From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO  
To: Commanding Officer, USS BOXER (CV-21)  


Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950  

Encl: (1) Organization  
(2) Narrative of Operations  
(3) Tabulation of Sorties and Hours flown  
(4) Material Damage  
   (a) Enemy  
   (b) Own  
(5) Personnel Casualties, Enemy and Own  

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group TWO for the period 15 September - 2 October 1950 required by reference (a) is forwarded for inclusion in the report of USS BOXER (CV-21).  

2. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Air Group TWO on 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 September and October 1 and 2 as directed by Commander Task Force 77 in compliance with Commander Task Force 77 Op Order 1-50, and Commander Joint Task Force 7 Op Plan 9-50 for every day except 27 September; on 27 September the above plus Commander Carrier Division 1 Op Order 2-50.  

3. Comment and Recommendation:  
   (a) Air Operations.  
   
   1. For controlled close support, or Deep Support, four separate three (3) hour flights of eight to fourteen aircraft were scheduled. Caps, Tarcaps, Naval Gun Fire and ASP patrols gave an additional launch of sixteen aircraft to the close or Deep Support launch.  

   2. Since two carriers were operating together, close or deep support flights were maintained over the target area continuously.  

   3. Special flights such as photo and strikes were launched as called for by Commander Task Force 77.
(b) Tactics.

1. Since no air opposition was encountered and anti-aircraft fire was, in general, light or non existent, individual and trial runs could be made to insure better identification and therefore better target destruction.

2. Moderate success was obtained against tunnels and bridge abutments by skip bombing or mast head attacks with bombs having a 4 to 5 second delay fuse.

3. Armed reconnaissance patrols and ground support work are best controlled by using a flight or four (4) VF and four (4) VA to a selected target. It is then possible for each division (VA or VF) to give protection to the other if anti-aircraft fire is encountered.

4. It is strongly recommended that unless a definite target is available before each close support or deep support launch, the VA aircraft should not be heavily loaded with napalm, 1000 lb or 500 lb bombs plus full HVAR and ammo. By cutting down on the above load especially the napalm bomb there would be no need for the futile dropping of napalm and bombs on non-deserving targets which happened rather frequently. It also would allow for greater safety and greater maneuverability on targets which call for rockets or ammo instead of napalm or heavy bombs.

(c) Anti Submarine Patrol.

1. The lack of sonobouys for the VA aircraft greatly reduced the potential effectiveness of the hunter killer unit.

2. VA(S) configured aircraft are considered necessary for night operations. The range and sensitivity of the APS-20A make it impracticable for surface craft to leave screening stations and investigate the numerous contacts.

3. To further increase the effectiveness of ASW operations it is recommended that hunter killer teams train as a unit prior to arrival in combat area.

4. Since efficiency of the radar operator is greatly reduced after two hours of operation, flights should be limited to three hours when practicable.

(d) Aircraft Ordnance.

1. The following ordnance and fusing is considered desirable for targets indicated.
## TARGET

(a) **A/C on ground**
   - 20mm, 50cal, & Frag
   - Bombs
   - VT

(b) **A/C revetted or personnel**
   - Frag Bombs, Rockets
   - & Napalm
   - VT

(c) **Locomotives**
   - 20mm, 50cal, Rockets

(d) **Oil Cars**
   - 20mm

(e) **Power Stations**
   - 20mm, 50cal, Rockets
   - small bombs

(f) **Bridges**
   - 2000 lb (dive bomb)
   - 1000 or 500 lb skip
   - 4-5 sec delay

(g) **Factories**
   - Bombs, 20mm, 50cal
   - Instant or 0.025

(h) **RR Yards**
   - Bombs, Rockets

(i) **Tunnels**
   - Bombs, Rockets
   - 4-5 sec delay

(j) **Vehicles, trucks**
   - 20mm, 50cal, Rockets

(k) **Tanks**
   - Napalm, rockets (SAF)
   - Instant or 4-5 sec delay

(l) **Boats**
   - All ordnance

### Communication

1. To date only a few planes in the air group have been called upon to use authentication or recognition signals although much time and effort has been spent on the dissemination to all pilots of the proper daily codes. For the current type operations it does not seem necessary that pilots of single sea aircraft should be encumbered with this extra data.

### Air Intelligence

1. Non-flying Air Intelligence Officers are still urgently needed by the squadrons of the air group. The aviators of the group, now acting in the AIO capacity, have to date done an excellent job in addition to their primary duty of flying plus other collateral squadron duties. However, this overload situation has, in a few instances, resulted in inadequate briefing and de-briefing.

2. Photo coverage and intelligence information, collected by other sources, should be expeditiously disseminated to the lower echelons, namely the squadron.
that will be participating in the mission. At times in the past it has been noted that such target information has not reached the participating elements until the mission has been completed.

3. The best charts available in any quantity for close support work have been the mercator charts with a scale of 1:250,000. However it was found that the transverse mercator projection charts with a scale of 1:50,000 were actually the best although there were only enough charts to supply the flight leaders.

(g) Personnel.

1. The transition from peace to wartime operations has indicated an immediate need in the air group for non-flying Air Intelligence and Maintenance Officers. It is of interest to note that in the last war streamlined carrier squadrons had a complement of only about ten enlisted men. However, it was found necessary for them to have three or four non-flying officers who usually served in the billets of aircraft intelligence maintenance, administrative and material officers. In the present instance, squadrons are responsible for the complete administration of over one hundred enlisted men; they perform all their own maintenance, ordnance and material functions and yet are not considered to need any non-flying officers. An increase in ordnance personnel, especially that of VA squadrons, is needed. With the continuous use and heavy loading required of VA aircraft an increase in AOAN, AO3, AO2 is urgently required to carry on sustained operations.

(h) Material discrepancies.

1. Aircraft.

(a) Wartime operating conditions revealed the following facts regarding the F4U-4 aircraft:

1. F4U-4

(a) RB-19 spark plugs have given the best performance in the R 2800 - 42W engine.

(b) Oil cooler shut off valves should be installed on an urgent basis.

(c) Armor plate protection is desirable if planes are to be used for extensive close support work.
2. F4U-5P

(a) While most photography requested was for vertical coverage, it was sometimes necessary to employ two (2) photo aircraft on one flight to achieve vertical and oblique photographs due to inoperative condition of rotating mount in F4U-5P.

NOTE: A service change and Standard Stock items would be necessary to keep mount operative.

(b) A view finder would eliminate much duplication and undue use of material, by giving better coverage on target assigned and less flying time over target.

(c) The equipment now being used has not progressed with the speed of the present photo aircraft, as cycling speeds of presently used cameras dictate airspeeds so low as to make use of flaps necessary in order to keep the camera axis level. By decreasing cycling time better runs could be made over dangerous targets with greater safety for pilots and aircraft.

3. F4U-5N

(a) The VFN pilots of this group feel that the APS-19A Radar is wholly inadequate as airborne intercept radar. This is due in main to the inability of the APS-19A to follow targets more than a few degrees from the 12 o'clock position also the double dot presentation showing relative position of target as to altitude will generally fade completely before any change in altitude is indicated. It would be next to impossible to intercept an aircraft if the pilot was aware of your presence and used evasive action. The APS-6 radar gear was much superior to the APS-19A for intercept work. A well trained pilot could follow a target in all but the most violent maneuvers.

NOTE: The APS-19A is considered excellent on "Search" and "Beacon" positions.

2. Ordnance

(a) On the Corsairs the Mark 8 MOD 2 shackle has been found to work very well. It is strongly recommended that adapters be made available to use on the rocket launchers (Mark 5 MOD 4) of the F4U so
that 100 and 220 lb frag bombs may be carried when needed.

(b) It is strongly recommended that future VA aircraft have four forward firing 20 mm guns. The AD(W) aircraft should be equipped with two forward firing 20mm guns. Also the AD spare parts list should be enlarged to include 100 Mark 9, Mod 3 rocket launchers, 2 20mm gun kits, four spare guns and forty ammunition cans.

(c) In the F4U-5N and 5F the mark 7 link are not satisfactory because of their continual breakage. This breakage caused by the rounds falling towards loading slot when wings are folded; as wings are spread kinks develop resulting in breakage. It is recommended a much stronger link be supplied which will keep the rounds from developing a kink when wings are folded and spread. It is believed that use of Mark 8 links would eliminate this trouble.


It is recommended that:

(a) Skip and mast head bombing be included in the training syllabus of the dive bomber and fighter bomber propeller squadrons.

(b) Close support included in the training syllabus of the VA and VF squadrons.

(c) Strafing be included in the training syllabus of all VA squadrons.

(d) The ASW attack team of VA(s) and VA(W) aircraft and pilots train and operate in the same squadron or unit.

(e) The carrying of authentication codes and recognition signals should not be required of single-seat aircraft pilots when conducting strike missions. If necessary a simplified code should be used.

(f) Non-flying Intelligence Officers be assigned the squadrons of the air group and that the squadron ordnance personnel, especially for VA squadrons, complement be doubled in the following rates: AOAN, A03, and A02.

(g) Complete target information be given the strike pilots as early as possible prior to the mission and
that appropriate grid charts (transverse mercator projection scale of 1:50,000) be provided in sufficient quantity for all pilots engaged in close support work.

(h) The following corrective action be taken in regards aircraft and ordnance discrepancies of the F4U-4.

(1) Install armor plate protection.

(2) Install oil cooler shut off valves.

(3) Use only RB-19 spark plugs.

(4) Adapters be made available to use on the Mark 5 Mod 4 rocket launchers.

(i) Corrective action for F4U-5F and F4U-5N.

(1) Install armor plate protection.

(2) Install oil cooler shut off valves.

(3) Substitute Mark 8 links for 20mm for Mk 7 links that are now being used.

(j) Corrective action necessary for the AD are:

(1) Install four forward firing 20mm on the future VA aircraft.

D. M. WHITE
CAG-2
Commander D. M. WHITE
14 Aircraft
23 Pilots
1 AD4Q
3 AD4N
3 AD4W
3 F4U-5N
3 F4U-5P
1 HO3S

VF-64
Commander R. W. RYND
VF-63
LCDR T. U. BALL
VF-23
LCDR C. E. RUSSELL
VF-24
LCDR E. R. CCFFMAN
VA-65
Commander R. W. PHILLIPS

16 F4U-4
16 F4U-4
16 F4U-4
16 F4U-4
18 AD-4
23 Pilots
23 Pilots
23 Pilots
23 Pilots
24 Pilots

NOTE: Figures reflect number of flyable aircraft and qualified pilots available at commencement of operations.
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS 15 SEPT THRU 2 OCT 1950

Offensive operations against North Korean Forces were conducted during the following period September 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, October 1 and 2.

On the afternoon of the 15th September strike groups and precautionary cover was supplied for the amphibious loading of the 7th Marine Corps and 10th Army Corps at Inchon, South Korea. A number of fires were started in the area assigned the strike groups although no accurate amount of damage could be determined.

From the 16th September thru 2 October the flights in general were close and deep support, strikes and sweeps as called for and covered an area on the west coast from Suwon to Pyongyang. Targets attacked and damaged were airfield installations, railroad facilities, locomotive and and rolling stock, bridges, power stations, oil, tanks, factories, troops and vehicles.

From the 23. September until 30 September road sweeps were assigned strike groups. There were five road sweeps made up of the following:

Road sweep #1 - Seoul southwest to Chungju, north to Wongu, along RR back to Seoul.

Road sweep #2 - Seoul south through Suwon to Chowan, to Chonju north through Chucksan-nu, back to Seoul.

Road sweep #3 - Seoul northwest to Kaesng, west to Hayu, north to Siawan, southwest to Kaesng.

Road sweep #4 - Seoul NE to Chunchon, north to Numhwa, northwest to Inchon, Sibyan-nu, southwest to Youchan, south to Seoul.

Road sweep #5 - Seoul on railroad east to Wonju, north to Chunchon, southwest to Seoul.

On morning of 27th September a strike was made against North Korean forces dug in at Fankochi Pt, Lat and Long. 37-40N, 125-21E to repel a mock amphibious landing feint by Naval Forces at that point. Targets were mainly dug in troops and gun emplacements.

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA, VALLEY FORGE and BOXER operated together with each carrier leaving for replenishment area every third day.

ENCLOSURE (2)
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 2 OCTOBER 1950

ACTION REPORT 15 SEPTEMBER

Flight operations commenced at 1432 with the launching of 2 AD's to act as target coordinators and a strike group consisting of 12 F4U's and five AD's. This group attacked Inchon beach and the surrounding area hitting targets with 500 lb. GP bombs, 1000 lb GP bombs, 5" HVAR's, and 3.25 target spotting rockets and strafed the general area. A factory located on grid 8950, N.E. corner, was left burning and gave indications of a probable oil fire. The Inchon beach area, north of the causeway, was strafed but the results were unknown. Hits were registered on a small island, 9546D and 9136N, where a machine gun emplacement and a 122MM emplacement were noted. Smoke obscured these targets but both were believed destroyed prior to departure. Four hits were made upon a large shed type building at 9245B Damaged. A small amount of inaccurate flak was noted at 9245R - two bursts at 3000 feet. Communications difficulties due to heavy traffic and also confusion as to correct channels assigned. Two of our own planes were damaged with one hole in each tail which were believed to have been caused by rocket pig tail. The flight was recovered at 1805I.

The second flight commenced at 1432 with the launching of 2 F4U's to act as Air coordinators and a strike group consisting of 7 AD's and 10 F4U's. Bombing and strafing runs were made on Inchon between Grace and Joan areas (approximate) - damaging buildings. Three large fires were noted in the area, plus a number of small ones. One of the major fires came from what appeared to be butane or oil tanks in the Red area. Another near Joan area was a fierce white flame with little smoke. Still another in the Ima area appeared to be of a pyrotechnic nature. A few (3-4) small boats about the size of LCSN's (40-50 feet) were noted at the docks in the Grace and Fanny areas. All appeared undamaged. Upon retirement from area and orbit over Yongjon do Island three pilots reported flak bursts of one to five black puffs at about 9000 feet near Paju-do Island. One plane was circling near the bursts, and one stated that the anti-aircraft fire apparently came from a U.S., destroyer in the area. No damage assessment is possible since the bombing was an area assignment and all the bombs except one fell within the assigned area. Some difficulty was experienced in communications with TADC apparently due to inability to answer all calls in heavy traffic. All planes were recovered at 1820I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 16 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event 16, commenced at 0400I with the launching of one AD-4N and one AD-4W on anti-submarine patrol. Situation routine. The flight was recovered at 0900I.

The second flight, designated event 1, commenced at 0600I with the launching of 6 AD's for deep support, 2 F4U's for NCF spot 1, 7 F4U's for TARGAP, and 3 F4U's for deep support for a total of 17 offensive sorties and 8 defensive sorties. The planes carried 500lb. GP bombs, HVAR's, and NAPAL's. The six AD's on deep support hit a railroad yard adjacent to Yongduri with rockets and left railway cars and a warehouse burning fiercely. No hits were recorded as they dive bombed a railway at Suishakiri. Moderate flak was observed over Seoul at 6000 feet and it was apparently 3 or 5 inch; though inaccurate the altitude was correct. One 40mm mount on top of the park at Pyonchang was inaccurate but the altitude was correct. The two F4U's scheduled for NCF spotting were not used by the controller. The 5 F4U's scheduled for deep support were released to search for targets of opportunity. All together, nine railroad cars were destroyed (983-1632) by direct bomb hits; one bomb hit a railroad junction 2 miles west of Suwon; eight railroad cars were left burning at Uljongbu (977-1662) after being hit with napalm and rockets. One railroad car, located at Jo-To 996-1646, was ignited by a napalm hit. An unidentified 5000 ton freighter on Cus 050 degrees was observed 75 miles bearing 240 Pt. Nancy at 0855I. All the planes were recovered at 0900I.

The third flight, designated event 2, commenced at 0730I with the launching of two F4U-5P's and two F4U-4's on a photo mission. All the planes were recovered at 1030I.

The fourth flight, designated event 4, commenced at 0900I with the launching of 6 AD's and 3 F4U's for deep support, 8 F4U's for CAP, 3 F4U's for TARGAP, 2 F4U's for NCF spot 2, and two AD's for ASP-C. The planes were loaded with 500 lb. GP bombs, HVAR's and napalm. The AD's and F4U's assigned to deep support attacked an ammunition dump between the highway and railroad just S.W. of a 3 track railroad bridge one half mile S. W. of Seoul. They used napalm and bombs. They also hit a railroad yard 5-10 miles S.W. of Seoul (town of Eitoho). Three buildings were left burning and four railroad cars were believed to have been destroyed. Additional railroad cars appeared to have been previously attacked and damaged. Flak at this point was inaccurate and light to moderate and believed to be of small calibre. No AD emplacements were sighted. Four F4U's struck an ammunition dump, railroad yards, and an oil storage depot in the vicinity of Seoul but the damage was not known. Communications were reported as excellent. Event 4 consisted of 18 F4U's and 8 AD's on offensive sorties, and 3 F4U's on defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1200I.

ENCLOSURE (2)
The fifth flight, designated event 7, commenced at 1200I with the launching of 8 F4U's for CAP, 2 F4U's for NGF spot 3, 8 F4U's for TARCAP, 5 AD's and 8 F4U's for deep support, and two AD's for ASP-D. The planes carried the same ordnance as the previous flights of the day. The two F4U's who were assigned to NGF spot 3 attempted to work with controller but were unsuccessful due to communications difficulties. The five AD's assigned to deep support dropped 3 Napalm on ten coal cars at Kuri-Myon leaving three burning. Five Napalm were dropped at each end of a train tunnel two miles east of Kuri-Myon. It is believed that a train was inside the tunnel. Two weapon carrier type trucks on the railroad east of Sugin-Myon were strafed with 20 MM and left burning. Ten 5 inch HVAR's were fired on a bridge, over a railroad, five miles east of Kuri-Myon and at least two hits were noted. Two 500lb GP bombs were dropped upon a RR bridge 5 miles east of Yangpyong, but no hits were observed. Five locomotives, parked together 3 miles east of Yangpyong and just west of Chunson, were strafed with 20 MM. However, the damage could not be assessed. Event 7 consisted of 13 F4U's and 7 AD's on offensive sorties and 8 F4U's on defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1500I.

The sixth flight, designated event 10, commenced at 1500I with the launching of two F4U's assigned to NGF spot 4, 7 F4U's TARCAP, 2 AD's for ASP-E, 8 F4U's for CAP, 4 F4U's and 5 AD's for deep support, 2 F4U's for photo 2 and 2 F4U's as escort for photo two. The planes carried 500 lb, GP bombs, HVAR's and Napalm. Two F4U's assigned to deep support swept Yon Ha river for the purpose of investigating and attacking camouflaged gunboats and 15 HVAR's, two 500 GP bombs and 90% of the full load of ammunition. One gunboat was left burning and all were damaged.

Five AD's, assigned to deep support, attacked with 16 HVAR's, seven 500 lb GP bombs and strafed with 20 MM approximately 20 boxcars in RR yard near Chunson but were unable to assess the damage. A roundhouse, in center of Seoul, was left smoking from bombs, rocket hits, and strafing runs. Inaccurate flak was observed 300 yards WNW of rail yard at Chunson coming from approximately 10 light caliber guns. People in white were noted moving in areas east of Seoul and were moving in both directions.

Seven F4U's assigned to TARCAP were assigned reconnaissance between BARGAP 2 and 3. They located 500-1000 troops on road between Munsan-ni and Kwansan-ni with handguns, horse carriages, trucks, and three light tanks at CS 0684. Strafing was conducted damaging carts, trucks, and killing or wounding approximately 50 troops. The troops were white jackets and dark trousers and were walking toward Seoul. Some of the carts carried mounted machine guns, other ammunition. Light inaccurate AA (20mm & 40 mm) was observed at CS 0395, 1576, 1075. Two F4U's assigned to deep support reported striking an ammunition and oil storage depot leaving it burning, and Evaluation destroyed. Four small craft aground were strafed and hit by at least one rocket resulting in undetermined damage. One F4U, flown by Lt CDR D. C. TAYLOR, 99311, USN, was ditched one quarter of a mile west of Point Pogo. The damage was inflicted by damaged rockets which had probably been damaged by flying debris from the first run. During the second run the rocket motors exploded after firing and flying fragments struck the aircraft engine causing failure. Lt CDR TAYLOR was picked up by a shore based helicopter about ten minutes after he affected a forced landing. A second F4U of the group making the second run was damaged by flying debris when the explosion occurred. Another F4U, flown by Ens John James Brogan, 506739, USN VF-23, lost power on takeoff and settled into the water. The auxiliary fuel tank exploded and burned.
The pilot was rescued immediately and confined to the sick bay suffering from 1st and 2nd degree burns. Seven to ten days may be required for recovery and return to flight status. Event 10 consisted of 17 F4U's and 7 AD's on offensive sorties and 8 F4U's on defensive sorties. All the planes except the above mentioned two were recovered at 1800I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
The first flight, designated event one, commenced at 0300I with the launching of one AB for TARCAP, one AD for ASP-1, one AD as night intruder, and two F4U's for CAP. All the planes were recovered at 0600I.

The second flight, designated event two, commenced at 0600I with the launching to F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, one AD for ASP-2, and two AD's for ASP-5, three F4U's for CAP, and six F4U's for deep support. The two F4U's assigned to NGF spot were diverted to the ground control coordinator for close support. Eight low strafing runs were made on troops entrenched in defensive positions along the ridges at target area 9949. Pilots reported observing thousands of pedestrian civilians moving in groups on the roads from the south and the east toward Seoul. All the people wore white clothing and were accompanied by animal drawn vehicles. Numerous sheds and shacks were observed on the main roads south of Seoul end pilots believed that they might be coverings for tanks or vehicles. An AD, flown by Ensign E.E. Sanders, USN was shot down by small arms fire at 37-30N and 126-38E. Close protective cover was provided for a WMO helicopter and the recovery of Ensign Sanders effected. Following his rescue, F4U's strafed the AD and left it burning. Flak which was accurate in altitude but not intense or accurate in deflection, and believed to be 20mm or 40mm was observed southeast of Seoul on the 2349 coordinate. Inaccurate flak, possibly from 20mm, was also observed at BS 9764. At coordinates CS 0766 near the ferry crossing, the following were seen: a possible supply dump, dirt mounds closed by a door in one end and indicating a small ammunition dump, and a small vehicle parking lot with small oil trucks. All of the planes except the one AD noted were recovered at 0900I.

The third flight, designated event five, commenced at 0900I with the launching of two F4U's on NGF spot, four F4U's on TARCAP, two AD's on ASP-4, four F4U's on CAP, six F4U's and four AD's on deep support and two F4U's on Photo. F4U's and AD's dropped ten 500 lb. G.P. bombs, one Napalm, fired twenty HVAR's, and strafed a troop barracks, a former schoolhouse located at grid 185802. The barracks was left burning and was believed destroyed. Providing close support four AD's attacked approximately one hundred troops on a ridge located at grid 0048. Excellent results were reported by the ground controller. Fires were observed west and north of Seoul at 37-35 N and 126-50E. All the planes were recovered at 1200I.

ENCLOSURE (2)
The fourth flight, designated event eight, commenced at 1200I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP-4, four F4U's for CAP, and six F4U's and four AD's for deep support. Approximately 200 troops and some carts were strafed on the road from Oson to Suwon and moving towards Seoul. Napalms were dropped on a town near Sihung (CS1546) where troop concentrations were reported. Mass troop movements were observed on the roads in the vicinity of Suwon. The troops were dressed in white and moved on foot. The main motorized transportation was by motorcycle. All the planes were recovered at 1530I.

The fifth flight, designated event 11, commenced at 1530I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP-6, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support and three F4U's for photo. AD's dropped 500 lb G.P. bombs, Napalms, and strafed a village near Kwanakson where troop concentrations had been reported. Intense flak was observed upon the ridges north of Kaesong. One F4U piloted by LTJG PAINTER, USN, was lost on takeoff. The pilot was rescued and sustained no injuries. All of the other planes were recovered at 0900I.

The sixth flight, designated event 12, commenced at 1700I with the launching of one AD for TARCAP and one AD as a night intruder. The AD's attacked and probably destroyed a tank located at HoHyun. Approximately 100 carts and an undetermined number of men were strafed between Kumyehgun and Suwon and about forty men were killed. A 20mm or 40mm gun position at 1660I was strafed and silenced. The planes were both recovered at 2100I.

The seventh flight designated event 13, commenced at 1900I with the launching of two AD's for ASP-7 and two F4U's for CAP. The two planes were recovered at 2100I and reported nothing of consequence.

Pilots feel that in addition to the present practice of dropping surrender leaflets to North Korean troops, leaflets should be dropped to the residents of Seoul and Inchon areas advising them of the purpose of our air attacks and the action they should take to avoid being mistaken for the enemy. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.

ENCLOSURE (2)
The first flight, designated event 2, commenced at 0600I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, 5 F4U's and 4 AD's for deep support, 8 F4U's CAF, 4 F4U's TARCAP, the scheduled two AD's for ASF were aborted. The planes carried 500# G.F. bombs, HVAR, and Napalms. The F4U's assigned to deep support attacked an AA installation at Munsan-ai CS592) hitting it with 14 HVAR's and 7 bombs. The same group strafed approximately 32 buildings at Yonchon (CT0817) and though the target was hit no fires resulted. A large barn at Kuhwa- Ri (CT 0817) was also strafed but did not burn. Four AD's assigned to deep support strafed and damaged a pushcart two miles west of Yonan (CS 4998) The same group bombed, rocketed, and strafed ten freig cars all of which were left burning. The balance of the flight was uneventful. Event two consisted of 11 F4U's and 4 AD's on offensive sorties and 6 F4U's on defensive sorties. Two AD's, ASP-1, were aborted. All the planes were recovered at 0900I.

The second flight, designated event 5, commenced at 0900I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, 4 F4U's TARCAP, 2 AB's ASF, 8 F4U's CAF, 6 F4U's and 4 AD's for deep support, and 2 F4U's photo. Fifty troops were strafed 5 miles east of Sariwon (YC 4464). Three RR cars were left burning in the railroad yard 10 miles NW of Sariwon. Three strings of boxcars, 45 in all, were hit with two 500# G.F. bombs, 20 HVARS, strafed, and left burning at YC3868 YC4264 and YC4064. All were damaged and were probably destroyed. Six HVAR's and 50 caliber strafing silenced a 20mm fleck position located in a pit at YC5858. A bridge at BT 5855 was hit with one 500 lb. G.F. bomb and one span was damaged. A tank, located at CT6351, was attacked with rockets and destroyed. Minor damage was inflicted on two F4U's by small arms fire. One was hit in the oil tank and had a small caliber hole in the elevator fabric, the other had a small caliber hole in the elevator fabric. Another F4U suffered minor damage to its tail while observing the bridge at CS 0196. It was believed to have been caused by 75mm AA; some tracers indicated small caliber AA were also noted. An AD returned with three holes in the tail section apparently inflicted by small caliber AA. Event 5 consisted of 14 F4U's and six AD's for offensive sorties and 8 F4U's for defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1200I.

The third flight, designated event 8, was launched at 1200I and consisted of two F4U's for NGF spot, 4 F4U's TARCAP, two AD's ASF - 8 F4U's CAF; 6 F4U's and 4 AD's for deep support, and two F4U's photo. An AD bombed, dropped a Napalm, strafed, left burning and probably destroyed a vehicle three miles north of Burah-san CS 2704.
The pilots reported high fuel consumption due to heavy ordnance carried by deep support aircraft on reconnaissance missions. Event 8 consisted of 14 F4U’s and six AD’s on offensive sorties, and 8 F4U’s on defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1530I.

The fourth flight, designated event 11, commenced at 1520I with the launching of two F4U’s for NGF spot, four F4U’s T/R CAP, two AD’s ASI-4, 8 F4U’s CAP, six F4U’s and 4 AD’s for deep support, and 2 F4U’s for photo. AD’s strafed six certs between Seoul and Chonan but none burned. Three warehouses at Chonan (CR3574) were hit with Napalms and strafed. The three were left burning fiercely. A small warehouse at Fyongtaek (CR-2994) was bombed, rocketed, strafed and left burning. A small rail yard (CR3094) was attacked with bombs and rockets and the rails damaged by two rockets hits. Of eight Napalms dropped by the AD’s on this flight, at least three did not go off until strafed. Event 11 consisted of 14 F4U’s and 6 AD’s on offensive sorties, and 8 F4U’s on defensive sorties. All the planes except one were recovered at 1845I. One F4U, attached to VF-63, piloted by LTJG Frank SMITH Jr., USN, 447929, in attempting to land aboard took a late waveoff. The wing scraped along the flight deck and struck the barrier causing the plane to enter the water in an inverted position. The pilot was not recovered. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
The first flight, designated event 1, commenced at 0400I with the launching of one AD for TARCAF, one AD as Night Intruder, one AD as ASF-1, one F4U as CAP, and one AD as TADC-control. One AD assigned to ASP and one F4U assigned to CAP were recovered aboard at 0600I. The balance of the flight was recovered at 0900I. Nothing of consequence was reported.

The second flight, designated event 2, commenced at 0600I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAF, two AD's for ASF-2, eight F4U's for CAP, and six F4U's and four AD's for deep support. A railway yard at Suwon (CS2528) was damaged with rockets, bombs, and by strafing. An airfield at Suwon (CS2528) was damaged with rockets, bombs, and by strafing. Troops and carts along the highway from Seoul to Chonan (CR3485) were strafed. Two AA emplacements located at BS 9996 and BS 9997 were hit and damaged with 31 rockets, three Napalm, two 500 lb. G.P. bombs, and 20mm ammunition. A railroad bridge located at BT 7108 was hit with two 500lb G.P. bombs, one Napalm, and several HVAR's but the extent of damage was not observed. Seven passengers were located CS7927, were strafed with 4000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition and left burning. Three railroad gondolas, located at CS2968 were damaged. All planes were recovered at 0900I.

The third flight designated event 5, commenced at 0900I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAF, two AD's for ASF-3, eight F4U's for CAP, six F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and two F4U's for photo. Three F4U's attacked an AA emplacement, located at Kuchon (3555 A) with five HVARS, a 500 lb. G.P. bomb, and 50 caliber ammunition. The damage was undetermined. Two F4U's encountered automatic weapon fire along the road at 3778 at altitudes from 1000-2000 feet. They received minor damage from flak at 0110 but did not attack the position. Three AA emplacements located at 3256Y, 3356X, and 35560, were attacked by AD's and hit with 14 HVAR's, two 500 lb G.P. bombs and two Napalm. Four F4U's hit the same targets. All the emplacements were heavily damaged. Two AD's hit and damaged 30 railway cars located north of Seoul at Haya and killed two men. One AD-4 was lost due to enemy ground fire. The plane was piloted by LTJG C.E. SEEMAN, USN file number 0378906. LTJG SEEMAN was not seen to leave the plane and is now missing in action. All of the planes of the flight were recovered at 1200I except the plane piloted by LT SEEMAN.
The fourth flight, designated event 8, commenced at 1200I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASF-4, eight F4U's for CAP, six F4U's and four AD's for deep support. Four AD's hit and destroyed a tank located at CR 3243. Buildings located at CS1755M were hit with Napolms, strafed and left burning. A large factory type building, located at CS2728, was hit with 18 rockets and strafed with 20mm. The building did not burn and no estimate was made of the damage.

Kyongsong airport was hit and damaged with one 500 lb G.P. bomb, eight HVAR's and 2400 rounds of 50 caliber. Two carts, CS1197, were strafed and destroyed with 50 caliber. One cart, CS2193, was destroyed by strafing with 50 caliber. A building northeast of Seoul, CS2360, was hit and damaged with one 500 lb G.P. bomb. An oil drum dump located southwest of Seoul CS1955, was hit and damaged with one 500 lb G.P. bomb, six HVAR's and 2200 rounds of caliber. All aircraft were recovered at 1530I.

The fifth flight designated event 11, commenced at 1530I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASF-5, eight F4U's for CAP, six F4U's and four AD's for deep support. One truck and four field artillery pieces on wheels at coordinate CS1765 were observed to be damaged after air attack with five HVAR's and 50 caliber strafing. The town of Yongdungpo-ri, southwest of Seoul, was attacked by the deep support group with 90 HVAR's, 7 Napalms, 13 500lb G.P. bombs and strafing. About ten factory type buildings were burning and smaller fires were started. Heavy black smoke rose to about 7,000 feet from this and previous flights. All aircraft in the flight were recovered at 1845I.

The fifth and sixth flights, designated event 12 and event 13, commenced at 1700I with the launching of one AD as night intruder and at 1830 with the launching of one AD for ASF-6 and one F4U for CAP. Nothing eventful was reported upon their return. They were all recovered at 2100I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 22 SEPTEMBER 1950

The first flight, designated event four, commenced at 0600I with the launching of four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and five F4U's and four AD's for deep support. The planes assigned to TARCAP, CAP and ASP reported their flights as being uneventful. The deep support group was assigned targets in the southwest section of Seoul. Four F4U's and five AD's strafed, dropped 500 lb G.P. bomb, and fired 25 HVAR's at eight or more 20mm or 40mm AA emplacements along a ridge. (2257 to 2356). One gun was probably destroyed and one damaged; damage to the other positions was not observed. A 20mm or 40mm AA position and nearby buildings at CS2155 were strafed and attacked with five 500lb G.P. bombs and twelve HVAR's, and a pillbox at CS2256 was attacked with 1 Napalms, one 500 lb G.P. bomb, and five HVAR's. The AA position was probably destroyed, and the pillbox was damaged by one direct rocket hit. Troops were observed moving east, at 2350, on the road south of Seoul. All of the planes in the flight were recovered at 0900I.

The second flight, designated event six, commenced at 0900I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and two F4U's for a photo mission. The planes assigned to TARCAP, CAP and ASP reported their flights as uneventful. The gunfire spotting flight and the deep support group were directed to attack troop concentrations attempting to cross the Han river at several points south and east Seoul. Ten 500 lb G.P. bombs, four Napalms, seventy-one HVAR's and several thousand rounds 20mm and 50caliber ammunition were expended on groups totaling 1000-1500 troops. Casualties are estimated at 200. Then, in close support of friendly troops, the planes strafed and attacked with 24 HVAR's enemy troops on the southside of a ridge (CS1852) south of Seoul. All of the planes were recovered at 1200I.

The third flight, designated event nine, commenced at 1200I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and two F4U's for a photo mission. The planes assigned to TARCAP, CAP, and ASP reported their flights as uneventful. The NGF spot aircraft were directed to seek targets of opportunity. They strafed troops crossing the Han river east of Seoul and strafed eight horse drawn wagons which burned and exploded. The deep support group was sent north of Seoul to sweep lines of communication. Fifty boxcars at Tokso-ri (CS4362), Paltang-ri (CS4457), Hwangju (UC4182) and Sariwon (VC4065) were strafed and hit with 500 lb G.P. bombs, HVAR's, and Napalms. A railroad tunnel located four miles east of Yongju (36°18 N and 125°38 E) was probably plugged by a 500 lb G.P. bomb which exploded inside.
A railroad bridge at Hwangju was destroyed by a 500 lb G.P. bomb. Troops and carts at CS 5152 were strafed, damaging two ox carts and killing or wounding an indefinite number of NK troops. No apparent attempt was made to repair railroads as far north as Sunan. Many troops and several motorcycles were observed about eight miles northwest of Pyongyang. Meager and inaccurate flak, believed to be three-inch, was observed over Pyongyang and moderate 40mm flak was observed over Kyonipo. All the planes on the flight were recovered at 1530I.

The fourth flight, designated event 12, commenced at 1530I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support, four F4U's and four AD's for sweep activity, and two F4U's for a photo mission. The sweep was assigned the airfield at Sinanju (39-35 N and 125-35 E) as a target. The field appeared to be inoperative and no airfield installations were observed. The flight strafed the railyard, twenty to thirty cars, two locomotives, and adjacent buildings, and dropped 200# fragmentation bombs causing an undetermined amount of damage. Buildings believed to be warehouses, were strafed and hit with eight HVAR's as were twenty railroad cars six miles southeast of Anju. The deep support group hit a railroad tunnel, located two miles east of Yongyu (39-18 N and 125-36 E), with a 500 lb G.P. bomb which exploded well inside and was believed to have collapsed it. This group also attacked roads and rail lines between Seoul and Yongyu (39-18N and 125-38 E). They strafed and rocketed a truck and approximately 85 troops in the vicinity of Sunan (39-13 N and 125-33 E), destroying the truck and killing or wounding twenty to twenty-five troops. All of the planes on the flight were recovered at 1830I.

The fifth flight, designated event 13, commenced at 1530I with the launching of four F4U's for CAP and two AD's for ASP. The flight was uneventful and was recovered at 1845I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 23 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event one, commenced at 0400I with the launching of one AD for CAP and one AD for ASP. Both planes were recovered at 0600I and reported their flights as uneventful.

The second flight, designated event two, commenced at 0400I with the launching of one AD for TARCAP and one AD as night intruder. After landing at Kimpo the AD's were joined by a marine F7F who led them to a close support targets in Seoul. A reported command post at 2059 and AA positions among the govern ment buildings at 2100 were attacked with 500 lb GP bombs, 220 lb fragmentation bombs and strafed. The AA positions were silenced after the third run. Both planes were recovered at 0730I.

The third flight, designated event four, commenced at 0600I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and four AD's for deep support. The planes assigned to TARCAP reported their flight as uneventful. The two AD's on ASP were directed by a destroyer to search the area in the vicinity of the task force for a possible submarine. The results were negative. The two F4U's on NGF spotted the area from Seoul southward to Oceans. Friendly troops were observed at Suwon airfield but no enemy activity was observed on the road from Suwon to a point ten miles south of Oceans (CS 2807). The deep support group orbited under the direction of several controllers until 0730I, at which time they were directed to attack three reported gun positions on a point of land forty miles southeast of Inchon (BR 5989). As insufficient time remained to obtain another target allowance consisting of twelve 500 lb GP bombs and eighty HVAR's was dropped on those positions. The positions appeared to be unoccupied and general damage was noted though no guns were observed. All of the planes were recovered at 0900I.

The fourth flight, designated event six, commenced at 0900I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, four AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and four F4U's on a photo mission. The TARCAP, CAP, and ASP flights were uneventful. The NGF spot provided protective cover for an AD pilot who had parachuted from his aircraft in the hills southeast of Pyongyang. The pilot was recovered by a land based helicopter. The deep support group was assigned a close support mission consisting of several tunnels in the western part of Seoul. Eight 500 lb G.P. bombs were dropped and thirty two HVAR's were fired on a double tunnel entrance located at grid 1638. Two 500 lb GP bombs and three Naginals were dropped at another double tunnel entrance at grid 1758. The results were undetermined. One AD made a forced landing at Kimpo airfield as a result of a flak damaged oil tank. Photo planes, with escorts, made photographs of selected areas of Seoul and strip maps of lines of communication between Uibongju (CS 2678) and Chuncheon (CS 3893) and from Suwon to Pyongtaek (GR 2994), west to the coast and back to Suwon.

ENCLOSURE (2)
of the planes in the flight were recovered at 1200I except the one AD noted.

The fourth flight, designated event nine, commenced at 1200I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARGAP, four AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and four AD's for deep support. The CAP, TARGAP, and ASP flights were uneventful. Two F4U's scheduled for the NGF spot mission, joined the deep support group in attacks on targets of opportunity on the highway north of Kwangju. The following targets were hit: One motor vehicle strafed (YD 4209), one truck attacked with rockets and strafed (YD 4212). Approximately 200 troops were strafed (YD 4303) but the number of casualties was not observed, a hut and ten troops were destroyed by a napalm (YD 4311). A tunnel was hit and believed to have been blocked by a 500 lb GP bomb which exploded in the entrance; a railroad (XC 4293) was damaged by three 500 lb GP bombs. The group observed a 25 m AD position on a hill to the east of the railroad entrance of the tunnel listed above. All of the planes on the flight were recovered at 1530I.

The fifth flight, designated event 12, commenced at 1530I with the launching of four F4U's for TARGAP, four F4U's for Scoop, four F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and AD's for deep support. The TARGAP and CAP flights were uneventful. After a long of orbiting, scoops and deep support aircraft were diverted to a highway southeast of P'yongyang where approximately 32 tanks and 20 vehicles had been reported. About 20 camouflaged vehicles were sighted on the road between P'yongyang and Sampo-bong. The vehicles were strafed and attacked by our scoops aircraft and two 500 lb GP bombs and twenty four 220 lb fragmentation bombs were dropped. Hits were observed on the vehicles, but the damage could not be determined. The deep support group received instructions to proceed to the above noted target at such a late hour that it was necessary, for reasons of time and fuel, to unload armament on-ute to the target area on targets of opportunity, namely, a tunnel north of Hoesan (YC 4124), a bridge (YC 4026), and a railroad station (YC 4334) causing an undetermined amount of damage. All of the planes were recovered at 1815I.

The sixth flight, designated event 13, was launched at 1530I and consisted of four F4U's for CAP and four AD's for ASP. Nothing of consequence was reported of their recovery at 1815I.

The seventh flight, designated event 15, was launched at 1700I and consisted of one AD for TARGAP and one AD as a night intruder. Neither of the planes reported anything eventful upon their recovery at 2100I.

The eighth flight, designated event 16, was launched at 1830I and consisted of one AD for ASP and one AD for Night CAP. Neither of the planes reported anything eventful upon their recovery at 2100I.

ENCLOSURE (2)
Targets in the area north of Samwon are more plentiful than in areas previously attacked but distance from the force leaves little time to search for and to attack the targets, making it imperative that prompt assignment of targets in this area be made if they are to be effectively attacked. As an example, the thirty tanks and twenty vehicles, reported near Pyongyang today, were reported to the controller at about 1300L. Orbiting aircraft of Event nine who intercepted this report were not despatched until it was too late to comply. Event 12 sweep, which was despatched quite promptly after arrival at P0. Nancy, found the vehicles but had insufficient time and fuel to search for the tanks. The deep support group was not despatched in time to reach the target. Many undamaged bridges and AA protected factories in this area are felt to be suitable targets for sweep missions for assignment by the ship. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 25 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event four, commenced at 0615I with the launching of two FAU's for NGF spot, four FAU's for TARCAP, eight FAU's for CAP, two AD's for ASP, and four AD's and four FAU's for close support. The TARCAP and CAP flights were uneventful. The ASP flight reported a radar contact with a possible Schnorkel submarine at 36°35.5'N and 124°37'E thirty miles north of the 0700I position of the task force. The close support group and the NGE spot were assigned targets consisting of AA positions and defense installations in the hills of southwest Seoul. All of the armament was expended on gun emplacements along the top of the ridge in the following areas: GS 2257, GS 2356, and GS 2357, and on trenches and emplacements on the southwest and northeast slopes. Two 500#/GP bomb hits on gun emplacements were observed and the observation plane reported excellent results. A 40mm AA emplacement at GS 2356 was destroyed, and an ammunition dump at GS 2356 was hit with fifteen HVAR's and destroyed. All of the planes were recovered at 0900I.

The second flight, designated event six, commenced at 0915I with the launching of two FAU's for NGE spot, four FAU's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight FAU's for CAP, four FAU's and four AD's for close support, and four FAU's for a photographer and escort. Six FAU's and three AD's were added to the close support group for offensive strength. The ASP, CAP, and TARCAP flights were uneventful. The photo flight noted that the railroad from Ha eju to Sariwon and a spur line to a dock at the Cheryong-gang appears to be intact. A small vessel was at the dock. The NGE spot flight was sent on a road sweep north of Seoul at 1115I, where they attacked eight railroad cars with two 500#/GP bombs and eight HVAR's. Two cars were blown off the tracks and four others were probably destroyed. Four FAU's of the close support group were sent 25 miles south of Seoul to a point between Suwon and Osan to assist friendly tanks that were being held up by enemy gun fire. The planes were unaho to sight targets and the controller could not give the locations of any. No targets were attacked by this group. The remainder of the close support group attacked the hilly section of southeast Seoul that had been attacked by the previous flight. Twenty-four 500#/GP bombs and one hundred HVAR's were dropped on trenches and gun positions in this area. Smoke and dust prevented observation of the damage which was undoubtedly inflicted. Foot traffic was observed moving east from Ha eju to Eunsong. All of the planes in the flight were recovered at 1215I.

The third flight, designated event nine, commenced at 1215I with the launching of two FAU's for NGE spot, four FAU's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight FAU's for CAP, and nine FAU's and seven AD's for close support. The ASP, CAP, and TARCAP flights were uneventful. The NGE spotter flight strafed and damaged two trucks and fired eight HVAR's into a bridge approach just west of Pyongjeong (GS 2061), but no damage was evident. The pilots on this flight reported transmissions on VHF channel nine from "Boyhood 14" who attempted to direct them to another area. When asked to authenticate, "Boyhood 14" could not comply. The
close support controller verified our belief that "Boooyah 14's" transmissions were attempts at radio deception by the enemy. Nine FAU's and three AD's, of the close support group, attacked a large multiple roof railroad shop just west of P'yongyang (53-53 N and 127-34E). The building was left in flames after twelve 500# bombs were dropped, five of which were direct hits. Proceeding from this area and heading southeast, the flight discovered and attacked a twelve-car camouflage railroad train at 38-20 N and 127-10E. During the attack one hundred and six HVAR's were fired into the train, destroying five cars and damaging seven others. The flight then separated and four AD's were diverted by the close support controller to attack a ridge (1959) northwest of Seoul, dropping eight 500# bombs and firing forty-four HVAR's. Numerous strafing runs were also made on the west slopes of the ridge, but observation of the damage was limited because of the rugged countryside. The flight was recovered at 1545L.

The fifth flight, designated event twelve, commenced at 1545L with the launching of two FAU's for NGF spot, four FAU's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight FAU's for CAP, nine FAU's and seven AD's for close support, and four FLU's for a photo mission and escort. The CAP, TARCAP, NGF spot, and ASP flights were all uneventful. The photo flight was not assigned a mission after reporting to the controller. The close support group was divided by the controller into three flights and assigned several targets. Two groups, consisting of seven AD's and five FAU's, were sent on a sweep northwest of Seoul. They attacked a railroad bridge and a road bridge five miles east of Yonan (BS 5599) with fifteen 500# bombs. One bomb hit and destroyed one span of the railroad bridge. Eight HVAR's fired at the highway bridge caused some damage to the bridge approach. The AD's proceeded west to Haeju (XC 3812) and attacked railway yards with seven 500# bombs and eighty-four HVAR's. Fires were started in five storerooms north of the tracks. One large building was burning brightly when last observed. Additional damage was inflicted on the previously damaged railroad yard. Four FAU's were instructed to proceed northeast of Seoul and hit AA emplacements found in the hills. Although flying at hilltop height in an effort to draw fire from the ground, they saw no indication of AA fire or guns. They returned to the ship without attacking any targets. All the planes were recovered at 1845L. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 26 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event one, commenced at 0445I with the launching of one AD for ASP and one AD for CAP. The flight was uneventful and was recovered at 0615I.

The second flight, designated event two, commenced at 0415I with the launching of one AD for TARCAP and one AD as night intruder. Both flights were consolidated into one night intruder mission and assigned to patrol north from area 2663 on the northeast edge of Seoul. Almost immediately after starting to patrol this highway, the night intruders discovered a train heading north out of Seoul, in area 2860. The planes immediately attacked the train, strafing it and dropping two 500 lb GP bombs and fifteen 220 lb fragmentation bombs. The train was brought to a stop in a cloud of steam from the engine. Both of the planes were recovered at 0745I.

The third flight, designated event four, commenced at 0615I with the launching of two F4U’s for NEF spot, four F4U’s for TARCAP, two AD’s for ASP, eight F4U’s for CAP, and four F4U’s and four AD’s for deep support. The ASP, TARCAP, and the CAP flights were uneventful. The four F4U’s of the deep support group were directed to sweep area five, east of Seoul. Two railroad cars were completely demolished and four others damaged at the Chijong-ryon railway siding after being hit with eight HVAP’s and strafed by the group. Four AD’s assigned to deep support were sent by the controller to sweep area four, northeast of Seoul. At Chinchon, on hill 301, the planes attacked an AD emplacement with twenty-four rockets and strafing. The gun was destroyed and the position neutralized. One span of a bridge, in the same area (CS 3995), fell into the water after eight 500 lb bombs were dropped and two direct hits observed. The north of a tunnel and the surrounding vegetation were torn up at Kapyong (CS 7183) when hit with twenty-four rockets from the AD’s. The NEF spot flight was assigned to sweep sector three, northwest of Seoul. A bridge approach, eight miles east of Kaesong (BE 7107), was blasted with one 500 lb bomb. Six rockets from the F4U’s hit and damaged a car located fifteen miles north of Haenju at Miryok-tong. Two cars approximately one mile north of Haenju were strafed and destroyed. Although no flak was observed by any of the pilots, a small hole was found in the left wing of one F4U upon landing. Upon return to the ship, during recovery, an F4U, piloted by LTJG Bass of Fighter squadron sixty-three (VF-63), spun in on the approach and crashed into the sea. LTJG Bass was immediately rescued by the helicopter and sustained no injuries. The rest of the planes were recovered at 0915I.

The fourth flight, designated event six, commenced at 0915I with the launching of two F4U’s for NEF spot, four F4U’s for TARCAP, two AD’s for ASP, four AD’s and four F4U’s for deep support and four F4U’s for a photo mission and escort. The TARCAP, ASP and CAP flights were uneventful. While enroute to a mission at Chinampo and Kyonipo, the photo escorts strafed two cars, a mortar vehicle and a seventy-five foot train of camouflage objects of the road four miles north of...
Chinampo (YU 1955). Two of the carts were destroyed; the others, though strafed, did not burn. Thirty or forty "U" shaped trenches were observed along the top of a leeve at (YU 3063). Two or three men were observed in each trench. Six miles northeast of Seoul, in a roa 2961 to 3262, nine trucks were strafed by the NGE spot. The trucks varied in size from a half-ton, carrying personnel, to a ton wheel vehicle pulling field piece. One truck was run off the road down an embankment and other trucks were set on fire and left burning intensly. One of these showed the small rectangular flame of burning phosphorus. In the same general vicinity, a truck was destroyed by four F4U's assigned to deep support. The planes attacked the tank with six 500 lb bombs, eight rockets, and one napalm. Two direct hits with 500 lb bombs were observed. Six closely spaced 20mm AA positions in area 3362M were destroyed with two 500 lb bombs, twelve rockets, and one napalm by the same group, and an armored car in area 3061 was also destroyed by direct rocket hits. A one-half ton truck in area 3263 was damaged by strafing and a motor vehicle was probably destroyed by a close rocket hit. All of the planes were recovered at 1215.

The fifth flight, designated event nine, commenced at 1215I with the launching of two F4U's for NGE spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and four AD's for deep support. The CAP and ASP flights were unsuccessful. The F4U's assigned to NGE spot were despatched to area four. A railroad bridge one mile to the west of Pyonggang (CT 5053) was hit by two 500 lb bombs, causing the cables to give way. Two camouflaged vehicles at Kona (CT 6538) were strafed and knocked out by six rockets. At Tongdahon (CT 5115), a stalled tank which were being protected by a 20mm gun emplacement was strafed and the emplacement was knocked out. Four F4U's assigned to deep support were sent to area three to attack targets of opportunity between Chinampo and Pyongyang. No targets, troops, or vehicles were observed in the area. At Pyonggang (CT 5149), four AD's, assigned to deep support, searched area four. A highway tunnel with supplies stored inside received a direct hit from a salvo of eight rockets and was heavily damaged. What is believed to have been a self-propelled 75mm gun on a light tank chassis was found at Chongong-ni, strafed, hit with two rockets and heavily damaged. Seven 500 lb bombs were dropped and twenty five rockets were fired at tunnel northeast of Seoul (38-47M and 126-25E) and at least one bomb, a direct hit, exploded within, probably blocking the tunnel entrance. Two rockets hit and destroyed a small truck at 38-27M and 125E. The planes were all recovered at 1545I.

The sixth flight, designated event twelve, commenced at 1545I with the launching of two F4U's for NGE spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and four AD's for deep support. The CAP, TARCAP, and ASP flights were unsuccessful. The F4U's assigned for NGE spotting were sent to sweep a roa four, northeast of Seoul. At Cayong (CS 7228) a railroad boxcar was attacked with two 500 lb bombs and rockets. One bomb was a near miss and the rockets severely damaged the car. Eight miles east of Chunson (CT 6105) and Chongong (CT 3010) two boxcars and a hidden truck were left smoking, but not burning, after being hit with six rockets and strafed. After an appreciable period of orbiting, the deep support group was directed to attack mortar positions ten miles northwest of Seoul. However, the mortar positions could not be detected. Four F4U's dropped four 500 lb bombs in the area and destroyed a building. An automobile was destroyed five miles north of Seoul (CS 2568) after
being hit with napalms and rockets from four AD's. A locomotive, which had been previously attacked and a tender were strafed and rocketed with EVAR's at Uijongbu. The tender was set on fire. The four AD's were forced by weather to land aboard the USS PHILIPPINE SEA where they remained all night. The remaining aircraft were recovered at 16451.

The seventh flight, designated event 14, commenced at 16451 with the launching of one AD for ASF and one AD for CAP. Both planes were recovered immediately because of weather conditions unsuitable for flying. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
NGF spot flights commenced at 0615I with the launching of four F4U's on event one. At 0715I an additional NGF spot flight consisting of two F4U's and two AD's was launched. These flights directed the Naval gunfire of the U.S.S. MANCHESTER and DESDIV 112 who were bombarding Fankochi Point (37-40N & 125-21E). During the bombardment, hits were observed at 06772 Q and 06726. Trenches and gun emplacements at 0732 were hit with six-inch gun fire. Five inch gun fire hits were observed at 0737723 on trenches and gun emplacements. These positions are considered to be destroyed. In addition, the vessels delivered saturation fire over the fortified area of the peninsula. Four of the planes were recovered at 0915I and the remaining four at 1015I.

Strike Able, designated event two, commenced at 0615I with the launching of ten F4U's and six AD's. Four of the Boxer's AD's were launched from the PHILIPPINE SEA. Strike Able directed its attacks on the Fankochi Point area. The planes attacked a trench along the western cliff of the peninsula with 220 lb fragmentation bombs. Twelve 220 lb fragmentation bombs were dropped on the southwest beaches and twelve instantaneously fused bombs were dropped on pill boxes and trenches in the southwest and central area of the peninsula. Two 1000 lb bombs with two hour delay fuses were placed near a block house and a trench. Four F4U's attacked trenches containing some troops at 071725. The trenches were strafed and six rockets were fired into nearby emplacements in the same area. In area 082730 four 500 lb VT fused bombs, eight rockets and two napalm were dropped into trenches and on two gun emplacements. In area 081731 on Fankochi Point, a napalm bomb was dropped on a building near two machine gun pits. The building was destroyed and the weapons silenced. Two pill boxes and trenches on the west side of Fankochi Point were attacked with four rockets and one napalm. All the planes were recovered at 0915I.

Strike Baker, event four, commenced with the launching of ten F4U's and seven AD's at 0815I. The F4U's made four runs on gun emplacements in the vicinity of 0772, firing fifty-six rockets, dropping four 500 lb bombs, and six napalm. It is estimated that two gun emplacements were destroyed at 069720 and 065721. Four 500 lb bombs were dropped on three gun emplacements, at 064725 and 069720, and it is believed that the emplacements were badly damaged by near misses. Two gun emplacements were also damaged at 070721 after receiving six direct hits and several near misses from rockets. The AD's on strike Baker had a primary target of positions at the southern tip of Fankochi Point, where twenty-one 1000 lb bombs and fifty-six 220 lb fragmentation bombs were dropped. A moderate amount of damage was done to the gun emplacements. No personnel were sighted during this attack. All of the planes were recovered at 1015I.
Because of the high arming distance required for the VT fused and delayed action bombs, results of the bombing attacks could not be accurately determined. However, all trenches and gun positions appeared to have been damaged or knocked out. Installations in the Fankoki Point area appeared to be quite new, but relatively little activity was noted at the time of this attack. Some machine gun fire was received from forces on the ground, and a small amount of inaccurate AA, 76mm or over, was observed; apparently coming from a point well north of the target area. Troops when first observed were on the beaches and climbing the cliffs. No more than 100 troops were observed at any time, most of which became casualties. It is felt that the Fankoki Point defenses may have been built in the belief that our initial landing would be at that point and that previous to the time of this attack the defending force was withdrawn for the defense of Seoul. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
The first flight, designated event four, commenced at 0615I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two A4D's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's and four A4D's for deep support. The CAP, TARCAP, and ASP flights were uneventful. After receiving no target assignments from the controller, the two F4U's assigned to NGF spot proceeded to approximately thirty miles north of Seoul (CT3106) where they attacked a gun emplacement. After seven runs, dropping two 500 lb bombs and firing thirteen rockets, the gun emplacement was silenced. One of the F4U's sustained slight damage to it's tail section from 20mm AA fire from the emplacement. The deep support group reported to the controller and were assigned to sweep area three, northwest of Seoul. Near Kaeson (BT 8403) the planes saw a truck halt and about twenty troops abandon the vehicle and scattered as it was attacked with four 500 lb bombs, four rockets and strafed. Two of the rockets were direct hits on the truck, approximately fifteen of the troops were killed or wounded and the truck believed destroyed. At Yonan two wagons covered with hay were strafed and hit with two rockets and one wagon was left burning. The deep support flight was split up at Sinwon-ni. Four A4D's of the deep support flight attacked several trucks loaded with supplies along the side of the road just east of Chontac-ri. Four 500 lb bombs were dropped upon the trucks and one truck was left burning from a direct hit. A camouflaged vehicle two miles west of Chongan (YC 5507) was destroyed with one hit and one damaging near miss by rockets. Near Kaeson (BT 9505) a weapons carrier was destroyed with two 500 lb bomb hits. Returning from Sinwon-ni, four F4U's attacked a small truck east of Keju. Four rockets were fired and one direct hit resulted in the destruction of the truck. The four F4U's joined with the A4D's at Paekchon (BT 6305) where two tanks covered over with branches were discovered. One tank was left burning and numerous hits observed on the other after it had been strafed and attacked with forty rockets. Later the group attacked a bridge three miles west of Keason with four 500 lb bombs. Pieces of the superstructure were blown off and the bridge was weakened in general, but no spans were knocked out. The flight reported much enemy activity on the hill tops from Keason to Heiju. Many troops were observed in newly dug trenches. All of the planes were recovered at 0915I.

The second flight, designated event six, commenced at 0915I with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two A4D's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four A4D's for deep support, and four F4U's for a photo mission escort. The CAP, TARCAP and ASP flights were uneventful. The NGF spot strafed a cart eight miles west of Keason (7303). The cart did not blow up. Two carts were also strafed near Yonan, and one was left burning. A group of fifteen people were spotted standing near trenches at Yongdomyon and about ten troops were killed or wounded by strafing. The deep support group was instructed to sweep the roads from Sariwon to Pyongyang and south of Chinampo. (more)
(Continued) A railroad train was sighted five miles south of Sariwon but was not attacked as the controller informed the group that it had been previously knocked out. Meager and inaccurate flak was encountered due east of Chinnampo. At Chinnampo the group split up. The AD's strafed two ox carts near Waryong-ni (XC 8969) and killed or wounded approximately ten troops. The F4U's strafed and damaged six carts at (YC 3874). The F4U's and the AD's rejoined just north of Onchon-ni where a tank and two vehicles were sighted and attacked. The NGF flight, which was north of there at the time, saw the bomb blasts, heard the rest of the group on VHF, and joined in the attack on the tank. Eighteen 500 lb bombs were dropped and twenty rockets fired at the tank and two vehicles. Two direct bomb hits were observed on the tank. The north side of the town (Onchon-ni) was left in flames and about twenty people were killed or wounded. One pilot noted automatic weapon fire in this area. While returning to the ship the F4U's strafed two small trucks but time did not permit damage to be checked. The photo mission and escorts were directed to map the area from Heiju to Sariwon. While returning to the ship they strafed five or six ox drawn carts at CT 5266 and left all but one burning. All of the planes were recovered at 12151.

The third flight, designated event nine, commenced at 12151 with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, three F4U's and three AD's for deep support, and four F4U's for a photo mission. The CAP, TARCAP, and ASP flights were uneventful. The NGF spot strafed and destroyed a jeep with four passengers five miles east of Pyongyang. Twelve 500 lb bombs were dropped and forty-eight rockets were fired at six to eight warehouse type buildings in Sinch'on (YB 1842) by the deep support group. The buildings were badly damaged but did not burn. The group also strafed four carts west of Haeju (XC 3216), destroying two and damaging one. Photo escort planes strafed a cart northwest of Pyongyang which burst into flames. Two trucks and many carts were observed on the roads in the same area, but the direction of the vehicles could not be determined. An enemy encampment of approximately 150 troops located at Susanmyon (YD 1217), was strafed killing or wounding 25 to 50 troops. All the planes were recovered at 15151.

The fourth flight, designated event 12, commenced at 15151 with the launching of two F4U's for NGF spot, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, five F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and four F4U's for a photo mission. The NGF spot flight was assigned to sweep the western part of sweep area four, north of Seoul, for targets of opportunity. Two carts at CT 2735 were strafed but they did not burn. Two bridges under construction near Chongdong-ni (CT 2735) were attacked with eleven rockets and two 500 lb bombs. One rocket hit and two near misses with 500 lb bombs were scored. The photo mission planes made two strafing runs near Ongjin airfield killing or wounding twenty-five troops dispersed in groups of ten or twenty about the fields of that area. Slight damage was sustained to the speed ring of the plane by automatic small arms fire. A munitions factory five miles west-southwest of Haeju was strafed with no apparent damage. The deep support group was sent on a road sweep north and northeast of Seoul. Thirty-six rockets were fired, five 500 lb bombs were dropped, and the planes strafed four camouflaged objects in the middle of the railroad tracks at Kumhwa (CT 6738). The objects were long mounds and were thought to be loaded cars. All were left in flames. Two railroad oil tank cars at CT 6341 were attacked with five 500 lb bombs, six rockets and strafing.
(Continued) Although the tank cars sustained no direct hits, an underground storage tank blew up and the area was left in flames. At Chorwon (GT 4334) a road bridge was attacked with twenty rockets and four 500 lb bombs. Two direct rocket hits were observed and a building near the bridge was left in flames. All of the planes were recovered at 1830I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 29 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event one, commenced at 0415 with the launching of one AD for ASP and one AD for CAP. At the same time event two was launched consisting of one AD for TARGCAP and one AD as NIGHT INTRUDER. Both flights were uneventful. The planes on event one were recovered at 0615 and the planes of event two at 0745.

The third flight, designated event four, commenced at 0615 with the launching of four F4U's for TARGCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for Deep Support, and one AD engine run-in over the force. The ASP and CAP flights were uneventful. The F4U's assigned to TARGCAP were assigned to sweep area three, northeast of Seoul. After experiencing communications difficulties the planes arrived over the target area late and attacked no worthwhile targets. The deep support mission was assigned a search and attack mission in areas 8276 and 9276 by Dovastate Able, and ordered to report to the control of Buccaneer Fourteen. However, communications could not be established with Buccaneer Fourteen. The flight then proceeded on the southern leg of road sweep three, northeast of Seoul, where two cars located one mile east of Yonan were strafed and rocketed. One direct rocket hit was observed on each of the two cars. At Haeju, a bridge just north of the city (YC 4212) was attacked with two 500 lb bombs and eight rockets. One 500 lb bomb and four rocket hits were damaging near misses. The damage to the bridge could not be assessed as the bridge did not collapse. The F4U's probably destroyed another bridge northwest of Haeju after dropping two 500 lb bombs and firing seven rockets; of which one bomb and three rockets were direct hits. A fire was started to the north of the bridge as a result of the attack. At Hanpo (BT 7733), the AD's attacked a railroad bridge with ten 500 lb bombs and twenty-four rockets. Twelve rocket hits and ten damaging bomb misses were observed. Following this attack, the AD's attacked a tunnel at Nanchonjom (BT 7345), hitting it with two 500 lb bombs and twenty-four rockets. The tunnel mouth is believed to have been closed by the hits. All of the planes were recovered at 0915.

The fourth flight, designated event six, commenced at 0915 with the launching of four F4U's for TARGCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, three AD's and four F4U's for Deep Support, and four F4U's for a photo mission and escort. The CAP, TARGCAP, and ASP flights were all uneventful. Four F4U's and three AD's were sent on a ship assigned mission to an area one mile east of Pyongyang airfield where photo interpretation had shown AA positions and revetted buildings as well as operational railway yards. Three AD's dropped six 500 lb bombs and fired thirty-five rockets into the freight yards, while four F4U's fired rockets and dropped one 500 lb bomb on warehouses (YD 4920) and rocketed and strafed AA positions at YD 4521. A building, on which two AA positions were located, was destroyed by rocket hits and strafing and one warehouse was destroyed by a bomb hit. Leaving this target area, the flight headed south and attacked a tunnel approximately five miles to the south of Chungma (YC 4399). (more)
(Continued) Three 500 lb bombs found their mark and blocked the entrance of the tunnel. Continuing further south, the AD's and F4U's made attacks approximately five miles northwest of Simson-ni (YC 3636). Three ore cars were damaged by six rockets, and a railroad yard at Ayang (YC 4334), with twenty or thirty cars was attacked with fifteen rockets. The railroad station and three cars were in flames when the planes departed. Later, tankers and replacements to the north and east of Hoeju (YC 4224) were strafed and attacked with twenty-four rockets. Several fires were started, but an estimate of the damage could not be made. The two F4U's assigned to the photo mission, and the two F4U's assigned as escort, flew north to Pyongyang where they made a photo map of the city. While returning to the ship the flight strafed a cart and a truck southeast of Sineun (YC 2243). All of the planes were recovered at 1215I.

The fifth flight, designated event nine, commenced at 1215I with the launching of four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for deep support, and one AD for engine run-in. The CAP, TARCAP and ASP flights were uneventful. The deep support group was assigned to road sweep area three, north of Seoul. The four AD's, assigned to deep support, swept the eastern part of the area. While proceeding north from Kaesong (BT 7833) to Kampo-ri (BT 7833), two freight cars were attacked and destroyed by strafing and four rockets. In the small village of Hulgas-ri (BT 6850), a railroad yard with two or three tracks, two rail cars and an engine were attacked. Four runs were made during which twenty-four rockets hit and badly damaged the tracks, the cars and the engine. Approximately 1,000 yards north of the railroad yard, two camouflaged buildings, about thirty yards wide and seventy-five yards long and built up with sandbags, were attacked with twelve 500 lb bombs and eight rockets. Though two bomb and two rocket hits were noted, the extent of the damage was not observed. However, the nearby village was set on fire as a result of the attack. The planes strafed and fired sixteen rockets into trenches and dugouts on a small hill east of Honchon-ri (BT 6650); one dugout was destroyed by a direct rocket and three others were damaged. Small arms fire was noted in the area, and one F4U was hit in the right wing in the oil cooler by the fire. Eight or nine battered enemy planes were observed on Simnok field, but no other activity was noted. The western side of the sweep was swept by four F4U's. Three horse drawn carts were strafed and about ten people killed at Yontan-ni (YC 4028). Three 500 lb bombs, twenty-four rockets and strafing runs left two railroad engines and three flat cars at Sarinon (YC 4363) heavily damaged. The F4U's struck next at Puyong (BT 7637). Here, two rockets were fired and strafing runs were made upon eight to ten railroad cars in a railroad yard resulting in that being left in flames. The next target for the planes was at Knum-ri (BT 7716), where supplies and six or seven railroad cars were attacked. The targets were strafed and one 500 lb bomb was dropped leaving the supplies smoking and the cars damaged. All of the planes were recovered at 1515I.

The sixth flight, designated event twelve, commenced at 1515I with the launching of four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's and four AD's for Deep Support, and four F4U's for a photo mission and escort. The CAP, TARCAP, and ASP flights were uneventful. The deep support mission was assigned close support targets in the town of Uijongbu (CY 2872).
Continued) The town was the scene of heavy ground fighting and they were directed to area bomb and strafe the city. The flight dropped sixteen bombs, fired eighty rockets and expended about 300 rounds of 20mm and 4800 rounds of 50 caliber. The town was left in flames. One of the F4U's, flown by Ensign Claude C. Howell of VF-24, was shot down near the city. Ensign Howell was seen to parachute free of his plane. The other three planes remained as long as possible to guard the pilot and then landed at Kimpo, since it was too late to return to the ship. The photo flight was assigned a mission of photographing bridges at the following points: 39-40N & 126-35E, one mile south Pakchon 39-42N & 125-35E, two miles west of Yongbyon 39-49N & 125-45E, and Kujang 39-42N & 126-01E. The flight returned along the south bank of the Chonchon River where loaded coal cars were observed in several villages. At Sukchon (39-25N & 125-06E) they strafed and destroyed a railroad motor hand car. Five trucks were also observed under trees along the road two to five miles south of Sukchon (39-23N & 125-26E). All of the planes were recovered, with the exception of the F4U shot down and the three F4U's that landed at Kimpo, at 1830I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
Event One, consisting of one AD for ASP and one F4U for CAP commenced at 0430I and was recovered at 0630I. The flight was uneventful.

Event Four, consisting of four F4U's for Mine Sweep, four F4U's for TARGAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and four F4U's for a photo mission, commenced at 0630I and was recovered at 0930I. The flight was uneventful.

The next flight, designated Event Six, commenced at 0930I with the launching of four F4U's for TARGAP, two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, fifteen F4U's and seven AD's for a strike, and one AD for a test flight. The TARGAP, CAP and ASP were uneventful.

Fifteen F4U's and seven AD's proceeded to the assigned target, an electric power plant and twelve AA positions surrounding the plant, located just east of Pyongyang (YD 4322). Fifteen 500 lb. bombs and one hundred and twenty rockets from the F4U's together with twenty-one 1000 lb. bombs and eighty-four 100 lb. bombs from the AD's were dropped in seven dive bombing runs. All hit the target area. The AA positions were severely damaged or destroyed, an adjoining oil dump was left in flames, and flames and smoke rose several thousand feet into the air from the destroyed power plant.

Upon leaving the target area, what is believed to have been an ammunition dump was strafed by all the planes in the group, but no explosions or flames were observed. Moderate and accurate 20mm and 40mm AA fire was encountered in the area.

One F4U hit with AA on the sixth run made a forced landing just north of Chungwha YD 4305. The pilot, ENS DORRIS of VF-23, made a forced landing and was seen to leave the plane and head for the woods. Later he was forced by sniper fire to return to his plane. Seven F4U's, covering the downed pilot pending the arrival of a helicopter from Kimpo Airfield were later relieved by four F7F's and landed at Kimpo to refuel. ENS DORRIS was picked up about two hours later by land based helicopter and returned to Kimpo airfield. All of the planes, with the exception of seven F4U's and the one F4U shot down, were recovered at 1230I. The seven F4U's detained to guard ENS DORRIS landed aboard at 1830I.

The fourth flight, designated Event Eight, commenced at 1230I with the launching of four F4U's for TARGAP; two AD's for ASP, eight F4U's for CAP, and two F4U's on a photo mission. The CAP, TARGAP, and ASP flights were uneventful.
At Tosan (CT 1240), the photo flight observed two to three hundred personnel appearing to be UN prisoners of war at a ferry heading west. Most of the group, who had already crossed, were in a rough military formation about four abreast. When the planes made a low pass, they did not disperse but waved their arms and white flags. They were dressed in what appeared to be marine green field uniforms; some wore undershirts and others were stripped to the waist. Most of the personnel appeared to be Filippinos or Hawaiians. No guards were observed but the pilots believed they saw several of the group take cover in the undergrowth when the planes first appeared. It is felt that the group may be those prisoners of war reported evacuated from Seoul before its occupation by United Nations forces.

The fifth flight, designated Event Ten, commenced at 1530I with the launching of four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's eight F4U's for CAP, and one AD for a test flight. The CAP and the ASP flights were uneventful. The F4U's assigned to TARCAP left their orbit point and proceeded to Heiju, north to Anak and on to Onjong-ni where ten trucks were reported to be in the area. All of the roads were searched but no trucks were found. However, six carts were strafed and set fire in that area.

Later, a camouflaged building was attacked, strafed and left burning on the western edge on Onjong-ni.

Another building on the southern edge of Anak was set on fire from strafing. All of the planes were covered at 1830I.

The sixth flight, designated Event Twelve, commenced at 1815I with the launching of one F4U for CAP and one AD for ASP. The flight was uneventful and the planes were recovered at 2115I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 2 OCTOBER 1950

The first flight, designated Event Four, commenced at 0630 with the launching of eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's for MINE SWEPEP, four F4U's for TARCAP, two AD's for ASF, one AD for a ferry flight to Kimpo, one F4U ferry to the Philippine Sea, and one AD for an engine run-in. All of the flights were uneventful and all planes were recovered at 0930.

The second flight, designated Event Six, commenced at 0930 with the launching of eight F4U's for CAP, four TARCAF, two AD's for ASP for ASF, and two F4U's for a photo mission. All of the flights were uneventful and all were recovered at 1230.

The third flight, designated Event Eight, commenced at 1230 with the launching of eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's for TARCAP, seven F4U and seven AD's for a strike, and two F4U's for a photo mission. The CAP, TARCAP, and photo flights were uneventful.

Each AD assigned to the strike carried twelve 100 lb. bombs with instantaneous fuses and three 100 lb. bombs with 4-5 second delay fuses. Each F4U assigned to the strike carried one 500 lb. instantaneous fused bomb and eight 5" rockets. The mission of the strike was to attack the railroad bridge at Sinanju. The secondary target was the highway bridge at Sinanju.

At approximately 1420 the seven F4U's strafed and rocketed three 20mm positions at the south end of the railroad bridge, while the seven AD's made a low level attack on the bridge, dropping 1000 lb. bombs. The AD's made two additional bombing runs while the F4U's dive-bombed with 500 lb. bombs. The attack resulted in eight direct 1000 lb. bomb hits which left the bridge severely damaged, though all spans were left standing.

Approximately ten minutes after the attack the photo plane recorded the damage made by the attacks. All of the planes were recovered at 1530. One F4U sustained major damage as a result of striking a barrier stanchion.

The last flight of the day, designated Event Ten, commenced at 1530 with the launching of eight F4U's for CAP, four F4U's for TARCAP, and two F4U's for a photo mission. All of the flights were uneventful.

Upon recovery of all aircraft at 1830, the BOXER left formation and set course for Yokosuka to go in dry dock for temporary repairs.

ENCLOSURE (2)
It is felt that the solution to the problem of destroying well constructed bridges has not been found. Direct hits on a narrow bridge are difficult to obtain at the release altitude required by dive bombing with instantaneous or non-delay fused 1000 lb. bombs, while delayed action bombs, as shown by this attack, do not produce the desired results. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
TABULATION OF SORTIES AND HOURS FLOWN

15 September thru 2 October 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plane</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>3429.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>1225.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H03S</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4720.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sorties over Korean Targets: 882
Sorties (Total): 1346
TABULATED DATA

A. Ammunition expended 15 September thru 2 October 1950

Bombs:

General purpose bombs - - - - - - 266.75 tons
NAPALM (MK-12) - - - - - - - - - - 181

Rockets:

HVAR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4544
SMOKE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24

AMMO:

20mm - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 32,300 rds
50cal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 207,750

B. Number of hours flown

F4U-4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3429.9
AD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1225.5
HO3S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 65.0
TOTAL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4720.4

ENCLOSURE (3B)
SCORE OF DAMAGE INFLECTED AGAINST KOREAN TARGETS BY CARRIER AIR GROUP TWO DURING PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER THRU 2 OCTOBER 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>PROBABLY DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Cars</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Tank Cars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Tender</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Handcars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Roundhouse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Ore Cars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Freight Cars</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Flat Cars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight Yards</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Yards</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Cars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Tunnels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Bridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Shop, Multiple Roof</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Power Plant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dugouts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Drum Dump</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Storage Tank (Underground)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Tunnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hut</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm Emplacement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pill Boxes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Dump</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Dump</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunboats</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge Approach</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA Emplacements</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (4A)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>PROBABLY DESTROYED</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun But Trenches</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Drawn Carts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (When actual target of strafing and bombing runs)</td>
<td>360 killed or wounded.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MATERIAL DAMAGE

A. Self.

(1) 2 F4U-4B lost when forced down due to enemy AA action.
(2) 2 AD-4 lost when forced down due to enemy AA action.
(3) 1 F4U-4 lost by running into own rocket blast over Inchon.
(4) 5 F4U-4 operational losses by following causes:
   (a) 2 F4U by loss of power on take-off.
   (b) 2 F4U attempted landing on board. One over side other side other sustained strike damage to fuselage due to hard landing.
   (c) 1 F4U spun in on approach to carrier landing.
(5) 10 other aircraft received minor repairable damage for light and medium AA fire.

ENCLOSURE (4B)
PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

A. Enemy.

Unknown

B. Own

1. LTJG, C. E. SEEMAN, 0378906/1310, USN missing. Plane forced down and crashed and burned on September 20, 1950, 3 miles west of Koesung, Korea.

2. ENS. C. C. HOWELL, 0445669/1310, USN parachuted from aircraft after being hit by AA. Pilot observed on ground 10 miles north of Seoul, Korea September 29, 1950. Killed while prisoner of war.

3. LTJG, F. (n) SMITH Jr. 0447929/1310, USN, lost at sea as result of crash attempted carrier landing on September 19, 1950.
From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO  
To: Commanding Officer, USS BOXER (CV-21)  
Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950  
Encl: (1) Organization  
(2) Narrative of Operations  
(3) Tabulation of Sorties and Hours Flown  
(4) Material Damage  
(a) Enemy  
(b) Own  
(5) Personnel Casualties, Enemy and Own  

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group TWO for the period 15-22 October 1950, required by reference (a), is forwarded for inclusion in the report of USS BOXER (CV-21).  

2. Operations against North Korean invasion forces and in support of United Nations forces advancing in North Korea were conducted by Carrier Air Group TWO on 15, 16, 18, 20, 21 and 22 October as directed by ComCarDiv ONE (CTF-77) OpOrder 3-50. Operations in general were hampered by poor weather and paucity of targets.  

3. Comment and Recommendations:  

(a) Air Operations.  

(1) The requirement that all air operations commence exactly at the scheduled time appears to be an artificiality which tends to prolong time into the wind. On many occasions the task force would have been turned into the wind and have enough wind over the deck to start launching aircraft a good five minutes prior to scheduled launching time. All hands would then wait until that scheduled time before they were allowed to launch. During the last war the idea that time into the wind be kept to a minimum was so closely adhered to that almost all carriers would prepare for catapulting the first few planes in the launch so that they could start launching even before the wind line was reached. It is believed that this practice is well worth keeping and that the ships of the task force should be free to commence either launching or landing for a scheduled event as soon as they consider local conditions suitable.  

(2) The method of breaking up a group and landing it aboard a carrier of a task group as laid down in USF 4 is unwieldy, impractical and well-nigh impossible to use. After many attempts to use it, following all its precepts faithfully, all groups of the Atlantic Fleet, strongly supported by the Carrier Division Commanders, have urged against its use and have recommended various revisions or other methods to replace it. To date, no action has been apparent to replace it. It is believed that with the reappearance of three and four carrier task groups, the problem will again be some urgent and that positive steps should be taken to remove from USF 4 this cumbersome method. Its major defect is that it commits too many single aircraft to the approach circle and gives them no definite place to go on wave-offs. It also makes no concession to the fact that with only two carriers in the formation there is no congestion using the
"old fashioned" break-up, and puts both carrier groups in a most disadvantageous position. It is a system which lends itself beautifully to illustrative diagrams in a text book but is impossibly cumbersome when used by aircraft flying around a carrier.

In its place could be substituted a very simple break-up. Altitudes for the various circles are the same. All circles are centered on the median of the carrier's sector. The radii of the circles become progressively smaller as they become lower. They are all tangent to the carrier and no aircraft is to go inside the carrier station circle except in the approach to a landing. If the pilots are thoroughly briefed on the inflexible rule that in the upwind leg they must give room to the other carriers, there will be no interference. While there will always be occasions when individual pilots violate this rule, that problem can be beaten by training and air discipline. It can never be beaten by devising a system which is so complex that few of the junior pilots can ever even understand it.

(3) The flights scheduled were in general too short for the proper and thorough accomplishment of the mission assigned. The Corsairs could easily have flown a four hour flight since they carried one full external tank on all flights. The AD's could have flown a three and one-half hour flight loaded as they were. As the operation was originally set up, strike flights were required to check in with a ship in the Wonsan area prior to proceeding on their assigned mission. This necessitated a leg of one hundred to one hundred twenty miles practically due west. Then upon being released to continue on mission assigned, the flight would have to turn North and fly anywhere from sixty to one hundred miles to get to his objective. The same trip was required in reverse on the return. This was changed when operations started to allow the strike flights to proceed direct to their target areas. Even so, the time allowed over the target was not sufficient. In all cases there was a heavy bomb target given as primary target followed by a road sweep. Covering the road sweep normally took about half an hour just to fly over the route. Any time spent in investigating possible targets and attacking targets found must be added to this time. The launching and rendezvous time was normally fifteen minutes. The Task Force was operating in the neighborhood of one hundred miles from the target area. The run in took about forty-five minutes. The return in a light condition normally took about thirty-five minutes. This left about one hour and twenty-five minutes in the target area. Since this was insufficient time to do the job thoroughly and with precision the only alternative would be to increase the length of the flights.

(4) It is recommended that the recognition turn for flights returning with radio contact be eliminated when a flight has been in radio communication with the force for some time and his position has been checked with radar there appears to be very little use for this maneuver unless the TGCCG needs it for some positive identification. If that is the case he can order a maneuver at the time and it would be better if it were not some standard move that all aircraft were to make on that day. In the case of aircraft not in radio communication with the force, the maneuver should be retained but as a visual signal to be made as soon as the force is in sight.

(b) Tactics.

(1) Flights scheduled for road sweeps should be limited to four aircraft. Any more are too many to handle. This type of flight required that the aircraft be spread out and radio chatter is a must. Multiplying the number of aircraft involved multiplies all the difficulties attendant upon such a flight. It is recommended that in the future road sweeps be conducted by four fighter aircraft loaded with rockets and machine gun ammunition and that all aircraft with heavy loads be assigned definite targets with order of priority.

(c) Anti-Submarine Patrol.

(1) The lack of sonobuoys for VA aircraft greatly reduced the potential effectiveness of the hunter-killer unit.
(2) VA(S) configured aircraft are considered necessary for effective night operations. The range and sensitivity of the APS-82A radar pick up so many targets that it is impracticable for the surface craft to leave their screening stations to investigate. They could only be investigated by properly equipped aircraft.

(3) To increase further the effectiveness of ASW operations it is recommended that hunter-killer teams train as a unit prior to deployment to a ship-based air group.

(4) Since efficiency of the radar operator is greatly reduced after two hours of constant operation, flights should be limited to three hours duration if practicable.

(d) Aircraft Ordnance.

(1) This air group has advocated the fifty-caliber installation of the F4U-4 aircraft as an excellent weapon. In order to clarify, the following is submitted. The pilots feel that in the particular action in which they have been using this installation it is highly satisfactory. Against personnel, light buildings and vehicles it is probably superior to the twenty millimeter installation owing to the greater saturation. However, as a general strafing and anti-aircraft weapon, against lightly armored vehicles, other aircraft, and ships, the twenty millimeter installation is considered superior.

(2) It is strongly recommended that the AD-4 aircraft should be equipped with four twenty millimeter guns in lieu of the present two. With those guns, the AD would equal the F4U as a fighter aircraft. Its strafing performance would also be greatly improved.

(e) Communications.

(1) While it was most gratifying to have a separate radio channel assigned each ship for use as a launch/land frequency, it is not believed that such a luxury could be afforded in a real war with several task groups operating in close proximity. It is realized that this practice grew up in the years since the war ended, in an effort to make carrier work even safer. To do is right and proper. However, no attempt should be made to change the doctrine governing assignment of radio frequencies in war to cover this situation. The launch/land frequency can be eliminated whenever need dictates during war.

(f) Air Intelligence.

(1) Non-flying Air Intelligence officers are needed badly at the squadron and group level. It is noted that CNO has given each squadron an allowance to cover this need.

(2) Since photo configured aircraft are so scarce and it appears that only a few such specialized aircraft could ever be assigned to a carrier, it is recommended that a modification be designed for standard VF and VA aircraft somewhat similar to that in the TBM and F6F in the last war. Then it should be possible to have at least one plane on each strike which could take photos good enough for damage assessment and for each unit intelligence purposes. At present the VF(P) aircraft are solely for the use of the flag and are used to take pictures as ordered by the Task Force Commander for broader purposes.

(g) Personnel.

The latest allowance lists have taken care of the major shortages except that of about thirty percent more ordnancemen being needed in VA squadrons. This need still exists.
Material Discrepancies.

(1) F4U-4. It is recommended that the RB-19 spark plug be designated as the preferred spark plug for use in the R2800-42W engine. The aircraft have held up remarkably well considering their advanced age, both literally and in design. They are certainly a tribute to Chance Vought Aircraft.

(2) F4U-5P.

(a) While most photography was for vertical coverage, it was necessary to employ two photo aircraft on one flight to achieve both vertical and oblique photography owing to the inoperative condition of the rotating mount.

(b) A view finder would eliminate duplication and wasted time by giving more precision in the coverage of assigned target area.

(c) The equipment now being used has not progressed with the speed of modern photo aircraft. The cycling speeds of presently used cameras dictate airspeeds so low that it is necessary to use flaps in order to keep the camera axis level. By decreasing cycling time, better runs could be made over dangerous targets with greater safety for pilots and aircraft.

(3) Ordnance.

(a) The Mark 8 Mod 2 shackle has given no trouble on the Corsairs. Adapters should be made available for use with the rocket launchers (Mark 5 Mod 4) on the F4U-4 so that 100# and 220# bombs can be carried as an alternate load.

(b) In both the F4U-4 and the AD-4 a system should be installed for positive mechanical jettisoning of the rocket launchers. At the end of the last war a dangerous situation existed because unfired and unjettisonable rockets were being brought back and landed aboard carriers. This situation still exists. While no personnel or material casualties resulted from this cause during this cruise, the fact remains that it is potentially very dangerous. A five inch rocket catapulting up the deck after an arrested landing toward the people and aircraft spotted forward cannot be ignored and must be considered an unacceptable risk.
ComCVG-2
13 Aircraft
22 Pilots

Commander D. W. White
1 AD-4Q
3 AD-4N
3 AD-4W
3 F4U-5N
2 F4U-5F
1 HC-3S

VF-64

Commander R. W. Rynd
16 F4U-4
23 Pilots

VF-63

Lieutenant Commander T. J. Ball
16 F4U-4
21 Pilots

VF-23

Lieutenant Commander C. E. Russell
16 F4U-4
22 Pilots

VF-24

Lieutenant Commander E. R. Coffman
16 F4U-4
22 Pilots

VJ-65

Commander R. W. Phillips
16 AD-4
23 Pilots

Note: Figures reflect numbers of flyable aircraft and qualified pilots available at commencement of operations.
Flight operations commenced at 0800 with the launching of 1 F4U-5P and 1 F4U escort plus a strike group of 20 F4U's and 7 AD's. This group attacked a bridge at CI7905, another at 5192CV and the Eastern side of Sin-do island with 1000 lb GP bombs, 500 lb GP bombs, 5" HVAR's and M5APL. They also strafed the general area. The bridge at CI5309 was severely damaged, while the bridge at CV91-90T received many close misses and was believed damaged. Sin-do Island was severely hit with HVAR's, M5APL, and strafing. Six gun emplacements and many entrenchments were hit. A bridge west of the Choshin Reservoir was visibly shattered, about 60% damaged. The flight was recovered at 1120I.

The second flight was launched at 1100I consisting of 1 F4U-5P and escort, 9 F4U's on a road sweep from Kosen to Fusan Reservoir and a strike group of 7 AD's and 12 F4U's. The road sweep attacked 4 trucks at CV6155 and CV7145 plus a supply dump at CV7243 with HVAR's, M5APL and 50 Cal. Two trucks were destroyed, the other two damaged. Two railroad cars were destroyed, 8 damaged, and supplies and stores left burning. The strike group destroyed a bridge at CV8290 and damaged a bridge at CV7975. A locomotive at CV8039 was damaged by HVAR's and strafing. The flight was recovered at 1415I.

The third flight commenced at 1400I with the launching of 1 F4U-5P and escort, a strike group consisting of 12 F4U's and 8 AD's plus a fighter sweep of 11 F4U's. The fighter sweep hit bridges at CV91-36 and CV12-43 with 500 lb GP bombs HVAR's and M5APL. Near misses on both bridges with holes resulting in highways plus one large factory and adjacent building burned out were reported. The strike group hit bridges at DV2433, DV5427, DV9535 and smaller bridges in the area. There was extensive damage on DV4547 and a direct hit on DV0535 with a 500 lb GP, while moderate damage was reported on DV2433 with 1000 lb GP bombs. Three small bridges between DV2431 and DV2447 received damage. All planes were recovered at 1715I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
Flight operations commenced at 0830 with the launching of 1 AD-4N and 1 AD-4N as ASP, 1 F4U-5P and 1 F4U as Photo Hop plus 4 F4U's as CAP. At 09301, 8 F4U's were launched as TARCAP also a strike group of 5 F4U's and 8 AD's. The weather was such that the strike group was unable to reach any targets and all the planes were recovered at 17301.

At 15301 4 F4U's were launched as CAP and 1 AD-4N with 1 VAN as ASP. All aircraft were recovered at 17451.

At 20301 2 VAN and 1 AD-4Q were launched to be recovered by the VALLEY FORGE at 24011. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.

Flight operations commenced at 10301 with the launching of 1 AD-4N and 1 AD-4N as ASP, 8 F4U's were launched as CAP. The strike group consisted of 7 F4U's and 8 AD's. Attacking bridges and road targets in the Yongchong-Dong and Chosen reservoir area with 1000 and 500 lb GP's and HVAR's the strike group damaged a bridge at CV5482 and struck a bridge at CV5387 causing heavy damage making it impassable. A bridge at CV54176 was hit on the Northern approach with a 500 lb GP. The flight was recovered at 18301.

The second flight of the day was launched at 10301. It consisted of a Photo plane and escort on a photo mission, a AD-4N and AD-4W on an ASP flight, an eight plane F4U CAP flight, four F4U on TARCAP plus a strike group consisting of 8 F4U's and 8 AD's.

The strike group was loaded with 1000, 500 and 100 lb GP bombs and HVAR's. A railroad bridge at DV9176 East of Tanchon was hit with four 1000 lb GP's and eight 500 lb GP's and many damaging misses. It was heavily damaged. A gun emplacement at DV5843 3 miles south of Pyongji, was hit with five 100 lb GP's and 12 HVAR's causing approximately twenty casualties and completely destroying the emplacement. A railroad bridge at DV9078 took a direct hit from a 500 lb GP and one span was dropped. Fifteen horse-drawn carts were hit with HVAR's and strafing, ten were destroyed and five damaged. Three gun emplacements at DV9378 and four at DV5284 were strafed and rocketed with light damage. This flight was recovered at 19001.

The third flight was launched at 13001 and consisted of a photo mission, 1 F4U-5P plus 1 F4U-5 escort, a CAP flight of 8 F4U's, a TARCAP of four F4U's, and a strike group of 12 F4U's and 8 AD's. A bridge at EA-6169 received two direct hits and 3 near misses from 500 GP's causing a thirty foot length to be knocked out. A bridge at EA9584 received one direct hit from a 500 lb GP causing one span to be dropped. At DA9269 a railroad yard was hit by 8 HVAR's but damage was undetermined. Another yard at DA9799 was hit by a 500 lb GP and railroad intersection tracks torn up. Tracks and undetermined number of box cars were hit with one 500 lb GP and 8 HVAR's at EA8886. Two trucks at EA3589 were destroyed by 2 HVAR's and strafing. A truck was...
strafed at EA2541 with many hits. Another truck was strafed at EA2632 with many hits. Four HVAR's were placed in a tunnel at EA2541. The tracks were damaged and white steam emitted from the tunnel. A highway bridge at EA5686 was hit with one 500 lb GP and sustained three holes from near misses of 1000 lb GP bombs, causing minor damage. The railroad yards at Sindongni (EA1453) was hit with many HVAR's, damaging a locomotive and thirty railroad cars. The flight was recovered at 1540I.

The fourth flight consisted of 6 F4U's on CAP and 4 F4U's on TARCAP. They were recovered at 1745I.

The fifth flight was launched at 1740I consisting of F4U-5N's on DADCAP, 2 AD-4N's on NIGHT Intruder missions and one AD-4N on AEW. Nothing of importance was reported and the flight was recovered at 2050I.

The final night flight was launched at 2400I consisting of 1 AD-4W and 2 F4U-5N's. Nothing of importance was reported and all aircraft were recovered at 0310I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 20 OCTOBER

The first launch at 0815I this date was an ASP and weather flight by 1 AD-4N and 1 AD-4W. They reported nothing of importance and were recovered at 1154I.

The second launch at 1010I consisted of 1 AD-4N and 1 F4U-5N for Itazuke with a passenger.

The third flight launched at 1115I consisting of one ASP mission of 1 AD-4W and 1 AD plus a CAP hop of 7 F4U's. They were recovered at 1450I.

The fourth launch at 1430I was an ASP flight of 1 AD-4N and 1 AD, and an eight plane CAP. All planes were recovered at 1745I although 6 planes were sent to the VALLEY FORGE because of a barrier crash on the BOXER and ensuing darkness. The plane was a strike but the pilot was unharm'd. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.

ACTION REPORT 21 OCTOBER

The first launch at 0630I consisted of one ASP mission with 1 AD-4I and 1 AD-4W plus 6 F4U's on CAP. This flight plus our planes that landed on the VALLEY FORGE the night before were recovered at 0945I.

The second launch consisted of 8 F4U's on CAP and 1 AD-4W plus 1 AD-4N on ASP. Nothing of importance was reported and all planes were recovered at 1230I.

The third flight launched consisted of 1 AD-4W for AEW and 2 F4U-5F for DADCAP. It launched at 2050I and was recovered at 2300I. Nothing of importance was reported and no enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
The first flight launched at 0415I. It consisted of 2 AD-4N's for DADCAP and 1 AD4W on AEW missions. Nothing of importance was reported and the flight was recovered at 0640I.

The second flight launched at 0630I and consisted of 1 AD-4W and 1 AD on ASP, a CAP of 7 F4U's and a strike group of 12 F4U's and 8 AD's. This flight went on a road sweep, hitting fishing boats at Songjin (Ev1703 with HVAR's and ammo, two boats were sunk and others damaged. A bridge at DV88-83 was hit by two 500 lb GP and one treatle knocked out. A bridge at DV87-96 received one hit and 4 near misses from 500 lb GP bombs. At Pyongyang, DV8778, a railroad bridge was hit with HVAR's and one 500 lb bomb. The bridge listed as damaged. A railroad bridge at EV1392 was destroyed by four hits and 7 near misses with 500lb bombs. Ten railroad cars at DV8278 were strafed with 20MM cannon and damaged. A highway bridge at DV6764 was hit with 23 HVAR's and heavily damaged. The planes on this launch were recovered at 0930I. One AD struck the harrier with minor damage, the pilot was not hurt.

The third launch at 0930I was for aircraft being transferred: 2 F4U-5P's, 7 AD4's, 1 F4U4 to the PHILIPPINE SEA; 2 AD4's, 1 AD4Q and 1 HO33 to the VALLEY FORGE; 1 F4U-5F, 1 F4U4 and AD4's to the LEYTE at 1000I recovered 2 VA and 1 AD4N.

The BOXER left the formation at about 1200I and set course for Sasebo, Japan.

Our final launch at 1528I was on ASP hop of 1 AD4W and 1 AD4N which was recovered at 1735I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
TABULATION OF SORTIES AND HOURS FLOWN

15 - 22 October 1950.

**Sorties:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hours Flown:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F4U</td>
<td>747.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>278.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCS</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1045.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ammunition Expended:**

- **Bombs:**
  - General Purpose: 662 tons
  - Fragmentation: 2.2 Tons
  - Napoleon (Mk 12 and/or 1000 lb WRF): 35

- **Rockets:**
  - Five inch HVAR: 1573

**Ammunition:**

- 20 mm: 6509 rds.
- .50 cal: 58995 rds.
MATERIAL DAMAGE.

Damage to enemy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NH and RR Bridges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR Cars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hored Carts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Damp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshalling Yards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Damage to self:

(1) 1 F4U-4 received damage from enemy small arms fire resulting in engine and engine mount change.

(2) 2 F4U-4 received minor damage, one from rocket blast and one from bomb blast.

(3) 2 F4U-4 operational losses, one from engine failure during carrier approach, cause undetermined, and the other from strike damage caused by hard landing and subsequent barrier crash.

(4) 1 AD-4 operational loss from night landing and barrier crash. Strike recommended.

(5) 2 AD-4 received minor damage, repairs on board, caused by barrier crashes.

ENCLOSURE (4)
From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO for period 1 August 1952 through 11 August 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction No. 3480.4

Encl: 1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the Action Report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comments and recommendations are presented under the headings indicated below:

   I  Mission and Composition
   II  Chronology
   III  Ordnance
   IV  Damage
       A  Inflicted on the Enemy
       B  Aircraft Damage
   V  Personnel Performance

A. L. Downing
PART I MISSION AND COMPOSITION

a. Departed Yokosuka 1 Aug 1952, Carrier Air Group T.XO, embarked in the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), proceeded to the area off the east coast of Korea and reported to Commander Task Force SOW TY-SVEN. Operating under CTF-77 Operations Order No. 22-51 (second revision), and in accordance with the Daily Air Plan promulgated by Commander Carrier Division THIRTEEN, the mission of the Group was to perform interdiction flights consisting of -strikes, armed reconnaissance flights and heckler flights directed primarily against North Korean supply routes including railroad track and equipment, bridges, highways and supply areas. Defensive missions included CAP and ASP.

b. Composition of the Air Group

(see table on next page)
PART II CHRONOLOGY

1 August 1952 - Departed NOB Yokosuka.

2 August 1952 - Enroute to Korean Theater of Operation.

3 August 1952 - Conducted Group tactics and training enroute to Korean Theater of operation. Sixty-six (66) sorties included sixty (60) group tactics, two (2) slow time and four (4) ASP.

4 August 1952 - Joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. No air operations due to replenishment.

5 August 1952 - Seventy (70) tons of ordnance was dropped by one hundred and eighteen (118) sorties including armed recce, strikes, NAP, photo and others. Targets were interdiction targets on railroad and supplies and billeting areas south of Wonsan.

6 August 1952 - Six (6) armed recce and four (4) ASP sorties were launched in the early morning. A serious fire on the hangar deck of the USS BOXER curtailed further operations. In addition to the loss of aircraft and equipment, the following listed personnel of the Air Group were killed in the fire: LT James E. SHROPSHIRE, Jr., Flight Surgeon of Air Group TWO; SODEN, D. G., AT2, VO-35 Detachment "Able"; CANALES, I. (n), AA, VA-65; TAYLOR, R. S., RN, VF-24; CONGER, V. L., FN3, VF-64; WARK, J. R., HM3, VF-64, and DURD ETT E, W. D., AT3, VO-35 Detachment "Able".

7 August 1952 - No air operations due to damage caused by fire.

8 August 1952 - Replenished at sea with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and departed for NOB Yokosuka.

9 August 1952 - Enroute to NOB Yokosuka.

10 August 1952 - Enroute to NOB Yokosuka.

11 August 1952 - Arrived NOB Yokosuka for repair of ship and availability.
### SUMMARY OF SORTIES BY DATE AND TYPE

1 August to 11 August 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Sorts</th>
<th>Aborts</th>
<th>Day Night</th>
<th>Sorts Photo</th>
<th>Armed Strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/ 1/52</td>
<td>Departed NOB Yokosuka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 2/52</td>
<td>Enroute to Korean Waters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 3/52</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 4/52</td>
<td>Joined Task Force and Replenishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 5/52</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 6/52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 7/52</td>
<td>No flight operations due to fire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 8/52</td>
<td>Replenishment and departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN for NOB Yokosuka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/ 9/52</td>
<td>Enroute to NOB Yokosuka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10/52</td>
<td>Enroute to NOB Yokosuka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/11/52</td>
<td>Arrived NOB Yokosuka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "other" column includes slow line, test flights, courier flights, training flights and weather recco.
SUMMARY OF sorties flown on 1 August and 11 August 1952
BY AIRCRAFT TYPE AND OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE AND OTHER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>FAI</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>194</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others include training flights, courier flights, test flights, and slow times.
D. Aircraft Damage

1. Combat damage to Air Group TWO aircraft from 1 August 1952 to 11 August 1952.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type A/C</th>
<th>Bureau Number</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Time Out Of Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/5/52</td>
<td>VF-34</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>51825</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>6 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/5/52</td>
<td>VC-35</td>
<td>AD-4N</td>
<td>124143</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>6 Hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Operational damage to Air Group TWO Aircraft from 1 August 1952 to 11 August 1952.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type A/C</th>
<th>Bureau Number</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Time Out Of Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/5/52</td>
<td>VA-65</td>
<td>AD-4</td>
<td>123249</td>
<td>Carrier Crash</td>
<td>8 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/5/52</td>
<td>VA-65</td>
<td>AD-A</td>
<td>127862</td>
<td>Hit Gun Mount</td>
<td>10 Hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Aircraft damaged beyond repair aboard ship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type A/C</th>
<th>Bureau Number</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VF-24</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>123025</td>
<td>Badly burned by fire and soaked with salt water. Strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VF-24</td>
<td>F9F-2</td>
<td>127163</td>
<td>Nose and wings burned and soaked with salt water. Strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>F9F-2P</td>
<td>123706</td>
<td>Burned, soaked with salt water and shrapnel damage. Overhaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VC-61</td>
<td>F9F-2P</td>
<td>123711</td>
<td>Burned, soaked with salt water and shrapnel damage. Overhaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>123181</td>
<td>Damage by intense heat and salt water. Overhaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5N</td>
<td>124517</td>
<td>Badly burned by fire and soaked with salt water. Strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/6/52</td>
<td>VF-63</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>80999</td>
<td>Salt water damage. Overhaul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Aircraft Lost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>TYPE A/C</th>
<th>DRILL</th>
<th>CAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-6-52</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>96022</td>
<td></td>
<td>Destroyed by hangar deck fire and jettisoned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-6-52</td>
<td>VF-24</td>
<td>123069</td>
<td></td>
<td>Destroyed by hangar deck fire and jettisoned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Aircraft Damage, Statistical Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>P27</th>
<th>P4U</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/C Lost (Combat)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Lost (Combat)/100 Sorties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Lost (Operational)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*A/C Lost (Operational)/100 Sorties</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total A/C Lost</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Total A/C Lost/100 Sorties</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Damaged by AA (includes A/C lost)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Damaged by AA/100 Sorties</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NOTE: These tabulations based on total sorties. Other tabulations based upon offensive sorties only.
PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

A. Air Group personnel performed in an outstanding manner both in action against the enemy and in fighting fire aboard ship. Morale was excellent.

B. Casualties

1. The Air Group flight surgeon and six enlisted men were killed as a result of fire and explosion aboard ship.

   a. LT SHROPSHIRE - Died while attempting to save 2 Corpmen who were trapped in Flight Surgeon's Office.

   b. TAYLOR, R. S., RN - Died as a result of being trapped in the Flight Surgeon's Office.

   c. MARK, J. V., HM3 - Died as a result of being trapped in the Flight Surgeon's Office with TAYLOR, above.

   d. CONGER, V. L., MT3 - Died in the attempt to save other men's lives.

   e. CANALES, L. (n), AA - Died in the attempt to save other men's lives with CONGER, above.

   d. DURDAN, W. S., AT3 - Died from suffocation in Aircrowns' compartment.

   e. SCOBIE, D. G., AT2 - Died from suffocation in Aircrowns' compartment.
DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CNO (2 Advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 Advance)
CINCPACFLT EVAL GROUP
COMNAVFE (1 Advance)
COMNAVFE EVAL GROUP
CONEVENTHFLT (1 Advance)
CTF-77 (1 Advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSEVPAC
COMFAIRLAMEDA
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9)
U.S.S. Kearsarge (CV-33)
U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
U.S.S. ORISKANY (CV-34)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
U.S.S. SHANGRI-LA (CV-38)
U.S.S. TARA (CV-40)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
U.S.S. WASP (CV-18)
U.S.S. CORREGIDOR (CVE-58)
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
U.S.S. CABOT (CVL-28)
U.S.S. SAIPAN (CVL-48)
COMCARDIV-1
COMCARDIV-2
COMCARDIV-3
COMCARDIV-4
COMCARDIV-5
COMCARDIV-6
COMCARDIV-14
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-16
COMCARDIV-17
COMCARDIV-18
CVG-1
CVG-2
CVG-3
CVG-4
CVG-5
CVG-6
CVG-7
CVG-8
CVG-9

CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-17
CVG-19
CVG-101
CVG-102
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
VC-3
VC-11
VC-35