From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) CPOAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINGPACFLT INST 3480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised)
(o) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
      (2) Chart showing area of operations
      (3) USS BADOENGY STRAIT ltr serial 1341 of 20 November 1951

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, USS BADOENGY STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during this period.

2. The report is divided into 6 parts, as listed below:

  Part I General Narrative.
  Part II Chronological order of events.
  Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
  Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
  Part V Personnel performance and casualties.
  Part VI Comments and recommendations.

Part I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951, the USS BADOENGY STRAIT (CVE-116) under the command of Captain Roy L. JOHNSON, 62606/1310, USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-212 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. GRAF, 06207/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer, operated as a
of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

(1) The Commanding Officer, USS RÖDOENG STRAIT, was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 17 December to 2130 28 December 1951, at which time the Command of the Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMAS SIDNEY (CVE-17). During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of three destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct air operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army in Korea (KUSAK), and to render search and rescue assistance as required.

(2) The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in enemy-held North Korea. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element, when directed, or as targets of opportunity.

(3) During this operating period VMF-212 aircraft flew armed reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pro-briefed Strikes, Airspot for Naval gunfire, and Photo Reconnaissance missions as illustrated by schedule in enclosure (1). Of the 11 days in the operating area only one entire day was lost to inclement weather, thus giving a total of 10 days of air operations. During this period VMF-212 flew 274 sorties of which 2 aborted. There was a total of 598.2 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 59.82 hours per day and 27.2 missions per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft flyable on board 23.1, and the total average aircraft availability 21.1.

(4) During this operating period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in Korean Coastal areas, Nan and Mike, in the vicinity of Latitude 38°00' and Longitude 124°00'E as a point 0BOE. The screen consisted of the HMAS ATHABASKAN (DER-29), HMAS CHARITY (DD-29), and the USS PORTERFIELD (DD-682). On 27 December 1951, the USS HANSON (DD-832) relieved the USS PORTERFIELD.

Part II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

170656/Dec - The RÖDOENG STRAIT got underway for the Yellow Sea area, with VMF-212 embarked, in company with HMAS ATHABASKAN in accordance with CTG 95.1 directive, from Sasebo, Japan.

171100/ Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed aloft) on route to the operating area.

172022 USS PORTERFIELD joined the screen, as previously directed. This ship had been operating with HMAS SIDNEY; "turn over" notes were passed by high-line.

172100 Relieved the HMAS SIDNEY (CVE-17) and assumed CTE 95.11.
**Part II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (Cont'd)**

18 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD.

HMS CHARITY joined the screen, as previously directed. A total of 41 flights (14 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was generally good. Major R. F. STUBBING, 020335/7302, USMC, encountered ground fire while on an armed reconnaissance mission and his aircraft received a direct hit by a 20mm shell which exploded in the engine accessory section, causing a fire to break out. The pilot was able to get two miles out over TAEDONG INLET before bailout. He received minor cuts and burns and was rescued by a helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER (CL-82) patrolling that area.

**VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 500 lb GP bombs</td>
<td>14 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 3.5&quot; rockets</td>
<td>4 Airspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,200 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>15 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 December - HMS ATHABASKAN and HMS CHARITY refueled from the BADOENG STRAIT.

191725/ 

HMS CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area. The remainder of the force rotating southward for the night.

A total of 42 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather was generally good.

**VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>11 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>1 Photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
191752/ Weather reconnaissance plane from VP-SIX, based in Japan, reported sighting 30 un-identified trawlers at Latitude 36-20N, Longitude 123-00E.

Commander Task Force 95 directed CTE 95.11 to investigate.

192017/ HMCS ATHABASKAN and USS PORTERFIELD detached from the screen to conduct search for reported trawlers.

20 December - HMCS ATHABASKAN and USS PORTERFIELD rejoined formation at first light. Results of search negative.

CTE 95.11 was directed to furnish CAP for coastal convoy enroute to INCHON.

Refueled USS PORTERFIELD and HMCS ATHABASKAN.

201648/ USS PORTERFIELD detached to carry out night patrol assigned in the PAEGNYONG-DO area. The remainder of the force retiring southward for the night.

A total of 39 flights (18 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather in general was good.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>18 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>21 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,700 Rounds .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 December - USS MANCHESTER, with USS EVERSOLE as escort, joined with TE 95.11 at Latitude 38-25N and Longitude 124-10E.

CTE 95.11 conferred with Rear Admiral DYER, CTF-95, aboard the USS MANCHESTER.

Major R. F. STUBBERG, USMCVR was returned from the USS MANCHESTER via helicopter.

211653/ USS MANCHESTER and USS EVERSOLE departed.

211658/ HMCS ATHABASKAN was detached to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

Only 2 flights (these being CAP) were flown this date. Weather remained foggy all day.
22 December - Refueled HMCS ATHABASKAN, and CBS CHARITY.

A total of 12 flights (2 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather remained foggy until early afternoon.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>2 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>2 Airspot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,700 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>4 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD

A total of 35 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather was excellent.

231701/ Detached USS PORTERFIELD to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

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<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
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</thead>
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<td>10 CAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>191 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>6 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo</td>
<td>19 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 December - Refueled HMCS ATHABASKAN.

A total of 42 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather was excellent.

241710/ HMCS ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
<td>12 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORDNANCE EXPENDED

61 3.5" rockets
4 Napalm bombs
38,500 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

25 December - HMS CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

No flight operations conducted due to rain and fog that continued all day. A Merry Christmas was had by all.

26 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD and HMS CHARITY.

USS PORTERFIELD detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

Only 10 flights (2 of which were defensive) were flown, due to inclement weather.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
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<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000 lb. GP bombs</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 500 lb. GP bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159 5&quot; HVAR rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 3.5&quot; rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Napalm bombs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 TarCap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

271706/ HMCS ATHARASKAN departed to night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

28 December - USS HANSON temporarily detached to join TU 90.32.7 as convoy screening ship and CAP control. However, due to reduced visibility in the convoy area, CAP was not launched. The HANSON returned to TE 95.11 about 1230.

USS HANSON and HMCS ATHARASKAN refueled during the day.

281650/ USS HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-DO area and directed to join the HMCS SIDNEY who assumed GTE 95.11 on 29 December 1951. The USS HANSON also carried the "TURNOVER" notes that were to be passed.
to HMAS SIDNEY. The BADOENG STRAIT with HMSCS ATHABASKAN and HMSCS CHARITY in company, and VMF-212 embarked, took departure from the operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

281922/ HMSCS ATHABASKAN detached to proceed to the port of Kure, Japan independently.

282130/ The Commanding Officer, HMAS SIDNEY, assumed command of Task Element 95,11 in area MIKE. The BADOENG STRAIT continued course for Sasebo, Japan in company with HMSCS CHARITY.

Inclement weather curtailed flight operations this date. 8 flights (all of which were combat) were flown.

VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

- 8 500 lb. GP bombs
- 62 5" HVAR rockets
- 4,800 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to Fleet Activities, Sasebo.

29 December - HMSCS CHARITY detached to proceed independently to Kobe, Japan.

291723/ Moored at buoy #18, Sasebo harbor, to remain through 6 January 1952 for replenishment and recreation.

Part III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

A. The gasoline heating unit for mixing NAPALM, as described in enclosure (3), was evaluated operationally during this period. The results proved extremely satisfactory and a separate report is under preparation pointing out the capabilities and applicability of the equipment as designed.

B. The assembly, arming, and stowage of Mk 77 Mod 0 Fire Bombs presented several problems. Assembly was time consuming due to the care that must be exercised in tightening the tie-rod nut to the prescribed 425 in/lbs. torque. Of the 36 bombs used, tie-rod threads were stripped on 4, making the entire bomb useless in all four cases. An additional three bombs separated while planes were being catapulted. This was believed to be caused by the stripping of the tie-rod threads also.

C. The disengaging of hung-rockets during arrested landing created an awkward situation. The most efficient method involved, to prevent damage to the ship or other aircraft by these rockets traveling down the flight deck was the innovation and use of the "Fredericks Barrier". This consisted of lashing
six cargo nets together - forming two sections of three nets each. These two sections were strung across the flight deck just aft of the forward elevator to serve as a deck-level barrier in which wandering rockets were caught and then jettisoned. After landing an aircraft with hung-rockets the nets were pulled apart, gate fashion, to allowing taxing forward. Ten plane handlers were required to open and close the nets. A total of 74 hung-rockets were returned to the ship during this operational period.

D. The fire-power umbrella of this ship does not extend the full 360 degrees around the ship. There exists a vacant 20 degree sector on the bow, 10 degrees on either side. This was caused by the authorized removal of the forward 40mm mount.

E. The fire control system is not completely adequate for night radar firing as the computer system installation has no direct method of designation of air targets from GIC to the Gun Control Platform.

F. Facilities are not available for developing gun camera film aboard the CVE-105 type carrier. Damage assessment is consequently a matter of memory or personal evaluation at de-briefings.

G. The ASW allowance of Mk 24 mines, that is required to be carried, consumes valuable storage space that could otherwise be used to advantage to store armament more in line with the mission of the ship during this type operation.

H. Ammunition expenditures:

1. During the operating period covered by this report the following ordnance was expended.

**BY VAF-212 AIRCRAFT**

- 1000 lb. GP bombs 19
- 500 lb. GP bombs 140
- 5" HVAR rockets 1,266
- 3.5" rockets 181
- Napalm (Fire Bombs) 36
- 6.5" ATAR rockets 24
- .50 Cal. (Belted) 195,400

**BY USS RADOENG STRAIT**

- 40mm 4,472
Part IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own battle damage -

1. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.

2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 338.5 Revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.

B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy -

1. Ships of this task element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of the screen during the period covered by this report.

2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 338.3 Revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

Part V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in the general high standard of the Navy and Marine Corps.

B. Casualties -

1. On 18 December 1951, Major R. F. STUEBING, USMC, was forced to bail out over water after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. He was recovered by helicopter. He suffered minor burns and lacerations on the face.

C. The recommended wartime compliment as submitted by this command to COMAIRPAC on 10 October 1951, reflects CVE-105 personnel requirements for this type operation. Comments from individual departments are as listed below:

1. Executive Department: Requires 1 additional YNT2, as legal yeoman; 1 typewriter repairman.

2. Air Department: Total numbers adequate. Recommend dropping 1 ADC, 3 AD1, 4 AD2, and 6 AD3, totaling 14 men, to be replaced by 7 AN's and 7 AA's.

3. Dental Department: Recommend the allowance of dental officers on CVE's be increased to 2.


5. Supply Department: Inadequate. Additions required are 1 DK1, and 5 non-rated men.

6. Gunnery Department: Recommend 12 more non-rated men in order to more efficiently maintain Condition THREE watches.
7. Operations Department:

a. Under the present method of having Quartermasters and Signalmen considered as one rating, it is recommended that the present allowance of 17 QM's be increased to 20 ratings to include 12 ratings with Signalmen qualifications (NJC 0230-0239), in order that continuous around the clock watches may be stood.

b. That the photographer allowance be increased by 3, to total 6 (1 PH3, and 2 AN(PH) additional).

c. Increase of three RD3 and three radarman strikers.

Part VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. The operation of the BADOENG STRAIT and VMF-212 as part of TE 95.11, in conjunction with other surface units, was considered to have been most effective in the enforcement of a seaward and coastwise blockade of the West Coast of Red held Korea between latitudes 37-30N and 38-50N. The tactical advantage afforded by CTE 95.11 closing to within 33 miles of the enemy coastal area for daily commencements, made it possible to schedule two hour missions, each composed of from 6 to 8 aircraft, continuously during daylight hours. A veritable shuttle on "demand" targets was conducted in the face of the continual threat of "hit-and-run" attacks by Manchurian based Red air forces.

B. The employment of VMF-212 fighter-bomber F4U-4 aircraft as CAP for troop convoys proceeding along the West coast of Korea detracted to a great degree from the primary mission of TE 95.11. Fully realizing the need for this CAP, it is believed, however, that carrier planes of this type could be more profitably employed wherein their armament carrying capabilities were exploited against the enemy.

C. At the present time CIC has no satisfactory means of positively identifying friendly aircraft. In the event the enemy elected to launch token or all-out air attacks against TE 95.11, the situation would become quite critical with the enemy in an excellent position to strike the first blow and thus temporarily take command of the situation.

D. The maximum number of screen ships available during daylight hours was three. At darkness, and until dawn, the size of the screen was automatically reduced to two ships, as the third was diverted to protect ships lying off the Red held coastline. A definite submarine threat would pose a very difficult problem with such an inadequate ASW screen.

E. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Weather prognostications were so difficult as to try the patience of the best, because reports from the westward were simply non-existent.

RECOMMENDATION: Employ aerologists with experience in the Yellow Sea area. Equip carriers operating in the Yellow Sea area with Rayinsonde and Facsimile Transceivers.
2. Intelligence data of all types is continually pouring in, requiring accurate interpretation and evaluation at all hours of the day and night.

**Recommendation:** A minimum of two officers and six enlisted personnel who are graduates of advanced schools of Combat Intelligence should be made available to carrier task element commanders.

3. Panoramic photo intelligence was not available upon deployment and was a great hindrance in the debriefing analysis. After every fresh snowfall the features of the target areas would take on new profiles. Present AMF (1:50,000) charts, though accurate and detailed, became as confusing as adolescent finger-paintings.

**Recommendation:** That photo aircraft and pilots be assigned to each carrier. A detachment of two of the type planes employed by the squadron embarked would suffice on a CVE carrier.

4. A lack of pre-deployment training in close-air support and target interdiction work, where available shipboard intelligence plays a major part, created a temporary difficulty in understanding many problems of the embarked squadron.

**Recommendation:** Coordinate training with Marine Squadrons based at El Toro prior to deployment to the Far East area. The practice of the relieving carrier, arriving from CONUS, sending key personnel on the last period of operations to embark on the carrier in TF-95 is considered an extremely sound and essential practice.

5. The projection of enemy air and submarine attacks against this small task element would very radically alter the present, almost complete freedom of action enjoyed.

**Recommendation:** That additional escort vessels for air defense and ASW be assigned insofar as practicable in order that the current freedom of action would not be curtailed in the event of overt attacks.

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Copy to: (ADVANCE)
CNO
ComMarCorps
CINCINCLANT
COMNAVFFE
COMFTHFLTL
CTF-95
CTG-95.1
COMAIRPAC
CONCARDIV 17
GGairFMPac
CGFPac
CG1stM AY
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS BATAAN (CVE-29)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
CO MAG-12
CO VMF-212

G. R. PALUS
Commander, U.S. Navy
**U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)**  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California  

**DECLASSIFIED**  
27 January 1952

**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR**  
27 January 1952  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Ammo.</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
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<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>A-3</td>
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<td>1730</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-18</td>
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<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

1. All A/C full load .50 Cal.
2. Maintain 2 A/C on Condition 11 after each launch from one-half hour before sunrise until sunset.
3. 500# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR
4. 4 A/C with 1000# GP/DC, 8-HVAR
   2 A/C NAPALM, 8-HVAR
5. 2 A/C - 500# GP/DC, 8-WP
   2 A/C - NAPALM, 8-WP
6. 500# GP/DC, 8-HVAR

**Approved:**  
G. R. PALUS  
CDR, USN  
Operation Officer

**Submitted:**  
A. S. IRISH  
LCDR, USN  
Air Oper. Officer

---

Enclosure (1) to USS BADOENG STRAIT 1st Serial 005 of
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
To: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
Via: Commander Carrier Division SEVENTEEN

Subj: Mixing of Napalm in Cold Weather

Ref: (a) COMAIRPAC ltr serial 30/14896 of 30 August 1951

Encl: (1) Photograph of Strainer Shell
(2) Photograph of 5/8" Copper Tubing (Coiled)(three prints)
(3) Photograph of Baffle Plate welded to coils
(4) Photograph of Header (two prints)
(5) Photograph of Temperature Gauge (Well type)(two prints)

1. It is the purpose of this letter to describe, in response to reference (a), a napalm heater unit developed by this ship.

2. The basic idea of the heater, as developed, is that the gasoline is heated by steam directly rather than by means of water. The heating system is prepared in a reamed out strainer shell as pictured in enclosure (1). The two coils of 5/8" copper tubing total 90 feet in length, 50 feet in the larger coil and 40 feet in the smaller coil as pictured in enclosure (2). A baffle plate is welded in the center of the coils causing the flow of gasoline to circulate properly throughout the length of the unit to give the desired increase in temperature for heating of the gasoline as pictured in enclosure (3). The header with a baffle plate is used to control the flow of steam from the inlet to the discharge point as pictured in enclosure (4). Enclosure (5) pictures the unit installed, and the location of the well type temperature gauge and hand valve to control the steam entering the unit. This unit uses a steam pressure of 35 pounds in the copper coils with 65 pounds of gasoline pressure from the pump room. The increase of gasoline temperature under test was 45° with 35 pounds at the mixing hopper which is believed to be sufficient for mixing of napalm under most adverse weather conditions.

3. It is believed that the heater described has the following advantages:

   a. Greater safety. Complete drainback is accomplished. Any leaks will introduce steam (water) into the gasoline which does no harm.

   b. Greater accessibility. Units can be easily installed at any fueling station desired, either flight or hanger dock. This permits napalm tanks to be invariably filled on the planes and eliminates the handling of filled tanks.

Enclosure (3) to CVE-116 letter ser 005 of

d. Greater speed. A minimum of equipment to handle. The number of heating units can be increased to permit mixing napalm in a minimum length of time.

J. C. ALDERMAN
From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander Seventh Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet


Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1
(d) C.T.G. 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised)
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Chart Showing area of operations
(3) CTE 95.11 dispatch of February 1952

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c) and (d) the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the periods 7 January - 16 January 1952 and 25 January - 6 February 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during these periods and this report therefore does not cover the time between the two subject periods, when the ship was in Sasebo for replenishment and recreation.

2. The report, divided into six parts, as listed below, is appended:

- Part I  General Narrative
- Part II  Chronological Order of Events
- Part III  Remarks on Performance of Ordnance Material, and equipment, including Ammunition Expenditure
- Part IV Summary of Own and Enemy Battle Damage
- Part V  Personnel Performance and Casualties
- Part VI  Comments and Recommendations
Part I General Narrative

a. During the period 7 January 1952 through 6 February 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT under the command of Captain ROY L. JOHNSON, 62606/1310 USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212, LT. COL JOSEPH A. GRAY 06207/730 OSU, USMC, Commanding, embarked, operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

(1) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT, remained Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2140 on 7 January 1952 to 2223 on 16 January 1952 and from 2145 on 25 January to 2100 on 6 February 1952. The Commanding Officer H.K.S. SYDNEY (CVL-17) assumed CTE 95.11 from 2223, 16 January until 2145, 25 January and at 2100, 6 February the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was relieved as CTE 95.11 by the Commanding Officer H.K.S. GLORY (CVL-19). During the periods of this report Task Element 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of three destroyers active as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships at various times due to demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct air operations in support of the United Nations blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army, Korea (Busak), and to render search and rescue assistance as required.

(2) The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. No enemy naval forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface action took place. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the west coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element when directed, or as targets of opportunity.

(3) During these operating periods VMF-212 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, Pre-briefed Strikes, Airspot, and Photo Reconnaissance missions, as illustrated in enclosure (1). During the period 8 January through 16 January there were 9 days in the operating area and flight operations were conducted on all nine days. On two of these days however, flight operations were curtailed due to inclement weather. During this period VMF-212 flew 336 sorties of which 4 aborted. There was a total of 714.1 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 79.34 hours per day and 36.89 missions per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft on board was 23.6 and the total average aircraft available 22.4.

During the period 25 January through 6 February there were 12 days in the operating area with 2 days of flying lost due to inclement weather and 4 other days on which flight operations were reduced by inclement weather. During this period VMF-212 flew 344 sorties of which 4 aborted. There was a total of 662.7 combat hours flown, for an overall average of 66.27 hours per day and 34.4 missions per day. The Squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft on board was 22.92, and the total average aircraft available was 20.92.
(4) During these periods in the operating area ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in geographical areas Nan and Mike, with the average Point Oboe at 380° - 00N, 124° - 00E. The following ships were assigned to the screen at various times during the two periods of operations:

- H.M.S. CHARITY (D-29)
- H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN (DD-803)
- U.S.S. HANSON (DDR-832)
- H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN (DDE-219)
- U.S.S. MARSHALL (DD-676)
- H.M.C.S. CAYUGA (DDE-218)
- H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71)
- U.S.S. RADFORD (DDE-446)
- H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34)

Part II Chronological Order of Events

7 January
In accordance with CTE 95.1 Dispatch 0607572 of January 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMF-212 embarked got underway for the Yellow Sea area in company with H.M.C.S. CAYUGA (DDE-218), and H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71).
2140/ Relieved the R.M.A.S. SYDNEY (CVE-17) and assumed CTE 95.11.

8 January
H.M.S. CHARITY joined the screen as previously directed.
H.M.C.S. CAYUGA and H.M.S. CONSTANCE detached to proceed to CTE 95.1 for duty on coastal blockade force.
1135/ U.S.S. HANSON (DDR-832) joined the screen as previously directed. The CTE 95.11 turnover notes from the R.M.A.S. SYDNEY were passed to the BADOENG STRAIT at this time.
1351/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN (DD-803) joined the screen as previously directed. A total of 32 flights (4 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was generally good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>4 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 6.5&quot; ATAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1715/ H.M.S. CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area. The remainder of the force retired southward for the night.

9 January
H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined and resumed screening duties.
1710/ H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 41 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was generally good throughout the day.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>19 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,500 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 January
Refueled H.M.S. CHARITY and U.S.S. HANSON.
Only 8 flights (these being CAP) were flown this day. The weather remained marginal around the ship and bad in the target area all day.
H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN remained in Paegonyong-Do area because CTE 95.11 had retired to the south in order to provide air cover for a troop convoy.

11 January
H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN rejoined and resumed screening duties.
A total of 38 flights (9 of which were defensive) were flown this day.
The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>9 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>14 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>8 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>7 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,400 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1715/ U.S.S. HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in Paegonyong-Do area.

12 January
U.S.S. HANSON rejoined and resumed screening duties.
1420/
U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124) with U.S.S. COLLETT (DD-730) as escort joined with TE 95.11.
CTE 95.11 conferred with Rear Admiral DYER, CTF 95, aboard the U.S.S. ROCHESTER.
1605/
1720/
H.M.N.S. CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in Paegonyong-Do area.
A total of 39 flights (14 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The number of CAP flights was higher than usual due to the fact that TE 95.11 provided air cover for a troop convoy during the day. The weather was excellent.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

| 14 CAP |
| 13 TarCap |
| 2 Air Spot |
| 6 Strike |
| 4 Armed Recco |

| MISSIONS |
| 14 CAP |
| 13 TarCap |
| 2 Air Spot |
| 6 Strike |
| 4 Armed Recco |

| 500# G.P. bombs |
| 3,5" Rockets |
| 2 Napalm bombs |

| 47,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo |

---

**13 January**

H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined and resumed screening duties.

Received a dispatch from U.S.S. ROCHESTER which stated that F4U-4, side number LD-15 on a Strike mission, had crashed in the sea. The pilot, Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, U.S.M.C. bailed out and was recovered by helicopter.

---

**14 January**

U.S.S. ROCHERSTE informed CTE 95.11 by radio that Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, U.S.M.C. was dead due to drowning when recovered by helicopter.

Herolved H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN and H.M.S. CHARITY.

H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 46 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general was good.

---

**14 January**

U.S.S. HANSON refueled

0724/

H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN rejoined and resumed screening duties.

0755/

H.M.N.S. VAN GALLEN came alongside U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT and with Honors transferred the remains of Captain C. C. SCHWARTZ, USMC.

---

**15 January**

U.S.S. HANSON detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 36 flights (6 of which were defensive) were flown this day.

The weather which was good in the morning, gradually deteriorated to marginal and below in the afternoon.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>14 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 January
U.S.S. HANSON rejoined screen.
U.S.S. HANSON detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in Paengnyong-Do area.
A total of 46 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown on this day. The weather, in general, was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>18 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,200 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 January
H.M.S. VAN GALEN and U.S.S. HANSON refueled.
U.S.S. HANSON rejoined screen.
A total of 46 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown on this day. The weather was generally good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>16 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Napalm bombs</td>
<td>8 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37,000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1607/
U.S.S. HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-Do area, and directed to join the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY who was to assume CTE 95,11 on 17 January 1952. The U.S.S. HANSON was further directed to pass to the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY the "turn-over" notes.

1722/
Took course for SASEBO, JAPAN in company with H.M.S. CHARITY and H.M.N.S. VAN GALEN.

2223/
The Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. SYDNEY, assumed command of Task Element 95,11 in area Mike. The U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT continued course for SASEBO, JAPAN.
H.M.S. CHARITY detached to proceed independently to KOBE, JAPAN.

Commenced AA Gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in area "George" enroute to SASEBO.

Moored to bay #18 Sasebo harbor Japan, to remain through 24 January 1952 for replenishment and recreation.

Underway for Yellow Sea operating area in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN.

H.M.S. CHARITY reported for duty as screening unit.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in Area "George".

Relieved the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY as the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BISSON STRAIT assumed CTF 95,11.

On a TarCap mission, Captain J. D. NADELMOFER, USMCR bailed out of his aircraft over Kirin-Do island.

Messages relayed from Sea Air Rescue helicopter stated that Captain J. D. NADELMOFER 037971, USMCR was dead when it arrived on scene.

U.S.S. RADFORD joined the screen as previously directed.

This ship had been operating with the H.M.A.S. SYDNEY, and therefore had "trun over" notes, which were passed to U.S.S. BISSON STRAIT.

H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegmyong-Do area.

A total of 25 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this day. The weather deteriorated to unsuitable flying conditions in the afternoon.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>6 C.I.F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>7 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,700 Rounds 150 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN retained screen

H.M.S. CHARITY detached to proceed on night patrol in Paegmyong-Do area.

An unidentified aircraft approached the force, and the report contained in enclosure (3) was made.

A total of 33 flights (8 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was marginal throughout the day and curtailed flight operations.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>8 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>14 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,600 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 January 1965
H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined the screen.

1625/1623/
U.S.S. RADFORD detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the P'nyong-Do area.

A total of 26 flights (6 of which were defensive) were flown this day. Poor weather again curtailed flight operations.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>6 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>10 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>6 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,800 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 January 1965
U.S.S. RADFORD rejoined screen.

1622/1623/
H.M.S. ATHABASKAN detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the P'nyong-Do area.

1628/
U.S.S. RADFORD refueled from U.S.S. BADENGE STRAIT. A total of 47 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>24 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>11 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23,200 Rounds 150 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 January 1965
U.S.S. MARSHAL (DD-676) and U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) joined the formation. The U.S.S. PORTERFIELD transferred 2 medical patients to U.S.S. BADENGE STRAIT for treatment, and departed to the coastal blockade area. The U.S.S. MARSHAL remained as part of the screen to relieve the U.S.S. RADFORD.

0847/
U.S.S. RADFORD detached to duty previously assigned with TF 95.1 in the coastal blockade group.
H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN rejoined screen.
U.S.S. MARSHALL detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 43 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was excellent.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinance Expended</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>20 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Napalm bombs</td>
<td>7 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,200 Rounds 50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 January
U.S.S. MARSHALL rejoined the screen.
H.M.S. CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.
A total of 48 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinance Expended</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>24 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>6 Armed Recco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>4 Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,000 Rounds 50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 February
U.S.S. PORTERFIELD, departed, having transferred a medical patient to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT to operate on coastal blockade.

1600h
H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area to remain with Task Element 95.12 until the morning of 2 February as Task Element 95.11 was proceeding southward to provide air cover for a troop convoy on 2 February.
A total of 16 flights (4 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was marginal and curtailed flight operations.
VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

| 3 | 1000# G.P. bombs |
| 4 | 500# G.P. bombs |
| 32 | 3.5" Rockets |
| 55 | 5" HVAR Rockets |
| 4 | Napalm bombs |
| **5,400** | **Rounds .50 Cal Ammo** |

**MISSIONS**

| 4 | CAP |
| 6 | TarCap |
| 3 | Armed Recco |
| 2 | Air Spot |

2 February  The weather remained unsuitable for air operations throughout the entire day.

3 February  H.M.S. ATHABASKAN joined the screen.

1625/ U.S.S. MARSHAL detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

A total of 38 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was good until late afternoon when it became marginal to below.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

| 6 | 1000# G.P. bombs |
| 15 | 500# G.P. bombs |
| 117 | 3.5" Rockets |
| 56 | 5" HVAR Rockets |
| 1 | Napalm bomb |
| **28,000** | **Rounds .50 Cal Ammo** |

**MISSIONS**

| 12 | CAP |
| 19 | TarCap |
| 7 | Armed Recco |

4 February  U.S.S. MARSHAL rejoined the screen.

1526/ H.M.S. CHARITY detached to night patrol assignment in Paegnyong-Do area.

There were no flight operations this day due to continuous snow throughout the day.

5 February  H.M.S. CHARITY rejoined the screen.

1545/ H.M.S. ATHABASKAN detached to night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do area.

VMF-212 completed their 2000th consecutive barrier-free carrier landing.

A total of 32 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather in general, was good.

VMF-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

**ORDNANCE EXPENDED**

| 17 | 500# G.P. bombs |
| 48 | 3.5" Rockets |
| 93 | 5" HVAR Rockets |
| **15,700** | **Rounds .50 Cal Ammo** |

**MISSIONS**

| 12 | CAP |
| 18 | TarCap |
| 2 | Air Spot |
6 February  U.S.S. MARSHEL detached to report to CTF 95.1 for duty in the coastal blockade group.

1500/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN rejoined.
1517/ H.M.S. CHARITY detached to rendezvous with H.M.S. COCKADE, then proceeded on previously assigned mission in Paegnyong-Do area. This ship also carried the turn-over notes to be passed to the H.K.S. GLORY.
1541/ Took course for SASEBO, JAPAN in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN.
2010/ H.M.S. COCKADE joined screen.
2100/ The Commanding Officer H.M.S. GLORY, assumed CTE 95.11.

A total of 32 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this day. The weather was generally good.

VFM-212 Aircraft accomplished the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDANANCE EXPENDED</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 1000#/ G.P. bombs</td>
<td>12 Cap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td>18 TarCap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Navalm bombs</td>
<td>2 Air Spot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,5000 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 February  H.M.S. COCKADE detached to proceed independently to Kure, Japan.

1336/ Rendezvoused with U.S.S. CHARA (KA-58) for test of Alderman-Rig for replenishment at sea.

1833/ Moored to buoy #18 Sasebo, Japan.

8 February  Underway for Kobe, Japan in company with H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN in accordance with ComServRon Three dispatch 071169Z of February 1952.

1112/ Chopped to CTF 95 from CTG 95.1.

1125/ Completed launching all remaining VFM-212 aircraft for fly-away to ITAMI Air Force Base, Japan.

1130/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASKAN was detached to return to Sasebo.

1206/ Conducted AA gunnery firing drill (towed sleeve) in area Fox.

9 February  Moored starboard side to, pier 4, Kobe, Japan for transfer of aviation spare parts, material, and turn over notes and information to U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), who was relieving the U.S.S. BAO-UNG STRAIT in TG 95.1.

1750/ All remaining personnel of VFM-212 were disembarked to proceed to ITAMI Air Force Base, Japan.

11 February Transfer of material and information to U.S.S. BAIROKO completed this day.
12 February Underway for YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.

13 February Chopped to ComNavFe for Operational Control.

14 February Underway for Pearl Harbor, T.H. in accordance with ComNavFe 110708Z of February 1952.


1. The MK 77 Mod 0 Fire Bomb is still considered to be unsatisfactory due to time consumed in assembly, and the tendency of the tie-rod threads to strip, both during assembly, and after assembled, and when hung on the aircraft. Several leaked as a result of the forces exerted on them by the catapult launch, and some separated completely. This was especially true during low wind condition launches.

2. Hung rockets on returning aircraft continued, but the percentage involved was less than on the previous operation. A very effective rocket catcher (described as the "Fredericks Barrier" in Commander Task Element 95,111's Action Report serial 005 dtd 5 February 1952 by CO, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT) is in use by this vessel, but it is still felt that the best solution to this problem would be the installation of a device for jettisoning rockets from aircraft when firing fails to release them.

3. The ASW allowance of MK 24 mines that is required to be carried at all times consumes valuable storage space that could otherwise be used to store armament more in line with the primary mission of close air support or interdiction.

4. Ammunition expenditures.

   a. During the operating periods covered by this report the following ordnance was expended:

   1. 7 January through 24 January 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By VMF-212 Aircraft</th>
<th>By USS BADOENG STRAIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63 1,000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>1,680 Rounds of 40MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,509 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>394 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 6.5&quot; ATAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239,700 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. 25 January through 31 January 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By VMF-212 Aircraft</th>
<th>By USS BADOENG STRAIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>1,742 Rounds 40 MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 500# G.P. bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,173 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113,500 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
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</table>

3. 1 February through 8 February 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By VMF-212 Aircraft</th>
<th>By USS BADOENG STRAIT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 1000# G.P. bombs</td>
<td>3,170 Rounds 40 MM</td>
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<td>36 500# G.P. bombs</td>
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<tr>
<td>338 3.5&quot; Rockets</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>212 5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Napalm bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,600 Rounds .50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part IV Summary of Own and Enemy Battle Damage.

1. Own Battle damage.
   a. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.
   b. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 3480.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.

2. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.
   a. The ships of this task element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as a member of this task element during the period covered by this report.
   b. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 3480.3 revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in keeping with the high standards of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is considered worthy of special mention that during the subject operations, VMF-212 completed their 20,000th barrier-free carrier landing.
2. Casualties.

a. On 13 January 1952, Captain Charles Clinton SCHWARTZ 021191/7302/0110, USMC was forced to bail out over water after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. Captain SCHWARTZ was picked up by helicopter and taken to the U.S.S. ROCHESTER (C.-124) where at 1315 he was pronounced dead of drowning and internal injuries.

b. On 26 January 1952, Captain John D. NADELHOFER, 037971/7302 USMC, was forced to bail out over the friendly island of Kirin-Do after his aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. Captain NADELHOFER's aircraft was trailing smoke and was at an altitude of 2000 feet when he abandoned it. His parachute was not seen to open by his wingman. The aircraft crashed on the island and Captain NADELHOFER was observed by his wingman to be lying 100 yards from it. The SAR helicopter arrived within 15 minutes of the bail out, and the crew reported that Captain NADELHOFER was dead when they arrived. It is believed that the pilot hit the horizontal stabilizer of his aircraft during the bail out attempt and was either killed or rendered unconscious at that time. Captain NADELHOFER's remains were wrapped in his parachute and buried on Kirin-Do Island.

Part VI Comments and Recommendations

1. The comments and recommendations submitted as part six of Commander Task Element 95.11's Action Report for the period 17 December 1951 through 6 January 1952 apply also to the operating periods covered by this report.

2. A break down of the carriers air search radar, when all the other ships operating with her are allied destroyers, would seriously effect the defensive capabilities of the force, since the destroyers radar are in many ways inadequate. This is particularly true for the Common Wealth destroyers.

   Recommendation: That care be exercised to insure that screening vessels are assigned that have capable airsearch radar installed.

3. The failure of the high voltage generator for the TCZ transmitter caused serious difficulties.

   Recommendation: That the spares allowance for radio transmitter be reviewed.

4. The A.B. Dick mimeograph machine is a very important piece of equipment. It was new when this vessel left the United States in September 1951. Due to it's high usage however, numerous small easily replaced parts have worn out.

   Recommendation: That spare parts for the mimeograph machine be authorized and carried in stock by vessels having such machines on board. The parts can easily be installed by ship board personnel.
5. Visual signals with Allied Ships in the screen was impossible at night thereby causing delay and possible error by the necessity of sending coded radio signals.

Recommendation: The Allied ships operating with U.S. ships be supplied with "NANGI" gear in order to minimize the delay in sending night messages.

6. Small arms ground fire resulted in the ditching of two aircraft and the necessity of the pilots to bail-out. Both pilots were killed as a result of their bail-out.

Recommendation: That additional emphasis be placed on bail-out procedures, prior to deployment of a squadron, and the survival techniques for the area of employment be stressed.

7. In communications there were two ever present problems (1) A tendency by all commands to over classify traffic and (2) the use of too high precedence attached to traffic. The combination of the two tended to bog down traffic and place an excessive burden on the communication personnel.

Recommendation: That judicious screening of all traffic for over classification be instituted. The promulgation of the recent directive whereby encrypted traffic, under some conditions, may be referred to without classifying a reply will undoubtedly help alleviate this situation. There should be a concerted effort by every one concerned to lower the precedence assigned to traffic. The efforts of one unit to lower the precedence attached to his traffic would not help the overall situation.

8. The Section Baker Allowance for spare parts as modified by increased quantities of reported high usage items was in itself adequate for support of maintenance and repairs. However, there were too many critical items which, if it had not been for Carrier-on-Board delivery of overdue shipments, could have seriously reduced the availability of aircraft. Even so, one 40G for seven (7) days and another for three (3) days were caused by delay in receipt of original outfitting quantities. One was due to a port wing assembly that was 42 days overdue on delivery. The other was due to magneto 37 days overdue. The fact that many critical items of spare parts, when requisitioned from the U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8), had to be passed to as many as three (3) supply activities in GONUS before available stocks of them could be obtained caused an increase in communications traffic that was unacceptable as a combat condition.

Recommendation: Accordingly, it is recommended that increased levels of high usage items, especially surfaces, magneto, generators, and instruments, be maintained by aviation supply activities supporting the forward areas. Further, it is recommended that the Carrier-on-Board delivery system be adopted as a permanent facility in aviation supply support, augmented by a vigorous follow-through on delivery overland to the point from which deliveries leave.

9. Finally it is felt that no action report would be complete, especially when it involves Allied units, unless some mention were made of the benefits, lessons learned, difficulties, if any, derived from operating with Allied units.
a. It is interesting to note that the Allied units operating with this unit were woefully lacking in a good gun laying fire control system for shore bombardment attested to by the air spotters and subsequent questioning.

b. The non use of white phosphorus shells by shore bombardment ships to mark the initial fall of shot. This was confirmed by questioning.

c. On the positive side of the ledger it was heartening to see and experience the progress which has been made in the almost universal knowledge and adoption of joint maneuvering, screening, communication and replenishment, evolutions by all units.

Copyr. (ADVANCE)

GNO
COM MAR CORPS
CICLORPACFLT
COMNAVFE
COM7thFLT
CTF-95
CG-95.1
COMAIRPAC
COMCARDIV 17
CGAIRPAC
CGFMFPAC
CG1stMAW
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
CG MAG-12
CG VMF-212

AUTHENTICATED

G. R. PALUS
CGR, USN

-16-
U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Ammo.</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>380 gals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CCAST RECCO</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Note 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>1100</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAF</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Note 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Note 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1415</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
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<td>TARCAF</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1530</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-12</td>
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<td>TARCAF</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1530</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-13</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RIVER RECCO</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Note 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
1. All A/C full load .50 Cal.
2. Maintain 2 A/C on Condition 11 after each launch from one-half hour before sunrise until sunset.
3. 500# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR
4. 1000# 4/5 delay, 8-HVAR
5. 2 A/C – 500# GP/DC, 8-WP
   2 A/C – NAPALM, 8-WP
6. 2 A/C – 500# GP/DC, 8-HVAR
   2 A/C – NAPALM, 8-HVAR

Approved: G. R. PALUS
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

Submitted: A. S. IRISH
LCda, USN
Air Oper. Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)
AT 271735I AND 271800I A SINGLE AIRCRAFT B-29 TYPE MADE TWO APPROACHES OVER THIS FORCE IN POSIT LAT 37-32N LONG 124-18E X NEGATIVE MK THREE IPF X UNABLE TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS X ALTITUDE ABOUT 2500 FT X SIGHTED VISUALLY FROM THE SHIP THROUGH BREAKS IN OVERCAST AND HAZE X DISAPPEARED OFF RADAR SCOPE TO THE NORTHWEST X UNABLE TO ESTABLISH IDENTIFCATION THROUGH KNOWN AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS IN AREA NOR AFTER INQUIRY THROUGH JOC OF FLEET SORDON MOVEMENTS.
FROM:  Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
To:    Chief of Naval Operations
Via:   (1) Commander Task Group 76.7 (Commander Carrier Division SEVENTEEN)
       (2) Commander Task Force 76 (Commander Amphibious Group THREE)
       (3) Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force 7 (Commander SEVENTH Fleet)
       (4) Commander Naval Forces Far East
       (5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj:  Action Report for 9 October through 16 October 1952; submission of

Ref:   (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
       (b) OPNAV INST 3460.4
       (c) CINC PACFLT INST 3480.1
       (d) CTF 90 and CTF 76 Op Plan No. 101A-52
       (e) CTG 70.3 Op Plan No. 22-52
       (f) CTG 76.7 and CTF 76.53 Op Plan No. 21-52

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) the
   action report of the BADOENG STRAIT for the period from 9 October through
   16 October 1952 is submitted herewith.

2. The report is divided into six parts, as listed below:

   Part I General Narrative - Appendix I
   Part II Chronological Order of events - Appendix II
   Part III Ammunition expenditures - Appendix III
   Part IV Summary of our and enemy battle damage - Appendix IV
   Part V Personnel performance and casualties - Appendix V
   Part VI Comments and recommendations - Appendix VI

H. L. Ray
H. L. Ray
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U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118) (1)
U.S.S. POINT CROZ (CVE-119) (1)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer
GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 9 October 1952 through 16 October 1952, the U.S.S. 
Badoeng Strait under command of Captain H. L. Ray, 62691/1310, USN, and 
with VS-931, Commander P. V. K. Kennedy, 084261/1310, USN, Commanding, embarked; 
operated as a part of Savann Fleet and Task Force 76 and successively 
under the operational control of Commander Task Group 70.3, Commander Task 
Group 76.7 and Commander Task Element 76.53. Commander Carrier Division 17 
embarked in the U.S.S. Badoeng Strait was the immediate operational commander 
in each instance.

2. The mission of the Badoeng Strait during this period was:

   (1) To conduct ASW flight operations in support of Commander Task Group 
       76.7, Commander Task Element 76.53, and Commander Task Group 70.3.

3. The Task Element of which the Badoeng Strait was a part, reported for 
duty with CTG 76.5 at Ofunak, Japan, departing on 9 October, to area TAHIE in 
the objective area, below Gwang-ki, Korea, departing therefrom on 16 October 
1952. The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and the so called 
Volunteer Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. This Task Unit performed 
the tasks set forth in the mission. VS Squadron 931 flew 278 day and night 
hours during this time. On 16 October Task Group 76.7 was detached to 
resume its normal designation of Task Group 96.7.
OPERATION PLAN
UTG 70.3 No. 22-52

Chart and Map Reference: air Navigation Chart V30-17

Task Organization

70.3 ASW Group

(a) 70.30 Carrier Element

BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) CAPT H.L. Ray (1362) 1 CVE
VS-931

Plane Guard(s) as assigned

(b) 70.31 Screen and Destroyer Element

Destroyers as assigned

(c) 70.3.1 Surface Attack Unit One

Destroyers as assigned

(d) 70.3.2 Surface Attack Unit Two

Destroyers as assigned

JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE 7
COMMANDER Task Group 70.3
ASW GROUP and
COMCARRDIV-17
U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT, Flagship

Yokosuak, Japan
1 October 1952

ADAM C.E. EKSTROM (212)
OPERATION PLAN
CTG 76.7/CTE 76.53 No. 21-52

chart and map references: (Refer to ComPhibForFE OpPlan No. 101A-52)

Task Organization

76.7 ASW Group
76.53 ASW Element

(a) 76.7.1/76.53.1 Surface Attack Unit One
    Destroyers as assigned

(b) 76.7.2/76.53.2 Surface Attack Unit Two
    Destroyers as assigned

(c) 76.7.3/76.53.3 Carrier Unit
    BAODING STRAIT (CVE-116) Capt H.L. Ray (1362) 1 CVE
    VS-931 Cdr F.V. Kennery (5420) 18AF
    Plane Guard(s) as assigned.

(d) 76.7.4/76.53.4 Screen and Destroyer Unit
    Destroyers as assigned
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

9 October 1952

082130Z Arrived OTARU, Hokkaido with CTG 96.7 and VS-931 embarked.

090430Z Underway from OTARU, Hokkaido with CTE 76.53 and VS-931 embarked.

090550Z Launched 2 ASW teams for ASP using search plan 1 1A5E for Anti-Submarine coverage during sortie of CTF 76.5.

090750Z Recalled all aircraft and cancelled further air operations due to weather.

10 October 1952

091800Z CTG 76.5 reported pinacle (Enemy radar at bearing 300°).

091915Z Launched One (1) team for ASP.

092010Z Aircraft investigating 3 AAMT reports bearings indicated "A" (232°), "B" (210°), and "C" (307°). Aircraft encountered heavy rain while investigating pinacle "A". The BADOENG STRAIT and the HARS Y L. HUBBARD attempted to coordinate by triangulation on these pinacles but the base line between the ships was too short to give a reasonably good position of the source of AAMT.

092020Z The HARS Y L. HUBBARD reported pinacle "C" as AAMT 8800/200/1/unknown/300°T. Evaluated as possible enemy submarine.

092023Z Pinacle "C" faded.

092025Z Pinacles "A" and "B" faded.

092100Z 5 Kneehigh (BADOENG STRAIT aircraft call) reported APS -20 radar out of commission. 5 Kneehigh was recalled. 4 Kneehigh was ordered to search, under positive control, ahead of the Task Group.

092140Z The FLANK KNOX in station 5 reported sonar contact 235°/8000 yards. The HOLLISTER assisting. The Task Group made an emergency turn 20° right.

092148Z Sonar contact evaluated as school of fish by the HOLLISTER. The FLANK KNOX concurred.

092251Z 4 Kneehigh returned from search and landed.

100134Z CTG 70.5 reported AAMT 8565/700/1/unknown. This was evaluated as HN-34 fire control radar or possible SS radar.
1002582 Launched one team for ASP.

1004072 BADOING STRAIT exercised at General Quarters for abandon ship drill.

1005582 Launched search team for ASP.

1006012 Recovered search team launched at 1002582.

1010452 Recovered search team launched at 1005582.

11 October 1952

1018372 ASP cancelled due to weather.

1023402 The HARRY E. HUBBARD reported AENT 4350/410/2/unknown/unknown. No evaluation could be made.

1100002 Launched one search team for ASP Plan 3L.

1101202 7 and 8 Kneehigh reported a disappearing radar contact. 8 Kneehigh (attack aircraft) was unable to drop sonobuoys due sonobuoy dispenser failure. 22 Kneehigh was launched to replace 8 Kneehigh. 8 Kneehigh was directed to conduct visual search ahead of the screen.

1102562 Launched 3 and 4 Kneehigh for ASP.

1103122 Contact reported by 7 and 8 Kneehigh evaluated as non-submarine.

1103432 Recovered 7, 8, and 22 Kneehigh.

1104002 The BADOING STRAIT exercised at General Quarters for "A" bomb defense.

1106062 Recovered 3 and 14 Kneehigh.

1107002 Launched two teams - 9 and 10 Kneehigh first team and 4 and 15 second team for ASP search plan 4L.

1107102 9 Kneehigh reported his APS-20 Radar out of commission. 5 Kneehigh was launched as replacement.

1109332 The HARRY E. HUBBARD reported AENT 2:40/700/2/10/165°.

1110532 4, 5, 10, and 15 Kneehigh recovered.

12 October 1952

1118002 Launched 9, 14, 7, and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.
12 October 1952 (Continued)

111855Z BALOONG STRAIT obtained MT 116/60/5/3/unknown.

111907Z Task Group 76.5 dissolved. Task Group 76.7 was formed under command of Commander Carrier Division 17, with BALOONG STRAIT, VO-951 embarked, and the DDs UHLAAR, KIDD, WEDDERBURN, and HOPPER.

111930Z General Quarters - set Condition ONE.

112100Z Launched 5 and 10 Kneehigh and 3 and 4 Kneehigh for ASP.

112145Z 9, 14, 7, and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

112340Z 3 and 4 Kneehigh reported disappearing radar contact 6 miles East of UHLAAR. Sonobuoys were dropped with no results.

120000Z Launched 2, 19, 7, and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

120100Z 5, 10, 3, and 4 Kneehigh recovered.

120256Z Launched 12, 15, 10, and 17 Kneehigh for ASP.

120313Z Launched 5 Kneehigh to replace 17 Kneehigh whose radar was reported out of commission.

120411Z CTF 77 reported 20 enemy aircraft over YOONAN.

120411Z CTF 77 reported enemy aircraft headed Northwest.

120700Z 12, 15, 10, 5, and 17 Kneehigh recovered.

120830Z Launched 7 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

121112Z 7 and 22 Kneehigh recovered.

13 October 1952

121800Z Launched 7 and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.

122031Z Dawn alert - set Condition ONE.

122049Z BALOONG STRAIT obtained MT 8710/800 to 900/1 to 3/4.

122052Z Launched 4 and 11 Kneehigh for ASP.

122127Z 7 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

122215Z Fueled WEDDERBURN (DD-684).

122320Z Fueled UHLAAR (DD-867).

APPENDIX II-3
13 October 1952 (Continued)

130000Z Launched 5 and 14 Kneehigh for ASP. 5 Kneehigh reported APS-20 radar out of commission. 7 Kneehigh launched as replacement for 5.

130035Z 4, 5, and 11 Kneehigh recovered.

130040Z Fueled KILD (DD-661).

130150Z Fueled NOPHELL (DD861).

130206Z 7 Kneehigh reported disappearing radar contact bearing 115/18 miles dropped investigating sonobuoy. Later evaluated as school of porpoises seen in the area.

130310Z Launched 17 and 20 Kneehigh for ASP. 17 Kneehigh could not retract landing gear so 19 Kneehigh was launched as replacement.

130337Z 14 Kneehigh had barrier crash necessitating engine and propeller change.

130400Z 8, 10, 17, 5 Kneehigh recovered.

130400Z BADOENG STRAIT obtained KENT 8795/1575/.25/unknown/unknown.

130415Z BADOENG STRAIT obtained KENT 885/1785/.25/2/unknown.

130407Z Both 19 and 20 Kneehigh IFF inoperative. They were then assigned to search south of the force, under positive control.

140455Z Launched 6 and 9 Kneehigh to replace 19 and 20 Kneehigh on ASP in vicinity of contact area.

130620Z Task Group 76.7 dissolved and Task Element 76.53 reactivated with same forces under command of Commander Carrier Division 17.

130620Z 17 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

130756Z Launched 10 and 19 Kneehigh for ASP.

130836Z 6 and 9 Kneehigh recovered.

131026Z Joined Task Group 76.5.

131110Z 10 and 19 Kneehigh recovered.

131455Z HARRY E. HUBBARD (DD-768) reported KENT 1450/50/15/5.

APPENDIX II-4
14 October 1952

131805Z Launched 2 and 9 Kneehigh for ASP.

131947Z UHANN (DD-687) reported sonar contact, doubtful submarine 130°/2175 yards.

131953Z Task Group made emergency turn to starboard.

132014Z UHANN evaluated contact as school of fish.

132035Z ONANILLA (PF) in the slow tractor group reported sonar contact, evaluated as submarine, North of ULUNG-D0. ROGERS assisting. 2 and 9 Kneehigh vectored to investigate.

132100Z Launched 8 and 17 Kneehigh for ASP.

132123Z 8 and 17 Kneehigh relieved 2 and 9 over contact area.

132135Z 8 Kneehigh dropped 2 sonobuys then dispenser jammed, 17 Kneehigh reported his APS-20 radar inoperative.

132140Z 2 and 9 Kneehigh recovered.

132205Z Launched 12 and 19 Kneehigh to replace 8 and 7 Kneehigh. After several attempts at working the dispenser 8 Kneehigh finally succeeded in laying a complete pattern. Cavitations were heard but were evaluated as caused by adjacent ships. The contact was evaluated as school of fish.

132255Z 12 and 19 Kneehigh directed to search in close proximity of Task Group.

140003Z Launched 11 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

140050Z 8, 12, 17, and 19 Kneehigh recovered.

140150Z General Quarters. Unidentified aircraft in the area.

140207Z Aircraft identified as friendly. Secured from General Quarters.

140300Z Launched 5 and 20 Kneehigh for ASP.

140630Z Launched 9 and 22 Kneehigh for ASP.

140704Z 5 and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

141018Z 22 Kneehigh recovered.

141018Z 9 Kneehigh crashed over port side after failing to engage an arresting wire. HOLLISTER and STABLE assisting in search for crew members.

APPENDIX II-5
14 October 1952 (Continued)

141042Z  Crew of 9 Kneehigh composed of 4 men, recovered by HOLLISTER small boat and returned to BAYOCEM STRAIT. Crewmen received only minor injuries. 9 Kneehigh sank.

15 October 1952

141900Z  CT76.53 chopper to C3A1P-7 to become CTG 70.3 with BAYOCEM STRAIT VS-931, WILLYAUS, UH-50A, HOPKILL, KIDD, FRANK KNOX, and HOLLISTER.

142030Z  General Quarters, dawn alert.

142100Z  Weather unsatisfactory for flying. Air Operations held in abeyance on one half hours notice.

150220Z  "H" Hour set as 151400ITM by CTG 76.5.

150245Z  Launched 4, 17, 5, 8, 2, and 11 Kneehigh for AS6. IFF inoperative on 4 and 17 Kneehigh.

150315Z  Launched 1 and 10 Kneehigh to replace 4 and 17.

150332Z  4 and 17 Kneehigh recovered.

150335Z  1 and 10 Kneehigh IFF inoperative directed to search in vicinity of own carrier under positive control.

150400Z  Fueled HOPKILL (DD-861)

150420Z  5 and 8 Kneehigh reported disappearing contact 220°/60. Sonobuoy pattern laid and machinery noises received. Contact designated as WAKASABA.

150425Z  LOS ANGELES and CHAFF reported to be close to contact area, possible source of machinery noises.

150455Z  Fueled WATANABE (DD-684)

150516Z  TE 70.31, SNJ-1 composed of HOLLISTER and FRANK KNOX departed screen for contact area. HOLLISTER in command.

150528Z  8 Kneehigh reported sonobuoy pattern lost due to high seas.

150540Z  Fueled KIDD (DD-661).

150545Z  8 Kneehigh laid new sonobuoy pattern. Still receiving machinery noises, but no movement of target.

150623Z  Launched 3, 20, 12, 7, 14, 19 Kneehigh for AS6. 55 knots of wind across the deck. Flew aircraft off with full load, did not use catapult.

APPENDIX II-6
15 October 1952 (Continued)

150657Z 1, 8, 10, and 5 Kneehigh recovered.

150720Z 2, 5, and 11 Kneehigh recovered. All aircraft recalled because of high winds and heavy seas.

150850Z 3, 7, 12, 14, 19, and 20 Kneehigh recovered.

151040Z CTG 70.3 chopped to TF 76 to become CTG 76.7 to provide ASP for TG 76.4 on movement to P'OHANG-DONG.

151100Z Contact Cold. Shm-1 composed of FRANK KNOX and HOLLISTER chopped to CTE 76.4.

16 October 1952

152000Z Launched 5 and 12 Kneehigh for ASP.

152330Z Launched 4 and 11 Kneehigh for ASP.

160000Z 5 and 12 Kneehigh recovered.

160020Z Fueled Unkown (DD-867).

160125Z Fueled HOLLISTER (DD-788).

160225Z Fueled STABLE (DD-444).

160337Z 4 and 11 Kneehigh recovered.

160400Z Fueled OZBOWN (DD-846).

160700Z Fueled FRANK KNOX (DLR-742).

160755Z Operations having been terminated for this group CTG 76.7 chopped to COMNAVFE to resume its normal designation of CTG 96.7.
No ammunition was expended during the period of this operation.
SUMMARY OF OUR AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

The BADGER STR. IT did not engage the enemy. No battle damage resulted. No ammunition was expended in battle.
There were no casualties. The performance of personnel was deemed to be satisfactory in all respects under the conditions that existed. The effectiveness in full combat of the ship's batteries and repair parties with fractional complements and frequent personnel changes remains to be seen.
1. **Naval Operations**

   a. Surface

      (1) **Tactics**

      The formation was protected by a bent line screen. Formations 92K, 92V, and 92Z were prescribed for TF 76.5. In 92R (the formation normally used) this ship was assigned AAKSR 42 as its station. The BOA of the group was 15 knots, thus leaving a 4 knot speed differential for the carrier to take position for the conduct of flight operations and return to station. This necessitated the carrier having to leave station approximately one hour early under wind conditions that usually existed to position itself for flight operations by method AAKSR. It would be preferable for conducting air operations to leave one station in each quadrant on the outer circle unassigned, giving the carriers the option of selecting a station which would facilitate operations.

      **Recommendations:**

      When formation 92R is used or a similar formation is prescribed, assign one station in each quadrant on the outer circle, for occupancy at its option, depending upon existing wind.

   b. Air

      (1) **Day - Night**

      It is believed that this is the first time a CV5 has attempted to operate with a full VS complement of 18 AF-2 Type aircraft under war time conditions. When eighteen (18) aircraft are carried, eight (8) can be carried on the hangar deck and still allow sufficient space for the helicopter and the turnapooll. Ten (10) aircraft can be operated and handled on the flight deck. Nine (9) aircraft were spotted forward of the barriers, thus permitting recovery of the tenth aircraft. Under adverse deck conditions, or during night recovery operations, a longer landing interval for the last few aircraft was necessary in the interest of safety. Spotting operations in the very close quarters forward of the barriers was necessarily slow. Furthermore, this longer interval between aircraft enables plane crews and spotting personnel to clear the area forward of the barriers prior to the next aircraft's recovery, a most important measure of safety.

   c. **All Weather**

      On October 14th and 15th a low pressure wave formed with surprising rapidity in the objective area. The attendant high winds caused
a choppy sea which soon developed heavy grounds swells. It was necessary to cancel flight operations because a severely pitching deck increased the possibility of a landing aircraft damaging the tightly spotted aircraft forward. A further consideration was the possibility of serious damage to the Mark IV arresting gear due to the weight of the AF aircraft.

D. Anti-Submarine

(1) Surface

Standard bent line screens were ordered employed. No unusual anti-submarine tactics were used.

(2) Aircraft

The tactics used by aircraft were in accord with published doctrine. The armament carried was one (1) MK-24 mine, two (2) MK-94 depth charges and four (4) 3.25" rockets. This combination of armament would permit the attack plane to press a Class "A" attack anywhere within the area to be covered, the MK-24 mine to be used only when well clear of friendly forces.

Recommendations:

None.

(3) Air/Surface

At 150420Z one team reported a disappearing radar contact. A standard five (5) buoy pattern was laid and machinery noises were heard and reported. The contact was 60 miles from the Task Group. A Search and Attack Unit consisting of the HULLISTER and FRANK KNOX was dispatched to the Datum. High seas prevented the SaU from steaming at full speed, therefore, the time late was excessive. By this time the pilot had used all his smoke lights in trying to keep his pattern marked. He could only maintain his position in the general area by radar plotting from known positions on the beach. The SaU arrived in the area, however, and commenced a spiral search plan. At 151100Z the contact was reported as still cold. The SaU was ordered to abandon the search.

Recommendations:

(a) Advanced training should be provided to develop the ability by airborne radar operators to interpret targets through heavy sea returns.

(b) A long burning smoke light of at least two hours should be developed.
In early July of this year it was decided to install the MK-10 IF on this vessel, then scheduled to sail on 19 July. A hurried installation of UPX-1 equipment was made by the Naval Station, San Diego. This equipment was installed for use with the 5K radar. This installation is unsatisfactory in that it is non-directional and the reliable range is limited to about 20 miles. One test with aircraft was made prior to departure west coast. There was no opportunity to use this equipment until the period of this operation. The indication on the scope is a complete circle that coincides with the target being interrogated. This indication is satisfactory only when two targets do not appear simultaneously at the same range, and there are relatively few targets on the scope.

Recommendation:

The complete SPS-6 and UPX-1 equipment should be installed at the earliest opportunity.

ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

During previous Hunter/Killer operations an experimental installation of AN/ARQ-9 equipment was made to determine the extent of improvement of this equipment over the standard shipboard ECM equipment of limited frequency range. A motor generator from the AN/ARN-7 was used to obtain the necessary 115V AC 400 cycle power for the equipment. A motor generator from the AN/ARN-1 was used for the 28V DC supply. The AN/ARP-9 was installed in the ship's ECM Room, and connected so that it could be supplemented by the AN-J pulse analyzer, ANP Panoramic adapter, and the ANQ direction finder for further evaluation of contacts. The DTM antenna was used with the TN-128 and TN-129 tuning heads. Excellent bearings were obtained on the primary target in passive ECM exercises on a submarine 5V radar out to 30 miles without having to worry about harmonics. On higher frequencies, such as the SS radar uses, a standard "Y" (AN-S-45 ANPR) antenna was used. This was necessary since the sensitivity of the DTM antenna at these frequencies was so high that the ECM scope was completely saturated, and no bearings could be obtained. The ANP and ANQ were used to further evaluate targets. The ANJ was used successfully in determining pulse width. The ANP was used to determine the repetition frequency without much success. The best repetition rates were obtained by the operator using earphones. The ship evaluates the installation as highly successful, the most important feature being that of the frequency range of the ANPR-9. The installation was transferred on 16 October to the U.S.S. SICILY.

Recommendations

The ANPR-9 equipment should be made available for installation on an interim basis, as described above, until permanent equipment is procured for shipboard use.
a. Bureau of Aeronautics

(1) Catapults and Arresting Gear

The H-4C catapult was used almost exclusively due part of the time to low wind conditions and part of the time to the unavailability of the H-2 mod 1 catapult. The AF aircraft spotted fairly easy, considering its size and weight. It is essential, however, that a tail wheel steering bar be used to expedite lining the tail wheel fore and aft along the catapult tail wheel guide. Low wind conditions reduced the usefulness of the H-2 mod 1 catapult. The average launching pressure used was 2850 psi. This exerted high shock loads on the reeling and sheave system. Consequently, in addition to routine checks, careful inspection during non-operating periods was required to insure proper operation of the bearings and spacers for the high speed towing sheaves.

The MK-4 arresting gear with the MK-4 CPW and the Fisher limited lift valve operated normally throughout the period, with only one difficulty being encountered. Although wind over the deck was often as low as 13 knots, the mean was about 24 knots, there was little difficulty in arresting the AF in favorable seas. Aircraft were scheduled for three hour flights and were loaded, during daylight hours with one (1) MK-24 mine, two (2) MK-54 Depth Charges, four (4) 3.25" rockets and a full load of fuel. Occasionally, due to adjustments of the flight schedule it was necessary to recover the AF2S in a slightly overloaded condition. When this became necessary the average overload was 200 lbs. No difficulty was encountered, however, in arresting the aircraft in this condition and no ill effects were noted in the arresting gear. Three instances occurred wherein aircraft pulled out close to the maximum available purchase cable. These times occurred during low wind conditions with the flight deck steady. The average runout experienced was approximately 117 feet.

H-2 HOD-1 Catapult

A malfunction occurred when the 30-inch speed sheave on the piston end froze. Disassembly and inspection of the sheave and bearings revealed that the roller bearings had broken down, possibly due to high shock loads, resulting in excess friction and binding of bearing surfaces. Temporary repairs were made by the ship's force, and the catapult returned to an emergency standby status. Inspection of the 30-inch speed sheave on the crosshead revealed that it was also beginning to break down. While operating with AF's most launchings were made at pressures near 2900 psi. This caused unusually high shock loads to be exerted on the sheaves. All sheaves were receiving ample lubrication.
From:  Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOEG STRAIT (CVL-116) and Commander
Task Element 95.11
To:  Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SHWORTHY Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj:  Action Report 29 October 1952 through 12 November 1952; submission of

Ref:  (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
      (b) OPLAN INST 3480.4
      (c) CINCPOACFLT INST 3480.1A
      (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrd 2-52

Encl:  (1) Sample Air Schedule 95.11
      (2) Aircraft usage and availability; chart of 95.11

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), the action report
   of Task Element 95.11 for the period 29 October 1952 through 12 November
   1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOEG STRAIT,
   was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 30 October until 2100 on 10
   November of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:
   PART I  General Narrative
   PART II Chronological Order of Events
   PART III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment,
            including ammunition expenditure,
   PART IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   PART V Personnel performance and casualties
   PART VI Special comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by
   referring to VMA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for November 1952.

   **PART I**

   **General Narrative**

   (1) During the period 29 October 1952 through 12 November 1952, the U.S.S.
       BADOEG STRAIT, under the command of Captain H.L. May, 62691/1310, USN,
       with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312, Lieutenant Colonel R.B. Cameron,
       07207/7302, USA, Commanding Officer, embarked, operated as a unit of the
       U.S. ewORTHY Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of
       Commander Task Group 95.11.
(2) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT assumed command of Task Element 95.11 at 2100, 30 October 1952 upon arrival in the operating area and was relieved upon departing at 2100, 10 November 1952 by Commanding Officer, H.M.S. GLORY. During the period of this report Task Element 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and from three to four destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to two or three ships nightly to provide one vessel for close inshore patrol under the direction of Commander Task Element 95.12.

(3) The mission of Task Element 95.11 was to conduct air operations essential to the maintenance of the blockade of the West Coast of Korea. The Task Element was assigned certain tasks which are briefed in order of priority as follows:

(a) To provide by day a 2 aircraft TACAN over TU 95.12.1 in the ChOSO-KORE area to strike active enemy artillery, protect against enemy piston-driven aircraft, to patrol the local coastal area, and provide air spot.
(b) To provide air spot for other units of TE 95.12.
(c) To provide combat air patrol for TE 95.11.
(d) To provide air strikes requested by TE 95.15, guerilla organizations and JOC, Korea.
(e) To provide armed reconnaissance of the coast line from the Han river to HANCHON.
(f) To provide armed reconnaissance, strikes and interdiction throughout the assigned southwestern Korean land area.
(g) Provide close air support.
(h) Provide convoy cover on request.

(4) The enemy forces were the North Korean People's Army and the so-called "Volunteer" Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea. No enemy naval forces were encountered by this vessel. Enemy small craft operating in the rivers and estuaries together with numerous enemy installations ashore were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Task Element.

(5) The BADOENG STRAIT with VMA-312 embarked and H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) in company departed Sasebo, Japan on 29 October 1952 for the Yellow Sea in compliance with CTF 95.1 dispatch 271355Z October 1952. Gunnery exercises were conducted enroute in area G2/52.

(6) Night VMA-312 aircraft which had been placed ashore for use in Field Carrier Landing Practice by newly arrived pilots landed aboard the ship from K-6 on 30 October 1952. A total of 53 carrier qualification landings were made throughout the day to qualify 6 pilots and to requalify 5 pilots who had had no recent carrier experience.

(7) Combat air operations commenced at 06301 on 31 October 1952 and dusk operations continued throughout the patrol. Five deck load launches were made daily at 1 3/4 hour intervals, since this method was considered best suited to fulfill tasks assigned. Each launch comprised approximately 50 percent of available aircraft. First priority was given to maintaining the TACAN over TU 95.12.1. Availability permitted increasing the number
of aircraft from two to four. This increase was considered highly desirable since, when targets were not available over the Task Unit, as was frequently the case, the TARCAP was given permission to absent itself temporarily to strike in other areas when lucrative targets existed. Thus the TARCAP was always briefed regarding alternate targets and often made strikes on inland areas. It was sometimes diverted northward to make the armed reconnaissance of coastal waters to NadChon under cover of Air Force F-86 sweeps. Second priority was given to providing a two plane CAP for TE 95.11 after which the remaining aircraft were assigned various missions such as armed reconnaissance strikes, interdiction, and support of TE 95.15 and guerrilla organization. No special requests for air spot and convoy escort were received. Aircraft available during this patrol would not permit offering aircraft to JOC, Korea for close air support missions. In fact, during the period 3 through 7 November, flyable aircraft decreased to such an extent that the CAP was reduced to a 2 plane dawn and dusk CAP in order to maintain the 4 plane TARCAP together with adequate reconnaissance of coastal areas and estuaries.

8) The Task Element operated continuously for 11 days in the Yellow Sea area. Combat flight operations were conducted on all 11 days. Weather conditions were generally good and limited flight operations to a slight degree only. During this patrol VMF-312 flew 350 sorties. A total of 736.7 combat hours were flown for an average of 66.97 hours per day and 31.81 sorties per day.

9) Upon commencing air operations on 30 October 1952, there were 23 aircraft of the 24 allowed VMF-312 aboard. A series of accidents, largely operational, reduced this with the result that the average number on board ship during the patrol was 20 of which 4 had received strike damage. An average availability of 13 aircraft was achieved only by extensive structural repairs to several damaged aircraft among the 16 which remained. The maintenance organization of the squadron functioned in an outstanding fashion under an extremely heavy work load during this patrol. Aircraft assignments, availability, and daily sorties are shown graphically in enclosure (2).

10) During this patrol ships of TE 95.11 operated in geographical area Num and Mike with Point Oboz in the vicinity of 37°30'N 126°30'E. The following listed ships were assigned to TE 95.11 for screening purposes at various times during the period.

- U.S.S. Lyman K. Swenson (DL-729)
- B.S.S. Constituto (D-71)
- M.S.S. Guadalupe (D-29)
- M.S.S. Catanova (D-57)
- U.S.S. Match (DL-699)
PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

29 October
0648I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 271559Z of October 1952, the U.S.S. BATACLAN (CV2-16), with VMA-312 and HU-1 detachment aboard, got underway from Sasebo, Japan for Korean operating areas "MAG" and "IKE," off the West Coast of Korea.

1250I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) joined as previously directed.

1315I/ Conducted 40mm AA firing at a towed sleeve.

1340I/ Completed AA firing.

30 October
0912I/ Commenced first period of carrier requalifications, recovered eight VMA-312 aircraft from K-6.

0925I/ Captain Webb C. Hall caught a late wire and engaged a barrier during landing qualification. Aircraft suffered a damaged propeller.

0947I/ Completed first period of requalifications.

1046I/ Commenced second period of requalification landings with seven aircraft airborne.

1123I/ One aircraft suffered class "B" damage as a result of a hard landing. Port wing center section buckled.

1150I/ Second Lieutenant A. D. Howard, U.S.N., suffered amputation of one finger, serious cuts in two fingers and a back injury when the plane he was flying engaged the barriers during an attempted landing and nosed over to the inverted position. Aircraft failed to catch an arresting wire and was damaged beyond repair when it engaged all four barriers. Ships bridge suffered minor damage from starboard wing of the aircraft.

1236I/ Completed second period of carrier requalifications.

1539I/ Commenced third period of requalifications with nine aircraft airborne.

1630I/ Completed third period of requalifications. A total of six pilots were qualified and five pilots were requalified with a total of fifty nine landings.

2100I/ Relieved H.M.S. OCEAN and assumed duty as CTG 95.11.

2330I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) and H.M.S. CHARTER (D-29) joined the Task Element as previously directed.
31 October
0630I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack warehouses near ULMUL. Flight damaged one warehouse and observed light AA fire during the attack.

0830I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group diverted from pre-briefed target due to weather and proceeded to cut a road bridge at KUBIGN. AA fire was observed during the attack. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a tunnel reported as housing a grenade factory. Tunnel was damaged and two aircraft suffered minor damage from enemy small arms fire.

0910I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1015I/ Two plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a radar station at ORIP'O-RI. Planes damaged a radar antenna and one building.

1028I/ Commenced recovery of 0830I launch.

1100I/ Captain Robert C. WHITBERN, USN, suffered bruised back muscles when aircraft he was flying engaged four barriers during a landing attempt. Tailwheel and tailhook assembly were sheared off of the plane when the hook engaged the arresting gear. Aircraft suffered class "B" damage in collision with the barriers.

1230I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops and buildings near BINGI. One building was destroyed with an estimated twenty troops killed and thirty wounded. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed three buildings near CHINJIN.

1248I/ Recovered 1015I launch.

1330I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack a command post on hill 291 overlooking CH'I-DO Island. All ordnance was expended with unassessable damage.

1345I/ H.M.S. GUARDIAN (D-29) detached to CTB 95.12 for WORTHINGTON patrol.

1402I/ Recovered TBm aircraft with spare parts from Itazuke, Japan.

1441I/ Recovered 1230I launch.

1550I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops near TOK-TONG. Troops were strafed with unassessable damage and two road cuts
were made at UNO-RI. STRIKE group attacked troop village of PINTANG-DONG destroying twelve buildings and damaging one.

1615/ Recovered 13301 launch.

1738/ Recovered 15501 launch.

1755/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TARGA area until noon. Low scattered clouds gradually increased to broken with a ceiling of 2000 feet by 15001. Visibility was unrestricted until 14001, then gradually reduced to six miles with haze. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots, during the period.

Mission Summary:
Twelve CAP, twenty three Targ Cap and eleven STRIKE for a total of forty six sorties.

1 November
0630/ Two planes CAP, three plane Targ Cap, and three plane STRIKE launch. CTU 95.12.1 released Targ Cap to attack a large boat which was sunk near FI-40. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near NOUNK Galaxy destroying six buildings and damaging one. Small arms fire was observed during the attack.

0658/ Launched TBM to return to Itazuke, Japan.

0845/ Two planes CAP & three plane Targ Cap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released Targ Cap to attack a road bridge near CHAERYONG-JONG-NI which was damaged by the flight. One plane suffered minor damage from 20 mm gun fire.

0919/ Recovered 06301 launch.

1115/ Two plane CAP and four plane Targ Cap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released Targ Cap for pre-briefed armed reconnaissance. Flight destroyed four buildings and damaged one near SINCHON-NR. Four buildings were destroyed with secondary explosions near IDO-NYON and three buildings destroyed at DAEBONG-NI.

1130/ H.M.S. Connaught (D-29) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol

1135/ H.M.S. Constance (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WORTHINGTON patrol.

1141/ Recovered 08451 launch.

1315/ Two plane CAP and four plane Targ Cap launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested Targ Cap to attack gun positions near CHI'MINAP0. Three gun positions were damaged and small arms fire was observed.
during the attack. Two aircraft landed at K-53, one to remove hung ordnance, before returning to the ship.

13451/ recovered 11151 launch.

15451/ Two plane GAF, four plane TARCAP and three plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troop village near CHUNGCHIN-DO. Four buildings were destroyed with secondary explosions and flight made a reconnaissance of Taedong River before returning. STRIKE group attacked a rail tunnel near CHUNGCHON. The tunnel was heavily damaged and five rail cars were. Two planes of flight diverted to K-53 to remove hung ordnance. A plane piloted by Captain Thomas D. INLAND, USMC, struck a soft spot in the runway at K-53 and nosed over to the inverted position. Pilot was uninjured but plane suffered class "B" damage.

1621/ recovered 13151 launch.

1746/ recovered 15451 launch.

1748/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TARCAP area with visibility of twelve to thirty miles during the period. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten GAF, eighteen TARCAP and six STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

2 November
06301/ Two plane GAF, three plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village near SUNWLI-DO. Four buildings were destroyed with an estimated seven troops killed and ten wounded. One plane suffered minor damage to a wing from small arms fire. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a gun position, four buildings and a small boat near PUNGSON. One aircraft landed at K-53 with an oil leak.

08301/ Two plane GAF, three plane TARCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched. One aircraft returned to the ship with a rough running engine. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troop village and bunkers near SUNWLI-DO. Seven buildings and a concrete blockhouse were destroyed with an estimated thirty-five troops killed. One plane was damaged by 20MM AA fire. Major Marshall C. GREGORY, USMC, attempted a landing at K-53 to remove hung ordnance. Aircraft struck a hole in the runway and cartwheeled resulting in strike damage.
Pilot was uninjured. STRIKE group spotted for naval gunfire and attacked troops in support of a guerrilla operation from SUNMI-DO Island. Eleven buildings were destroyed with four damaged and enemy troops were strafed.

0845I/ Recovered one aircraft from 0830I launch due to a rough running engine.

0945I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1025I/ H.M.S. CHAUNTY (D-29) rejoined from CTB 95.12 WORTHINGTON patrol.

1030I/ Detached U.S.S. LYMAN K. SMITHSON (DD-729) to CTB 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol.

1115I/ Two planes CAP and four planes T-HCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released T-HCAP to attack supplies near ULAUL. A large amount of supplies and a road bridge were destroyed.

1145I/ Recovered 0830I launch.

1245I/ Two planes CAP and four planes T-HCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released T-HCAP to attack troop village near CHANGON. Seven buildings were destroyed and one rail cut made.

1336I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1545I/ Two planes CAP and five planes T-HCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released T-HCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGON-NI. Five buildings were destroyed, four damaged and a command post damaged. A fire was observed during the attack.

1556I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1635I/ H.M.S. CHAUNTY (D-57) joined Task Element as a relief for H.M.S. CHAUNTY (D-29).

1716I/ Commenced recovery of 1545I launch.

1729I/ An aircraft moving forward out of the arresting gear collided with three parked aircraft. One aircraft suffered class "B", one class "C", and two class "D" damage.

1733I/ Completed recovery of 1545I launch.

1733I/ Completed recovery of 1545I launch.

1738I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.
Weather Summary:
Clear skies and unlimited visibility provided excellent flying conditions. Winds light and variable three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CaP, twenty TaRCaP, and five STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

3 November
0630I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions and buildings near CHAUNG-NI. Revetments and trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and eight buildings were damaged.

0820I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions near SONGHWA. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage; a road bridge was damaged, a road cut made and two ox carts destroyed.

0853I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

0945I/ U.S.S. LIEBHÜM K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WORTHINGTON patrol.

1000I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop positions near SONGHWA. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and one road bridge was damaged.

1038I/ Recovered 0820I launch.

1055I/ U.S.S. MEHSHI (DE-699) joined Task Element as previously directed.

1145I/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCaP to attack a gun position firing on a minesweeper near PIUNGHAN. Gun position was neutralized and flight spotted for naval gunfire directed at enemy troop positions. Subsequently, the following dispatch was received from CTU 95.12.1:

THE OFFENSIVE SPirit, SKILL, AND DESIRE TO HELP DISPLAYED BY TaRCaP CALLED DOWN TO ASSIST SHIPS BEING FIRED UPON THIS AFTERNOON WAS SPLENDID. WE ARE BOTH IMPRESSED AND GRATEFUL.

One road bridge was destroyed enroute to the ship.

1202I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol

1207I/ Recovered 1000I launch.
Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95,12,1 release TARCAP for reconnaissance north of CH'INNAMPO. Four buildings were destroyed with a large secondary explosion occurring. Two buildings were damaged one road and a railroad cut near CH'INNAMPO Intense AA fire was encountered during the attack.

1410I/ Recovered 1145I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and six plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95,12,1 released TARCAP to attack a command post near P'UNGSAE. Flight damaged two buildings, a rail tunnel, a command post, and destroy three ox carts with oxen. A plane flown by Captain Charles A. WILLES, USAF, was hit four times by AA fire. An emergency landing was made at K-53 and during the landing roll-out the aircraft suffered class "B" damage as a result of nosing up in soft sand. The pilot was uninjured.

1531I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1646I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1815I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operational and TARCAP area clear until noon when gradually increasing cloudiness formed a ceiling of 2500 to 4000 feet. Winds were light and variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary
Ten CAP and twenty-six TARCAP for a total of thirty-six sorties.

4 November

0630I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95,12,1 requested TARCAP to attack gun positions firing on a mine sweeper near P'UNGSAE. Gun positions located in a village were attacked with four buildings destroyed and one damaged. A road bridge, a boat and a command post were damaged. 20mm AA fire was observed in attack on gun positions.

0820I/ Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95,12,1 released TARCAP to attack troop village of CHOYANG-DONG. Three buildings and grain storage areas damaged.

0842I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

1000I/ Four plane TARCAP launched. One plane made an emergency landing at K-53 due to a gas leak. CTU 95,12,1 released remaining TARCAP to attack troop positions near CHANGYON. Trenches were attacked with unassessable damage and a building of sheet metal construction was destroyed.

1020I/ Recovered 0820I launch.
H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) rejoined from CTU 95.12 WHITEHEAD patrol.

H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troop village and positions at TACHON-NI. Ten buildings were destroyed and two gun positions damaged.

Recovered 1000I launch.

Two plane TARCAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released four plane TARCAP for reconnaissance of railroad to CHANGYON. Three buildings were destroyed and one damaged near TACHON-NI. AA fire was encountered during the attack. CTU 95.12.1 released two plane TARCAP to attack troop village near SONGHIWA. Two buildings were destroyed with one building and a fire control bunker damaged.

Recovered 1150I launch.

Two plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested flight to attack a building surrounded with gun positions near CHANGYON. One building was destroyed with unassessable damage to gun positions. AA fire was observed during the attack.

Recovered 1330I launch.

Recovered 1530I launch.

Weather Summary:
Operating and TARCAP area clear with visibility varying from ten miles to unlimited during the period. Winds were light and variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Four CAP and twenty-five TARCAP for a total of twenty-nine sorties.

5 November

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troop village and positions that had been firing on CH'0-DO Island. Ten buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. Light AA fire was encountered. Two small boats were destroyed and four damaged.

Four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village of TAH-UNG. Eight buildings were destroyed with six buildings and a small boat damaged.
0831// Recovered 0630I launch.

1000I// Four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troop village of SWN-HEPI-DONG. Twenty-five buildings were destroyed with fifteen damaged and four oxen pulling carts were destroyed.

1015I// Recovered 0615I launch.

1140I// H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) rejoined from CTU 95.12 WHITBREAD patrol.

1145I// Four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troop village of BAYN-DONG. Eight buildings were destroyed and five damaged with an estimated five troops killed, ten wounded, and nine oxen killed.

1205I// Recovered 1000I launch.

1228I// U.S.S. WARSWICH (DE-699) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1330I// Four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack a troop village near SONGOH-ON-NI. Nineteen buildings were destroyed. Light antiaircraft fire was encountered during the attack.

1348I// Recovered 1145I launch.

1520I// Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TaRCap to attack troop village and trenches near CHANGYO. Twenty-five buildings were destroyed and three gun positions damaged. Light antiaircraft fire was observed.

1536I// Recovered 1330I launch.

1605I// One BADONG STRAIT officer transferred to LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) to observe destroyer operations.

1719I// Recovered 1520I launch.

1724I// Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Ceiling was 2000 feet with low broken clouds and visibility of three to fifteen miles. Winds were variable from eight to thirty knots and heavy seas producing marginal flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Four CAP and twenty-four TaRCap for a total of twenty-eight sorties.
6 November
0900I/ One plane CaP and four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack warehouses near CH'INNAMPO. Two warehouses were damaged. Light NA fire was observed. Two aircraft, one with hun ordnance, diverted to K-6.

1010I/ Four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troop village and gun positions near CH'INNAMPO. Four buildings, two rail cars and two oxen were destroyed with one gun position damaged. A plane flown by Major Edward O. ALSIP, USMC, suffered major damage to the right wing from rocks blown into the air by a secondary explosion while attacking ox carts. Major ALSIP was escorted to K-6 for landing.

1025I/ A plane flown by Captain Francis R. CAWFIELD, USMC, suffered class "3" damage as a result of a hard landing. Port landing gear sheared off and port wing buckled.

1108I/ Completed recovery of 0900I launch.

1120I/ U.S.S. nASH (DE-699) rejoined from CTZ 95.12 WHITBREAD patrol.

1200I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) detached to CTZ 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1201I/ Four plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack a troop village near CH'ANGYON. Sixteen buildings were destroyed, three damaged, and four oxen pulling carts, were killed.

1212I/ Recovered remaining two aircraft of 1010I launch.

1330I/ Three plane TaRCap launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack railroad bridge near CH'ANGYON. A railroad locomotive was damaged, one ox killed and one rail cut made.

1353I/ Recovered 1200I launch plus two aircraft that diverted to K-6 from 0900I launch.

1530I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCap launched. TaRCap joined by two aircraft previously diverted to K-6 from 1010I launch. Damaged plane was replaced by a new aircraft. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI. Twelve buildings were destroyed, nine damaged, two rail cars made, one gun position destroyed and an estimated fifteen troops killed.

1541I/ Recovered 1330I launch.

1730I/ Recovered 1530I launch including the two plane from K-6.
Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operation and TaRCaP area clear with visibility of fifteen to forty miles. Winds varied from fifteen to thirty knots. The first scheduled launch was cancelled due to high winds and a pitching deck. Rough seas continued throughout the day.

Mission Summary:

Three CmAP and twenty-one TaRCaP for a total of twenty-four sorties.

7 November
0800I/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a road bridge near KOHO-NI. Three bridges were damaged and six exoarts were destroyed.

1008I/ Recovered 0800I launch.

1102I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1136I/ Six plane TaRCaP launched. Flight was unable to proceed inland due to a ceiling of 800 feet. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop village near HONGGUMP’O-R1 and a total of ten buildings were destroyed.

1201I/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1321I/ Recovered 1136I launch.

1520I/ Two plane CmAP launched.

1528I/ One BAOENG STRAIGHT officer transferred to the LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) by helicopter to observe destroyer operations.

1700I/ Recovered 1520I launch.

1721I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Frontal weather with large swells and low ceilings in target area limited number of sorties flown. Ceiling varied from 0 to 1500 feet with winds variable at ten to thirty knots.

Mission Summary:
Two CmAP and ten TaRCaP for a total of twelve sorties.
8 November

0645I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a troop village near CH'ANGYON. Two buildings were destroyed and two damaged.

0815I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a troop village near CH'ANGYON. Flight destroyed nine buildings, damaged five and then flew reconnaissance of coast to CH'INNAMFO.

0842I/ Recovered 0645I launch.

1000I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack building and railroads near SADINWON. Four buildings were destroyed and a rail car damaged then flight flew along the coast to CH'INNAMFO photographing target areas.

1030I/ Recovered 0815I launch.

1112I/ U.S.S. LINN K. SWENSON (DD-729) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITEBREAD patrol.

1150I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a railroad bridge near CH'INNAMFO. Three buildings were destroyed and a railroad bridge, road bridge, and two ox carts damaged. Twenty-five troops were killed and ten wounded north of CH'INNAMFO.

1210I/ H.M.S. OSWALD (D-57) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEBREAD patrol.

1211I/ Recovered 1000I Launch.

1317I/ One B.D.O. STRAIT officer returned aboard by highline from LINN K. SWENSON (DD-729) having observed WHITEBREAD patrol operations.

1330I/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a railroad bridge near SADINWON. Railroad bridge was damaged and two rail cars were hit. Three ox carts were destroyed, four buildings damaged and three road cars were destroyed. One plane was hit by 37MM AA fire with minor damage to tail section and external fuel tank.

1403I/ Recovered 1150I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a road bridge near SADINWON. Bridge was destroyed, however, one plane was hit by 37MM AA fire and was escorted to K-6 for a landing. Pilot was uninjured but plane suffered strike damage. Pilot returned by helicopter. Remainder of flight destroyed a bridge and four buildings near CH'ANGYON.
Recovered 13301 launch.

17261/ Remaining planes of 15151 launch recovered.

17381/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Clear skies with visibility of fifteen to thirty miles. Wind variable five to fifteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten GAF and twenty-four TaRCaP for a total of thirty-four sorties

9 November

06451/ Two plane GAF and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released to attack a warehouse containing 7000 bags of rice near KAOHSIUNG. The warehouse was destroyed and two observation posts damaged.

08201/ Two plane GAF and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack supply buildings near CH'INNAFPO. A large amount of supplies and an ox cart were destroyed.

08371/ Recovered 06451 launch.

10051/ Three plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troop area near P'UNGCH. Damage was unassessable as targets were difficult to locate due to cumulus clouds.

10231/ Recovered 08201 launch plus one aircraft diverted to K-6 from 15151 launch of the previous day.

11151/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11501/ Two plane GAF and four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack supply buildings in CH'INNAFPO area. Six buildings and two ox carts were destroyed with three buildings damaged.

12001/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

12011/ Recovered 10051 launch.

13451/ Four plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack boat construction yard at CHOCH-OH. Four boats were destroyed and boat building sites were damaged.

13581/ Recovered 11501 launch.
1520I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a radar station near ANAK. Station was attacked with unassessable damage. 20mm and 37mm AA fire was encountered. One rail cut and a road cut was made while returning to ship.

1549I/ Recovered 1345I launch.

1740I/ Recovered 1520I launch.

1801I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operating area clear, cumulus clouds in target area with bases at 2000 to 6000 feet. Winds light and variable at three to eight knots.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP and twenty three TARCAP for a total of thirty-one sorties.

10 November
0645I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge near SONGHWA. Railroad bridge and three buildings were destroyed.

0820I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a railroad bridge at HaSONK. One railroad bridge was destroyed, two rail cuts made and a grain elevator damaged.

0840I/ Recovered 0645I Launch.

1010I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack troops in trenches near CHANGNYON. An estimated ten troops were killed then a railroad bridge was attacked with unassessable damage.

1018I/ Recovered 0820I Launch.

1102I/ H.H.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1129I/ One BaDOENG STRAIT officer came aboard by highline from LYMAN K. SWENSON having observed a WHITBREAD patrol operation.

1145I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a rail overpass near CH'INMACPO. Overpass was damaged, a rail cut made and a building damaged. Photos were made of possible future targets in CH'INMACPO area.

1200I/ U.S.S. LYMAN K. SWENSON chocked to CTE 95.12.
12061/ Recovered 10101 launch.

12201/ Four personnel transferred to U.S.S. Harsh (DE-699) by highline for transportation to the United States.

13401/ Two plane CaP and six plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack gun positions that had been firing on ships near Ch'Ol-O-D0 Island. Damage to gun position was unassessable. One rail cut was made and a rail siding damaged.

14061/ Recovered 11451 launch.

15151/ Two plane CaP and five plane TaRCaP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack a power transformer near CH'AEKYONG. The transformer and one building were destroyed. A road bridge and one ox cart were destroyed.

15491/ Recovered 13401 launch.

17071/ Recovered 15151 launch.

17161/ Set a course for Sasebo.

18301/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) detached with instructions to rendezvous with H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

21001/ Relieved as CT2 95.11 by H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
Area was clear during the morning with cumulus clouds forming at 2500 feet in target area during the afternoon. Visibility was five miles and winds were variable at five to fifteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Twelve CaP and twenty-seven TaRCaP for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

11 November
00321/ H.M.S. CONSTANCE (D-71) detached to rendezvous with H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

16021/ Transferred one officer by helicopter to U.S.S. Harsh (DE-699) for transportation to United States.

12 November
07011/ U.S.S. Harsh (DE-699) detached to proceed independently to Yokosuka, Japan.

12171/ Moored to buoy number 18 in Sasebo, Japan.
1. Hung ordnance was a serious problem for this operating period. When
time permitted, planes with hung ordnance were directed to land at K-53
emergency landing field. Three of these landings ended in major damage to
the planes because of soft spots resulting from water erosion of the beach.
As a result of these experiences, planes with hung rockets and 100# bombs
were landed aboard and only those with larger bombs were sent to K-6 for
dearming.

2. The 100 pound G.P. AK-30-1A bombs with different lugs were not segregat-
ed when received aboard. This resulted in great difficulty locating the
usable bombs to load on the MK-55 bomb racks. The single suspension lug on
the 100 pound G.P. was not modified for the Mark 9 launcher, making a
standard load impossible.

3. The performance of and results obtained by the use of napalm bombs were
elegant. The few instances of duds are believed to have been caused by
igniter faults. AK-23 igniters and two AK-173 fuzes were used on each MK-78
hod-1 tank. The threaded receptacle for the fuze in many tanks was bent out
of shape, resulting in the inability to install fuzes. This was due to
rough handling prior to delivery to this ship.

4. On one occasion, a 1MK which was jettisoned over the side of the ship
exploded several seconds after contact with the water. This rocket had
failed to fire while carried by an aircraft and had detached itself from
the aircraft during the arrested landing. The reason for exploding when
jettisoned could not be determined. No damage to the ship resulted.

Recommendations:

A. A wooden plug should be installed in the tank fuze receptacle prior to
shipment in order to avoid damaging it.

B. Either the single suspension lug on the 100 pound G.P. AK-N30-1A should
be modified to fit the MK-55 bomb rack or the aero 14A racks should be
installed on the aircraft.

5. Ammunition expenditures

   a. During the operating periods covered by this report the following
   ordnance was expended:

   29 October through 12 November 1952

   By VNA-312 Aircraft

   21 1000# GP Bombs
   107 500# GP Bombs
   238 100# GP Bombs

   By USS BALBOA STRAIT

   760 Rounds 40MM ammunition

-19-
5. Ammunition Expenditures (Continued)

By VNA-312 aircraft

84 260# Frag Bombs
 3 250# GP Bombs
950 5" HE Rockets
125 3.5" Rockets
120 Napalm Bombs
52,740 Rounds 20Mm ammo
35,500 Rounds 50 Cal. ammo
Part IV

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

DECLASSIFIED

1. Own Battle Damage
   a. None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
   b. Battle damage received by Vm-312 aircraft:
      
      31 October 1952  2 A/C received small arms hits,
      1 November 1952  1 A/C hit by 20MM fire; minor damage.
      2 November 1952  2 A/C hit by small arms fire; minor damage.
      3 November 1952  1 A/C received minor damage by small arms fire.
      6 November 1952  1 A/C hit with small arms fire; minor damage.

      For detailed damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare
      Reports. (OpNav 3480.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating
      period.

2. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.
   a. The ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy
      while operating as a member of this Task Element during the period
      covered by this report.
   b. Damage inflicted on the enemy by Vm-312 aircraft follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Undamaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges - 3</td>
<td>Road Bridges - 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings - 23</td>
<td>R.A. Bridges - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions - 7</td>
<td>Amm. Dump - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses - 1</td>
<td>Command Post - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junkers - 5</td>
<td>Observation Post - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Carts - 8</td>
<td>Buildings - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revetted buildings - 4</td>
<td>Revetted Buildings - 8</td>
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<td>Locomotives - 1</td>
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<td>grenade factory - 1</td>
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<td>Transformer Building - 1</td>
<td>Road cuts - 12</td>
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<td>Duker - 1</td>
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<td>Electric transformer - 1</td>
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-21-
PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in the general high standards of the Navy and Marine Corps.

2. Casualties

   a. At 0925 on 30 October 1952, 2nd Lieutenant A.D. HOWARD, USMC, while landing aboard the U.S.S. BAWANG STRAIT during carrier qualification, failed to engage an arresting wire and crashed through three barriers. The aircraft came to rest in an inverted position against the island superstructure. 2nd Lieutenant HOWARD had his left hand injured to the extent that the 5th digit was severed.

   b. At 1100 on 31 October 1952, Captain Robert C. WHITEHEAD, USN, while landing aboard the U.S.S. BAWANG STRAIT on return from a strike flight, lost his tail wheel and hook on making contact with the deck and crashed into the barriers as a result, the pilot sustained a strained back. He was transferred to a naval hospital two days later.
1. During the first few days of this operating period there were several serious aircraft accidents aboard ship attributable to lack of training and experience on the part of both pilots and landing Signal Officers. It was necessary to conduct carrier qualifications on the first day of this period. During these qualifications, two aircraft were damaged to such an extent as to be beyond repair aboard ship, despite the unusual competence of the squadron maintenance personnel in effecting repairs. Two additional landing accidents occurred aboard ship in which the aircraft suffered strike or major overhaul damage. On another occasion an aircraft taxied out of the landing area and crashed into aircraft parked forward of the barrier, damaging three of these planes, one seriously, and with serious damage resulting to itself. The procedure of shipping pilots to the forward area to qualify and obtain experience in carrier operations seems unduly expensive in terms of damaged aircraft. In this instance it also seriously hampered the conduct of combat operations.

Recommendation:

Pilots and landing Signal Officers destined for carrier duty in the combat area should be adequately trained before departing the continental limits.

2. This vessel departed port with only a partial complement of aircraft. The need to conduct qualification landings for new pilots, with the resulting damage indicated in paragraph above, further reduced the availability of aircraft. Also, during the period of this report five aircraft of necessity were landed at an emergency landing strip on Paengnyong-Do. Three were directed there for the removal of hung ordnance, another landed because of mechanical difficulties and the fifth because of battle damage. Two of these aircraft suffered major damage during rollout due to the poor condition of the landing strip. There are no good landing strips in the immediate vicinity of the operating area although beach sites presently in use could be rendered adequate with little effort. When the aircraft with hung ordnance or battle damage are sent to fields further south, their services are lost to the Task Element for the remainder of the day and sometimes part of the following day. This reduction of aircraft coupled with inadequate replacement service seriously jeopardized accomplishment by this Task Element of its assigned tasks.

Recommendation:

The complement of Corsairs on the 105 class CVE should be maintained at 24 through provision of sufficient aircraft in the forward area for this purpose.

Note: Arrangements to effect improvement of the K-53 landing strip at Paengnyong-Do have been made with JOG Korea.
3. The volume of classified communications traffic handled during this operating period was extremely heavy. On the third day of operations one EGC developed electro/mechanical trouble which put it out of service periodically thereafter for periods up to 3 hours. This failure of one of the two EGC’s allowed this ship presented a major difficulty. Since both machines were being used to nearly capacity, the remaining machine was unable to carry the load, and delays in handling traffic resulted. Toward the end of the operating period this machine also developed trouble, but remained operational.

Recommendation:

On escort carrier performing the duties of an Element Commander should be allowed an extra EGC to be used as a spare during its tour of duty in the Yellow Sea. A letter recommendation in this regard is being submitted.

4. Delivery of ship-to-shore communications traffic is slow and sometimes inaccurate due to the volume of traffic.

Recommendation:

A point-to-point circuit should be used for a period of 2 to 4 hours each evening with either Radio Tokyo or Radio Guam. It is believed that frequencies already assigned for this use. Arrangements along these lines should materially expedite the delivery of high precedence traffic without interfering with other units and commands.

5. Hangar Deck Operations:

Normally, sixteen Corsairs can be spotted on the hangar deck. However, space required for the helicopter, turnapull, QEC stands, large work tables and de-grossing tanks for aircraft machine guns has reduced the space available for parking aircraft so that only fourteen can be accommodated. Thus a serious problem results when it is necessary to accommodate several wrecked aircraft being returned for salvage. The hangar deck during this operation on several occasions was overcrowded with resultant delays, while continuing repairs to several damaged aircraft and conducting routine checks. When an aircraft is damaged to the point that it is usable only for scrap, and when it is apparent to the Commanding Officer that retention of the aircraft aboard will delay maintenance of other aircraft, it is considered that the engine should be removed, the aircraft should be stripped of any useful parts and the remainder dumped overboard.

Recommendation:

The authority of the Commanding Officer to dispose of a damaged aircraft in the forward area should be broadened in cases where there is no hope whatsoever of effecting repairs. This authority should require stripping of the aircraft prior to such disposal.
6. The bridle arrester designed and reported by the USS RENDova (CVE-114) in Confidential letter 583 serial OL82 of 15 October 1952 is considered to be an improvement over the bridle arrester proposed by the USS BATAAN (CVL-29). However, photographs taken while launching show that the bridle flaps up as it was being arrested. There has not yet been any indication of any damage to tail surfaces resulting from the bridle movement.

Recommendation:

The possibility that when using this bridle arrester the bridle may damage the tail surfaces necessitates close watch in this regard.

7. The V-4 division accomplished the following during the reported period: Three engines preserved, five props preserved, eight props assembled, one ECM assembled, thirty five tires mounted. In addition, shops were maintained and maintenance personnel were assigned to assist in squadron maintenance work. An N-7 tank was mounted on a cart with small pneumatic wheels. The tank was fitted with a drain, drain valve, and a drain hose (surveyed fire hose) of sufficient length to reach from the hangar deck to the water level. This is used as a drain oil bower to satisfy a much needed method of safely disposing of drain oil, particularly when it is contaminated with gasoline.

8. The 40mm ammunition training allowance as outlined in ANOrd Circular Letter ALO-49 of 24 June 1949 and modified by COLUMPAC INSTRUCTION 8000.1A of 21 July 1952 should be increased. In accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 2-51 (Revised) all vessels are required to engage in AA training exercises when passing through area "G3060", Isebo. While the present allowance is adequate to fulfill this requirement, very little is available for the training of green crews prior to the vessel's departure from the United States.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the allowance of 40mm ammunition be increased so that personnel can be adequately trained prior to the ship's deployment to Wes Pac.

9. Departure from the type ship's allowance of bombs should be authorized and specified by type commanders in order to more closely approximate the number and types of ordnance being used in a specific combat area in accordance with the targets being presented. This ship has found it necessary to vary from the type commander's allowance after it left the United States, whereas it should have been possible to anticipate the type of ordnance being used prior to departure. It is recognized that it would be difficult to anticipate the type of targets to be destroyed long in advance and, accordingly, the type of ordnance most suitable. However, an increase in 1,000 pound GP bombs, the inclusion of 250 pound GP Bombs and of at least ten 500 pound SAP bombs was found to be necessary during this operation. A similar requirement is anticipated for subsequent operations. Need for this change was first experienced by this vessel when on previous duty in the Yellow Sea in January and February 1952, and also by the ship which this
vessel relieved. Thus it is felt that the continued need for these ordnance items is reasonably assured.

Recommendation:

The ordnance allowance as specified by the Type Commander should be changed to provide for:

a. Increasing 1,000 lb GP bombs from 24 to 50, with a reduction in the amount of 500 lb GP bombs from 300 to 250.

b. Inclusion of at least ten 500 lb SAP bombs.

c. Inclusion of one-hundred 250 lb GP bombs and reduction of 220 lb or 260 lb fragmentation bombs by a similar amount.

10. Time and operating conditions do not permit belting 20MM aircraft ammunition and finning aircraft rockets while the ship is in the operating area. This must be done during the replenishing period before leaving port. It is a considerable hardship on ordnance crews who are thus denied an adequate rest and recreation period while the ship is in port.

Recommendation:

All 20MM aircraft ammunition should be delivered belted.

11. This ship sustained damage to two MK-51 mod 2 directors due to an aircraft accident on 15 October 1952. During the following ship repair and replenishment period from 18 October through 29 October it was possible to replace only one director, resulting in the ship operating in Korea area "MAD" with 14% of the effectiveness of its armament substantially reduced.

Recommendation:

Replacement MK-51 mod-2 directors should be readily available in the forward area.

H. L. Ray

Copy to:
CNO (2) Advance
CINCPE (2) Advance
CINCPE EVCUT GROUP
COMNAV (1) Advance
COMNAV EVCUT GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. COLE
COMUSN
Operations Officer

CTF-77 (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
CG (1) Advance
C, USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
C, USS RENOVA (CVE-114)
C, USS BATROKO (CVE-115)
C, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
C, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
C, USS ARAKAWA (CVE-12)
C, USS FERIA (CVE-312)
### Flight Schedule for 2 November 1952

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
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<td>1530</td>
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**Load Limits**

- **A**: all A/C full gun loads.
- **B**: 2 A/C Napalm and 8-HVAR.
  - 1 A/C 500# D.C./inst. and L-260# inst./.11.
- **C**: 2 A/C 500# inst./.11 and L-260# inst./.11.
  - 2 A/C Napalm and 8-HVAR.
- **D**: all A/C 500# inst./.11 and L-260# inst./.11.
- **E**: all A/C 500# inst./.11 and 8-HVAR.
- **F**: all A/C 500# EmsP/L-5 sec delay and 8-HVAR.
- **G**: all A/C 500# GP inst./.11 and L-260 inst./.11.

---

B.E. COLKITJ JR.
LOCM, USN
Air Operations Officer

**Copy to:**
- MEDICAL (2)
- NAV (2)
- LPO (6)
- SQUADRON OFFICE (6)
- AIR PLLOT (2)
- AIR INTELLIGENCE (2)
- BRIDGE (4)
- CPO QUARTERS (3)
- PHOTO (3)
- ALL OFFICERS (10)
- AIR DEPT (8)

**Enclosure (1)**
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and
Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 19 November through 29 November 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) CPNAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
(3) Damage Confirmed by intelligence sources, report of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report
of the Task Element 95.11 for the period 19 November through 29 November
1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT
was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 19 November until 2100 on 28
November of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.

Part II Chronological Order of events.

Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment,
including ammunition expenditure.

Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by
referring to VHA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for November 1952.
A. During the period of 19 November to 29 November 1952, Captain H. L. Ray, O62691, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11. Commander Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group. The U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) operated as a unit of TE 95.11. Ships assigned CTE 95.11 as screen were the U.S.S. HICKOX (DE-673), U.S.S. WISEMAN (DE-677), H.M.S. CONWY (D-20), and H.M.C.S. HALIFAX (DDE-215). The screen varied from two to four ships as screen ships were detached to CTE 95.12 for night patrols.

B. During the period of this report the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) operated off the west coast of Korea in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. During daylight hours, the carrier remained in the general vicinity of 37°20'N 124°40'E and retired southward during the night.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the west coast of Korea is blockage of the Korean West Coast. This blockage is performed by patrol ships of CTE 95.12, CTE 95.11 aircraft and screening ships, and by the troops on occupied islands. A group of five islands stretching from the Han River estuary in the South to the Taedong estuary in the North are so occupied and provide information by radar, friendly agents and guerrillas action. These islands are of great value in warning of enemy air action and in the rescue of United Nations pilots forced down in North Korea.

The assigned tasks of CTE 95.11 are air protection of the blockage forces (TE 95.12 and TE 95.15) against enemy artillery fire and enemy aircraft, air spotting for friendly gunfire, close air support of attacks by friendly forces, surveillance of coastal area, armed reconnaissance, and strikes against enemy targets in assigned area. In performing these tasks, CTE 95.11 maintained, during daylight hours two defensive CAPS over carrier, four TACIPS controlled by CTU 95.12.1 in target area and supplied STRIKE groups to attack targets as requested by CTE 95.12 and CTE 95.15. STRIKE also attacked targets developed from intelligence sources.

D. The full potential of the ship and squadron could not be realized during this patrol because of a shortage of aircraft. With an operating allowance of 24 F4U model aircraft, there were not more than twenty aboard ship. While some additional aircraft were delivered on board during this patrol, these were only adequate to cover attrition.

E. The patrol was a most interesting one, with a considerable number of worthwhile targets developing, and substantial damage is believed to have been inflicted on the enemy. Most targets were selected on the basis of requests for assistance received from friendly troops occupying the small islands which fringe the North Korean territory. The more important incidents of the patrol are listed herein.
F. On the 21st of November the troops on SUNWI-DO reported having been heavily shelled from the mainland which is only about 1000 yards away and requested an air strike. Because of the aircraft shortage and commitments elsewhere it was decided to arm the two plane CAP with Napalm and rockets for strikes in this nearby area. All except DAWN and DUSCUP were so armed for the remainder of the patrol. The Task Element closed the islands to the extent practicable in order to retain voice contact and control of the CAP throughout the strikes. The napalm strikes on the mainland appeared to be highly successful as friendly troops reported fires burning for twelve hours after the initial strike with several secondary explosions. It was reported that morale of friendly troops was improved 100% by the strikes. Needless to say, this accomplishment was equally beneficial to the morale of the pilots of VNA-312 and the ships personnel.

G. Another request for air strikes was received on 23 November when friendly forces on the mainland occupying the mountainous terrain of Joint CHANGSON-GOT (AC 4522) reported being under attack by 100 enemy troops. The TARCAP assigned to CTU 95.12.1 was released to hit this area and also to air spotting for the surface ship assigned. Low level attacks were made on reported enemy installations but identification of targets and damage assessment was difficult because of the rugged terrain and heavy ground cover which exists in that area. A subsequent report from friendly troops, however, reported that the combined attack repelled the enemy who sustained losses of 12 KIA and 9 WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

H. The encounter between six corsairs and two A-1s is noted because the apparent success of the defensive tactics employed. The six corsairs of a strike group had just recovered from their initial attack on a pre-briefed target on 28 November when the 2 A-1s started making a series of three firing runs from overhead and astern. Five corsairs assumed a tight circular tail chase formation at low altitude, in accordance with squadron doctrine, the 6th aircraft being separated and unable to join. This latter aircraft took evasive action from the A-1 on his tail by threading through the passes between the hills at an extremely low altitude. Two corsairs of the larger group were able to bring their rockets to bear and fired eight HVAs in the general direction of one A-1 which then broke off action. Five corsairs in a tail chase proved to be too large a group and subsequent deep strike sorties have been maintained at four aircraft or multiples of four in order that aircraft can join-up in a tight circle with all planes in a steeply banked turn.

I. The policy of interchanging officers with H.H.B. GLORY (CVL-19) and screening ships of TE 95.11 for familiarization and training purposes was continued during this patrol.

J. A note worthy feature of this period was the prevailing flyable weather, during the nine consecutive days of the patrol, all scheduled flights were performed without interruption from weather or other causes.
K. VmW-312 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. CAMBRON, O7027, USNcG, during this period. Planes assigned this squadron consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft on board during this patrol was 20 and the average availability per day was 17.0. Total number of sorties flown during the period was 339 for a total of 786.2 hours. A total of 119 hours of this was "over the target time."
1300I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun positions in CHANGNYON and P'UAMSAN area. This flight destroyed three gun positions, cut one road bridge and destroyed one building.

1345I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road and railroad bridges in CHINNAPE area. Planes destroyed two bridges and sank one small boat with an estimated two troops killed.

1516I/ Recovered 1300I launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 1145I launch.

1650I/ Two aircraft, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-6.

1713I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1720I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds at 1500 feet in operating area lifting to 3000 feet in the target area, except 2000 feet over the southern sector. Fresh northerly winds. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP and four STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

21 November
0700I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack bridges in ONGJIN area. Planes cut three roads, set fires in village, and damaged a bridge bypass.

0900I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop bunkers and warehouses in CHANGNYON area. Planes damaged bunkers and warehouses. STRIKE group attacked road bridges in ONGJIN area. One bridge destroyed. One plane of this flight hit by small caliber fire damaging an oil cooler. Plane later landed aboard safely.

0910I/ Recovered 0700I launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 yesterday at 1650.

1019I/ CTU 95.12.4 requested aircraft to attack enemy positions in the area as mortars and artillery had fired continually on SUNWI-10 for the past week.

1023I/ U.S.S. HILCOX (DU-673) rejoined the screen from CTU 95.12, 12THAALD patrol.
Two plane CAP and four plane TaikCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaikCAP to attack railroad cars in SINHON-NI area, observation point in P'UNGSAN area and power transformer in CHANGYOUN area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged one transformer and two rail cars, cut two railroads and neutralized an observation post.

Recovered 0900I launch.

u.s. CUBS (D-20) advised CTE 95.11 of a casualty to distiller pump which was repairable but fresh water supply would require replenishment from tanker at PALSANGYONG-DO island.

Two plane CAP, four plane TaikCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaikCAP to attack road bridge in TaikP'UGNS area. Planes destroyed two bridges, cut one road and destroyed one building. STRIKE group attacked supply village in CHANGYOUN area. Twelve buildings were destroyed.

Recovered 1100I launch.

u.s. CUBS (D-20) detached to proceed to PALSANGYONG-DO for repair of distilling pump and replenishment of fresh water supply. H.m.c. u.s. maila (UDE-215) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

Two plane CAP and three plane TaikCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaikCAP to attack command post on hill 297 in the P'UNGSAN area and buildings in the S'INDON-NI area. Planes damaged command post with estimated fifteen troops killed, destroyed five buildings and left three burning.

Recovered 1300I launch.

Recovered 1500I launch.

Task element retired southward for the night.

CTE 95.12 advised CTE 95.11 that mine-sweepers would be operating close to shore, 23, 24, and 25 November and requested CTE 95.11 to provide air cover against enemy coastal artillery, using smoke screen if necessary.

CTE 95.12 was advised that no smoke making equipment was available but that TaikCAP would be assigned additional responsibility of covering mine-sweepers during the operation.

Weather Summary:
Broken low clouds in operating and target areas at 2500 to 3500 feet. Haze and shallow ground fog in central sector of target area until 1000. Average to good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, Nineteen TaikCAP, and eight STRIKE for a total of thirty-seven sorties.
Two plane CAöP and four plane TACöP launched. CTU 95.12.1
released TACöP to attack command post in PAN area. Plane
damaged two buildings, got direct hits on command post trenches
and cut one railroad. Two planes of this flight hit by small
caliber AA fire causing minor damage. Planes returned safely.

Two plane CAöP and four plane TACöP launched. CTU 95.12.1
released TACöP to attack buildings in CHIBÖPO area. Planes
destroyed one building, damaged radar position and hit gun
positions.

Recovered 07001 launch.

M.I.S. WDöB (U-20) rejoined the screen after having repaired
distilling pump and replenished fresh water supply.

Two planes CAöP, four plane TACöP, and four plane STRIKE
launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACöP to attack road bridges
in T-CHÖN-Wö area. Planes cut one road and damaged revet-
ments. SHöA group attacked supply dump in CHANGÉÖN area.
Planes destroyed five buildings with an estimated five troops
killed and five wounded.

M.I.S. m.I. (UOE-215) rejoined the screen from CTU 95.12,
WhITBAÖD patrol.

Recovered 09001 launch. One plane struck LSO screen with port
wing during landing, damaging port wing and kileron.

U.S.S. WDöBöN (Dö-677) detached to CTU 95.12, WhITBAÖD patrol.

Two plane CAöP and two plane TACöP launched. CTU 95.12.1
released TACöP to attack troops in BÖCHÖN area. Planes dam-
aged a railroad car and dropped bombs in troop area with
unassessable damage.

Recovered 11001 launch.

Two TBö of VT-23 "OWIFISH" line, landed aboard with spare part
and personnel.

Two plane CAöP and four plane TACöP launched. CAöP attacked
troop area as requested by CTU 95.12.4 with unassessable damage
and returned to act as defensive CAö. CTU 95.12.1 released
TACöP to attack railroad bridge in CHANGÉÖN area. Planes cut
one railroad and two roads and destroyed nine buildings with an
estimated twenty troops killed.

Recovered 13001 launch.
1654I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1720I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
High overcast with ceiling 8000 feet. Low scattered to broken clouds in target area. Visibility 10 to 15 miles. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, and three STRIKE for a total of thirty one sorties.

23 November
The U.S.S. WILDCAT (CVE-677) was unable to return to the force having struck a submerged rock while performing patrol duty and the operational control of CTU 95,12. Resulting damage minor but required dry dock facilities for repair. Ship was subsequently ordered to Japanese port for repairs.

0700I/ Two CAP, two TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95,12 released TARCAP to attack supply dump in P'UNGSA area. Planes destroyed one warehouse and bombed and strafed troops in trench. STRIKE group attacked buildings in T'AM'TAI area and destroyed four buildings, one railroad car, damaged two rail cars, and go a direct hit on railway tunnel entrance.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack trenches and bunkers in SUNDI-10 area as requested by CTU 95,12,4. Planes bombed area with unassessable damage. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95,12,1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in P'UNGSA area. Planes destroyed one building with an estimated ten troops killed. Trenches were bombed in the area with unassessable damage. Two planes of this flight were hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage to wing and flaps.

0926I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95,12,1 released TARCAP to attack mortar positions in CH'UNGSA area. Damage was unassessable. CAP released to attack gun position in CH'ANGYON area. Gun position was neutralized. At 1120I during his second run on this target Captain Charles W. MILLS, WO3/C, was hit in the left arm by small arms fire. Captain MILLS was able to make a landing on K-53, the emergency strip on PANJONG-DO, and was later evacuated by plane to a Korean hospital. Damage to plane was a small hole in the canopy. Plane was flown back to the ship later in the day. STRIKE group attacked ammunition dump in PANJONG-AN area. Planes damaged two buildings, knocked out a loading dock and damaged a large amount of supplies.
1131/  Recovered 09001 launch.

12001/  H.M.S. COLOM (U-20) detached to CIN 95.12, WAITING patrol.

13001/  Two plane CAP and four plane TACHAP launched.  CTU 95.12.1
        released TACHAP to attack mortar positions in PONGGANG-WI area
        and gun positions in P'UNKOM area. Both areas attacked with
        unassessable damage.

13181/  Recovered 11001 launch.

15001/  Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and two plane TACHAP launched.
        CTU 95.12.1 released TACHAP to attack supplies and docks in
        CH'INOHPO area. Planes destroyed two small boats and damaged
        supplies with direct hits. STRIKE group attacked supplies in
        T'AM'I'an area. Planes destroyed ten buildings, damaged a radar
        station and made four road cuts.

15341/  Recovered 13001 launch.

17171/  Recovered 15001 launch.

17561/  Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather summary:
Scattered to broken low clouds, ceiling 2000 feet lowering in
target area to 1500 feet. Radiation ground fog in central and
southern TACHAP areas. Weak trough passing through area during
the morning period. Flying conditions mostly average.

Mission summary:
Ten CAP, twelve TACHAP, and twelve STRIKE for a total of
thirty-four sorties.

24 November
07001/  Two plane CAP, four plane TACHAP, and four plane STRIKE
        launched.  CTU 95.12.1 released TACHAP to attack buildings in
        CH'ANGYUN area. Planes destroyed three buildings and six sheds,
        STRIKE group attacked railroad overpass in SINCH'ON area. Plane
        destroyed overpass and cut one railroad. One plane of this
        flight was hit by small caliber AA fire, resulting in minor
        damage. Plane landed aboard safely.

09001/  Two plane CAP and four plane TACHAP launched. CAP released
        to attack radio station and buildings in KONGUNPO-RI area.
        Planes destroyed six buildings and damaged five others. At
        about 09151, a plane of this flight flown by Captain L. W.
        KUHLI, USMC, was hit by automatic AA fire of 50 caliber type.
        Left oil cooler was damaged causing loss of oil, propeller
        overspeeding, and consequent freezing of engine about two
        minutes after being hit. A water landing was made one mile
        from shore about ten miles south of CHOO Island. Pilot was
        rescued by helicopter from CHOO after having been in the water
        only 12 minutes. The pilot was uninjured and returned to the
        ship the following day.
CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies and troops in CHANG NYON area. Planes destroyed eight buildings, a large amount of supplies, killed an estimated thirteen troops and wounded fifteen.

0925I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack troops in SWAMI-DO area. Planes destroyed seven buildings. At 1140I during this attack, Captain Carleton H. GREEN, USMC, dropped fragmentation bombs from a low altitude instead of a napalm bomb as intended. The plane was disabled in a water landing was made ten miles South of SWAMI-DO Island. A first helicopter was at the scene in about fifteen minutes but was unable to lift the pilot from the water. A second larger helicopter was sent from K-53 and completed the rescue. Pilot was uninjured. Total time in the water was forty-five minutes. Remaining plane returned as defensive CAP.

CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun position and troops in CHANG NYON area. Planes damaged a gun position and destroyed supplies. STRIKE group attacked supplies in CHANG NYON area. Planes bombed and made two road cuts.

1119I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1128I/ H.M.S. "WIND" (D-20) rejoined the screen from OTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1156I/ U.S.S. "HAZAMA" (DD-673) detached to OTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance and two TARCAP launched. Armed reconnaissance attacked and destroyed gun positions in CHANG NYON area. An estimated fifteen troops killed and one wounded.

1315I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1435I/ Captain GREEN, USMC, returned to ship by helicopter from K-53.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP and TARCAP released to attack troops in CHANG NYON area. Troop area received one hundred percent bomb coverage and fires were left burning. CAP returned to act as defensive CAP.

1541I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1729I/ Two aircraft from 1300I flight, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-14. Recovered remaining planes of 1500I launch.
1736I Force retired southward for the night.

Weather summary:
Overcast most of the day at 1500 to 8000 feet. Light rain in the target area. Visibility 8 miles. Marginal flying condition becoming average by 1100I.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TAIACAP, seven STRIKE, and four armed reconnaissance for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

25 November
0700I Two plane CAP and four plane TAIACAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and troops in UPHU-UR area. Planes destroyed nine buildings with an estimated twenty seven troops killed. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIACAP to attack troops in CHAMYON area. Planes bombèd two gun positions and troop area with unassessable damage.

0900I Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and three plane TAIACAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIACAP to attack troops in SANGYUN area. Planes destroyed nine buildings and damaged four. STRIKE group attacked troops in CHAMYAN-RI area. Planes destroyed twenty-nine buildings and damaged ten.

0924I Recovered 0700I Launch.

1100I Two plane CAP and two plane TAIACAP launched. CAP attacked troops in SANGU-UN area, and destroyed six buildings. Plan returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIACAP to attack troop positions in CHAMYON area. Planes destroyed large amount of supplies and damaged one building with an estimated five troops killed.

1116I Recovered 0900I launch.

1145I U.S.S. HIXON (BB-673) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBONE patrol.

1218I H.M.S. milla (WDS-215) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBONE patrol.

1300I Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and four plane TAIACAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and trenches in the SUNWI-DO area. Planes destroyed three buildings and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAIACAP to attack gun position in SUNGI area. Planes destroyed a gun position, destroyed four buildings and damaged five. STRIKE group attacked warehouses in SWU-UN area. Planes destroyed one building and damaged six.
1317I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and two plane TACAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack buildings in PHONGNH area. Planes damaged one building and two railroad overpasses. STRIKE group attacked buildings in MAWNG-NI area. Planes cut three road bridges and one road.

1518I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1720I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1726I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Scattered low, middle and high clouds. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Average flying conditions, light winds.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, fifteen TACAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties.

26 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TACAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack ammunition dump in MAWNG-NI area. Planes dropped bombs in dump area, destroyed two gun positions and damaged one, destroyed one building and damaged one. STRIKE group attacked troops in HAEU area. Planes started fires in troop area with bombing and strafing.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TACAP launched. CAP attacked troops in MAWNG-NI area. Planes destroyed eighteen buildings and one small boat and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack buildings in MAWNG-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged three gun positions.

0920I/ Recovered two aircraft diverted to K-6 on previous day.

0925I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TACAP launched. CAP attacked troops in MAWNG-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged a gun position. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack supplies on dock in CHINH area. Planes left supplies on dock burning, destroyed three warehouses, damaged three warehouses and one boat. STRIKE group attacked troops in MAWNG-NI area, destroying seven buildings with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded, a bridge and trenches were damaged.
1117I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1119I/ Two replacement aircraft landed aboard from K-6.

1200I/ U.S. NICKUX (DB-673) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBEAD patrol.

1205I/ H.M.S. HALE (DD-215) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBEAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and three plane TACCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of CHUATONG. Planes destroyed ten buildings and left village burning. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack buildings in ONCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings and damaged two. A railroad was cut and a rail overpass damaged.

1322I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and three plane TACCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack buildings in ONCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged trench and gun positions, destroyed a road bridge, damaged a railroad and cut one road. STRIKE group attacked buildings in CHANGYON area destroying four buildings, one bridge, cut two railroads, and damaging two buildings and a radar station.

1520I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1715I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1721I/ Task element retired southward for night.

Weather Summary:
Cyclonic flow aloft causing high cloudiness throughout the operating area. Ceiling 7000 feet lowering near end of period to 3000 feet. Average flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TACCAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

27 November 0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TACCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP damaged buildings in CHINAMPO area with strafing before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack buildings in the ANNA area. Planes made excellent hits destroying seven buildings and strafed remaining buildings. STRIKE group attacked fuel tanks in CHINAMPO area. Planes scored direct hits on tanks with rockets, resulting in no apparent damage. One plane developed an oil leak and was escorted to K-53 for landing. Escort knocked out road bridge enroute. Remaining aircraft destroyed one building, one gun position, cut a railroad, and damaged a building. One plane was slightly damaged by small arms fire.
0900/ Two plane CAP, two plane SkiiKE, and four plane TaRCaP launched. CAP attacked troop village in 52NI-DO area. Flight destroyed eight buildings and damaged six before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack road bridge in OnCh'On-NI area. Flight scored a road cut and damaged the bridge. Flight then destroyed six buildings, one warehouse, and damaged a road bridge. SkiiKE and spotting mission attacked a gun position in 52NI-DO area. Gun position was damaged. Aircraft of this flight spotted ship's gunfire and made strafing runs which resulted in probable destruction of gun position, an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded. One plane was hit by small caliber fire with minor damage.

0911/ U.S.S. n[M]xW (wD-673) rejoined screen from CTZ 95.12, WHITE-Bone patrol.

0938/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCaP, and four plane SkiiKE launched. CAP attacked a village in OnCh'On area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged five with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack road bridges in HaNWI area. One bridge was damaged, three roads cut, eight buildings destroyed, radar antenna destroyed and one building damaged. SkiiKE group attacked tunnels in T'AnN'An area. Plane closed one tunnel, destroyed one building, and attacked troops in caves and buildings with unassessable damage.

1128/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1135/ [M]xW (wD-215) detached to CTZ 95.12 for WHITE-25D patrol.

1300/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CAP attacked troop village in ChungYong area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, strafed a gun position and a group of trenches before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack troops in OnCh'On-NI area, a group of building were left burning and a truck was destroyed with two troops killed. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-14 to pick up photographs required for target analysis.

1321/ Army Guerrilla unit based on PaDongYong-DO Island reported that one hundred troops with mortars and machine guns were attacking friendly troops occupying point CHUNG-GoT (XC 5522) and requested that CTZ 95.11 aircraft attack enemy troops as soon as possible.

1332/ Recovered 1100I launch.
1351I/ CTE 95.11 advised LEOPMU and JOC that TaskCAP had been diverted to attack enemy troops.

1500I/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and four plane TaskCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaskCAP to attack troops menacing friendly troops in SONGCH'ON area. Troop area attacked with unassessable damage. Major Raymond J. RICHALD JR. USAF, made low strafing pass, reported a rough running engine during pull up, and was escorted to K-53 for emergency landing. A wheels down landing was attempted with six rockets and an external fuel tank aboard. The plane was observed to nose over to an inverted position at the edge of the shallow water. Within a few seconds the plane was burning intensely preventing rescue by nearby personnel. A doctor was dispatched from the ship by helicopter immediately and pronounced the major dead when he arrived. The aircraft was completely destroyed. STRIKE group diverted to assist TaskCAP attacking enemy troops near SONGCH'ON, but was unable to assist due to low ceiling and limited attack area. STRIKE group attacked village of SONGJIN and destroyed twenty-eight houses and damaged a railroad car.

1513I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1649I/ Recovered 1500I launch, plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-14.

1729I/ Force retired southward for the night.

1737I/ A dispatch from CTU 95.12.4 reported the 1500I STRIKE of 21 November silenced mortar positions that were attacking the island of SUNWI-UO, thereby raising morale one hundred percent. Fires were reported still burning in the area twelve hours after STRIKE with secondary explosions.

Weather Summary:
Low overcast at 3500 to 4000 feet with rain until early afternoon. Marginal weather conditions in the target area restricted target visibility. Visibility 5 to 8 miles in rain. Cold front 400 miles northwest of operating area.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TaskCAP, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of forty-six sorties.

28 November 0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four planes TaskCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaskCAP to attack troops in SONGCH'ON area. Direct hits with Napalm destroyed twelve buildings containing troops. Small arms fire was encountered during attack. A coastal gun was neutralized with rockets. STRIKE group attacked group village in ONGJIN area. Eight buildings were destroyed with Napalm and a truck strafed.
0901/ Two plane CAP and four plane TACAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and supplies in UPGN-10 area. Ten buildings were destroyed and five damaged with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack radio antenna in WUNGUN-10 area. Damage not assessable. Two medium size boats were damaged in the CHODO area by rockets. Heager and inaccurate AA fire was observed in CHODO area.

0915/ Recovered 0901 launch.

1100/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SUNJ-DO area. Nine buildings were destroyed and six others damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack four junks in the P.HANGYONG-DO area. One junk was destroyed and five others damaged. STRIKE group attacked bridges in SINWON-NI area. Flight destroyed one railroad bridge, damaged a road bridge and scored hits on three gun positions. Flight was attacked by HIG type aircraft in Chachyong area. HIG Type planes made three firing runs on the formation with no damage resulting. Eight 5" HVAR rockets were fired at the HIG's which seemed to confuse the enemy pilots as the engagement was broken off immediately thereafter. No damage was inflicted on the enemy planes.

1116/ Recovered 0901 launch.

1202/ U.S.S. HICKOK (DD-673) chopped to 0901 95.12.

1300/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in KANGYONG area. Flight destroyed three buildings and damaged two, plus bombing enemy troop area with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in CHALANG-DO area. Flight destroyed twenty-five buildings and damaged ten. One small boat was destroyed, five damaged and a gun position damaged.

1315/ Recovered 1100 launch.

1325/ Two marine pilots of VMA-312 transferred to P.HANGYONG-DO by helicopter for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) to observe flight operations.

1425/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in KADU area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged two. Fire from six to eight 20mm AA weapons was observed during the attack. One bridge was destroyed, two roads cut and a gun position was destroyed. STRIKE group attacked troops in YONAN area. An estimated twenty-five troops were killed.
1500I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1631I/ Recovered 1425I launch

1640I/ Set course southward for Sasebo.

2100I/ relieved as CT-W 95.11 by H.K.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
Cold frontal passage at 0400 cleared operating and target area by 0530 with unlimited ceilings and visibility throughout the period. Fresh northeast to north winds with moderate to rough seas after mid-period.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TAHCP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of forty-three sorties.

29 November

1315I/ Detached H.M.S. HALIFAX (ODS-215) to proceed independently to Sasebo.

1650I/ Moored to buoy number 18 in Sasebo Harbor.
Performance of ordnance material and equipment

A. Ship's ordnance expended, 544 rounds 40mm.

B. Performance of ship's ordnance

1. AA firing exercise was conducted 19 November. There were no material casualties, however, three loading casualties did occur.

2. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

   21 November - The radar antenna on Mount II was not boresighted. The antenna will be boresighted on arrival in port.

   26 November - Radar Range Unit MK-19 MOD-0 casualty: Intermittent jumping of range step and no sweep in precision of the radar indicator. (control) MK-2. The cause was a faulty capacitor C-358 in Radar Range Unit circuit. The capacitor was replaced.

   27 November - Radar Indicator MK-2 casualty: Partial loss of range sweep and step. The cause was shorted capacitor C-J29 in Radar Indicator Unit.

3. AA firing exercise was not conducted enroute to Sasebo. The 40mm training allowance for use while employed in WestPac is not sufficient to conduct an exercise each time we transit the firing area throughout the period of the ship's scheduled operations in WestPac.

4. General quarters gunnery and fire control personnel have participated in an active training program to improve the AA defense capability of the ship. The training consisted of the following exercises:
   a. 40mm loading drill.
   b. Target acquisition and tracking drill using JAF.
   c. Training films pertaining to operations of and maintenance of guns and fire control equipment.
   d. Instruction to indoctrinate all personnel in safety precautions pertaining to operation of gun and handling of ordnance material.

C. Ammunition replenishment was accomplished in Sasebo, Japan prior to this cruise. Excellent cooperation was experienced in dealing with the issuing activity NavOrd Facility. The following items were NIS:

1. Adapter, F/AH - MK-219 Fuze
2. Auxiliary booster, MK-4
3. Anti-personnel bomb fuze extension (daisy cutter - 18 inch)
4. 3,5 rocket head (WP or PWP)
5. 20mm Ctg. A/C Beltaed
6. Torpedo boosters MK-9 MOD-0 (F/AK-24 Mine)
7. Fuze MK-142 MOD-0 (F/AK-24 Mine)
The lack of availability of items (1) and (2) can hamper future operations when present stock is depleted. These are used with anti-personnel bombs. The shortage is not critical at this time, however, the ship began the last operating period with 20 less than our allowance of 350. Item (3) is available only with 36" extension. The 18" is more desirable for catapulted aircraft. Item (4) will cause fire as well as being good smoke markers. The present inventory consists of FS smoke heads only. Item (5) was not available, however, the component rounds and links were substituted.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that belted 20mm A/C ammunition be furnished because this requires considerable effort to belt while in port in addition to normal replenishing. Time, space, and personnel are not available during operations to belt ammunition.

During replenishment, 62 fire bombs (Napalm tanks) were rejected and returned to NavOrdPac. These were promptly replaced by NavOrdPac. The tanks were damaged and not useable probably due to careless handling and poor stowage facilities.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that better stowage facilities be made available and that returnable crates be provided for some degree of protection to the tank during handling and stowage.

D. Summary of Aviation Ordnance Expanded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>50# GP P Bombs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350# AIB Bombs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260# S/S AIB Bombs</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>358</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; NVAH Rockets</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20mm Ammo</td>
<td>42,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 Cal. Ammo</td>
<td>91,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

3. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun positions</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road bridges</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road cuts</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cuts</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar stations</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage tanks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad overpass</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ox carts</td>
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<td>Oxen</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Command posts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation post</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power transformer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dock with large amount of supplies destroyed.
Troop trenches strafed with no assessment of damage.

C. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft:

1. One aircraft damaged by enemy fire and consequently lost in water landing.
2. One aircraft damaged by own bomb blast and consequently lost in water landing.
3. One aircraft nosed over and burned during emergency landing at K-53. Engine malfunction believed caused by enemy small arms fire observed by ships in vicinity of target area.
4. Six other aircraft slightly damaged by enemy flak and small arms fire.
PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

a. Performance

1. Personnel
   The high morale of the crew was reflected in the excellent job performed during the period of this report. Personnel on board during this period including Marines was 119 officers and 1003 enlisted for a total of 1122. There were no transfers or new personnel reporting aboard during this period.

2. Education
   Educational advancement received continued emphasis despite a heavy operating schedule. Ships company personnel are currently enrolled in twenty five USMIL Courses, nineteen officer correspondence course, one hundred twenty three enlisted correspondence courses and a total of two hundred eleven course books are checked out for study. Valuable on the job training was utilized during the period.

3. Divine Services
   Services conducted aboard during this period included, three protestant services, one catholic mass, daily catholic rosary services, one Latter Day Saints class, two periods of choir practices and one bible class.

4. Welfare and Recreation
   Maintenance requirements reduced movie showings to six during this period, a capacity turnout indicated this to be the most popular shipboard recreation.

   A daily summary of aircraft missions and damages inflicted plus a roundup of world news and sporting events is given over the ships announcing system by the Chaplain each day at noon. This is a great morale builder and is eagerly awaited by all hands.

   The ships cruise book is progressing on schedule and will be completer when the ship reaches the states.

   A large number of officers and enlisted personnel take advantage of rest hotel facilities during in-port periods.

   Thanksgiving dinner left little to be desired and was a great contribution to morale.

b. Casualties

1. Captain Charles A. WILLIS, USN, was wounded in the left arm by enemy AA fire during a bombing run 11201, 23 November 1952. Captain WILLIS landed at K-53 and was evacuated to a Korean hospital.

-20-
2. Major Raymond J. Nightyak, USMC, 023222, attempted an emergency landing at K-53 about 1630Z, 27 November 1952. During the landing roll out the plane nosed over to the inverted position. Intense fir plus wing rockets prevented nearby personnel from rescuing the pilot. The body of Major Nightyak was returned aboard the following day.
SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

1. **Comment:** Upon breaking out a box of .50 primer detonators (lot No. A 030), after having been aboard in the ships magazines less than ten days, they were found to be wet and corroded. Check of the ship's storages spaces showed no destructive moisture content and the container box showed no indication of previous wetness. However, the detonators were in such condition that they were considered unsafe for use.

**Recommendation:**
That great care be exercised when handling and storing ammunition and when possible damage is assessed that steps be taken to inspect and remove the damaged items. The limited amount of storage space aboard a CVE does not leave allowance for a percentage of "throw-aways."

2. **Comment:** A napalm mixer manufactured by General Motors Corporation, Harrison Radiator Division, Lockport, N.Y. (serial U4424) was used in order to evaluate its effectiveness. No instruction book accompanied the instrument, but familiarity with mixing napalm by ships personnel through use of a similar, and by considered opinion, more efficient piece of equipment (USS BAYONETT STRAIT [CVE-116] ltr ser 68 of 22 Jan 1952) evaluation was effectively realized. The results obtained from the General Motors Corporation indicate that the mixer is unsuitable for cold weather operation when gasoline runs below normal temperatures in ships tanks.

**Recommendation:**
A complete evaluation report is being prepared, by separate correspondence, for BUOrd. However, at this time the basic discrepancy to be noted is that the heat exchanger unit on the mixer should be enlarged for adequate mixing of the powder with the gasoline. A unit similar to that described in the above mentioned BAYONETT STRAIT'S letter is believed to answer the immediate needs of napalm preparation.

3. **Comment:** Numerous bursters for Fuze H-157 were discovered to be oversized. Twenty-two (22) out of the 302 bursters handled were found to be oversized. These were taken from lots No. C.P. 15817-23 of June 1951 and No. C.P. 15817-23 of July 1951. (See gunnery, also).

**Recommendation:**
That more careful inspection of ordnance materials be made at the manufacturing point.

4. **Comment:** During this operation the ship's starboard whip antennas were required to be lowered for roughly 10 hours out of every 24 hours. The reasons - launching and recovery periods, loading napalm tanks (due to possible high induction fields indicated in ComairFac ltr ser 10/02314 of 29 October) and topping-off periods.
Recommendation:
That conclusive tests be made on CWK type carrier for induction activity or that the starboard antennas be relocated to eliminate the close proximity to the flight deck.

5. Comment: The MK-4 life-raft located at the LSO platform for emergencies has no designated stowage space. As a result, the V-4 Division of the NAVY LANTHAR manufactured a quick release rack on the outboard side of the gun tub, located just aft of the platform, in order to make it readily available to be jettisoned. Iron straps (1/2" x 3/16") with quick-release pin were used.

Recommendation:
That all carriers use ship's force to manufacture a similar device for emergency release, should an aircraft be ditched near by.

6. Comment: The VM squadron operating aboard was equipped with AN/ AMW-6 direction finders. This was not known until shortly before their arrival. Bench-test components were immediately ordered in order to service the gear. All parts except the harness and control box have arrived at this time. No operating handbook has been received, however, the equipment has been set-up for operation through the efforts of competent personnel.

Recommendation:
That electronic bench-test equipment for the AN/AMW-6 be added to the section "n" allowance of all carriers.

7. Comment: As a result of uncontrolled skidding by aircraft coming out of the arresting gear and the limited parking space ahead of the barriers, several planes have received minor damage through collision. The flight deck was stained with Buships formula 21.

Recommendation:
Several corrective measures are offered: One, that an abrasive be added to the stain. Two, that flight deck planking be prefabricated with an abrasive material and to avoid having an aircraft come upon this increased traction suddenly, graduate the degrees of abrasiveness; or perhaps install about every third or fourth crossdeck planking with a uniform prefabricated abrasive planks in order to avoid the possibility of a nose-up.

8. Comment: Wet weather together with the maneuvering of airplanes on the hard rubber mats at the forward end of the R-4C catapult shuttle track has broken the mats adhesion to the flight deck. The ship's carpenter has used every available adhesive but has not successfully secured the mats to the flight deck. One mat was put in during the ships last yard period, while the second was put in by the ships force recently.
Recommendation:
That effective materials and procedures for fastening rubber mats to flight deck be developed. The following methods are suggested for consideration: One, that flat-head wood screws secure the mat to a wood deck. Or secondly, using round head bolts with washers to secure the mat through to the steel deck below.

9. Comment: Serious stowage problems for departmental and squadron materials are encountered on the hangar deck and elevator pits. Additional room is required for mixing napalm, wing stowage, ADC's and machine gun cleaning.

Recommendation:
That tank-top conversion (BuNoNo 840015) with a date of 12 November 1951 be considered for early installation in order to afford additional stowage requirements along with personnel and work space needs.

10. Comment: One hundred fifty (150) N7 & N8 Napalm tanks were received at Sasebo, Japan when re-arming ship for this operation, of these, seven five (75) were rejected as being damaged to much to be used. On some tanks the seams were split, others had the external igniter bracket broken off and others had so many dents and creases that it was feared they would cause severe buffeting when in flight.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all tanks before issuing and survey tanks not suitable for issue prior to delivery to operating forces.

11. Comment: 18,000 rounds of aircraft incendiary 20mm were received at Sasebo. Of these, the contents of two (2) wooden cases were so badly corroded they were dangerous to handle. Ammunition had gotten wet and was evidently not inspected before issue.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all wooden cases and boxes of ammunition before issuing and survey the unfit rounds.

12. Comment: The V.T. Fuzes 7-90 of Log No. 9-2-594-1 of June 1945 had the arming wire protection ring modified by increasing the thickness of the ring one quarter of an inch (\textfrac{1}{4}). One set of locking pins had been modified to receive an arming wire and one pin had not been modified. The second pin is being modified on board at this time.

Recommendation:
That when modifications are to be made, they be completed prior to being issued to operating activities; in order that the operating forces may not be hindered by a modification program prior to using the ordnance.
13. **Comment:** Because of an excessive number of wires broken or burned the following crossdeck pendants were replaced:

- #1 after 50 engagements
- #2 after 53 engagements
- #3 after 64 engagements

**Recommendation:**
None.

14. **Statistics:**

a. **Launches**

- **H-2-1 Catapult**
  - No. - 107
  - Avg. Wt. pounds - 14200
  - Avg. Wind knots - 25
  - Avg. Pressure psi - 2700
  - No. Briettes expended - 7

- **H-4C Catapult**
  - No. - 226
  - Avg. Wt. pounds - 15000
  - Avg. Wind knots - 26
  - Avg. Pressure psi - 2200
  - No. Briettes expended - 12

b. **Landings**

- No. - 334
- Avg. Wind knots - 26
- CIP psi - 550
- Avg. Run-out Ft. - 115
- No. times wires caught:
  - #1 - 75
  - #2 - 131
  - #3 - 74
  - #4 - 45
  - #5 - 7
- Barriers engaged - 0

**Engineering Department**

1. **Electronics:** During this operation several electronic difficulties were encountered. The most serious was with the four VK repeaters on board. Two of these repeaters are designed for operation with the AN/USR-6 AEW system. This system has been out of operation for the past six months due to the lack of a transformer which has burned out. Replacements are unavailable in any of the supply activities. VK-No. 2 and VK-No. 3 operate with this system and even though the system is inoperative the VK's can still be used as repeaters for the search radars. The 120 volt line voltage for these two repeaters is obtained from the ships 440 V.A.C. generators. The
440 volts is stepped down to 120 volts through a transformer common to the AN/MDX-6 system only. In addition to this transformer, the line voltage for these repeaters is further controlled by a center tap transformer. A fire occurred in VA-No. 3, burning out both fuse holders and impairing the off-center range switch and its associated wiring. Multiple of the fuses blew in trying to determine the cause of the fire. It was discovered that the line voltage on VA-No. 2 was 128 volts instead of the normal 117. The line voltage at the ANW transformer was 117 volts. Further investigation showed the line passed through the above mentioned center tap transformer and improper positioning of the center-tap had raised the line voltage from 117V to 128V. This center-tap transformer was labeled as an auto-transformer for the SG-1 radar on the main plate, and the fact that it was being used to control the line voltage for VA-No. 2 and VK-No. 3 was not known by any of the electronic personnel. Further, the design of the VK repeaters is such that an undersize fuse holder must be used because of space limitations. The end of the fuse holder comes within a fraction of an inch of the off-centering range switch. It is felt that the over heating of the fuse holder, caused by the high line voltage and current plus the defective fuses installed caused the fire without blowing the fuses. This repeater was placed back in operation after about five man-days work. The night following the fire, VA-No. 2 blew a fuse. It was felt that this was also due to the line overload. It was at this time the center-tap transformer was discovered. The voltage was cut down to 117 volts and VA-No. 2 refused and put back on the line. Then VA-No. 1 and VA-No. 4 both blew fuses with VA-No. 1 also burning out one fuse holder. Investigation showed that these two repeaters get their 120 volts supply from a transformer common to much of the ship's lighting circuits in the forward part of the ship. After putting these repeaters back on the line a chart was kept of the line voltages at these two repeaters. These voltages varied from 112 volts to 123 volts. It was learned that the transformers supplying this voltage operate at full load conditions and that any changes in this load, such as turning on electrical machinery, will cause the voltage to fluctuate. These two repeaters continued to blow fuses periodically during the operation due to overload. It is recommended that the VK set up be modified to include a separate transformer for obtaining their line voltage rather than have the varying load condition occurring with the use of lighting circuit transformers.

One of the TCK transmitters was put out of commission to work on a noisy motor generator. It was found that the ball bearing in the motor end was very poorly packed and apparently had a flat ball. This bearing was replaced and the bearing on the generator was repacked. This transmitter was out of commission for about four hours. There were no other failures in communications equipment.

The only other electronic difficulty was several tube failures in the AN/ UFX-1. The tubes that failed are the 6K4 and 6V56. These are the same tubes that have failed several times previously this year. It is felt that none of the above failures seriously affected the ship's operating schedule. There were always at least to VA's on the line, the TCK was put out of commission only during a lull in ship to shore traffic and the AN/UFX-1 was out of commission for a short period of time.
The continued shortage of electronics rating caused a hand to mouth operation at all times. The air division has been able to keep enough of the electronics equipment in operation to permit a satisfactory evaluation during this and other combat patrols, but to do this it is often necessary for certain of the higher rated personnel to work 10 to 12 hours a day.

The theory that designated strikers are rated men and that third class petty officers can be counted as second class and on up the line, is not always true. In practice it is found that a designated striker, although very interested in his work, falls short of the practical knowledge found in the third class petty officer. In doing repair work the most dependable men are the first and second class petty officers, the third class petty officer is a good assistant but seldom has sufficient practical knowledge to do the job alone. In the final summary of the first and second class petty officers form the repair crews and unless they are supplied in sufficient number, we will have to work long hours if the equipment is to operate.

C. Operations Department:

1. Combat Information Center: Enlisted personnel in CIC are arranged in three rotating watch sections with one watch officer, one Air Controller and one Air Operations Officer on watch during all air operations.

Air control of defensive CAP, departing Task Forces and SHFACS are the primary functions of CIC during present operations. Defensive CAP is used to intercept all returning SHFACS in addition to unidentified aircraft, thus providing maximum training of Air Controllers.

Defensive Air Control work is seriously limited by proximity of land and limitations of equipment in this type of operation. During air operations the carrier remains within twenty-five to forty miles of enemy territory. The average range of detection of single aircraft over water with SK Air Search radar has been thirty to forty miles and almost negative results obtained with aircraft over land. CAP stationed between the ship and expected attack origin have a bare twenty miles in which to intercept an aircraft before it enters the ships detection range. This would be inadequate should jet aircraft make an attack on the ship. The ship is equipped with both NK-3 and UFACK type IFF, however, the UFACK type has a non-directional antenna. This produces an identification ring on the scope at the proper range but no bearing. This system further reduces the IFF detection range to about a thirty mile maximum. An SPS-6 type radar with directional type IFF is recommended for ships conducting this type of operation.

2. Communications:

a. Personnel: The shortage of rated personnel, although serious, did not hamper the rapid transmission or reception of messages. Radio watches were stood on a basis of one in three. Any further loss of rated personnel would necessitate the standing of radio watches on a port and starboard basis. OMO watches were stood on a basis of one in three with two OMO's on watch continuously. Due to the heavy encrypted traffic load, the OMO watch was augmented by two additional officers during peak periods.

b. Traffic analysis: It has been determined that over one hundred messages a day were handled by the main communication station, at least one half of which were classified. Classified traffic amounted to an average of approximately twelve thousand coded groups a day.
c. material: a worn bearing on the motor generator of the TCK-1 was the only casualty that occurred to the transmitters. This was repaired in a period of four to six hours. If this repair had not been affected the loss of this transmitter would have seriously affected operational communications due to there being no spare transmitters in this frequency range available. Due to the shortage of transmitters in the medium to high frequency range, all medium to high frequency transmitters must be in operation continuously.

Carry-over was experienced on two primary VHF circuits (voice) causing serious difficulty in the control of aircraft during critical periods of air operations. Interference was experienced on several occasions on primary CW nets. This interference was attributed to the proximity of frequencies and attempted jamming.

One of the most serious difficulties experienced this patrol in regard to communications was the continued failure of coding machines. During the last operation failure was experienced with the two machines this unit is allowed during the in-port period both machines were turned over to Crypto-Repair facilities in Sasebo. Work on neither machine was satisfactorily complete and prior to departure both machines were turned in to the RPMIO in Sasebo and two other machines were drawn. These had just been returned to RPMIO from a repair facility and were thought to be in excellent repair. However on the fifth day of operating one of the machines became inoperative due to failure of the clutch mechanism. The other machine has remained operative but has consistently given trouble in that it has failed to print properly. Failure of the one machine has thrown the entire load of eight to twelve thousand code groups a day on this machine and has doubled the work load on crypto personnel due to improper printing.

Before leaving Sasebo it was requested that an additional machine be issued on temporary custody for use as a spare in case of failure. This request was turned down by the RPMIO due to the allowance list. Had both machines become inoperative during this operation it would not have been possible to keep up with the operational traffic that is required to be handled by a Task Element Commander in this area. There are no Crypto-Repair personnel assigned to this unit.

Recommendations:

1. Safeguard the number of trained enlisted and officer personnel so that it will not be necessary to decrease the number of watches from the present one in three. Any increase in the work load would increase the fatigue and decrease efficiency.

2. Provide a spare transmitter in the medium to high frequency range to guard against a serious hampering of primary communications in the event of a one hundred percent casualty to a medium to high frequency transmitter.

3. Continue the effort to decrease the amount of traffic, both classified and unclassified, that is transmitted by radio. Mail should be used as often as possible.
4. That the allowance list be increased to allow three coding machines to be issued to CVE's on this duty. This increased allowance would only be required during the time the unit is operating in this area and could be transferred to each relieving unit in turn.

5. That present crypto repair facilities be examined with a view toward improving the quality of repair work.

6. That if practicable one crypto repair man be assigned to CVE's operating in this capacity.

3. Photographic Laboratory: The photo laboratory is operated by three rated men and one striker with the senior rate being a second class photographer. In addition to standing flight deck watches and continuing routine shipboard work, the laboratory supported five photographic sorties, expending three rolls of F-56 film and two rolls of K-20 film. Negatives from these sorties were used to produce three mosaics plus 154 prints.

4. Aerology: Ratt circuits provide the main source of aerological data in this area and proved to be unreliable during many hours of the day. Facsimile equipment is very desirable for carriers operating in this area.

D. Medical Department:

1. Captain Charles A. Willis 037774, USN, was wounded in the left arm by small caliber AA fire on 23 November 1952. Captain Willis was flown to a Korean hospital. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

2. Major Raymond M. Hix, USMC, was killed attempting an emergency landing at K-53 when his plane nosed over to an inverted position and burned. Remains were returned aboard the following day and transported to Sasebo. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

3. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

   a. admitted to sick list 24
   b. Total sick days out of 12342 possible working days 80
   c. Officers admitted to sick list 1
   d. Total patient visits to sick call 466
   e. Total medical treatments 539
   f. Patients received from other ships 2
   g. Patients transferred to hospital 0
   h. Number minor injuries treated 26
   i. Number major injuries treated 4
   j. Number shipboard injuries resulting in death 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures 3
   l. Major surgical procedures 0
   m. Venereal Disease cases and non-specific Urethritis total 18
      1. Gonorrhea 4, Chancroid 3
      2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure 11
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last in port period 238
4. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 4
b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation 1
c. Average number days pilots grounded 3.2
d. Crew grounded for medical reasons 0
e. No. of pilots KIA 1
f. No. of pilots WIA 1

H. L. RAY

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCNAVFLT (2) advance
CINCNAVFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COM7thFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMInPAC (5)
COMMessVPAC
COMPAKRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMAIRDIV 15
COMCARDIV 17
CO, FAMINESTUPAC (2)
CO, AINFRAC (1) Advance
CG, FrAC (1) Advance
CG, 1st MARAIRWING
CG, MAG-12
CG, VFA-312

CO, U.S.S. Batan (CVL-29)
CO, U.S.S. Reina (CVE-114)
CO, U.S.S. Bairoko (CVE-115)
CO, U.S.S. Point Cruz (CVE-119)
CO, U.S.S. Sicily (CVE-118)

AUTHORIZED

R. R. Stansell, CO, USN

CGR, USN
Operations Officer
FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 28 November 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>No. A/C</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Launch</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Ammo</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1000#/0.25 as alternate load.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
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<td>1515</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-12</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>A, B</td>
<td>500#/0.25 as alternate load.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HELICOPTER**

- Guard mail
- Guard mail

Note:
1. Events A, B, and C without belly tanks.
2. Events D and E with belly tanks.

**Ammo Load**

- A - All A/C full gun loads.
- B - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.

B. S. COMKITT JR.
Lcdr., USN
Air Operations Officer
The following is a list of damage inflicted by planes from this carrier and verified by intelligence sources in North Korea. This is not a complete report covering all strikes made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 November 1952</td>
<td>HONGGAN-MI area</td>
<td>Seven North Koreans Killed, twenty-eight wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>SUNWI-DO area</td>
<td>Seven North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>SUNWI-DO area</td>
<td>Twenty North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>MONGGANP'0-RI area</td>
<td>Twelve North Koreans Killed, one light machine gun destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'ILANG-MI area</td>
<td>Fifty-one North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'ANGHYAN-MI area</td>
<td>Twenty-nine North Koreans Killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'ILANG-MI area</td>
<td>One North Korean Killed, large ammo dump destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'ILANG-MI area</td>
<td>Three North Koreans Killed, twenty-one houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'INNAMPO area</td>
<td>One warehouse containing 3000 bags rice destroyed, two small junkers and three cement houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>SINC'ION area</td>
<td>Eighty-three North Koreans Killed, twenty wounded. One warehouse containing 300 bags rice and four pillboxes destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November 1952</td>
<td>HONGGAN-MI area</td>
<td>Nineteen North Koreans Killed, two bunkers, two guard posts, and one 80mm mortar destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>UPCH'O-RI area</td>
<td>Six North Koreans Killed, six wounded and one truck destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>UPCH'O-RI area</td>
<td>Nine North Koreans Killed, eight wounded and one civilian wounded Two bomb shelters destroyed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (3)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>SHANJ-DO Area</td>
<td>Seven North Koreans killed and six houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November 1952</td>
<td>UPCH'U-RI Area</td>
<td>Fifty North Koreans killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CH'INNAMPO Area</td>
<td>One warehouse containing 3000 bags grain, two junks and cement jetties destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHIANGYAN-NI Area</td>
<td>Thirty North Koreans killed and four houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHEILANG-NI Area</td>
<td>One North Korean killed, one wounded. One large ammo dump and fifteen houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 November 1952</td>
<td>CHEILANG-NI Area</td>
<td>Three North Koreans killed, three wounded. Twenty-one houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>SHINMI-DO Area</td>
<td>Twenty laborers killed and one hundred-twenty houses destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1952</td>
<td>HONGGUMPO-RI Area</td>
<td>One-hundred North Koreans attack D-4 safe village. Partisans plus Navy and Air repelled attack, killing twelve North Koreans, and wounding nine. One heavy machine gun and ten rifles were destroyed with no friendly casualties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander S&WTHN Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 7 December through 17 December 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) O705 Navy Regulations
(b) Opnav Inst 3480.1
(c) CinC PacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample air schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of 11-24

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Element 95.11 for the period 7 December through 17 December 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 7 December until 2100 on 16 December of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.
Part II Chronological Order of Events.
Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to Unit-312 Type "B" Report Combat Diary for December 1952.
A. During the period of 7 December to 16 December 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VHA-312 embarked, operated as a unit of TE 95.11, Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command of TE 95.11 was Captain H. L. J. deV, O2691/1310, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT. Ship’s assigned CTE 95.11 as screen included the U.S.S. HICKOX (DE-573), U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DL-182), H.K.C.S. GUADALCÁ, (DDE-228), and H.K.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three as units were transferred temporarily to CTE 95.12 for night patrols along the enemy held coast line.

B. The BADOENG STRAIT sailed from Sasebo on 7 December 1952, with H.K.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) in company as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 050606Z of December. Both ships conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises in area GEORG while enroute. These ships became units of TE 95.11 at 072100Z when the Commanding Officer, BADOENG STRAIT, relieved the Commanding Officer of H.K.S GLORY (CVI-19) as CTE 95.11.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coast line and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TE 95.12, the Island Naval Defense Element; the troops of TE 95.15, the Island Defense Element; and the units of TE 95.11, the Carrier Element. The Island Defense Element is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends the islands fringing the enemy held coast line from the Han River on the South to the Taedong estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Element in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Element have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

D. In performing its assigned tasks, TE 95.11 normally operated in the area southwest of PAENGNYOUNK-DO, conducting dawn to dusk air operations, and retired southward for the night. Five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours with approximately fifty percent of available aircraft in each launch. In each launch four aircraft were assigned as a TARCAP for CTU 95.12.1 stationed in the vicinity of SOKTO Island, two aircraft were assigned as CAP, and when aircraft availability permitted, a four plane STRIKE or reconnaisance flight was added. It was usually possible to launch three such strikes each day.

E. During this patrol there were numerous requests from the Island Defense Element and from Guerilla activities for STRIKE against troops which threatened the security of friendly islands. Continued attack was made on these targets, particularly those in the vicinity of SOKTO-DO and SOKTO. Little change was made in the employment of aircraft practiced on the previous patrol. Except at dawn and dusk, CAP aircraft were given a full ordnance loading of bombs or napalm and provided support in the PAENGNYOUNK-DO to HAEJU
area, returning later for defensive purposes. The TAKGAN was assigned pre-
briefed targets to be attacked when the controlling ship had no targets re-
quiring attention. Armed reconnaissance of the coastline northward to
MamChon was scheduled on alternate days to coincide with the time of Saber
jet sweeps in that area.

F. Air operations were marred by two accidents which fortunately ended
without serious injury to personnel. The Corsair piloted by Captain C. L.
Williams, USMC, crashed over the bow into the water following a catapult
launch. It appears that either the catapult bridle or the aircraft bridle
hook failed during the initial impulse allowing the plane to move without
catapult assist and therefore unable to gain sufficient speed to become
airborne. The pilot was recovered by helicopter uninjured and returned
aboard in six minutes. The Corsair piloted by Major Vernon E. Ball, USMC,
was hit by AA fire while attacking an enemy truck and became untenable. Major
Ball parachuted from low altitude, landing on a wad flat in the Taedong-
Gang southwest of Ch'Inhwaipo. He was covered by his team mates until picked
up by the Air Force helicopter from Chodo. Major Ball suffered a punctured
thorax when his plane was hit.

G. A considerable amount of difficulty with bombs failing to release from
wing racks was experienced as on previous patrols. Since landing fields
are available, it has been doctrine to send aircraft with bombs larger than
1,000 lb to land at K-6 airfield for removal, although the absence of those
planes reduces the offensive effort which is possible for the day. Squadron
maintenance is concentrating on finding a solution.

H. A number of Japanese fishing vessels began to appear in the operating
area North of 36° North Latitude during this operation. Such vessels, most
of which appear to be equipped with radio and direction finders, could prove
dangerous to the security of allied ships operating in the Yellow Sea. This
opinion was reported to CNE 95.12 with information to the Commander West
Coast Blockade and Patrol Group on 8 December 1952.

I. The interchanging of officers with the H.M.S. GLORY and screening ships
for familiarization and training has been continued. The Air Operations
Officer of CTF 95.1, Commander PACFY, MIF, was aboard during the early
portion of the cruise to observe air operations. Two officers from H.M.S. GLORY
and three from H.M.C.S. ChimoDak were aboard at various times during the
period for the same purpose. The BAIDONG STRAIT sent two officers to the
GLORY to observe carrier air operations, and four to the CROCODILE to observe
night inshore patrol and bombardment. One officer was sent on a visit to
the Island Defense Element for liaison purposes. Unfortunately, the inter-
change of officers on the part of the BAIDONG STRAIT was necessarily
restricted to junior officers, since the ship's allowance is such that others
cannot be spared at sea.
J. A highlight of the patrol was the visit of the Task Group Commander, Rear Admiral C. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN. The Admiral arrived aboard by high-line from H.M.S. NEWCASTLE and hoisted his flag on the BADOENG STRAIT. It is possible that this is the first time in history that an admiral of the Royal Navy has hoisted his flag on a U.S. Navy vessel. The admiral returned to the NEWCASTLE two days later.

K. VMT-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. CAMERON, 07027, USMC, was aboard during this period. Planes assigned to this squadron consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft aboard per day for the period was nineteen. Average availability per day was seventeen. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 345 for a total of 823 hours. A total of 69.2 hours of this was "over the target time." A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron One was aboard as plane guard. The helicopter flew forty-six sorties for a total of twenty-six hours. One rescue was made by the helicopter when a plane entered the water after an aborted catapult shot.
PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

7 December
0630I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 050606Z of December 1952, the U.S.S. BAODING STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMA-312 and HU-1 detachment embarked, got underway from baseo, Japan for operating areas, "Main" and "KIKI", off the west Coast of Korea.

1050I/ H.M.S. AThasASCAlt (DUE-219) joined as previously directed.

1105I/ Commenced 40mm AA firing at towed sleeve.

1135I/ Completed AA firing. Two tow sleeves knocked down by 40mm fire. A total of 1290 rounds of 40mm ammunition expended in this training exercise.

2000I/ CTE 95.11 (H.M.S. GLORY) advised BAODING STRAIT that U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) had been directed to investigate vessels in position 36°32'N 124°18'E and if Japanese to escort them westward to 124°00'E, from there southward until ordered to rendezvous with BAODING STRAIT.

2100I/ Relieved H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2210I/ U.S.S. HICKOX advised CTE 95.11 she was escorting two Japanese fishing vessels westward.

2347I/ U.S.S. HICKOX reported two additional vessels being escorted westward, identified as same vessels ordered out of area on previous night.

8 December
0050I/ Received message from CTE 95.11 (presumably sent by H.M.S. GLORY) action CTE 95.12, information BAODING STRAIT. Message stated sixteen fishing vessels located 3°16'N 124°50'E, investigation not practicable.

0304I/ CTE 95.11 directed U.S.S. HICKOX to take only such action with respect to Japanese fishing boats as is authorized in paragraphs six through eight, Appendix BAR 9 to CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

0352I/ CTE 95.11 advised CTE 95.12 that presence of Japanese fishing boats (about two hundred miles North of their prescribed area) presented a security threat to CTE 95.11 operations and requested establishment of a special patrol as provided by CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52.

0730I/ Two CAP, four TARKAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 directed TARKAP to attack troops in village of KANSONCH'ON. Twelve buildings in the village were destroyed. Flight then flew reconnaissance of TAEDONG River to CH'INNAPO. STRIKE group attacked pre-briefed target consisting of railroad bridge in
SONGWHA area. Flight damaged bridge and made two rail cuts. Two aircraft from this flight diverted to K-7 to remove bomb ordnance.

0830I/ Arrived in operating area "MAN".

0850I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) joined as previously directed.

0900I/ Two CAP and four TACCAP launched. CAP released to attack storage dump in Ch'INMAPO area. Target area completely covered by rockets and napalm destroying an estimated 2,400 bags of rice. Flight returned to ship as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of buildings, bunkers, and trenches in the CHANGYON area. One gun position and two buildings were destroyed. Light small arms fire was encountered.

0908I/ U.S.S. HICKOX reported four Japanese fishing vessels had been left at 36°24'N 123°55'E proceeding on course 180°T at 9 knots.

0915I/ Recovered 0730I launch.

1008I/ CTE 95.12 advised CTG 95.1 that ship availability would not permit special fish patrol until second U.S. Destroyer made available.

1014I/ Lt. Com. E. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, CTG 95.1, (CTE 95.19), plus two members of his staff came aboard by highline from H.M.S. NEWCASTLE to observe Task Element 95.11 operations and hoisted his flag.

1027I/ CTE 95.19 concurred with CTE 95.12 with respect to fishing patrol and requested CTF 95.1 discuss matter with CAP 95 to clarify classification of fishing areas and procedures and consider possibility of providing patrol from sources other than TG 95.1.

1100I/ Two CAP and four plane TACCAP launched. CAP released to attack supply dump in the CHANGYON area. Dump area was hit with full ordnance load. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack pre-briefed target, villages containing troops in CHANGYON area. Flight destroyed seven buildings and damaged a railroad bridge.

1119I/ Landed two replacement aircraft plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-6.

1129I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1245I/ Two CAP and four plane TACCAP launched. CAP released to attack supply dump in CHANGYON area and made two road cuts and building housing a truck was damaged. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack pre-briefed targets, troops in CHANGYON area. Flight dropped fifteen frags in troop area with no estimate of damage. Seven buildings were destroyed and two buildings damaged in neighboring villages.
Light AA fire was encountered.

1302I/ Recovered 11001 launch.

1315I/ H.M.C.S. CAUSABLE (DUE-221) joined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBEC patrol.

1445I/ Two CAP, three TACCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TACCAP to attack pre-briefed target, troops and supplies in CH'INHAPPO area. One building damaged one destroyed in CH'INHAPPO area. Four buildings destroyed in village of KONGCH'ON and caves in ULLYUL area attacked. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. STRIKE group destroyed one railroad overpass and damaged another in SONGHWA area. Four buildings destroyed and two damaged in ONGJI area. Photos were taken of areas containing possible future targets.

1450I/ Recovered 1245I launch.

1640I/ Recovered 1445I launch.

1700I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

2010I/ CTG 95.1 advised CTE 95.19 and CTE 95.11 that (a) additional ships were not available for fishing patrol, (b) that the only restrictions placed on Japanese fishing boats by Japanese government were for them to stay south of latitude 36-00N, and that (c) a representative of CTF 95 would discuss the problem with COMNAVFE.

2155I/ CTE 95.11 requested to investigate possible attack on friendly island of SUDWI-DO by 700 North Korean troops dressed in civilian clothes and living in civilian houses at HANGWAN.

Weather Summary:
Variable low clouds, scattered to broken with bases at 1500 to 2000 feet, high overcast at 10,000 to 14,000 feet in ship area. Target area had no low clouds and remained CAVU throughout the day. Winds northerly 10 to 20 knots.

Mission Summary:
CAP ten, TACCAP seventeen and STRIKE ten for a total of thirty-seven sorties.

9 December
0715I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TACCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. TACCAP destroyed gun position in P'UNGSAW area and a small boat in the CHANGYON area. Automatic weapons fire observed in this area. STRIKE group damaged a railroad bypass in the SINCH'ON area.
Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP launched. In response to the request of friendly troops in SUnWI-DO island CAP attacked troop village in SUnWI-DO area, destroying ten buildings and returned to act as defensive CAP. TARCAP attacked village containing 400 troops in CHANGYON area destroying three buildings. Flight destroyed two buildings in OGWUN area and damaged one in T'aeET'AN area.

Recovered 0715I launch.

Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troop village in SUnWI-DO area destroying five buildings and damaging four. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. TARCAP attacked caves and troop villages in CHANGYON area damaging caves and destroying five buildings. One plane of this flight hit by 30 cal AA fire with minor damage. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. STRIKE attacked railroad tunnel and sheds in CHANGYON area. Tunnel was closed, shed and road bridge damaged. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

U.S.S. KOTOYUMI directed by CTE 95.12 to patrol for fishing vessels in the vicinity of 36 CON for a period of twenty-four hours.

Recovered 0900I launch.

HICKOK

U.S.S./(DL-673) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

Rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SUnWI-DO area destroying one building and damaging another. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. TARCAP was joined by two aircraft from K-6. Flight attacked caves containing troops in CHANGYON area killing an estimated ten troops and wounding ten. Three buildings and a boat destroyed plus three boats damaged in CHANGYON area. Two aircraft from this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance. Light AA fire was observed.

Recovered 1100I launch.

Two plane CAP, two plane TARCAP launched. TARCAP attacked troop and storage area in vicinity of CHANGYON with unassessable damage.

Recovered 1315I launch plus two planes previously diverted to K-6.

Recovered two aircraft diverted to K-6 on previous day.
1706I/ recovered 1515I launch.

1714I/ Force retired southward for the night.

2030I/ CTI 95.15 advised there was a motor junk, sail junk, and 150 rubber boats assembled in 5OK-TO Island area presumably for invasion of friendly 5OK-TO Island. A plane from Air Force was requested to illuminate area at night.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds with ceiling of 2,500 feet until 1400I. High broken clouds throughout the day. No low clouds in TarCAP area during day. Visibility was unlimited and wind was 12 to 15 knots from the North.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TarCAP, and ten STRIKE for a total of thirty-eight sorties.

10 December
0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TarCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. TarCAP released by CTI 95.12.1 to attack a village containing troops in the 5OK-TO Island area. Twelve houses were destroyed in the village. CTI 95.12.1 directed TarCAP to attack trenches reported to contain 150 rubber boats in the same area. Trench area was damaged. Remaining ordnance was expended on island of UNG-DU, reported by CTI 95.15 as probable supply base for suspected invasion of 5OK-TO Island. STRIKE group attacked enemy positions on island of UNG-DO. Damage was unassessable.

0905I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TarCAP launched. CTI 95.12.1 released TarCAP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of troops and supplies in CHANG TAO area. Two villages attacked and eleven buildings destroyed. Troop and gun positions attacked with hits being made on two gun positions. One plane of this flight hit in each wing by small caliber AA fire. One plane of this flight lost napalm bomb during take-off. However, bomb fell in water resulting in no damage.

CAP was released to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of troops and supplies in CHANG-NG area. Full ordnance load expended on troop area with unassessable damage. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP.

0918I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1110I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TarCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP released to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of revetted buildings in T'ale'T'ah area. Six buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP.
CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets. Troop concentration attacked in CHANGYON area with unassessable damage. Four camouflaged trucks and a cave were damaged. Two planes of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage. STRIKE group attacked reveted buildings in CHANGYON area. A reveted locomotive shed was damaged. One railroad tunnel was damaged and a radar site attacked.

1125I/ Recovered 09051 launch.

1146I/ U.S.S. HICKOK (DD-673) rejoined screen from CTG 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1155I/ Adm. E.G.N. CLIFT (DD-21), KN, CTG 95.1, (CTG 95.19), plus two members of his staff transferred to H.M.C.S. CHUNHAER (DDE-228) by high-line; admiral's flag hauled down.

1202I/ Two H.M.C.S. CHUNHAER officers transferred to H.M.C.S. CHUNHAER by high line to observe WHITBREAD patrol operations.

1205I/ H.M.C.S. CHUNHAER (DDE-228) detached to CTG 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CaP and four plane TaRCaP launched. CaP released to attack troops and bunkers in SANYI-DO area. Entire ordnance load expended in troop area with unassessable damage. Flight returned to act as defensive CaP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets in P'UNGSN area. Camouflaged truck area hit. Four buildings of a troop village destroyed. Flight made reconnaissance of HANJON River before returning.

1329I/ Recovered 11101 launch.

1515I/ Two plane CaP, four plane TaRCaP, and seven plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCaP to attack pre-briefed targets consisting of villages containing troops in CHANGYON area. Three villages were attacked. Nine buildings were destroyed and seven damaged. Troop bunkers were attacked and light small arms fire was observed during attack. STRIKE group attacked railroad bridge in CHANGYON area as briefed. Target was hit with two bombs, one rail cut was made. An AA position was attacked but bombs did not explode. A railroad overpass in SONGHA area was attacked resulting in eight rail cuts.

1540I/ Recovered 13151 launch.

1706I/ Recovered 15151 launch.
Task Element retired southward for night.

Weather Summary:
Weather was CALM for entire day. Winds from northwest at fourteen to eighteen knots. Below freezing temperatures existed in target area throughout day.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of forty-five sorties.

11 December
07001
Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops and bunkers in SOK-TO Island area. Damage was unassessable. Two radio antennas destroyed and a bunker damaged on hill 391. STRIKE group attacked railroad bridge in CHA-KYONG area. Flight cut three railroad bridges, destroyed four rail cars and made six rail cuts. Light AA fire was encountered.

09151
Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop positions in SUNWI-DO area with unassessed damage. During this flight First Lieutenant Paul C. ROSENBERG, OCMR, flew to K-53 with engine running intermittently and made a wheels up landing. Plane received class "B" damage. Pilot was uninjured. Remaining plane returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops and buildings in ULJUL area. Eighteen buildings destroyed with an estimated ten troops killed and ten wounded.

09301
Recovered 07001 launch.

10401
U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) reported for duty as relief for U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673). U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) chocked to COMDESRON-TWENTY.

11151
Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troop village in SUNWI-DO area. Five buildings damaged and planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops on hill 391. One lookout post destroyed, one bunker destroyed and area neutralized. Ten buildings destroyed and eight damaged in village of HA-GAMJONG. STRIKE destroyed one truck North of CH‘INNAPO. Reveted buildings, trenches and bunkers attacked in HA-GAMJONG-WI area with unassessable damage.

11311
Recovered 09151 launch.

11371
H.M.S. CHUSAFAST (DDE-228) rejoined from CTU 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

11411
Landed two TBM type aircraft (VR-23) from ITAZUKE, Japan.
1151I/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) came along side to deliver mail.

1201I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DD-219) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCAP launched. CAP attacked troops and buildings in SUNWI-DO area. Flight destroyed one building, damaged one and damaged four small boats. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack pre-briefed targets. Six buildings destroyed, one damaged in SOK-TO area. Eight buildings destroyed in neighboring village and flight flew reconnaissance of area before returning.

1325I/ Two TBMs aircraft launched to return to ITAZUKA, Japan. Passenger were CTR PARKY, RN, Air Operations Officer, CTG 95.1, and two RN pilots from H.M.S. GLORY.

1345I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1346I/ Launched helicopter to K-53.

1443I/ Helicopter returned from K-53 with LT HOGRENSON.

1514I/ Commenced launching CAP and TaRCAP.

1516I/ A plane piloted by Captain Charles L. WULFINS, USMCR, failed to gain flying speed when catapulted. Plane struck water in nose down attitude and stayed afloat long enough for pilot to swim clear uninjured. Helicopter rescued pilot and returned him aboard six minutes after entry into water. Breaking of plane launching hook or a broken bridle is believed to have caused the accident.

1547I/ Completed launching two plane CAP and four plane TaRCAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCAP to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Thirteen villages destroyed. After completion of mission the squadron commander with wing man proceeded to K-6 for administrative conference. CTU 95.12.1 directed remainder of flight to PIUNGSAW area where one gun position was destroyed.

1605I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1707I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1709I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

1714I/ Guerrilla liaison officers (Army) came aboard in air force helicopter for conference concerning support of future Guerrilla operations.
Weather Summary:
Clear skies in operating and TaRCap area until noon with low scattered clouds gradually increasing to broken with ceiling of 2000 feet by 1500I. Visibility unrestricted until 1400I, gradually reduced by haze to six miles. Winds light and variable, three to eight knots, during the period.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TaRCap and eight STRIKE for a total of thirty-eight sorties.

12 December
0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TaRCap, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack village of KOSYOU-NI. Flight destroyed a motorcycle, damaged four buildings and three bunkers. Gun positions in CHANGNYON attacked with an estimated five killed and ten wounded. Intense 50 caliber fire was observed. One bunker, four trucks destroyed, and two troops killed in ULAJUL area. STRIKE group destroyed fifteen buildings in village of TONG-SAN-NI. Three buildings destroyed and two damaged in CHANGNYON area.

0826I/ Lieutenant JONES, RCN, came aboard by highline from H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-225) to observe flight operations. Two BAODENG STRIKE officers returned to ship having completed observation of WHITBAND patrol operation.

0905I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TaRCap launched. CAP attacked village in UPOU'O-NI area destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Eighteen buildings destroyed, six buildings and a bunker damaged.

0926I/ One plane of 0700I launch caught No. 6 wire and engaged a barrier damaging aircraft propeller.

0939I/ Completed recovery of 0700I launch.

1025 I/ Launched Air Force helicopter containing Guerrilla liaison representatives.

1115I/ Four plane TaRCap and four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 on 11 December returned to ship to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TaRCap to attack troop village in CHANGNYON area. Five buildings destroyed and five damaged. Two gun positions destroyed on UNG-DO Island. An fire observed on UNG-D. Three huts destroyed in TALCH'ON area. STRIKE group neutralized a command post and radio station in CHANGNYON area. Troops and trenches attacked with unassessable damage. Flight flew reconnaissance of road from CHANGNYON to SINGH'ON.
1126I/ Recovered 09051 launch.

1150I/ H.M.S. ATHENA (DD-219) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHAIR patrol.

1225I/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITEHAIR patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in JUANGDO area. Four buildings were destroyed. One plane returned to ship after being hit by small arms fire. Plane was hit in left oil cooler causing smoke and loss of oil. Remaining plane returned as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in ULYUL area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, damaged one building and an observation post.

1329I/ Landed plane damaged by enemy AA fire.

1335I/ Launched replacement CAP.

1347I/ Recovered 11151 launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack command posts in P'UNGSAE area. Two command posts and mortar position hit with unassessable damage. One building damaged. STRIKE group attacked troop village in T'AMSAN area. Four buildings were destroyed. A secondary explosion was observed. Two planes diverted to K-6, one with hung ordnance.

1532I/ Recovered 13151 launch.

1607I/ Lieutenant JUNO, RCN, returned to H.M.C.S. CRUSADE (DDE-228) by helicopter.

1709I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1726I/ Recovered 15151 launch.

2245I/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADE (DDE-228) detached to investigate surface radar contacts, location 36 23N, 123 26E.

2343I/ Surface contact identified by H.M.C.S. CRUSADE (DDE-228) as two Japanese fishing boats with side numbers P-02547 and P-02548. Boats were anchored 600 feet apart with white masthead light burning and are equipped with MF/DF. Place of registration is Hata, Japan. Boats instructed to proceed south to authorized fishing area.

Weather Summary:
During the morning, low broken clouds with ceiling of 2500 feet in operating area varying to scattered clouds at 3000 feet over target area. Afternoon, low broken clouds over target at 2500
to 3000 feet with snow showers in operating area. Visibility eig
to ten miles. Winds West to northwest six to ten knots. Mild
cold frontal passage at 1500I.

mission summary:
Ten CaP, twenty TRACAP, and twelve STRIKE for a total of forty-
two sorties.

13 December
0104I/
CTE 95.11 advised CTE 95.12 and CTD 95.1 of presence of two large
Japanese fishing boats at 36° 23'N 123° 26'E. Boats are green
with white superstructure, equipped with MF/DF, have side numbers
F-02547, F-02548 and are registered in Nakita, Japan. Crew of
vessels instructed in Japanese to proceed South below 36° 00'N.

0700I/
Two plane CaP, four plane TRACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched.
CTU 95.12.1 released TRACAP to attack troop village in CHUNGCHON
area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, then strafed an observation
post and small boat with unassessable damage. Two planes
dverted to K-6, one with hung ordnance. STRIKE group attacked
a troop village in Kyonput'o area. Eight buildings were destroyd.

0823I/
Two Army STKAT officers transferred to R.H.C.O. GERMAN
(But-228) for observation of WHITSHAW patrol operations.

0900I/
Two plane CaP and four plane TRACAP launched. CaP attacked
blockhouse in JUWIL-D area. One blockhouse destroyed with fifty
North Korean troops killed. Planes returned to act as defensive
CaP. CTU 95.12.1 released TRACAP to attack troop village in
CHUNGCHON area. Nine buildings were destroyed and eight damaged.
Bombs dropped on troops trenches with unassessable damage.

0918I/
Recovered 0700I launch plus two aircraft diverted to K-6 on
previous day.

0953I/
U.S.S. Pompamillie (VA-582) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12
WHITSHAW patrol.

1110I/
Two plane CaP, four plane TRACAP, and three plane STRIKE launched.
Two aircraft previously diverted to K-6 returned as TRACAP for
a total of six TRACAP. CaP attacked trenches and bunkers in
SUWIL-D area with unassessable damage before returning to act as
defensive CaP. CTU 95.12.1 released TRACAP to attack artillery
and observation posts in TALCHON-NI area. One observation post
was destroyed. Three buildings destroyed, five buildings and a
road bridge damaged. Two planes, one with hung ordnance dive
to K-6. STRIKE group attacked a truck in Nak area. Truck
damaged with an estimated three troops killed. A fire in the
area, position not observed, scored hits on a plane piloted by
Major Vernon L. Bunnell, U.S. Army. The engine froze from lack of oil
and major Bunnell parachuted free about four minutes after being
hit. Plane hit in mud bank with only the tail section remaining visible. An Air Force helicopter from the island of CH'0-DO rescued Major BALL about forty minutes after the plane was shot down. Major BALL suffered a superficial bullet wound in the left side. Light AA fire was observed in the area.

11261/ Recovered O9001 launch.

11581/ N.N.C.S. CAUSADAH (DDE-228) detached to CTU 95.12 WHITEHEAD patrol.

12251/ Major Vernon E. BALL, USAF, shot down in enemy territory.

12511/ Helicopter from CH'0-DO Island reported Major BALL aboard with minor wound.

13001/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAHCAP launched ahead of schedule, the latter flight to assist in covering rescue operation if required. CAP attack village of HAMAH-MI destroying five buildings and damaging four before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TAHCAP to attack troop village in CHANGYON area. Two buildings were damaged and troop areas hit with unassessable damage. Light AA fire was observed.

13511/ Recovered 11400I launch plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-6.

13515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAHCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 directed TAHCAP to attack troop area in CHANGYON area. Planes destroyed seventeen buildings and strafed troops.

15281/ Recovered 13001 launch.

16341/ Major BALL was returned aboard by a helicopter from K-53.

16371/ Launched helicopter to return to K-53.

17031/ Recovered 15151 launch.

18001/ Task element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Broken low clouds with base at 2500 feet in operating area varying to scattered and clear in target area during the morning. Afternoon ceiling gradually lowered, from 3000 to 1500 feet. Visibility unlimited with southerly winds of five to ten knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TAHCAP, and nine STAIKs for a total of thirty-nine sorties.
14 December
0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack command post in P'UNGSA area. Flight neutralized command post and destroyed one building. STRIKE group bombed caves in ONGIN area with unassessable damage. One building destroyed, three damaged and one rail car destroyed. Light AA fire was observed.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP jettisoned ordnance to investigate unidentified aircraft and acted as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in CHANYON area. Three villages attacked with fifteen buildings destroyed.

0926I/ recovered 0700I launch.

1110I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and three plane STRIKE launched CAP attacked a troop village in CHANG-NI area with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village in CHANYON area. Village was left burning and one nearby building was damaged. Flight burned with napalm the plane that was shot down in ANAK area on previous day. STRIKE group attacked coastal gun position in CHUUSAN area. Flight attacked three coastal gun positions protecting HANCH-ON with an estimated ten troops killed. A secondary explosion, following the attack, could be felt at 2500 feet by the pilots. An electrical sub-station North of CHINNAmPO area was hit and electrical flashes observed as building caught fire. Light AA fire was observed over HANCH-ON.

1120I/ H.M.S. CHANTICLEER (DE-223) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITAGE patrol.

1125I/ One aircraft with structural defects considered unsafe for carrier landings sent to K-6.

1130I/ recovered 0900I launch.

1153I/ Landed HU-1 helicopter from K-6 which is to replace HU-1 helicopter as plane guard through 16 December. HU-1 helicopter inoperative, awaiting spare parts.

1200I/ U.S.S. PORTER (DD-462) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1313I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village of P'UAMNAM-11. Before returning to act as defensive CAP flight destroyed five buildings and damaged six resulting in one secondary explosion. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supply dump in CHANYON area. A large concentration of supplies was attacked with an estimated fifty percent destroyed.
1331I/ Recovered 1110I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked rice storage in NADJU area. One building was destroyed and storage area left burning. Flight cut two railroads and destroyed four railcars loaded with supplies. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack rice on docks in CH'INMAPO area. Flight destroyed 1000 bags of rice, four buildings and killed ten troops. A rail cut was made in SUNGMA area.

1532I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1709I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1735I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary
Broken to overcast with ceiling of 3500 feet in the morning lowering to 2500 feet in late afternoon. Ceiling in target area 4000 feet lowering to 3000 feet in afternoon. Surface winds from south at nine to fourteen knots, shifting to north-west with cold front passage at 1520I. Flying conditions average, lowering to marginal in late afternoon.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty-one TAACAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of forty-two sorties.

15 December
0910I/ H.M.C.S. ATAGASCAN (DVE-219) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1130I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAACAP, and three plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack gun positions and bunkers near ULJUL. Flight was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to enemy aircraft in the area. Flight made two rail cuts near CHANGYON. STRIKE group attacked reveted buildings near ONGJIN. Destroying one building.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAACAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TAACAP to attack reveted buildings near ONGJIN. Five buildings were destroyed and three damaged. One aircraft returned to ship with rough engine, destroying one building and damaging another on way to ship. CTU 95.12.1 requested remaining planes to attack 76MM gun position near P'UNGSAK. Damage was unassessable.

1335I/ Recovered 0910I launch.

1433I/ Recovered plane with rough running engine from 1315I launch.
1450I/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1525I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARGP, and four plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TARGP to attack ammunition dump near P'UMGSAN. Damage unassessable. CTU 95.12.1 requested flight to attack two troop villages near CHANGNYON. Four buildings were destroyed. STRIKE group attacked power sub station North of CH'IINAHPO. Power station destroyed as secondary explosions occurred.

1540I/ Recovered 1335I launch.

1716I/ Recovered 1525I launch.

1724I/ Task Element retired Southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Moderate secondary cold front passed at 0345I causing a thirteen degree temperature drop and northwesterly winds increasing to thirty-two knots with moderate to rough seas. Flight operations delayed until 1120I due to heavy seas and a pitching deck. Targe area was clear during the morning with high cirrus and scattered low clouds at 2000 feet in the operating area.

Mission Summary:
Six CAP, eight STRIKE, and eleven TARGP for a total of twenty-five sorties.

16 December

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARGP, and four plane STRIKE launched CTU 95.12.1 released TARGP to attack supplies in village near CH'IINAHPO. Flight left supplies burning, destroyed one building and damaged two sixty foot boats. STRIKE group attacked ammunition dump near HANGU with unassessable damage and then damaged five buildings near HANGU.

0910I/ Three plane CAP and three plane TARGP launched. CAP attacked a gun position and revetted buildings with one building and gun position damaged and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARGP to attack supplies near ULYUL. Fourteen buildings destroyed, six damaged and secondary explosions observed. Three small boats were damaged near CHANGNYON.

0922I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1005I/ LT JONES, RON and GUNNAR DRUKIN, RON, came aboard by highline from H.M.S. CAUSADAR (DDE-228) to observe carrier operations. Two BADONG STRAIT officers returned aboard having completed observation of WHITEHEAD patrol.
1115I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troop buildings near UPCH'0-RI destroying four and then returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack reveted buildings near ONGJIN. Two buildings were destroyed and one damaged. CTU 95.12.1 then requested plan to attack gun position that had been firing on CH'0-DO island. Position was attacked with unassessable damage. Eight buildings were destroyed and two damaged near ULJUL although snow flurries hampered attacks in this area. The flight then flew reconnaissance of TAEDONG River. STRIKE group attacked railroad near SINCHON and made two rail cuts.

1123I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1258I/ Detached U.S.S. PORTERFIELD to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol, with instructions to report to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) on completion.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop positions near UPCH'0-RI. Troop area attacked with unassessable damage. A rail tunnel was closed and one rail cut was made. Light AA fire was observed.

1334I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1445I/ LT JONES, HCN, and GUARDER DURKIN, HCN, returned to H.M.S. GUARDSER (DDE-228) by helicopter.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. A TARCAP was not provided because of weather in that locality. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpasses near CHANGYON. One overpass was destroyed and one damaged.

1528I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1545I/ Launched MAG-12 helicopter to return to K-6.

1649I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1654I/ Set course southward for Basebo.

2100I/ Relieved as CTE 95.11 by H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
High broken clouds with stratus cumulus layer at 3000 feet increasing to scattered low clouds at 1500 feet with snow showers at noon. TARCAP area ceilings 3500 to 2000 feet with snow showers along the coast moving inland during afternoon. Flying conditions became marginal due to low ceilings and visibility. Winds north westerly at ten to eighteen knots.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, fourteen TARCAP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.
17 December

1140/ Conducted 40mm AA firing at a towed sleeve.

1206/ Completed AA firing. A total of 1063 rounds of 40mm ammunition was expended.

1620/ Moored to buoy eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.
REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

A. Ship's Ordnance Expended:

7 December - 1290 rounds 40mm ammunition
17 December - 1083 rounds 40mm ammunition

B. Performance of ship's Ordnance

a. AA firing exercise was conducted 7 December with no material casualty.

The following casualties were sustained during AA firing exercise 17 December:

Mount #4 - Left Barrel - Broken extractor; replaced.
Mount #13 - Left Barrel - Taper pin sheared in rammer cocking lever (r.h.s.) and shaft; replaced pin.
Mount #11 - Left Barrel - Broken sear; replaced.

b. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

12 December - (Radar II) Jump in range step caused by faulty capacitor C-348 in radar indicator Control MK-II; replaced capacitor.
14 December - (Radar II) Sluggish range rate transmission caused by fault resistor R-108 in Mk-37 amplifier (range rate servo amplifier); replaced resistor.
14 December - (Radar II) No transmitted pulse caused by shorted tube V 1-826 in power supply MK-7 which blew fuse 1011 in Radar Control Unit (power) while in operating position.
14 December - (Radar 2) No T&D dot in gun director sight. The tube V 3(3B24) in radar power supply MK-7 was loose in socket causing loss of 472 volts going to plates of gun sight CR0 tube.

c. The power drive on Mount #11 sustained the following casualty:

11 December - Oscillation in elevation (auto) caused by broken lead on terminal board of elevation power drive amplifier; the lead was repaired.

d. AA firing exercises were conducted enroute from and to Sasebo. The exercise conducted 7 December appeared to be successful since a sleeve was downed by both the starboard and after batteries. The proficiency of gun crews has improved considerably because of the extensive training program at sea coupled with the periodic firings.
C. Aircraft Ordnance Expended

1000# GP Bombs - 27
500# GP Bombs - 144
500# SAP Bombs - 4
200# PITROG Bombs - 168
250# GP Bombs - 162
100# GP Bombs - 390
Napalm Bombs - 153
5" hVAR Rockets - 848
Rounds 20mm Ammo - 36,700
Rounds 50 cal Ammo - 93-250
A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block Houses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Sub Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Carts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Stations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Outs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Overpasses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Sheds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (in bags)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacked Supplies</td>
<td>Large amount destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft

1. One aircraft was lost in an aborted catapult shot probably due to a broken bridle or plane launching hook.

2. One aircraft was lost to enemy AA fire in enemy territory. The pilot parachuted clear and plane was destroyed.

3. One plane suffered class "B" damage in an emergency, wheels up, landing at K-53 due to engine malfunction.

4. One aircraft required a propeller change as a result of catching a late wire and engaging a carrier.

5. Four aircraft suffered damage consisting of holes in fuselage, wings, and oil cooler from enemy small caliber AA fire.

6. Two aircraft received minor damage to tail cones in taxi accidents.
PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance
   1. Personnel
      Enthusiastic performance by ALL HANDS resulted in a maximum effort during this patrol. Personnel on board during the period including marines was 109 officers and 996 enlisted for a total of 1105. There were no transfers or new personnel reporting aboard during this period.

   2. Education
      An increase in USAF and correspondence course enrollments indicates continued interest in educational advancement. Ships company personnel are currently enrolled in thirty-four USAF courses, one-hundred-twenty-seven enlisted correspondence courses, nineteen officer correspondence courses and a total of two-hundred-thirty-four course books are checked out for study. Four officers from this ship went aboard Canadian destroyers to observe operating procedures. Three Canadian and three English officers came aboard to observe flight operations and discuss operating procedures. Two VNA-312 pilots were transferred to H.M.C.S. UNOY (CVL-19) at the end of the period to observe flight operations.

   3. Divine Services
      Services conducted aboard during this period included, three protestant services, one catholic mass, daily rosary services and two bible classes. The BatOEING STRAIT chaplain and the CHAPLAIN from the H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN exchanged visits to conduct services.

   4. Welfare and Recreation
      A maximum air operations effort with its attendant maintenance requirements limited movie showing to four during the patrol. A capacity crowd was present for each showing. A summary of news including, missions and results, world news and sporting events is given daily at noon by the chaplain over the ships announcing system. A summary of the Task Elements operations and a review of existing situation in Korea is presented to the crew by the Intelligence Officers at the conclusion of each patrol.

B. Casualties
   1. Major Vernon L. Ball, MC, received superficial wounds in the left side by a flak burst. Major Ball was evacuated to safety in enemy territory and was rescued by helicopter and returned to the ship.
PART VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON OPERATIONAL DUTIES AND PROCEDURES

a. Air Department

1. Comment

F4U-4B, BuNo 63067, VMF-312, lost one napalm bomb from the port pylon during launch from the H-4C catapult. The eye of the outboard end of the bridie struck and bent the forward bridie deflector and is believed to have tripped the bomb rack manual release allowing the napalm tank to fall free of the ship. The rear bridie deflector was also bent. The bridie sustained no damage and the tank burst and fell free of the ship.

Recommendation

The above malfunction is considered to have resulted from the violent whipping of the bridie during shuttle over-run. Every effort is being made to reduce bridie whip by eliminating "hard shots" from catapults and by employing the standard bridie catcher in lieu of the nylon bridie retainer.

2. Comment

An F4U-4 was spotted on the H-4C catapult, hooked up and tensioned properly. Standard launching signals were exchanged between the pilot, catapult officer and the deck edge control operator. When the catapult was fired the pilot felt the jolt from the shuttle moving forward and then the snap of the tension ring. The catapult had a runaway shot and the plane rolled down the deck and over the bow of the ship under its own power. No material damage was done to the catapult other than a weakened runaway shot preventer diaphragm. The pilot swam clear prior to the planes sinking and was rescued by the helicopter. The accident was probably caused by either a broken bridie or breaking of aircraft launching hooks. The H-2 catapult was used for the remainder of the launch. The number of planes launched was reduced from ten to six to prevent an excessive expenditure of bridies as the H-2 bridie catcher was inoperative. The bridie catcher was repaired and in operation for the first launch the following morning.

3. Comment

Cross deck pendant No. 16 was changed due to an excessive number of wires broken after 144 engagements.

4. Comment

A barrier crash was sustained when an F4U-4 picked up No. 66 cross-deck pendant and engaged barriers No. 2 and 3 with its propeller. One barrier pendant was changed and the barriers rigged with a ready deck nine minutes after the crash. The propeller was changed and the aircraft made ready for flight within three hours.

-25-
5. Comment
Two aircraft (F4U-4B BuNos. 97410 and 97501) returned to the ship because of bad oil leaks. Emergency landing procedures were set up and the aircraft landed aboard immediately.

6. Comment
Failure of aircraft ordnance to release properly continues to be a major problem. Listed below is a summary of ordnance that failed to release along with appropriate comment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rack</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MK-55 (no deflector)</td>
<td>Either became unplugged, or Pigtail parted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>MK-55 and Aero 14A</td>
<td>Faulty igniter plug (Spring fatigued in Aero 17-17 receptacle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical failure (Deteriorated and faulty electrical wiring circuits on one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MK-55 and Aero 14A</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 Total HVaS

260# Flac

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rack</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aero 14A</td>
<td>Electrical short in Rack (ground wire)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

250# GP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rack</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Undetermined, after thorough examination by competent personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical short (wiring in wing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ITEM | RACK | REASON
--- | --- | ---
100# GP | | 
4 | MK-55 | Electrical Failure (wiring)
2 | MK-55 | Electrical Failure (solenoid burned out)
2 | MK-55 | Electrical Failure (Solenoid fell apart in racks)
14 Bombs total (all types) | | 
NaPalm | | 
1 | Port Pylon | Electrical Failure and Manual release wire broken
| | | Electrical Failure (Pilot failed to push manual release far enough to trip shackle).
2 Total | | 
312 | | 
7. Comment
The following steps are being taken by VmA/in an effort to reduce or eliminate hung ordnance:
a. The condition of EL7-17 igniter plug receptacles on all aircraft are being checked and replaced as required.
b. The circuit wiring on all aircraft showing release circuit wire deterioration is being replaced during in-port periods.

Recommendation
It is recommended that supporting repair units replace or overhaul defective or deteriorating aero 14A, MK-55, and MK-9 racks on aircraft prior to assignment of replacement aircraft to combat squadrons. (Certain replacement aircraft received by VmA-312 have been in this category). Further it is considered desirable that a study be made by overhaul activities to determine the expected service life of these bomb racks so that provision can be made for their orderly replacement. A letter in this regard is being sent to Commander Fleet Air, Japan.

That support and/or operating units develop an ejected cartridge case deflector for the MK-55 rack that will minimize damage to rocket pig-tails by ejected brass from the guns. (VmA-312 is working on this problem.)
8. Comment

Listed below is a summary of catapult and arresting gear performance during this patrol:

**LaUNCHES**

**H-2-1 Catapult**

- Total number of launches: 115
- Average Weight Pounds: 14,800
- Average Wind Knots: 29
- Average Pressure psi: 2,850
- No. Bridles expended: 9

**H-4C Catapult**

- Total number of launches: 229
- Average Weight Pounds: 15,000
- Average Wind Knots: 28
- Average Pressure psi: 2,200
- No. Bridles expended: 9

**LaNDINGS**

- Total number of landings: 341
- Average Wind Knots: 28
- CUP psi: 600
- Average runout feet: 114
- Wires Caught:
  
  - #1 - 66
  - #2 - 114
  - #3 - 94
  - #4 - 56
  - #5 - 8
  - #6 - 3
  - #7 - 0
  - #8 - 0
  - #9 - 0

- Barrier Crashes: 1
- Barriers Engaged: 2 & 3

**B. Operations Department**

1. **Combat Information Center:** Enlisted personnel in CIC are arranged in three rotating watch sections with one watch officer, one air controller and one air operations officer on watch during all air operations.

Air control of defensive CAP, departing TARCAP and STAIKES are the primary functions of CIC during present operations. Defensive CAP is used to intercept all returning STAIKES in addition to unidentified aircraft, thus providing maximum training of air controllers.

Defensive air control work is seriously hampered by proximity of land and limitations of equipment in this type of operation. During air operations the carrier remains within twenty-five to forty miles of enemy territory. The average range of detection of single aircraft over water with SK Air Search Radar has been thirty to forty miles and almost negative results obtained with aircraft over land. CAP stationed between the ship and expected attack origin have a bare twenty miles in which to intercept an aircraft before it enters the ships detection range. The ship is equipped with UPX-I type IFF, which as installed is non-directional. This produces an identification
ring on the scope at the proper range, but no bearing. This system further reduces the IFF detection range to about thirty miles maximum. An SPS-6 type radar with directional type IFF is necessary for ships conducting this type of operation.

It should be noted, however, that defense of the ship against enemy aircraft is considerably enhanced by two shore based radars of the Air Defense Command located at a distance and between the ship and enemy air bases. There are also several radar equipped friendly ships interposed between the carrier element and enemy bases.

2. Communications

a. Traffic

Communications traffic continued in great volume. Prompt delivery of dispatches was not possible in all cases because of serious garbles resulting from poor radio reception. A heavy influx of coded traffic from guerrilla forces was another factor which caused delays in traffic delivery.

b. Personnel

The loss of two rated radiomen during last in-port period with no replacement necessitated the assignment of watchmen on a port and starboard basis. It is believed that watchmen twelve hours a day over an extended period of time will impair the efficiency of communications.

c. Equipment

One medium frequency transmitter failed during the operation and was out of commission for a period of six hours. This imposed the handicap of not being able to guard the ship-shore frequency on a continuous basis.

3. Photographic Laboratory

The photo laboratory is operated by three rated men and one striker with the senior rate being a Photographer Second Class. Two photo missions were flown during the patrol, for target analysis in addition to PIO and routine ships work.

4. Aerology

NAVTEX circuits provide the main source of aerological data in this area and proved to be unreliable during many hours of the day. Facsimile equipment is desirable for carriers operating in this area. Weather reports from sector eight (Mission) are of great value as this is the area of Cyclo-Consis for weather moving into the Korean operating area.
C. Medical Department

1. Major Vernon E. Ball, USMC, sustained wounds, consisting of a punctured left thorax, by AA fire from the enemy while engaged in aerial combat.

2. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company

   a. Admitted to sick list 23
   b. Total sick days out of 10 possible working days 64
   c. Officer admitted to sick list 2
   d. Total patients visits to sick call 428
   e. Total medical treatments 204
   f. Patients received from other ships 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital 0
   h. Number of minor injuries treated 7
   i. Number of major injuries treated 0
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures 0
   l. Major surgical procedures 0
   m. Veneral disease cases and non-specific Urethritis Total - 26
      1. Gonorrhea - 5
      2. Chancroid - 4
      3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 17
   n. No. penicillin tablets issued last port period - 132

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 5
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation 0
   c. Average number days pilots grounded 3.3
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons 0
   e. No. of pilots KIA 0
   f. No. of pilots WIA 1

H. L. Ray

Copy to:

CNO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (2) advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVAF (1) advance
COMNAVAF EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) advance
CTF 77 (1) advance
CINCPAC (5)
Copy to: (Continued)

CDR, NWP
CDR, DPA
NAVWAR COLLEGE
CONTRU IV-15
CONTRU DIV-17
CO, FMIRPAC (2)
CG, FMFPAC (1) advance
CG, FMFPAC (1) advance
CG, 1st FMIRWING
CO, FMG-12
CO, VPAW-312
CO, USS Bataan (CVL-29)
CO, USS Yorktown (CVE-114)
CO, USS Bairoko (CVE-115)
CO, USS Sicily (CVE-118)
CO, USS Point Cruz (CVE-119)

[Signature]
S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer
**FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 16 December 1952**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
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<td>CAP</td>
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<td>0915</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>F4U</td>
<td>Flyaway</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1515</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>To K-6</td>
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**HELICOPTER**

- GUARD MAIL 0730
- GUARD MAIL 1135
- FLYAWAY 1515

**AND/LAND**

- A = All A/C full gun loads.
- B = All A/C Napalm and 6-hVAR.
- C = 2 A/C Napalm and 6-hVAR.
- D = 2 A/C 500#/inst./60 min and L-250# DC/ND
- E = All A/C 1000#/ .10/60 min and L-250# 0.1/ND.
- F = All A/C 500#/5 sec and L-250#/5 sec.
- G = All A/C 1000#/5 sec and L-250#/5 sec.

**B. H. COLKITT JR.**
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAO ENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander 3.WINTh Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action report 26 December 1952 through 5 January 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy regulations
(b) Opnav Inst 3480.4
(c) CincPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) OPN 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 26 December through 5 January 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAO ENG STRAIT was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 on 26 December until 2100 on 4 January of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   Part I    General Narrative.
   Part II   Chronological Order of Events.
   Part III  Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.
   Part IV   Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   Part V    Personnel Performance and Casualties.
   Part VI   Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to Vma-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952 and January 1953.
PART I  DECLASSIFIED

GENERAL HISTORICAL

A. During the period of 26 December 1952 to 4 January 1953, the USS BADOOGH STRAIT (CVS-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a unit of TE 95.11 (later redesignated as TU 95.1.1), Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command of TE 95.11 was Captain H. L. Kay, 62691/1310, USN. For the duration of this patrol this officer was also the Officer in Tactical Command, West Coast in accordance with paragraph 9, CTF 95.1 OpOrder 2-52. Ships assigned CTE 95.11 as screen included the USS LAWS HANCOCK (DD-675), USS PORTFORD (CL-682), HMAS ARAHANGAN (DL-219), HMS COCHRANE (D-34) and the HMNS CAWNPUR (DNE-226). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three ships as units were transferred temporarily to CTE 95.12 (later CTU 95.1.2) for night patrols along the enemy held coast line.

B. VMA-312 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cahoon, 07027, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. Planes aboard consisted of FJ-4 and AJ-4B type. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 21. Average availability per day was 16. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 255 including 8 sorties for carrier qualifications for a total of 462 hours. A total of 55.1 hours was “over the target time.” A single helicopter from helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 47 sorties for a total of 32.8 hours.

C. The BADOOGH STRAIT sailed from baseo, Japan, on 26 December 1952 as directed by CTF 95.1 dispatch 260655Z of December. Gunnery firing exercises were conducted in area GAIRU. Shortly afterwards five replacement aircraft were received aboard from Itami air force Base. The ship became a Unit of TU 95.11 at 262100Z when the BADOOGH STRAIT relieved the H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) upon arrival in area MILES.

D. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coastline and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TE 95.12, the Island Naval Defense Element; the troops of TE 95.15, the Island Defense Element; and the units of TE 95.11, the Carrier Element. The Island Defense Element is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the Han River on the South to the TAEJONG estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to the Task Element in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerrilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Element have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

E. In performing its assigned tasks, TE 95.11 normally operated in the area southwest of Pusan-Kong-0, conducting dawn to dusk air operations, and retiring southward for the night. Five deck load launchers were made daily at intervals of two hours with approximately fifty percent of available air-
craft in each launch. A two-aircraft CAP for TE 95.11 was launched with each deck load. Once a day a four plane TACAP was provided for CTU 95.12.1 stationed in the vicinity of O haktou Island. Modified instructions issued by CTG 95.1 now require this instead of a TACAP with each deck load launch as was previously required. Other aircraft operating in the target area are briefed to assist CTU 95.12.1 at anytime their services are requested.

F. The reduction in TACAP commitments permitted a more flexible employment of aircraft, and some changes in use and scheduling were made. Twice during this nine day period a four plane pre-dawn armed reconnaissance flight was launched at about 0615 to investigate rail and truck traffic in the area north of CHINAMPO. Such flights are launched only under ideal weather conditions because of the limitations of pilot training and aircraft instrument flying equipment. It was also considered necessary to initiate launches from an area in close proximity to Chindu Island so that radar vectoring from both the ships and TACAP would be available to the flight. The early armed reconnaissance launch, dubbed the "early early" by the pilots, became quite popular, because both flights found locomotives for their targets, a type of target that the pilots are most eager to attack.

G. There were no urgent requests from other elements of the group for air support strikes during the period. Continued attention was paid to troop concentrations and gun emplacements in positions to attack friendly islands and surface vessels. CAP aircraft were again loaded with ordnance for short range strikes against targets in the RANGYONG-DO to HANJU area when the Task Element was operating in the area southwest of PANGNYONG-DO, as this area is well screened by radars on friendly islands.

H. In view of the reduction in TACAP requirements, greater attention was given to armed reconnaissance of the coastal areas. Weather permitting, a careful search of the coastline from the HAN River to the TAOWING-GANG was made daily and the flight northward to HANCHON was performed on alternate days when jet fighter cover was available.

I. A most unfortunate accident occurred in the afternoon of 27 December when First Lieutenant John J. Gorky, U. S. N., was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the TAOWING-GANG. The Lieutenant parachute successfully and was observed uninjured in the water at the mouth of the estuary. Despite the attempts of two helicopters and one crash boat from CHIDU Island, rescue was not effected, apparently because of material defects in the rescue equipment. During the rescue MiG aircraft made six firing runs on the Corsair and CAP but did not penetrate to the helicopters. There was no damage to aircraft, friendly or enemy. A recommendation regarding the possible inadequacy of rescue equipment has been submitted separately.

J. For the first time BOUND STRAIT aircraft experienced appreciable interference from bad weather and flight operations were reduced on four days of the nine-day period. During one night, with a heavy swell running from the northwest and with frequent heavy snow showers and a temperature of 16°F, a moderate amount of snow and slush ice from the spray collected on the
flight deck. Assigned equipment was adequate for removal, however, flight operations were delayed until about noon because the pitching deck made flight operations too hazardous. On another occasion with a ceiling of 300 feet and 1/2 mile visibility, it was necessary to vector a returning flight to the ship using the SG-13 radar. The aircraft made visual contact with the ship and lowered at approximately 1/2 mile and executed satisfactory landings. Low ceilings in the target area frequently limited target selection and restrict ordnance loads which could be carried.

K. Carrier qualification and re-qualification of replacement pilots was performed during combat operations on this patrol. Four replacements requiring requalification only were received aboard the day prior to sailing. By a slight reduction in combat flights, it was possible to qualify these pilots. They were subsequently given several CAP assignments to further their training and familiarization with the area and procedures. Then on the 7th day of air operations four additional pilots who required full carrier qualification were delivered aboard by the marine "COD" aircraft. The following day full carrier qualification was given to two of these pilots. Additionally, the marine pilot of the "COD," previously qualified in Corsairs, was checked out in landing the TBM model aircraft aboard. Because of light variable winds it was necessary to delay qualification of the remaining two Corsair pilots until 5 January. The carrier qualification performed in this manner reduced the total combat sorties by five. However, two aircraft received major damage during qualifications, which indirectly reduced the offensive effort to a greater degree.

L. On the 27th of December as the Task Element retired to the South for the night with three ships in a bent-line screen (303), the U.S.S. LANSING (DD-855) on station THUNDER reported a sonar contact with a probable submarine. The Task Element Commander considered this to be a Case I contact and as a precautionary measure directed an attack be made although it was considered that the contact might be a known underwater object charted in the vicinity. The U.S.S. WILDFLOWER was directed to assist. Within six minutes of this contact, the U.S.S. WICKERSHAM in station SCENE reported a sonar contact, but evaluated it as non-submarine five minutes later. After investigating the contact further, the LANSING and WICKERSHAM made a flash LUNKBAG report. The Task Element followed this with three amplifying reports mentioning the known underwater object in the vicinity and including a final report of non-submarine.

M. A fire occurred in the trash bin surrounding the BATTEN STRAIT's incinerator on the evening of 30 December. The fire started when embers which were being removed from the fire box burst into flame and could not be controlled by the CO2 bottle in hand. The fire was confined to the incinerator room and minor damage to electric wiring resulted.

N. Despite weather interference and reduction in total sorties made below that achieved on previous patrols, the results of air strikes appear to have been better than earlier strike results. An increased number of secondary
explosions were noted. The first early pre-dawn strike North of CHINNAPO located one locomotive and eight trucks and reported making damaging attacks. The second such strike found four locomotives made-up in three trains totaling over fifty boxcars apparently stopped because of rail cuts made by shore based night fighters. Immediately following this strike CHODO reported many MIG's in the area and went to a Warning RED alert. A flash report of the locomotive targets was sent to JOC Korea. Although there was no assurance that jet fighter cover would be available since proper coordination with shore based aircraft cannot be guaranteed under existing procedures, it was possible to launch two additional sorties totaling eleven aircraft against this target. Information available to this command indicates that with the exception of a few F-104's which made high altitude rocket runs about noon that day, no other aircraft hit the target. This is believed to have resulted from an erroneous report received in the JOC that denied the existence of the trains. The statements of returning pilots from these separate strikes totaling fifteen aircraft were in virtual agreement regarding these locomotives and they reported doing considerable damage with one large secondary explosion. Photographic damage assessment could not be made, since photographic aircraft are not included in the allowance of the vessel.

0. The interchange of officers with H.M.S. GLORY and screening ships for familiarization and training was continued. Three officers were received aboard from H.M.S. GLORY to observe air operations. One officer from U.S.S. LANGLEY and two officers from the U.S.S. PORTSMOUTH were aboard for training as air controllers, while the SADOING STRAIT transferred two officers to the GLORY for familiarization. The SADOING STRAIT Operations Officer was transferred on three days' sail to JOC Korea at the end of the patrol for liaison and familiarization purposes.

P. In view of the targets located by two early morning patrols, it would appear profitable to give greater attention to the flat coastal area between CHINNAPO and SINANJU. For best results, all-weather attack aircraft for locating targets and making initial road or rail cuts would be needed. Because of the areas' location with respect to communist jet airfields, the subsequent day attacks would require day attack squadrons operating under and closely coordinated with jet fighter cover. A fast carrier or fast carrier task force would be ideal for this purpose. The occasional appearance of a fast carrier in the Yellow Sea area would probably have a most disconcerting effect upon the enemy. Accordingly, periodic assignment of a fast carrier for Yellow Sea operations is recommended.
PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

26 December
0642I/ In accordance with OTG 95.1 dispatch 240655Z of December 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for Korean West Coast Operating Areas, "NAM" and "NAN."

1130I/ Commenced 40MM AA firing on towed sleeve in area GEORGES.

1155I/ Completed 40MM AA firing having expended 1658 rounds of 40MM ammunition. One tow sleeve was knocked down.

1506I/ Recovered five VMA-312 aircraft from Iwami, Japan.

2058I/ CTE 95.11 (H.M.S. GLORY) advised U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT that the U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) and U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) had been detached to investigate fishing vessels in prohibited area and some delay in their reporting for duty with BADOENG STRAIT was to be expected.

2100I/ Relieved the H.M.S. GLORY (CML-19) and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2100I/ Arrived in Korean Operating area "LIKE."

2300I/ Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT assumed duty as OTC of Naval Blockade and Patrol Group on the Korean West Coast.

27 December
0301I/ The U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) reported two Japanese fishing vessels at 36°-11N, 124°-52E. Vessels refused to move until a 40MM was fired overhead then both vessels were escorted to 124°-00E and directed to proceed south of 36°-00N. Vessels were identified as Kiyoh Maru, 5-W061, number YG-2-293 and Kiyoh Maru, 3W-W060, Number YG-2-294.

0500I/ PORTERFIELD reported for duty.

0725I/ arrived in Korean operating area "NAN."

0740I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) reported for duty.

0822I/ PORTERFIELD transferred one officer aboard by highline for training in air control duties.

0825I/ LCm M. A. K. FINLAY, RN, Communications Officer and S/Lt J. B. ALDRICH, RN, an aviator from the H.M.S. GLORY, came aboard from the PORTERFIELD, by highline, to observe carrier operations and to discuss communications procedures common to the two service.

1102I/ CTE 95.11 advised H.M.S. BIRMINGHAM that gun fire spot could be provided at 1400I to 1530I and TaRCap would be available from 1600I to 1700I if desired.
11341/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) reported for duty.

12201/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a command post near CHELLANG-NI with unassessable damage, then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad bridge near CHANGSON, damaging the bridge and making one rail cut. One plane of the flight jettisoned bombs and did not attack due to inoperative radio.

13401/ Four plane STRIKE, two plane Gunfire Spot Team and three plane Carrier Qualification Group launched. The STRIKE group attacked supplies on a dock near CH'INNAMFO, A plane flown by First Lieutenant John R. GOERY, USNR, 052549, was the second to deliver an attack. As he passed over the target at 1000 feet he reported that he had been hit and headed out to sea. Members of the flight observed pieces of his left wing falling from the plane and brown smoke pouring from his engine. LT GOERY jettisoned his remaining ordnance and proceeded down the TAEDONG Estuary toward the sea until his engine quit at which time he parachuted free. The plane crashed into the water. LT GOERY in his parachute drifted out to sea where he landed in the water about a mile from shore. He waved to the planes overhead and appeared to be in good condition. One plane of the flight escorted a helicopter to the scene from CH'0-LO Island while two others provided air cover for the downed pilot. The two plane Gunfire Spot team arrived to provide additional cover. About seventeen minutes after the pilot entered the water, a flight of four NIGS attacked the planes above LT GOERY. The NIGS engaged the covering planes for a period of ten minutes during which time they made six firing runs. No damage was inflicted on either friendly or enemy aircraft. The helicopter waited in a near by area until the NIGS had departed. The helicopter arrived over LT GOERY about thirty minutes after he entered the water, meanwhile a strong current had drifted the downed pilot and his rubber raft to within one half mile of the shore. The helicopter reported an inoperative winch, so a rope ladder was lowered to the pilot. During the next half hour LT GOERY was observed to climb to the top of the ladder six times without succeeding in getting inside the helicopter. At this time, a rubber raft was dropped to the pilot, however, he was unable to reach it. A second helicopter arrived from CH'0-LO and attempted to rescue the pilot, however, the winch cable broke and LT GOERY was dropped into the water again. A rope was lowered to the pilot but he was now too weak to attempt to climb it. A plane from the group then escorted a crash boat from CH'0-LO island to the scene. At this time a flight of F-86 jets arrived to assist in the rescue. The crash boat arrived about one and one half hours after the pilot was down. As the boat neared the pilot, shore batteries opened fire and were bracketing the boat with shells. The covering planes silenced two of the three guns firing before expending all their
ordnance. The crash boat now reported it was unable to approach the pilot as one engine was failing and one running rough due to near misses of shell fire. The covering planes now lost sight of LT GOHEN as it was late afternoon and the pilot was last seen floating low in the water with no visible movement. A second group of planes arrived to relieve the covering group. LT GOHEN was not sighted again and is listed as missing in action.

1342I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DE-219) reported eight Japanese fishing trawlers at 35-55N 125 12E and advised that vessels were ordered to proceed to authorized fishing areas.

1359I/ Recovered 1220I launch.

1417I/ Commenced Carrier qualification landings with three planes.

1419I/ One plane collapsed a tail wheel during a carrier qualification landing.

1500I/ Recovered carrier qualification planes having requalified three pilots with a total of fourteen landings. It was impossible to qualify these pilots prior to entering the operating area as the pilots reported aboard one day before the scheduled sailing date.

1500I/ ATHABASCAN reported that she would be unable to rendezvous with CTE 95.11 before dark and would proceed directly to CTU 95.12.1 if permissible.

1605I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. This STRIKE group relieved the 1340I group as cover for the attempted rescue of LT GOHEN. No targets were attacked.

1708I/ Recovered remainder 1340I launch.

1746I/ Recovered 1605I launch.

1749I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1801I/ CTE 95.11 released the ATHABASCAN to proceed to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

2018I/ LEWIS HANCOCK of the screen reported sonar contact with probable submarine at 37 36N, 124 27.5E, Case I. Due to the position in relation to the Task Element, CTE 95.11 concurred that it was Case I and directed an attack.

2022I/ FORTHFIELD was detached to join HANCOCK as assisting ship. CTE 95.11 advised the LEWIS HANCOCK that the contact was in immediate vicinity of a reported pinnacle.
COCKADE reported a sonar contact 2400 yards from the screen.

COCKADE evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine.

LEWIS HANCOCK completed depth charge attack on sonar target with impulse type depth charges. Depth charges did not detonate.

LEWIS HANCOCK sent a flash submarine contact report.

LEWIS HANCOCK completed two firing attacks with HEDGEHOGS. Explosions were observed.

LEWIS HANCOCK reported sonar contact dead in the water at thirty fathoms.

CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to join CTE 95.11 to augment screen.

PORTERFIELD gained sonar contact and evaluated it as improbable submarine.

CTE 95.11 sent an amplifying report stating that sonar contact was in close proximity to a known underwater object and had been evaluated as doubtful submarine.

LEWIS HANCOCK illuminated attack area to search for wreckage, no wreckage was observed.

CTE 95.11 directed LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD to rejoin the Task Element.

CTE 95.11 suggested CTE 95.12 recall the ATHABASCAN since destroyers on contact had been ordered to rejoin.

CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to resume station on WHITBREAD patrol.

CTE 95.11 sent second amplifying report stating that final evaluation of sonar contact was non-submarine.

LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD rejoined the Task Element.

Weather Summary:

A mild cold front passed HANJU area at 0615 I, preceded by rain turning to snow by 0700 I. Visibility was five miles with ceiling of 1000 feet in showers. Surface winds shifted from northwest to northeast and increased to twenty-eight knots. Bombing strikes were not launched due to weather. Weather improved to operational minimums by 1100 I with broken low clouds in operating area and clear skies in target area.
Mission Summary:

Two CAP, eight TARCAP, and eight STRIKE for a total of eighteen sorties. In addition three carrier qualification flights were made.

28 December
0015I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to investigate a radar surface contact at 36-35N, 124-35E.

0106I/ CTE 95.11 sent a dispatch in reference to initial submarine report and the two amplifying reports stating this as the third and final report and evaluating sonar contact as non-submarine.

0110I/ LEWIS HANCOCK reported contact was South Korean power junk No. 3 JUS Number 1F-1230 out of KINSAN. Vessel was instructed to clear the area and CTE 95.12 was notified.

0220I/ LEWIS HANCOCK rejoined the Task Element.

0745I/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. One plane returned to ship after take-off due to canopy being jammed open. Remainder of STRIKE was unable to enter target area due to low ceiling and visibility. Flight jettisoned ordnance in clear area and returned to ship.

0759I/ Plane returning aboard with a jammed canopy suffered class "B" damage when port landing gear collapsed on contact with the deck.

0840I/ Eight enlisted personnel destined for the U.S.S. HANCOCK were transferred by highline. One officer came aboard from U.S.S. HANCOCK to receive training in air control duties.

0926I/ Recovered remainder of 0745I launch.

1136I/ K.J. C.S. PAMABOCAN (DBE-219) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Six plane STRIKE launched to attack a radar site in a village near CHANG YONG. Twelve buildings were destroyed and a gasoline fire started. One plane was hit in external fuel tank by AA fire; the tank was jettisoned.

1510I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12,1 requested TARCAP to attack gun positions near AK-TO island that had fired on aircraft rescue boat 27 December. Damage to gun position was unassessable. Flight then attacked a village near CHANG YONG destroying three buildings and damaging fourteen with ten troops killed.
1531/ Recovered 13151 launch.
1712/ Recovered 15101 launch.
1714/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Overcast to broken clouds with ceilings of 500 feet and a visibility of four miles reduced morning flight operations. Target area cloudy until 1030, gradually clearing during the afternoon. Weather marginal to undesirable during the morning, becoming average in the afternoon.

Mission Summary:

Three CAP, twelve STIIKE, and four TARCAP for a total of nineteen sorties.

29 December
0715/ Two plane CAP and four plane armed reconnaissance launched. R200 group scouted from OLGM to YOWAN, strafing ten railroad cars enroute. A grain warehouse near YOWAN and three buildings in OLGM were destroyed. Medium and moderate AA fire was encountered over YOWAN and OLGM.

0915/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance, and four plane STIIKE launched. CAP was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. Troop bunkers near HOMG were attacked with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. R200 group scouted northern area inland without sighting any unusual targets. A radar station thirty miles North of CH'INHAMP was attacked and destroyed. STIIKE group was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. One building was destroyed with two buildings and a cave damaged near OLGM.

0941/ Recovered 07151 launch.

1046/ U.S.S. PORTLAND (DD-582) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITREAD patrol.

1115/ Four plane CAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of PAOPIKU, destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to ship to act as defensive CAP.

1131/ Recovered 09151 launch.

1205/ Recovered two replacement aircraft plus a "COD" TBM, with mail from K-6.
1217\(I\) U.S.S. HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to CTU 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1325\(I\) Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a
troop village near HONG\(\text{\u2031}\)UNPO-RI, destroying six buildings, then
returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked rail-
road facilities near CHANG\(\text{\u2031}\)UNG. One railroad switch was destroy-
ed, four rail cars damaged and five rail cuts made. A thirty-
foot boat was damaged near CH'IN\(\text{\u2031}\)NAMPO. Two planes were diverted
to K-6 for removal of hung ordnance.

1331\(I\) Launched "COD" TBK with LCM\(\text{\u2031}\) U.S.A.K. FUKAY, KN, and SUB LT J.A.
SNYNDERS, KN, aboard for IJF\(\text{\u2031}\)UKA, Japan.

1341\(I\) Recovered 1151 launch.

1515\(I\) Two plane CAP and two plane TACCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released
TACCAP to attack troop village of HONG\(\text{\u2031}\)UNG. Six buildings were
destroyed and two damaged. Captain Carleton B. GRANT, USMC,
suffered injury to his eyes from smoke produced by a premature
rocket explosion in front of his plans. Injury resulted in a
deferred emergency landing.

1530\(I\) Recovered remainder of 1325\(I\) launch.

1645\(I\) Commenced recovery of 1515\(I\) launch. One plane suffered class
"B" damage as a result of engaging two barriers during landing.

1709\(I\) Completed recovery of 1515\(I\) launch.

1731\(I\) Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds with variable ceilings of 1500 to 2500 feet in
operating area during the morning. Target area ceilings varied
from 3500 feet in the north to 500 feet in the South with rain
and snow showers during the morning. Flying conditions average
until 0930I decreasing to undesirable at mid period and improving
to average in the afternoon with ceilings of 4000 feet. An
approaching cold front produced increasing winds and cloudiness.
In many cases the weather limited the targets which could be
attacked and the type of ordnance which could be employed.

Mission Summary:

Twelve CAP, two TACCAP, eight armed reconnaissance and eleven
STRIKE for a total of thirty-three sorties.
30 December

0615I/ A pre-dawn, four plane Armed Reconnaissance was launched. RECCO group attacked targets of opportunity by moonlight near PI'ONYANG. Eight trucks were strafed and damaged. A locomotive and four rail cars were damaged near PI'ONYANG. A road bridge and bomb shelters were damaged near CHANGYON. Light AA fire was observed near PI'ONYANG.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings containing rice near ULYUL and destroyed three buildings. A small boat was damaged near CHANGYON.

0819I/ Recovered 0615I launch.

0915I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP joined with two planes from K-6 that had been diverted there 29 December. Flight then attacked a troop village near SUNWI-10 destroying sixteen buildings and damaging a gun position. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad station near NAJU destroying three buildings. One building was destroyed near SICH'ON, moderate and accurate AA fire was encountered near NAJU.

0936I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP flew reconnaissance of railroad from ONGJIN to HAJU. One flat car was attacked with unassessable damage before planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supplies stored near SICH'ON with unassessable damage. Flight damaged two railcars and made a rail cut.

1130I/ Recovered 0915I launch plus two aircraft from K-6.

1300I/ H.M.S. WOODPE (D-34) detached to CTX 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TACAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-10 destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTX 95.12.1 released TACAP to attack a troop village near CHANGYON. Flight destroyed eighteen buildings and damaged six. STRIKE group attacked troops and reported mine storage area near CH'INMAHP'o. Two gun positions were destroyed with an estimated ten troops killed and five wounded. A troop village near SICH'ON was attacked with eight buildings damaged, an estimated five troops killed, and three wounded.

1336I/ Recovered 1115I launch.
1400I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (CV-67) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and three plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. HGU group made a reconnaissance of HAGU Peninsula then attacked a troop village near YONAN, destroying six buildings. This flight strafed two small boats on the friendly island of KYODONG-DO by mistake. No personnel were observed in the vicinity and none were believed injured.

1540I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1736I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1736I/ Task element retired southward for the night.

2230I/ A Class "A" fire was reported in the Incinerator Space.

2305I/ The fire, confined to the incinerator space, was reported under control.

2330I/ The fire in the incinerator was completely extinguished. Fire was caused by smouldering embers igniting trash in the incinerator space during removal of ashes. Damage resulting from the fire consisted of paint burned from bulkheads, and the loss of personal effects valued at $125.00.

Weather Summary:

Clear skies and unlimited ceiling with visibility aloft reduced slightly by haze. Surface winds West to North West at fourteen to eighteen knots. Flying conditions good to excellent.

Mission Summary:

Twelve CAP, four TAHCAP, seven Armed Reconnaissance, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

31 December

0025I/ H.M.S. ATLANTIC (DLU-219) detached to investigate radar surface contact. ATLANTIC returned to assigned screening station after identifying surface contact as H.M.S. CRANE (PF).

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near NAMIN destroying thirty-seven buildings and a boat house with an estimated twenty troops killed and ten wounded. Fifteen buildings were damaged.
One officer was returned to U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) by high-line, having completed training in air control duties. A second officer was received aboard the BALOONG STRAIT for similar training.

Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and three plane armed reconnaissance launched. CAP destroyed four buildings and damaged four in a troop village near YONAN then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group destroyed fourteen buildings and damaged six in a troop village near CH'INMAipo. One plane of this flight suffered damage to the starboard wing resulting from a hit by a 20MM AA projectile. Originally this was believed to have been caused by an explosion of a wing gun. The aircraft was escorted to K-6 for landing by a second plane of the group. RECON group flew a reconnaissance to the Han River than destroyed five buildings and damaged three in villages near YONAN. Light AA fire was encountered during the attack.

Recovered 0715I launch.

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troops and bunkers near SUNWI-DO, damaging one bunker, then returned to act as defensive CAP. Remaining STRIKE planes attacked and destroyed one building near KYOKIP'0. Heavy snow showers hampered the attack.

While awaiting the return of the 0915I launch the ceiling lowered to 300 feet with visibility of less than one half mile. The returning aircraft were vectored to the carrier using the 5G-lb radar and a low visibility controlled approach procedure. The aircraft were successful in making visual contact with LSO at a distance of one half mile. The ceiling lifted shortly thereafter and the remainder of the 0915I launch was recovered.

ATHABASCAN detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol this date and on 1 January, then to report to CTE 95.12 for duty at 020001I January 1953.

H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

Recovered 1115I launch. Remaining flights cancelled because of weather.

H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) reported three Korean fishing boats at 36-20N, 124-55E with side numbers BB-9524, BB-9525, BS0-9534 and BB-9535. Boats were instructed to proceed south out of the restricted area.

Task Element retired southward for the night.
Weather Summary:

Scattered low clouds during the early morning. Cloudiness increased to overcast with a ceiling of 2000 feet by 0930I. Target area clear in the early morning with lowering ceiling as a cold front approached from the northwest. A wave developed in the Yellow Sea lowering ceiling to 500 feet and visibility to one mile, with snow and light rain by noon. Flying conditions average until 1000I, marginal from 1000I until noon and undesirable for the remainder of the day.

Mission Summary:

Seven CAP, eleven STRIKE and three Armed Reconnaissance for a total of twenty-one sorties.

1 January 1953

0001I  TE 95.11 designation changed to TU 95.1.1 in accordance with change No. 12 to CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52.

0715I/ Scheduled flight operations were delayed because of heavy seas and frequent snow showers.

1500I/ Light plane STRIKE launched to attack the troop village of TAESOK-GUN. Thirty-two buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged with two secondary explosions observed. Flight destroyed three rail cars at SAENG-MA then split into sections for reconnaissance of HAEJU area.

1650I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1654I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 2000 feet lowering to 500 feet in snow showers throughout the day. Morning visibility was one half mile in snow and steam fog increasing to six miles in the afternoon. Target area clear from mid-morning throughout the day. Surface winds from the northwest twenty-five to thirty knots, with heavy seas decreasing to twenty-four knots in the afternoon. Flying conditions undesirable until 1400I becoming marginal for remainder of the day. Frequent snow flurries and spray during the pre-dawn period kept a moderate coating of snow and slush ice on the flight deck. This alone would not have delayed operations since the mechanical sweeper was effective in keeping the deck clear enough for use.

Mission Summary

Eight STRIKE for a total of eight sorties.

-15-
2 January

0630I/ Four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched to attack targets of opportunity near P'YONGYANG. CTU 951.5 (CH'0-DO) requested the flight investigate a reported railcut near KYOMIP'0. The flight located three trains near KYOMIP'0 apparently stopped there by a rail cut made by shore based night fighters. There were a total of about sixty rail cars and four locomotives. The flight damaged all four locomotives and two rail cars. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered. The location of the trains was given to CTU 951.5 by voice radio by the returning aircraft.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group divided to attack trains near KYOMIP'0. Three freight cars were damaged and a near miss on one locomotive produced a large secondary explosion. Three buildings were destroyed in a troop village near CH'INNAPO. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered during attacks on the trains.

0833I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

0903I/ CTU 951.1 sent a flash report of the train's location to JOC Kor-

0915I/ Two plane CAP and four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near KONGGUMPO-RI destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. HECO group was unable to attack the important train targets due to previously arranged rendezvous with planes from K-6. This group scouted to the HAN River area and attacked a troop village near YONAN. Thirteen buildings were destroyed and five damaged. HECO group then made scheduled rendezvous with two aircraft that had been diverted to K-6 on 31 December and returned to the ship.

0935I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Scheduled four plane TAI CAP augmented by three additional aircraft launched as STRIKE to attack stalled trains near KYOMIP'0. One locomotive and twelve rail cars were damaged. Three rail cuts were made. Air force F-84 jets were observed overhead, attacking the trains with rockets from higher altitude. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered.

1209I/ Recovered 0915I launch including two planes from K-6.

1212I/ One officer was returned to the U.S.S. RHODESFIELD (DD-682) by helicopter having completed training in Air Control duties.

1228I/ H.M.C.S. ONSLAUGHT (DDE-228) joined the Task Unit.

1251I/ Recovered 1115I launch.
12351/ PORTERFIELD detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

13451/ Two plane CAP and four plane TAWCAP launched, the latter to replace earlier scheduled TAWCAP which was diverted. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGGWAP'O-RI, destroying thirteen buildings, then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TAWCAP to attack a battalion head quarters near CH'INDARPO. Twelve buildings were destroyed with one large secondary explosion observed. Light AA fire was encountered.

15151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked a troop area near UPOH'I-RI with unassessable damage. One road bridge was cut at SONGGWAP'O-RI.

15341/ Recovered 13451 launch plus one TBM "COD" from K-6 with four replacement pilots for VA-312 aboard. Pilots had no previous carrier experience and came aboard for qualification landings.

17121/ Recovered 15151 launch.

17131/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had variable broken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 1500 to 2000 feet. A few light snow showers were in the area during the afternoon. Visibility was eight to ten miles. Target area was clear with good visibility throughout the day. Flying conditions were average during the period.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TAWCAP, fifteen STRIKE, and eight Armed reconnaissance for a total of thirty-five sorties.

3 January

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings reported to house a rubber boat factory near SONGGWAP'O-RI. Three buildings were damaged. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

09151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. One TBM launched to qualify MAC-12 pilot in carrier landings. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGGWAP'O-DO destroying nineteen buildings and an estimated four troops killed. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. Light AA fire was encountered. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpasses near SONGGWAP, damaging two. One building was damaged near CH'ANGYON. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.
0941I/ Recovered remainder of 0715I launch.

1003I/ Commenced qualification landings with TBM.

1010I/ Completed TBM pilot qualification with a total of three landings.

1033I/ Launched the TBM "CQI", with one FAU as escort, to K-6. The ships operations officer departed as a passenger in the TBM for Tap with Senior Naval Liaison Officer, JOC Korea, to discuss operating procedures with Naval representatives in JOC Headquarters.

1115I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers North of CH’INNAPO destroying two bunkers and damaging a cave. A road bridge was damaged near CH’INNAPO.

1151I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch plus two planes that had diverted to K-6 from 0715I launch.

1202I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAC patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAHCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-D0. Flight damaged one building then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TAHCAP to attack troop bunkers near CH’INNAPO. One bunker was destroyed and a loading wharf damaged. Five buildings were damaged near OnGjin. Flight flew reconnaissance of coast from CH’INNAPO to PAEJENHYANG-D0. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near kabJu destroying nineteen buildings. A cave was damaged and a road cut made near OnGjin.

1340I/ Recovered 1115I launch plus two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 0915I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes launched for qualification landings. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers near Sunwi-D0. Two bunkers were destroyed and some rice supplies damaged.

1534I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1608I/ Commenced qualification landings.

1652I/ Completed qualification of two pilots with a total of twelve landings.

1658I/ Recovered 1515I launch plus qualification planes.
1800I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

The operating area had broken low clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet until 0900I. Remainder of the day was partly cloudy with unlimited visibility. Target area was clear throughout the day. Winds were from the North at twenty to twenty-five knots. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TArCAp, and twenty-four STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties. Three pilots were qualified with a total of fifteen landings.

4 January
01211/ H.M.C.S. GUNSADER (DDE-22S) reported a sonar contact.
01231/ GUNSADER reported sonar contact evaluated as non-submarine.
07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a reported rubber boat factory near CHAOHONG-NL. Three buildings were destroyed and four damaged. Troops were observed and attacked in a nearby village. Seven buildings were damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded.
09151/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group split into two divisions to attack railroad targets. The first division attacked a railroad marshalling yard near CHAOHONG, destroying a road bridge and making seven rail cuts. A plane piloted by Captain Eugene W. Jablonski, U.S.N.R., was hit in the windshield by a 20mm projectile. The pilot suffered slight cuts from glass splinters. The plane later landed aboard safely. The second group attacked a railroad junction near CHAOHONG. Seven railcars were destroyed and three damaged. A coal chute was destroyed and four rail cuts made. One plane suffered minor damage from AA fire.
09251/ Recovered 07151 launch.
09591/ Two plane CAP launched.
1051I/ The Chaplain from the U.S. Navy came aboard by helicopter to conduct religious services.
11151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHAOHONG-NL destroying fifteen buildings and damaging five. Flight then flew reconnaissance to the HAN river.
1131/ Recovered 0915I and 0959I launch.

1141/ H.M.S. COCKADES (D-34) chopped to CTU 95.1.2.

1315/ Three plane STRIKE and four plane TACCAP launched. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a transformer near SINCISON. Three buildings were destroyed in a nearby village. CTU 95.1.4 released TACCAP to attack a battalion headquarters near CHINNAMPO. One building was destroyed and one damaged.

1327/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1345/ U.S.S. LEWIS HAMOOCK (DD-675) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1352/ LEWIS HAMOOCK alongside to transfer mail and personnel. LT CLABAN RN, came aboard by highline.

1426/ Two BADOENG STRAIT officers plus LT CLABAN RN, transferred to the CHUBADUK by highline for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19). The BADOENG STRAIT officers are to observe air operations aboard the GLORY.

1515/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near SUNWI-DO. Eighteen buildings were destroyed and six damaged. One plane of this group plus two plane defensive CAP returned to K-6 enroute to Itami for installation, test, and repair of wing rocket stations.

1532/ Recovered 1315I launch. Scheduled carrier qualification landings were cancelled because of light variable winds.

1713/ Recovered remainder of 1515I launch.

1714/ Set a course southward for Sasebo.

1726/ The CHUBADUK came alongside to transfer mail.

2058/ CHUBADUK chopped to H.M.S. GLORY.

2100/ Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 by H.M.S. GLORY. Relieved as OTC, West Coast, by H.M.S. CRANE.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had a high overcast and low broken clouds with a ceiling of 1000 feet. Target area had an unlimited ceiling. Winds were light and variable at five to seven knots. Flying conditions average to good in target area for the entire period.
Mission Summary:

Eight CaP, four TaRCaP, and twenty-three STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

5 January
0845I/ Three plane CaP and two plane Carrier Qualification Group launched
0924I/ Commenced qualification landings with two planes.
0940I/ One plane of the qualification group suffered class "B" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing.
1026I/ Recovered remainder of 0845I launch. Two pilots were qualified with a total of seven landings.
1027I/ U.S.S. Lewis HANCOCK (DD-875) chopper to CTU 95.1.1.
1729I/ Holed to Buoy Number eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.
PART III

REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES.

A. Ships ordnance expended 26 December 1952:

1. 1650 rounds of 40mm.

B. Performance of ship's ordnances:

1. AA firing exercise was conducted 26 December 1952 with no material casualties.

2. 30 December: improper assembly of breech block on right gun of Mount #5 caused the outer cocking lever to break, and burred the sear and inner crank. All parts were replaced.

3. The AK-34 radar of the AK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

   a. 27 December: (Radar II) Variance of crystal current in transmitter receiver caused by Th tube 724B. The tube was replaced.

   b. 31 December: (Radar VIII) Power failure in 115 volt circuit due to a bad fuse in the MK-3 fuse box. The fuse was replaced.

   c. 2 January: Intermittent transmission of range to receiver, also indication of no torque on range receiver dial. The malfunction was caused by a faulty 6L6 (low emission) tube in amplifier AK-4 Mod 1. The mechanical limit stop for range in the relay transmitter assembly also stopped. The tube was replaced and the limit stop set.

4. Mount #14 sustained the following casualty:

   a. 31 December: Failed to synchronize train due to a faulty amplifier. The amplifier was replaced.

C. The AA firing exercise on 26 December indicated a need for improvement in the accuracy of fire of the port battery. No firing was conducted en route to Sasebo because of inclement weather.

D. A five point training program for the department has been promulgated. The five points are:

1. General Drills, i.e., Loading drills

2. General Training Periods, i.e., Lectures, Practical exercises

3. Advancement Training, i.e., Correspondence courses

4. Personal Training via USAFI.

5. School Programs (Fleet and Service)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>464</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>5&quot; HV.A Rockets</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20MM Ammo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 cal. Ammo</td>
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PART IV DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no Battle Damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>292</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad Coal Shute</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Railroad Locomotives</td>
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<td>Road Bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies (In Stacks)</td>
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<td>Large Amount Destroyed</td>
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<td>Transformer Stations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage suffered by Ships aircraft

1. Operational Damage

a. The tail wheel assembly was sheared from a plane during qualification landings on 27 December resulting in class "C" damage.

b. One aircraft suffered class "B" damage when the port landing gear collapsed during a landing on 28 December.

c. A tail wheel collapsed during a landing causing a plane to strike the barriers and resulting in class "B" damage on 29 December.

d. One plane suffered class "3" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing on 5 January.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action

a. One plane was lost in the sea after being hit by AA fire on 27 December.

b. One plane received minor damage consisting of bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 26 December.
c. One aircraft suffered class "C" damage as a result of a hit in the starboard wing by 20MM AA fire on 31 December.

d. One plane received a hole in the cowling as a result of flying through debris caused by a rocket blast on 3 January. Damage was minor.

e. One plane suffered a shattered windshield as a result of a hit by 20MM AA fire on 4 January.

f. One plane received bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 4 January.
PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel

Number of personnel assigned to the ship during the patrol, including marines, was 1123. Personnel absent for various reasons totaled 38 leaving 1,085 actually aboard during the period. Four marine pilots came aboard while the ship was at sea.

2. Education

Educational advancement received continued emphasis as personnel prepare for the advancement in rating examinations. In addition to courses already being utilized, nine correspondence courses, four USNFI courses and twenty-one course books were issued during the patrol. On the job training constituted the largest single phase of the program due to the heavy operating schedule.

Exchange of officers between units of the United Nations Fleet has proved to be an interesting and valuable source of training. Two officers from this ship were transferred to the British Carrier to observe air operations. Four officers from various units in the area came aboard for training and to observe operations.

3. Divine Services

Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, four protestant services with two holy communions, one catholic mass, daily rosary services, one bible class and two Latter Day Saints services. The Chaplain from the H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) came aboard to conduct Catholic Mass.

4. Welfare and Recreation

A heavy maintenance schedule reduced movie showings to four during this period. Each movie was attended by a capacity audience.

The library rates high as a form of recreation as evidenced by the large number of books currently checked out to personnel.

A summary of the day’s action, world news and sporting events is broadcast over the ship’s announcing system at noon each day by the Chaplain.

A staff headed by the Chaplain, prints a daily paper which is available for reading during the breakfast hour and is distributed to all ships in the Task Unit.

B. Casualties

First Lieutenant John B. GOARY, USN, O-53549, was declared missing in action on 27 December 1952. Numerous attempts to rescue LT GOARY from the water near enemy territory failed and it has not been determined that he survived to reach the shore. It is considered extremely improbable in view of his location in the water, the circumstances of the attempted rescue, and the temperature of the water that he could have survived.
SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

Recommendations

The following recommendations set forth in the action report for 8 December through 17 December 1952 remain valid.

c. Operating squadrons should check regularly and frequently condition of AL7-17 igniter plug receptacles on all aircraft, and replace as required.

b. Operating squadrons should renew circuit wiring on all aircraft showing release circuit wire deterioration.

c. Support FASRONs should replace or overhaul defective or deteriorating Aero 14A, K-55, and MK-9 racks on aircraft prior to assignment of replacement aircraft to combat squadrons.

Comment

Three (3) new pilots with no previous carrier experience were carrier qualified. (Total landings 30). During carrier qualifications on 5 January 1953, F4U-4B, BuNo 97501, sustained probable class "A" damage when it went into the starboard catwalk incident to landing aboard. The pilot was uninjured. The aircraft was removed from the catwalk using the Le-Tourneau crane.

Comment

The H03S-1 helicopter was out of commission on three occasions during flight operations because of an inoperative rotor brake resulting from brake shoe failure. Since the rotor brake is designed as a rotor parking brake, it required use in carrier helicopter operation to stop blade rotation subjects brake shoes to relatively severe conditions of wear. The HU-1 DET maintenance records show that six (6) sets of brake shoes have had to be replaced during the last six months. This vessel has strictly adhered to current operating instructions for this model helicopter.

Recommendations

a. A more rugged rotor brake shoe should be developed for the H03S-1 helicopter. It is understood the brake assemblies on more recent models have been developed, taking into account the severe demands of carrier operation.

b. Until such time as a more rugged brake shoe is available, brake shoes should be thoroughly inspected before and after each flight, and that they be replaced prior to failure.
Comment

The catapult bridle allowance for the CVE-105 Class Carrier contains requirements for F6F, F8F, AF, TBm, AD, and F4U type aircraft. In adding up the non-usable bridles, due to the basic fact that only one type aircraft can be efficiently operated at any one time, it is obvious that valuable storage space is used for items that will undoubtedly never be used on any one particular cruise.

Recommendation

The allowance of bridles for types of aircraft not assigned be reduced to two (2) for each type for use in emergencies. Proper bridles can be loaded on the basis of type aircraft assigned for forthcoming operations. Thus monetary savings will result as well as the saving in stowage space.

Comment

Cold weather operational problems were encountered almost continuously during this period. Scheduling ten (10) plane strikes for dawn launch presents difficult deck spotting problems to the CVE-105 carrier during extreme cold weather. To insure that the first launch was ready in all respects at the scheduled time, the following procedures were considered necessary:

a. Assigned aircraft were spotted on the hangar deck at least four (4) hours prior to launch in order to aid in turn-up.

b. These planes were respotted to flight deck just prior to turn-up check-out.

c. Topping off with gasoline of these aircraft was done on hangar deck.

d. Ammunition loading except fuzing was done on the hangar deck.

e. The formation steamed down wind during preparations for launching in order to have the least amount of freezing wind across the deck. This substantially improved the efficiency and safety of personnel on the flight deck.
Aircraft handling tractors are not equipped with visible all-round red lighting for night flight deck operations. This command is placing a small red light on each fender as a safety measure to insure that all personnel can see the movement of the tractors at night.

Recommendation

Aircraft handling tractors should be provided with small all-round red lights as a safety measure to insure that personnel see its movements on a black-out flight deck.

Comment

The hung ordnance summary for the subject period is set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>aero 14a</td>
<td>10-faulty igniter plugs (S ring fatigue, aero 17-17 plugs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 - Faulty pig tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - Circuit Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MK-9</td>
<td>3 - Faulty igniters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 - Cut pig-tails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Total FV.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>aero 14a</td>
<td>1 - Circuit Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>6 - Circuit Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>aero 14a</td>
<td>1 - Solenoid Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>3 - Pilot error (switches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Total Bombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While some improvement was noted with respect to hung ordnance during this operating period, the problem remains acute and requires further concerted effort for solution.
Land - Launch Data is tabulated below:

Launches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Launches</th>
<th>H-2-1 Catapult</th>
<th>H-4C Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight Pounds</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind knots</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Pressure psi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Bridles Expanded</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Landings</th>
<th>266</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind Knots</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPV psi</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Runout Feet</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wires Caught</td>
<td>#1 - 49, #2 - 92, #3 - 77, #4 - 36, #5 - 8, #6 - 3, #7 - 0, #8 - 0, #9 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Crashes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers engaged</td>
<td>2 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Operations Department

1. Combat Information Center

Watches in CIC were arranged into three rotating watch sections of enlisted men with a total of seven men to a section. There are six CIC watch officers and two Air Plot Watch Officers. During all air operations, there is an Air Plot Officer, a CIC Watch Officer, and an Air Control Officer on watch.

The carrier operates approximately thirty-five miles from enemy territory during daylight hours. A two plane CAP is maintained on station five to ten miles from the ship in the expected direction of enemy air activity. This provides approximately twenty-five miles in which to affect an intercept of approaching aircraft.

The major function of CIC during these patrols is control of STRIKE groups and the defensive CAP. Returning strikes are intercepted by defensive CAP to provide identification as well as training. Interception is usually made about fifteen to twenty miles from the ship. A better air search radar and IFF installation would substantially aid CIC in improving the air defense of the ship.
Three officers from the screen destroyers were aboard to obtain training as air controllers during this patrol. The defensive G.P. were split and used for practice intercepts in order to provide a maximum amount of training.

2. Communications

1. Personnel

Due to a shortage of trained radiomen, watches were stood on a port and starboard basis, six hours on and six hours off. Standing of long watches over a long period of time decreased efficiency and increased the number of errors made. Although this command received three graduates from class "C" schools, graduates were unable to meet minimum requirements for guarding a circuit because of inadequate training. Moreover, during the period that this ship has operated as Commander Task Element 95.11, the radio traffic has increased several times over that experienced in operations previous to this assignment.

Recommendation:

a. Escort Carriers operating as Task Element Commanders in the Yellow Sea should be provided four (4) rated radiomen above the fleet average because of the unusually heavy traffic load in this area.

b. The requirements for completion of Class "C" radio school should be increased to the minimum point necessary to enable a graduate to guard the slower circuits.

2. Material

The coding machines, although never in an inoperative state, were a constant source of trouble through faulty mechanical operation.

Recommendation

It is recommended that an additional medium-high frequency transmitter and an additional coding machine be provided in this class ship, when the ship is operating in the capacity of CTF 95.11.

3. Services

It was found that requests for services from major relay stations were slow in being transmitted and on several instances it was necessary to initiate a second request. In messages of importance to operations, a delay in receiving a service could have serious consequences.

A message originated by this command was altered as to date time group, characters of groups, and message indicator when re-broadcast by NDT HITT. The date time group of the message was altered from 111358Z of December to 111357Z of December and the fourth message indicator was changed
from chaulin to VICTOR. Numerous characters in the re-broadcast differed from those in the original message. These alterations made it impossible to decrypt the message. The resulting requests for re-encryption from all addresses, in such cases, increases the work load on circuits and crypto centers substantially.

3. Photographic Laboratory

Photographic work was confined to routine ship's work, photographs for the cruise book, and support of the squadron. The aerial camera and assembly were lost in action the first day of operations as the plane carrying the installation was shot down by enemy fire. A replacement assembly was not available aboard the ship.

4. Aerology

Weather forecasting in the Yellow Sea is difficult due to lack of reports. During an average 24 hour period, the teletype response (RATT) is grabbed about five hours, normally between 1000I and 1500I. It is difficult to keep a map sequence as the ship has no facsimile equipment, and no other outside aid is available. On the average less than two canned maps a day are received from AIF, Tokyo. It is considered that facsimile equipment should be installed on carriers at the earliest opportunity.

C. Engineering Department

1. Damage Control

At 2225 on 30 December, a class "A" fire broke out in the incinerator room. Approximately thirty minutes was required to extinguish this fire.

Personal cleaning the fire box placed hot ashes and clinkers into a container to dump overboard. This material flared up and a CO2 fire extinguisher was exhausted in attempting to quell the flames. The personal involved want to get a bucket of water, one departing immediately, and the second man when the first one was slow in returning. When both were gone, with the doors to the incinerator room dagged close, the fire broke out again and set fire to adjacent trash. The fire was brought under control with fire hoses.

As a result of the experience of this fire, the procedure for fire fighting has been changed to require ringing the general alarm. With the entire crew standing easy at battle stations the ability of the ship to counter a fire or to prevent a chain reaction of other fires or explosions resulting from the initial fire, is materially increased.

To improve safety in the incinerator room the personnel assigned there are being given additional training in fire fighting. Additional CO2 fire extinguishers have been placed there. Safety precautions requiring trash to be moved direct from the accumulation bins to the fire box will be rigidly enforced.
D. Medical Department

1. First Lieutenant John B. Goodfay, USN, 053549, was declared missing in action 27 December 1952.

2. There were no personnel wounded or killed in action during this patrol.

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company

   a. Admitted to sick list - 155
   b. Total sick days out of 10 possible working days - 146
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 1
   d. Total patients attending sick call - 422
   e. Total medical treatments - 667
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 0
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 10
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 0
   j. Number of ship board injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 10
   l. Major surgical procedures - 0
   m. Venereal diseases cases and non-specific Urethritis - total - 25

1. Gonorrhea - 3
2. Chancroid - 7
3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 15
n. Penicillin tablets issued during last port period - 128

4. Medical statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 6
   b. Pilots permanently grounded for medical reasons - 0
   c. Average number days pilots grounded - 2
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 0
   e. No. of pilots ill - 0
   f. No. of pilots VLA - 0
   g. No. of pilots MLA - 1

H. L. Ray

Copy to:

CNO (2) advance
CINCPACFLT (2) advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVURO (1) advance

-33-
COMMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) advance
COMINLANT (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMINLJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMCUDIV-15
COMCUDIV-17
CO, FAINBETUPE (2)
CG, HINPMPPAC (1) advance
CG, FONPPAC (1) advance
CG, 1st MarINWING
CO, NAGAL
CO, VAM-312
CO, USS BANTAM (CVE-29)
CO, USS MANOVA (CVE-114)
CO, USS HOKO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
CO, USS POINT COZ (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. Wiles
CNR, USN
Operations Officer
### Flight Schedule for 27 December 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>A/B/C</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0855</td>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0855</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0845</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a,D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Helicopter**

- GUARD 1100 0730
- GUARD 1110 1150

**Notes:**
1. All flight with belly tanks.

**A/B/C Load**

- **A** = All A/C with full gun loads.
- **B** = All A/C 1000/l 5 sec and 4-100# inst./ND.
- **C** = All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
- **D** = 2 A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
- **E** = All A/C 500/l 0.1/.025 and 6-100/l 0.1/.025.

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**Enclosure (1)**
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOONG STRAIT (CVE-116)
Commander Task Unit 95.1.1

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SOUTHERN Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: action Report 11 January 1953 through 21 January 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4
(c) CinCPacflt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

incl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
(3) Rocket Barrier Diagram

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 11 January through 21 January 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOONG STRAIT was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 on 11 January until 2100 on 20 January of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   PART I General Narrative.

   PART II Chronological Order of Events.

   PART III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.

   PART IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

   PART V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

   PART VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VFA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952 and January 1953.
A. During the period 11 to 20 January 1953, the USS BADOONG STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of CTU 95.1.1, Carrier Unit, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command was Captain H. L. Ray, 62691/1310, USN who, for the duration of this patrol, was also OTC, West Coast in accordance with CFP 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. Ships assigned CTU 95.1.1 as screen included the USS HOOKS (DE-802), USS EASON (DD-631), HARV FERGUSON (DE-76), HSS COCKADE (D-34) and HNS NAUSA (DD-215). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three as units were rotated temporarily to CTU 95.1.2 for twenty-four hour periods for night patrols along the enemy held coast line and for replenishing enroute.

B. VMA-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Cahoon, 07207, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. Planes consisted of F4U-5 and F4U-4B types. At the beginning of the patrol there were a total of 16 aircraft aboard but replacements received on the third and fourth day of air operations raised this total to 24, the authorized allowance. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 20. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 284 for a total of 637.8 hours. A total of 49.5 hours was over the target time. A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 44 sorties for a total of 31.4 hours.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coast line and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of CTU 95.1.2, the Naval Defense Unit; the troops of CTU 95.1.5, the Island Defense Unit; and the ships of CTU 95.1.1, the Carrier Unit. The Island Defense Unit is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the Han river on the South to the Taedong Estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Unit in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Unit have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

D. The BADOONG STRAIT sailed from Sasebo, Japan at 0645I on 11 January 1953 as directed by CTU 95.1 dispatch 090807Z of January. Gunnery firing exercises were conducted in area GeBuGe. Shortly thereafter three aircraft temporarily based ashore at Itami Air Force Base for repairs were received aboard. These aircraft were led by Lieutenant Colonel Winston E. Jimson, 07571, USMC, who reported aboard as the prospective Commanding Officer of VMA-312 for familiarization and requalification in carrier landings. Five replacement aircraft assigned from the USS ESSEX were flown to the ship via Korean air bases but were unable to rendezvous because of weather. These aircraft finally arrived aboard 14 and 15 January 1953. The ship became a part of CTU 95.1.1 at 112100I.
b. In performing its assigned tasks, the Task Unit continued conducting
dawn to dusk air operations, operating during daylight in the vicinity of
37°30' North Latitude, 124°E Longitude and retiring southward for the night.
However, it was often necessary for the carrier to operate as far North as
38°25' North Latitude to find adequate ceiling and visibility. Normally
five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours, with
approximately 50 per cent of available aircraft in each launch. A two plane
CAP for TU 95.1.1 was assigned in each deck launch, while a four plane
TADCAP was provided once each day for the vessel of CTU 95.1.2 stationed
in the vicinity of Oktok Island. All STRIKE groups assigned targets in the
chungo-ojatto area, however, were briefed to assist CTU 95.1.2 whenever their
services were requested.

f. During the first several days of the patrol air operations were hampered
by weather. On the twelfth of January northwest winds as high as 36 knots
and gusts to 54 with resulting heavy seas precluded air operations for the
first time since the vessel commenced operations in the Yellow Sea on 29
October 1952. On the succeeding five days, minimum temperatures during
daylight hours ranged from 15° to 22°F. Minor technical difficulties resulting
therefrom reduced aircraft availability. Personnel working on the flight
deck in this weather found it extremely bitter and were slowed down.
Freezing spray and light snow on the flight deck were also a problem, but
delayed only one sortie. Thereafter the mercury continued rising until
minimum daylight temperatures reached 32°F on the final day of air opera-
tions. The effect of the temperature on air operations can be gauged from
the chart of aircraft usage and availability (enclosure (2)) hereto. It
should be noted that minimum temperatures are normally experienced during
daylight hours since the Task Unit retires to the warmer southern waters at
night.

g. Directives from higher authority required this unit to provide general
air coverage for troop convoys approaching the Inchon area from the south
on 14 January. Coverage afforded the convoys on this date was very general
indeed since frequent snow showers and low ceilings curtailed operations.
Three aircraft returning to the ship from K-6 covered the entrance to
Inchon harbor during one period of the day. Air operations were resumed in
the afternoon when improved weather was found to the North, but low ceilings
and visibility continued to preclude air operations in the sea areas to
the South.

h. The Task Unit provided immediate assistance to H-95 SPAWASH on 15 January
when she came under fire from shore batteries in the vicinity of Haeju. Two
returning CAP aircraft were diverted to the scene, and provided cover until
a four plane STRIKE group arrived with full ordnance loads. Photographs
taken indicated that one gun position was destroyed and one gun position
and command post damaged by this group and the subsequent STRIKE group
which attacked them.

i. The extension of the ice incident to lowered temperatures demanded
increased air support. Twelve planes struck targets south of Haeju because
ice conditions made it difficult for the Frigate operating there to give
necessary cover to YONDAE-DO. Close pack ice around SOKTO and CHODO opened the possibility of an overland invasion from the mainland and reduced the ability of surface ships to operate in and cover those areas. Increased reconnaissance of this area was instituted, and all aircraft transiting the area were briefed to establish communication with the ships stationed there and to provide assistance if requested.

J. The difficulties of qualifying pilots for carrier operations in the combat area are illustrated by the experience of the prospective commanding officer of VA-312 on this patrol. After his initial landing aboard in a pre-frontal rain squall while the ship was enroute to the operating area, he was scheduled for CaP in order to conduct his carrier qualification landings while strike aircraft were away from the ship. Each time this was attempted some unforeseen circumstances of weather, emergency landing, or emergency launch precluded practice landings. After two such attempts, and in view of his excellent carrier landing technique and previous experience, he was assigned regular missions. He returned from the nine days of air operations with nine landings, of which nine were combat sorties. No formal carrier qualification landings were made.

K. On previous patrols a serious effort was made toward selecting targets and then tailoring the ordnance loading on the assigned strike aircraft to attain greatest results. Because of the difficulty of rearming during this patrol in the exceptional cold weather a modification to this system was adopted in an attempt to speed up rearming. For a given period - a full day when practicable - targets of a given type were selected for attack so that a standard ordnance loading could be used with good effect. This system reduced the workload on ordnance crews to a considerable degree, and expedited rearming. It is recommended for adoption where circumstances are appropriate.

L. On retiring from the operating area on the evening of 20 January, a total of 48 fishing vessels were sighted in the prohibited area between latitudes 37° and 36° N in the vicinity of longitude 124° 40' E. This is a large increase over numbers previously encountered and would appear to represent a concerted encroachment on an area reserved for combat operations.

M. At 2021001 the BAOGHONG STRAIT was replaced in TU 95.1.1 by the HMS GLORY relinquished the duties of OTC West Coast, and retired toward Sasebo in company with USS JOINT. Anti-aircraft firing exercises on a towed sleeve were conducted by both ships the next day. Upon completion, JOINT conducted a torpedo firing exercise using the BAOGHONG STRAIT as target. The execution of the attack and the retirement appeared excellent, but accuracy could not be judged since the torpedo was not observed from the target ship.
CARONLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

11 January

0645I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 9908072 of January 1953, the USS BADONING STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for Korean West Coast Operating Areas, "AIKE" and "NaN".

1128I/ Commenced 40mm AA firing on a towed sleeve in area "GEORGE".

1155I/ Completed 40mm AA firing having expended 1823 rounds of 40mm ammunition.

1335I/ Recovered three VMA-312 aircraft from Itami, Japan. Six additional aircraft, scheduled to land aboard from K-3, returned to base due to weather.

2100I/ Relieved the Hms GLORY (CVL-19). Assumed duty as CTU 95.1.1 and OTC of Naval Blockade Forces off the west coast of Korea.

Weather Summary:
Broken clouds with a ceiling of 5000 feet and overcast at 10,000 feet during the day. Wind increased from three knots at 1630I to thirty-six knots by 2030I, and maintained this velocity throughout the night. Heavy seas slowed the speed of advance to eight knots and prevented rendezvous with other ships of TU 95.1.1 as previously scheduled.

12 January

1530I/ Arrived in Korean Operating Area "AIKE".

1630I/ USS ROOKS (DD-804) and Hms RAID (DD-215) joined the Task Unit. Upon detachment by Hms GLORY on 11 January, these ships were diverted to patrols in area "NaN" rather than join BADONING STRAIT earlier because of heavy seas.

1820I/ USS ARBON (DD-651) joined the Task Unit from WHITBREAD patrol.

2330I/ Arrived in Korean Operating Area "NaN".

Weather Summary:
Cloud cover variable broken to overcast with ceilings of 500 to 1500 feet. Moderate snow showers throughout the day. Surface winds northwest thirty-two to thirty-eight knots with gusts to fifty-four knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 35°F and 24°F. High seas of sixteen to twenty feet delayed arrival in operating area and caused cancellation of air operations.
13 January
0745I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked and damaged a railroad tunnel near ONGJIN.

0849I/ HMC5 Haida (DDE-215) came alongside for transfer of mail and personnel. LT John G. Marshall, RN, and LT R. Carvin, RN, pilots from the HMS Glory (CVL-19), came aboard by highline to observe air operations.

0912I/ USS Artesian (AO-631) came alongside for transfer of mail.

0930I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes returned from K-6 were used as defensive CAP. STRIKE group damaged a railroad tunnel and four buildings near Ongjin. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

1025I/ Recovered 0745I launch plus four VMA-312 replacement aircraft from K-6.

1050I/ HMS Newcastle (D-76) joined the Task Unit.

1108I/ USS hooks (AO-604) came alongside to transfer mail.

1145I/ Two plane CAP and three plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked troop villages near JUNIU-DO destroying two buildings and damaging three. One plane of the flight spotted gunfire from the HMS Newcastle near Honggang-ni.

1200I/ Hooks detached to CTU 95.1.2 for Whitehead patrol.

1212I/ Recovered remainder of 0930I launch plus two replacement planes from K-6.

1345I/ Three plane Gunfire Spot group launched. This group spotted gunfire for HMS Newcastle and attacked troop villages near Honggang-ni. In addition to damage inflicted by ships' gunfire the flight destroyed three buildings and damaged three. Flight diverted to K-6 due to communication difficulties and marginal weather.

1400I/ The primary Air Search Radar (SK) became inoperative. Spare parts required for repair were not available aboard ship.

1407I/ Recovered 1145I launch.

1545I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TACCAP launched. CTU 95.1.2 requested TACCAP to attack a gun position in a cave which had been firing on Chodo Island. The entrance to the cave was destroyed. One large building was damaged near CH'INWAMPO. Light AA fire was encountered.
16071/ Recovered two aircraft that had diverted to K-6 from 0930I launch.
16381/ ...reported a sonar contact at 38-13N, 124-36E.
16401/ ...evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine.
17321/ Recovered 1545I launch.
17331/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.
22001/ ...reported a sonar contact at 37-32N, 124-36E, HAIDA designate assisting ship.
22021/ ...CTU 95.1.1 informed ...of an underwater object listed in CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52 as being in this approximate location.
22171/ ...ERIBEN reported sonar contact dead in the water with no doppler effect.
22521/ ...ERIBEN and HAIDA evaluate sonar contact as doubtful submarine.
23281/ Final evaluation of sonar contact was doubtful submarine. CTU 95.1.1 directed ERIBEN and HAIDA to rejoin the screen.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet lowering to 1500 feet by 1100I. Visibility varied from one to ten miles in sea fog and snow showers. Winds were from the northwest at twenty-two to twenty-seven knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 23°F and 15°F. Target area was clear throughout the day.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four VARKCAP, eleven STRIKE, and three Gunfire Spot for a total of twenty-six sorties.

14 January
0030I/ ...ERIBEN (DD-631) and ...HAIDA (DD-215) rejoined the screen.
08151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. Because of low visibility and snow showers, it was necessary for the Air Controller to direct the rendezvous of the STRIKE group. The flight then attacked troops and supplies near TONAN. Three buildings were destroyed with one secondary explosion observed. Two planes diverted to K-6 due to marginal weather.
08361/ ...HAIDA came alongside for mail transfer.
10351/ Commenced recovery of 0815I launch. Snow showers reduced visibility to less than one mile and required radar control of planes entering the landing pattern. One plane caught number
DECLASSIFIED

six wire and engaged number three barrier, damaging the propeller and engine cowling.

1106I/ Completed recovery of 0815I launch. Aircraft launching operations suspended because of weather.

1131I/ Recovered three planes that had diverted to K-6 from 1345I launch 13 January, plus one "OD" TBM. The three Corsairs flew convoy cover in the vicinity of LST's, AKA's and APA's in accordance with instructions since low visibility in operating area prevented TU 95.1.1 CAP from covering the convoy from seaward.

1152I/ USS ROCKS (DE-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1240I/ Enlisted detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1400I/ Light plane STRIKE launched. Flight attacked a railroad tunnel near Chanyong. Both entrance to the tunnel were damaged and four rail cuts were made. Low visibility and snow showers continued in the southern part of the operating area and prevented launching CAP to cover convoy.

1440I/ NAVAL chopper to CTG 95.1 before being relieved by Hrs COCKADE, since COCKADE was diverted by COMNAVFE to investigate a Japanese fishing boat reported in distress.

1520I/ Four plane TACCAP launched. Two planes, diverted to K-6 from 0815I launch, returned to act as defensive CAP. TACCAP attacked a troop village near Haenju damaging six buildings.

1546I/ Recovered 1400I Launch.

1603I/ CTU 95.1.1 received a flash dispatch from LEOPARD (Army Liaison Group on Paengyong-Do) requesting an immediate air strike against eighty North Korean Troops with three 82mm guns attacking friendly positions on Changsang-Got Peninsula (XC 484192).

1650I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. Flight attacked troop area and gun positions on Changsang-Got Peninsula as requested with unassessable damage. One plane was hit in the propeller by small arms fire.

1727I/ Recovered 1520I launch plus two planes diverted to K-6 from 0815I launch.

1747I/ Recovered 1650I launch.

1748I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had broken clouds to overcast conditions.
throughout the day with ceilings varying from 1500 feet to 400 feet in snow showers. Visibility was five to eight miles lowering at times to less than one mile in snow showers and sea smoke. Surface winds were from the northwest at twenty to twenty-four knots. The target area was clear throughout the day. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 22°F and 17°F. Flying conditions were marginal to undesirable.

Mission Summary:
Four CaP, sixteen STRIKE, four TARCaP, and three Convoy Escort for a total of twenty-seven sorties.

15 January
0425I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) joined the Task Unit.

0730I/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near UPCH'0-KI destroying nine buildings and damaging six. Flight then flew reconnaissance to Han River.

0827I/ COCKADE came along side to transfer mail.

0930I/ Two plane CaP, four plane armed reconnaissance and one TBM "COW" for k-6 launched. CaP attacked a troop village near UPCH'0-KI destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to act as defensive CaP. This flight was then sent to aid CTU 95.1.6 (HMS SPOONW) which was being fired upon by shore batteries located on the Ongjin Peninsula. Gun positions were straffed with unassessable damage. The flight remained on station to cover CTU 95.1.6 until relieved by 1130I STRIKE group. RECCO group attacked a troop village North of CH'INNAMPO destroying ten buildings and damaging ten. Four vehicle bunkers were destroyed. The flight observed an F9F crash into the water three miles North of SOK-TO Island. The plane was destroyed and survival of the pilot was believed impossible.

0944I/ Recovered 0730I launch.

1040I/ CTU 95.1.6 requested TARCaP immediately. TU 95.1.6 (HMS SPARROW) was covering mine sweeping operations North of YONGYON Islands when enemy shore batteries from the Ongjin Peninsula opened fire.

1056I/ Defensive CaP departed to aid TU 95.1.6.

1107I/ CTU 95.1.1 reported to JOG Korea that TarCaP was being provided for CTU 95.1.6.

1130I/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group reported to CTU 95.1.6 and relieved CaP of the 0930I launch. Two gun positions and a command post were damaged on the Ongjin Peninsula. Light AA fire was encountered with one aircraft suff-
er sustained minor damage. CAP flight reported to CTU 95.1.6 and was released to attack pre-briefed target. Flight destroyed seven buildings in a troop village near Ongjin then returned to act as defensive CAP for TU 95.1.1.

1155I/ Recovered four planes of 0930I launch.
1201I/ USS CAHN (DD-631) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.
1253I/ Recovered four planes of 1130I launch and remaining two planes of 0930I launch.
1305I/ HMAS CONSOLID (D-76) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.
1430I/ Two plane CAP, three plane TARKAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near Ongjin, destroying three buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. One plane of this flight remained airborne and joined the 1600I launch as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released the TARKAP to attack a gun position near Soyangwa. The gun position was damaged. Six buildings were destroyed in a troop village near Nonggan-Ni. The STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Sinch'oun destroying eight buildings and damaging seven.

1457I/ Recovered remaining two aircraft of 1130I launch.
1600I/ One plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was joined by one plane from 1430I launch. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Daegu destroying nine buildings with one secondary explosion observed.
1625I/ Recovered eight planes of 1430I launch.
1734I/ Recovered 1600I launch plus one plane from 1430I launch.
1815I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had broken clouds to overcast conditions with ceilings variable from 1000 to 2000 feet. Light sea fog and snow showers were in the area. Surface winds were from the northwest at sixteen to twenty-two knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 23.5°F and 15°F. The target area was clear throughout the period.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, three TARKAP, four Armed Reconnaissance and sixteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-two sorties.
16 January

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ANAK destroying eleven buildings.

0915I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN destroying three buildings and damaging three. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 requested TARCAP to attack a gun position. Position was attacked with unassessable damage. Flight then attacked a troop village near CHINHANNIM destroying five buildings. 

The STRIKE group attacked gun positions on the ONGJIN Peninsula that had fired on CTU 95.1.6 on the previous day. One gun position and a command post were destroyed also a second gun position was neutralized.

0946I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1027I/ Landed one plane of 0915I launch due to an electrical fire.

1130I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village and gun position near ONGJIN. Two buildings were destroyed and a gun position hit with unassessable damage. Flight then escorted a TBM "COD" to the ship and remained as defensive CAP. STRIKE group split into two divisions and attacked each end of a railroad tunnel near SIMWON-MI. One end of the tunnel was closed and the other end damaged. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-6 with hun ordnance.

1209I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch.

1220I/ Hms COCKADE (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1225I/ Hms CONSORT (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. One CAP plane aborted due to an electrical fire. Remaining plane acted as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHINHANNIM destroying seventeen buildings and damaging two. Light AA fire was encountered.

1343I/ Recovered five planes of 1130I launch.

1352I/ Recovered three planes of 1130I launch plus one TBM "COD" from Itazuki.

1408I/ Recovered one plane from 1315I launch due to an electrical fire.

1425I/ CONSORT came alongside to transfer mail and personnel. The Operations Officer and three other officers from his department
of the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) came aboard by highline to observe operations of TU 95.1.1.

1545I/ Seven plane STRIKE launched. One TEA "COD" launched for Itazuki via k-16 with two pilots of HMS GLORY (CVL-19) and one officer from the BADOENG STRAIT Air Department as passengers. Two pilots from GLORY departed after completing observation of BADOENG STRAIT Air Operations. The BADOENG STRAIT officer departed to attend an escape and evasion seminar conducted by the FIFTH Air Force in the Joint Operation Center, Korea. The STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CH'INNAKPO destroying twelve buildings and damaging five.

1600I/ Recovered remainder of 1315I launch.

1745I/ Recovered 1545I launch plus two planes that diverted to K-6 from 1130I launch.

1750I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating and target area had varying high broken clouds to overcast conditions with unlimited ceilings. Surface winds were northwest at twelve to sixteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 28°F and 13°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, four TARGCAP, and twenty-seven STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

17 January

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHANGNYON destroying eight buildings and damaging five. An estimated twelve troops were killed and fifteen wounded.

0945I/ Recovered 0715I launch. Flight operations were discontinued due to snow showers and reduced visibility.

1200I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITE BLOOD patrol.

1202I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARGCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUWUI-DO destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released TARGCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGNYON. Three buildings were damaged and a gun position hit with unassessable damage. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHANGNYON destroying eight buildings and damaging four.
1215I/ USN ROOKS (Du-804) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1400I/ Two plane CAP and two four-plane STRIKE groups launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying seven buildings and damaging three. Flight then returned to ship to act as defensive CAP. First STRIKE group attacked supply buildings near CH'INNAMPO. Two buildings were damaged and a supply dump hit with unassessable damage. Light AA fire was encountered. The second STRIKE group attacked a North Korean Police Headquarters near CH'INNAMPO destroying nine buildings and damaging seven.

1426I/ Recovered 1202I launch.

1600I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near ONGJIN destroying two buildings and damaging one. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supply and transformer buildings near ANAK. Four buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Blue flashes were observed as bombs hit the transformer building.

1620I/ Recovered 1400I launch.

1726I/ Recovered 1600I launch.

1810I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
The operating area was overcast with high and middle layers of clouds. Low clouds formed after sunrise causing variable ceilings from 1000 to 8000 feet. Visibility good but reduced at times to less than one mile by snow showers. The target area had an overcast at 4000 feet in northern area and at 1500 feet in the southern area with light snow. Weather was variable in both areas due to a low depression passing two hundred miles south. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 32°F and 22°F. Flying conditions were average becoming undesirable in snow showers.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-three STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

18 January
0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a railroad tunnel near CHANGYON. Entrance to the tunnel was damaged and one rail cut made.
0915I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUMWI-DO destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group split and attacked each end of a railroad tunnel near HAENJU. Both entrances to the tunnel were damaged and two rail cuts were made. Light AA fire was encountered.

0944I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUMWI-DO destroying eight buildings and damaging four. Flight then escorted a "COD" TBM back to the ship and resumed station as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked and damaged a gun position and command post near KONGGANG-NI. Flight then destroyed three buildings and damaged one in a troop village near SUMWI-DO.

1134I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1143I/ USS ANDROMEDA (DD-631) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1240I/ USS HOOKS (DD-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUMWI-DO destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad tunnel near HAENJU. One entrance was damaged and one rail cut made. Flight then damaged a gun position and command post near KONGGANG-NI.

1335I/ Recovered 1115I launch, plus one TBM "COD" from K-6.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked two railroad tunnels near CHANGYON. Entrances to both tunnels were damaged and three rail cuts were made. One plane of this flight suffered minor damage from small arms fire.

1524I/ One TBM "COD" launched to K-6 with the Operations Officer and three other officers from the Operations Department of the USS BATAAN (CVL-29) aboard as passengers.

1531I/ Recovered 1315I Launch.

1645I/ Recovered seven planes of 1515I launch.

1721I/ Recovered remaining two planes of 1515I launch.

1723I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

1835I/ HMS COCKADE (D-34) reported a sonar contact, HOOKS designated assisting ship.
1845I/ COCKADE evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine and was directed to resume screening station.

2000I/ CTU 95.1.6 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide air strikes against troop and supply concentration west of YONAN (YB 953926) as it was difficult for surface craft to provide necessary cover to YONG-HAE-DO Island at night due to ice conditions around the island.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target areas had unlimited ceiling and visibility throughout the day. Winds were from the northwest at eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 33°F and 29°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-six STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

19 January
0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near WAGJIN destroying ten buildings and damaging five. A command post was damaged near CHANGYON.

0915I/ Two planes CAP, four planes TARCAP, and four planes Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying three buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGYON. Flight destroyed six buildings and damaged six. Troops in trenches were attacked near P'ungsan with an estimated ten killed and ten wounded. R3COO group scouting the coast northward to HANCHIN. Flight attacked troop bunkers North of CH'INNAMPO damaging two. Two revetted buildings were destroyed and one damaged.

0933I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near RONGGANG-NI destroying three buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers and supplies near YONAN as requested by CTU 95.1.6. Two troop bunkers were damaged and three buildings near CHANGYON were destroyed.

1135I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1201I/ HMS CONSORT (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1240I/ USS JABIN (DD-631) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.
1315I/ Two plane CAP and two four-plane STRIKE groups launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SWAM-DO destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. First STRIKE group attacked a troop village near T'ANAN destroying twelve buildings and damaging eight with one secondary explosion observed. Two large warehouses were destroyed in a second village. Two aircraft suffered minor damage from small arms fire. A third aircraft suffered minor damage to the starboard wing as a result of striking a wire during pull-up from an attack. The second STRIKE group attacked buildings and revetments near T'ANAN destroying fifteen buildings.

1357I/ Recovered 1115I Launch plus two TBM "COD" planes from ITAMUKI with passengers aboard destined for the COCKADE and 9685. 

1428I/ 9685 came alongside to transfer mail.

1445I/ Transferred three personnel to the COCKADE by helicopter.

1500I/ Transferred two personnel to the 9685 by helicopter.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked supplies and supply buildings near YONAN as requested by CTU 95.1.6. Eight buildings were destroyed and four damaged. Three stacks of supplies were damaged.

1539I/ Two TBM "COD" launched for Itazuki.

1553I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1728I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1735I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

2014I/ CTU 95.1.1 reported damage to troop and supply concentration west of YONAN to CTU 95.1.6 as eight buildings with large stacks of supplies destroyed and three bunkers damaged.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet. Target area was mostly clear during the morning. Low broken clouds moved inland during the afternoon reducing the ceiling to 2000 feet. Visibility was good in both areas. Surface winds were west northwest at ten to fifteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 34°F and 29°F. Flying conditions were average.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, four TBM CAP, twenty-four STRIKE, and four Armed reconnaissance for a total of forty-two sorties.
20 January...

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. TARCAP attacked two gun positions near Ch'anggyon, damaging one position. Flight then destroyed a warehouse near Songhwa.

0915I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near Onjalin. Two buildings were destroyed with six buildings and a gun position damaged. Moderate RN fire was encountered. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Ch'innamipo destroying two buildings, a warehouse and damaging twelve buildings. A gun position was destroyed near Songhwa and a road bridge damaged near Songdahap'o-ri. One plane of this flight returned to the ship early due to a faulty magnetos.

0939I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

0959I/ Recovered a plane from 0915I launch with a deferred emergency due to a faulty magnetos.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a village near Ch'anggyon destroying two buildings and damaging two. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Up'oh'o-ri destroying four buildings and damaging four.

1134I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch.

1200I/ HMAS Cochrane (D-34) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for Whitbread patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. The STRIKE group split into two divisions. The first division attacked a troop village near Ch'innamipo destroying twenty-five buildings. The second division attacked warehouses near T'aen'ian destroying three warehouses and eight buildings. Two plane CAP group departed for K-6, at the conclusion of their mission, to accomplish overhaul of aircraft electrical firing circuits.

1336I/ Two Vima-312 pilots were transferred to the LEMH for further transfer to the GloAF to observe air operations.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Up'oh'o-ri destroying thirteen buildings and damaging six.

1530I/ Recovered remainder of 1315I launch.

1655I/ Recovered 1515I launch.
Set a course southward for Sasebo.

USS *ROOKS* (DD-304) departed to investigate three fishing vessels at 36-54N, 124-30E.

*ROOKS* ordered to escort fishing vessels out of prohibited area and then rendezvous with *HMS GLORY* (CVL-19).

*ERBEN* returned from investigating fishing vessels.

*ERBEN* choppd to *HMS GLORY*.

*CTU 95.1.1* reported the presence of forty-eight fishing vessels between 36-00N and 37-00N, 124-40E, action to *CTU 95.1.2* with information to *CTG 95.1* and *GLORY*, and that *ROOKS* was detached to clear the area of fishing vessels and join *HMS GLORY* later. The majority of the vessels are believed to have been South Korean, some of which had departed KUNSAN on 19 January with intentions to remain in the area for five days.

Relieved as *CTU 95.1.1* and OTC West Coast by *HMS GLORY*.

*ROOKS* reported a large fishing fleet anchored at 36-23N 124-50E.

*Weather Summary*:
Low broken clouds in both operating and target area produced a ceiling of 2500 feet. Visibility was good except in snow showers and ground fog along the coast and the southern target area. Surface winds were west northwest at nine to fifteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 35°F and 32°F. Flying conditions were average lowering to marginal in snow showers.

*Mission Summary*:
Ten CAP, four TACAP, and twenty-eight STRIKE for a total of forty-two sorties.

21 January

1040I/ Commenced 40MM AA firing on a towed sleeve in area "GEDIGE".

1153I/ Completed 40MM AA firing on a towed sleeve. A total of 3029 rounds of 40MM ammunition was expended. Three target sleeves were knocked down and a fourth one was hit.

1313I/ *HMS CONSORT* (L-76) fired a practice torpedo using the *USS BADGLEY STRAIT* (CVL-116) as a target.

1332I/ CONSORT detached to recover torpedo and proceed independently into Sasebo Harbor.

1711I/ Moored to buoy number eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.
A. Ships ordnance expended

1. 11 January 1953 - 1829 rounds
2. 21 January 1953 - 3029 rounds

B. Performance of ships ordnance

1. AA firing at a towed sleeve was conducted on 11 January with no material casualties.

2. AA firing at a towed sleeve was conducted on 21 January with the following material casualties:
   a. Mount #2 - Three misfires
      Mount #4 - One misfire
      Mount #9 - One misfire

      The misfires were caused by defective primers. No data on lot numbers could be obtained as mixed reworked lots of 40mm ammunition were being used. All safety precautions were observed and the misfires were disposed of with no difficulty.

   b. The left gun of Mount #3 jammed. A new round was lowered before a fired round had cleared the loader causing the gun to jam. This casualty was caused by worn contact shoulders of breechblock and extractor. The extractors were not getting enough impulse from the opening of the block to kick the shell out with sufficient speed. The breechblock and extractors were replaced.

3. The Mk-34 Radar of the Mk-63 Director system sustained the following casualties during the patrol:
   a. 11 January (Radar - 7) - T and F dot failed to respond to the signal generated by the bearing dial (in search position). This was caused by a faulty tube 6H6 (V-13) shorted in the target acquisition unit. The tube was replaced.

4. Other casualties sustained during this period:
   a. 4 January - Mount #6 and #8 failed to synchronize in elevation. This was caused by an open 52 lead on thirty-six speed synchro on terminal board at director pedestal. The lead was connected.

   b. 14 January - Mount #5 firing circuit failed to operate in local or automatic. This was due to a broken firing clutch rocker arm. The rocker arm was replaced.
C. The two AA firing exercises showed improvement over previous firing. Three sleeves were knocked down and a fourth hit during the exercise on 21 January.

D. Target acquisition and loading drills were held during the patrol.

E. Listed below is a summary of aircraft ordnance expended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# SAP Bombs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; MVAR Rockets</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rounds 20mm Ammo</td>
<td>24,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rounds 50 cal Ammo</td>
<td>41,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft

1. Operational Damage

   a. One aircraft suffered a damaged propeller and cowling on 14 January as a result of catching number 6 wire and engaging two barriers.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action.

   a. One plane suffered minor damage to a propeller on 14 January from small arms fire.

   b. One plane suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the wing, on 15 January from enemy small arms fire.

   c. One plane suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the fuselage, on 18 January from enemy small arms fire.

   d. Two aircraft suffered minor damage, consisting of bullet holes in the wing, on 19 January from enemy small arms fire.

   e. One plane suffered minor damage to a wing on 19 January as a result of striking a wire during an attack.

C. Damage inflicted on enemy by ships aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings (troop)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Outs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies (stacked)</td>
<td>Large amount damaged</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel
The number of personnel on board during this cruise including the Marines was 1091. The spirit and morale of the crew was demonstrated in the collection of funds for the harch of Dimes. A total of $3,657.00 was collected in the drive, during the first two weeks. It is anticipated that the final collection will exceed $5,000.00. One division averaged more than fourteen dollars per man in the division.

2. Education
Enlisted personnel are currently enrolled in nineteen officer correspondence courses, one hundred forty-two enlisted correspondence courses, thirty-one USAF courses and a total of two hundred thirty-four course books are checked out for study. Lectures and on the job training as well as individual study have been increased in preparation for the coming advancement in rating examinations.

3. Divine Services
Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, three protestant services, one Catholic Mass, daily Rosary services, two Latter Day Saints services and two Bible classes.

4. Recreation
Books from the ships library constituted the most active form of recreation. Movie showings were limited to three during the patrol because of aircraft maintenance requirements. The Chaplain continued his usual broadcasts of local news, world news, and sporting events over the ships announcing system each day at noon. A newspaper is printed each day and copies are distributed to other ships in the Task Unit.

B. Casualties

1. There were no personnel casualties during this patrol.
A. Air Department

Comment
During this operating period, the task unit contended with the coldest weather so far encountered. Temperatures for about four consecutive days ranged from a low of 12°F to a high of 18°F. Severe working conditions were experienced, particularly on the flight deck, with winds at launching periods ranging to 38 knots over the deck. This imposed delays in rearming and in effecting minor aircraft repairs or adjustments on the flight deck. This situation was alleviated considerably by positioning the ship for commencement of the days operations so that the ship could be headed downwind during rearming.

Recommendation
On below freezing temperatures or with high winds carrier task units should position in advance of starting flight operations bearing in mind the desirability of running downwind between recovery and respotting so as to create, as nearly as possible, a no-wind condition over the deck, thus giving handling, gasing, and loading crews more favorable conditions for expeditious rearming. Also, time allowances in scheduling should be increased to compensate for greatly increased human efforts required in decreasing temperatures.

Comment
The present light weight colored helmets used to designate flight deck operating groups are not sufficiently warm in temperatures below 30°F. The main discomfort was about the ears. Several men used wads of cotton or sewed in powder puffs to alleviate this discomfort.

Recommendation
That colored winter flight deck helmets be developed that are of sufficient warmth to provide necessary protection at sub-freezing temperatures. These helmets should contain loops wherein goggle straps may be interlaced to avoid loss by slipstream pressure as goggles are quite necessary for plane directors and chalkmen. Also, small but firm visors could be incorporated which would tend to lessen the wind pressure at the eye level while at the same time providing non-glare characteristics needed on sunny days.

Comment
Due to the infrequent but exceedingly dangerous situation resulting when hung-rockets became detached from an aircraft on an arrested landing the BAADONG STRAIT, in December 1951, developed the "FREDERICKS" Barrier. This barrier consisted of several cargo nets rolled and tied which were strung across the flight deck manually whenever aircraft to be recovered were carrying hung ordnance. It necessitated a minimum of eight (8) personnel to open and close this barrier. Recently the BAADONG STRAIT developed and is now using the "LUSH" Barrier which has certain advantages over its predecessor. This new barrier is attached to and operates on the
Number  4 Barrier stanchions (Illustrated in Enclosure (3)). Its advantages are:

1. No personnel are involved in the handling of the net after it is once rigged.
2. Aircraft can be taxied and towed across it.
3. It is always in position when the barriers are up even though a pilot fails to notify FLY CON of his hung ordnance.
4. Rigging involves a maximum of fifteen minutes on the first operating day.
5. It stops the rocket closer to the jettison ramp where it can be disposed of more quickly.

Recommendation

A more permanent net using the principles of the "HALF" Barrier should be developed using a strong wear-resistant stainless steel or galvanized iron wire netting. For lack of better materials this original net is constructed of layers of cotton and nylon two (2) inch tape. This has proven serviceable but it is not totally resistant to the rough wear and tear imposed by constant use during aircraft operating periods, or to weather deterioration.

Comment

Yielding elements at the number one, two, three, and four cross-deck pendants are high-rate replacement items due to the punishment given by landing aircraft. Since 1 October 1952, eleven (11) elements have been broken. Spares have been difficult to obtain necessitating exchanges with elements in areas where less abusive use occurs - namely those outboard on the number nine, eight or seven wires. Temporary rigs are installed at these locations until replacements are obtained.

Recommendation

Yielding element spares should be increased in the forward area supply activities where continued operations quickly depletes allowances. The allowance for the ship is six (6).

Comment

This trip to the line again required CARQUAL operations. Only one pilot, the new Commanding Officer of VMA-312, was in need of refresher landing. It was therefore, decided to carry out requalifications during his assignment to a vaf mission in order to perform a minimum amount of non-operational activity. However, due to unfavorable sea conditions a landing period was not scheduled. Therefore, as time progressed under these same conditions the pilot found himself completing his eighth combat mission as he completed his eighth refresher landing.
Comment
F40-4B BuNo 97410 engaged number seven pendent, receiving a ninety foot runout and engaged barriers number two and three. Both wires of number three barrier were replaced because of kinks. One barrier support pendent parted and was replaced. The propeller, speed ring, and dive brakes of the plane were damaged.

Comment
A summary of hung ordnance for this patrol is listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25AVR</td>
<td>MK-55</td>
<td>Electrical Circuit Failure, Aero 14A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 25AVR

| 80#BBS | MK-55 | Electrical Circuit Failure, Aero 14A |

Total 80#BBS

The previous recommendation, that faulty release circuits be overhauled or replaced is still applicable. This program currently in effect has resulted in a markedly decrease in the amount of hung ordnance.

Land - Launch Data:

1. Launches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H-2-1 Catapult</th>
<th>H-4C Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Launches</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight Pounds</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Pressure psi</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind Knots</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Bridles Expanded</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Recoveries

   Number Landings - 285
   Average Wind Knots - 31
   CPV psi - 625
   Average runout feet - 112
   Wires Caught - #1 - 54, #2 - 113, #3 - 62, #4 - 42, #5 - 10, #6 - 3,
   #7 - 1, #8 - 0, #9 - 0.

   No. Barrier Crashes - 1
   Barriers engaged - 2 & 3
B. Operations Department

1. Communications

   a. Personnel
      As indicated in previous reports, the shortage of trained
      radiomen continued to create a hardship.

      Recommendation
      That escort carriers operating as Task Unit Commander in the
      Yellow Sea be provided four (4) rated radiomen above the fleet average
      because of the unusually heavy traffic loading in the area.

   b. Training
      Progress in training was evidenced by the rapid improvement
      by all strikers in that FOX broadcasts are now guarded by strikers and one
      striker has qualified as a regular operator on all circuits.

   c. Material
      One electric coding machine could not be utilized for encoding
      due to mechanical failure. This machine has recently been overhauled but
      it still failed to operate properly. The loss of one machine hampered the
      flow of both outgoing and incoming classified traffic. This further
      substantiates a previous recommendation, that an additional coding machine
      should be provided this class ship when operating as CTU 95.1.1.

2. Photographic Laboratory
   A total of twenty successful photographic sorties were flown during
   this patrol. A K-25 camera POD mounted on a wing pylon was used. Most of
   the photographs were made at a low altitude to evaluate attack damage and
   identify prospective targets. A total of 668 exposures were made and 123
   prints were produced from these exposures.

3. Aerology
   Difficulty in gathering weather data from outside sources continued
   on this patrol. NAV circuits operated about forty percent of the time during
   the patrol. This was due to weather, weak signals, and ice forming on
   antennas. A shortage of radiomen prevented manual copying of these circuits
   except for two schedules a day. One schedule of upper air analysis and one
   of surface analysis from CH0. The weather plane from Japan failed to arrive
   or to contact the ship during many of the nightly weather reconnaissance
   flights. Fasimile equipment would do much to relieve the weather information
   situation in the Yellow Sea.

C. Engineering Department

1. Electronics
   The SK-3 Air Search Radar was out of commission for a period of five
   days due to a failure of the rotating joint in the antenna. The copper
conductor leading to the rotating antenna joint was seized by the joint and twisted until it parted.

The twisting caused a shifting of all the conductors in the antenna assembly resulting in several splits in the conductor and four shorts from the conductor to ground. There are no spares for this assembly carried aboard, however, repairs were effected by straightening bent sections, silver soldering splits and inserting copper sleeves in the places where the twisted sections had to be removed. It was impossible to get all of the kinks out of the conductors. The line now meanders the required five hundred megohms up to the point where the conductor enters the antenna feed horn. From there to the radiating element there is a direct short to ground. Repair of this short was considered impossible while the ship was underway. When the gear was activated, normal targets appeared but the power output of the radar is still very low.

The damaged conductors in the SK Antenna will be replaced in Sasebo if spare parts are available at the tender.

D. Medical Department

1. There were no casualties during this patrol.

2. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company
   a. Admitted to sick list - 34
   b. Total sick days out of 10,910 possible working days - 122
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 1
   d. Total patients visits to sick call - 588
   e. Total medical treatments - 1840
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 1
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 37
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 1
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 37
   l. Major surgical procedures - 1
   m. Veneral disease cases and non-specific Urethritis total - 28
      1. Gonorrhea - 3
      2. Chancreoid - 0
      3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 25
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last port period - 114.

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group Pilots and Crewmen
   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 2
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation - 2
   c. Average number of days pilots grounded - 2
d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 3

e. No. of pilots KIA - 0

f. No. of pilots WIA - 0

H. L. Ray

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. Cole
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
CDNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSEVPAC
COMFAIRJAP
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMCANDIV-15
COMCANDIV-17
CO, FAIRBETHUPAC (2)
CG, AEFPAFPAC (1) Advance
CG, FMFPAC (1) Advance
CG, 1ST AUSTRALIAN WING
CO, BAG-12
CO, VNA-312
CO, USS B. TANAN (CVE-29)
CO, USS KENDOV (CVE-114)
CO, USS BAINO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-116)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
19 January 1953

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 20 JANUARY 1953

MOONRISE 1037
MOONSET 2345
PHASE New Moon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO. a/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMMO</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TALKaP</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0925</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>a,D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RECCO</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>a,C</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>a,D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CaP</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>a,B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HELIICOPTER
GUARD MAIL 0900
GUARD MAIL 1135
All ships
WHITHEAD ships

NOTE
1. All a/C 100 gallons in belly tanks.

AMMO LOAD

a - all a/C full gun loads.
B - Half a/C Napalm and 6-HVA.R.
   Half a/C 500#/ inst./.01 and 6-100#/ inst./.01.
C - all a/C Napalm and 6-HVA.R.
D - all a/C 500#/ inst./.01 and 6-100#/ inst./.01.

B. E. COLKITT JR.
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)
* It is to be noted that the rocket barrier is connected to the aircraft barrier only at the stanchion.
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
      (2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
      (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
      (4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

subj: Action Report 28 January through 6 February 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
     (b) OpNav Inst 3480.4
     (c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
     (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
      (2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
      (3) ...

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report
   of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 28 January through 6 February 1953
   is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT
   was Commander Task Element 95.1.1 from 2100 on 28 January until 2100 on 5
   February of this period.

   This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

   Part I General Narrative.
   Part II Chronological Order of Events.
   Part III Narrative on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment,
   including ammunition expenditure.
   Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.
   Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.
   Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by
   referring to VHA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for January and
   February 1953.
GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. During the period 28 January through 5 February 1953, the USS BADONG STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of TU 95.1.1, Carrier Unit, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command was Captain W. L. Way, 62961/1310, USN, Commanding Officer, USS BADONG STRAIT, who, for the duration of this patrol, was also OTC, West Coast in accordance with CINCPAC 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. Ships assigned to TU 95.1.1 as screen included the HMAS CONSORT (D-76), HMAS CONRIS (D-25), USS ROCKS (DD-804), USS HANNA (DE-449), USS COLLETT (DD-730), HMAS ANZAC (DD-10) and HNS ATHENI/BASCHIN (DDE-219). These ships were available for screening purposes as the fourth ship was provided to CTU 95.1.2 in rotation from the screen for twenty-four hour periods for night patrols along the enemy held coast line, replenishing enroute.

B. VMA-312, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel W. E. JENISON, 07571, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. At the beginning of the patrol there were 22 aircraft on board but three additional aircraft were received on the second day of air operations, increasing total to 25 aircraft. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 23.5. Average availability was 17.5. Total sorties flown for the eight-day period were 336 for a total of 886.3 hours. A total of 173 hours was over the target time. A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 62 sorties for a total of 44.1 hours.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coastline and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TU 95.1.2, the Naval Defense Unit; the troops of TU 95.1.5, the Island Defense Unit; and the ships of TU 95.1.1, the Carrier Unit. The Island Defense Unit is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands forming the enemy held coastline from the Han River on the South to the TAEJONG Estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Unit in providing security for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Unit have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

D. The BADONG STRAIT, with HMAS CONSORT (D-76) in company, sailed from Sasebo, Japan, at 0331, 28 January 1953, as directed by CINCPAC dispatch 200629C of January. Heavy pre-frontal squalls caused cancellation of the gunnery exercises scheduled for area BADONG. Because of heavy northwest swells the HMAS CONSORT was unable to maintain station, dropping behind the BADONG STRAIT and rejoined the following day. The BADONG STRAIT became a part of TU 95.1.1 when the Commanding Officer assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1 and OTC West Coast at 221001.
E. In performing its assigned tasks, the Task Unit continued conducting dawn to dusk air operations, operating during daylight in the vicinity of 37° 45' North Latitude, 124° East Longitude, and retiring southward for the night. However, it was sometimes necessary for the carrier to operate as far north as Latitude 38° 20' to find better weather. Normally, five decks load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours, with approximately 50 percent of available aircraft in each launch. A two plane CAP for TU 95.1.1 was assigned in each launch, while a four plane CAP was provided each day for the vessels of CTU 95.1.2 stationed in the vicinity of SOKTO Island. All strike groups assigned targets in the CHODO-SOKTO area, however, were briefed to assist CTU 95.1.2 whenever their services were requested.

F. Weather during the entire eight day patrol was good to excellent for flight operations. Temperatures during daylight were somewhat warmer than previously experienced and ranged from 19°F to 37°F with an average of about 27°F. All scheduled flights for the entire eight day period were launched as planned.

G. With a full moon prevailing, two "early early" four plane sorties, launched at 0115, were made during this patrol, one on 31 January and the second on 2 February. These flights divided into two two-plane sections to reconnoiter the road and railroad lines of communication between HAHJU and Ch'Inampho. The first sortie destroyed eight trucks, damaged two, and reported a convoy of trucks stalled in the area. A later strike group destroyed one of these trucks and damaged the remainder. The armed reconnaissance flight of 2 February was less successful since only three trucks were found and destroyed, however, five buildings were also destroyed near HAHJU, with one secondary explosion observed. The scarcity of road traffic noted on this flight is believed to have resulted from a B-29 attack which occurred in the vicinity immediately before the Corsair flight.

H. Two aircraft were lost during the patrol. On 29 January the Corsair piloted by Captain Alexander WATSON, USMC, developed engine trouble immediately after catapulting and ditched near the life guard destroyer. The pilot was recovered uninjured by helicopter within two minutes. On 31 January the Corsair piloted by Captain Westrick NOAKS, USMC, was struck in the engine by an fire while participating in a successful attack against a rail bridge near Ch'Inampho. Captain NOAKS made a wheels-up landing on the emergency beach strip at CHODO and was later returned uninjured to the ship by helicopter. The aircraft received additional minor damage on landing.

I. Unusually good results were attained in strikes against rail bridges on 31 January. In the morning, one four plane strike group dropped a span on a rail bridge near Ch'Inampho with one direct hit with a 1,000 lb bomb. A later eight plane strike group destroyed another rail bridge in this vicinity with three direct 1,000 lb bomb hits.
J. On 3 February an intensified attack schedule was attempted in order to ascertain the capability of the ship to mount such a schedule and determine organizational weaknesses. It was assumed that a general offensive operation, such as an amphibious attack, was underway, and that an all out offensive by the Carrier Element was required for a short period of time. The object of this exercise was also to advance the training and readiness of the ship and squadron. Some artificiailities were introduced by the adoption of the following measures:

(1) Targets were selected the previous day and briefing folders provided.

(2) All targets were in close proximity to the coastline, and the time spent in reconnaissance and observation of attack damage was reduced to a minimum.

(3) To expedite reammount ordnance loads were standardized, two loadings being used during the day - one type in the morning and a shift made to a second standard in the afternoon. Wing loadings were rockets or 100 lb bombs to facilitate hand loading. Two center line bombs were carried since belly tanks were not required.

(4) The Carrier Element operated as near the beach as the mine hazard permitted.

(5) Launches were scheduled every 1.5 hours for a total of 7 deck launches and 64 sorties. A CAP was scheduled to stay on station for three hours and was catapulted with every other deck launch.

All scheduled sorties departed on time. It was possible to launch a total of 66 sorties instead of the 64 planned. However, it was an unusually fortunate day in that few incidents occurred to interfere with operations. Three aircraft were damaged by small arms fire which in one case caused the tail wheel to collapse on landing aboard. The deck was quickly cleared and no significant delay resulted.

K. A four plane strike group was attacked by four MIG type aircraft near 2000 on 4 February. Three of the four pilots had been attacked by MIG's before and reported that the tactics used were much improved over those previously observed. Four deliberate, coordinated, flap-down, attacks were made by the MIG's and pressed to close range. The Corsairs were able to fire four brief bursts at the MIG's and one MIG was hit near the tail section, a piece of which was observed to fall free. One Corsair returned to land early because of a rough engine which had developed before the melee.

L. Five newly arrived replacement pilots were given refresher carrier qualification landings on 4 February while acting as CAP. Four of these pilots had made their first carrier landing checkout on the West Coast in January, while the fifth had experience in a carrier squadron in 1950. A total of 20 CATCAT landings were made. The following day all pilots were given an area checkout and one combat sortie against targets on the coast.
N. When circumstances permitted, radars were silenced twice daily for a period of approximately one half hour and Electronic Countermeasures equipment was employed in an effort to pin-point enemy radar stations. Negative results were obtained.

N. On 4 February, two strike groups were loaded with eight "Tiny Tim" 12 inch rockets to attack gun positions. All rockets were fired successfully and only one of the eight failed to detonate. Accuracy of the attacks was good considering the infrequency of use by the pilots of this weapon, with a total of five hits, one near miss, one defective rocket, and one miss. Damage inflicted can not be accurately assessed but visual observations indicate two gun positions destroyed and damage on three other positions unassessable. This large rocket appears to be an excellent weapon for use against coastal gun positions concealed in caves.

O. On 4 February, aircraft reconnoitering in the vicinity noted increased enemy activity on the ONGIN-HAEJU Peninsula. Twenh-11e strike aircraft were sent to attack targets in this area the following day and rocket hits in a large cave caused an explosion which erupted the entire hillside, and caused considerable damage to both wings of the aircraft flying at 800 feet. This information was passed on to the H.M.S GLORY and to the Task Group Commander, since time did not permit the BADOENG STRAIT to give the area the deserved attention.

P. On termination of flight operations on 5 February, the Task Unit set a course southward for Sasebo, the BADOENG STRAIT having completed its sixth and final patrol. The BADOENG STRAIT was relieved as CTU 95.1.1 and OTG West Coast at 21001 when the H.M.S GLORY assumed those duties. Shortly thereafter, the screen was detached to join H.M.S GLORY, and her escort, HMAS ADELAIDE (DE-219) and HMAS ANZAC (DD-10), joined as escort for BADOENG STRAIT.

Q. After mooring in Sasebo the following afternoon, Rear Admiral B.G.A. CLIFFORD, C.B., CTG 95.1, came aboard and expressed his appreciation to the assembled crew for the services rendered while in the Task Group.

R. The following complimentary dispatches were received upon departing from Sasebo,

From: CTF 95
To: BADOENG STRAIT

"FROM THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA THE USS BADOENG STRAIT HAS DISTINGUISHED HERSELF AS A HIGHLY EFFICIENT SUCCESSFUL FIGHTING UNIT X THE DEVOTION TO DUTY OF BADOENG STRAIT WAS REFLECTED IN THE HEAVY DAMAGE INFLECTED ON THE ENEMY BY PILOTS OF VNA 312 X GOOD LUCK AND A SMOOTH VOYAGE HOME X RADM GIDRICH SENS X THIS MESSAGE MAY BE DECLASSIFIED UPON ARRIVAL PERL X"
From: COMTHPFLT
To: BADOENg STRAIT
Info: COMNAVFE

"COMTHPFLT CONGRATULATES BADOENg STRAIT AND MARINE CHECKERBOARD SQUADRON (VM-312) FOR OUTSTANDING SERVICES DURING TOUR OF DUTY IN KOREAN WATERS. THE LARGE NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH YOU HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY BY MAINTAINING CONSTANT PRESSURE ON ENEMY POSITIONS IN WESTERN KOREA. YOU HAVE MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO SUCCESS OF UNITED NATIONS CAMPAIGN. WELL DONE X GOOD LUCK AND A PLEASANT VOYAGE HOME X VAH CLARK X MAY DECLASSIFY ON ARRIVAL PEARL X"

From: COMNAVFE
To: BADOENg STRAIT / CTF 95 / COMTHPFLT / CTG 95.1 / COMAIRPAC / CINCPACFLT / COMCIVDIV-15

"TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF BADOENg STRAIT A MOST DESERVING WELL DONE X YOUR SUPPORT OF VM-312 IN PURSUIT THE BAD AGGRESSOR ON THE WEST COAST OF KOREA WAS OUTSTANDING X MAY YOUR HOMeward VOYAGE BE BLESSED WITH FAIR WINDS AND A FOLLOWING SEA X VAH R. D. BRISCOE SENDS X THIS MAY BE DECLASSIFIED ON ARRIVAL PEARL X"
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

28 January
04301/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 260629Z of January 1952, the USS BALENG STRAIT (CVL-116), with VAM-312 embarked got underway from Sasebo, Japan for operating area "W.N." off the West Coast of Korea.

09451/ Gunnery exercises were cancelled because of heavy squalls and low ceilings.

11001/ HMS CONSORT (D-76) unable to rendezvous because of heavy seas. CONSORT advised to join, when practicable at best safe speed; the BALENG STRAIT would proceed at 15.5 knots because of heavier weather expected later.

21001/ Rejoined the HMS GLORY (CVL-19). Assumed duty as CTU 95.1.1 and OTC of Naval Blockade Forces off the West Coast of Korea.

29 January
04101/ USS ROCKS (DD-804) joined the Task Unit from HMS GLORY (CVL-19).

07151/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a gun position near RONINGANG-51 with unassessable damage.

08581/ Stopped main engine number two and secured boilers numbers three and four. This engineering casualty was caused by the check valve on generating tank number two sticking in the closed position causing a loss of feed water. Electrical power was lost momentarily until the emergency diesel generator was placed in operation.

09151/ Two plane CAP, four plane TAICAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.1.2 released TAICAP to attack a troop village near PUNGSA. Five buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. A gun position was attacked near CHANGIWON with unassessable damage. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near CHANGUIPO destroying eight buildings.

09451/ Arrived in area "W.N."

09471/ Recovered 07151 launch.

11191/ HMS CONSORT (D-76) joined the Task Unit.

11201/ Commenced launching aircraft.
11271/ One aircraft ditched near the plane guard destroyer shortly after being launched due to a complete engine failure. The pilot, Captain Alexander Watson, USNR, 032510, was recovered two minutes after ditching and was back aboard the carrier five minutes after ditching. There were no injuries. The aircraft sank.

11281/ Completed launching two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE. STRIKE was reduced to three planes due to aircraft ditching after takeoff. CAP attacked a troop village near Songch'on-Mi destroying eight buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Sinwon-Mi destroying eight buildings and damaging six.

11461/ Recovered 0915I Launch.

12131/ CONSORT detached to CTU 951.2 for WHITESTREAM patrol.

12201/ HMS COMUS (D-20) joined the Task Unit.

13191/ Main engine number two with boilers number three and four returned to operating condition, the check valve having been repaired.

13201/ WICKERSON, George E., TN, 572-12-41, suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the left maxillary bone while manning his General Quarters Station on 40mm mount number nine. The mount was in automatic control when the accident occurred. WICKERSON was pinned between the gun barrel and a general announcing system speaker as the mount was being trained.

13301/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near Songch'on-Mi with unassessable damage then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Ch'unch'on destroying eighteen buildings and damaging fifteen.

13551/ Recovered remainder of 11201 Launch.

15301/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was joined by three VMB-312 planes from K-6. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Uljanol destroying five buildings and damaging three. Three rail cars were damaged near Ch'ungyon.

15501/ Recovered 13301 Launch plus one "00D" TBM from K-6.

17421/ Recovered 15301 Launch plus three planes from K-6.

20221/ USS HOOBS reported her sonar gear inoperative and estimated repairs completed 3 February.
DECLASSIFIED

23071/ CTU 95.1.4 advised CTU 95.1.1 that an LST would be beached at WOTOKO Island 30 January and requested TACCAP cover if available. If TACCAP not available planes are requested to provide assistance should enemy shore artillery open fire on the LST.

Weather Summary:
The operating area had low broken clouds with a ceiling of 2500 feet and unlimited visibility. The target area was clear with unlimited visibility. Winds were from the northwest at fourteen to twenty knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 28°F and 30°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Thirteen CAP, four TACCAP, and nineteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties.

30 January
0141/ CTU 95.1.1 advised CTU 95.1.4 that one division of planes from each flight would remain in the WOTOKO Island area as TACCAP until necessary for them to attack pre-briefed targets.

0600/ U.S.S. HANNA (DE-449) joined the Task Unit.

0715/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near TaHAN destroying ten buildings and damaging four.

0915/ Launched two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE. One plane of the STRIKE group jettisoned ordnance and returned to the ship due to plane canopy being jammed in the open position. CAP attacked a troop village near SONCHON-NI destroying two buildings and damaging two. One plane of the flight jettisoned ordnance due to faulty electrical wiring. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a rail marshalling yard at Hasyu. Flight damaged a railroad bridge, repair shed, and made seven rail cuts. Two road bridges were cut near SONCHON.

0942/ Recovered 0715I launch plus one plane with a jammed canopy from 0915I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. TBM "COD" launched for K-6 via K-16 with two passengers. CAP attacked a troop village near SONCHON-NI destroying one warehouse and damaging two buildings. Flight then returned to the ship to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SONCHON-NI destroying two buildings, and damaging three. One plane developed a rough running engine and was escorted back to the ship by a second plane. This section destroyed four buildings and damaged one near SONCHON-NI.
11441/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch.

12071/ Recovered one plane from 1115I launch due to a rough running engine.

12121/ USS ROKKS (DD-604) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

12501/ HMS WASORT (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

13151/ Four plane TARCAP and four plane armed reconnaissance launched.
CTU 95.1.2 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near ULMUL.
Flight destroyed five buildings and damaged four. MILCO group
scouted north to HANCH'ON attacking targets of opportunity. Light
troops were killed and eight wounded near HANCH'ON. Two buildings
were destroyed and two damaged near CH'INMAPO. Light AA fire
was encountered during this attack. Three rail cars were damaged
near CH'INMAPO.

13541/ Recovered remainder of 1115I launch.

15301/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group
attacked a troop village near SINGH'ON destroying ten buildings
and damaging eight.

15551/ Recovered 1315I launch.

17221/ Recovered six planes of 1530I launch.

17511/ Recovered remainder of 1530I launch.

17521/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

18101/ Observed complete radar silence in the Unit and conducted
intercept search for enemy radar signals for thirty minutes.
Nearest enemy held territory is twenty miles away. No signals
were obtained.

18351/ CTU 95.1.4 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide TARCAP on 31 January
for an LST beached on CH'0-DO Island in range of enemy guns.

20001/ Main engine number 2 and boilers 3 & 4 placed out of commission
for repairs to leaky condenser.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Surface winds were north to northwest
at twelve to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures
were 32.5°F and 24°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TARCAP, twenty-one STRIKE, and four Armed
Reconnaissance for a total of thirty-seven sorties.
31 January
0100I/ Main engine number two and boilers three and four were returned to operating condition, having completed repairs to leaky condenser.

0615I/ A pre-dawn four plane STRIKE launched. Flight split into two sections and attacked targets of opportunity. One truck was destroyed near KONGCHAP'0-NI. One truck was destroyed near CHANGYON. Five trucks were destroyed near TALCHON-NI. One truck was destroyed and two damaged near SINCHON. Flight informed the ship, by voice radio, of a convoy of trucks now stalled near TALCHON-NI and requested the next STRIKE group attack them.

0620I/ CU 95.1.4 was advised that TACCAP would be provided until the LST was retracted from the beach on CH330. STRIKE leaders were instructed to check in with CU 95.1.4 and orbit until necessary to proceed to pre-briefed target.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group destroyed a railroad bridge near CHANGYON. Flight then attacked a truck convoy near TALCHON-NI as requested by 0615I STRIKE group. One truck was destroyed and remaining trucks damaged.

0819I/ Recovered 0615I launch.

0920I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCHON-NI destroying ten buildings. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad marshalling yard near ANJU destroying a maintenance shed and making one rail cut. A gun position and command post was damaged near CHANGYON. A bridge was damaged near ONCHON-NI. Two rail cars were destroyed and a rail cut made near SINCHON.

0940I/ Recovered 0730I launch.

1125I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCHON-NI destroying ten buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to ship and one aircraft landed due to oil leak and fluctuating oil pressure. Remaining planes acted as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a rail bridge and railroad junction near CHANGYON destroying one rail bridge and making three rail cuts. A plane flown by Captain Westrick MORRIS, 031381, USNCR, was hit in the engine by AA fire during the attack. The plane was landed wheels up on CH10-DI Island with Class "B" damage resulting. The pilot was uninjured and returned to the ship by helicopter later in the day. The remainder of the flight destroyed a gun position near P'UNGSAN.
USS HOOKS (DD-304) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

Recovered 0920I launch.

USS INDIAN (DE-449) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

Recovered one plane from 1125I launch due to fluctuating oil pressure.

Four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked a shipyard near HABU, destroying six buildings.

Recovered remainder of 1125I launch.

Two plane CAP and two four plane STRIKE groups launched. First STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ULYUL destroying eleven buildings. Two revetted buildings were destroyed near T'AN'T'AN. Second STRIKE group attacked a troop village near ULYUL destroying three buildings. Two rail cars were destroyed and two damaged near CH'INWAMPO.

Recovered 1330I launch.

Recovered 1535I launch.

Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Secured all radars in the Task Unit and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals for one hour. Nearest enemy held territory was thirty miles away. Results were negative.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Surface winds were North to northwest at twelve to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 27°F and 23°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP and thirty-two STRIKE for a total of forty sorties.

1 February

Silenced all Task Unit radars for one hour and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.

Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near KAGJIN destroying seven buildings and making one road cut. Two planes of the flight diverted to K-14 and K-16 to obtain target area photographs.
0920I/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a
   troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying five buildings.
   Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. One plane of the
   flight landed early due to low fuel supply. STRIKE group attacked
   road bridges near CHANGYONG destroying two bridges and making one
   road cut. One plane was hit in the external fuel tank by AA fire.
   The plane later landed aboard safely.

0931I/ Commenced recovery of 0715I launch.

0932I/ One plane suffered class "C" damage as a result of catching number
   seven wire and engaging barrier number two.

1000I/ Completed recovering remainder of 0715I launch.

1035I/ The Chaplain from the BADÖING STRAIT was transferred by highline
   to HMS CONSONT (D-76) to conduct religious services.

1116I/ Recovered one plane from 0920I launch due to low fuel supply.

1125I/ Four plane TARCAP launched. Two planes that diverted to K-16
   from 0715I Launch returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4
   released TARCAP to attack a battalion headquarters near SONGCH'
   ON-NI. The headquarters was destroyed.

1156I/ Recovered remainder of 0920I launch.

1200I/ HMS COMUS (D-20) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1230I/ USS HANNA (DE-449) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1255I/ The Badöing STRAIT Chaplain returned aboard from the COMUS.

1330I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group
   attacked a troop village near SINC'HON. Ten buildings were
   destroyed and seven damaged with one secondary explosion ob-
   served. Light AA fire was encountered.

1348I/ Recovered 1125I launch plus two planes from K-16.

1535I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group
   attacked a troop village near CHANGYONG destroying twelve build-
   ings and damaging six.

1559I/ Recovered 1330I launch.

1725I/ Recovered eight planes of 1535I launch.

1753I/ Recovered remainder of 1535I launch.
1756I/ Silenced all Task Unit Radars and conducted ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals. Nearest enemy land was thirty miles away. Results were negative.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Winds northeast to north at ten to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 22°F and 19°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

Mission Summary:
Ten CaP, four TAOCaP, and twenty-five STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

2 February
0525I/ All Task Unit radars silenced for forty minutes and ECM Intercept Search conducted for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.

0600I/ Four plane armed reconnaissance launched. The flight split into two sections and attacked targets of opportunity. Five buildings were destroyed near KAEJU and a secondary explosion was observed. One truck was destroyed near AMAK. Two trucks were destroyed near CH'INMAFO. Moderate AA fire was encountered at CH'ANGYONG.

0715I/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. CaP attacked a troop village near ONGHIN destroying five buildings and damaging eleven. One AA gun position was destroyed and a secondary explosion was observed.

0821I/ Recovered 0600I launch.

0920I/ Two plane CaP and four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CaP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying seven buildings and damaging three. An estimated ten troops were wounded. One plane of this flight suffered damage consisting of holes in the wings, fuselage, and tail section as a result of own bomb blast when dropped from a low altitude. The pilot was uninjured, however, the plane was recovered early due to an oil leak. Remaining plane acted as defensive CaP. ARDCO group attacked and destroyed a gun position in a cave near ONGHIN. CRU 95.1.2 requested the flight to attack two gun positions firing on friendly junk near SONGCH'ON-NI. One gun position was destroyed and one damaged. Two ox-carts were destroyed near YOMAK.

0935I/ Recovered 0715I launch.
105SI/ Recovered one plane from 0920I launch due to an oil leak.

1125I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SOGCH'ON-MI destroying eight buildings and damaging a gun position. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near HAEJU destroying five buildings and damaging two. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordinance.

1159I/ Recovered remainder of 0920I launch.

1208I/ HMS COMUS (L-20) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITSEAD patrol.

1222I/ Recovered two TBM "COD" planes from Itazuke, Japan with five replacement pilots for VMB-312.

1330I/ Four plane Armad Reconnaissance launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 from 1125I launch, returned to act as defensive CAP. MECO group attacked and destroyed a radar station near ONCH'ON-MI.

1344I/ Launched two TBM "COD" planes with mail and passengers for Itazuke, Japan via K-6.

1354I/ Recovered remainder of 1125I launch.

1535I/ Four plane BARCAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.1.2 released BARCAP to attack a troop village near OSKJIN. Three buildings were destroyed. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near OSKJIN, destroying six buildings and damaging six. One plane of this flight returned early due to a rough running engine.

1545I/ Recovered 1330I launch.

1628I/ One plane of 1535I launch landed aboard due to rough running engine. The plane caught number seven wire and engaged barriers number two and three, however, the aircraft was not damaged.

1705I/ Recovered remainder of 1535I launch.

1739I/ Recovered two planes diverted to K-6 from 1125I launch.

1745I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area mostly clear with unlimited visibility throughout the day. Winds northwest to North at ten to eighteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 26°F and 21°F. Flying conditions were excellent.

-14-
3 February
01001/ HRS COMUS (D-20) departed to investigate a group of fishing boats at 37-28N, 124-21E.
03301/ COMUS returned from investigation of fishing boats.
04421/ CTU 95.1.1 reported the presence of approximately twenty-five fishing vessels at 37-28N, 124-21E to CTU 95.1.2. The vessels identified were South Korean and were flying proper identification signals. CTU 95.1.1 advised that present intentions were to detach one unit at 031900I to patrol this area and requested assistance from transient vessels as practicable.
07151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Haebu destroying twelve buildings.
08451/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked two troop villages near Ongjin destroying thirty-five buildings.
0902I/ Recovered STRIKE group of 0715I launch.
09471/ CTU 95.1.6 requested CTU 95.1.1 provide air STRIKES against gun positions near Hongusa-Ni which were bringing accurate fire on friendly movements.
10151/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near Ongjin-Ni destroying nineteen buildings.
10421/ Recovered 0845I launch plus CAP from 0715I launch.
11451/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a command post near Chiwasa.
11461/ HRS CONSOL (D-76) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBRAND patrol.
11551/ Recovered STRIKE group of 1015I launch.
12001/ USS ROCKS (DD-804) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBRAND patrol.
13151/ Launched two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE. STRIKE group split into two divisions. The first division attacked gun position near Songhwa which had been firing on Chi'0-DO Island. One gun position was damaged. The second division attacked gun positions and caves near Chaeryong. Two gun positions were destroyed and two caves damaged.
1345I/ Recovered 1345I launch plus CAP from 1025I launch.

1445I/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop billeting area near OMYIN destroying ten buildings and damaging five. One plane of this flight was hit in the wing by small arms fire. A second plane was hit in the tail section by AA fire.

1454I/ Recovered STRIKE group of 1315I launch.

1615I/ Two plane CAP and ten plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group divided into one eight plane flight and a two plane section. Eight plane flight attacked gun positions near RONGGANG-NI as requested by CTF 95.16. An observation post was damaged and gun positions, caves, and ammo storage dumps were attacked with unassessable damage. The two plane section damaged a command post near RONGGANG-NI.

1626I/ Commenced recovery of 1445I launch.

1628I/ One plane suffered Class "B" damage when a tail wheel collapsed during a landing. This plane had been hit in the tail section by AA fire.

1635I/ Completed recovery of 1405I launch plus CAP from 1315I launch.

1800I/ Recovered 1615I launch.

1801I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

1845I/ All Task Unit radars silenced for thirty minutes and ECM Intercept Search for enemy radar signals conducted. Nearest enemy held land was twenty-five miles away. Results were negative.

1942I/ USS HUNCH (DE-449) departed to investigate a group of fishing boats.

2055I/ WINS reports a sonar contact at 37-25N, 124-40E. The contact was evaluated as non-submarine.

2110I/ HUNCH detached and directed to patrol prohibited fishing area described in Annex "DG" of CTF 95 Operation Order 2-52 and to comply with CTF 95.1 OPOSG Number 525. The HUNCH was directed to rendezvous with TU 95.1.1 at 030700I.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target area overcast with a ceiling of 6500 feet during the morning. Ceiling lowered to 1500 feet by late afternoon. Visibility was ten miles, lowering to two miles in light
snow showers. Surface winds were northeast in the morning veering
to southeast in the afternoon. Maximum and minimum temperatures
were 31°F and 25°F. Flying conditions were average becoming
marginal after 1500.

Mission Summary:
Eight CaP and fifty-eight STRIKE for a total of sixty-six sorties.

4 February
0625I/ all Task Unit radars silenced for thirty minutes and ECM Intercept
Search conducted for enemy radar signals. Results were negative.

0630I/ USO HaNA (DE-449) informed CTU 95.1.1 that one South Korean
fishing vessel, the YANG BOCK, M 10717 from KYONG-1, 10717, had
been sighted at 37-01N, 124-35W, in the prohibited area, during
the night patrol. This was in addition to fishing vessels sighted
at 032050I which had later cleared the area.

0711I/ HaNA rejoined from night patrol of prohibited area.

0745I/ Two plane CaP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group
attacked a troop village near SOGNA destroying four buildings.
One aircraft developed a rough running engine and was being
escorted down the TAEJONG-GaNG Estuary near CH'INWAO when the
flight was attacked by four MiG type aircraft. CH'0-DO radar
station had reported bogeys over PI YONGYANG but did not have
this group on their radar. The enemy attacked in two plane
sections at 2000 feet using coordinated tactics and pressing
home the attacks. The battle lasted for eight minutes with
each MiG making four firing runs on the Corsairs. The Corsairs,
tired four brief bursts at the enemy planes and one MiG was hit
in the tail section by 50 cal fire. A piece of the fuselage
was seen to fall free and the plane was listed as damaged. The
Corsairs suffered no damage, however, one plane made an emergency
landing aboard due to a rough running engine. It was observed
that the MiG type planes appeared to have been piloted
by highly experienced personnel.

0910I/ One plane from 0745I launch landed aboard due to a rough running
engine.

0945I/ Two four-plane armed Reconnaissance groups and four plane carrier
re-qualification group launched. The first 3000 group scouted
North to HANCHON. One revetted building was destroyed North of
CH'INWAO. Three rail cars and a warehouse were damaged near
CH'INWAO. The second group attacked a troop village near
P'UNGSAI destroying six buildings. Flight then scouted along
the main supply route.
Recovered remainder of 09451 launch.

Commenced qualification landings with four aircraft.

Recovered four qualification planes. Three pilots requalified with a total of fourteen landings.

Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack pre-briefed gun positions near CH'INNAMPO. This flight was loaded with "TINY TIM" Rockets to evaluate the effectiveness of this weapon against coastal gun positions. Two aircraft scored hits and completely destroyed two well fortified gun positions. A third plane missed the target and the fourth rocket failed to detonate when it struck the target. All rocket motors fired properly and proved effective on this type target. One plane with an escort returned early due to an oil leak.

Recovered remainder of 09451 launch.

HaWIA detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBRAND patrol.

USS ROCKS (DD-804) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBRAND patrol.

Recovered one plane from 11451 launch due to an oil leak.

Captain R. F. LeONARD, RN, Chief of Staff of TG 95.1, came aboard by highline from the ROCKS.

Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and a two plane Carrier Qualification group launched. This STRIKE group was loaded with the 11.75 inch rocket to determine its effectiveness against gun positions located in caves. The target assigned was near P'UMSAN. Three of the planes scored hits while the fourth jettisoned its "TIM" after receiving a large hole in its port wing root caused by flying debris from the hit made by the preceding plane. The pilot was making a camera run for assessment purposes. Damage to the cave positions could not be assessed. All "TIMS" fired, operated, and detonated properly. The damaged aircraft was escorted to the carrier and landed aboard safely.

A helicopter and crew from P'ENGNYONG-DO landed aboard for transportation to Yokosuka, Japan.

Commenced qualification landings with two planes.

Recovered two qualification planes. Two pilots requalified with a total of six landings.
1451I/ Landed one plane from 1330I launch due to damaged wing root.

1600I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. Flight split into two divisions and attacked troop villages near CH'ON-NI destroying eighteen buildings and damaging eight.

1610I/ Recovered remainder of 1330I launch.

1751I/ Recovered 1600I launch.

1752I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

2122I/ HOOks departed to investigate a fishing vessel. The vessel was identified as South Korean, KF 3295.

2226I/ HUS consolid (D-76) departed to investigate a fishing vessel at 37-CON, 124-03,56. The vessel was identified as South Korean, k-10997.

Weather Summary:
Operating area had an overcast at 1500 feet during the morning with visibility of ten miles. Ceiling increased to 5000 feet by mid morning. The target area had a ceiling of 1000 feet in the southern area during the morning. Ceiling in target area increased to 5000 feet by mid morning. Winds were northeast at twelve to seventeen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 31°F and 28°F. Flying conditions were marginal becoming average at 0900I.

Mission Summary:
Eight CAP, four TaskCAP, sixteen STRIKE, eight Armed Reconnaissance and five Qualification for a total of 41 sorties.

5 February

0230I/ USS COLBERT (DD-730) joined the Task Unit.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP diverted to K-6 at conclusion of the mission for urgent administrative purposes. CTU 95.1.4 requested the STRIKE to fly RESCAP near CH'ON-DO. The flight searched the CH'ON-DO area for an hour with negative results. Group then attacked a gun position near CHANG-YON with unassessable damage.

0845I/ USS ROOKS (DD-604) chopper to COH3S0RON-20.

0920I/ Three plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying six buildings. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked bunkers, caves, and gun positions near NGONG-NI with unassessable damage.
Recovered remainder of 0715I launch plus one TBM "COD" and one replacement plane from K-6.

Four plane T.H.RCAP launched. CTU 95.1.4 released the TARCAP and flight split into two sections for attacks. The first section destroyed five buildings near SONGHWA. The second section destroyed a gun position near SONGHWA.

Recovered 0920I launch.

Recovered one plane from 1125I launch due to a rough running engine.

USS Haiku (DE-449) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITREAD patrol.

Two plane CAP, two plane Armed Reconnaissance and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying three buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. KBECO group scouted the southern ONGJIN Peninsula area and attacked a troop village near SONGCH'ON-NI destroying ten buildings. STRIKE group attacked a road bridge near UPCH'ON-RI. The bridge was damaged and two road cuts made. Two planes from this flight diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

Launched one TBM "COD" to K-6. TBM was escorted by 1330I KBECO group.

Recovered remainder of 1125I launch.

Captain K. F. LEONARD, RN, Chief of Staff of TG 95.1 was transferred by highline to HAS COMUS (D-20).

Four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes diverted to K-6 from 0715I launch, returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked caves and gun positions near SUNWI-DO with unassessable damage. One plane suffered damage consisting of large holes in both wings and fuselage as a result of striking debris caused by a large secondary explosion in a cave. The plane later landed aboard safely.

Recovered remainder of 1330I launch.

CTU 95.1.1 reported the location of numerous gun positions, storage caves, observation posts and troops in trenches along the ONGJIN-HEJU Peninsula to CTG 95.1 and HSS GLORY (CVL-19). Attacking pilots reported troops along the peninsula to be very active during this patrol as they are apparently building new defenses.
1630I/ Commenced recovery of two planes diverted to K-6 from 1330I launch. One plane suffered Class "B" damage as a result of landing with the tail hook in the up position and engaging the barriers.

1645I/ Recovered remaining plane from 1330I launch.

1740I/ Recovered 1734" launch, nine two planes from 0715I launch.

1741I/ Set a course southward for Sasebo, Japan.

2100I/ Rejoined as CTU 95.1.1 and CTG of West Coast Blockade and Escort Group by HMAS GLORY (CVE-19).

2315I/ Chopped HMAS CONSIGN (D-76), HANNA, and COLBERT to CTU 95.1.1.

Weather Summary:
Operating and target areas had scattered clouds in the early morning increasing to an overcast condition with a ceiling of 8000 feet by noon. Visibility was eight to ten miles. Winds were northeast to North at eight to fourteen knots. Maximum and minimum temperatures were 37°F and 33°F. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:
Nine CAP, four TARCAP, two armed reconnaissance and nineteen SHrike for a total of thirty-four sorties.

6 February

0011I/ HMAS ATHABASCAN (DD-219) and HMAS ANZAC (DD-10) joined from HMAS GLORY (CVE-19).

1742I/ Scored to buoy number twenty in Sasebo Harbor.

1815I/ Rear Admiral R. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, CTG 95.1, Commander West Coast Blockade and Escort Group, came aboard officially to make a farewell address to the ships company.

1844I/ Rear Admiral R. G. A. CLIFFORD, RN, departed.
PART III

REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. There was no expenditure of ships ordnance this patrol.

B. Performance of ships ordnance:

1. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 fire control system sustained the following casualties during the patrol:

   4 February: The antenna of radar number seven rotated into limit stops. Antenna would not synchronize with radar signal. The casualty was due to a sheared coupling pin in the antenna response mechanism. The pin was replaced.

2. The other casualties sustained during the period were:

   28 January: The motor on the cease firing circuit of mount three failed to operate due to a ground in the motor field caused by salt water. The motor field was rewound.

C. All firing exercises were cancelled due to unfavorable weather.

D. Excellent results were obtained during target acquisition drills. The mount No. 63 system was acquiring targets designated at near maximum range.

E. The second loader of mount nine suffered a compound fracture of comminuted left maxillary on 29 January when his head was pressed between the rotating mount and a loudspeaker on the hullhead. The mount was in automatic control position.

F. Summary of aviation ordnance expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# 8x20F Bombs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260# 4.5x4.5 BM</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# GP Bombs</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm Bombs</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.75&quot; rockets</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 20MN Ammo</td>
<td>31,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 50 Cal Ammo</td>
<td>64,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART IV

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Headquarters</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caves</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Posts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Posts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLG-15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox-Carts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar Stations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cars</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Repair Sheds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Damage suffered by ships aircraft

1. Operational damage
   a. One plane was ditched at sea due to a complete engine failure on 29 January.
   b. One plane suffered Class "C" damage as a result of engaging the barriers on 1 February.
   c. One plane suffered Class "B" damage when the hook sheared off and the tail wheel caught a wire on 3 February.
   d. One plane suffered Class "B" damage as a result of landing with the tail hook in the up position and engaging the barriers on 5 February.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action
   a. On 31 January one plane was hit in the engine by AA fire and subsequently landed wheels up on a friendly island resulting in class "E" damage.
   b. One plane suffered minor damage to an external fuel tank from small arms fire on 1 February.
c. One plane suffered damage consisting of holes in wings and fuselage as a result of flying through debris from own bomb blast on 2 February. Class "C" damage resulted.

d. Two planes suffered minor damage consisting of holes in wings and tail section from small arms fire on 3 February.

e. One plane suffered Class "C" damage as a result of flying through debris from a secondary explosion of a target on 5 February.
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel
   The number of personnel assigned to the ship during the patrol included 801 enlisted navy, 71 Naval Officers, 164 Marine enlisted and 41 Marine Officers for a total of 1,077. Five Marine replacement pilots came aboard while the ship was at sea.

2. Education
   Department training officers began preparing training schedules to coincide with the anticipated return to the United States. Training during the cruise centered around preparations for advancement in rating examinations. An additional twenty-four course books were issued and twelve personnel applied for correspondence courses. On the job training continued as a valuable source of education.

3. Divine Services
   Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, two protestant services with Holy Communion, daily Rosary services, one Latter Day Saints service and two bible classes. The Chaplain conducted protestant services aboard the HMS ONSAINT (D-76) at sea.

4. Welfare and Recreation
   Aircraft maintenance requirements reduced movie showings to three during the patrol. The ship's library continued to rate high as a source of recreation. A summary of local and world news was presented over the ship's announcing system at noon each day by the Chaplain. A daily newspaper was printed and distributed to all ships in company.

B. Casualties

1. There were no casualties during this patrol.
PART VI

SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

Comment
When a crash occurs on the flight deck all Air Department stations and several Engineering divisions must be immediately alerted in order that action can be taken to prevent spread of fire, should it develop. Of primary interest is the requirement that the foam generators be manned immediately. This last factor cannot be accomplished immediately as the flight deck crash signal is not heard below the flight deck level. The crash bell for this type carrier does not require operation of a total ships force fire bell in that fires do not always follow crash landings. However, it does require that certain Engineering details be alerted. At the present time this can only be accomplished through the MC circuits.

Recommendation
The crash alarm should be tied in directly with the General announcing system. A letter in this regard is being submitted to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Comment
On one occasion where the outside temperature was between 20°F and 14°F the number three (3) catwalk fire station valve was found to be frozen. It is apparent that this is a dangerous situation in view of a possible deck crash during cold weather operations.

Recommendation
Salt water and foam valves should be insulated and/or suitable heating elements should be provided. The number three (3) catwalk fire station should be lagged inside the skin of the ship.

Comment
Whenever heavy weather or heavy rains are encountered, an excessive amount of water leaks into the elevator pits. Investigation showed that drainage was not adequate during heavy rainfall.

Recommendation
The drainage outlets from the elevator combing at the flight deck level should be increased in number.

Comment
A slight warpage of the H-4C shuttle track was discovered after investigating pilots complaints of a tugging sensation experienced at approximately halfway through the power run. Inspection of the track at this point revealed a slight misalignment in one four foot section. The shuttle was reassembled with new shoes instead and launchings were
continued. As the shoes began to wear in, the tugging sensation became negligible.

Recommendation
None

Hung Ordnance Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIM</th>
<th>STACK</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>HK-55</td>
<td>Electrical failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aero 14A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Total Rockets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 100#  | 6         | HK-55           |
| 250#  | 1         | Aero 14A        |
| 260#  | 1         | HK-55           |
| 8 Total Bombs |

Marked improvement was attained in reducing hung ordnance during this period, relative to previous periods.

LAND - LAUNCH DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Launches</th>
<th>H-2-1 Catapult</th>
<th>H-4C Catapult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight Pounds</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Wind knots</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Pressure psi</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Bridles expended</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number - 343</th>
<th>average Wind knots - 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPV psi - 750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Runout feet - 110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wires Caught - #1 - 72, #2 - 145, #3 - 77, #4 - 40, #5 - 5, #6 - 0, #7 - 2, #8 - 0, #9 - 0.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Crashes - 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers engaged - #2, #3, and #4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Engineering Department

While underway from base to the Yellow Sea operating area on 28 January 1953, excessive salinity of the condensate from #2 main condenser was encountered. After eliminating all other possible sources of salt water contamination, the only remaining possibility was leaking condenser tubes. Operating conditions of the ship made it impossible to reduce speed to sufficiently low rate to open the condenser until the night of 30 January 1953. At this time, the port shaft was allowed to idle with no power applied. The #2 main condenser was opened and tested as per article 46-42 (2) Buships manual. Six tubes were found to be leaking and were plugged.

C. Medical Department

1. There were no personnel casualties during this patrol.

2. Medical statistical summary for the patrol:
   a. Admitted to sick list - 35
   b. Total sick days out of 10,770 possible working days - 167
   c. Officers admitted to sick list - 2
   d. Total patients visits to sick call - 754
   e. Total medical treatments - 1938
   f. Patients received from other ships - 0
   g. Patients transferred to hospital - 2
   h. Number of minor injuries treated - 26
   i. Number of major injuries treated - 2
   j. Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death - 0
   k. Minor surgical procedures - 26
   l. Major surgical procedures - 0
   m. Veneral disease cases and non-specific Urethritis - Total - 12
      (1) Gonorrhea - 1
      (2) Chancroid - 1
      (3) Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 10
   n. Penicillin tablets issued last port period - 154

3. Squadron flight personnel statistical summary:
   a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 4
   b. Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation - 0
   c. Average number of days pilots grounded - 3
   d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 0
   e. Number of pilots KIA - 0
   f. Number of pilots WIA - 0

H. L. Ray
Copy to:

GNO (2) Advance
CMCPaCFLT (2) Advance
CMCPaCFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMWPNTHFlt (1) advance
GTF 77 (1) advance
COMALPAC (5)
COMSEVPAC
COMPHITAC

NAVLO WATT COLLEGE
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-17

CO, FAIRESTAC (2)
CG, ALRFMPAC (1) advance
CG, FAFFAC (1) advance
CG, 1ST RNINT/WLG
QO, NA-G-12
DO, VM-312
DO, USS B.TUAM (CVL-29)
DO, USS REMJOVA (CVE-114)
DO, USS BALIKO (CVE-115)
DO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
DO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED:

S. O. COLE
CIR, USN
Operations Officer
FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 5 FEBRUARY 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NO. A/C</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>LAUNCH</th>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>AMM</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0930</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>To K-6 at 0930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0715</td>
<td>0930</td>
<td>A,C</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>0920</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>0920</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>A,D</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>A,B</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,B</td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<td>D-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,E</td>
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<td>D-9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>RECO</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>A,B</td>
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<td>E-10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A/C from K-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 A/C SAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STRIKE</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>A,F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HELMETT

GUARD MAIL 0900
GUARD MAIL 1145

NOTES:
1. All A/C 100 gallons in belly tanks except Event ABLE ONE (A-1).
2. Event ABLE ONE (A-1) full belly tanks.

AMM0 LOAD:
A - All A/C full gun loads.
B - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
C - Half A/C 500# GP / 5 sec. and 4-250# / 5 sec.
    half A/C 500# SAP / 5 sec. and 4-250# / 5 sec.
D - Half A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
    half A/C 500# SAP / .1 and 4-250# .1 / .1.
E - All A/C 1000# .1 / .1 and 2-250# .1 / .1.
F - Half A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
    half A/C 1000# inst. / ND and 2-250# inst. / ND.

B. E. COLKITT JR.
LGDR, USN
air Operations Officer