seriously hampered the conduct of combat operations.

Recommendation:

Pilots and landing signal Officers destined for carrier duty in the combat area should be adequately trained before departing the continental limits.

2. This vessel departed port with only a partial complement of aircraft. The need to conduct qualification landings for new pilots, with the resulting damage indicated in paragraph above, further reduced the availability of aircraft. Also, during the period of this report five aircraft of necessity were landed at an emergency landing strip on Paengnyong-Do. Three were directed there for the removal of hung ordnance. Another landed because of mechanical difficulties and the fifth because of battle damage. Two of these aircraft suffered major damage during rollout due to the poor condition of the landing strip. There are no good landing strips in the immediate vicinity of the operating area although beach sites presently in use could be rendered adequate with little effort. When the aircraft with hung ordnance or battle damage are sent to fields further South, their services are lost to the Task Element for the remainder of the day and sometimes part of the following day. This reduction of aircraft coupled with inadequate replacement service seriously jeopardized accomplishment by this Task Element of its assigned tasks.

Recommendation:

The complement of Corsairs on the 105 class CVâ should be maintained at 24 through provision of sufficient aircraft in the forward area for this purpose.

Note: Arrangements to effect improvement of the K-53 landing strip at Paengnyong-Do have been made with JOG Korea.

-23-
3. The volume of classified communications traffic handled during this operating period was extremely heavy. On the third day of operations one ECM developed electro/mechanical trouble which put it out of service periodically thereafter for periods up to 3 hours. This failure of one of the two ECM's allowed this ship presented a major difficulty. Since both machines were being used to nearly capacity, the remaining machine was unable to carry the load, and delays in handling traffic resulted. Toward the end of the operating period this machine also developed trouble, but remained operational.

Recommendation:

On escort carrier performing the duties of an Element Commander should be allowed an extra ECM to be used as a spare during its tour of duty in the Yellow Sea. A letter/recommendation in this regard is being submitted.

4. Delivery of ship-to-shore communications traffic is slow and sometimes inaccurate due to the volume of traffic.

Recommendation:

A point-to-point circuit should be used for a period of 2 to 4 hours each evening with either Radio Tokyo or Radio Guam. It is believed that frequencies are already assigned for this use. Arrangements along these lines should materially expedite the delivery of high precedence traffic without interfering with other units and commands.

5. Hangar Deck Operations:

Normally, sixteen Corsairs can be spotted on the hangar deck. However, space required for the helicopter, turnapull, QEC stands, large work tables and de-greasing tanks for aircraft machine guns has reduced the space available for parking aircraft so that only fourteen can be accommodated. Thus a serious problem results when it is necessary to accommodate several wrecked aircraft being returned for salvage. The hangar deck during this operation on several occasions was overcrowded with resultant delays, while continuing repairs to several damaged aircraft and conducting routine checks. When an aircraft is damaged to the point that it is usable only for scrap, and when it is apparent to the Commanding Officer that retention of the aircraft aboard will delay maintenance of other aircraft, it is considered that the engine should be removed, the aircraft should be stripped of any useful parts and the remainder dumped overboard.

Recommendation:

The authority of the Commanding Officer to dispose of a damaged aircraft in the forward area should be broadened in cases where there is no hope whatsoever of effecting repairs. This authority should require stripping of the aircraft prior to such disposal.
6. The bridle arrester designed and reported by the USS KANDOVA (CVE-114) in Confidential letter 583 serial 0182 of 15 October 1952 is considered to be an improvement over the bridle arrester proposed by the USS BATAAN (CVL-29). However, photographs taken while launching show the bridle flaps up as it was being arrested. There has not yet been any indication of any damage to tail surfaces resulting from the bridle movement.

Recommendation:

The possibility that when using this bridle arrester the bridle may damage the tail surfaces necessitates close watch in this regard.

7. The V-4 division accomplished the following during the reported period: Three engines preserved, five props preserved, eight props assembled, one QLC assembled, thirty five tires mounted. In addition, shops were maintained and maintenance personnel were assigned to assist in squadron maintenance work. An N-7 tank was mounted on a cart with small pneumatic wheels. The tank was fitted with a drain, drain valve, and a drain hose (surveyed fire hose) of sufficient length to reach from the hangar deck to the water level. This is used as a drain oil bowser to satisfy a much needed method of safely disposing of drain oil, particularly when it is contaminated with gasoline.

8. The 40th ammunition training allowance as outlined in BuOrd Circular Letter A10-49 of 24 June 1949 and modified by COLAIRPAC INSTRUCTION 8000.1A of 21 July 1952 should be increased. In accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 2-51 (Revised) all vessels are required to engage in AA training exercises when passing through area "GOOKAN", Kasebo. While the present allowance is adequate to fulfill this requirement, very little is available for the training of green crews prior to the vessel's departure from the United States.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the allowance of 40th ammunition be increased so that personnel can be adequately trained prior to the ship's deployment to West Pac.

9. Departure from the type ship's allowance of bombs should be authorized and specified by type commanders in order to more closely approximate the number and types of ordnance being used in a specific combat area in accordance with the targets being presented. This ship has found it necessary to vary from the type commander's allowance after it left the United States, whereas it should have been possible to anticipate the type of ordnance being used prior to departure. It is recognized that it would be difficult to anticipate the type of targets to be destroyed long in advance and, accordingly, the type of ordnance most suitable. However, an increase in 1,000 pound GP bombs, the inclusion of 250 pound GP Bombs and of at least ten 500 pound HAF bombs was found to be necessary during this operation. A similar requirement is anticipated for subsequent operations. Need for this change was first experienced by this vessel when on previous duty in the Yellow Sea in January and February 1952, and also by the ship which this
vessel relieved. Thus it is felt that the continued need for these ordnance items is reasonably assured.

Recommendation:

The ordnance allowance as specified by the Type Commander should be changed to provide for:

a. Increasing 1,000 lb GP bombs from 24 to 50, with a reduction in the amount of 500 lb GP bombs from 300 to 250.

b. Inclusion of at least ten 500 lb SAP bombs.

d. Inclusion of one-hundred 250 lb GP bombs and reduction of 220 lb or 260 lb fragmentation bombs by a similar amount.

10. Time and operating conditions do not permit belting 20MM aircraft ammunition and finning aircraft rockets while the ship is in the operating area. This must be done during the replenishing period before leaving port. It is a considerable hardship on ordnance crews who are thus denied an adequate rest and recreation period while the ship is in port.

Recommendation:

All 20MM aircraft ammunition should be delivered belted.

11. This ship sustained damage to two MK-51 Mod 2 directors due to an aircraft accident on 15 October 1952. During the following ship repair and replenishment period from 18 October through 29 October it was possible to replace only one director, resulting in the ship operating in Korea area "NAN" with 14% of the effectiveness of its armament substantially reduced.

Recommendation:

Replacement MK-51 Mod-2 directors should be readily available in the forward area.

H. L. Ray

Copy to:
CNO (2) advance
CINCFLTLT (2) advance
CINCPLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVE (1) advance
COMNAVSEVENFLTLT (1) advance

AUTHENTICATED
S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

CTF-77 (1) advance CO, USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
CCL.M,INIPAC (5) CO, USS RENDOV (CVE-114)
CINCSEVPAC CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
COMFAJAPAC CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
COMC.RDIV-15
COMC.RDIV-17
CO, FAMARUPTAC (2)
CG, FAMFMFPAC (1) advance
CG, FAMFPAC (1) advance
CG, 1st MAWRAIWING
CO, FAAG-12
CO, FAM-312
1 November 1952

**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 2 NOVEMBER 1952**

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**Ammo Loads**

- A - all a/c full gun loads.
- B - 2 a/c Napalm and 8-HVAR.
- C - 4 x 500# D.C./inst. and 4-260# inst./.01.
- D - all a/c 500# inst./.01 and 4-250# inst./.01.
- E - all a/c 500# inst./.01 and 8-HVAR.
- F - all a/c 500# Napalm and 8-HVAR.
- G - all a/c 500# GP inst./.01 and 4-250 inst./.01.

**Copy to:**

- MEDICAL (2)
- READY I (2)
- SQUADRON OFFICE (6)
- AIR INTELLIGENCE (2)
- CPO QUARTERS BB
- ALL OFFICERS' STAT HHRS
- EACH SHOREN SHIP (3)

**ENCLOSURE (1)**
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and
Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SOWTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 19 November through 29 November 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) CPNAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
(3) Damage Confirmed by intelligence sources, report of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report
of the Task Element 95.11 for the period 19 November through 29 November
1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT
was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 19 November until 2100 on 28
November of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   Part I General Narrative.
   Part II Chronological Order of Events.
   Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment,
   including ammunition expenditure.
   Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
   Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by
referring to VHA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for November 1952.
A. During the period of 19 November to 29 November 1952, Captain H. L. Hay, O62691, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADENGT STRAIGHT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11, Commander Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group. The U.S.S. BADENGT STRAIGHT (CVE-116) operated as a unit of T.E. 95.11. Ships assigned CTE 95.11 as screen were the U.S.S. HICKOX (DE-673), U.S.S. WISEMAN (DE-677), H.A.S. COMUS (D-20), and H.M.C.S. Haida (DDE-215). The screen varied from two to four ships as screen ships were detached to CTE 95.12 for night patrols.

B. During the period of this report the U.S.S. BADENGT STRAIGHT (CVE-116) operated off the West coast of Korea in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. During daylight hours, the carrier remained in the general vicinity of 37°20'N 124°40'E and retired southward during the night.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West coast of Korea is blockade of the Korean West Coast. This blockade is performed by patrol ships of CTE 95.12, CTE 95.11 aircraft and screening ships, and by the troops on occupied islands. A group of five islands stretching from the Han River estuary in the South to the Taedong estuary in the North are occupied and obtain information by radar, friendly agents and guerrilla action. These islands are of great value in warning of enemy air action and in the rescue of United Nations pilots forced down in North Korea.

The assigned tasks of CTE 95.11 are air protection of the blockade forces (TE 95.12 and TE 95.15) against enemy artillery fire and enemy aircraft, air spot for friendly gunfire, close air support of attacks by friendly forces, surveillance of coastal area, armed reconnaissance, and strikes against enemy targets in assigned area. In performing these tasks, CTE 95.11 maintained, during daylight hours two defensive C.P.S over carrier, four TARCPS controlled by CTE 95.12.1 in target area and supplied STRIKE groups to attack targets as requested by CTE 95.12 and CTE 95.15. STRIKES also attacked targets developed from intelligence sources.

D. The full potential of the ship and squadron could not be realized during this patrol because of a shortage of aircraft. With an operating allowance of 24 F4U model aircraft, there were never more than twenty aboard ship. While some additional aircraft were delivered on board during this patrol, these were only adequate to cover attrition.

E. The patrol was a most interesting one, with a considerable number of worthwhile targets developing, and substantial damage is believed to have been inflicted on the enemy. Most targets were selected on the basis of requests for assistance received from friendly troops occupying the small islands which fringe the North Korean territory. The more important incidents of the patrol are listed herein.
F. On the 21st of November the troops on SUNWI-10 reported having been heavily shelled from the mainland which is only about 1000 yards away and requested an air strike. Because of the aircraft shortage and commitments elsewhere it was decided to arm the two plane CAP with Napalm and rockets for strikes in this nearby area. All except DAWN and DUSCAP were so armed for the remainder of the patrol. The Task Element closed the islands to the extent practicable in order to retain voice contact and control of the CAP throughout the strikes. The napalm strikes on the mainland appeared to be highly successful as friendly troops reported fires burning for twelve hours after the initial strike with several secondary explosions. It was reported that morale of friendly troops was improved 100% by the strikes. Needless to say, this accomplishment was equally beneficial to the morale of the pilots of VNA-312 and the ships personnel.

G. Another request for air strikes was received on 23 November when friendly forces on the mainland occupying the mountainous terrain of joint CHANGSON-GOT (XC 4522) reported being under attack by 100 enemy troops. The TARCAP assigned to CTU 95.12.1 was released to hit this area and also to air spot for the surface ship assigned. Low level attacks were made on reported enemy installations but identification of targets and damage assessment was difficult because of the rugged terrain and heavy ground cover which exists in that area. A subsequent report from friendly troops, however, reported that the combined attack repelled the enemy who sustained losses of 12 KIA and 9 WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

H. The encounter between six corsairs and two MiGs is noted because of the apparent success of the defensive tactics employed. The six corsairs of a strike group had just recovered from their initial attack on a pre-briefed target on 28 November when the 2 MiGs started making a series of three firing runs from overhead and astern. Five corsairs assumed a tight circular tail chase formation at low altitude, in accordance with squadron doctrine, the 6th aircraft being separated and unable to join. This latter aircraft took evasive action from the MiG on his tail by threading through the passes between the hills at an extremely low altitude. Two corsairs of the larger group were able to bring their rockets to bear and fired eight 45s in the general direction of one MiG which then broke off action. Five corsairs in a tail chase proved to be too large a group and subsequent deep strike sorties have been maintained at four aircraft or multiples of four in order that aircraft can join up in a tight circle with all planes in a steeply banked turn.

I. The policy of interchanging officers with H.H.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and screening ships of TE 95.11 for familiarization and training purposes was continued during this patrol.

J. A noteworthy feature of this period was the prevailing flyable weather. During the nine consecutive days of the patrol, all scheduled flights were performed without interruption from weather or other causes.
K. VFA-312 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cameron, 07027, USMC, during this period. Planes assigned this squadron consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft on board during this patrol was 20 and the average availability per day was 17.0. Total number of sorties flown during the period was 339 for a total of 786.2 hours. A total of 119 hours of this was "over the target time."
13001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack gun positions in CHANGNYON and P'ungsan area. This flight destroyed three gun positions, cut one road bridge and destroyed one building.

13451/ Recovered 11001 launch.

15001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack road and railroad bridges in CHINANPO area. Planes destroyed two bridges and sank one small boat with an estimated two troops killed.

15161/ Recovered 13001 launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 11451 launch.

16501/ Two aircraft, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-6.

17131/ Recovered 15001 launch.

17201/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds at 1500 feet in operating area lifting to 3000 feet in the target area, except 2000 feet over the southern sector. Fresh northerly winds. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TaRCAP and four STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

21 November
07001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack bridges in ONGJIN area. Planes cut three roads, set fires in village, and damaged a bridge bypass.

09001/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack troop bunkers and warehouses in CHANGNYON area. Planes damaged bunkers and warehouses. STRIKE group attacked road bridges in ONGJIN area. One bridge destroyed. One plane of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire damaging an oil cooler. Plane later landed aboard safely.

09101/ Recovered 07001 launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 yesterday at 1650.

10191/ CTU 95.12.4 requested aircraft to attack enemy positions in the area as mortars and artillery had fired continually on SUNGWI-DO for the past week.

10231/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DU-673) rejoined the screen from CTU 95.12, WHITBEAD patrol.
1100I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaKCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaKCaP to attack railroad cars in SIMWON-NI area, observation point in P'UNGSA area and power transformer in CHAMYONG area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged one transformer and two rail cars, cut two railroads and neutralized an observation post.

1123I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1151I/ H.M.S. COMMANDER (D-20) advised CTE 95.1 of a casualty to distiller pump which was repairable but fresh water supply would require replenishment from tanker at PAHNGYONG-DO island.

1300I/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaKCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaKCaP to attack railroad cars in P'UNGSAN area. Planes destroyed two bridges, cut one road and destroyed one building. STRIKE group attacked supply village in CHANGYON area. Twelve buildings were destroyed.

1324I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1434I/ H.M.S. COMMANDER (D-20) detached to proceed to PAHNGYONG-DO for repair of distilling pump and replenishment of fresh water supply. H.M.S. RUNA (DEE-215) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITAKIN patrol.

1500I/ Two plane CaP and three plane TaKCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaKCaP to attack command post on hill 297 in the P'UNGSAN area and buildings in the OCH'ON area. Planes damaged command post with estimated fifteen troops killed, destroyed five buildings and left three burning.

1530I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1700I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1710I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1930I/ CTE 95.12 advised CTE 95.11 that mine-sweepers would be operating close to shore, 23, 24, and 25 November and requested CTE 95.11 to provide air cover against enemy coastal artillery, using smoke screen if necessary.

CTE 95.12 was advised that no smoke making equipment was available but that TaKCaP would be assigned additional responsibility of covering mine-sweepers during the operation.

Weather Summary:
Broken low cloud in operating and target areas at 2500 to 3500 feet. Haze and shallow ground fog in central sector of target area until 1000. Average to good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CaP, Nineteen TaKCaP, and eight STRIKE for a total of thirty-seven sorties.
22 November
07001/ Two plane CatP and four plane TaXCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaXCaP to attack command post in P'ungsan area. Plane damaged two buildings, got direct hits on command post trenches and cut one railroad. Two planes of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire causing minor damage. Planes returned safely.

09001/ Two plane CatP and four plane TaXCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaXCaP to attack buildings in Ch'inu'po area. Planes destroyed one building, damaged radar position and hit gun positions.

09221/ Recovered 07001 launch.

09351/ mg.s. WhUb (U-20) rejoined the screen after having repaired distilling pump and replenished fresh water supply.

11001/ Two plane CatP, four plane TaXCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaXCaP to attack road bridges in Taungyong area. Planes cut one road and damaged revetments. TaXCaP group attacked supply dump in Ch'angyon area. Planes destroyed five buildings with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded.

11251/ mg.s. WhUb (UWS-215) rejoined the screen from CTB 95.12, WhITBedN patrol.

11321/ Recovered 09001 launch. One plane struck LSO screen with port wing during landing, damaging port wing and Killeron.

11451/ mg.s. WhUbN (UW-677) detached to CTB 95.12, WhITBedN patrol.

13001/ Two plane CatP and two plane TaXCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaXCaP to attack troops in Sinch'on area. Planes damaged a railroad car and dropped bombs in troop area with unassessable damage.

13151/ Recovered 11001 launch.

13261/ Two TBM of Vt - 23 "COBFISH" line, landed aboard with spare part and personnel.

15001/ Two plane CatP and four plane TaXCaP launched. CatP attacked troop area as requested by CTU 95.12.4 with unassessable damage and returned to act as defensive CatP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaXCaP to attack railroad bridge in Ch'angyon area. Planes cut one railroad and two roads and destroyed nine buildings with an estimated twenty troops killed.

15141/ Recovered 13001 launch.
1654I/ Recovered 15001 launch.

1720I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
High overcast with ceiling 8000 feet. Low scattered to broken clouds in target area. Visibility 10 to 15 miles. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten C\P, eighteen TA\RC\P, and three STRIKE for a total of thirty one sorties.

23 November

The U.S.S. WISCONSIN (WG-677) was unable to return to the force having struck a submerged rock while performing patrol duty under the operational control of CTU 95.12. Resulting damage minor but required dry dock facilities for repair. Ship was subsequently ordered to Japanese port for repairs.

0700I/ Two C\P, two TA\RC\P, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12 released TA\RC\P to attack supply dump in P'U\NG\DN area. Planes destroyed one warehouse and bombed and strafed troops in trench. STRIKE group attacked buildings in T'A\ET\AN area and destroyed four buildings, one railroad car, damaged two rail cars, and go a direct hit on railway tunnel entrance.

0900I/ Two planes C\P and four plane TA\RC\P launched. C\P released to attack trenches and bunkers in S\UM\I-10 area as requested by CTU 95.12.4. Planes bombed area with unassessable damage. Planes returned to act as defensive C\P. CTU 95.12.1 released TA\RC\P to attack buildings in P'U\NG\DN area. Planes destroyed one building with an estimated ten troops killed. Trenches were bombed in the area with unassessable damage. Two planes of this flight were hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage to wing and flaps.

0926I/ Recovered 07001 launch.

1100I/ Two plane C\P, four plane TA\RC\P, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TA\RC\P to attack mortar positions in Ch'ONG\DN area. Damage was unassessable. C\P released to attack gun position in CHANG\NYON area. Gun position was neutralized. At 1120I during his second run on this target Captain Charles W. WILLIS, U.S.N., was hit in the left arm by small arms fire. Captain WILLIS was able to make a landing on K-53, the emergency strip on P'U\NG\DN-10, and was later evacuated by plane to a Korean hospital. Damage to plane was a small hole in the canopy. Plane was flown back to the ship later in the day. STRIKE group attacked ammunition dump in HAEJ\ONG-NI area. Planes damaged two buildings, knocked out a loading dock and damaged a large amount of supplies.
Recovered 09001 launch.

12001/ h.m.s. COHS (U-20) detached to CTU 95.12, WHITEHAWK patrol.

13001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAHCAp launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAp to attack mortar positions in PONGGANG-MI area and gun positions in P'UNGSAH area. Both areas attacked with unassessable damage.

13181/ Recovered 11001 launch.

15001/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and two plane TAHCAp launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAp to attack supplies and docks in CH'INJAMPO area. Planes destroyed two small boats and damaged supplies with direct hits. STRIKE group attacked supplies in T'AN'AN area. Planes destroyed ten buildings, damaged a radar station and made four road cuts.

15341/ Recovered 13001 launch.

17171/ Recovered 15001 launch.

17561/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather summary:
Scattered to broken low clouds, ceiling 2000 feet lowering in target area to 1500 feet. Radiation ground fog in central and southern TAHCAp areas. Weak trough passing through area during morning period. Flying conditions mostly average.

Mission summary:
Ten CAP, twelve TAHCAp, and twelve STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

24 November

07001/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAHCAp, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAp to attack buildings in CHANGYUN area. Planes destroyed three buildings and six sheds. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpass in SINH'ON area. Plane destroyed overpass and cut one railroad. One plane of this flight was hit by small caliber AA fire, resulting in minor damage. Plane landed aboard safely.

09001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAHCAp launched. CAP released to attack radio station and buildings in HONGUNPO-RI area. Planes destroyed six buildings and damaged five others. At about 0915, a plane of this flight flown by Captain R. W. KUHLMAN, USMC, was hit by automatic AA fire of 50 caliber type. Left oil cooler was damaged causing loss of oil, propeller overspeeding, and consequent freezing of engine about two minutes after being hit. A water landing was made one mile from shore about ten miles south of CHODO Island. Pilot was rescued by helicopter from CHODO after having been in the water only 12 minutes. The pilot was uninjured and returned to the ship the following day.

-8-
CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies and troops in SunGun area. Planes destroyed eight buildings, a large amount of supplies, killed an estimated thirteen troops and wounded fifteen.

0925I/ recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launch. CAP released to attack troops in Sumi-D0 area. Planes destroyed seven buildings. At 1140I during this attack, Captain Carleton M. GREEN, USN, dropped fragmentation bombs from a low altitude instead of a napalm bomb as intended. The plane was disabled in a water landing was made ten miles South of Sunwi-D0 Island. The first helicopter was at the scene in about fifteen minutes but was unable to lift the pilot from the water. A second larger helicopter was sent from K-53 and completed the rescue. Pilot was uninjured. Total time in the water was forty-five minutes. Remaining plane returned as defensive CAP.

CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun position and troops in ChangNyon area. Planes damaged a gun position and destroyed supplies. STRIKE group attacked supplies in ChangNyon area. Planes bombed and made two road cuts.

1119I/ recovered 0900I launch.

1128I/ H.M.S. MDfS (D-20) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, Whitbread patrol.

1156I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance and two TARCAP launched. Armed reconnaissance attacked and destroyed gun positions in ChangNang-Ni area. An estimated fifteen troops killed and one wounded.

1315I/ recovered 1100I launch.

1435I/ Captain Gantt, USN, returned to ship by helicopter from K-53.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP and TARCAP released to attack troops in ChangNyon area. Troop area received one hundred percent bomb coverage and fires were left burning. CAP returned to act as defensive CAP.

1541I/ recovered 1300I launch.

1729I/ Two aircraft from 1300I flight, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-14. recovered remaining planes of 1500I launch.
17361/ Force retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Overcast most of the day at 1500 to 8000 feet. Light rain in the target area. Visibility 8 miles. Marginal flying conditions becoming average by 1100I.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, seven STRIKE, and four armed reconnaissance for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

25 November
0700I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and troops in U'CU'-O-NI area. Planes destroyed nine buildings with an estimated twenty-seven troops killed. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in CHANGYON area. Planes bombed two gun positions and troop area with unassessable damage.

0900I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in SAHNgUYUNG area. Planes destroyed nine buildings and damaged four. STRIKE group attacked troops in CHANGYAN-OI area. Planes destroyed twenty-nine buildings and damaged ten.

0924I/ Recovered 0700I Launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in U'CU'-O-NI area, and destroyed six buildings. Plan returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop positions in CHANGYON area. Planes destroyed large amount of supplies and damaged one building with an estimated five troops killed.

1116I/ Recovered 0900I Launch.

1145I/ U.S. HUBA (WW-673) rejoined the screen from CTI 95.12, WHITBAND patrol.

1218I/ U.S. HUBA (WW-215) detached to CTI 95.12, WHITBAND patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and trenches in the SUNGWIL area. Planes destroyed three buildings and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun position in SUNGWIL area. Planes destroyed a gun position, destroyed four buildings and damaged five. STRIKE group attacked warehouses in U'CU'-N-MI area. Planes destroyed one building and damaged six.
13171/ Recovered 11001 launch.

15001/ Two plane CAP and two plane TAIKAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIKAP to attack buildings in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes damaged one building and two railroad overpasses. STRIKE group attacked buildings in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes cut three road bridges and one road.

15181/ Recovered 13001 launch.

17201/ Recovered 15001 launch.

17261/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather summary:
Scattered low, middle and high clouds. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Average flying conditions, light winds.

Mission summary:
Ten CAP, fifteen TAIKAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties.

26 November

07001/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TAIKAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIKAP to attack ammunition dump in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes dropped bombs in dump area, destroyed two gun positions and damaged one, destroyed one building and damaged one. STRIKE group attacked troops in CH'INP'U area. Planes started fires in troop area with bombing and strafing.

09001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAIKAP launched. CAP attacked troops in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes destroyed eighteen buildings and one small boat and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIKAP to attack buildings in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged three gun positions.

09201/ Recovered two aircraft diverted to K-6 on previous day.

09251/ Recovered 07001 launch.

11001/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TAIKAP launched. CAP attacked troops in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged a gun position. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIKAP to attack supplies on dock in CH'INP'U-NI area. Planes left supplies on dock burning, destroyed three warehouses, damaged three warehouses and one boat. STRIKE group attacked troops in CH'INP'U-NI area, destroying seven buildings with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded. A bridge and trenches were damaged.
Recovered 09001 launch.

Two replacement aircraft landed aboard from K-6.

U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

H.M.S. HAKA (DUE-215) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

Two plane CAP and three plane TACAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of CHUKTONG. Planes destroyed ten buildings and left village burning. CTE 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack buildings in OMCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings and damaged two. A railroad was cut and a rail overpass damaged.

Recovered 11001 launch.

Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and three plane TACAP launched. CTE 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack buildings in OMCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged trench and gun positions, destroyed a road bridge, damaged a road bridge and cut one road. STRIKE group attacked buildings in CHANGYON area destroying four buildings, one bridge, cut two railroads, and damaging two buildings and a radar station.

Recovered 13001 launch.

Recovered 15001 launch.

Task Element retired southward for night.

Weather Summary:
Cyclonic flow aloft causing high cloudiness throughout the operating area. Ceiling 7000 feet lowering near end of period to 3000 feet. Average flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TACAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

27 November

Two plane CAP, four plane TACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP damaged buildings in NONGCH'PO area with strafing before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTE 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack buildings in the ANAK area. Planes made excellent hits destroying seven buildings and strafed remaining buildings. STRIKE group attacked fuel tanks in CHINANPO area. Planes scored direct hits on tanks with rockets, resulting in no apparent damage. One plane developed an oil leak and was escorted to K-53 for landing. Escort knocked out road bridge enroute. Remaining aircraft destroyed one building, one gun position, cut a railroad, and damaged a building. One plane was slightly damaged by an small arms fire.
Two plane U.P, two plane UUKE, and four plane TaRCaP launched. U.P attacked troop village in SWII-10 area. Flight destroyed eight buildings and damaged six before returning to act as defensive U.P. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack road bridge in OmCh'ON-NI area. Flight scored a road cut and damaged the bridge. Flight then destroyed six buildings, one warehouse, and damaged a road bridge. UUKE and spotting mission attacked a gun position in SWII-DO area. Gun position was damaged. Aircraft of this flight spotted ship's gunfire and made strafing runs which resulted in probable destruction of gun position, an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded. One plane was hit by small caliber fire with minor damage.

U.S. mIuh. (D-673) rejoined screen from CTU 95.12, WHITE-Bullet patrol.

Recovered 07001 launch.

Two plane U.P, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane UUKE launched. U.P attacked a village in OmJIN area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged five with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded before returning to act as defensive U.P. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack road bridges in HwDU area. One bridge was damaged, three roads cut, eight buildings destroyed, radar antenna destroyed and one building damaged. UUKE group attacked tunnels in T'AL'TAN area. Plane closed one tunnel, destroyed one building, and attacked troops in caves and buildings with unassessable damage.

Recovered 09001 launch.

K....U. mIuh. (D-215) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITE-Bullet patrol.

Two plane U.P and four plane TaRCaP launched. U.P attacked troop village in CHANGKUN area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, strafed a gun position and a group of trenches before returning to act as defensive U.P. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troops in OmCh'ON-NI area. A group of building were left burning and a truck was destroyed with two troops killed. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-14 to pick up photographs required for target analysis.

Army Guerrilla unit based on PaeNGYONG-DO Island reported that one hundred troops with mortars and machine guns were attacking friendly troops occupying point CHUNGKUN-GOT (XC 4522) and requested that CTU 95.11 aircraft attack enemy troops as soon as possible.

Recovered 11001 launch.
13511/ CTE 95.11 advised LEOP and JOG that TARCAP had been diverted to attack enemy troops.

15001/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops menacing friendly troops in NONGCH'ON-0-11 area. Troop area attacked with unassessable damage. Major Raymond J. HIGHFEAR, USMC, made low pass, reported a rough running engine during pull up, and was escorted to K-53 for emergency landing. A wheels down landing was attempted with six rockets and an external fuel tank aboard. The plane was observed to nose over to an inverted position at the edge of the shallow water. Within a few seconds the plane was burning intensely preventing rescue by nearby personnel. A doctor was dispatched from the ship by helicopter immediately and pronounced the major dead when he arrived. The aircraft was completely destroyed. STRIKE group diverted to assist TARCAP attacking enemy troops near NONGCHON 0-11, but was unable to assist due to low ceiling and limited attack area. STRIKE group attacked village of SUNWI-DONG and destroyed twenty-eight houses and damaged a railroad car.

15131/ Recovered 13001 launch.

16491/ Recovered 15001 launch, plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-14.

17291/ Force retired southward for the night.

17371/ A dispatch from CTU 95.12.4 reported the 15001 STRIKE of 21 November silenced mortar positions that were attacking the island of SUNWI-DO, thereby raising morale one hundred percent. Fires were reported still burning in the area twelve hours after STRIKE with secondary explosions.

Weather summary:
Low overcast at 3500 to 4000 feet with rain until early afternoon. Marginal weather conditions in the target area restricted target visibility. Visibility 5 to 8 miles in rain. Cold front 400 miles northwest of operating area.

Mission summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of forty-six sorties.

28 November
07001/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in SONGCH'ON- NI area. Direct hits with Napalm destroyed twelve buildings containing troops. Small arms fire was encountered during attack. A coastal gun was neutralized with rockets. STRIKE group attacked group village in ONGJIN area. Eight buildings were destroyed with Napalm and a truck strafed.
09001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAACAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and supplies in UPCH'-0-RI area. Ten buildings were destroyed and five damaged with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack radio antenna in NONGUNP'-0-RI area. Damage not assessable. Two medium size boats were damaged in the CHODO area by rockets. Heager and inaccurate Na fire was observed in CHODO area.

09151/ Recovered 07001 launch.

11001/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and two plane TAACAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SUNWI-DO area. Nine buildings were destroyed and six others damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack four junks in the PAENGYONG-DO area. One junk was destroyed and five others damaged. STRIKE group attacked bridges in SUNMUN-NI area. Flight destroyed one railroad bridge, damaged a road bridge and scored hits on three gun positions. Flight was attacked by MiG type aircraft in CHINATONG area. MiG type planes made three firing runs on the formation with no damage resulting. Eight 5" HVAR rockets were fired at the MiG's which seemed to confuse the enemy pilots as the engagement was broken off immediately thereafter. No damage was inflicted on the enemy planes.

11161/ Recovered 09001 launch.

12021/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) chopped to CTE 95.12.

13001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAACAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in PAENGYONG area. Flight destroyed three buildings and damaged two, plus bombing enemy troop area with un- assessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack troop village in CHIANG-NI area. Flight destroyed twenty-five buildings and damaged ten. One small boat was destroyed, five damaged and a gun position damaged.

13151/ Recovered 11001 launch.

13251/ Two marine pilots of VMA-312 transferred to PAENGYONG-DO by helicopter for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) to observe flight operations.

14251/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and three plane TAACAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack troops in HAEJU area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged two. Fire from six to eight 20MM AA weapons was observed during the attack. One bridge was destroyed, two roads cut and a gun position was destroyed. STRIKE group attacked troops in YOAN area. An estimated twenty-five troops were killed.
1500I/ recovered 1300I launch.
1633I/ recovered 1425I launch
1640I/ Set course southward for SaSEBO.
2100I/ relieved as CTB 95.11 by H.H.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
Cold frontal passage at 0400 cleared operating and target area by 0530 with unlimited ceilings and visibility throughout the period. Fresh northeast to north winds with moderate to rough seas after mid-period.

Mission Summary:
Ten C.P., eighteen TARCAP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of forty-three sorties.

29 November
1315I/ Detached H.M.C.S. HAIDA (VDU-215) to proceed independently to SaSEBO.
1650I/ Moored to Buoy number 18 in SaSEBO Harbor.
PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ship's ordnance expended, 544 rounds 40mm.

B. Performance of ship's ordnance

1. AA firing exercise was conducted 19 November. There were no material casualties, however, three loading casualties did occur.

2. The X-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

   21 November - The radar antenna on mount 11 was not boresighted. The antenna will be boresighted on arrival in port.

   26 November - Radar Range Unit MK-19 Mod-0 casualty: Intermittent jumping of range step and no sweep in precision of the radar indicator (control) MK-2. The cause was a faulty capacitor C-358 in Radar Range Unit Circuit. The capacitor was replaced.

   27 November - Radar Indicator MK-2 casualty: Partial loss of range sweep and step. The cause was shorted capacitor C-329 in Radar Indicator Unit.

3. AA firing exercise was not conducted enroute to Sasebo. The 40mm training allowance for use while employed in WesPac is not sufficient to conduct an exercise each time we transit the firing area throughout the period of the ship's scheduled operations in WesPac.

4. General quarters gunnery and fire control personnel have participated in an active training program to improve the AA defense capability of the ship. The training consisted of the following exercises:

   a. 40mm loading drill.
   b. Target acquisition and tracking drill using CAP.
   c. Training films pertaining to operations of and maintenance of guns and fire control equipment.
   d. Instruction to indoctrinate all personnel in safety precautions pertaining to operation of gun and handling of ordnance material.

C. Ammunition replenishment was accomplished in SASEBO, Japan prior to this cruise. Excellent cooperation was experienced in dealing with the issuing activity, NavOrd Facility. The following items were NIS:

   1. Adapter, F/AH - MK-219 fuze
   2. Auxiliary booster, MK-4
   3. Anti-personnel bomb fuze extension (daisy cutter - 18 inch)
   4. 3.5 rocket head (WP or PWP)
   5. 20mm Ctg, A/C Belted
   6. Torpedo boosters MK-9 Mod-0 (F/KK-24 Mine)
   7. Fuze MK-142 mod-0 (F/KK-24 Mine)
The lack of availability of items (1) and (2) can hamper future operations when present stock is depleted. These are used with anti-personnel bombs. The shortage is not critical at this time, however, the ship began the last operating period with 20 less than our allowance of 350. Item (3) is available only with 36" extension. The 18" is more desirable for catapulted aircraft. Item (4) will cause fire as well as being good smoke markers. The present inventory consists of FS smoke heads only. Item (5) was not available, however, the component rounds and links were substituted.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that belted 20mm A/C ammunition be furnished because this requires considerable effort to belt while in port in addition to normal replenishing. Time, space, and personnel are not available during operations to belt ammunition.

During replenishment, 62 fire bombs (Napalm tanks) were rejected and returned to NavOrdFac. These were promptly replaced by NavOrdFac. The tanks were damaged and not useable probably due to careless handling and poor stowage facilities.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that better stowage facilities be made available and that returnable crates be provided for some degree of protection to the tank during handling and stowage.

D. Summary of Aviation Ordnance Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>500# SAP Bombs</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>350# ADB Bombs</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>260# 8000s Bombs</td>
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<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>358</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>141</td>
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<tr>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20mm Ammo</td>
<td>42,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 Cal. Ammo</td>
<td>91,200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

#### A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

#### B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun positions</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
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<td>Road bridges</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road cuts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>177</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad cuts</td>
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<td>Radar stations</td>
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<td>Railroad cars</td>
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<td>Tunnels</td>
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<td>Oxen</td>
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<td>Command posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observation post</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power transformer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Docks with large amount of supplies destroyed.
Troop trenches strafed with no assessment of damage.

#### C. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft:

1. One aircraft damaged by enemy fire and consequently lost in water landing.
2. One aircraft damaged by own bomb blast and consequently lost in water landing.
3. One aircraft nosed over and burned during emergency landing at K-53.
   Engine malfunction believed caused by enemy small arms fire observed by ships in vicinity of target area.
4. Six other aircraft slightly damaged by enemy flak and small arms fire.
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel
   The high morale of the crew was reflected in the excellent job performed during the period of this report. Personnel on board during this period including Marines was 119 officers and 1003 enlisted for a total of 1122. There were no transfers or new personnel reporting aboard during this period.

2. Education
   Educational advancement received continued emphasis despite a heavy operating schedule. Ships company personnel are currently enrolled in twenty five USaF Courses, nineteen officer correspondence course one hundred twenty three enlisted correspondence courses and a total of two hundred eleven course books are checked out for study. Valuable on the job training was utilized during the period.

3. Divine Services
   Services conducted aboard during this period included, three protestant services, one catholic mass, daily catholic rosary services, one Latter day Saints class, two periods of choir practices and one bible class.

4. Welfare and Recreation
   Maintenance requirements reduced movie showings to six during this period. A capacity turnout indicated this to be the most popular shipboard recreation.

   A daily summary of aircraft missions and damages inflicted plus a roundup of world news and sporting events is given over the ships announcing system by the Chaplain each day at noon. This is a great morale builder and is eagerly awaited by ALL HANDS.

   The ships cruise book is progressing on schedule and will be complete when the ship reaches the states.

   A large number of officers and enlisted personnel take advantage of rest hotel facilities during in-port periods.

   Thanksgiving dinner left little to be desired and was a great contribution to morale.

B. Casualties

1. Captain Charles A. WILLIS, USNCH, was wounded in the left arm by enemy AA fire during a bombing run 1120I, 23 November 1952. Captain WILLIS landed at K-53 and was evacuated to a Korean hospital.
2. Major Raymond J. NIGHTYAR, USMC, 023222, attempted an emergency landing at K-53 about 1630, 27 November 1952. During the landing roll out the plane nosed over to the inverted position. Intense fire plus wing rockets prevented nearby personnel from rescuing the pilot. The body of Major NIGHTYAR was returned aboard the following day.
SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

1. Comment: Upon breaking out a box of .01 primer detonators (lot No. 4030A), after having been aboard in the ships magazines less than ten days, they were found to be wet and corroded. Check of the ships storage spaces showed no destructive moisture content and the container box showed no indication of previous wetness. However, the detonators were in such condition that they were considered unsafe for use.

Recommendation:
That great care be exercised when handling and storing ammunition and when possible damage is assessed that steps be taken to inspect and remove the damaged items. The limited amount of storage space aboard a CVE does not leave allowance for a percentage of "throw-aways."

2. Comment: A napalm mixer manufactured by General Motors Corporation, Harrison Radiator Division, Lockport, N.Y. (serial U4424) was used in order to evaluate its effectiveness. No instruction book accompanied the instrument, but familiarity with mixing napalm by ships personnel through use of a similar, and by considered opinion, more efficient piece of equipment (USS BADOENG STRAIT(CVE-116) ltr ser 68 of 22 Jan 1952) evaluation was effectively realized. The results obtained from the General Motors Corporation indicate that the mixer is unsuitable for cold weather operation when gasoline runs below normal temperatures in ships tanks.

Recommendation:
A complete evaluation report is being prepared, by separate correspondence, for BuOrd. However, at this time the basic discrepancy to be noted is that the heat exchanger unit in the mixer should be enlarged for adequate mixing of the powder with the gasoline. A unit similar to that described in the above mentioned BADOENG STRAIT'S letter is believed to answer the immediate needs of napalm preparation.

3. Comment: Numerous bursters for Fuze M-157 were discovered to be oversized. Twenty-two (22) out of the 302 bursters handled were found to be oversized. These were taken from lots No. C.P. 15817-23 of June 1951 and No. C.P. 15817-23 of July 1951. (See gunnery, also).

Recommendation:
That more careful inspection of ordnance materials be made at the manufacturing point.

4. Comment: During this operation the ship's starboard whip antennas were required to be lowered for roughly 10 hours out of every 24 hours. The reasons - launching and recovery periods, loading napalm tanks (due to possible high induction fields indicated in ComairFAC ltr ser 10/02314 of 29 October) and topping-off periods.
Recommendation:
That conclusive tests be made on CVE type carrier for induction activity or that the starboard antennas be relocated to eliminate the close proximity to the flight deck.

5. Comment: The MK-4 life-raft located at the LD0 platform for emergencies has no designated stowage space. As a result the V-4 Division of the BANDUNG STRAIT manufactured a quick release rack on the outboard side of the gun tub, located just aft of the platform, in order to make it readily available to be jettisoned. Iron straps (1$\frac{1}{4}$" X 3/16") with quick-release pin were used.

Recommendation:
That all carriers use ship's force to manufacture a similar device for emergency release, should an aircraft be ditched near by.

6. Comment: The VA-3 squadron operating aboard was equipped with AN/ AUW-6 direction finders. This was not known until shortly before their arrival. Bench-test components were immediately ordered in order to service the gear. All parts except the harness and control box have arrived at this time. No operating handbook has been received, however, the equipment has been set-up for operation through the efforts of competent personnel.

Recommendation:
That electronic bench-test equipment for the AN/AUW-6 be added to the section "h" allowance of all carriers.

7. Comment: As a result of uncontrolled skidding by aircraft coming out of the arresting gear and the limited parking space ahead of the barriers, several planes have received minor damage through collision. The flight deck was stained with Buships formula 21.

Recommendation:
Several corrective measures are offered: One, that an abrasive be added to the stain. Two, that flight deck planking be prefabricated with an abrasive material and to avoid having an aircraft come upon this increased traction suddenly, graduate the degrees of abrasiveness; or perhaps install about every third or fourth crossdeck planking with a uniform prefabricated abrasive plank in order to avoid the possibility of a nose-up.

8. Comment: Wet weather together with the maneuvering of airplanes on the hard rubber mats at the forward end of the H-40 catapult shuttle track has broken the mats adhesion to the flight deck. The ship's carpenter has used every available adhesive but has not successfully secured the mats to the flight deck. One mat was put in during the ships last yard period, while the second was put in by the ships force recently.
Recommendation:
That effective materials and procedures for fastening rubber mats to
flight deck be developed. The following methods are suggested for
consideration: One, that flat-head wood screws secure the mat to a
wood deck. Or secondly, using round head bolts with washers to secure
the mat through to the steel deck below.

9. Comment: Serious stowage problems for departmental and squadron
materials are encountered on the hangar deck and elevator pits. Addi-
tional room is required for mixing napalm, wing stowage, 50's and
machine gun cleaning.

Recommendation:
That tank-top conversion (BandoNG STRAIT ltr CVE16/WE/ars L9-2/13
acr 1357 of 23 Nov 1951) be considered for early installation in order
to afford additional stowage requirements along with personnel and work
space needs.

10. Comment: One hundred-fifty (150) N7 & N8 Napalm tanks were received
at Sasebo, Japan when re-arming ship for this operation, of these, seven-
five (75) were rejected as being damaged to much to be used. On some
tanks the seams were split, others had the external igniter bracket brok
off and others had so many dents and creases that it was feared they
would cause severe buffeting when in flight.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all tanks before issuing
and survey tanks not suitable for issue prior to delivery to operating
forces.

11. Comment: 13,000 rounds of aircraft incendiary 20mm were received at
Sasebo. Of these, the contents of two (2) wooden cases were so badly
corroded they were dangerous to handle. Ammunition had gotten wet and
was evident not inspected before issue.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all wooden cases and
boxes of ammunition before issuing and survey the unfit rounds.

12. Comment: The V.T. Fuses T-90 of Log No. F.4. 264-4 of June 1945 had
the arming vane protection ring modified by increasing the thickness of
the ring one quarter of an inch (\(\frac{1}{4}\)). One set of locking pins had been
modified to receive an arming wire and one pin had not been modified.
The second pin is being modified on board at this time.

Recommendation:
That when modifications are to be made, they be completed prior to
being issued to operating activities; in order that the operating forces
may not be hindered by a modification program prior to using the ordnanc
13. **Comment:** Because of an excessive number of wires broken or burned the following crossdeck pendants were replaced:

- **#1** after 56 engagements
- **#2** after 53 engagements
- **#3** after 64 engagements

**Recommendation:**
None.

14. **Statistics:**

**a. Launches**

**H-2-1 Catapult**
- No. - 107
- Avg. Wt. pounds - 14200
- Avg. Wind knots - 25
- Avg. Pressure psi - 2700
- No. Bridles expended - 7

**H-4C Catapult**
- No. - 226
- Avg. Wt. pounds - 15000
- Avg. Wind knots - 26
- Avg. Pressure psi - 2200
- No. Bridles expended - 12

**b. Landings**
- No. - 334
- Avg. Wind knots - 26
- Ctrl. psi - 050
- Avg. run-out Ft. - 115
- No. times wires caught
  - **#1** - 75
  - **#2** - 131
  - **#3** - 74
  - **#4** - 45
  - **#5** - 7
- Barriers Engaged - 0

**B. Engineering Department**

1. **Electronics:** During this operation several electronic difficulties were encountered. The most serious was with the four VK repeaters on board. Two of these repeaters are designed for operation with the AN/SRR-6 AEW system. This system has been out of operation for the past six months due to the lack of a transformer which has burned out. Replacements are unavailable in any of the supply activities. VK-No. 2 and VK-No. 3 operate with this system and even though the system is inoperative the VK's can still be used as repeaters for the search radars. The 120 volt line voltage for these two repeaters is obtained from the ships 440 V.a.c. generators. The
440 volts is stepped down to 120 volts through a transformer common to the AN/WPR-6 system only. In addition to this transformer, the line voltage for these repeaters is further controlled by a center tap transformer. A fire occurred in Vk-No. 3, burning out both fuze holders and impairing the off-center range switch and its associated wiring. Nightly the fuzes blew. In trying to determine the cause of the fire it was discovered that the line voltage on Vk-No. 2 was 128 volts instead of the normal 117. The line voltage at the ANW transformer was 117 volts. Further investigation showed the line passing through the above mentioned center tap transformer and improper positioning of the center-tap had raised the line voltage from 117V to 128V. This center-tap transformer was labeled as an auto-transformer for the 6G-1 radar on the name plate, and the fact that it was being used to control the line voltage for Vk-No. 2 and Vk-No. 3 was not known by any of the electronic personnel. Further, the design of the VK repeaters is such that an undersize fuze holder must be used because of space limitations. The end of the fuze holder comes within a fraction of an inch of the off-centering range switch. It is felt that the over heating of the fuze holder, caused by the high line voltage and current plus the defective fuzes installed caused the fire without blowing the fuzes. This repeater was placed back in operation after about five man-days work. The night following the fire, Vk-No. 2 blew a fuze. It was felt that this was also due to the line overload. It was at this time the center-tap transformer was discovered. The voltage was cut down to 117 volts and Vk-No. 2 refused and put back on the line. Then Vk-No. 1 and Vk-No. 4 both blew fuzes with Vk-No. 1 also burning out one fuze holder. Investigation showed that these two repeaters get their 120 volts supply from a transformer common to much of the ship's lighting circuits in the forward part of the ship. After putting these repeaters back on the line a chart was kept of the line voltages at these two repeaters. These voltages varied from 112 volts to 123 volts. It was learned that the transformers supplying this voltage operate at full load conditions and that any changes in this load, such as turning on electrical machinery will cause the voltage to fluctuate. These two repeaters continued to blow fuzes periodically during the operation due to overload. It is recommended that the VK set up be modified to include a separate transformer for obtaining their line voltage rather than have the varying load conditions occurring with the use of lighting circuit transformers.

One of the TCK transmitters was put out of commission to work on a noisy motor generator. It was found that the ball bearing in the motor end was very poorly packed and apparently had a flat ball. This bearing was replaced and the bearing on the generator was repacked. This transmitter was out of commission for about four hours. There were no other failures in communications equipment.

The only other electronic difficulty was several tube failures in the AN/ UFX-1. The tubes that failed are the 6A4 and 6A66. These are the same tubes that have failed several times previously this year. It is felt that none of the above failures seriously affected the ship's operating schedule. There were always at least to VK's on the line, the TCK was put out of commission only during a lull in ship to shore traffic and the AN/UFX-1 was out of commission for a short period of time.
The continued shortage of electronics ratings caused a hand to mouth operation at all times. The air division has been able to keep enough of the electronics equipment in operation to permit a satisfactory evaluation during this and other combat patrols, but to do this it is often necessary for certain of the higher rated personnel to work 10 to 12 hours a day.

The theory that designated strikers are rated men and that third class petty officers can be counted as second class and on up the line, is not always true. In practice it is found that a designated striker, although very interested in his work, falls short of the practical knowledge found in the third class petty officer. In doing repair work the most dependable men are the first and second class petty officers, the third class petty officer is a good assistant but seldom has sufficient practical knowledge to do the job alone. In the final summary of the first and second class petty officers form the repair crews and unless they are supplied in sufficient number, we will have to work long hours if the equipment is to operate.

C. Operations Department:

1. Combat Information Center: Enlisted personnel in CIC are arranged in three rotating watch sections with one watch office, one Air Controller and one air operations Officer on watch during all air operations.

Air control of defensive CAP, departing TaCAP and STRIKES are the primary functions of CIC during present operations. Defensive CAP is used to intercept all returning STRIKES in addition to unidentified aircraft, thus providing maximum training of Air Controllers.

Defensive air control work is seriously limited by proximity of land and limitations of equipment in this type of operation. During air operations the carrier remains within twenty-five to forty miles of enemy territory. The average range of detection of single aircraft over water with SK air search radar has been thirty to forty miles and almost negative results obtained with aircraft over land. CAP stationing between the ship and expected attack origin have a bare twenty miles in which to intercept an aircraft before it enters the ships air range. This would be inadequate should jet aircraft make an attack on the ship. The ship is equipped with both MK-3 and UPX type IFF, however, the UPX type has a non-directional antenna. This produces an identification ring on the scope at the proper range but no bearing. This system further reduces the IFF detection range to about a thirty mile maximum. An FPS-6 type radar with directional type IFF is recommended for ships conducting this type of operation.

2. Communications:

a. Personnel: The shortage of rated personnel, although serious, did not hamper the rapid transmission or reception of messages. Radio watches were stood on a basis of one in three. Any further loss of rated personnel would necessitate the standing of radio watches on a port and starboard basis. OWO watches were stood on a basis of one in three with two OWO's on watch continuously. Due to the heavy encrypted traffic load, the OWO watch was augmented by two additional officers during peak periods.

b. Traffic analysis: It has been determined that over one hundred messages a day were handled by the main communication station, at least one half of which were classified. Classified traffic amounted to an average of approximately twelve thousand coded groups a day.
c. Material: A worn bearing on the motor generator of the TCK-I was the only casualty that occurred to the transmitters. This was repaired in a period of four to six hours. If this repair had not been affected the loss of this transmitter would have seriously affected operational communications due to there being no spare transmitters in this frequency range available. Due to the shortage of transmitters in the medium to high frequency range, all medium to high frequency transmitters must be in operation continually.

Carry-over was experienced on two primary VHF circuits (voice) causing serious difficulty in the control of aircraft during critical periods of air operations. Interference was experienced on several occasions on primary CW nets. This interference was attributed to the proximity of frequencies and attempted jamming.

One of the most serious difficulties experienced this patrol in regard to communications was the continued failure of coding machines. During the last operation failure was experienced with the two machines this unit is allowed during the in-port period both machines were turned over to Crypto-Repair facilities in Sasebo. Work on neither machine was satisfactorially complete and prior to departure both machines were turned in to the RPAIO in Sasebo and two other machines were drawn. These had just been returned to RPAIO from a repair facility, and were thought to be in excellent repair. However on the fifth day of operating one of the machines became inoperative due to failure of the clutch mechanism. The other machine has remained operative but has consistently given trouble in that it has failed to print properly. Failure of the one machine has thrown the entire load of eight to twelve thousand code groups a day on this machine and has doubled the work load on crypto personnel due to improper printing.

Before leaving Sasebo it was requested that an additional machine be issued on temporary custody for use as a spare in case of failure. This request was turned down by the RPAIO due to the allowance list. Had both machines become inoperable during this operation it would not have been possible to keep up with the operational traffic that is required to be handled by a Task Element Commander in this area. There are no Crypto-Repair personnel assigned to this unit.

Recommendations:

1. Safeguard the number of trained enlisted and officer personnel so that it will not be necessary to decrease the number of watches from the present one in three. Any increase in the work load would increase the fatigue and decrease efficiency.

2. Provide a spare transmitter in the medium to high frequency range to guard against a serious hampering of primary communications in the event of a one hundred percent casualty to a medium to high frequency transmitter.

3. Continue the effort to decrease the amount of traffic, both classified and unclassified, that is transmitted by radio. Mail should be used as often as possible.

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4. That the allowance list be increased to allow three coding machines to be issued to CVE's on this duty. This increased allowance would only be required during the time the unit is operating in this area and could be transferred to each relieving unit in turn.

5. That present crypto repair facilities be examined with a view toward improving the quality of repair work.

6. That if practicable one crypto repair man be assigned to CVE's operating in this capacity.

3. **Photographic Laboratory**: The photo laboratory is operated by three rated men and one striker with the senior rate being a second class photographer. In addition to standing flight deck watches and continuing routine shipboard work, the laboratory supported five photographic sorties, expending three rolls of F-56 film and two rolls of K-20 film. Negatives from these sorties were used to produce three mosaics plus 154 prints.

4. **Aerology**: Ratt circuits provide the main source of aerological data in this area and proved to be unreliable during many hours of the day. Facsimile equipment is very desirable for carriers operating in this area.

D. Medical Department:

1. Captain Charles A. WILLIS 037774, USNCR, was wounded in the left arm by small caliber fire on 23 November 1952. Captain WILLIS was flown to a Korean Hospital. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

2. Major Raymond MIGHTY, USNR, was killed attempting an emergency landing at K-53 when his plane nosed over to an inverted position and burned. Remains were returned aboard the following day and transported to Sasebo. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

3. **Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company**

   a. Admitted to sick list
   b. Total sick days out of 12342 possible working days
   c. Officers admitted to sick list
   d. Total patient visits to sick call
   e. Total medical treatments
   f. Patients received from other ships
   g. Patients transferred to hospital
   h. Number minor injuries treated
   i. Number major injuries treated
   j. Number shipboard injuries resulting in death
   k. Minor surgical procedures
   l. Major surgical procedures
   m. Venereal Disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total 18
      1. Gonorrhea 4, Chancroid 3
      2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure 11
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last in port period

   -29-
4. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number days pilots grounded</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew grounded for medical reasons</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of pilots KIA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of pilots WIA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. L. Ray

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPOACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPOACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFL (1) Advance
COMNAVFL EVALUATION GROUP
COM7thFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMJRpAC (5)
COMsFirstVPAC
COMFAPAC
NAVAL War COLLEGE
COMCARDIV 15
COMCARDIV 17
CO, FABETUPAC (2)
CO, aFRPAC (1) Advance
CG, FRPAC (1) Advance
CG, 1st WAARWING
CO, Magn-12
CO, VA-312

CO, U.S.S. BatTan (CVL-29)
CO, U.S.S. HENLOVA (CVE-114)
CO, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)
CO, U.S.S. POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
CO, U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118)
U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

27 November 1952

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 28 November 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO. A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>A, B</td>
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<td>A-3</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
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<td>1115</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
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<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<td>C-7</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
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<td>1315</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>C-8</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
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<td>1000#/25 as alternate load.</td>
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<td>A, B</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
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<td>1715</td>
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<tr>
<td>#13</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>500#/25 as alternate load.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HELIICOPTER**

GUARD MALL  
GUARD MALL  
All ships.  
Designated ships.

Note:  
1. Events A, B, and C without belly tanks.  
2. Events D and E with belly tanks.

Ammo Load  
A - All A/C full gun loads.  
B - All A/C Napalm and 6-HV&R.

B. G. COLOKITT JR.  
LCDR, USN  
Air Operations Officer

Copty to  
CO  
XO  
AERO  
AIR PLOT (2)  
BRIDGE (4)  
PHOTO LAB  
AIR DEPT (8)  
MEDICAL (2)  
READY I (2)  
SQUADRON OFFICE (6)  
AIR INTELLIGENCE (2)  
CPO QUARTERS (1)  
ALL OFFICERS (2)  
SCREEN SHIP (3)  
ENCLOSURE (1)
The following is a list of damage inflicted by planes from this carrier and verified by intelligence sources in North Korea. This is not a complete report covering all strikes made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 November 1952</td>
<td>RONGGANG-NI Area</td>
<td>Seven North Koreans Killed, twenty-eight wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>SUNWI-DO Area</td>
<td>Seven North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>SUNWI-DO Area</td>
<td>Twenty North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>MONGGHUP'0-RI Area</td>
<td>Twelve North Koreans Killed, one light machine gun destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>CHILANG-NI Area</td>
<td>Fifty-one North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHANGHYAN-NI Area</td>
<td>Twenty-nine North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHILANG-NI Area</td>
<td>One North Korean Killed, large ammo dump destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHILANG-NI Area</td>
<td>Three North Koreans Killed, twenty-one houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'IIMNAMPO Area</td>
<td>One warehouse containing 3000 bags rice destroyed. Two small junks and three cement houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>SINC'ION Area</td>
<td>Eighty-three North Koreans Killed, twenty wounded. One warehouse containing 300 bags rice and four pillboxes destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November 1952</td>
<td>RONGGANG-NI Area</td>
<td>Nineteen North Koreans Killed, two bunkers, two guard posts, and one 80mm mortar destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>UPCH'I0-RI Area</td>
<td>Six North Koreans Killed, six wounded and one truck destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>UPCH'I0-RI Area</td>
<td>Nine North Koreans Killed, eight wounded and one civilian wounded. Two bomb shelters destroyed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (3)
25 November 1952 SUNWI-DO area

Seven North Koreans killed and six houses destroyed.

25 November 1952 UPCH’O-RI area

Fifty North Koreans killed.

26 November 1952 CH’INN-ThPO area

One warehouse containing 3000 bags grain, two junks and cement jetties destroyed.

26 November 1952 CH’ANGYAN-NI area

Thirty North Koreans killed and four houses destroyed.

26 November 1952 CHELANG-NI area

One North Korean killed, one wounded. One large ammo dump and fifteen houses destroyed.

26 November 1952 CHELANG-NI area

Three North Koreans killed, three wounded. Twenty-one houses destroyed.

28 November 1952 SUNWI-DO area

Twenty laborers killed and one hundred-twenty houses destroyed.

28 November 1952 HONGU-PO-RI area

One-hundred North Koreans attack D-4 safe village. Partisans plus Navy and air repelled attack, killing twelve North Koreans, and wounding nine. One heavy machine gun and ten rifles were destroyed with no friendly casualties.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SAWNTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 7 December through 17 December 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) Opnav Inst 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report
of the Task Element 95.11 for the period 7 December through 17 December
1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT
was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 7 December until 2100 on 16
December of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:
   Part I General Narrative.
   Part II Chronological Order of Events.
   Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment,
            including ammunition expenditure.
   Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
   Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by
referring to Vm-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952.
A. During the period of 7 December to 16 December 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VA-312 embarked, operated as a unit of TE 95.11, Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command of TE 95.11 was Captain H. L. May, U.S.N., Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT. Ship's assigned CTE 95.11 as screen included the U.S.S. HICKOX (DDE-673), U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682), H.M.C.S. CHUSADER (DDE-228), and H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three as units were transferred temporarily to CTE 95.12 for night patrols along the enemy held coast line.

B. The BADOENG STRAIT sailed from Sasebo on 7 December 1952, with H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) in company as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 050606Z of December. Both ships conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises in area GEORG while enroute. These ships became units of TE 95.11 at 072100I when the Commanding Officer, BADOENG STRAIT, relieved the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) as CTE 95.11.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coast line and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TE 95.12, the Island Naval Defense Element; the troops of TE 95.15, the Island Defense Element; and the units of TE 95.11, the Carrier Element. The Island Defense Element is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends the islands fringing the enemy held coast line from the Han River on the South to the Taedong estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Element in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Element have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

D. In performing its assigned tasks, TE 95.11 normally operated in the area southwest of PAENGNYONG-DO, conducting dawn to dusk air operations, and retired southward for the night. Five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours with approximately fifty percent of available aircraft in each launch. In each launch four aircraft were assigned as a TARCAP for CTU 95.12.1 stationed in the vicinity of SOKTO Island, two aircraft were assigned as CAP, and when aircraft availability permitted, a four plane STRIKE or reconnaissance flight was added. It was usually possible to launch three such strikes each day.

E. During this patrol there were numerous requests from the Island Defense Element and from Guerilla activities for STRIKE against troops which threatened the security of friendly islands. Continued attack was made on these targets, particularly those in the vicinity of SUNWI-DO and SOKTO. Little change was made in the employment of aircraft practiced on the previous patrol. Except at dawn and dusk, CAP aircraft were given a full ordnance loading of bombs or napalm and provided support in the PAENGNYON-DO to HAEJU
area, returning later for defensive purposes. The TaKeAP was assigned pre-
briefed targets to be attacked when the controlling ship had no targets re-
quiring attention. Armed reconnaissance of the coastline northward to
HANCHO was scheduled on alternate days to coincide with the time of Saber
jet sweeps in that area.

F. Air operations were marred by two accidents which fortunately ended
without serious injury to personnel. The Corsair piloted by Captain C. L.
MULLINS, USMC, crashed over the bow into the water following a catapult
launch. It appears that either the catapult bridle or the aircraft bridle
hook failed during the initial impulse allowing the plane to move without
catapult assist and therefore unable to gain sufficient speed to become
airborne. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjured and returned
aboard in six minutes. The Corsair piloted by Major Vernon E. BALL, USMC,
was hit by AA fire while attacking an enemy truck and became untenable. Major
BALL parachuted from low altitude, landing on a mud flat in the TAEDONG-
GANG southwest of CH'INNAPO. He was covered by his team mates until picked
up by the Air Force helicopter from CHODO. Major BALL suffered a punctured
thorax when his plane was hit.

G. A considerable amount of difficulty with bombs failing to release from
wing racks was experienced as on previous patrols. Since landing fields
are available, it has been doctrine to send aircraft with bombs larger than
100 lb to land at K-6 airfield for removal, although the absence of those
planes reduces the offensive effort which is possible for the day. Squadron
maintenance is concentrating on finding a solution.

H. A number of Japanese fishing vessels began to appear in the operating
area North of 36° North Latitude during this operation. Such vessels, most
of which appear to be equipped with radio and direction finders, could prove
dangerous to the security of allied ships operating in the Yellow Sea. This
opinion was reported to CTE 95.12 with information to the Commander West
Coast Blockade and Patrol Group on 8 December 1952.

I. The interchanging of officers with the H.A.S. GLORY and screening ships
for familiarization and training has been continued. The Air Operations
Officer of CTG 95.1, Commander PATCY, RN, was aboard during the early portion
of the cruise to observe air operations. Two officers from H.A.S. GLORY
and three from H.A.C.S. CRUADER were aboard at various times during the
period for the same purpose. The TAEDONG STRAIT sent two officers to the
GLORY to observe carrier air operations, and four to the CRUADER to observe
night inshore patrol and bombardment. One officer was sent on a visit to
the Island Defense Element for liaison purposes. Unfortunately, the inter-
change of officers on the part of the TAEDONG STRAIT was necessarily
restricted to junior officers, since the ship's allowance is such that other
cannot be spared at sea.
J. A highlight of the patrol was the visit of the Task Group Commander, Rear Admiral J. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN. The Admiral arrived aboard by high-line from H.M.S. NEWCASTLE and hoisted his flag on the BADOENG STRAIT. It is possible that this is the first time in history that an admiral of the Royal Navy has hoisted his flag on a U.S. Navy vessel. The admiral returned to the NEWCASTLE two days later.

K. VMA-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. CAMERON, 07027, USMC, was aboard during this period. Planes assigned this squadron consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft aboard per day for the period was nineteen. Average availability per day was seventeen. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 345 for a total of 823 hours. A total of 69.2 hours of this was "over the target time." A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron One was aboard as plane guard. The helicopter flew forty-six sorties for a total of twenty-six hours. One rescue was made by the helicopter when a plane entered the water after an aborted catapult shot.
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

7 December

0630I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 050006Z of December 1952, the U.S.S. BAOENGT STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMAS-312 and HU-1 detachment embarked, got underway from Sasebo, Japan for operating areas, "HAN" and "MIKE," off the West Coast of Korea.

1050I/ H.M.S. ATHABASCA (DDE-219) joined as previously directed.

1105I/ Commenced 40mm AA firing at towed sleeve.

1135I/ Completed AA firing. Two tow sleeves knocked down by 40mm fire. A total of 1290 rounds of 40mm ammunition expended in this training exercise.

2000I/ CTE 95.11 (H.M.S. GLORY) advised BAOENG STRAIT that U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) had been directed to investigate vessels in position 36-32N 124-48E and if Japanese to escort them westward to 124-00E, from there southward until ordered to rendezvous with BAOENG STRAIT.

2100I/ Relieved H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2210I/ U.S.S. HICKOX advised CTE 95.11 she was escorting two Japanese fishing vessels westward.

2347I/ U.S.S. HICKOX reported two additional vessels being escorted westward, identified as same vessels ordered out of area on previous night.

8 December

0050I/ Received message from CTE 95.11 (Presumably sent by H.M.S. GLORY) action CTE 95.12, information BAOENG STRAIT. Message stated sixteen fishing vessels located 30-16N 124-50E investigation not practicable.

0304I/ CTE 95.11 directed U.S.S. HICKOX to take only such action with respect to Japanese fishing boats as is authorized in paragraphs six through eight, Appendix B, to CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

0352I/ CTE 95.11 advised CTE 95.12 that presence of Japanese fishing boats (about two hundred miles North of their prescribed area) presented a security threat to CTE 95.11 operations and request established of a special patrol as provided by CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

0730I/ Two CAP, four TACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTE 95.12.1 directed TACAP to attack troops in village of KANSOCH'ON. Twelve buildings in the village were destroyed. Flight then flew reconnaissance of BAOENG River to CH'INNAPO. STRIKE group attacked pre-briefed target consisting of railroad bridge in
SONGHWA area. Flight damaged bridge and made two rail cuts. Two aircraft from this flight diverted to K-7 to remove undamaged ordnance.

0830/ Arrived in operating area "WAN".

0850/ U.S.S. HICKO (DD-673) joined as previously directed.

0900/ Two CAP and four TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack stowage dump in Ch'INNAMPO area. Target area completely covered by rockets and napalm destroying an estimated 2400 bags of rice. Flight returned to ship as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of buildings, bunkers, and trenches in the CHANGYON area. One gun position and two buildings were destroyed. Light small arms fire was encountered.

0908/ U.S.S. HICKO reported four Japanese fishing vessels had been left at 36-24N 123-55E proceeding on course 160°T at 9 knots.

0915/ Recovered 07301 launch.

1008/ CTE 95.12 advised CTG 95.1 that ship availability would not permit special fishing patrol until second U.S. Destroyer made available.

1014/ HAdM E. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, CTG 95.1, (CTE 95.19), plus two members of his staff came aboard by highline from H.M.S. NEWCASTLE to observe Task Element 95.11 operations and hoisted his flag.

1027/ CTE 95.19 concurred with CTE 95.12 with respect to fishing patrol and requested CTF 95.1 discuss matter with CTF 95 to clarify classification of fishing areas and procedures and consider possibility of providing patrol from sources other than TG 95.1.

1100/ Two CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack supply dump in the OuGNIN area. Dump area was hit with full ordnance load. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of buildings, containing troops in CHANGYON area. Flight destroyed seven buildings and damaged a railroad bridge.

1119/ Landed two replacement aircraft plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-6.

1129/ Recovered 09001 launch.

1245/ Two CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack supply dump in OuGNIN area and made two road cuts and building housing a truck was damaged. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed targets, troops in CHANGYON area. Flight dropped fifteen frags in troop area with no estimate of damage. Seven buildings were destroyed and two buildings damaged in neighboring villages.
Light AA fire was encountered.

1302I/ Recovered 11001 launch.

1315I/ H.M.S. Confident (DUE-221) joined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBE patrol.

1445I/ Two CAP, three TARGCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARGCAP to attack pre-briefed target, troops and supplies in Ch'INNAMPO area. One building damaged one destroyed in Ch'INNAMPO area. Four buildings destroyed in village of KOMIN'OW and caves in ULLYUL area attacked. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. STRIKE group destroyed one railroad overpass and damaged another in SONGHWA area. Four buildings destroyed and two damaged in ONGJIN area. Photos were taken of areas containing possible future targets.

1450I/ Recovered 12451 launch.

1640I/ Recovered 14451 launch.

1700I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

2010I/ CTG 95.1 advised CTE 95.19 and CTE 95.11 that (a) additional ships were not available for fishing patrol, (b) that the only restrictions placed on Japanese fishing boats by Japanese government were for them to stay South of latitude 36.00N, and that (c) a representative of CTF 95 would discuss the problem with COMNAVFE.

2155I/ CTE 95.11 requested to investigate possible attack on friendly island of SUNGI-DO by 700 North Korean troops dressed in civilian clothes and living in civilian houses at Haizawan.

Weather Summary:
Variable low clouds, scattered to broken with bases at 1500 to 2000 feet, high overcast at 10,000 to 14,000 feet in ship area. Target area had no low clouds and remained CAVU throughout the day. Winds northerly 10 to 20 knots.

Mission summary:
CAP ten, TARGCAP seventeen and STRIKE ten for a total of thirty-seven sorties.

9 December
0715I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARGCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. TARGCAP destroyed gun position in P'ungsan area and a small boat in the CHANGYON area. Automatic weapons fire observed in this area. STRIKE group damaged a railroad bypass in the SINCH'ON area.
09001/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaRCaP launched. In response to the request of friendly troops in SUNWI-DO island CaP attacked troop village in SUNWI-DO area, destroying ten buildings and returned to act as defensive CaP. TaRCaP attacked village containing 400 troops in CHANGYON area destroying three buildings. Flight destroyed two buildings in ONGJIN area and damaged one in T'AE'T'AN area.

09201/ Recovered 07151 launch.

11001/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CaP attacked troop village in SUNWI-DO area destroying five buildings and damaging four. Planes returned to act as defensive CaP. TaRCaP attacked caves and troop villages in CHANGYON area damaging caves and destroying five buildings. One plane of this flight hit by 30 cal AA fire with minor damage. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. STRIKE attacked railroad tunnel and sheds in CHANGYON area. Tunnel was closed, shed and road bridge damaged. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

11021/ H.M.S. KOITOITI directed by CTE 95.12 to patrol for fishing vessels in the vicinity of 36 OON for a period of twenty-four hours.

11221/ Recovered 09001 launch. HICKOX

12001/ U.S.S./(DJ-673) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

13151/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

13151/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaRCaP launched. CaP attacked troop village in SUNWI-DO area destroying one building and damaging another. Planes returned to act as defensive CaP. TaRCaP was joined by two aircraft from K-6. Flight attacked caves containing troops in UL-UL area killing an estimated ten troops and wounding ten. Three buildings and a boat destroyed plus three boats damaged in CHANGYON area. Two aircraft from this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. Light AA fire was observed.

13311/ Recovered 11001 launch.

15151/ Two plane CaP, two plane TaRCaP launched. TaRCaP attacked troop and storage area in vicinity of CHANGYON with unassessable damage.

15371/ Recovered 13151 launch plus two planes previously diverted to K-6.

17011/ Recovered two aircraft diverted to K-6 on previous day.
17061/ recovered 15151 launch.

17141/ Force retired southward for the night.

20301/ GTE 95.15 advised there was a motor junk, sail junks and 150 rubber boats assembled in SOK-TO Island area presumably for invasion of friendly SOK-TO Island. A plane from Air Force was requested to illuminate area at night.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds with ceiling of 2,500 feet until 14001. High broken clouds throughout the day. No low clouds in TARCAP area during day. Visibility was unlimited and wind was 12 to 18 knots from the North.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP, and ten STRIKE for a total of thirty-eight sorties.

10 December
07001/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. TARCAP released by CTU 95.12.1 to attack a village containing troops in the SOK-TO Island area. Twelve houses were destroyed in the village. CTU 95.12.1 directed TARCAP to attack trenches reported to contain 150 rubber boats in the same area. Trench area was damaged. Remaining ordnance was expended on island of UNG-DO, reported by GTE 95.15 as probable supply base for suspected invasion of SOK-TO Island. STRIKE group attacked enemy positions on island of UNG-DO. Damage was unassessable.

09051/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of troops and supplies in CH'ONGNYON area. Two villages attacked and eleven buildings destroyed. Troop and gun positions attacked with hits being made on two gun positions. One plane of this flight hit in each wing by small caliber AA fire. One plane of this flight lost napalm bomb during take-off. However, bomb fell in water resulting in no damage.

CAP was released to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of troops and supplies in CH'ONGNYON area. Full ordnance load expended on troop area with unassessable damage. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP.

09181/ Recovered 07001 launch.

11101/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP released to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of reveted buildings in T'AM'T'AN area. Six buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP.
CTU 95.12.1 released TnRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets. Troop concentration attacked in CH'ANGNYON area with unassessable damage. Four camouflaged trucks and a cave were damaged. Two planes of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage. STRIKE group attacked reveted buildings in CH'ANGNYON area. A reveted locomotive shed was damaged. One railroad tunnel was damaged and a radar site attacked.

1251/ recovered 09051 launch.

11461/ U.S.S. NICKOX (DD-673) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11551/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DD-228) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

1201/ Two BUKANG SHKAIT officers transferred to H.M.C.S. CRUSADER by high line to observe WhITBREAD patrol operations.

12051/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

1315/ Two plane CAP and four plane TnRCaP launched. CAP released to attack troops and bunkers in SUNWI-DO area. Entire ordnance load expended in troop area with unassessable damage. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TnRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets in P'UNGSHON area. Camouflaged truck area hit. Four buildings of a troop village destroyed. Flight made reconnaissance of HANCHON River before returning.

1329/ recovered 11101 launch.

1515/ Two plane CAP, four plane TnRCaP, and seven plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TnRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of villages containing troops in CH'ANGNYON area. Three villages were attacked. Nine buildings were destroyed and seven damaged. Troop bunkers were attacked and light small arms fire was observed during attack. STRIKE group attacked railroad bridge in CH'ANGNYON area as briefed. Target was hit with six bombs, one rail cut was made. An ADA position was attacked but bombs did not explode. A railroad overpass in SONGHWA area was attacked resulting in eight rail cuts.

1540/ recovered 1315I launch.

1706/ Recovered 1515I launch.
17201/ Task Element retired southward for night.

Weather Summary:
Weather was G«VU for entire day. Winds from northwest at fourteen to eighteen knots. Below freezing temperatures existed in target area throughout day.

Mission Summary:
Ten GAP, twenty TaRChP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of forty-five sorties.

11 December
07001/ Two plane GAP, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRChP to attack troops and bunkers in SOK-TO Island area. Damage was unassessable. Two radio antennas destroyed and a bunker damaged on hill 391. STRIKE group attacked railroad bridge in CHaK-YONG area. Flight cut three railroad bridges, destroyed four rail cars and made six rail cuts. Light AA fire was encountered.

09301/ Recovered 07001 launch.

11151/ Two plane GAP, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troop positions in SUnWI-D area with unassessed damage. During this flight First Lieutenant Paul C. HOGenson, USMCR, flew to K-53 with engine running intermittently and made a wheels up landing. Plane received class "B" damage. Pilot was uninjured. Remaining plane returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRChP to attack troops and buildings in ULUHUL area. Eighteen buildings destroyed with an estimated ten troops killed and ten wounded.

11371/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11411/ Landed two TBM type aircraft (VR-23) from ITAZUKE, Japan.
U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) came along side to deliver mail.

H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DD-219) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP launched. CAP attacked troops and buildings in SUNWI-DO area. Flight destroyed one building, damaged one and damaged four small boats. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack pre-briefed targets. Six buildings destroyed, one damaged in 5OK-TO area. Eight buildings destroyed in neighboring village and flight flew reconnaissance of area before returning.

Two TRM aircraft launched to return to ITAZUKA, Japan. Passengers were CDR Percy, mN, Air Operations Officer, CTG 95.1, and two RN pilots from H.M.S. GLOXY.

Recovered 1151 launch.

Launched helicopter to K-53.

Helicopter returned from K-53 with LT HOGENSON.

Commenced launching CAP and TaRCAP.

A plane piloted by Captain Charles L. MULLINS, USMCR, failed to gain flying speed when catapulted. Plane struck water in nose down attitude and stayed afloat long enough for pilot to swim clear uninjured. Helicopter rescued pilot and returned him aboard six minutes after entry into water. Breaking of plane launching hook or a broken bridle is believed to have caused the accident.

Completed launching two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Thirteen villages destroyed. After completion of mission the squadron commander with wing man proceeded to K-6 for administrative conference. CTU 95.12.1 directed remainder of flight to PIUNGSAN area where one gun position was destroyed.

Recovered 1151 launch.

Recovered 1515 launch.

Task Element retired southward for the night.

Guerrilla liaison officers (Army) came aboard in Air Force Helicopter for conference concerning support of future Guerrilla operations.
Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TaRCaP area until noon with low scattered clouds gradually increasing to broken with ceiling of 2000 feet by 1500I. Visibility unrestricted until 1400I, gradually reduced by haze to six miles. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots, during the period.

Mission Summary:
Ten ChAP, twenty TaRCaP and eight STRiKE for a total of thirty-eight sorties.

12 December
0700I/ Two plane ChAP, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane STRiKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack village of KO3Y0U-NI. Flight destroyed a motorcycle, damaged four buildings and three bunkers. Gun positions in CHANGNYON attacked with an estimated five killed and ten wounded. Intense 50 caliber fire was observed. One bunker, four trucks destroyed, and two troops killed in UTILUL area. STRiKE group destroyed fifteen buildings in village of TONG-SaN-NI. Three buildings destroyed and two damaged in CHANGNYON area.

0826I/ Lieutenant JONES, RCN, came aboard by highline from H.M.C.S. CRUZADOR (DDE-226) to observe flight operations. Two BADOENG STRaIT officers returned to ship having completed observation of WHITBaRd patrol operation.

0905I/ Two plane ChAP and four plane TaRCaP launched. "V" ChAP attacked village in UPCH'0-NI area destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Planes returned to act as defensive ChAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Eighteen buildings destroyed, six buildings and a bunker damaged.

0926I/ One plane of 0700I launch caught No. 6 wire and engaged a barrier damaging aircraft propeller.

0939I/ Completed recovery of 0700I launch.

1025 I/ Launched Air Force helicopter containing Guerrilla liaison representatives.

1115I/ Four plane TaRCaP and four plane STRiKE launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 on 11 December returned to ship to act as defensive ChAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Five buildings destroyed and five damaged. Two gun positions destroyed on UNG-DO Island. A fire observed on UNG-DO. Three huts destroyed in TaLCH'ON area. STRiKE group neutralized a command post and radio station in CHANGNYON area. Troops and trenches attacked with unassessable damage. Flight flew reconnaissance of road from CHANGNYON to SING'HON.
11261/ Recovered 09051 launch.

11501/ H.M.C.S. ATHAESCAN (DD-219) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

12251/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

13151/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SWNWI-DO area. Four buildings were destroyed. One plane returned to ship after being hit by small arms fire. Plane was hit in left oil cooler causing smoke and loss of oil. Remaining plane returned as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack troop village in ULYUL area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, damaged one building and an observation post.

13291/ Landed plane damaged by enemy AA fire.

13351/ Launched replacement CAP.

13471/ Recovered 11151 launch.

15151/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack command posts in PUNGSO area. Two command posts and mortar position hit with unassessable damage. One building damaged. STRIKE group attacked troop village in T'ANG area. Four buildings were destroyed. A secondary explosion was observed. Two planes diverted to K-6, one with hung ordnance.

15321/ Recovered 13151 launch.

16071/ Lieutenant Jonas, RCN, returned to H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) by helicopter.

17091/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

17261/ Recovered 15151 launch.

22451/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) detached to investigate surface radar contacts, location 36° 23N, 123° 26E.

23431/ Surface contact identified by H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) as two Japanese fishing boats with side numbers F-02547 and F-02548. Boats were anchored 600 feet apart with white masthead light burning and are equipped with HF/DF. Place of registration is HaKata, Japan. Boats instructed to proceed south to authorized fishing area.

Weather Summary:
During the morning, low broken clouds with ceiling of 2500 feet in operating area varying to scattered clouds at 3000 feet over target area. Afternoon, low broken clouds over target at 2500
to 3000 feet with snow showers in operating area. Visibility eigh
to ten miles. Winds West to northwest six to ten knots. Mild
cold frontal passage at 1500I.

Mission summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP, and twelve STRIKE for a total of forty-
two sorties.

13 December 0104I/
CTE 95.11 advised CTE 95.12 and CTTG 95.1 of presence of two large
Japanese fishing boats at 36° 23'N 123° 26'E. Boats are green
with white superstructure, equipped with MF/DF, have side numbers
F-0<547, F-02548 and are registered in mahanTa, Japan. Crew of
vessels instructed in Japanese to proceed South below 36° 00'N.

0700I/
Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched.
CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON
area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, then strafed an observa-
tion post and small boat with unassessable damage. Two planes
diverted to K-6, one with hung ordnance. STRIKE group attacked
a troop village in KYUNGPI'U area. Eight buildings were destroye.

0823I/
Two B&W SNAIT officers transferred to H.C.C. CHUSADER
(DD-226) for observation of WHITBRAH patrol operations.

0900I/
Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked
blockhouse in SUNWI-LO area. One blockhouse destroyed with fifty
North Korean troops killed. Planes returned to act as defensive
CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in
CHANGNYON area. Nine buildings were destroyed and eight damaged.
Bombs dropped on troop trenches with unassessable damage.

0918I/
Recovered 0700I launch plus two aircraft diverted to K-6 on
previous day.

0953I/
U.S.S. PORTSMOUTH (DD-682) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12
WHITBRAH patrol.

1110I/
Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched.
Two aircraft previously diverted to K-6 returned as TARCAP for
a total of six TARCAP. CAP attacked trenches and bunkers in
SUNWI-DO area with unassessable damage before returning to act as
defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack artillery
and observation posts in TULLUNGON-NI area. One observation post
was destroyed. Three buildings destroyed, five buildings and a
road bridge damaged. Two planes, one with hung ordnance diverte
to K-6. STRIKE group attacked a truck in ANAK area. Truck
damaged with an estimated three troops killed. Map fire in the
area, position not observed, scored hits on a plane piloted by
Major Vernon L. BALL, USAF. The engine froze from lack of oil
and Major BALL parachuted free about four minutes after being
hit. Plane hit in mud bank with only the tail section remaining visible. An Air Force helicopter from the island of CH'O-DO rescued major BALL about forty minutes after the plane was shot down. Major BALL suffered a superficial bullet wound in the left side. Light AA fire was observed in the area.

11261/ recovered 09001 launch.

11581/ n.m.c.s. CHUSADk (DDE-228) detached to CTE 95.12 WHITBEAD patrol.

12251/ Major Vernon C. BALL, USAF, shot down in enemy territory.

12511/ Helicopter from C.'O-D0 Island reported major BALL aboard with minor wound.

13001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAKCAP launched ahead of schedule, the latter flight to assist in covering rescue operation if required. CAP attacked village of KAWAEMI-NI destroying five buildings and damaging four before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAKCAP to attack troop village in CHANGYON area. Two buildings were damaged and troop areas hit with unassessable damage. Light AA fire was observed.

13511/ recovered 11001 launch plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-6.

15151/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAKCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 directed TAKCAP to attack troop area in CHANGYON area. Planes destroyed seventeen buildings and strafed troops.

15281/ recovered 13001 launch.

16341/ Major BALL was returned aboard by a helicopter from K-53.

16371/ Launched helicopter to return to K-53.

17031/ recovered 15151 launch.

18001/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Broken low clouds with base at 2500 feet in operating area varying to scattered and clear in target area during the morning. Afternoon ceiling gradually lowered, from 3000 to 1500 feet. Visibility unlimited with southerly winds of five to ten knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TAKCAP, and nine STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.
14 December

07001/ Two plane CAP, four plane TANCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TANCAP to attack command post in P'Uungsan area. Flight neutralized command post and destroyed one building. STRIKE group bombed caves in ONGjin area with unassessable damage. One building destroyed, three damaged and one rail car destroyed. Light AA fire was observed.

09001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TANCAP launched. CAP jettisoned ordnance to investigate unidentified aircraft and acted as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TANCAP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Three villages attacked with fifteen buildings destroyed.

09261/ Recovered 07001 launch.

11101/ Two plane CAP, four plane TANCAP and three plane STRIKE launched CAP attacked a troop village in CHANGNYON area with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TANCAP to attack a troop village in CHANGNYON area. Village was left burning and one nearby building was damaged. Flight burned with napalm the plane that was shot down in ANAK area on previous day. STRIKE group attacked coastal gun position in CHUMSAN area. Flight attacked three coastal gun positions protecting HANCHON with an estimated ten troops killed. A secondary explosion, following the attack, could be felt at 2500 feet by the pilots. An electrical sub-station North of CHINWAPO area was hit and electrical flashes observed as building caught fire. Light AA fire was observed over HANCHON.

11201/ H.M.S. CHUBADUR (DDE-228) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11251/ One aircraft with structural defects considered unsafe for carrier landings sent to K-6.

11301/ Recovered 09001 launch.

11531/ Landed HSG-12 helicopter from K-6 which is to replace HU-1 helicopter as plane guard through 16 December. HU-1 helicopter inoperative, awaiting spare parts.

12001/ U.S.S. PORTECITO (DU-662) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

13131/ Two plane CAP and four plane TANCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village of P'Uungsan. Before returning to act as defensive CAP flight destroyed five buildings and damaged six resulting in one secondary explosion. CTU 95.12.1 released TANCAP to attack supply dump in CHANGNYON area. A large concentration of supplies was attacked with an estimated fifty percent destroyed.
13311/ Recovered 11101 launch.

15151/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAHCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked rice storage in WAJU area. One building was destroyed and storage area left burning. Flight cut two railroads and destroyed four railcars loaded with supplies. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAP to attack rice on docks in CH'INNAPO area. Flight destroyed 1000 bags of rice, four buildings and killed ten troops. A rail cut was made in SONGnwa area.

15321/ Recovered 13151 launch.

17091/ Recovered 15151 launch.

17351/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary
Broken to overcast with ceiling of 3500 feet in the morning lowering to 2500 feet in late afternoon. Ceiling in target area 4000 feet lowering to 3000 feet in afternoon. Surface winds from south at nine to fourteen knots, shifting to north-west with cold front passage at 15201. Flying conditions average, lowering to marginal in late afternoon.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty-one TAHCAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of forty-two sorties.

15 December
09101/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DUE-219) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

11301/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAHCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAP to attack gun positions and bunkers near ULLYUL. Flight was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to enemy aircraft in the area. Flight made two rail cuts near CHANGYON. STRIKE group attacked revetted buildings near ONGJIN. Destroying one building.

13151/ Two plane CAP and three plane TAHCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAP to attack revetted buildings near ONGJIN. Five buildings were destroyed and three damaged. One aircraft returned to ship with rough engine, destroying one building and damaging another on way to ship. CTU 95.12.1 requested remaining planes to attack 76MM gun position near P'UNGBAN. Damage was unassessable.

13351/ Recovered 09101 launch.

14331/ Recovered plane with rough running engine from 13151 launch.
1450I/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEBREAD patrol.

1525I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack ammunition dump near P'UllNASAN. Damage unassessable. CTU 95.12.1 requested flight to attack two troop villages near CHANGNYON. Four buildings were destroyed. STRIKE group attacked power sub station North of CH'InWahFO. Power station destroyed as secondary explosions occurred.

1540I/ Recovered 1335I launch.

1716I/ Recovered 1525I launch.

1724I/ Task Element retired Southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Moderate secondary cold front passed at 0345I causing a thirteen degree temperature drop and northwesterly winds increasing to thirty-two knots with moderate to rough seas. Flight operations delayed until 1120I due to heavy seas and a pitching deck. Target area was clear during the morning with high cirrus and scattered low clouds at 2000 feet in the operating area.

Mission Summary:
Six CAP, eight STRIKE, and eleven TARCAP for a total of twenty-five sorties.

16 December

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies in village near CH'InWahFO. Flight left supplies burning, destroyed one building and damaged two sixty foot boats. STRIKE group attacked ammunition dump near wANGU with unassessable damage and then damaged five buildings near haJU.

0910I/ Three plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked a gun position and reveted buildings with one building and gun position damaged and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies near ULLYUL. Fourteen buildings destroyed, six damaged and secondary explosions observed. Three small boats were damaged near CHANGNYON.

0922I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1005I/ LT JONAS, RCN and GUNnREN DRUKIN, RCN, came aboard by highline from M.A.S. CRUSADE (DDE-228) to observe carrier operations. Two BADONG STRAIT officers returned aboard having completed observation of WHITEBREAD patrol.
1115I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troop buildings near UPCH'0-RI destroying four and then returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack revetted buildings near ONGJIN. Two buildings were destroyed and one damaged. CTU 95.12.1 then requested plan to attack gun position that had been firing on CH'0-DO island. Position was attacked with unassessable damage. Eight buildings were destroyed and two damaged near ULJUL although snow flurries hampered attacks in this area. The flight then flew reconnaissance of TAEJONG River. STRIKE group attacked railroad near SINCHON and made two rail cuts.

1123I/ Recovered 09151 launch.

1258I/ Detached U.S.S. PORTERFIELD to CTE 95.12 for WHITEBREAD patrol, with instructions to report to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) on completion.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop positions near UPCH'0-RI. Troop area attacked with unassessable damage. A rail tunnel was closed and one rail cut was made. Light AA fire was observed.

1334I/ Recovered 11151 launch.

1445I/ LT JONES, RON, and GUNNER DURKIN, RON, returned to H.M.C.S. CHUSAUKI (DDE-228) by helicopter.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. A TARCAP was not provided because of weather in that locality. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpasses near CHANGYON. One overpass was destroyed and one damaged.

1528I/ Recovered 13151 launch.

1545I/ Launched MAG-12 helicopter to return to K-6.

1649I/ Recovered 15151 launch.

1654I/ Set course southward for basebo.

2100I/ Relieved as CTE 95.11 by H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
High broken clouds with strato cumulus layer at 3000 feet increasing to scattered low clouds at 1500 feet with snow showers at noon. TARCAP area ceilings 3500 to 2000 feet with snow showers along the coast moving inland during afternoon. Flying condition became marginal due to low ceilings and visibility. Winds north westerly at ten to eighteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, fourteen TARCAP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of thirty nine sorties.
17 December
1140I/ Conducted 40MM AA firing at a towed sleeve.

1206I/ Completed AA firing. A total of 1063 rounds of 40MM ammunition was expended.

1620I/ Moored to buoy eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.
Remarks on Performance of Ordnance, Material, and Equipment Including Ammunition Expenditure

A. Ship's Ordnance Expended:

7 December - 1290 rounds 40mm ammunition
17 December - 1063 rounds 40mm ammunition

B. Performance of Ship's Ordnance

a. AA firing exercise was conducted 7 December with no material casualties. The following casualties were sustained during AA firing exercise 17 December:

Mount #4 - Left Barrel - Broken extractor; replaced.
Mount #13 - Left Barrel - Taper pin sheared in rammer cocking lever (r.h.) and shaft; replaced pin.
Mount #11 - Left Barrel - Broken sear; replaced.

b. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

12 December - (Radar II) Jump in range step caused by faulty capacitor C-348 in Radar Indicator Control MK-II; replaced capacitor.
14 December - (Radar II) Sluggish range rate transmission caused by fault resistor R-108 in MK-37 amplifier (range rate servo amplifier); replaced resistor.
14 December - (Radar II) No transmitted pulse caused by shorted tube V 1-836 in power supply MK-7 which blew fuse 1011 in Radar Control Unit (power) while in operating position.
14 December - (Radar 2) No D&S dot in gun director sight. The tube V 3(3B24) in radar power supply MK-7 was loose in socket causing loss of 472 volts going to plates of gun sight Cro tube.

c. The power drive on Mount #11 sustained the following casualty:

11 December - Oscillation in elevation (auto) caused by broken lead on terminal board of elevation power drive amplifier; the lead was repaired.

d. AA firing exercises were conducted enroute from and to Sasebo. The exercise conducted 7 December appeared to be successful since a sleeve was downed by both the starboard and after batteries. The proficiency of gun crews has improved considerably because of the extensive training program at sea coupled with the periodic firings.
C. Aircraft Ordnance Expended

1000# GP Bombs - 27
500# GP Bombs - 144
500# SAP Bombs - 4
200# FrG Bombs - 168
250# GP Bombs - 162
100# GP Bombs - 390
Napalm Bombs - 153
5" HVAR Rockets - 848
Rounds 20mm Ammo - 36,700
Rounds 50 cal Ammo - 93-250
SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clock Houses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Sub Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Carts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Stations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Overpasses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Sheds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (in bags)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stack Supplies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Large amount destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft

1. One aircraft was lost in an aborted catapult shot probably due to a broken bridle or plane launching hook.
2. One aircraft was lost to enemy AA fire in enemy territory. The pilot parachuted clear and plane was demolished.
3. One plane suffered class "B" damage in an emergency, wheels up, landing at k-53 due to engine malfunction.
4. One aircraft required a propeller change as a result of catching a late wire and engaging a barrier.
5. Four aircraft suffered damage consisting of holes in fuselage, wings, and oil cooler from enemy small caliber AA fire.
6. Two aircraft received minor damage to tail cones in taxi accidents.
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel

Enthusiastic performance by ALL HANDS resulted in a maximum effort during this patrol. Personnel on board during the period including Marines was 109 officers and 996 enlisted for a total of 1105. There were no transfers or new personnel reporting aboard during this period.

2. Education

An increase in USAFI and correspondence course enrollments indicates continued interest in educational advancement. Ships company personnel are currently enrolled in thirty-four USAFI courses, one-hundred-twenty-seven enlisted correspondence courses, nineteen officer correspondence courses and a total of two-hundred-thirty-four course books are checked out for study. Four officers from this ship went aboard Canadian destroyers to observe operating procedures. Three Canadian and three English officers came aboard to observe flight operations and discuss operating procedures. Two VHA-312 pilots were transferred to H.H.C.S. GLORY (CVL-19) at the end of the period to observe flight operations.

3. Divine Services

Services conducted aboard during this period included, three protestant services, one catholic mass, daily rosary services and two bible classes. The BADENGER STREET Chaplain and the CHAPLAIN from the H.H.C.S. ATHABASCAN exchanged visits to conduct services.

4. Welfare and recreation

A maximum air operations effort with its attendant maintenance requirements limited movie showing to four during the patrol. A capacity crowd was present for each showing. A summary of news including, missions and results, world news and sporting events is given daily at noon by the chaplain over the ships announcing system. A summary of the Task Elements operations and a review of existing situation in Korea is presented to the crew by the Intelligence Officers at the conclusion of each patrol.

B. Casualties

1. Major Vernon E. BAH, USNR, received superficial wounds in the left side by a flak burst. Major BAH parachuted to safety in enemy territory and was rescued by helicopter and returned to the ship.
A. Air Department

1. Comment

F4U-4B, BuNo 63067, VMF-312, lost one napalm bomb from the port pylon during launch from the H-4C catapult. The eye of the outboard end of the bridle struck and bent the forward bridle deflector and is believed to have tripped the bomb rack manual release allowing the napalm tank to fall free of the ship. The rear bridle deflector was also bent. The bridle sustained no damage and the tank burst and fell free of the ship.

Recommendation

The above malfunction is considered to have resulted from the violent whipping of the bridle during shuttle over-run. Every effort is being made to reduce bridle whip by eliminating "hard shots" from catapults and by employing the standard bridle catcher in lieu of the nylon bridle retainer.

2. Comment

An F4U-4 was spotted on the H-4C catapult, hooked up and tensioned properly. Standard launching signals were exchanged between the pilot, catapult officer and the deck edge control operator. When the catapult was fired the pilot felt first the jolt from the shuttle moving forward and then the snap of the tension ring. The catapult had a runaway shot and the plane rolled down the deck and over the bow of the ship under its own power. No material damage was done to the catapult other than a weakened runaway shot preventer diaphragm. The pilot swam clear prior to the planes sinking and was rescued by the helicopter. The accident was probably caused by either a broken bridle or breaking of aircraft launching hooks. The H-2 catapult was used for the remainder of the launch. The number of planes launched was reduced from ten to six to prevent an excessive expenditure of bridles as the H-2 bridle catcher was inoperative. The bridle catcher was repaired and in operation for the first launch the following morning.

3. Comment

Cross deck pendant No. 12 was changed due to an excessive number of wires broken after 144 engagements.

4. Comment

A barrier crash was sustained when an F4U-4 picked up No. #6 cross-deck pendant and engaged barriers No. 2 and 3 with its propeller. One barrier pendant was changed and the barriers rigged with a ready deck nine minutes after the crash. The propeller was changed and the aircraft made ready for flight within three hours.
5. Comment  
Two aircraft (F4U-4B BuNos. 97410 and 97501) returned to the ship because of bad oil leaks. Emergency landing procedures were set up and the aircraft landed aboard immediately.

6. Comment  
Failure of aircraft ordnance to release properly continues to be a major problem. Listed below is a summary of ordnance that failed to release along with appropriate comment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITN</th>
<th>RACK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HVAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MK-55 (no deflector)</td>
<td>Either became unplugged, or Pigtail parted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>MK-55 and Aero 14A</td>
<td>Faulty igniter plug (Spring fatigued in Aero 17-17 receptacle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical failure (Deteriorated and faulty electrical wiring circuits on one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MK-55 and Aero 14A</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 Total HVARS

260# FUG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITN</th>
<th>RACK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aero 14A</td>
<td>Electrical short in Rack (ground wire)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

250# GP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITN</th>
<th>RACK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical short (wiring in wing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following steps are being taken by VM/A in an effort to reduce or eliminate hung ordnance:

a. The condition of E17-17 igniter plug receptacles on all aircraft are being checked and replaced as required.

b. The circuit wiring on all aircraft showing release circuit wire deterioration is being replaced during in-port periods.

Recommendation

It is recommended that supporting repair units replace or overhaul defective or deteriorating Aero 14A, MK-55, and MK-9 racks on aircraft prior to assignment of replacement aircraft to combat squadrons. (Certain replacement aircraft received by VM/A-312 have been in this category). Further it is considered desirable that a study be made by overhaul activities to determine the expected service life of these bob racks so that provision can be made for their orderly replacement. A letter in this regard is being sent to Commander Fleet Air, Japan.

That Support and/or operating units develop an ejected cartridge case deflector for the MK-55 rack that will minimize damage to rocket pig-tails by ejected brass from the guns. (VM/A-312 is working on this problem.)
8. Comment

Listed below is a summary of catapult and arresting gear performance during this patrol:

**LaUNCHES**

**H-2-1 Catapult**

- Total number of launches - 115
- Average Weight Pounds - 14,800
- Average Wind Knots - 29
- Average Pressure psi - 2,850
- No. Bridles expended - 9

**H-4C Catapult**

- Total number of launches - 229
- Average Weight Pounds - 15,000
- Average Wind Knots - 28
- Average Pressure psi - 2,100
- No. Bridles expended - 9

**LandingS**

- Total number of landings - 341
- Average Wind Knots - 28
- UPV psi - 000
- Average runout feet - 114
- Wires Caught - #1 - 66, #2 - 114, #3 - 94, #4 - 56, #5 - 8
  #6 - 3, #7 - 0, #8 - 0, #9 - 0
- Barrier Crashes - 1
- Barriers Engaged - 2 & 3

**B. Operations Department**

1. Combat Information Center: Enlisted personnel in CIC are arranged in three rotating watch sections with one watch officer, one Air Controller and one Air Operations Officer on watch during all air operations.

   Air control of defensive CnP, departing TARCAP and STRIKES are the primary functions of CIC during present operations. Defensive CnP is used to intercept all returning STRIKES in addition to unidentified aircraft, thus providing maximum training of Air Controllers.

   Defensive Air Control work is seriously hampered by proximity of land and limitations of equipment in this type of operation. During air operations the carrier remains within twenty-five to forty miles of enemy territory. The average range of detection of single aircraft over water with SK Air Search Radar has been thirty to forty miles and almost negative results obtained with aircraft over land. CnP stationed between the ship and expected attack origin have a bare twenty miles in which to intercept an aircraft before it enters the ships air range. The ship is equipped with UPX-1 type IFF, which as installed is non-directional. This produces an identification...
ring on the scope at the proper range, but no bearing. This system further reduces the IFF detection range to about thirty miles maximum. An SPS-6 type radar with directional type IFF is necessary for ships conducting this type of operation.

It should be noted, however, that defense of the ship against enemy aircraft is considerably enhanced by two shore based radars of the Air Defense Command located at a distance and between the ship and enemy air bases. There are also several radar equipped friendly ships interposed between the carrier element and enemy bases.

2. Communications

a. Traffic

Communications traffic continued in great volume. Prompt delivery of dispatches was not possible in all cases because of serious garbles resulting from poor radio reception. A heavy influx of coded traffic from guerrilla forces was another factor which caused delays in traffic delivery.

b. Personnel

The loss of two rated radiomen during last in-port period with replacement necessitated the assignment of watches on a port and starboard basis. It is believed that watches twelve hours a day over an extended period of time will impair the efficiency of communications.

c. Equipment

One medium frequency transmitter failed during the operation and was out of commission for a period of six hours. This imposed the handicap of not being able to guard the ship-shore frequency on a continuous basis.

3. Photographic Laboratory

The photo laboratory is operated by three rated men and one striker with the senior rate being a Photographer Second Class. Two photo missions were flown during the patrol, for target analysis in addition to PIO and routine ships work.

4. Aerology

WATS circuits provide the main source of aerological data in this area and proved to be unreliable during many hours of the day. Facsimile equipment is desirable for carriers operating in this area. Weather reports from sector eight (Russian) are of great value as this is the area of Cyclo-Genesis for weather moving into the Korean operating area.
1. Major Vernon E. Ball, USMC, sustained wounds, consisting of a punctured left thorax, by AA fire from the enemy while engaged in aerial combat.

2. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company
   a. Admitted to sick list 23
   b. Total sick days out of 10 possible working days 64
   c. Officer admitted to sick list 2
   d. Total patients visits to sick call 428
   e. Total medical treatments 204
   f. Patients received from other ships 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital 0
   h. Number of minor injuries treated 7
   i. Number of major injuries treated 0
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures 0
   l. Major surgical procedures 0
   m. Venereal Disease cases and non-specific Urethritis Total - 26
      1. Gonorrhea - 5
      2. Chancroid - 4
      3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 17
   n. No. penicillin tablets issued last port period - 132

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen
   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 5
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation 0
   c. Average number days pilots grounded 3.3
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons 0
   e. No. of pilots KIA 0
   f. No. of pilots WIA 1

H. L. Ray

Copy to:
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CINCPACFLT (2) advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFLE (1) advance
COMNAVFL E EVALUATION GROUP
COMSWEVTHFLT (1) advance
CTF 77 (1) advance
COMNAVFLE (5)
Copy to: (Continued)

CDDBaNVPaC
CDBbFc.LGJNPaN
NavAL War COlLAGE
COMCdrDIV-15
COMCdrRDIV-17
CO, FhIRBELUPaC (2)
CG, ANrFhRFPaC (1) advance
CG, FhRFPaC (1) advance
CG, 1st FhRnWING
CO, AnG-12
CO, VFA-312
CO, USER BtAMN (CVL-29)
CO, USR FhDfnW (CVE-114)
CO, USR BtIROK (CVE-115)
CO, USR SICLY (CVE-118)
CO, USR POINT CrUZ (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer
**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 16 DECEMBER 1952**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
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<td>0915</td>
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**HELICOPTER**
- GUARD MAIL 0730
- GUARD MAIL 1135
- FLYAWAY 1515

**LOAD**

- **A** - All A/C full gun loads.
- **B** - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
- **C** - 2 A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.  
  - 2 A/C 500 lb inst./ND and 4-250 lb DC/ND

- **D** - 2 A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.  
  - 2 A/C 500 lb 0.1/ND and 4-250 lb 0.1/ND.
- **E** - All A/C 1000 lb 0.1/ND and 2-250 lb 0.1/ND.
- **F** - All A/C 500 lb SAP/ 5 sec and 4-250 lb/5 sec.
- **G** - All A/C 1000 lb/5 sec and 2-250 lb/5 sec.

---

B. L. COLKITT JR.
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander 3/WNTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 26 December 1952 through 5 January 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) NAVY Regulations 0705
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 26 December through 5 January 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 on 26 December until 2100 on 4 January of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.
Part II Chronological Order of Events.
Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VMA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952 and January 1953.
PART I DECLASSIFIED

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. During the period of 26 December 1952 to 4 January 1953, the USS BADONG ST Nath (CVE-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a unit of TE 95.11 (later redesignated as TU 95.1.1), Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command of TE 95.11 was Captain H. L. Hay, 62691/1310, USN. For the duration of this patrol this officer was also the Officer in Tactical Command, West Coast in accordance with paragraph 9, CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52. Ships assigned CT 95.11 as screen included the USS Louis HANCOCK (DD-675), USS PORTLAND (DL-682), HMAS ATHABASCAN (DUE-219), HNS COCKADE (D-34) and the HMAS Cangur (DUE-228). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three ships as units were transferred temporarily to CT 95.12 (later CTU 95.1.2) for night patrols along the enemy held coast line.

B. VMA-312 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cahron, 07027, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. Planes aboard consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 21. Average availability per day was 16. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 255 including 8 sorties for carrier qualifications for a total of 562 hours. A total of 55.1 hours was "over the target time." A single helicopter from helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 47 sorties for a total of 32.8 hours.

C. The BADONG ST Nath sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on 26 December 1952 as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 21005/52 of December. Gunnery firing exercises were conducted in area GoDak. Shortly afterwards five replacement aircraft were received aboard from Itami Air Force Base. The ship became a Unit of TE 95.11 at 2400ZI when the BADONG ST Nath relieved the H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) upon arrival in area MIKE.

D. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the west coast of Korea is to block the coastline and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TE 95.12, the Island Naval Defense Element; the troops of TE 95.15, the Island Defense Element; and the units of TE 95.11, the Carrier Element. The Island Defense Element is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the Han River on the South to the Taedong estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Element in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerrilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Element have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

E. In performing its assigned tasks, TE 95.11 normally operated in the area southwest of Pusan/Cong-10, conducting dawn to dusk air operations, and retiring southward for the night. Five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours with approximately fifty percent of available air-
craft in each launch. A two-aircraft CAP for TR 95.11 was launched with each deck load. Once a day a four plane TARCAP was provided for CTU 95.12.1 stationed in the vicinity of OshlTO Island. Modified instructions issued by CTG 95.1 now require this instead of a TARCAP with each deck load launch as was previously required. Other aircraft operating in the target area are briefed to assist CTU 95.12.1 at anytime their services are requested.

F. The reduction in TARCAP commitments permitted a more flexible employment of aircraft, and some changes in use and scheduling were made. Twice during this nine day period a four plane pre-dawn armed reconnaissance flight was launched at about 0615Z to investigate rail and truck traffic in the area North of CHINNAMPO. Such flights are launched only under ideal weather conditions because of the limitations of pilot training and aircraft instrument flying equipment. It was also considered necessary to initiate launches from an area in close proximity to OshlTO Island so that radar vectoring from both the ships and OshlTO would be available to the flight. The early armed reconnaissance launch, dubbed the "early early" by the pilots, became quite popular, because both flights found locomotives for their targets, a type of target that the pilots are most eager to attack.

G. There were no urgent requests from other elements of the group for air support strikes during the period. Continued attention was paid to troop concentrations and gun emplacements in positions to attack friendly islands and surface vessels. CAP aircraft were again loaded with ordnance for short range strikes against targets in the PAEKGNYONG-DO to HAEJU area when the Task element was operating in the area southwest of PAEKGNYONG-DO, as this area is well screened by radars on friendly islands.

H. In view of the reduction in TARCAP requirements, greater attention was given to armed reconnaissance of the coastal areas. Weather permitting, a careful search of the coastline from the HAN River to the TAEGWANG-GANG was made daily and the flight northward to HANCHON was performed on alternate days when jet fighter cover was available.

I. A most unfortunate accident occurred in the afternoon of 27 December when First Lieutenant John B. GOJKY, UShG, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the TAEGWANG-GANG. The Lieutenant parachuted successfully and was observed uninjured in the water at the mouth of the estuary. Despite the attempts of two helicopters and one crash boat from OshlTO Island, rescue was not effected, apparently because of material defects in the rescue equipment. During the rescue MIG aircraft made six firing runs on the Corsair CAP but did not penetrate to the helicopters. There was no damage to aircraft, friendly or enemy. A recommendation regarding the possible inadequacy of rescue equipment has been submitted separately.

J. For the first time TAEGWANG STRAIT aircraft experienced appreciable interference from bad weather and flight operations were reduced on four days of the nine-day period. During one night, with a heavy swell running from the northwest and with frequent heavy snow showers and a temperature of 19°F, a moderate amount of snow and slush ice from the spray collected on the
flight deck. Assigned equipment was adequate for removal, however, flight operations were delayed until about noon because the pitching deck made flight operations too hazardous. On another occasion with a ceiling of 300 feet and 1/2 mile visibility, it was necessary to vector a returning flight to the ship using the SG-1B radar. The aircraft made visual contact with the ship and 500 at approximately 1/2 mile and executed satisfactory landings. Low ceilings in the target area frequently limited target selection and restrict ordnance loads which could be carried.

K. Carrier qualification and re-qualification of replacement pilots was performed during combat operations on this patrol. Four replacements requiring requalification only were received aboard the day prior to sailing. By a slight reduction in combat flights, it was possible to qualify these pilots. They were subsequently given several CAP assignments to further their training and familiarization with the area and procedures. Then on the 7th day of air operations four additional pilots who required full carrier qualification were delivered aboard by the marine "UO" aircraft. The following day full carrier qualification was given to two of these pilots. Additionally the marine pilot of the "UO," previously qualified in Corsairs, was checked out in landing the TBM model aircraft aboard. Because of light variable winds it was necessary to delay qualification of the remaining two Corsair pilots until 5 January. The carrier qualification performed in this manner reduced the total combat sorties by five. However, two aircraft received major damage during qualifications, which indirectly reduced the offensive effort to a greater degree.

L. On the 27th of December as the Task Element retired to the South for the night with three ships in a bent-line screen (303), the U.S.S. Lanos on station TAHAN reported a sonar contact with a probable submarine. The Task Element Commander considered this to be a Case 1 contact and as a precautionary measure directed an attack be made although it was considered that the contact might be a known underwater object charted in the vicinity. The U.S.S. Poughkeepsie was directed to assist. Within six minutes of this contact, the H.M.S. Wuhu in station ONE reported a sonar contact, but evaluated it as non-submarine five minutes later. After investigating the contact further, the Lewis and Wuhu made a flash LUNKHEAD report. The Task Element followed this with three amplifying reports mentioning the known underwater object in the vicinity and including a final report of non-submarine.

M. A fire occurred in the trash bin surrounding the BADONG STRAIT's incinerator on the evening of 30 December. The fire started when embers which were being removed from the fire box burst into flame and could not be controlled by the CO2 bottle in hand. The fire was confined to the incinerator room and minor damage to electric wiring resulted.

N. Despite weather interference and reduction in total sorties made below that achieved on previous patrols, the results of air strikes appear to have been better than earlier strike results. An increased number of secondary
explosions were noted. The first early pre-dawn strike North of CHINNAMPO located one locomotive and eight trucks and reported making damaging attacks. The second such strike found four locomotives made-up in three trains totaling over fifty boxcars apparently stopped because of rail cuts made by shore based night fighters. Immediately following this strike CHODO reported many MIG's in the area and went to a Warning RED alert. A flash report of the locomotive targets was sent to JOC Korea. Although there was no assurance that jet fighter cover would be available since proper coordination with shore based aircraft cannot be guaranteed under existing procedures, it was possible to launch two additional sorties totaling eleven aircraft against this target. Information available to this command indicates that with the exception of a few F-54's which made high altitude rocket runs about noon that day, no other aircraft hit the target. This is believed to have resulted from an erroneous report received in the JOC that denied the existence of the trains. The statements of returning pilots from three separate strikes totaling fifteen aircraft were in virtual agreement regarding these locomotives and they reported doing considerable damage with one large secondary explosion. Photographic damage assessment could not be made, since photographic aircraft are not included in the allowance of the vessel.

O. The interchange of officers with H.M.S. GLOSY and screening ships for familiarization and training was continued. Three officers were received aboard from H.M.S. GLOSY to observe air operations. One officer from U.S.S. LSM 157 HANOVER and two officers from the U.S.S. PONTAFLIED were aboard for training at air controllers, while the BALFOING STRAIT transferred two officers to the GLOSY for familiarization. The SADOING STRAIT Operations Officer was transferred on three days to JOC Korea at the end of the patrol for liaison and familiarization purposes.

P. In view of the targets located by two early morning patrols, it would appear profitable to give greater attention to the flat coastal area between CHINNAMPO and SINANJU. For best results, all-weather attack aircraft for locating targets and making initial road or rail cuts would be needed. Because of the areas' location with respect to communist jet airfields, the subsequent day attacks would require day attack squadrons operating under and closely coordinated with jet fighter cover. A fast carrier or fast carrier task force would be ideal for this purpose. The occasional appearance of a fast carrier in the Yellow sea area would probably have a most disconcerting effect upon the enemy. Accordingly, periodic assignment of a fast carrier for Yellow Sea operations is recommended.
26 December

0642I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 240605Z of December 1952, the U.S.S. BADENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for Korean West Coast Operating Areas, "HIKE" and "WAN."

1130I/ Commenced 40MM AA firing on towed sleeve in area GEORGE.

1155I/ Completed 40MM AA firing having expended 1658 rounds of 40MM ammunition. One tow sleeve was knocked down.

1506I/ Recovered five VMA-312 aircraft from ITA01, Japan.

2058I/ CTE 95.11 (H.H.S. GLORY) advised U.S.S. BADENG STRAIT that the U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) and U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) had been detached to investigate fishing vessels in prohibited area and some delay in their reporting for duty with BADENG STRAIT was to be expected.

2100I/ Relieved the H.H.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2100I/ Arrived in Korean Operating area "HIKE."

2300I/ Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADENG STRAIT assumed duty as OTC of Naval Blockade and Patrol Group on the Korean West Coast.

27 December

0302I/ The U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) reported two Japanese fishing vessels at 36-11N, 124-52E. Vessels refused to move until a 40MM was fired overhead then both vessels were escorted to 124-00E and directed to proceed South of 36-00N. Vessels were identified as Kiyo Maru, 5-W061, Number YG2-293 and Kaiyo Maru, 3W-W060, Number YG2-294.

0500I/ PORTERFIELD reported for duty.

0725I/ Arrived in Korean operating area "WAN".

0740I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) reported for duty.

0822I/ PORTERFIELD transferred one officer aboard by highline for training in air control duties.

0825I/ LCDR U. A. K. FINLAY, RN, Communications Officer and SUB LT J. H. BROMANUS, RN, an aviator from the H.H.S. GLORY, came aboard from the PORTERFIELD, by highline, to observe carrier operations and to discuss communications procedures common to the two service.

1102I/ CTE 95.11 advised H.H.S. BIRMINGHAM that gun fire spot could be provided at 14001 to 15001 and TARCap would be available from 16001 to 17001 if desired.
1134I/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) reported for duty.

1220I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a command post near CH'ELANG-NI with unassessable damage, then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a rail-road bridge near CH'ANGYON, damaging the bridge and making one rail cut. One plane of the flight jettisoned bombs and did not attack due to inoperative radio.

1340I/ Four plane STRIKE, two plane Gunfire Spot Team and three plane Carrier Qualification Group launched. The STRIKE group attacked supplies on a dock near CH'INNAPO. A plane flown by First Lieutenant John B. GOERY, USNCR, 053549, was the second to deliver an attack. As he passed over the target at 1000 feet he reported that he had been hit and headed out to sea. Members of the flight observed pieces of his left wing falling from the plane and brown smoke pouring from his engine. LT GOERY jettisoned his remaining ordnance and proceeded down the TAEDONG Estuary toward the sea until his engine quit at which time he parachuted free. The plane crashed into the water. LT GOERY in his parachute drifted out to sea where he landed in the water about a mile from shore. He waved to the planes overhead and appeared to be in good condition. One plane of the flight escort-ed a helicopter to the scene from CH'IO-DO Island while two others provided air cover for the downed pilot. The two plane Gunfire Spot team arrived to provide additional cover. About seventeen minutes after the pilot entered the water, a flight of four MIGS attacked the planes above LT GOERY. The MIGS engaged the covering planes for a period of ten minutes during which time they made six firing runs. No damage was inflicted on either friendly or enemy aircraft. The helicopter waited in a near by area until the MIGS had departed. The helicopter arrived over LT GOERY about thirty minutes after he entered the water, meanwhile a strong current had drifted the downed pilot and his rubber raft to within one half mile of the shore. The helicopter reported an inoperative winch, so a rope ladder was lowered to the pilot. During the next half hour LT GOERY was observed to climb to the top of the ladder six times without succeeding in getting inside the helicopter. At this time, a rubber raft was dropped to the pilot, however, he was unable to reach it. A second helicopter arrived from CH'IO-DO and attempted to rescue the pilot, however, the winch cable broke and LT GOERY was dropped into the water again. A rope was lowered to the pilot but he was now too weak to attempt to climb it. A plane from the group then escorted a crash boat from CH'IO-DO island to the scene. At this time a flight of F-86 jets arrived to assist in the rescue. The crash boat arrived about one and one half hours after the pilot was down. As the boat neared the pilot, shore batteries opened fire and were bracketing the boat with shells. The covering planes silenced two of the three guns firing before expending all their
ordnance. The crash boat now reported it was unable to approach
the pilot as one engine was failing and one running rough due to
near misses of shell fire. The covering planes now lost sight
of LT GOEY as it was late afternoon and the pilot was last seen
floating low in the water with no visible movement. A second
group of planes arrived to relieve the covering group. LT GOEY
was not sighted again and is listed as missing in action.

1342I/ H.M.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) reported eight Japanese fishing
trawlers at 35-55N 125 12E and advised that vessels were ordered
to proceed to authorized fishing areas.

1359I/ Recovered 1220I launch.

1417I/ Commenced Carrier qualification landings with three planes.

1419I/ One plane collapsed a tail wheel during a carrier qualification
landing.

1500I/ Recovered carrier qualification planes having requalified three
pilots with a total of fourteen landings. It was impossible to
qualify these pilots prior to entering the operating area as the
pilots reported aboard one day before the scheduled sailing date.

1500I/ ATHABASCAN reported that she would be unable to rendezvous with
CTE 95.11 before dark and would proceed directly to CTU 95.12.1
if permissible.

1605I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. This STRIKE group
relieved the 1340I group as cover for the attempted rescue of
LT GOEY. No targets were attacked.

1708I/ Recovered remainder 1340I launch.

1748I/ Recovered 1605I launch.

1749I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1801I/ CTE 95.11 released the ATHABASCAN to proceed to CTE 95.12 for
WHITBREAD patrol.

2018I/ LEWIS HANCOCK of the screen reported sonar contact with probable
submarine at 37 36N, 124 27.5E, Case 1.
Due to the position in relation to the Task Element, CTE 95.11
concurred that it was Case 1 and directed an attack.

2022I/ PORT ROYAL was detached to join HANCOCK as assisting ship.
CTE 95.11 advised the LEWIS HANCOCK that the contact was in
immediate vicinity of a reported pinnacle.
2026I/ COCKADE reported a sonar contact 2400 yards from the screen.

2031I/ COCKADE evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine.

2046I/ LEWIS HANCOCK completed depth charge attack on sonar target with impulse type depth charges. Depth charges did not detonate.

2053I/ LEWIS HANCOCK sent a flash submarine contact report.

2100I/ LEWIS HANCOCK completed two firing attacks with HEDGEHOGS. Explosions were observed.

2110I/ LEWIS HANCOCK reported sonar contact dead in the water at thirty fathoms.

2130I/ CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to join CTE 95.11 to augment screen.

2136I/ PORTERFIELD gained sonar contact and evaluated it as improbable submarine.

2144I/ CTE 95.11 sent an amplifying report stating that sonar contact was in close proximity to a known underwater object and had been evaluated as doubtful submarine.

2149I/ LEWIS HANCOCK illuminated attack area to search for wreckage, no wreckage was observed.

2203I/ CTE 95.11 directed LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD to rejoin the Task Element.

2209I/ CTE 95.11 suggested CTE 95.12 recall the ATHABASCAN since destroyers on contact had been ordered to rejoin.

2221I/ CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to resume station on WHITBREAD patrol.

2228I/ CTE 95.11 sent second amplifying report stating that final evaluation of sonar contact was non-submarine.

2305I/ LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD rejoined the Task Element.

Weather Summary:

A mild cold front passed HAUJU area at 0615I, preceded by rain turning to snow by 0700I. Visibility was five miles with ceiling of 1000 feet in showers. Surface winds shifted from northwest to northeast and increased to twenty-eight knots. Morning strikes were not launched due to weather. Weather improved to operational minimums by 1100I with broken low clouds in operating area and clear skies in target area.
Mission Summary:

Two CAP, eight TARCAP, and eight STRIKE for a total of eighteen sorties. In addition three carrier qualification flights were made.

28 December

0015I/ U.S.S. LAWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to investigate a radar surface contact at 36-35N, 124-35E.

0106I/ CTE 95.11 sent a dispatch in reference to initial submarine report and the two amplifying reports stating this as the third and final report and evaluating sonar contact as non-submarine.

0110I/ LAWIS HANCOCK reported contact was South Korean power junk No. 3 JUS Number 1F-1230 out of KUNSAN. Vessel was instructed to clear the area and CTE 95.12 was notified.

0220I/ LAWIS HANCOCK rejoined the Task Element.

0745I/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. One plane returned to ship after take-off due to canopy being jammed open. Remainder of STRIKE was unable to enter target area due to low ceiling and visibility. Flight jettisoned ordnance in clear area and returned to ship.

0759I/ Plane returning aboard with a jammed canopy suffered class "B" damage when port landing gear collapsed on contact with the deck.

0840I/ Eight enlisted personnel destined for the U.S.S. HANCOCK were transferred by highline. One officer came aboard from U.S.S. HANCOCK to receive training in air control duties.

0926I/ Recovered remainder of 0745I launch.

1136I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DD-219) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Six plane STRIKE launched to attack a radar site in a village near CHANGHYON. Twelve buildings were destroyed and a gasoline fire started. One plane was hit in external fuel tank by AA fire; the tank was jettisoned.

1510I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTE 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack gun positions near 5OK-TO island that had fired on aircraft rescue boat 27 December. Damage to gun position was unassessable. Flight then attacked a village near CHANGHYON destroying three buildings and damaging four with ten troops killed.
DECLASSIFIED

15311/ Recovered 13151 launch.
17121/ Recovered 15101 launch.
17141/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Overcast to broken clouds with ceilings of 500 feet and a visibility of four miles reduced morning flight operations. Target area cloudy until 1030, gradually clearing during the afternoon. Weather marginal to undesirable during the morning, becoming average in the afternoon.

Mission Summary:
Three CAP, twelve STRIKE, and four TARCAP for a total of nineteen sorties.

29 December
07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane armed reconnaissance launched. RECO group scouted from O. GJIN to YONAN, strafing ten railroad cars enroute. A grain warehouse near YONAN and three buildings in O. GJIN were destroyed. Medium and moderate AA fire was encountered over YONAN and O. GJIN.

09151/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. Troop bunkers near O. GJIN were attacked with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. RECO group scouted northern area inland without sighting any unusual targets. A radar station thirty miles North of CH’INHAMP was attacked and destroyed. STRIKE group was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. One building was destroyed with two buildings and a cave damaged near O. GJIN.

09411/ Recovered 07151 launch.
10481/ U.S.S. PORTSMOUTH (DD-682) rejoined from CTE 95-12, WHITEHEAD patrol.
11151/ Four plane CAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of PADSHI%WAG destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to ship to act as defensive CAP.
11311/ Recovered 09151 launch.
12051/ Recovered two replacement aircraft plus a "COD" TBM, with mail from K-6.
1217I/  U.S.S. HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1325I/  Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near MONGDU-P'0-RI, destroying six buildings, then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked railroad facilities near CH'AKYONG. One railroad switch was destroyed, four rail cars damaged and five rail cuts made. A thirty foot boat was damaged near CH'INNAMPO. Two planes were diverted to K-6 for removal of hung ordnance.

1331I/  Launched "COD" TEH with LDRN D.A.K. FINLAY, RN, and SUB LT J.A. SIKONDS, RN, aboard for ITAZUKA, Japan.

1341I/  Recovered 1115I launch.

1515I/  Two plane CAP and two plane TACCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack troop village of ONG-DONG. Six buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Captain Carleton L. GRUNN, USMC, suffered injury to his eyes from smoke produced by a premature rocket explosion in front of his plane. Injury resulted in a deferred emergency landing.

1530I/  Recovered remainder of 1325I launch.

1645I/  Commenced recovery of 1515I launch. One plane suffered class "B" damage as a result of engaging two barriers during landing.

1709I/  Completed recovery of 1515I launch.

1731I/  Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds with variable ceilings of 1500 to 2500 feet in operating area during the morning. Target area ceilings varied from 3500 feet in the north to 500 feet in the South with rain and snow showers during the morning. Flying conditions average until 09301 decreasing to undesirable at mid period and improving to average in the afternoon with ceilings of 4000 feet. An approaching cold front produced increasing winds and cloudiness. In many cases the weather limited the targets which could be attacked and the type of ordnance which could be employed.

Mission Summary:

Twelve CAP, two TACCAP, eight Armed Reconnaissance and eleven SHIITE for a total of thirty-three sorties.
30 December

0615/ A pre-dawn, four plane Armed Reconnaissance was launched. RECCO group attacked targets of opportunity by moonlight near P'YONYANG. Eight trucks were strafed and damaged. A locomotive and four rail cars were damaged near P'YONYANG. A road bridge and bomb shelters were damaged near CHANGYON. Light AA fire was observed near P'YONYANG.

0715/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings containing rice near ULLYUL and destroyed three buildings. A small boat was damaged near CHANGYON.

0815/ Recovered 0615 launch.

0915/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP joined with two planes from K-6 that had been diverted there 29 December. Flight then attacked a troop village near SUNWI-10 destroying sixteen buildings and damaging a gun position. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supplies stored near SINCH'ON with unassessable damage. Flight damaged two rail cars and made a rail cut.

0936/ Recovered 0715 launch.

1115/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP flew reconnaissance of railroad from ONGJIN to HAEJU. One flat car was attacked with unassessable damage before planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supplies stored near SINCH'ON with unassessable damage. Flight damaged two rail cars and made a rail cut.

1130/ Recovered 0915 launch plus two aircraft from K-6.

1300/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1315/ Two plane CAP, four plane TACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack a troop village near CHANGYON. Flight destroyed eighteen buildings and damaged six. STRIKE group attacked troops and reported mine storage area near CH'INMAHPO. Two gun positions were destroyed with an estimated ten troops killed and five wounded. A troop village near SINCH'ON was attacked with eight buildings damaged, an estimated five troops killed, and three wounded.

1336/ Recovered 1115 launch.
14001/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

15151/ Two plane CAP and three plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. HSCCO group made a reconnaissance of HAEJU Peninsula then attacked a troop village near YONAN, destroying six buildings. This flight strafed two small boats on the friendly island of KYODONG-DO by mistake. No personnel were observed in the vicinity and none were believed injured.

15401/ Recovered 13151 launch.

17361/ Recovered 15151 launch.

17361/ Task element retired southward for the night.

22301/ A Class "A" fire was reported in the Incinerator Space.

23051/ The fire, confined to the incinerator space, was reported under-control.

23301/ The fire in the incinerator was completely extinguished. Fire was caused by smouldering embers igniting trash in the incinerator space during removal of ashes. Damage resulting from the fire consisted of paint burned from bulkheads, and the loss of personal effects valued at $125.00.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies and unlimited ceiling with visibility aloft reduced slightly by haze. Surface winds West to North West at fourteen to eighteen knots. Flying conditions good to excellent.

Mission Summary:
Twelve CAP, Four TaRCAP, seven Armed Reconnaissance, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

31 December
00251/ H.M.S. ATHLASACAN (DD6-219) detached to investigate radar surfac contact. ATHLASACAN returned to assigned screening station after identifying surface contact as H.M.S. CRANE (PF).

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near OnGUN destroying thirty-seven buildings and a boat house with an estimated twenty troops killed and ten wounded. Fifteen buildings were damaged.
08271/ One officer was returned to U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) by high-line, having completed training in air control duties. A second officer was received aboard the BAODONG STRAIT for similar training.

09151/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and three plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP destroyed four buildings and damaged four in a troop village near YONAN then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group destroyed fourteen buildings and damaged six in a troop village near CH'INAMPO. One plane of this flight suffered damage to the starboard wing resulting from a hit by a 20MM AA projectile. Originally this was believed to have been caused by an explosion of a wing gun. The aircraft was escorted to K-6 for landing by a second plane of the group. RECCO group flew a reconnaissance to the Han River then destroyed five buildings and damaged three in villages near YONAN. Light AA fire was encountered during the attack.

09491/ Recovered 07151 launch.

11151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troops and bunkers near SUNWI-DO, damaging one bunker, then returned to act as defensive CAP. Remaining STRIKE planes attacked and destroyed one building near KYOKIP'O. Heavy snow showers hampered the attack.

11281/ While awaiting the return of the 09151 launch the ceiling lowered to 300 feet with visibility of less than one half mile. The returning aircraft were vectored to the carrier using the SG-1b radar and a low visibility controlled approach procedure. The aircraft were successful in making visual contact with LSO at a distance of one half mile. The ceiling lifted shortly thereafter and the remainder of the 09151 launch was recovered.

11371/ ATHABASCA detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol this date and on 1 January, then to report to CTE 95.12 for duty at 0200011 January 1953.

13301/ H.K.S. COCKADE (D-34) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

13401/ Recovered 11151 launch. Remaining flights cancelled because of weather.

15001/ H.K.S. Cossack (D-57) reported three Korean fishing boats at 36-20N, 124-55E with side numbers BF-9524, BF-9525, BS0-9534 and BF-9535. Boats were instructed to proceed South out of the restricted area.

16131/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

-14-
Weather Summary:

Scattered low clouds during the early morning. Cloudiness increased to overcast with a ceiling of 2000 feet by 0930I. Target area clear in the early morning with lowering ceiling as cold front approached from the northwest. A wave developed in the Yellow Sea lowering ceiling to 500 feet and visibility to one mile, with snow and light rain by noon. Flying conditions average until 10001, marginal from 10001 until noon and undesirable for the remainder of the day.

Mission Summary:

Seven CAP, eleven STRIKE and three Armed Reconnaissance for a total of twenty-one sorties.

1 January 1953
0001I TE 95.11 designation changed to TU 95.1.1 in accordance with change No. 12 to CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52.

0715I/ Scheduled flight operations were delayed because of heavy seas and frequent snow showers.

1500I/ Light plane STRIKE launched to attack the troop village of TAESOK-NI. Thirty-two buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged with two secondary explosions observed. Flight destroyed three rail cars at SamCHOW-NI then split into sections for reconnaissance of HAEJU area.

1650I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1654I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 2000 feet lowering to 500 feet in snow showers throughout the day. Morning visibility was one half mile in snow and steam fog increasing to six miles in the afternoon. Target area clear from mid-morning throughout the day. Surface winds from the northwest twenty-five to thirty knots, with heavy seas decreasing to twenty-four knots in the afternoon. Flying conditions undesirable until 1400I becoming marginal for remainder of the day.

Frequent snow flurries and spray during the pre-dawn period kept a moderate coating of snow and slush ice on the flight deck. This alone would not have delayed operations since the mechanical sweeper was effective in keeping the deck clear enough for use.

Mission Summary

Eight STRIKE for a total of eight sorties.
2 January

0630I/ Four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched to attack targets of opportunity near P'YONGYANG. CTU 95.1.5 (CH'0-DO) requested the flight investigate a reported railcut near KYOMIP'0. The flight located three trains near KYOMIP'0 apparently stopped there by a rail cut made by shore based night fighters. There were a total of about sixty rail cars and four locomotives. The flight damaged all four locomotives and two rail cars. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered. The location of the trains was given to CTU 95.1.5 by voice radio by the returning aircraft.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group divided to attack trains near KYOMIP'0. Three freight cars were damaged and a near miss on one locomotive produced a large secondary explosion. Three buildings were destroyed in a troop village near Ch'INNAPO. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered during attacks on the trains.

0833I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

0903I/ CTU 95.1.1 sent a flash report of the train's location to JOC Kore-

0915I/ Two plane CAP and four plane Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near KONGGUNP'0-RI destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. HCCCO group was unable to attack the important train targets due to previously arranged rendezvous with planes from K-6. This group scouted to the HAN River area and attacked a troop village near YONAN. Thirteen buildings were destroyed and five damaged. HCCCO group then made scheduled rendezvous with two aircraft that had been diverted to K-6 on 31 December and returned to the ship.

0935I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Scheduled four plane TACAP augmented by three additional aircraft launched as STRIKE to attack stalled trains near KYOMIP'0. One locomotive and twelve rail cars were damaged. Three rail cuts were made. Air Force F-84 jets were observed overhead, attacking the trains with rockets from higher altitude. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered.

1209I/ Recovered 0915I launch including two planes from K-6.

1212I/ One officer was returned to the U.S.S. PORTLAND (DD-682) by helicopter having completed training in Air Control duties.

1228I/ H.M.C.S. CHULABH (DE-228) joined the Task Unit.

1251I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

-16-
PORTERFIELD detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBRiad patrol.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched, the latter to replace earlier scheduled TARCAP which was diverted. CAP attacked a troop village near K'ONGCh'UNPO, destroying thirteen buildings, then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack a battalion head quarters near CH'INNAMPO. Twelve buildings were destroyed with one large secondary explosion observed. Light AA fire was encountered.

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked a troop area near UPCh'UN-KI with unassessable damage. One road bridge was cut at SONGCh'UN-KI.

Recovered 13451 launch plus one TBM "COD" from K-6 with four replacement pilots for VFA-312 aboard. Pilots had had no previous carrier experience and came aboard for qualification landings.

Recovered 15151 launch.

Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had variable broken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 1500 to 2000 feet. A few light snow showers were in the area during the afternoon. Visibility was eight to ten miles. Target area was clear with good visibility throughout the day. Flying conditions were average during the period.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TARCAP, fifteen STRIKE, and eight Armed Reconnaissance for a total of thirty-five sorties.

3 January

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings reported to house a rubber boat factory near ONCh'UN-KI. Three buildings were damaged. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. One TBM launched to qualify MiG-15 pilot in carrier landings. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGWA-D0 destroying nineteen buildings with an estimated four troops killed. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. Light AA fire was encountered. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpasses near SONGWA, damaging two. One building was damaged near CHANGYUN. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.
1003I/ Recovered remainder of 0715I launch.

1010I/ Commenced qualification landings with TBM.

1033I/ Completed TBM pilot qualification with a total of three landings.

1033I/ Launched the TBM "COU", with one F4U as escort, to K-6. The ships operations officer departed as a passenger in the TBM for TaD with Senior Naval Liaison Officer, JOC Korea, to discuss operating procedures with Naval Representatives in JOC Headquarters.

1115I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers North of CH'INNAPO destroying two bunkers and damaging a cave. A road bridge was damaged near CH'INNAPO.

1151I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch plus two planes that had diverted to K-6 from 0715I launch.

1202I/ U.S.S. Lewis HANCOCK (Du-675) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAL patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAKCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO. Flight damaged one building then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TAKCAP to attack troop bunkers near CH'INNAPO. One bunker was destroyed and a loading wharf damaged. Five buildings were damaged near Ongjin. Flight then flew reconnaissance of coast from CH'INNAPO to PAGYANG-DO. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near Seji destroying nineteen buildings. A cave was damaged and a road cut made near Ongjin.

1340I/ Recovered 1115I launch plus two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 0915I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes launched for qualification landings. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers near SUNWI-DO. Two bunkers were destroyed and some rice supplies damaged.

1534I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1608I/ Commenced qualification landings.

1652I/ Completed qualification of two pilots with a total of twelve landings.

1658I/ Recovered 1515I launch plus qualification planes.
1800I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

The operating area had broken low clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet until 0900I. Remainder of the day was partly cloudy with unlimited visibility. Target area was clear throughout the day. Winds were from the north at twenty to twenty-five knots. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-four STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties. Three pilots were qualified with a total of fifteen landings.

4 January

0121I/ H.M.C.S. CHUJADA (DDE-228) reported a sonar contact.

0123I/ CHUJADA reported sonar contact evaluated as non-submarine.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a reported rubber boat factory near CHON'ON-NI. Three buildings were destroyed and four damaged. Troops were observed and attacked in a nearby village. Seven buildings were damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded.

0915I/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group split into two divisions to attack railroad targets. The first division attacked a railroad marshalling yard near CHAIKONG, destroying a road bridge and making seven rail cuts. A plane piloted by Captain Eugene N. James, USNR, was hit in the windshield by a 20mm projectile. The pilot suffered slight cuts from glass splinters. The plane later landed aboard safely. The second group attacked a railroad junction near CHAIKONG. Seven railcars were destroyed and three damaged. A coal chute was destroyed and four rail cuts made. One plane suffered minor damage from AA fire.

0925I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

0959I/ Two plane CAP launched.

1051I/ The Chaplain from the CHUJADA came aboard by helicopter to conduct religious services.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHON'ON-NI destroying fifteen buildings and damaging five. Flight then flew reconnaissance to the Han river.
1136I/ Recovered 0915I and 0959I launch.

1144I/ H.M.S. COCKADES (D-34) chopped to CTU 95.1.2.

1315I/ Three plane STRIKE and four plane TANCAP launched. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a transformer near SINCH'ON. Three buildings were destroyed in a nearby village. CTU 95.1.4 released TANCAP to attack a battalion headquarters near CHINNAMPO. One building was destroyed and one damaged.

1327I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1345I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1352I/ LEWIS HANCOCK alongside to transfer mail and personnel. LT CLABA RD RN, came aboard by highline.

1426I/ Two BADOENG STRAIT officers plus LT CLABA RD, RN, transferred to the COCKADES by highline for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19). The BADOENG STRAIT officers are to observe air operations aboard the GLORY.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near SUNWI-DO. Eighteen buildings were destroyed and six damaged. One plane of this group plus two plane defensive CAP returned to K-6 enroute to Itami for installation, test, and repair of wing rocket stations.

1532I/ Recovered 1315I launch. Scheduled carrier qualification landings were cancelled because of light variable winds.

1713I/ Recovered remainder of 1515I launch.

1714I/ Set a course southward for Sasebo.

1726I/ The COCKADES came alongside to transfer mail.

2058I/ COCKADES chopped to H.M.S. GLORY.

2100I/ Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 by H.M.S. GLORY. Relieved as OTC, West Coast, by H.M.S. CutsANE.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had a high overcast and low broken clouds with a ceiling of 1000 feet. Target area had an unlimited ceiling. Winds were light and variable at five to seven knots. Flying conditions average to good in target area for the entire period.
Mission Summary:

Eight CaP, four TARCaP, and twenty-three STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

5 January
0845I/ Three plane CaP and two plane Carrier Qualification Group launched.
0924I/ Commenced qualification landings with two planes.
0940I/ One plane of the qualification group suffered class "B" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing.
1026I/ Recovered remainder of 0845I launch. Two pilots were qualified with a total of seven landings.
1027I/ U.S.S. Lewis HAMCOCK (DD-675) chopped to CTU 95.1.1.
1729I/ Moored to Buoy Number eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.

A. Ships ordnance expended 26 December 1952:
   1. 1685 rounds of 40MM.

B. Performance of ship's ordnances:
   1. AA firing exercise was conducted 26 December 1952 with no material casualties.
   2. 30 December; improper assembly of breech block on right gun of Mount #5 caused the outer cocking lever to break, and burred the sear and inner crank. All parts were replaced.
   3. The R-34 radar of the R-63 director system sustained the following casualties:
      a. 27 December: (Radar II) Variance of crystal current in transmitter receiver caused by TH tube 724B. The tube was replaced.
      b. 31 December: (Radar VIII) Power failure in 115 volt circuit due to a bad fuse in the R-3 fuse box. The fuse was replaced.
      c. 2 January: Intermittent transmission of range to receiver, also indication of no torque on range receiver dial. The malfunction was caused by a faulty 6L6 (low emission) tube in amplifier RK-4 Mod 1. The mechanical limit stop for range in the relay transmitter assembly also stopped. The tube was replaced and the limit stop set.
   4. Mount #14 sustained the following casualty:
      a. 31 December: Failed to synchronize in train due to a faulty amplifier. The amplifier was replaced.

C. The AA firing exercise on 26 December indicated a need for improvement in the accuracy of fire of the port battery. No firing was conducted enroute to Sasebo because of inclement weather.

D. A five point training program for the department has been promulgated. The five points are:
   1. General Drills, i.e., G.E., Loading drills
   2. General Training Periods, i.e., Lectures, Practical exercises
   3. Advancement Training, i.e., Correspondence courses
   4. Personal Training via USAFI.
   5. School Programs (Fleet and Service)
E. Summary of Aviation Ordnance Expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; HMAT Rockets</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20mm Ammo</td>
<td>20,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 cal. Ammo</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART IV DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no Battle Damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>railroad Coal Shute</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Locomotives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad Overpasses</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies (In Stacks)</td>
<td>Large Amount Destroyed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage Suffered by Ships Aircraft

1. Operational Damage
   a. The tail wheel assembly was sheared from a plane during qualification landings on 27 December resulting in class "C" damage.
   b. One aircraft suffered class "B" damage when the port landing gear collapsed during a landing on 28 December.
   c. A tail wheel collapsed during a landing causing a plane to strike the barriers and resulting in class "B" damage on 29 December.
   d. One plane suffered class "A" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing on 5 January.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action
   a. One plane was lost in the sea after being hit by AA fire on 27 December.
   b. One plane received minor damage consisting of bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 28 December.
c. One aircraft suffered class "C" damage as a result of a hit in the starboard wing by 20MM AA fire on 31 December.

d. One plane received a hole in the cowling as a result of flying through debris caused by a rocket blast on 3 January. Damage was minor.

e. One plane suffered a shattered windshield as a result of a hit by 20MM AA fire on 4 January.

f. One plane received bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 4 January.
PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel

Number of personnel assigned to the ship during the patrol, including marines, was 1,123. Personnel absent for various reasons totaled 38 leaving 1,085 actually aboard during the period. Four marine pilots came aboard while the ship was at sea.

2. Education

Educational advancement received continued emphasis as personnel prepared for the advancement in rating examinations. In addition to courses already being utilized, nine correspondence courses, four USAFI courses and twenty-one course books were issued during the patrol. On the job training constituted the largest single phase of the program due to the heavy operating schedule.

Exchange of officers between units of the United Nations Fleet has proved to be an interesting and valuable source of training. Two officers from this ship were transferred to the British Carrier to observe air operations. Four officers from various units in the area came aboard for training and to observe operations.

3. Divine Services

Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, four protestant services with two holy communions, one catholic mass, daily rosary services, one bible class and two Latter Day Saints services. The Chaplain from the H.A.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) came aboard to conduct Catholic Mass.

4. Welfare and Recreation

A heavy maintenance schedule reduced movie showings to four during this period. Each movie was attended by a capacity audience.

The library rates high as a form of recreation as evidenced by the large number of books currently checked out to personnel.

A summary of the days action, world news and sporting events is broadcast over the ships announcing system at noon each day by the Chaplain.

A staff, headed by the Chaplain, prints a daily paper which is available for reading during the breakfast hour and is distributed to all ships in the Task Unit.

B. Casualties

First Lieutenant John B. GOJRY, USA.C., 053549, was declared missing in action on 27 December 1952. Numerous attempts to rescue LT GOJRY from the water near enemy territory failed and it has not been determined that he survived to reach the shore. It is considered extremely improbable in view of his location in the water, the circumstances of the attempted rescue, and the temperature of the water that he could have survived.
PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air-Department

Recommendations

The following recommendations set forth in the action report for 8 December through 17 December 1952 remain valid.

a. Operating squadrons should check regularly and frequently condition of EL-17-17 igniter plug receptacles on all aircraft, and replace as required.

b. Operating squadrons should renew circuit wiring on all aircraft showing release circuit wire deterioration.

c. Support FASRONs should replace or overhaul defective or deteriorating aero 14-, 1K-55, and 1K-9 racks on aircraft prior to assignment of replacement aircraft to combat squadrons.

Comment

Three (3) new pilots with no previous carrier experience were carrier qualified. (Total landings 30). During carrier qualifications on 5 January 1953, F4U-4B, BuNo 97501, sustained probable class "A" damage when it went into the starboard catwalk incident to landing aboard. The pilot was uninjured. The aircraft was removed from the catwalk using the Le-Tourneau crane.

Comment

The H03S-1 helicopter was out of commission on three occasions during flight operations because of an inoperative rotor brake resulting from brake shoe failure. Since the rotor brake is designed as a rotor parking brake, it required use in carrier helicopter operation to stop blade rotation subjects brake shoes to relatively severe conditions of wear. The HU-1 DET maintenance records show that six (6) sets of brake shoes have had to be replaced during the last six months. This vessel has strictly adhered to current operating instructions for this model helicopter.

Recommendations

a. A more rugged rotor brake shoe should be developed for the H03S-1 helicopter. It is understood the brake assemblies on more recent models have been developed, taking into account the severe demands of carrier operation.

b. Until such time as a more rugged brake shoe is available, brake shoes should be thoroughly inspected before and after each flight, and that they be replaced prior to failure.
Comment

The catapult bridle allowance for the CVE-105 Class Carrier contains requirements for F6F, F6F, AF, TB, AD, and F4U type aircraft. In adding up the non-usable bridles, due to the basic fact that only one type aircraft can be efficiently operated at any one time, it is obvious that valuable storage space is used for items that will undoubtedly never be used on any one particular cruise.

Recommendation

The allowance of bridles for types of aircraft not assigned be reduced to two (2) for each type for use in emergencies. Proper bridles can be loaded on the basis of type aircraft assigned for forthcoming operations. Thus monetary savings will result as well as the saving in stowage space.

Comment

Cold weather operational problems were encountered almost continuously during this period. Scheduling ten (10) plane strikes for dawn launch presents difficult deck spotting problems to the CVE-105 carrier during extreme cold weather. To insure that the first launch was ready in all respects at the scheduled time, the following procedures were considered necessary:

a. Assigned aircraft were spotted on the hangar deck at least four (4) hours prior to launch in order to aid in turn-up.

b. These planes were respotted to flight deck just prior to turn-up check-out.

c. Topping off with gasoline of these aircraft was done on hangar deck.

d. Ammunition loading except fuzing was done on the hangar deck.

e. The formation steamed down wind during preparations for launching in order to have the least amount of freezing wind across the deck. This substantially improved the efficiency and safety of personnel on the flight deck.
Comment

Aircraft handling tractors are not equipped with visible all-round red lighting for night flight deck operations. This command is placing a small red light on each fender as a safety measure to insure that all personnel can see the movement of the tractors at night.

Recommendation

Aircraft handling tractors should be provided with small all-round red lights as a safety measure to insure that personnel see its movements on a blacked-out flight deck.

The hung ordnance summary for the subject period is set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Aero 14a</td>
<td>10-faulty igniter plugs (S ring fatigue, Aero 17-17 plugs) 2-Parted pig-tails 3-Circuit failure 4-Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MK-9</td>
<td>3 -Faulty igniters 7-Cut pig-tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total HV. RS</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aero 14a</td>
<td>1 - Circuit failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>6 - Circuit failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GP</td>
<td></td>
<td>100#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aero 14a</td>
<td>1 - Solenoid failure 3-Pilot error (switches) 5-Circuit failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While some improvement was noted with respect to hung ordnance during this operating period, the problem remains acute and requires further concerted effort for solution.
Land - Launch Data is tabulated below:

Launches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Launches</th>
<th>H-2-1 Catapult</th>
<th>H-4C Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight Pounds</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind Knots</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Pressure psi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Bridles Expended</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of landings</th>
<th>Average Wind Knots</th>
<th>CPV psi</th>
<th>Average runout feet</th>
<th>Wires Caught</th>
<th>Barrier Crashes</th>
<th>Barriers engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>#1 - 49, #2 - 92, #3 - 77, #4 - 36, #5 - 8, #6 - 3, #7 - 0, #8 - 0, #9 - 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Operations Department

1. Combat Information Center

Watches in CIC were arranged into three rotating watch sections of enlisted men with a total of seven men to a section. There are six CIC watch officers and two Air Plot Watch Officers. During all air operations, there is an Air Plot Officer, a CIC Watch Officer, and an Air Control Officer on watch.

The carrier operates approximately thirty-five miles from enemy territory during daylight hours. A two-plane C.P. is maintained on station five to ten miles from the ship in the expected direction of enemy air activity. This provides approximately twenty-five miles in which to effect an intercept of approaching aircraft.

The major function of CIC during these patrols is control of STRIKE groups and the defensive C.P. Returning strikes are intercepted by defensive C.P. to provide identification as well as training. Interception is usually made about fifteen to twenty miles from the ship. A better air search radar and IFF installation would substantially aid CIC in improving the air defense of the ship.
Three officers from the screen destroyers were aboard to obtain training as air controllers during this patrol. The defensive CP were split and used for practice intercepts in order to provide a maximum amount of training.

2. Communications

1. Personnel

Due to a shortage of trained radiomen, watches were stood on a port and starboard basis, six hours on and six hours off. Standing of long watches over a long period of time decreased efficiency and increased the number of errors made. Although this command received three graduates from class "D" schools graduates were unable to meet minimum requirements for guarding a circuit, because of inadequate training. Moreover, during the period that this ship has operated as Commander Task Element 95.11, the radio traffic has increased several times over that experienced in operations previous to this assignment.

Recommendation:

a. Escort Carriers operating as Task Element Commanders in the Yellow Sea should be provided four (4) rated radiomen above the fleet average because of the unusually heavy traffic load in this area.

b. The requirements for completion of Class "D" radio school should be increased to the minimum point necessary to enable a graduate to guard the slower circuits.

2. Material

The coding machines, although never in an inoperative state, were a constant source of trouble through faulty mechanical operation.

Recommendation

It is recommended that an additional medium-high frequency transmitter and an additional coding machine be provided in this class ship, when the ship is operating in the capacity of CTF 95.11.

3. Services

It was found that requests for services from major relay stations were slow in being transmitted and on several instances it was necessary to initiate a second request. On messages of importance to operations, a delay in receiving a service could have serious consequences.

A message originated by this command was altered as to date time group, characters of groups, and message indicator when re-broadcast by NDF h.f.T. The date time group of the message was altered from 111358Z of December to 111357Z of December and the fourth message indicator was changed.
from Channel to VICTOR. Numerous characters in the re-broadcast differed from those in the original message. These alterations made it impossible to decrypt the message. The resulting requests for re-encryption from all addresses, in such cases, increases the work load on circuits and crypto centers substantially.

3. Photographic Laboratory

Photographic work was confined to routine ships work, photographs for the cruise book and support of the squadron. The aerial camera and assembly were lost in action the first day of operations as the plane carrying the installation was shot down by enemy AA fire. A replacement assembly was not available aboard the ship.

4. Aerology

Weather forecasting in the Yellow Sea is difficult due to lack of reports. During an average 24 hour period, the telegraph response (MATT) is granted about five hours, normally between 10001 and 15001. It is difficult to keep a map sequence as the ship has no facsimile equipment, and no other outside aid is available. On the average less than two maps a day are received from JIF, Tokyo. It is considered that facsimile equipment should be installed on carriers at the earliest opportunity.

C. Engineering Department

1. Damage Control

At 2225 on 30 December, a class "A" fire broke out in the incinerator room. Approximately thirty minutes was required to extinguish this fire.

Personnel cleaning the fire box placed hot ashes and clinkers into a container to dump overboard. This material flared up and a CO2 fire extinguisher was exhausted in attempting to quell the flames. The personnel involved went to get a bucket of water, one departing immediately, and the second man when the first one was slow in returning. When both were gone, with the doors to the incinerator room closed, the fire broke out again and set fire to adjacent trash. The fire was brought under control with fire hoses.

As a result of the experience of this fire, the procedure for fire fighting has been changed to require ringing the general alarm. With the entire crew standing easy at stations the ability of the ship to counter a fire or to prevent a chain reaction of other fires or explosions resulting from the initial fire, is materially increased.

To improve safety in the incinerator room the personnel assigned there are being given additional training in fire fighting. Additional CO2 fire extinguishers have been placed there. Safety precautions requiring trash to be moved direct from the accumulation bins to the fire box will be rigidly enforced.
D. Medical Department

1. First Lieutenant John B. Goody, USMC, 053549, was declared missing in action 27 December 1952.

2. There were no personnel wounded or killed in action during this patrol.

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company

   a. Admitted to sick list - 155
   b. Total sick days out of 10 possible working days - 146
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 1
   d. Total patients attending sick call - 422
   e. Total medical treatments - 667
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 0
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 10
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 0
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 10
   l. Major surgical procedures - 0
   m. Venereal diseases cases and non-specific Urethritis - total - 25

   1. Gonorrhea - 3
   2. Chancroid - 7
   3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 15
   n. Penicillin tablets issued during last port period - 128

4. Medical statistical summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 6
   b. Pilots permanently grounded for medical reasons - 0
   c. Average number days pilots grounded - 2
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 0
   e. No. of pilots MA - 0
   f. No. of pilots VLA - 0
   g. No. of pilots MA - 1

H. L. Ray

Copy to:

ChO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (2) advance
CINCPACFLT BVALUATION GROUP
CommVFB (1) advance
COMNAVFLE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) advance
CTF 77 (1) advance
COMShInPac (5)
COMServPac
COMFAIrJapan
NAVAL War COLLEGE
CONCARDIV-15
CONCARDIV-17
CO, FAINESTUPAC (2)
CG, INPacPac (1) advance
CG, PHSPac (1) advance
CG, 1st MarInAirWing
CO, Nav 12
CO, Vbm-312
CO, USS BatTan (CVL-29)
CO, USS robot (CVE-114)
CO, USS BATROKO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
CO, USS POINT COZU (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. WILE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer
U.S.S. BADONG STRAIT (CVE-118)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

26 December 1952

**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 27 DECEMBER 1952**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0855</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0855</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/P</td>
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<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td></td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
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<td>1140</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>CtriQUL</td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C-8</td>
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<td>C/P</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
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<td>1325</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td></td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1730</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>C/P</td>
<td>CtriQUL</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HELICOPTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUARD</th>
<th>0730</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUARD</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**:

1. All flight with belly tanks.

**AMMO LOAD**

A - All a/C with full gun loads.

B - All a/C 1000# / 5 sec and 4-100# inst./ND.

C - All a/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.

D - 2 a/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.

2 a/C 500# 0.1/.025 and 6-100# 0.1/.025.

E - All a/C 500# / 5 sec and 6-HVAR.

B. E. COLKITT JR.

LCDr., USN
Air Operations Officer
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)  
Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE  
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE  
(3) Commander SOUTHWEST Fleet  
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 11 January 1953 through 21 January 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations  
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4  
(c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A  
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule  
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of  
(3) Rocket Barrier Diagram

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 11 January through 21 January 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 on 11 January until 2100 on 20 January of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   PART I General Narrative.
   PART II Chronological Order of Events.
   PART III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
   PART IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   PART V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
   PART VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to WNA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952 and January 1953.
A. During the period 11 to 20 January 1953, the USS BALOOG STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMa-312 embarked, operated as a part of TU 95.1.1, Carrier Unit, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command was Captain H. L. Ray, 82691/1310, USN who, for the duration of this patrol, was also UTC, West Coast in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. Ships assigned CTU 95.1.1 as screen included the USS ROCKS (DD-804), USS ERBEN (DD-631), HMS CONSORT (D-76), HMS COCKADE (D-34) and HMCS Haida (DDE-215). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three as units were rotated temporarily to CTU 95.1.2 for twenty-four hour periods for night patrols along the enemy held coast line and for replenishing enroute.

B. VMa-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Calhoun, 07207, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. Planes consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B types. At the beginning of the patrol there were a total of 16 aircraft aboard but replacements received on the third and fourth day of air operations raised this total to 24, the authorized allowance. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 23. Average availability was 20. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 284 for a total of 637.8 hours. A total of 49.5 hours was over the target time. A single helicopter from helicopter squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 44 sorties for a total of 31.4 hours.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coast line and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TU 95.1.2, the Naval Defense Unit; the troops of TU 95.1.5, the Island Defense Unit; and the ships of TU 95.1.1, the Carrier Unit. The Island Defense Unit is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the Han River on the south to the Taedong Estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Unit in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerrilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Unit have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

D. The BALOOG STRAIT sailed from Sasebo, Japan at 0645I on 11 January 1953 as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 090807Z of January. Gunnery firing exercises were conducted in area GDDG. Shortly thereafter three aircraft temporarily based ashore at Itami Air Force Base for repairs were received aboard. These aircraft were led by Lieutenant Colonel Winston E. Jenson, 07571, USMC, who reported aboard as the prospective Commanding Officer of VMa-312 for familiarization and requalification in carrier landings. Five replacement aircraft assigned from the USS ESSEX were flown to the ship via Korean air bases but were unable to rendezvous because of weather. These aircraft finally arrived aboard 14 and 15 January 1953. The ship became a part of TU 95.1.1 at 112100I.
E. In performing its assigned tasks, the Task Unit continued conducting
dawn to dusk air operations, operating during daylight in the vicinity of
37°30' North Latitude, 124°E Longitude and retiring southward for the night.
However, it was often necessary for the carrier to operate as far North as
38°25' North Latitude to find adequate ceiling and visibility. Normally
five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours, with
approximately 50 per cent of available aircraft in each launch. A two plane
cap for Task Unit 95.1.1 was assigned in each deck launch, while a four plane
cap was provided once each day for the vessel of CTU 95.1.2 stationed
in the vicinity of Johnson Island. All STRIKE groups assigned targets in the
Johnson Island area, however, were briefed to assist CTU 95.1.2 whenever their
services were requested.

F. During the first several days of the patrol air operations were hampered
by weather. On the twelfth of January northwest winds as high as 38 knots
and gusts to 54 with resulting heavy seas precluded air operations for the
first time since this vessel commenced operations in the Yellow Sea on 29
October 1952. On the succeeding five days, minimum temperatures during day-
light hours ranged from 15° to 22°F. Minor technical difficulties resulting
therefrom reduced aircraft availability. Personnel working on the flight
deck in this weather found it extremely bitter and were slowed down.
Freezing spray and light snow on the flight deck were also a problem, but
delayed only one sortie. Thereafter the mercury continued rising until
minimum daylight temperatures reached 32°F, on the final day of air
operations. The effect of the temperature on air operations can be gauged from
the chart of aircraft usage and availability (enclosure (2) hereto. It
should be noted that minimum temperatures are normally experienced during
daylight hours since the Task Unit retires to the warmer southern waters at
night.

G. Directives from higher authority required this unit to provide general
air coverage for troop convoys approaching the Johnson Island area from the south
on January. Coverage afforded the convoys on this date was very general
indeed since frequent snow showers and low ceilings curtailed operations.
Three aircraft returning to the ship from K-6 covered the entrance to
Johnson Island harbor during one period of the day. Air operations were resumed in
the afternoon when improved weather was found to the North, but low ceilings
and visibility continued to preclude air operations in the sea areas to the
South.

H. The Task Unit provided immediate assistance to H&G SPADAX on 15 January
when she came under fire from shore batteries in the vicinity of HAERU. Two
returning cap aircraft were diverted to the scene, and provided cover until
a four plane STRIKE group arrived with full ordnance loads. Photographs
taken indicated that one gun position was destroyed and one gun position
and command post damaged by this group and the subsequent STRIKE group
which attacked them.

I. The extension of ice incident to lowered temperatures demanded
increased air support. Twelve planes struck targets south of HAERU because
ice conditions made it difficult for the Frigate operating there to give
necessary cover to YONGHEE-DO. Close pack ice around SOKTO and CHODO opened the possibility of an overland invasion from the mainland and reduced the ability of surface ships to operate in and cover those areas. Increased reconnaissance of this area was instituted, and all aircraft transiting the area were briefed to establish communication with the ships stationed there and to provide assistance if requested.

J. The difficulties of qualifying pilots for carrier operations in the comar area are illustrated by the experience of the prospective commanding officer of VMA-312 on this patrol. After his initial landing aboard in a pre-frontal rain squall while the ship was enroute to the operating area, he was scheduled for CAP in order to conduct his carrier qualification landings while strike aircraft were away from the ship. Each time this was attempted some unforeseen circumstances of weather, emergency landing, or emergency launch precluded practice landings. After two such attempts, and in view of his excellent carrier landing technique and previous experience, he was assigned regular missions. He returned from the nine days of air operations with nine landings, of which nine were combat sorties. No formal carrier qualification landings were made.

K. On previous patrols a serious effort was made toward selecting targets and then tailoring the ordnance loading on the assigned strike aircraft to attain greatest results. Because of the difficulty of rearming during this patrol in the exceptional cold weather a modification to this system was adopted in an effort to speed up rearming. For a given period – a full day when practicable – targets of a given type were selected for attack so that a standard ordnance loading could be used with good effect. This system reduced the work load on ordnance crews to a considerable degree, and expedited rearming. It is recommended for adoption where circumstances are appropriate.

L. On retiring from the operating area on the evening of 20 January, a total of 48 fishing vessels were sighted in the prohibited area between latitudes 37° and 36° N in the vicinity of longitude 124° 40' E. This is a large increase over numbers previously encountered and would appear to represent a concerted encroachment on an area reserved for combat operations.

M. At 2021001 the BADOEANG STRAIT was replaced in TU 95.1.1 by the HMS GLORY relinquished the duties of OTC West Coast, and retired toward Sasebo in company with HMS CONSORT. Anti-aircraft firing exercises on a towed sleeve were conducted by both ships the next day. Upon completion, CONSORT conducted a torpedo firing exercise using the BADOEANG STRAIT as target. The execution of the attack and the retirement appeared excellent, but accuracy could not be judged since the torpedo was not observed from the target ship.
11 January
0645/  In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 0908072 of January 1953, the USS BADOITNG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for Korean West Coast Operating Areas, "AIKE" and "NAN".

1128/  Commenced 40mm AA firing on a towed sleeve in area "GEORGE".

1155/  Completed 40mm AA firing having expended 1823 rounds of 40mm ammunition.

1335/  Recovered three VMA-312 aircraft from Itami, Japan. Six additional aircraft, scheduled to land aboard from K-3, returned to base due to weather.

2100/  Relieved the Haa GLORY (CVL-19). Assumed duty as CTU 95.1.1 and OTC of Naval Blockade Forces off the West Coast of Korea.

Weather Summary:
Broken clouds with a ceiling of 5000 feet and overcast at 10,000 feet during the day. Wind increased from three knots at 1630I to thirty-six knots by 2030I, and maintained this velocity throughout the night. Heavy seas slowed the speed of advance to eight knots and prevented rendezvous with other ships of TU 95.1.1 as previously scheduled.

12 January
1330/  Arrived in Korean Operating Area "AIKE".

1630/  USS HOOD (DD-804) and HMAS HAILA (DDE-215) joined the Task Unit. Upon detachment by Haa GLORY on 11 January, these ships were diverted to patrols in area "NAN" rather than join BADOITNG STRAIT earlier because of heavy seas.

1820/  USS BAYOU (DD-621) joined the Task Unit from WHITBREAD patrol.

2330/  Arrived in Korean Operating Area "NAN".

Weather Summary:
Cloud cover variable broken to overcast with ceilings of 500 to 1500 feet. Moderate snow showers throughout the day. Surface winds northwest thirty-two to thirty-eight knots with gusts to fifty-four knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 35°F and 24°F. High seas of sixteen to twenty feet delayed arrival in operating area and caused cancellation of air operations.
13 January

0745I/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked and damaged a railroad tunnel near Ongjin.

0849I/ HMAS Haida (DDE-215) came alongside for transfer of mail and personnel, LT John G. Marshall, RN, and LT R. Carvin, RN, pilots from the HMAS GLORY (CWL-19), came aboard by highline to observe air operations.

0912I/ USS HBSN (DD-631) came alongside for transfer of mail.

0930I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes returned from K-6 were used as defensive CaP. STRIKE group damaged a railroad tunnel and four buildings near Ongjin. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

1025I/ Recovered 0745I launch plus four Vwa-312 replacement aircraft from K-6.

1050I/ HMAS CONCORD (D-76) joined the Task Unit.

1108I/ USS Hooks (DD-804) came alongside to transfer mail.

1145I/ Two plane CaP and three plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked troop villages near Sunwi-do destroying two buildings and damaging three. One plane of the flight spotted gunfire from the HMAS Newcastle near Ronggang-NI.

1200I/ Hooks detached to CTU 95.1.2 for Whitehead patrol.

1212I/ Recovered remainder of 0930I launch plus two replacement planes from K-6.

1345I/ Three plane Gunfire Spot group launched. This group spotted gunfire for HMAS Newcastle and attacked troop villages near Ronggang-NI. In addition to damage inflicted by ships gunfire the flight destroyed three buildings and damaged three. Flight diverted to K-6 due to communication difficulties and marginal weather.

1400I/ The primary Air Search Radar (SK) became inoperative. Spare parts required for repair were not available aboard ship.

1407I/ Recovered 1145I launch.

1545I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TACCAP launched. CTU 95.1.2 requested TACCAP to attack a gun position in a cave which had been firing on Giddo Island. The entrance to the cave was destroyed. One large building was damaged near Ch'Inwampo. Light AA fire was encountered.
16071/ Recovered two aircraft that had diverted to K-6 from 09301 launch.
16381/ CTU 95.1.1 informed CTG of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
16401/ CTU 95.1.1 informed CTG of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
17321/ Recovered 15451 launch.
17331/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.
22001/ CTU 95.1.1 informed CTG of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
22021/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.
22171/ CTU 95.1.1 informed CTG of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
22521/ CTU 95.1.1 informed CTG of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
23281/ Final evaluation of sonar contact was doubtless submarine.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet lowering to 1500 feet by 11001. Visibility varied from one to ten miles in sea fog and snow showers. Winds were from the northwest at twenty-two to twenty-seven knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 23°F and 15°F. Target area was clear throughout the day.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TACT, eleven STRIKE, and three Gunfire Spot for a total of twenty-six sorties.

14 January
00301/ USS ADAM (DD-631) and HMCS HAIDA (DWE-215) rejoined the screen.
08151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. Because of low visibility and snow showers, it was necessary for the Air Controller to direct the rendezvous of the STRIKE group. The flight then attacked troops and supplies near YONAN. Three buildings were destroyed with one secondary explosion observed. Two planes diverted to K-6 due to marginal weather.
08361/ HMCS HAIDA came alongside for mail transfer.
10351/ Commenced recovery of 08151 launch. Snow showers reduced visibility to less than one mile and required radar control of planes entering the landing pattern. One plane caught number
six wire and engaged number three barrier, damaging the propeller and engine cowling.

1106I/ Completed recovery of 0815I launch. Aircraft launching operations suspended because of weather.

113I/ Recovered three planes that had diverted to K-6 from 1345I launch 13 January, plus one "ODD" TAR. The three Corsairs flew convoy cover in the vicinity of LST's, AKA's and APA's in accordance with instructions since low visibility in operating area prevented TU 95.1.1 CAP from covering the convoy from seaward.

1152I/ USS HOOKS (D-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBRAD patrol.

1240I/ LUPD detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBRAD patrol.

1400I/ Light plane STRIKE launched. Flight attacked a railroad tunnel near CHAMYONG. Both entrances to the tunnel were damaged and four rail cuts were made. Low visibility and snow showers continued in the southern part of the operating area and prevented launching CAP to cover convoy.

1440I/ HAIWA chopped to CTG 95.1 before being relieved by HhS COCKADE, since COCKADE was diverted by COMNAVFE to investigate a Japanese fishing boat reported in distress.

1520I/ Four plane TARCAP launched. Two planes, diverted to K-6 from 0815I launch, returned to act as defensive CAP. TARCAP attacked a troop village near HANGU damaging six buildings.

1546I/ Recovered 1400I launch.

1603I/ CTU 95.1.1 received a flash dispatch from LEOPARD (Army Liaison Group on PaengYong-Do) requesting an immediate air strike against eighty North Korean Troops with three 82MM guns attacking friendly positions on CHANGSAN-GOT Peninsula (XC 484192).

1650I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. Flight attacked troop area and gun positions on CHANGSAN-GOT Peninsula as requested with unassessable damage. One plane was hit in the propeller by small arms fire.

1727I/ Recovered 1520I launch plus two planes diverted to K-6 from 0815I launch.

1747I/ Recovered 1650I launch.

1748I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary: The operating area had broken clouds to overcast conditions.
throughout the day with ceilings varying from 1500 feet to 400 feet in snow showers. Visibility was five to eight miles lowering at times to less than one mile in snow showers and sea smoke. Surface winds were from the northwest at twenty to twenty-four knots. The target area was clear throughout the day. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 22°F and 17°F. Flying conditions were marginal to undesirable.

Mission Summary:
Four CAP, sixteen STRIKE, four TARCAP, and three Convoy Escort for a total of twenty-seven sorties.

15 January
0425I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) joined the Task Unit.
0730I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near UPCH’O-RI destroying nine buildings and damaging six. Flight then flew reconnaissance to Han River.
0827I/ COCKADE came along side to transfer mail.
0930I/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance and one TBM "COD" for K-6 launched. CAP attacked a troop village near UPCH’O-RI destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. This flight was then sent to aid CTU 95.1.6 (HMS SPARROW) which was being fired upon by shore batteries located on the Ongjin Peninsula. Gun positions were strafed with unassessable damage. The flight remained on station to cover CTU 95.1.6 until relieved by 1130I STRIKE group. RECCO group attacked a troop village North of CH’INNAMPO destroying ten buildings and damaging ten. Four vehicle bunkers were destroyed. The flight observed an F9F crash into the water three miles North of SOK-TO Island. The plane was destroyed and survival of the pilot was believed impossible.
0944I/ Recovered 0730I launch.
1040I/ CTU 95.1.6 requested TARCAP immediately. TU 95.1.6 (HMS SPARROW) was covering mine sweeping operations North of YONGYON Islands when enemy shore batteries from the Ongjin Peninsula opened fire.
1056I/ Defensive CAP departed to aid TU 95.1.6.
1107I/ CTU 95.1.1 reported to JOC Korea that TARCAP was being provided for CTU 95.1.6.
1130I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group reported to CTU 95.1.6 and relieved CAP of the 0930I launch. Two gun positions and a command post were damaged on the Ongjin Peninsula. Light AA fire was encountered with one aircraft suff-
erating minor damage. CAP flight reported to CTU 95.1.6 and was released to attack pre-briefed target. Flight destroyed seven buildings in a troop village near ONGJIN then returned to act as defensive CAP for TU 95.1.1.

1151/ recovered four planes of 09301 launch.

1201/ USS Escanaba (DD-631) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1253/ recovered four planes of 11301 launch and remaining two planes of 09301 launch.

1305/ HMAS Gondwana (D-76) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1430/ Two plane CAP, three plane TjrkCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN, destroying three buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. One plane of this flight remained airborne and joined the 16001 launch as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released the TkRCAFP to attack a gun position near SONGHWA. The gun position was damaged. Six buildings were destroyed in a troop village near ROGGANG-NI. The STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SINC'ON destroying eight buildings and damaging seven.

1457/ recovered remaining two aircraft of 11301 launch.

1600/ One plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was joined by one plane from 14301 launch. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CANGNUNG destroying nine buildings with one secondary explosion observed.

1625/ recovered eight planes of 14301 launch.

1734/ recovered 16001 launch plus one plane from 14301 launch.

1815/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather summary:
The operating area had broken clouds to overcast conditions with ceilings variable from 1000 to 2000 feet. Light sea fog and snow showers were in the area. Surface winds were from the northwest at sixteen to twenty-two knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 23.5°F and 15°F. The target area was clear throughout the period.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, three TkRCAFP, four Armed Reconnaissance and sixteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-two sorties.
16 January

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Anak destroying eleven buildings.

0915I/

Two plane CAP, four plane ThRGAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near Ongjin destroying three buildings and damaging three. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 requested ThRGAP to attack a gun position. Position was attacked with unassessable damage. Flight then attacked a troop village near Chinnampo destroying five buildings. The STRIKE group attacked gun positions on the Ongjin Peninsula that had fired on CTU 95.1.6 on the previous day. One gun position and a command post were destroyed also a second gun position was neutralized.

0946I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1027I/ Landed one plane of 0915I launch due to an electrical fire.

1130I/

Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village and gun position near Ongjin. Two buildings were destroyed and a gun position hit with unassessable damage. Flight then escorted a TBm "COD" to the ship and remained as defensive CAP. STRIKE group split into two divisions and attacked each end of a rail tunnel near Simon-in-Ni. One end of the tunnel was closed and the other end damaged. Two planes of this flight diverted to k-6 with hung ordnance.

1209I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch.

1220I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for Whitbread patrol.

1225I/ HMS CONSORT (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, Whitbread patrol.

1315I/

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. One CAP plane aborted due to an electrical fire. Remaining plane acted as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Chinnampo destroying seventeen buildings and damaging four. Light AA fire was encountered.

1343I/ Recovered five planes of 1130I launch.

1352I/ Recovered three planes of 1130I launch plus one TBm "COD" from Itazuki.

1408I/ Recovered one plane from 1315I launch due to an electrical fire.

1425I/ CONsOrT came alongside to transfer mail and personnel. The Operations Officer and three other officers from his department
of the USS Batangan (CVL-29) came aboard by highline to observe operations of TU 95.1.1.

15451/Seven plane STRIKE launched. One TBM "COD" launched for Itazuki via K-10 with two pilots of HMS Glory (CVL-19) and one officer from the Bandoeng Strait Air Department as passengers. Two pilots from Glory departed after completing observation of Bandoeng Strait Air Operations. The Bandoeng Strait officer departed to attend an Escape and Evasion Seminar conducted by the Fifth Air Force in the Joint Operation Center, Korea. The STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Ch'Innampo destroying twelve buildings and damaging five.

16001/Recovered remainder of 13151 launch.

17141/Recovered 15451 launch plus two planes that diverted to K-6 from 11301 launch.

17501/Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating and target area had varying high broken clouds to overcast conditions with unlimited ceilings. Surface winds were northwest at twelve to sixteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 28°F and 16°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, four TACAP, and twenty-seven STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

17 January
07151/Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Changnyon destroying eight buildings and damaging five. An estimated twelve troops were killed and fifteen wounded.

09461/Recovered 07151 launch. Flight operations were discontinued due to snow showers and reduced visibility.

12001/HMS Cockades (D-34) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, Whitehead patrol.

12021/Two plane CAP, four plane TACAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near Sunwil-Do destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released TACAP to attack a troop village near Changnyon. Three buildings were damaged and a gun position hit with unassessable damage. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Changnyon destroying eight buildings and damaging four.
12151/ USS ROCKS (DL-804) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

14001/ Two plane CAP and two four-plane STRIKE groups launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying seven buildings and damaging three. Flight then returned to ship to act as defensive CAP. First STRIKE group attacked supply buildings near CH'INNAMPO. Two buildings were damaged and a supply dump hit with unassessable damage. Light AA fire was encountered. The second STRIKE group attacked a North Korean Police Headquarters near CH'INNAMPO destroying nine buildings and damaging seven.

14261/ Recovered 12021 launch.

16001/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN destroying two buildings and damaging one. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supply and transformer buildings near ANAK. Four buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Blue flashes were observed as bombs hit the transformer building.

16201/ Recovered 14001 launch.

17261/ Recovered 16001 launch.

18101/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating area was overcast with high and middle layers of clouds. Low clouds formed after sunrise causing variable ceilings from 1000 to 8000 feet. Visibility good but reduced at times to less than one mile by snow showers. The target area had an overcast at 4000 feet in northern area and at 1500 feet in the southern area with light snow. Weather was variable in both areas due to a low depression passing two hundred miles south. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 32°F and 22°F. Flying conditions were average becoming undesirable in snow showers.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-three STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

18 January 07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a railroad tunnel near CHANGYON. Entrance to the tunnel was damaged and one rail cut made.
0915I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group split and attacked each end of a railroad tunnel near HAEJU. Both entrances to the tunnel were damaged and two rail cuts were made. Light AA fire was encountered.

0944I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Flight then escorted a "COD" TBM back to the ship and resumed station as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked and damaged a gun position and command post near RONGGANG-NI. Flight then destroyed three buildings and damaged one in a troop village near SUNWI-DO.

1134I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1143I/ USS CARDO (DD-631) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1240I/ USS HOOKS (DD-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad tunnel near HAEJU. One entrance was damaged and one rail cut made. Flight then destroyed a gun position and command post near RONGGANG-NI.

1335I/ Recovered 1115I launch, plus one TBM "COD" from K-6.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked two railroad tunnels near CHANGYON. Entrances to both tunnels were damaged and three rail cuts were made. One plane of this flight suffered minor damage from small arms fire.

1524I/ One TBM "COD" launched to K-6 with the Operations Officer and three other officers from the Operations Department of the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) aboard as passengers.

1531I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1645I/ Recovered seven planes of 1515I launch.

1721I/ Recovered remaining two planes of 1515I launch.

1723I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

1835I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) reported a sonar contact, HOOKS designated assisting ship.
18451/ COCKADE evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine and was directed to resume screening station.

20001/ CTU 95.1.6 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide air strikes against troop and supply concentration west of YONAN (YB 953926) as it was difficult for surface craft to provide necessary cover to YONG-HAE-DO Island at night due to ice conditions around the island.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target areas had unlimited ceiling and visibility throughout the day. Winds were from the northwest at eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 33°F and 29°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-six STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

19 January
07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near UNGJIN destroying ten buildings and damaging five. A command post was damaged near CHANGNYON.

09151/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying three buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGNYON. Flight destroyed six buildings and damaged six. Troops in trenches were attacked near P'ungsan with an estimated ten killed and ten wounded. HTCCO group scouted the coast northward to HANCHON. Flight attacked troop bunkers North of Ch'INNAKOPO damaging two. Two reveted buildings were destroyed and one damaged.

09331/ Recovered 07151 launch.

11151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near RONGANG-NI destroying three buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers and supplies near YONAN as requested by CTU 95.1.6. Two troop bunkers were damaged and three buildings near CHANGYON were destroyed.

11351/ Recovered 09151 launch.

12011/ HMS CONSORT (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

12401/ USS HIBERN (DD-631) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.
13151/ Two plane CAP and two four-plane STRIKE groups launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SAWAI-DD destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. First STRIKE group attacked a troop village near T'AI'T'AN destroying twelve buildings and damaging eight with one secondary explosion observed. Two large warehouses were destroyed in a second village. Two aircraft suffered minor damage from small arms fire. A third aircraft suffered minor damage to the starboard wind as a result of striking a wire during pull-up from an attack. The second STRIKE group attacked buildings and revetments near T'AI'T'AN destroying fifteen buildings.

13571/ Recovered 13151 launch plus two TBM "COD" planes from ITAUKI with passengers aboard destined for the COCKADE and ERGBEN.

14281/ ERGBEN came alongside to transfer mail.

14451/ Transferred three personnel to the COCKADE by helicopter.

15001/ Transferred two personnel to the ERGBEN by helicopter.

15151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked supplies and supply buildings near YONAN as requested by CTU 95.1.6. Eight buildings were destroyed and four damaged. Three stacks of supplies were damaged.

15391/ Two TBM "COD" launched for Itazuki.

15531/ Recovered 13151 launch.

17281/ Recovered 15151 launch.

17351/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

20141/ CTU 95.1.1 reported damage to troop and supply concentration West of YONAN to CTU 95.1.6 as eight buildings with large stacks of supplies destroyed and three bunkers damaged.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet. Target area was mostly clear during the morning. Low broken clouds moved inland during the afternoon reducing the ceiling to 2000 feet. Visibility was good in both areas. Surface winds were West northwest at ten to fifteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 34°F and 29°F. Flying conditions were average.

Mission Summary:
Ten Cap, four TanCAP, twenty-four STRIKE, and four Armed reconnaissance for a total of forty-two sorties.
20 January

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. TARCAP attacked two gun positions near CHANGWON damaging one position. Flight then destroyed a warehouse near SONOHWA.

09151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN. Two buildings were destroyed with six buildings and a gun position damaged. Moderate AA fire was encountered. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CH'INNAMPO destroying two buildings, a warehouse, and damaging twelve buildings. A gun position was destroyed near SONOHWA and a road bridge damaged near SONGUMB'OK-RI. One plane of this flight returned to the ship early due to a faulty magneto.

09391/ Recovered 07151 launch.

09591/ Recovered a plane from 09151 launch with a deferred emergency due to a faulty magneto.

11151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a village near CHANGWON destroying two buildings and damaging two. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near UPCH'ON-RI destroying four buildings and damaging four.

11341/ Recovered remainder of 09151 launch.

12001/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

13151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. The STRIKE group split into two divisions. The first division attacked a troop village near CH'INNAMPO destroying twenty five buildings. The second division attacked warehouses near T'AMT'AN destroying three warehouses and eight buildings. Two plane CAP group departed for K-6, at the conclusion of their mission, to accomplish overhaul of aircraft electrical firing circuits.

13361/ Two Vau-312 pilots were transferred to the EBAC to further transfer to the GLOBE to observe air operations.

15151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near UPCH'ON-ATI destroying thirteen buildings and damaging six.

15301/ Recovered remainder of 13151 launch.

16551/ Recovered 15151 launch.
16561/ Set a course southward for Sasebo.

17421/ USS ROOKS (DD-804) departed to investigate three fishing vessels at 36-54N, 124-30E.

18001/ ROOKS ordered to escort fishing vessels out of prohibited area and then rendezvous with HMS GLORY (CVL-19).

18191/ ERBE returned from investigating fishing vessels.

20301/ ERBE chopped to HMS GLORY.

20461/ CTU 95.1.1 reported the presence of forty-eight fishing vessels between 36-00N and 37-00N, 124-40E, action to CTU 95.1.2 with information to CTG 95.1 and GLORY, and that ROOKS was detached to clear the area of fishing vessels and join HMS GLORY later. The majority of the vessels are believed to have been South Korean, some of which had departed KUNSAN on 19 January with intentions to remain in the area for five days.

21001/ Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 and OTC West Coast by HMS GLORY.

22421/ ROOKS reported a large fishing fleet anchored at 36-23N 124-50E.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds in both operating and target area produced a ceiling of 2500 feet. Visibility was good except in snow showers and ground fog along the coast and the southern target area. Surface winds were west northwest at nine to fifteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 35°F and 32°F. Flying conditions were average lowering to marginal in snow showers.

Mission Summary:
Ten CatP, four TarCatP, and twenty-eight STRIKE for a total of forty-two sorties.

21 January

10401/ Commenced 40MM AA firing on a towed sleeve in area "GEORGE".

11531/ Completed 40MM AA firing on a towed sleeve. A total of 3029 rounds of 40MM ammunition was expended. Three target sleeves were knocked down and a fourth one was hit.

13131/ HMS CONSORT (D-76) fired a practice torpedo using the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVL-116) as a target.

13321/ CONSORT detached to recover torpedo and proceed independently into Sasebo Harbor.

17111/ Moored to buoy number eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.

Mission Information -17-
a. Ships ordnance expended
   1. 11 January 1953 - 1829 rounds
   2. 21 January 1953 - 3029 rounds

b. Performance of ships ordnance
   1. AA firing at a towed sleeve was conducted on 11 January with no material casualties.
   2. AA firing at a towed sleeve was conducted on 21 January with the following material casualties:
      a. Mount #2 - Three misfires
         Mount #4 - One misfire
         Mount #9 - One misfire

      The misfires were caused by defective primers. No data on lot numbers could be obtained as mixed reworked lots of 40mm ammunition were being used. All safety precautions were observed and the misfires were disposed of with no difficulty.

      b. The left gun of Mount #3 jammed. A new round was lowered before a fired round had cleared the loader causing the gun to jam. This casualty was caused by worn contact shoulders of breech block and extractor. The extractors were not getting enough impulse from the opening of the block to kick the shell out with sufficient speed. The breechblock and extractors were replaced.

      c. The M-34 Radar of the M-63 Director system sustained the following casualties during the patrol.
         a. 11 January (Radar - 7) - T and E dot failed to respond to the signal generated by the bearing dial (in search position). This was caused by a faulty tube 6H6 (V-13) shorted in the target acquisition unit. The tube was replaced.

   4. Other casualties sustained during this period:
      a. 4 January - Mount #6 and #8 failed to synchronize in elevation. This was caused by an open 52 lead on thirty-six speed synchro on terminal board at director pedestal. The lead was connected.

      b. 14 January - Mount #5 firing circuit failed to operate in local or automatic. This was due to a broken firing clutch rocker arm. The rocker arm was replaced.
C. The two AA firing exercises showed improvement over previous firing. Three sleeves were knocked down and a fourth hit during the exercise on 21 January.

D. Target acquisition and loading drills were held during the patrol.

E. Listed below is a summary of aircraft ordnance expended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000^b GP Bombs</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>500^b GP Bombs</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>500^b SAMP Bombs</td>
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<td>250^b GP Bombs</td>
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<td>100^b GP Bombs</td>
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<td>Rounds 50 cal Ammo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft

   1. Operational Damage

      a. One aircraft suffered a damaged propeller and cowling on 14 January as a result of catching number 76 wire and engaging two barriers.

   2. Damage resulting from enemy action.

      a. One plane suffered minor damage to a propeller on 14 January from small arms fire.

      b. One plane suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the wing, on 15 January from enemy small arms fire.

      c. One plane suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the fuselage, on 18 January from enemy small arms fire.

      d. Two aircraft suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the wing, on 19 January from enemy small arms fire.

      e. One plane suffered minor damage to a wing on 19 January as a result of striking a wire during an attack.

C. Damage inflicted on enemy by ships aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings (troop)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Outs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies (Stacked)</td>
<td>Large Amount Damaged</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. Performance

1. Personnel
   The number of personnel on board during this cruise including the marines was 1091. The spirit and morale of the crew was demonstrated in the collection of funds for the March of Dimes. A total of $3,627.00 was collected in the drive, during the first two weeks. It is anticipated that the final collection will exceed $5,000.00. One division averaged more than fourteen dollars per man in the division.

2. Education
   Enlisted personnel are currently enrolled in nineteen officer correspondence courses, one hundred forty-two enlisted correspondence courses, thirty-one UsafI courses, and a total of two hundred thirty-four course books are checked out for study. Lectures and on-the-job training as well as individual study have been increased in preparation for the coming advancement in rating examinations.

3. Divine Services
   Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, three Protestant services, one Catholic mass, daily Rosary services, two Latter Day Saints services, and two Bible classes.

4. Recreation
   Books from the ships library constituted the most active form of recreation. Movie showings were limited to three during the patrol because of aircraft maintenance requirements. The Chaplain continued his usual broadcasts of local news, world news, and sporting events over the ships announcing system each day at noon. A newspaper is printed each day and copies are distributed to other ships in the Task Unit.

B. Casualties

1. There were no personnel casualties during this patrol.
A. Air Department

Comment
During this operating period, the task unit contended with the coldest weather so far encountered. Temperatures for about four consecutive days ranged from a low of 12°F to a high of 18°F. Severe working conditions were experienced, particularly on the flight deck, with winds at launching periods ranging to 38 knots over the deck. This imposed delays in rearming and in effecting minor aircraft repairs or adjustments on the flight deck. This situation was alleviated considerably by positioning the ship for commencement of the days operations so that the ship could be headed down-wind during rearming.

Recommendation
On below freezing temperatures or with high winds carrier task units should position in advance of starting flight operations bearing in mind the desirability of running down-wind between recovery and respotting so as to create, as nearly as possible, a no-wind condition over the deck, thus giving handling, gasing, and loading crews more favorable conditions for expeditious rearming. Also, time allowances in scheduling should be increased to compensate for greatly increased human efforts required in decreasing temperatures.

Comment
The present light weight colored helmets used to designate flight deck operating groups are not sufficiently warm in temperatures below 30°F. The main discomfort was about the ears. Several men used wads of cotton or sewed in powder puffs to alleviate this discomfort.

Recommendation
That colored winter flight deck helmets be developed that are of sufficient warmth to provide necessary protection at sub-freezing temperatures. These helmets should contain loops wherein goggles straps may be interlaced to avoid loss by slipstream pressure as goggles are quite necessary for plane directors and chaulkmen. Also, small but firm visors could be incorporated which would tend to lessen the wind pressure at the eye level while at the same time providing non-glare characteristics needed on sunny days.

Comment
Due to the infrequent but exceedingly dangerous situation resulting when hung-rockets become detached from an aircraft on an arrested landing the BADOING STRAIT, in December 1951, developed the "FREDERICKS" Barrier. This barrier consisted of several cargo nets rolled and tied which were strung across the flight deck manually whenever aircraft to be recovered were carrying hung ordnance. It necessitated a minimum of eight (8) personnel to open and close this barrier. Recently the BADOING STRAIT developed and is now using the "LUSH" Barrier which has certain advantages over its predecessor. This new barrier is attached to and operates on the
Number 4 Barrier stanchions (Illustrated in Enclosure (3)). Its advantages are:

1. No personnel are involved in the handling of the net after it is once rigged.
2. Aircraft can be taxied and towed across it.
3. It is always in position when the barriers are up even though a pilot fails to notify PLY CON of his hung ordnance.
4. Rigging involves a maximum of fifteen minutes on the first operating day.
5. It stops the rocket closer to the jettison ramp where it can be disposed of more quickly.

Recommendation

A more permanent net using the principles of the "Inflam" Barrier should be developed using a strong wear-resistant stainless steel or galvanized iron wire netting. For lack of better materials this original net is constructed of layers of cotton and nylon two (2) inch tape. This has proven servicable but it is not totally resistant to the rough wear and tear imposed by constant use during aircraft operating periods, or to weather deterioration.

Comment

Yielding elements at the number one, two, three, and four cross-deck pendants are high-rate replacement items due to the punishment given by landing aircraft. Since 1 October 1952, eleven (11) elements have been broken. Spares have been difficult to obtain necessitating exchanges with elements in areas where less abusive use occurs - namely those outboard on the number nine, eight or seven wires. Temporary rigs are installed at these locations until replacements are obtained.

Recommendation

Yielding element spares should be increased in the forward area supply activities where continued operations quickly depletes allowances. The allowance for the ship is six (6).

Comment

This trip to the line again required CARQUAL operations. Only one pilot, the new Commanding Officer of VAW-312, was in need of refresher landing. It was therefore, decided to carry out requalifications during his assignment to a war mission in order to perform a minimum amount of non-operational activity. However, due to unfavorable sea conditions a landing period was not scheduled. Therefore, as time progressed under these same conditions the pilot found himself completing his eighth combat mission as he completed his eighth refresher landing.
F4U-4B BuNo 97410 engaged number seven pendant, receiving a ninety foot runout and engaged barriers number two and three. Both wires of number three barrier were replaced because of kinks. One barrier support pendant parted and was replaced. The propeller, speed ring, and dive brakes of the plane were damaged.

Comment
A summary of hung ordnance for this patrol is listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RACK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HVAR</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical Circuit Failure, Aero 14A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Total HVAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMBS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>250#</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100#</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Total Bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The previous recommendation, that faulty release circuits be overhauled or replaced is still applicable. This program currently in affect has resulted in a markedly decrease in the amount of hung ordnance.

Land - Launch Data:

1. Launches
   Number of launches 127
   Average weight pounds 15,000
   Average pressure psi 2,900
   Average wind knots 29
   Number of bridles expended 6
   H-2-1 Catapult
   H-4C Catapult
   151
   14,900
   2,900
   29
   7

2. Recoveries
   Number landings - 285
   Average wind knots - 31
   CPV psi - 625
   Average runout feet - 112
   Wires caught - #1 - 54, #2 - 113, #3 - 62, #4 - 62, #5 - 10, #6 - 3, #7 - 1, #8 - 0, #9 - 0.
   No. Barrier Crashes - 1
   Barriers engaged - 2 & 3
B. Operations Department

1. Communications
   a. Personnel
      As indicated in previous reports, the shortage of trained
      radiomen continued to create a hardship.

      Recommendation
      That escort carriers operating as Task Unit Commander in the
      Yellow Sea be provided four (4) rated radiomen above the fleet average
      because of the unusually heavy traffic loading in the area.
   b. Training
      Progress in training was evidenced by the rapid improvement
      by all strikers in that FOX broadcasts are now guarded by strikers and one
      striker has qualified as a regular operator on all circuits.
   c. Material
      One electric coding machine could not be utilized for encoding
      due to mechanical failure. This machine has recently been overhauled but
      it still failed to operate properly. The loss of one machine hampered the
      flow of both outgoing and incoming classified traffic. This further
      substantiates a previous recommendation, that an additional coding machine
      should be provided this class ship when operating as CTU 95.1.1.

2. Photographic Laboratory
   A total of twenty successful photographic sorties were flown during
   this patrol. A K-25 camera POD mounted on a wing pylon was used. Most of
   the photographs were made at a low altitude to evaluate attack damage and
   identify prospective targets. A total of 668 exposures were made and 123
   prints were produced from these exposures.

3. Aerology
   Difficulty in gathering weather data from outside sources continued
   on this patrol. WATT circuits operated about forty percent of the time during
   the patrol. This was due to weather, weak signals, and ice forming on
   antennas. A shortage of radiomen prevented manual copying of these circuits
   except for two schedules a day. One schedule of upper air analysis and one
   of surface analysis from Ch0. The weather plane from Japan failed to arrive
   or to contact the ship during many of the nightly weather reconnaissance
   flights. Facsimile equipment would do much to relieve the weather information
   situation in the Yellow Sea.

C. Engineering Department

1. Electronics
   The SK-3 Air Search Radar was out of commission for a period of five
   days due to a failure of the rotating joint in the antenna. The copper
conductor leading to the rotating antenna joint was seized by the joint and twisted until it parted.

The twisting caused a shifting of all the conductors in the antenna assembly resulting in several splits in the conductor and four shorts from the conductor to ground. There are no spares for this assembly carried aboard, however, repairs were effected by straightening bent sections, silver soldering splits and inserting copper sleeves in the places where the twisted sections had to be removed. It was impossible to get all of the kinks out of the conductors. The line now meager the required five hundred megohms up to the point where the conductor enters the antenna feed horn. From there to the radiating element there is a direct short to ground. Repair of this short was considered impossible while the ship was underway. When the gear was activated, normal targets appeared but the power output of the radar is still very low.

The damaged conductors in the SK Antenna will be replaced in Sasebo if spare parts are available at the tender.

D. Medical Department

1. There were no casualties during this patrol.

2. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company

   a. Admitted to sick list - 34
   b. Total sick days out of 10,910 possible working days - 122
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 1
   d. Total patients visits to sick call - 588
   e. Total medical treatments - 1840
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 1
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 37
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 1
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 37
   l. Major surgical procedures - 1
   m. Veneral disease cases and non-specific Urethritis total - 28
      1. Gonorrhea - 3
      2. Chancroid - 0
      3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 25
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last port period - 114.

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 2
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation - 2
   c. Average number of days pilots grounded - 2
d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 3

e. No. of pilots KIA - 0

f. No. of pilots WIA - 0

H. L. Ray

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. Cole
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COHNAVFE (1) Advance
COHNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COHSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSEVPAC
COMFAIRJAP
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COM CAR DIV-15
COM CAR DIV-17
CG, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CG, AIRPhFPAC (1) Advance
CG, PhFPAC (1) Advance
CG, 1st Hawaiian WING
CO, HAG-12
CO, Vma-312
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
CO, USS HENDON (CVE-114)
CO, USS BIKOKO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 20 JANUARY 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
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<td>TAHCaP</td>
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<td>0925</td>
<td>a,B</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1125</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>a,D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HELICOPTER

GUARD MAIL 0900
GUARD MAIL 1135

NOTE
1. All A/C 100 gallons in belly tanks.

AMMO LOAD
A - All A/C full gun loads.
B - Half A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
   Half A/C 500# inst./.01 and 6-100# inst./.01.
C - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
D - All A/C 500# inst./.01 and 6-100# inst./.01.

B. E. COLKITT JR.
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)
BARRIER AND NET LOWERED

BARRIER AND NET RAISED

* IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT THE ROCKET BARRIER IS CONNECTED TO THE AIRCRAFT BARRIER ONLY AT THE STANCHION.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 28 January through 6 February 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Excl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
(3)

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 28 January through 6 February 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Element 95.1.1 from 2100 on 28 January until 2100 on 5 February of this period.

This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.
Part II Chronological Order of Events.
Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VFA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for January and February 1953.
During the period 28 January through 5 February 1953, the USS BADONGB STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of CTU 95.1.1, Carrier Unit, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command was Captain L. W. Petrel, USN, Comanding Officer, USS BADONGB STRAIT, who, for the duration of this patrol, was also OTC, West Coast in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. Ships assigned CTU 95.1.1 as screen included the HMQ CONSORT (D-76), HMQ CONSORT (D-20), USS ROCKS (LD-804), USS HANN (DE-449), USS COLLETT (DD-730), HMQ ANZAC (DD-10) and HMQ ATHABASCAN (DDE-219). Three ships were available for screening purposes as the fourth ship was provided to CTU 95.1.2 in rotation from the screen for twenty-four hour periods for night patrols along the enemy held coast line, replenishing enroute.

VMA-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Jewson, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. At the beginning of the patrol there were 22 aircraft on board but three additional aircraft were received on the second day of air operations, increasing total to 25 aircraft. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 23.5. Average availability was 17.5. Total sorties flown for the eight-day period were 336 for a total of 686.3 hours. A total of 173 hours was over the target time. A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 62 sorties for a total of 14.1 hours.

The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coastline and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TU 95.1.2, the Naval Defense Unit; the troops of TU 95.1.5, the Island Defense Unit; and the ships of TU 95.1.1, the Carrier Unit. The Island Defense Unit is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the Han River on the South to the TAEWUNG estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Unit in providing stations for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Unit have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

The BADONGB STRAIT, with HMQ CONSORT (D-76) in company, sailed from Sasebo, Japan, at 0301, 28 January 1953, as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 2606294 of January. Heavy pre-frontal squalls caused cancellation of the gunnery exercises scheduled for area GABIGS. Because of heavy northwest swells the HMQ CONSORT was unable to maintain station, dropping behind the BADONGB STRAIT and rejoined the following day. The BADONGB STRAIT became a part of TU 95.1.1 when the Commanding Officer assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1 and OTC West Coast at 201041.
E. In performing its assigned tasks, the Task Unit continued conducting
dawn to dusk air operations, operating during daylight in the vicinity of
37° 45' North Latitude, 124° East Longitude, and retiring southward for
the night. However, it was sometimes necessary for the carrier to operate
as far north as Latitude 38° 20' to find better weather. Normally, five
duck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours, with approx-
imately 50 percent of available aircraft in each launch. A two plane CAP
for TU 95.1.1 was assigned in each launch, while a four plane TARCAP was
provided each day for the vessels of CTU 95.1.2 stationed in the vicinity
of SOKTO Island. All strike groups assigned targets in the CHODO-SOKTO
area, however, were briefed to assist CTU 95.1.2 whenever their services
were requested.

F. Weather during the entire eight day patrol was good to excellent for
flight operations. Temperatures during daylight were somewhat warmer
than previously experienced and ranged from 19°C to 37°C with an average
of about 27°C. All scheduled flights for the entire eight day period
were launched as planned.

G. With a full moon prevailing, two "early early" four plane sorties,
launched at 0015, were made during this patrol, one on 31 January and the
second on 2 February. These flights divided into two two-plane sections
to reconnoiter the road and railroad lines of communication between HAJSU
and CH"I'MANPO. The first sorties destroyed eight trucks, damaged two,
and reported a convoy of trucks stalled in the area. A later strike group
destroyed one of these trucks and damaged the remainder. The armed reconnais-
sance flight of 2 February was less successful since only three trucks
were found and destroyed, however, five buildings were also destroyed near
HAJSU, with one secondary explosion observed. The scarcity of road traffic
noted on this flight is believed to have resulted from a B-29 attack which
occurred in the vicinity immediately before the Corsair flight.

H. Two aircraft were lost during the patrol. On 29 January the Corsair
piloted by Captain Alexander WATSON, USMCR, developed engine trouble imme-
diately after catapulting and ditched near the life guard destroyer. The
pilot was recovered uninjured by helicopter within two minutes. On 31
January the Corsair piloted by Captain Westrick NOGILS, USMCR, was struck
in the engine by an fire while participating in a successful attack against
a rail bridge near CHACHYONG. Captain NOGILS made a wheels-up landing on
the emergency beach strip at CHADO and was later returned uninjured to the
ship by helicopter. The aircraft received additional minor damage on land-
ning.

I. Unusually good results were attained in strikes against rail bridges on
31 January. In the morning, one four plane strike group dropped a span on
a rail bridge near CHACHYONG with one direct hit with a 1,000 lb bomb. A
later eight plane strike group destroyed another rail bridge in this
vicinity with three direct 1,000 lb. bomb hits.
J. On 3 February an intensified attack schedule was attempted in order to ascertain the capability of the ship to mount such a schedule and determine organizational weaknesses. It was assumed that a general offensive operation, such as an amphibious attack, was underway, and that an all out offensive by the Carrier Element was required for a short period of time. The object of this exercise was also to advance the training and readiness of the ship and squadron. Some artificialities were introduced by the adoption of the following measures:

(1) Targets were selected the previous day and briefing folders provided.

(2) All targets were in close proximity to the coastline, and the time spent in reconnaissance and observation of attack damage was reduced to a minimum.

(3) To expedite rearmament ordinance loads were standardized, two loadings being used during the day - one type in the morning and a shift made to a second standard in the afternoon. Wing loadings were rockets or 100 lb bombs to facilitate hand loading. Two center line bombs were carried since belly tanks were not required.

(4) The Carrier Element operated as near the beach as the mine hazard permitted.

(5) Launches were scheduled every 1.5 hours for a total of 7 deck launches and 64 sorties. A CAP was scheduled to stay on station for three hours and was catapulted with every other deck launch.

All scheduled sorties departed on time. It was possible to launch a total of 66 sorties instead of the 64 planned. However, it was an unusually fortunate day in that few incidents occurred to interfere with operations. Three aircraft were damaged by small arms fire which in one case caused the tail wheel to collapse on landing aboard. The deck was quickly cleared and no significant delay resulted.

K. A four plane strike group was attacked by four MIG type aircraft near KOHTO on 4 February. Three of the four pilots had been attacked by MIG's before and reported that the tactics used were much improved over those previously observed. Four deliberate, coordinated, flap-down, attacks were made by the MIG's and pressed to close range. The Corsairs were able to fire four brief bursts at the MIG's and one MIG was hit near the tail section, a piece of which was observed to fall free. One Corsair returned to land early because of a rough engine which had developed before the melee.

L. Five newly arrived replacement pilots were given refresher carrier qualification landings on 4 February while acting as CAP. Four of these pilots had made their first carrier landing checkout on the West Coast in January, while the fifth had experience in a carrier squadron in 1950. A total of 20 CATQUAL landings were made. The following day all pilots were given an area checkout and one combat sortie against targets on the coast line.
N. When circumstances permitted, radars were silenced twice daily for a period of approximately one hour and Electronic Countermeasures equipment was employed in an effort to pinpoint enemy radar stations. Negative results were obtained.

N. On 4 February, two strike groups were loaded with eight "Tiny Tim" 12 inch rockets to attack gun positions. All rockets were fired successfully and only one of the eight failed to detonate. Accuracy of the attacks was good considering the infrequency of use by the pilots of this weapon, with a total of five hits, one near miss, one defective rocket, and one miss. Damage inflicted cannot be accurately assessed but visual observations indicate two gun positions destroyed and damage on three other positions unassessable. This large rocket appears to be an excellent weapon for use against coastal gun positions concealed in caves.

O. On 4 February, aircraft reconnoitering in the vicinity noted increased enemy activity on the ONGJIN-HAEJU Peninsula. Twent-one strike aircraft were sent to attack targets in this area the following day and rocket hits in a large cave caused an explosion which erupted the entire hillside, and caused considerable damage to both wings of the aircraft flying at 800 feet. This information was passed on to the HMAS GLORY and to the Task Group Commander, since time did not permit the BADOENG STRAIT to give the area the deserved attention.

P. On termination of flight operations on 5 February, the Task Unit set a course southward for Sasebo, the BADOENG STRAIT having completed its sixth and final patrol. The BADOENG STRAIT was relieved as CTG 95.1.1 and OTO West Coast at 2100 when the HMAS GLORY assumed those duties. Shortly thereafter, the screen was detached to join HMAS GLORY, and her escort, HMAS ATHABASCOT (DEE-219) and HMAS ANZAC (DD-10), joined as escort for BADOENG STRAIT.

Q. After mooring in Sasebo the following afternoon, Rear Admiral E.G.A. CLIFFORD, C.B., CTG 95.1, came aboard and expressed his appreciation to the assembled crew for the services rendered while in the Task Group.

R. The following complimentary dispatches were received upon departing from Sasebo.

From. CTF 95
To: BADOENG STRAIT

"FROM THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA THE USS BADOENG STRAIT HAS DISTINGUISHED HERSELF AS A HIGHLY EFFICIENT SUCCESSFUL FIGHTING UNIT. THE DEVOTION AND DUTY OF BADOENG STRAIT WAS REFLECTED IN THE HEAVY DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY BY PILOTS OF VFA 312. GOOD LUCK AND A SMOOTH VOYAGE HOME X HAIL GINGRICH SENDS X THIS MESSAGE MAY BE DECLASSIFIED UPON ARRIVAL X"
From: Com7thFlt
To: Badong Strait
Info: ComNAVE

"Com7thFlt congratulates Badong Strait and Marine Checkerboard Squadron (VMA-312) for outstanding services during tour of duty in Korean waters. The large number of sorties which you have consistently been able to maintain has been particularly noteworthy by keeping constant pressure on enemy positions in western Korea. You have made major contribution to success of United Nations campaign. Well done. Good luck and a pleasant voyage home. VAH-4 Clark A. May declassify on arrival Pearl X."

From: ComNAVE
To: Badong Strait / CTF 95 / Com7thFlt / CTG 95.1 / COMAIRPAC / CINCPACFLT / CORCARDIV-15

"To the officers and men of Badong Strait, a most deserving well done. Your support of VMA-312 in purgelling the Red aggressor on the west coast of Korea was outstanding. May your homeward voyage be blessed with fair winds and a following sea. VAH-2 R. D. Briscoe sends X this may be declassified on arrival Pearl X."
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

28 January

0531/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 260629Z of January 1953, the

USS BADENGE STRAIT (CVL-116), with Vam-312 embarked got underway

from Sasebo, Japan for operating area "NAN" off the West Coast of

Korea.

0941/ Gunnery exercises were cancelled because of heavy squalls and low

ceilings.

1101/ HMAS CONSORT (D-76) unable to rendezvous because of heavy seas.

CONSORT advised to join, when practicable at best safe speed; the

BADENGE STRAIT would proceed at 18.5 knots because of heavier

weather expected later.

2101/ Relieved the HMAS GLORY (CVL-19). Assumed duty as CTU 95.1.1 and

OTC of Naval Blockade Forces off the West Coast of Korea.

29 January

04101/ USS ROOKS (DD-804) joined the Task Unit from HMAS GLORY (CVL-19).

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group

attacked a gun position near RONGGANG-NI with unassessable damage.

0851/ Stopped main engine number two and secured boilers numbers three

and four. This engineering casualty was caused by the check valve

on generating tank number two sticking in the closed position

causes a loss of feed water. Electrical power was lost momentar-

arily until the emergency diesel generator was placed in oper-

ation.

09151/ Two plane CAP, four plane TalCap and four plane STRIKE launched.

CTU 95.1.2 released TalCap to attack a troop village near P'UNGSAW.

Five buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. A gun position

was attacked near CHANGYON with unassessable damage. STRIKE

group attacked a troop village near CH'INMWPPO destroying eight

buildings.

0941/ Arrived in area "NAN".

09471/ Recovered 07151 launch.

11191/ HMAS CONSORT (D-76) joined the Task Unit.

11201/ Commenced launching aircraft.
11271/ One aircraft ditched near the plane guard destroyer shortly after being launched due to a complete engine failure. The pilot, Captain Alexander Watson, USMC, 032510, was recovered two minutes after ditching and was back aboard the carrier five minutes after ditching. There were no injuries. The aircraft sank.

11281/ Completed launching two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE, STRIKE was reduced to three planes due to aircraft ditching after takeoff. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SINWON-NI destroying eight buildings and damaging six.

11461/ Recovered 09151 launch.

12151/ CONSORT detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

12201/ HMS COMUS (D-20) joined the Task Unit.

13191/ Main engine number two with boilers number three and four returned to operating condition, the check valve having been repaired.

13201/ DICKERSON, George E., TN, 572-12-41, suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the left maxillary bone while manning his General Quarters Station on 40MM mount number nine. The mount was in automatic control when the accident occurred. DICKERSON was pinned between the gun barrel and a general announcing system speaker as the mount was being trained.

13301/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI with unassessable damage then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CH'INNAPO destroying eighteen buildings and damaging fifteen.

13551/ Recovered remainder of 11201 launch.

15201/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was joined by three VAB-312 planes from K-6. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ULAFUL destroying five buildings and damaging three. Three rail cars were damaged near CH'ANGYON.

15501/ Recovered 13301 launch plus one "COD" TBM from K-6.

17431/ Recovered 15301 launch plus three planes from K-6.

20221/ USS HOOKS reported her sonar gear inoperative and estimated repairs completed 3 February.
23071/ CTU 95.1.4 advised CTU 95.1.1 that an LST would be beached at SOKTO Island 30 January and requested TACCAP cover if available. If TACCAP not available planes are requested to provide assistance should enemy shore artillery open fire on the LST.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2500 feet and unlimited visibility. The target area was clear with unlimited visibility. Winds were from the northwest at fourteen to twenty knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 28°F and 30°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Thirteen CAP, four TACCAP, and nineteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties.

30 January
01421/ CTU 95.1.4 advised CTU 95.1.1 that one division of planes from each flight would remain in the SOKTO Island area as TACCAP until necessary for them to attack pre-briefed targets.

06001/ U.S.S. HANNA (DE-449) joined the Task Unit.

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near T'as'tan destroying ten buildings and damaging four.

09151/ Launched two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE. One plane of the STRIKE group jettisoned ordnance and returned to the ship due to plane canopy being jammed in the open position. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying two buildings and damaging two. One plane of the flight jettisoned ordnance due to faulty electrical wiring. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a rail marshalling yard at Haeju. Flight damaged a railroad bridge, repair shed, and made seven rail cuts. Two road bridges were cut near Songhwa.

09421/ Recovered 07151 Launch plus one plane with a jammed canopy from 09151 launch.

11151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. TBm "COD" launched for K-6 via K-16 with two passengers. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying one warehouse and damaging two buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SONGON-NI destroying two buildings, and damaging three. One plane developed a rough running engine and was escorted back to the ship by a second plane. This section destroyed four buildings and damaged one near SONGCHAP'0-NI.
Recovered remainder of 09151 launch.

Recovered one plane from 11151 launch due to a rough running engine.

USS ROOKS (DD-804) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

HAS CONSORT (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

Four plane TARCAP and four plane armed reconnaissance launched. CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near ULYUL. Flight destroyed five buildings and damaged four. 11151 launch scouted north to HANCH'ON attacking targets of opportunity. Eight troops were killed and eight wounded near HANCH'ON. Two buildings were destroyed and two damaged near CH'INWAMFO. Light AA fire was encountered during this attack. Three rail cars were damaged near CH'INWAMFO.

Recovered remainder of 11151 launch.

Two plane CaP and six plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SINCA'ON destroying ten buildings and damaging eight.

Recovered 13151 launch.

Recovered six planes of 15301 launch.

Recovered remainder of 15301 launch.

Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Observed complete radar silence in the unit and conducted intercept search for enemy radar signals for thirty minutes. Nearest enemy held territory is twenty miles away. No signals were obtained.

CTU 95.1.4 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide TARCAP on 31 January for an hSST beached on CH'0 Island in range of enemy guns.

Main engine number 2 and boilers 3 & 4 placed out of commission for repairs to leaky condenser.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Surface winds were north to northwest at twelve to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 32.5°F and 24°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, twenty-one STRIKE, and four Armed Reconnaissance for a total of thirty-seven sorties.
31 January 01081/ Main engine number two and boilers three and four were returned to operating condition, having completed repairs to leaky condenser.

0615I/ A pre-dawn four plane STRIKE launched. Flight split into two sections and attacked targets of opportunity. One truck was destroyed near HONGKUAM0-KI. One truck was destroyed near CHANGYON. Five trucks were destroyed near TALCH'ON-NI. One truck was destroyed and two damaged near SINCH'ON. Flight informed the ship, by voice radio, of a convoy of trucks now stalled near TALCH'ON-NI and requested the next STRIKE group attack them.

06201/ CTU 95.1.4 was advised that TARCAP would be provided until the LST was retracted from the beach on CHOSO. STRIKE leaders were instructed to check in with CTU 95.1.4 and orbit until necessary to proceed to pre-briefed target.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group destroyed a railroad bridge near CHAERYONG. Flight then attacked a truck convoy near TALCH'ON-NI as requested by 0615I STRIKE group. One truck was destroyed and remaining trucks damaged.

0819I/ Recovered 0615I launch.

0920I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SOWCH'ON-NI destroying ten buildings. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad marshalling yard near CHAERYONG destroying a maintenance shed and making one rail cut. A gun position and command post was damaged near CHANGYON. A bridge was damaged near ONCH'ON-NI. Two rail cars were destroyed and a rail cut made near SINC'ON.

0940I/ Recovered 0730I launch.

1125I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SOWCH'ON-NI destroying ten buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to ship and one aircraft landed due to oil leak and fluctuating oil pressure. Remaining planes acted as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a rail bridge and railroad junction near CHAERYONG destroying one rail bridge and making three rail cuts. A plane flown by Captain Westrick MORRIS, 031381, USMC, was hit in the engine by AA fire during the attack. The plane was landed wheels up on CH'0-DO Island with Class "B" damage resulting. The pilot was uninjured and returned to the ship by helicopter later in the day. The remainder of the flight destroyed a gun position near P'UNGSAN.
1130I/ USS HOOKS (DD-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.
1145I/ Recovered 0920I launch.
1200I/ USS HAIFA (DE-449) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.
12461/ Recovered one plane from 1125I launch due to fluctuating oil pressure.
1330I/  Four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked a shipyard near HaEJU, destroying six buildings.
1342I/ Recovered remainder of 1125I launch.
1535I/ Two plane CAP and two four plane STRIKE groups launched. First STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ULLYUL destroying eleven buildings. Two revetted buildings were destroyed near T'AeT'AN. Second STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ULLYUL destroying three buildings. Two rail cars were destroyed and two damaged near CH'INNAPO.
1548I/ Recovered 1330I launch.
1735I/ Recovered 1535I launch.
1748I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.
1755I/ Secured all radars in the Task Unit and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals for one hour. Nearest enemy held territory was thirty miles away. Results were negative.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Surface winds were North to northwest at twelve to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 27°F and 23°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP and thirty-two STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

1 February
0555I/ Silenced all Task Unit radars for one hour and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.
0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near OMGJIN destroying seven buildings and making one road cut. Two planes of the flight diverted to K-14 and K-16 to obtain target area photographs.
09201/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying five buildings. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. One plane of the flight landed early due to low fuel supply. STRIKE group attacked road bridges near CHANGYONG destroying two bridges and making one road cut. One plane was hit in the external fuel tank by AA fire. The plane later landed aboard safely.

09311/ Commenced recovery of 07151 launch.

09321/ One plane suffered class "C" damage as a result of catching number seven wire and engaging barrier number two.

10001/ Completed recovering remainder of 07151 launch.

10351/ The Chaplain from the BAEDOENG STRAIT was transferred by highline to HMS CONSORT (D-76) to conduct religious services.

11161/ Recovered one plane from 09201 launch due to low fuel supply.

11251/ Four plane TARCAP launched. Two planes that diverted to K-16 from 07151 launch returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack a battalion headquarters near SONGCH'ON-NI. The headquarters was destroyed.

11561/ Recovered remainder of 09201 launch.

12001/ HMS COMUS (D-20) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

12301/ USS HANNA (DE-449) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

12551/ The BAEDOENG STRAIT Chaplain returned aboard from the COMUS.

13301/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SINC'ON. Ten buildings were destroyed and seven damaged with one secondary explosion observed. Light AA fire was encountered.

13481/ Recovered 11251 launch plus two planes from K-16.

15351/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHANGYON destroying twelve buildings and damaging six.

15591/ Recovered 15301 launch.

17251/ Recovered eight planes of 15351 launch.

17531/ Recovered remainder of 15351 Launch.
17551/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

17561/ Silenced all Task Unit radars and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals. Nearest enemy land was thirty miles away. Results were negative.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Winds northeast to North at ten to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 22°F and 19°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-five STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

2 February
05251/ All Task Unit radars silenced for forty minutes and ECM Intercept Search conducted for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.

06001/ Four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. The flight split into two sections and attacked targets of opportunity. Five buildings were destroyed near HaEJU and a secondary explosion was observed. One truck was destroyed near ANAK. Two trucks were destroyed near CH'INNAMPO. Moderate AA fire was encountered at CH'AN'YONG.

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN destroying five buildings and damaging eleven. One AA gun position was destroyed and a secondary explosion was observed.

08221/ recovered 06001 launch.

09201/ Two plane CAP and four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying seven buildings and damaging three. An estimated ten troops were wounded. One plane of this flight suffered damage consisting of holes in the wings, fuselage, and tail section as a result of own bomb blast when dropped from a low altitude. The pilot was uninjured, however, the plane was recovered early due to an oil leak. Remaining plane acted as defensive CAP. RECOO group attacked and destroyed a gun position in a cave near ONGJIN. CU 951.1.2 requested the flight to attack two gun positions firing on friendly junks near NONGANG-NI. One gun position was destroyed and one damaged. Two ox-carts were destroyed near YON-K.

0935/ Recovered 07151 launch.
10561/ Recovered one plane from 09201 launch due to an oil leak.

11251/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGK'ON-NI destroying eight buildings and damaging a gun position. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near HAEJU destroying five buildings and damaging two. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

11561/ Recovered remainder of 09201 launch.

12061/ HMS CONUS (D-20) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

12211/ Recovered two TBM "COD" planes from Itazuke, Japan with five replacement pilots for VMA-312.

13301/ Four plane armed Reconnaissance launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 from 11251 launch, returned to act as defensive CAP. RECCO group attacked and destroyed a radar station near ONCH'ON-NI.

13441/ Launched two TBM "COD" planes with mail and passengers for Itazuke, Japan via K-6.

13541/ Recovered remainder of 11251 launch.

15351/ Four plane TARCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.1.2 released TarCAP to attack a troop village near ONGJIN. Three buildings were destroyed. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ONGJIN, destroying six buildings and damaging six. One plane of this flight returned early due to a rough running engine.

15431/ Recovered 13301 launch.

16281/ One plane of 15351 launch landed aboard due to rough running engine. The plane caught number seven wire and engaged barriers number two and three, however, the aircraft was not damaged.

17051/ Recovered remainder of 15351 launch.

17391/ Recovered two planes diverted to K-6 from 11251 launch.

17451/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Winds northwest to north at ten to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 26°F and 21°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

-14-
Mission summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, twelve Armed Reconnaissance and sixteen STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

3 February
0100I/ HMAS COIUS (D-20) departed to investigate a group of fishing boats at 37-28N, 124-21E.

0330I/ COIUS returned from investigation of fishing boats.

0442I/ CTU 95.1.1 reported the presence of approximately twenty-five fishing vessels at 37-28N, 124-21E to CTU 95.1.2. The vessels identified were South Korean and were flying proper identification signals. CTU 95.1.1 advised that present intentions were to detach one unit at 031900I to patrol this area and requested assistance from transient vessels as practicable.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Haeju destroying twelve buildings.

0845I/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked two troop villages near Ongjin destroying thirty-five buildings.

0902I/ Recovered STRIKE group of 0715I launch.

0947I/ CTU 95.1.6 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide air STRIKES against gun positions near Songgang-Ni which were bringing accurate fire on friendly movements.

1015I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Ongjin-Ni destroying nineteen buildings.

1042I/ Recovered 0845I launch plus CAP from 0715I launch.

1145I/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a command post near Ch'inedanpo.

1146I/ HMAS CONSORT (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1155I/ Recovered STRIKE group of 1015I launch.

1200I/ USS ROOKS (DD-804) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Launched two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE. STRIKE group split into two divisions. The first division attacked gun position near Songhwa which had been firing on Ch'ido-Do Island. One gun position was damaged. The second division attacked gun positions and caves near Ch'ao'ying. Two gun positions were destroyed and two caves damaged.
13241/ Recovered 11451 launch plus CAP from 10151 launch.

14451/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop billeting area near ONGGANG destroying ten buildings and damaging five. One plane of this flight was hit in the wing by small arms fire. A second plane was hit in the tail section by AA fire.

14541/ Recovered STRIKE group of 13151 launch.

16151/ Two plane CAP and ten plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group divided into one eight plane flight and a two plane section. Eight plane flight attacked gun positions near HONGGANG-NI as requested by CTU 95.1.6. An observation post was damaged and gun positions, caves, and ammo storage dumps were attacked with unassessable damage. The two plane section damaged a command post near HONGGANG-NI.

16261/ Commenced recovery of 14451 launch.

16261/ One plane suffered Class "B" damage when a tail wheel collapsed during a landing. This plane had been hit in the tail section by AA fire.

16351/ Completed recovery of 14051 launch plus CAP from 13151 launch.

18001/ Recovered 16151 launch.

18011/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

18451/ All Task Unit radars silenced for thirty minutes and ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals conducted. Nearest enemy held land was twenty-five miles away. Results were negative.

19421/ USS HANNA (DE-449) departed to investigate a group of fishing boats.

20551/ 3DNJs reports a sonar contact at 37-25N, 124-40E. The contact was evaluated as non-submarine.

21101/ HANNA detached and directed to patrol prohibited fishing area described in Annex "DOG" of CTF 95 Operation Order 2-52 and to comply with CTG 95.1 OPORD Number 523. The HANNA was directed to rendezvous with TU 95.1.1 at 0307001/

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area overcast with a ceiling of 6500 feet during the morning. Ceiling lowered to 1500 feet by late afternoon. Visibility was ten miles, lowering to two miles in light
snow showers. Surface winds were northeast in the morning veering
to southeast in the afternoon. Maximum and minimum temperatures
were 31°F and 25°F. Flying conditions were average becoming
marginal after 1500L.

Mission Summary:
Fight CaP and fifty-eight STRIKE for a total of sixty-six sorties.

4 February
0625L/ All Task Unit radars silenced for thirty minutes and ECM Intercept
Search conducted for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.

0630L/ USN HANNA (DE-449) informed CTU 95.1.1 that one South Korean
fishing vessel, the YANG BOCK, N 10717 from KYEONG-KI-DO, had
been sighted at 37-01N, 124-35E, in the prohibited area, during
the night patrol. This was in addition to fishing vessels sighted
at 032050L which had later cleared the area.

0711L/ HANNA rejoined from night patrol of prohibited area.

0745L/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group
attacked a troop village near SONGDAJU, destroying four buildings.
One aircraft developed a rough running engine and was being
escorted down the TAEDONG-GANG Estuary near CH'INMAPO when the
flight was attacked by four MIG type aircraft. CH'0-DO radar
station had reported bogeys over P'YONGBANG but did not have
this group on their radar. The enemy attacked in two plane
sections at 2000 feet using coordinated tactics and pressing
home the attacks. The battle lasted for eight minutes with
each MIG making four firing runs on the Corsairs. The Corsairs,
fired four brief bursts at the enemy planes and one MIG was hit
in the tail section by 50 cal fire. A piece of the fuselage
was seen to fall free and the plane was listed as damaged. The
Corsairs suffered no damage, however, one plane made an emergen-
cy landing aboard due to a rough running engine. It was
observed that the MIG type planes appeared to have been piloted
by highly experienced personnel.

0910L/ One plane from 0745L launch landed aboard due to a rough running
engine.

0945L/ Two four-plane armed Reconnaissance groups and four plane carrier
re-qualification group launched. The first 3000 group scouted
North to HANCHON. One revetted building was destroyed North of
CH'INMAPO. Three rail cars and a warehouse were damaged near
CH'INMAPO. The second group attacked a troop village near
P'YONGDAJU, destroying six buildings. Flight then scouted along
the main supply route.
10051/ Recovered remainder of 07451 launch.

10261/ Commenced qualification landings with four aircraft.

11021/ Recovered four qualification planes. Three pilots requalified with a total of fourteen landings.

11451/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed gun positions near CH'INNAMPO. This flight was loaded with "TINY TIM" Rockets to evaluate the effectiveness of this weapon against coastal gun positions. Two aircraft scored hits and completely destroyed two well fortified gun positions. A third plane missed the target and the fourth rocket failed to detonate when it struck the target. All rocket motors fired properly and proved effective on this type target. One plane with an escort returned early due to an oil leak.

12111/ Recovered remainder of 09451 launch.

12131/ HANNA detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBRAND patrol.

12161/ USS ROCKS (DD-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBRAND patrol.

12501/ Recovered one plane from 11451 launch due to an oil leak.

13171/ Captain H. F. LANDWIRD, RN, Chief of Staff of TG 95.1, came aboard by highline from the ROCKS.

13301/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and a two plane Carrier Qualification group launched. This STRIKE group was loaded with the 11.75 inch rocket to determine its effectiveness against gun positions located in caves. The target assigned was near P'LUNSAN. Three of the planes scored hits while the fourth jettisoned its "TIM" after receiving a large hole in its port wing root caused by flying debris from the hit made by the preceeding plane. The pilot was making a camera run for assessment purposes. Damage to the cave positions could not be assessed. All "TIMs" fired, operated, and detonated properly. The damaged aircraft was escorted to the carrier and landed aboard safely.

13511/ A helicopter and crew from PHNFGNYONG-DO landed aboard for transportation to Yokosuka, Japan.

14151/ Commenced qualification landings with two planes.

14261/ Recovered two qualification planes. Two pilots requalified with a total of six landings.
1451I/ Landed one plane from 1330I launch due to damaged wing root.

1600I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. Flight split into two divisions and attacked troop villages near OCH'ON-NI destroying eighteen buildings and damaging eight.

1610I/ Recovered remainder of 1330I launch.

1751I/ Recovered 1600I launch.

1752I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

2122I/ ROOKS departed to investigate a fishing vessel. The vessel was identified as South Korean, KF 3295.

2226I/ HMS ONSORT (D-76) departed to investigate a fishing vessel at 37-OON, 124-03.5E. The vessel was identified as South Korean, K-10097.

Weather Summary:
Operating area had an overcast at 1500 feet during the morning with visibility of ten miles. Ceiling increased to 5000 feet by mid morning. The target area had a ceiling of 1000 feet in the southern area during the morning. Ceiling in target area increased to 5000 feet by mid morning. Winds were northeast at twelve to seventeen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 31°F and 28°F. Flying conditions were marginal becoming average at 0900I.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, sixteen STRIKE, eight Armed Reconnaissance and five Qualification for a total of 41 sorties.

5 February

0230I/ USS COLT (DD-730) joined the Task Unit.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP diverted to K-6 at conclusion of the mission for urgent administrative purposes. CTU 95.1.4 requested the STRIKE to fly RESCAP near CH'0-DO. The flight searched the CH'0-DO area for an hour with negative results. Group then attacked a gun position near CHANG-YON with unassessable damage.

0845I/ USS ROOKS (DD-804) chpped to CONDESION-20.

0920I/ Three plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying six buildings. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked bunkers, caves, and gun positions near HONGJANG-NI with unassessable damage.
09371/ Recovered remainder of 07151 launch plus one TBM "COD" and one replacement plane from K-6.

11251/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.1.4 released the TARCAP and flight split into two sections for attacks. The first section destroyed five buildings near SONGHWA. The second section destroyed a gun position near SONGHWA.

11521/ Recovered 09201 launch.

11251/ Recovered one plane from 11251 launch due to a rough running engine.

13001/ USS HANNA (DE-449) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITESHEAD patrol.

13301/ Two plane CAP, two plane Armed Reconnaissance and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying three buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. RECOO group scouted the southern ONGJIN Peninsula area and attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying ten buildings. STRIKE group attacked a road bridge near UPCH'O-RI. The bridge was damaged and two road cuts made. Two planes from this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

13591/ Launched one TBM "COD" to K-6. TBM was escorted by 13301 RECOO group.

14051/ Recovered remainder of 11251 launch.

14291/ Captain R. F. LEONARD, BN, Chief of Staff of TG 95.1 was transferred by highline to HHS CONUS (D-20).

15351/ Four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 from 07151 launch, returned to act as defensive CAP, STRIKE group attacked caves and gun positions near SUNWI-DO with unassessable damage. One plane suffered damage consisting of large holes in both wings and fuselage as a result of striking debris caused by a large secondary explosion in a cave. The plane later landed aboard safely.

16041/ Recovered remainder of 13301 launch.

16101/ CTU 95.1.1 reported the location of numerous gun positions, storage caves, observation posts and troops in trenches along the ONGJIN-HAEJU Peninsula to CTG 95.1 and HHS GLORY (CVL-19). Attacking pilots reported troops along the peninsula to be very active during this patrol as they are apparently building new defenses.
16201/ Commenced recovery of two planes diverted to K-6 from 13301 launch. One plane suffered Class "B" damage as a result of landing with the tail hook in the up position and engaging the barriers.

16451/ Recovered remaining plane from 13301 launch.

17401/ Recovered 17401 launch, plus two planes from 07151 launch.

17411/ Set a course southward for Sasebo, Japan.

21001/ Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 and OTC of West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group by HMS GLORY (CVL-19).

23151/ Chopped HMS CONSORT (D-76), HANNA, and COLLENT to CTU 95.1.1.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target areas had scattered clouds in the early morning increasing to an overcast condition with a ceiling of 8000 feet by noon. Visibility was eight to ten miles. Winds were northeast to North at eight to fourteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 37°F and 33°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, four TARCAP, two armed reconnaissance and nineteen SHAKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

6 February
00111/ HMCS ATHABASCAN (DE-219) and HMAS ANZAC (DD-10) joined from HMCS GLORY (CVL-19).

17421/ Scored to buoy number twenty in Sasebo Harbor.

18151/ Rear Admiral E. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, CTG 95.1, Commander West Coast Blockade and Escort Group, came aboard officially to make a farewell address to the ships company.

18441/ Rear Admiral E. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, departed.
REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. There was no expenditure of ships ordnance this patrol.

B. Performance of ships ordnance:

1. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 fire control system sustained the following casualties during the patrol:

   4 February: The antenna of radar number seven rotated into limit stops. Antenna would not synchronize with radar signal. The casualty was due to a sheared coupling pin in the antenna response mechanism. The pin was replaced.

2. The other casualties sustained during the period were:

   28 January: The motor on the cease firing circuit of mount three failed to operate due to a ground in the motor field caused by salt water. The motor field was rewound.

C. All firing exercises were cancelled due to unfavorable weather.

D. Excellent results were obtained during target acquisition drills. The mount No. 63 system was acquiring targets designated at near maximum range.

E. The second loader of mount nine suffered a compound fracture of comminuted left maxillary on 29 January when his head was pressed between the rotating mount and a loudspeaker on the bulhead. The mount was in automatic control position.

F. Summary of aviation ordnance expended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# 500# Bombs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260# FMG Bombs</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.75&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20MM Amm</td>
<td>31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 Cal Amm</td>
<td>64,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Posts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox-Carts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cars</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Repair sheds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage suffered by ships aircraft

1. Operational damage

   a. One plane was ditched at sea due to a complete engine failure on 29 January.
   b. One plane suffered Class "C" damage as a result of engaging the barriers on 1 February.
   c. One plane suffered Class "B" damage when the hook sheared off and the tail wheel caught a wire on 3 February.
   d. One plane suffered Class "B" damage as a result of landing with the tail hook in the up position and engaging the barriers on 5 February.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action

   a. On 31 January one plane was hit in the engine by AA fire and subsequently landed wheels up on a friendly island resulting in class "B" damage.
   b. One plane suffered minor damage to an external fuel tank from small arms fire on 1 February.
c. One plane suffered damage consisting of holes in wings and fuselage as a result of flying through debris from own bomb blast on 2 February. Class "C" damage resulted.

d. Two planes suffered minor damage consisting of holes in wings and tail section from small arms fire on 3 February.

e. One plane suffered Class "C" damage as a result of flying through debris from a secondary explosion of a target on 5 February.
PART VI

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel

The number of personnel assigned to the ship during the patrol included 801 enlisted navy, 71 Naval Officers, 164 Marine enlisted and 41 Marine Officers for a total of 1077. Five Marine replacement pilots came aboard while the ship was at sea.

2. Education

Department training officers began preparing training schedules to coincide with the anticipated return to the United States. Training during the cruise centered around preparations for advancement in rating examinations. An additional twenty-four course books were issued and twelve personnel applied for correspondence courses. On the job training continued as a valuable source of education.

3. Divine Services

Services conducted aboard during this patrol included two protestant services with Holy Communion, daily Rosary services, one Latter Day Saints service and two bible classes. The Chaplain conducted protestant services aboard the HMS OCONOR (D-76) at sea.

4. Welfare and Recreation

Aircraft maintenance requirements reduced movie showings to three during the patrol. The ship's library continued to rate high as a source of recreation. A summary of local and world news was presented over the ship's announcing system at noon each day by the Chaplain. A daily newspaper was printed and distributed to all ships in company.

B. Casualties

1. There were no casualties during this patrol.
PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

Comment

When a crash occurs on the flight deck all Air Department stations and several Engineering divisions must be immediately alerted in order that action can be taken to prevent spread of fire, should it develop. Of primary interest is the requirement that the foam generators be manned immediately. This last factor cannot be accomplished immediately as the flight deck crash signal is not heard below the flight deck level. The crash bill for this type carrier does not require operation of a total ships force fire bill in that fires do not always follow crash landings. However, it does require that certain Engineering details be alerted. At the present time this can only be accomplished through the MC circuits.

Recommendation

The crash alarm should be tied in directly with the General announcing system. A letter in this regard is being submitted to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Comment

On one occasion where the outside temperature was between 20°F and 14°F the number three (3) catwalk fire station valve was found to be frozen. It's apparent that this is a dangerous situation in view of a possible deck crash during cold weather operations.

Recommendation

Salt water and foam valves should be insulated and/or suitable heating elements should be provided. The number three (3) catwalk fire station should be lagged inside the skin of the ship.

Comment

Whenever heavy weather or heavy rains are encountered, an excessive amount of water leaks into the elevator pits. Investigation showed that drainage was not adequate during heavy rainfall.

Recommendation

The drainage outlets from the elevator combing at the flight deck level should be increased in number.

Comment

A slight warpage of the H-4C shuttle track was discovered after investigating pilots complaints of a tugging sensation experienced at approximately halfway through the power run. Inspection of the track at this point revealed a slight misalignment in one foot section. The shuttle was reassembled with new shoes installed and launches were
continued. as the shoes began to wear in, the tugging sensation became negligible.

Recommendation
None

Hung Ordnance Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>MK-55</th>
<th>Aero 14A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMG 16</td>
<td>Electrical failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Total Rockets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250#</td>
<td>Electrical failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260#</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Total Bombs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marked improvement was attained in reducing hung ordnance during this period, relative to previous periods.

LAND - LAUNCH DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Launches</th>
<th>H-2-1 Catapult</th>
<th>H-4C Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight Pounds</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind Knots</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Pressure psi</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. bridles expended</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number - 343</th>
<th>Average Wind Knots - 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average CPV psi</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Runout feet</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wires Caught - #1 - 72, #2 - 145, #3 - 77, #4 - 40, #5 - 5, #6 - 0, #7 - 2, #8 - 0, #9 - 0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Crashes - 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers engaged - #2, #3, and #4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Engineering Department

While underway from base to the Yellow Sea operating area on 28 January 1953, excessive salinity of the condensate from #2 main condenser was encountered. After eliminating all other possible sources of salt water contamination, the only remaining possibility was leaking condenser tubes. Operating conditions of the ship made it impossible to reduce speed to sufficiently low rate to open the condenser until the night of 30 January 1953. At this time, the port shaft was allowed to idle with no power applied. The #2 main condenser was opened and tested as per article 46-42 (2) Buships manual. Six tubes were found to be leaking and were plugged.

C. Medical Department

1. There were no personnel casualties during this patrol.

2. Medical statistical summary for the patrol:
   a. Admitted to sick list - 35
   b. Total sick days out of 10,770 possible working days - 167
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 2
   d. Total patients visits to sick call - 754
   e. Total medical treatments - 1938
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 2
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 26
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 2
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 26
   l. Major surgical procedures - 0
   m. Veneral disease cases and non-specific Urethritis - Total - 12
      (1) Gonorrhea - 1
      (2) Chancroid - 1
      (3) Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 10
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last port period - 154

3. Squadron flight personnel statistical summary:
   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 4
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation - 0
   c. Average number of days pilots grounded - 3
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 0
   e. Number of pilots KIA - 0
   f. Number of pilots WIA - 0

H. L. Ray
Copy to:

GNO (2) Advance
CINCNAVFLT (2) Advance
CINCNAVFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEMINTHFLT (1) advance
CTF 77 (1) advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERFPAC
COMFARJPAC
NAVAL War College
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-17
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CG, AIRPMFPAC (1) advance
CG, FaFPAC (1) advance
CG, 1st naKnTldWING
CO, CVN-12
CO, VMA-312
CO, USS BATAN (CVL-29)
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
CO, USS BAILROKO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED:

S. O. COLE
Cdr, USN
Operations Officer
**DECLASSIFIED**

U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

4 February 1953

**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 5 FEBRUARY 1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0930</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>To K-6 at 0930 1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0930</td>
<td>A,C</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0920</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0920</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>A,D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>D-7</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>D-8</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DECO</td>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>E-10</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A/C from K-6 1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>A,F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HELICOPTER**

GUARD MAIL 0900
GUARD MAIL 1145

**NOTES:**

1. All A/C 100 gallons in belly tanks except Event ABLE ONE (A-1).
2. Event ABLE ONE (a-1) full belly tanks.

**AMMO LOAD:**

A - All A/C full gun loads.
B - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
C - Half A/C 500# GP / 5 sec. and 4-250# / 5 sec.
   Half A/C 500# SAP / 5 sec. and 4-250# / 5 sec.
D - Half A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
   Half A/C 500# SAP .1 and 4-250# .1 .1.
E - All A/C 1000# .1 .1 and 2-250# .1 .1.
F - Half A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
   Half A/C 1000# inst. / ND and 2-250# inst./ ND.

B. E. COLKIT JR.
Lcdr, USN
Air Operations Officer

**ENCLOSURE (1)**
OPERATING PERIOD FROM 29 JAN TO 5 FEB. 1953