SUBJECT: Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine

TO: Commandant, The Army War College

1. Transmitted herewith are 2 copies of document subject as above.

2. The attached document is presented as a guide in an attempt to point out techniques and tactics used by the enemy as evidenced by a year's experience in Korea.

3. While it is not believed that the attached booklet could possibly set forth the dogma of the enemy, it is believed that the information set forth therein is factually correct insofar as possible.

4. Any comments concerning this publication will be greatly appreciated.

5. This letter may be declassified when detached from attached document.

Incls:
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UNCLASSIFIED
The following group of studies is a compilation of articles some of which were previously published in Periodic Intelligence Reports of IX Corps and some of which are being published for the first time. The individual works are a result of the collection of information from all sources. Where possible, intensive interrogations of prisoners of war were conducted in order to determine, first hand, the actual tactics practiced and doctrine followed rather than to rely wholly upon captured documents, the contents of which, in many cases, are not adhered to.

While new weapons have been added to their armies, the cardinal principles of warfare as laid down in SUN Tzu's "Art of War", published in 510 BC, still constitute the fundamental doctrine of the oriental field commander. Where the enemy lacks fire power he attempts to gain superiority by massing his manpower; where the enemy must gain surprise to achieve success, he creates surprise by attacking across the most inaccessible terrain; where the enemy needs maneuverability he subjects his troops to grueling forced marches. Throughout these studies it is apparent that, in true Communist fashion, the end always justifies the means. Weapons and other equipment are valued above manpower—time is bountiful.

It is not intended that the contents of this pamphlet be considered the dogma of the CCF and NK armies, but rather it has been attempted to set forth a pattern or trend of enemy tactics. These tactics, having been used successfully, will more than likely continue to be used by the enemy.

The amount of information used in these studies was made possible by the cooperation of the 206th CIC Detachment and the 82nd MP Platoon.

John E. Moor
Colonel, CCF
Chief of S, G-2
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This chart and table of equipment represents a composite picture of the Chinese Communist infantry regiment fighting in Korea and was derived from prisoners of war. Interrogation reveals that a wide variety of organization and equipment exists from regiment to regiment of the same division and from battalions of the same regiment. In each case, the organization is based primarily on the number of weapons available per one unit, and empty figures represent approximate distribution. The battalion total does not include regimental service units.
Chinese Communist Infantry Regiment fighting in Korea and was derived from interrogation of Chinese equipment exists from regiment to regiment of the same division and from battalion to battalion of equipment of weapons available. Figures in parentheses are units per regiment; slanted figures are totals in total does not include regimental service units.
CHAPTER I
SECTION A

UNCLASSIFIED

CCF FORMATIONS

I - Chinese Communist Prisoners of War have stated, and captured documents have revealed, that the following basic tactical formations are taught during the training of the CCF soldier. However, the same PWs readily admit that these formations are rarely used in Korea. United Nations ground action experience in the past bears out these PW statements. But very plausible explanations have been advanced for the discarding of these formations. The first is the lack of training received by the CCF soldier before he is committed to action, and secondly the problems of control that arise from this deficiency. It has been found that the CCF extensively employs a single file formation to facilitate controlling units. This applies not only to the smaller units, but to battalions, and in some instances to the regiment.

II - The formations advocated by the CCF are:

A. Squad Leaders Left Triangle:

```
            X (Sqd Ldr)  
            o      o      o
            o      o      o
            o      o      o
36 - 64 paces
```

42 - 48 paces

B. Squad Leaders Right Triangle:

```
            X (Sqd Ldr)  
            o      o      o
            o      o      o
            o      o      o
54 - 64 paces
```

42 - 48 paces

C. Rear Triangle:

```
            X (Sqd Ldr)  
            26 - 32 paces
```

15 paces

UNCLASSIFIED
It has been established that the enemy, both Chinese Communist and North Korean, moves primarily during the hours of darkness. During daylight the enemy favors caves, tunnels, blown-up bridges, wooded areas and valleys for shelter and concealment. Often they will bivouac near small villages along the route of march, staying generally within 300 - 500 yards of roads and trails. Troops are assembled by means of bugle and whistle signals. At dusk it is customary for both the CCF and the KPA to leave shelters and enter villages and farmhouses to eat, and if discovered at this time by friendly air, the enemy has a tendency to attempt to hide in the houses, or wash up where they are rather than disperse. When in bivouac during the day, in order that their positions will remain undetected, the enemy has been taught not to fire unnecessarily on UN patrols.

II - ROUTES

An enemy movement will commence immediately after dark and will continue until shortly before first light. During these night movements the Chinese and North Korean armies occasionally utilize main roads, but more often they will travel along secondary roads and trails. Aircraft spotters, stationed on the high ground along the route of march, fire a warning rifle shot when UN planes are sighted. This firing is relayed from one ridge to another in rapid succession as a warning to troops in the area. Villagers provide moving units with information regarding the location of UN troops, and native guides may be used by the enemy, taken by force if necessary. There has been evidence that the enemy marks trails and roads at regular intervals with rocks, stones, blasted trees, and sign type markers. Instances have been reported when the enemy has treated rocks with a luminous substance readily discernible at night and easily followed. Trail marking has been evidenced right up to UN positions.

III - FORMATIONS

Prisoners of war have consistently stated that CCF and KPA units use the formation of single file by platoon when moving at night. There have been several explanations advanced for the perpetual employment of this formation. The two foremost reasons are: to control the movement of units in darkness, and to decrease the vulnerability of units to UN air strikes and artillery fires.

Standard distances between soldiers on the move at night is 2 - 5 paces, between platoons the distance is usually 8 - 10 meters, while between companies it is 10 - 15 meters. These distances are dependent upon the amount of illumination. Distances used increase in direct proportion to the amount of moon illumination on the particular night of movement.

On the march the CCF have been found to be lacking in security. A point may be sent ahead of a moving column but not a sufficient distance from the main body to prevent surprise of the entire unit in the event CCF elements are contacted. Rarely, if ever, do Chinese Communist units employ a flank guard. Likewise, it is only upon occasion that a rear guard is set out. This vulnerability to ambush and surprise attack has been established time and again in all CCF formations.
CHAPTER I

SECTION C

COVER AND CAMOUFLAGE

I - GENERAL

During the Korean campaign, both the Chinese and North Korean Communist forces have displayed an outstanding ability in providing for their cover and camouflage. Because of constant harassment by US air strikes and artillery fire, the enemy has been forced to develop to a high degree his ability to deceive the UN forces as well as to provide protection against air and artillery attacks.

While no formal training in cover and camouflage has appeared to be given the CCP or NK soldier prior to being committed to action, the task of instructing soldiers is covered extensively. Camera reconnaissance is undertaken concurrently with other subjects by the platoon officers and non-commissioned officers and the squad leader.

Camouflage and concealment are taught based on actual experience by the Communists on the use of natural materials such as grass, leaves, brush, trees, rubble, and so forth, for concealing individuals, positions, and equipment. Prisoners of war persist in their testimony of this principle so strongly emphasized by the CCP and the NKPA. Additionally, PWs have stated that manufactured camouflage materials were scarce to the point of being almost nonexistent. The enemy apparently makes little use of paints, nets, etc. An occasional prisoner has volunteered the information that in his particular unit a piece of brown or green cloth has been issued to each soldier for camouflage purposes. In these same units white cloth was issued during the winter months.

II - COVER

Available information, obtained through captured enemy documents and PW interrogation, reveals that enemy units continually dig strong protective positions. In the enemy rear areas, foxholes are dug for squad-size groups. In front line positions individual foxholes are dug three to four feet deep and large enough for one person to sleep in. In defensive positions, foxholes are dug large enough to accommodate three to four men.

An inspection of several forward assembly areas used by the enemy revealed that the reverse slopes of hills and draw along the route of advance were literally honeycombed with shallow foxholes. The bottoms of these steep draw are open with rice paddies covering the valley floor, the hills rising steeply with heavy brush and small trees covering the slopes. Generally the individual shelters were made at the line of contact and were bunched close together in groups sufficient in size to accommodate platoons. They extended only a short distance up the slope. These shallow holes were obviously intended for protection against air and artillery fire. They appeared to be effective against artillery fire due to the steep slope, but were good targets for strafing attacks from the north, air bursts, and night. Positions were extremely difficult to detect from distances beyond a few hundred feet.

Several prisoners of war have stated that their units usually dug between positions in the valleys and around burned-out villages in attempt to avoid attack by US aircraft. This was done in order that if planes had been selected and strafed mountain tops rather than the valleys, and generally paid very little attention to villages that had previously been bombed or burned.
As a precaution against air raids, overhead cover for squad dugouts consisted of two layers; one of timber and one of mud; a total thickness of approximately one meter. Individual shelter is often taken under blown-out bridges.

As protection against air attack individual vehicles and convoys move only under cover of darkness, with lights out whenever possible. Upon hearing an approaching aircraft, all vehicles are required to stop. During daylight hours vehicles are parked in valleys, in revetments when available, and are camouflaged to conform with the surrounding terrain.

III - CONCEALMENT

As has been previously mentioned, the CEF and FEA have proved to be masters in the art of camouflage. Despite their characteristic ability to blend themselves with their surroundings they have been forced to perfect this skill as a direct result of a lack of air support.

Troops are instructed by their officers and non-commissioned officers to camouflage themselves and their positions by utilizing foliage, thereby blending with the natural surroundings. Considerable attention is devoted by unit commanders to the initial camouflage of their positions and its continual improvement. Troops are taught to seek persistently maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment.

When moving on mountain trails, maximum use is made of trees and other vegetation to conceal the movement. When in open terrain, leaves, branches and grass are attached to the individual in order to blend with the surrounding area.

One EW stated that his unit had been issued straw mats for camouflage purposes. On a number of occasions, when in open terrain and warning of the approach of an aircraft, the men in the unit wrap themselves in the mats and lay down in orderly rows resembling wheat shocks. In all instances the ruse was a success and the aircraft passed them by.

When resting outside foxholes, troops carefully scatter about under trees and other natural cover, keeping at least ten feet apart. Upon the approach of planes everyone "freezes" in place, in order that movement does not disclose positions.

While the individual foxholes are not sufficient cover to protect against direct hits by enemy, the blending of foxholes with natural terrain features makes detection from the air extremely difficult, if not at times impossible. Thus, these foxholes provide a degree of defense which could not be reached through bomb-proof shelters except where considerable engineering effort was expended.

Probably the ability of the enemy to cover and conceal himself in the above fashion has been the greatest contributing factor to his success in evading aerial surveillance and reconnaissance and therefore accounts to a great degree for his ability to maintain a strong force opposing the US troops to date.
During the course of conducting studies on Chinese Communist tactics, an effort was made, through interrogation of prisoners and perusal of enemy documents, to discover the principles laid down by the CCP for conducting a river crossing operation. The solution of a river crossing problem appears to lie with the local unit commander concerned. The tactics employed in planning and establishing a bridgehead are discretionary with the commander. From interrogation it appears that unit leaders are compelled, therefore, to draw on personal experience in order to accomplish their mission.

It appears that the pattern of CCP river crossing tactics has been developed primarily as a result of a lack of support from air, artillery, and engineers. Because of this shortage, the CCP have adopted the procedure of launching attacks across rivers at points which are physically the easiest to cross as compared to points which would best favor them tactically. Prior to a crossing the CCP perform a thorough reconnaissance to determine the location of possible fords, dams, and bridges already in existence, as well as the dispositions of the UN forces.

Past experience of the United Nations forces suggests that the CCP limitations have forced commanders to fall back on the principle of mass assault, or human wave tactics in order to effect a river crossing and gain an initial bridgehead. It is a distinct possibility that the foremost elements of the assault force are second-rate troops, or perhaps even recruits. The second wave in this case would consist of seasoned and more experienced soldiers.

There are indications that the CCP, in attempting a river crossing, have some troops ford the river by stealth under the cover of darkness. When sufficient numbers have gained access to the opposite bank, an assault is launched.

In the cases of the Yalu, Punnan and Nam-Ha River crossings the Chinese Communists moved across the rivers at points where bridges, dams, or adequate fords existed. They did not necessarily plan their assault to be launched against UN sectors that could be expected to favor a CCP advance.

A study of these maneuvers has not revealed any particular fire plan for the support of the attacking elements. Artillery, when available, was used to fire preparations. Mortars, and heavy and light machine guns were used in the actual support of the attack.

The tactics employed after the bridgehead has been gained do not differ from the standard CCP attack tactics. The principles of penetration and envelopment are applied as soon as sufficient forces have crossed successfully.

One captured enemy document discusses the planning and the execution of a particular river crossing operation. With the exception of reconnaissance of fording points, the document does not advance principles for river crossing operations that differ in any way from the standard principles of attack. The Chinese appear to view a river as an obstacle which must be crossed with the means available to their forces. Since the CCP lack proper engineer bridging equipment, feasible sites assume increased importance as possible points from which to establish a bridgehead.
INTENSIVE STUDY has been made in order to determine, insofar as possible, the CCF doctrine governing patrol activity, the tactics and formations employed by patrols and the organization of patrols. Evidence uncovered to date reveals that CCF patrol activities are conducted almost exclusively by reconnaissance elements of the various units. Combat patrols, as such, are extremely limited, practically to the point of being nonexistent. From what information has been available, the Chinese Communist concept of patrols differs from UN patrol missions in that the CCF relies on patrols purely as an intelligence-gathering agency or for espionage. All available information has been incorporated in the following discussion concerning CCF patrolling, and the information set forth below is believed to be fairly representative of the CCF pattern of reconnaissance activities.

II - ORGANIZATION

Prisoners of war revealed that reconnaissance units are organic to headquarters from Army Group through regiment; the size of these units ranges from a battalion at Army Group to a platoon at regiment. Reconnaissance elements are triangular in structure and are built up from a basic unit of two officers and three ten-man squads. There appears to be, as a general rule, a portion of most of the reconnaissance units that is issued civilian clothing and performs missions of a special nature apart from those of the remainder of the unit. This latter group comprises up to one-third of the total reconnaissance unit strength.

III - ARMAMENT

The consensus of POW opinion regarding armament of a reconnaissance platoon is as follows:

- 2 pistols - 120 rounds per weapon - Platoon Leader and Assistant Platoon Leader
- 9 rifles - 104-170 rounds per weapon - 3 per squad
- 21 SMGs - 300 rounds per weapon - 7 per squad
- 2-4 hand grenades per individual

It was learned that the officers, when actually on patrol, often obtained additional sub-machine guns for their own use; that rifles are discarded whenever possible in favor of sub-machine guns.

Some conflict still exists in information regarding the weapons carried by that portion of the reconnaissance unit provided with civilian clothing. POWs have stated that this group is equipped with sub-machine guns, Nikon-type pistols, a combination of SMGs and pistols, a combination of these plus rifles. (Judging from their mission it would appear logical that this group is armed with a combination of SMGs and the automatic pistols.)

IV - MISSION

The primary responsibilities of CCF reconnaissance units, other than those carried in civilian clothes, is to make terrain reconnaissance, obtain road guides and, upon occasion, guide
their parent units into new areas. Reconnaissance elements recon-

miter to within a few kilometers of enemy positions. Reconnaissance elements are given a mission of reconnoitering behind UN front lines, they are reinforced by infantry. The infantry force engages with UN elements only when it has substantial numerical superiority.

When a mission is assigned to a reconnaissance unit, it is common practice to dispatch one squad to accomplish the mission. Only occasionally is a unit larger than a squad sent on a mission. Depending upon the importance of the assignment, as few as one or two men may be sent to make a terrain reconnaissance. When a mission is assigned to a reconnaissance unit, it is common practice to dispatch one squad to accomplish the mission. Only occasionally is a unit larger than a squad sent on a mission. Depending upon the importance of the assignment, as few as one or two men may be sent to make a terrain reconnaissance.

In the role of advance patrol and guide, the reconnaissance unit dispatches three-man teams to precede the main body by a distance not to exceed 3 km. These teams report back at least once each hour. Should the patrol fail to report back within the specified time limit, the main body halts and another three-man patrol is dispatched to determine the cause of the original group's failure to report. In the event of enemy sightings, all groups are ordered to return.

As stated by PWS, the mission of the reconnaissance group with civilian clothing is to probe UN front lines, infiltrate UN positions and reconnoiter the rear areas. A probing and reconnoitering mission assigned this unit is ordinarily accomplished by three to four men at night. This group will approach UN positions and open fire with the hope of tempting UN forces into returning fire thereby disclosing their positions. It is believed, as a result of CW interrogation, though not conclusively proved, that after drawing the fire of friendly forces and learning their location, this group will move along the front lines to the next suspected UN position and repeat the same procedure. As a result of these probes, the group will have been able to determine both the disposition of, and boundary between the two units. Having ascertained this information, the group attempts an infiltration between the two units and proceeds with its reconnaissance of UN rear areas.

Reports indicate that soldiers from the reconnaissance units are infiltrated behind UN lines, wearing socks, US, or civilian clothing. The refugee stream is widely used as a medium for moving these persons into UN rear areas.

V - FORMATIONS

Patrols prove to be no exception to the fact that CCP units on the move provide themselves with a bare minimum of security. In the majority of instances the patrol does not appear to employ security guards as such. There is rarely a point or rear guard. Each individual reportedly is on the alert for possible surprise attack from any direction.

Through interrogation it was learned that no hard and fast rule can be applied to the selection of patrol routes. The selection of routes appears to be a matter of CCP within each unit. Information from one unit reveals that their patrol prefers to move through valleys and defiles, while other PWS stated that it was common practice for patrols from their units to move along ridges and the sides of mountains. A feature common to nearly all PWS units was the fact that the route of shortest distance appeared to
far outweigh advantages of concealment and cover which might be achieved by using an alternate route.

A - Moving through mountains (See Sketch #9):

When moving through mountains a patrol will ordinarily avoid defiles and the crest of ridges. The patrol splits into two sections and moves in parallel files just below the ridge lines, along the sides of mountain forking the defile.

Distance between individuals in column at night is three to five paces and increases during daylight hours to ten to twenty paces. Distance between two parallel columns varies within certain limits; columns remain within sight of each other or within a distance at which a match flare can be seen.

Control of a split patrol rests with the Squad Leader and the Assistant Squad Leader, each of whom leads a column. Control is exercised between the files by a system of prearranged signals based on the striking of matches, blinking of a flashlight, clapping of hands or whistling.

If a patrol chooses, or is forced by circumstances, to move through a defile a three-man point may be sent fifteen to twenty-five yards ahead of the main body. If the point receives fire from the adjacent hillside, the main body either rushes through the defile or withdraws completely, depending upon the amount of fire received and the importance of their mission.

B - Crossing flat terrain (See Sketch #6):

The squad, when moving across flat, open terrain, splits into three columns. The center file is headed by the Squad Leader followed by three members of the patrol. The two flanking columns move slightly ahead of the center file and each is made up of three men. The Assistant Squad Leader places himself at the head of or at the rear of either flank column.

Distance between men within each column and the distance between the center column and the two flank files is again dependent upon ability to hear the movement of adjacent columns and hear signals made by the center file.

In moving across open spaces audible control measures are substituted for visual means.

C - Moving through wooded areas (See Sketch #8):

The formation used when moving a patrol through wooded areas is, in nearly all aspects, similar to that employed when crossing open terrain. The density of the woods dictates the division of the patrol into either two or three columns. Control, also dependent upon the density of area, consists of whistle signals and lighted match signals.

D - Maneuvering on mountain terrain (See Sketch #10):

If the mission to reconnoiter a mountain or a ridge line is given to reconnoiter elements, a squad is normally sent to reconnoiter the line. Upon approaching the foot of the high ground, two columns are formed from the patrol and take up posts at the base with observation along both sides of the mountain. The remainder of the patrol proceeds along the side of the mountain in single file, gradually moving upward. When a point somewhat below and roughly opposite the center of the crest is reached, the patrol makes a ninety degree turn and moves straight up the mountain, still in single file.
SKETCH NO. 2

Squad Leader Places

OPEN TERRAIN

THE ASSISTANT SQUAD LEADER PLACES HIMSELF WITH EITHER FLANK COLUMN, AT THE HEAD OR BRINGING UP THE REAR, DEPENDING UPON THE SITUATION.
RECONNOITERING A MOUNTAIN

SKETCH NO. 4
When it has been determined that the mountain is clear of enemy, a signal is made to the two men posted at the foot to proceed to the top. The entire squad then proceeds with a further reconnaissance mission or returns, using the route of approach, to its parent unit.

II - Reconnaissance of an area (See Sketch #5)

When given the mission of reconnoitering an area, the squad first selects the most prominent terrain feature in the area, or the most significant sector, and sends a group of three to four patrol members to reconnoiter this spot. In the situation portrayed in Sketch #5, the Assistant Squad Leader is sent with three men to Hill #A, which was determined to be the center of most opposition. Upon arriving at Hill #A, and upon determining it to be clear of enemy, a signal or message is sent to the Squad Leader at #C. In the event that the enemy is encountered in the vicinity of Hill #A, one member of the group reports this fact to the squad leader, while the balance of the group remains to continue observation. The Squad Leader in this case has two alternatives: (1) Continue with the reconnoitering of the remainder of the area or, (2) Withdraw his squad completely and return to his unit. Interrogation revealed that reconnoitering elements were extremely prone to withdraw upon sighting enemy of any strength. Reconnoitering patrol leaders, additionally, are reluctant to detach members from the patrol to continue observation. It cannot be firmly established as to whether this action is governed by unit patrol SOP or is simply the decision of the patrol leader.

If no enemy is discovered on, or in close proximity to Hill #A, the Squad Leader dispatches a three-man team to reconnoiter area #B, while he himself proceeds to area #B with two men. The three groups are given a specific time allotment in which to complete their reconnoitering. At the close of this period, each team remains in its respective sector to await a signal from the squad leader to move to #B, the point of rendezvous. Upon receipt of the signal, either visual or audible, the two flank teams converge on the center group by way of a route close to the river bank.

When the entire squad has assembled it moves out and returns to the parent unit along the same route used in the approach to the area.

An effort was made to determine, in this particular instance, if the area selected by the squad leader to reconnoiter was estimated to be of secondary significance, next to that of Hill #A. This proved to be the case, but also, proved to be coincidental. It appeared that control of the area was the determining factor in the selection of the center area by the leader. Unit control, always a matter of primary concern to the CCP, appears to dictate the type of formation used by reconnoitering patrols. As in the case of attack and withdrawal, the unit column is the central measure employed most extensively regardless of the situation. This inflexibility is a major weakness of the enemy patrolling system.

VI - DISCUSSION

As can be ascertained from the foregoing, possibly the most readily discernible feature common to all enemy reconnoitering activities is the stereotyped nature of the formations used by the enemy. The troops always assume column formation with the squad leader taking a position at the head of the column; only the column is used and at the head of the center column if a three-column formation is employed. Of equal significance is the fact that the enemy normally chooses the shortest route of approach.
RECONNOITERING AN AREA

SKETCH NO. 5
toward friendly positions and shows a propensity for returning to his lines by the same route taken in the advance. Of considerable importance is the reluctance on the part of the enemy reconnaissance unit to engage by fire with friendly troops. The failure of the enemy reconnaissance unit to employ flank and point guards can very easily be turned to the advantage of the troops.

VII - CONCLUSIONS

In order best to profit by this study, certain countermeasures which immediately suggest themselves should be applied to minimize the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts.

a. Of primary importance is the establishment of a counter-reconnaissance screen sufficiently in advance of friendly lines to ensure that enemy patrols will be intercepted before they can gain information regarding friendly positions.

b. When the enemy attempts to determine the exact location of friendly positions by drawing fire during hours of darkness, he should be denied this information through a rigid control of fire placed on these small enemy groups. Only those troops immediately to the front of the enemy probing action should bring fire to bear on the enemy. Except during a sizable counter-action or attack by the enemy, every effort should be made to have friendly flank elements hold their fire, thus bettering the chances that follow-up infiltration attempts will run into friendly positions.

c. Routes which offer the shortest distance to enemy positions should be considered the most likely avenues of approach for enemy reconnaissance units. These routes should be given added surveillance.

d. When enemy patrols are observed during the day or when their presence is determined at night, every effort should be made to ambush these patrols as the best means of preventing the completion of their assigned mission.
While the Chinese and North Koreans have not used mines and booby traps in great profusion during hostilities in Korea, they have, nonetheless, used them in sufficient quantity as to cause concern to the UN forces. Both the CCF and the NPA have shown considerable affinity for the use of mines during defensive operations; they have made little use of them under other tactical circumstances.

II - MINES

A. Types

CCF anti-vehicular, anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines are generally divided into two types: Standard and improvised. The most commonly seen standard types of land mines in Korea have been the Japanese Type 99 armor-piercing and the CCF Number 8 Anti-personnel. Many types of improvised mines have been encountered, of which the following are most common: The shell mine, fougasse, wooden cased mine, gasoline drum mine and earthenware mine. For the most part the standard type land mine is used exclusively as an anti-vehicle and anti-tank weapon, while the improvised type is employed against both vehicles and tanks, and personnel.

B. Employments

The CCF uses a wide variety of mine field patterns with no standard distance between mines within a field. Both of these features have served to the advantage of the CCF since considerable difficulty is experienced in locating minefields and removing the mines. The elementary pattern of anti-personnel minefields permits poorly trained troops to expel the mines. One of the major defects in the enemy system of laying minefields is that the patterns make little or no provision for depth.

The platoon anti-tank mine field pattern illustrated below is but one of the many systems used. It must be remembered that the distances shown are approximate only and may be expected to vary with the configuration of the terrain.

One of the favorite mine laying schemes of the CCF is to allow tanks and vehicles to pass along a road and then to lay mines in the tracks made by these vehicles.

Instances have been reported in which the CCF has "double" mines; placed one mine atop another in order to increase their effectiveness.
Anti-personnel mines and booby traps, in addition to anti-vehicle mines, have proved to be an important component of the enemy's defense, some examples of the CCF and NVA demolition tactics are set forth herein.

The anti-vehicle mine has been constructed, in a number of instances, by the most expedient means available. The explosive is preferably packed into non-metallic containers such as boxes, earthen bowls, bags, etc; however, shell casings have been used upon occasion. Two types of detonators have been used. The most common being a potato-masher grenade with a wire or string attached to the pin. The grenade may be detonated by an enemy soldier in a concealed position or tripped by a vehicle running into a trip wire. The second type of detonator is a pressure detonator discharged by the weight of the vehicle. Since this latter mine is non-metallic and has no detonating wire connected to it, it is very difficult to detect. Some have weighed as much as 25 pounds.

Some of the mine laying methods taught and utilized by the CCF are as follows:

1) Mines are buried in the following pattern with usually 5 or more mines in any given minefield. The mines are ordinarily 1 1/2 meters from the edge of the road with the depth of the field not uniform. Occasionally trip wires with a pull-type fuse are attached from some of the mines to trees or other similar objects on the side of the road. Should the vehicle miss the mine, it would then be activated through the tension upon the wire.

```
+-------------+
|             |
|  Trip Wire  |
|             |
+-------------+   1 1/2 meters
```

2) Another method used is in which 3-4 mines are tied in series with rope, with the mines spaced approximately 40 - 50 centimeters apart. Additional ropes are tied to either side of this group of mines, the ends of which extend to forholes approximately 50 meters from the side of the road. Soldiers hiding in these holes pull the mines into the path of passing vehicles.

```
+-------------+
| Wire        |
|             |
|             |
|             |
+-------------+   Forhole
| Wire        |
|             |
+-------------+   Forhole
```

3) 4 - 5 mines may be buried in a line approximately 1 - 1 1/2 meters from the edge of the road. The length of the minefield being approximately 50 meters.

Prisoners of War have reported that mined areas are marked by rocks, etc., during the occupation of the area by the CCF. Upon withdrawal of the CCF from the area, the markers are removed.
C. Anti-Personnel Mines

By and large, the most commonly encountered anti-personnel mine employed by the CCF and NVA is the serrated steel pipe type. These mines, filled with 1 1/2 pounds of 60 per cent dynamite, have an effective bursting radius of 100 yards. These mines are used in hasty or deliberate minefields in front of defensive positions. This type of mine is put to additional use in the construction of booby traps.

III - BOOBY TRAPS

In addition to the anti-personnel mine referred to above, the CCF uses an anti-personnel mine and booby trap generally constructed around the potato masher grenade which is detonated by a trip wire. These mines are concealed on trails, in houses, on friendly and enemy dead, on abandoned vehicles and equipment, in foxholes, etc. Since detonation of these mines depends upon a trip wire of some form, they can be detected by careful observation.

A case has been reported in which a mortar shell was buried a few inches below the surface of the earth and covered with the ashes of a burned-out fire. A small amount of fresh fire wood had been placed upon the heap, thus presenting a tempting site to UN soldiers seeking to build a fire. The mortar shell exploded two hours after the fire was lighted by UN personnel.

With firewood at a premium during the winter months in Korea, the CCF made extensive use of logs and branches in their booby trapping operations.
CHAPTER II

ATTACK

SECTION A

GENERAL

In order to establish a pattern of CCF attack doctrine and tactics, a large number of prisoners of war have been interrogated, captured enemy documents and after-action reports have been studied, and a study has been made of CCF after-action reports. A more prolonged and intensive study will be required to fill in completely all the details. However, it is believed that in view of the consistency of the information upon which this analysis is based, it represents a fairly accurate picture of the pattern of attack employed by the CCF.

II - LARGE UNIT ATTACK PROCEDURES

The normal CCF procedure is to launch limited-objective attacks. The unit coming into contact with the enemy stiffens its efforts, while other elements attack the enemy flanks. The CCF also favors two-pronged assault and envelopment tactics, not only for the larger units, but for some of the smaller units. During the APPROACH-MARCH the CCF normally employs a "two up, one back" formation.

Whenever possible, the following maneuver is executed (a CCF Army is used here for illustration; however, the tactics apply equally well for lower units). During the approach-march two divisions move forward with the third in reserve. When the main line of enemy resistance, or formidable enemy resistance is encountered, one division spreads out to assume the responsibility for both division sectors (i.e., the entire Army front), while the second division withdraws to the area of the reserve division. The division left on the line acts as a screening force, as immediately dispatches probing elements to confuse the enemy and to seek weak points in the enemy defenses. Often, small units will be dispatched to engage numerically superior enemy units, in order to confuse the enemy.

Meanwhile the division which was relieved is reorganized in the rear area. The period of preparation usually takes about three days from the time the division leaves the line until the army is ready to attack. During this period the acquisition of intelligence is most important (it has been fairly well established that the CCF will not attack without the numerical superiority ratio of at least six to one). Reconnaissance units are dispatched to ascertain the enemy strength and defense positions. Civilians from the immediate neighborhood are interrogated concerning enemy strength and dispositions. We have claimed that this latter method of obtaining information has proved most fruitful and reliable, and that information resulting from CCF probing attacks is given less weight than that gained through the interrogation of civilians and the patrolling by the reconnaissance elements.

At the end of this reorganization and information-gathering period one of the two divisions in the rear is committed to a thrust on a maximum frontage of three miles, through a weak point in the enemy lines. The point selected will preferably be at the boundary separating two large enemy units (regiments or divisions) or a section of the line held by NK units. When this attacking division has penetrated the enemy line to a sufficient depth to enable the division to engage the enemy reserve units, five battalions engage the co-reserve, while two battalions attempt an encirclement of the enemy units on line.
Meanwhile, elements of the reserve CCF division execute an envelopment of the other enemy flank in an attempt to join forces with the two encircling battalions from the penetrating division.

During the entire engagement the CCF division on the line actively continues to occupy the enemy. When the CCF meets with initial success at any point in the maneuver, it exploits this success without regard for the presence of UN units on its flanks.

After the ground has been secured the army reestablishes its "two up, one back" formation.

In the attack the army front will not be less than 20 kilometers. The minimum division front is 10 kilometers. The reserve division is located approximately three hours marching distance from the front.

The reserve army is generally located 40 kilometers to the rear of the attacking armies. It is so located as to be out of normal artillery range, yet close enough to the front to be available to any area upon demand.

III - BATTALION IN THE ATTACK

A. Sequence of events prior to the attack:

During the period of regroupment and reorganization prior to an attack the CCF division occupies an assembly area which is normally 25 kilometers from enemy front lines. The exact distance depends upon three factors: (1) the range of enemy artillery, (2) the distance the enemy patrols to his front and, (3) the availability of proper terrain in which to conceal troops. A screening force is positioned in front of the assembly area, where it remains until all units are prepared for the attack. Supplies are issued, and each individual soldier receives his rations and ammunition, to be used only on order. According to UN statements, supply trucks actually enter these assembly areas to make distribution.

On the night before the attack, the regiments move forward from the division assembly area to regimental areas approximately ten kilometers from the enemy frontlines. There they dig in an occupy defensive positions. While in these positions the battalion commanders are issued their orders and their zones of attack are assigned.

The following evening at dusk the battalions move out to attack. Usually all units halt within one to two thousand meters of the enemy lines where they take a short rest period, during which they may eat one of their combat rations. It is at this point that the company commanders are issued their orders and take over from the battalion commanders. There appears to be no flexibility permitted commanders of battalion or lower size units with respect to the method of attack or the timing thereof.

B. Sequence of events during the attack (See Sketch #6):

This sequence of events can best be understood by illustration. Sketch #6 is a graphic representation of a battalion in an attack.

Following the receipt of its mission, in the regimental assembly area, to attack Hill "A" and destroy an estimated three hundred enemy, the battalion, composed of three infantry companies of three platoons each, plus an attached bazooka platoon, move out of the assembly area in a column of companies and march toward Hill "B" to assembly point "Y". At the latter point the
companies were deployed within an area three hundred meters in width and approximately four hundred meters in depth. The battalion was ordered to dig im mediately with the main assault company deployed along the reverse slope of Hill #6 and the two remaining companies one hundred meters to the rear and toward the flanks. The Battalion Command Post was established three hundred meters further to the rear. The observer-sentry was posted at each end of Hill #6 and additional observation was obtained from posts along the ridge.

The battalion remained positioned in this area until approximately 2000 hours, or shortly after dark, on the night of the attack. At this time company "F" moved down the forward slope of Hill #6 toward Line #9, some five hundred meters distance, in three parallel platoon columns. At the same time Companies "E" and "G" were slightly to the rear of the lead company and the Battalion CP was moved to top of Hill #6.

Upon reaching Line #9 each platoon of the lead company formed into a column of three-manned assault teams and proceeded to move forward approximately three hundred meters to Line #4. During this phase of the advance, the two flank companies remained abreast of Company "F". The Battalion CP was moved from the crest of Hill #6 to the base of the forward slope. The bazooka platoon remained rough in the center of the sector in the vicinity. When all attacking elements had reached Line #4, which might well be compared to our line of departure, they remained in position until some time between 2300 and 0100 hours. At a given signal one twelve-man signal deployed as skirmishers and, carrying sub-machine guns (in this instance Thompsons with 5 clips of ammunition) and four hand grenades, moved forward about 200 meters to the base of Hill #9 and commenced firing on enemy positions. This was the signal for the remainder of the company, which had formed into nine columns of three-man assault teams, to begin firing and move up the face of Hill #9. Concurrently, the two flank companies moved forward into Line of Departure as skirmishers in a double envelopment of the hill. The mission of Company "F" was to gain the crest of the hill and establish firm positions while Companies "E" and "G" completed their movements and joined forces. In this particular action the major portion of the ROK forces managed to withdraw from the area prior to the link-up of the encircling companies.

IV - DISCUSSION

a. Time Elements: CCF night attacks might almost be said to have become "standardized" as regards time. For the most part attacks appear to be launched between 2300 and 0100 hours. As a result of interrogation it was learned that attacking units departed from their final assembly area shortly after dark and remained on, or in close proximity to, the line of departure until the assault was launched. Time of arrival of the attacking elements at the final assembly point appears to be discretionary with the commanding officer and dependent in large part on the tactical situation. In the particular case cited, the battalion arrived in Area #5 around 1000 hours on the day of the attack. We have noted that their units arrived at final assembly areas any time from one or two hours before moving forward, to the night preceding the attack.

b. Distances: It became quickly apparent in the early stages of the study that distances from enemy positions to the final assembly area fell into a fairly stable pattern. In nearly all instances the line of departure was located two hundred meters from enemy positions; a "control line" was located from 200 to 300 meters
to the rear of the Line of Departure; and occasionally a second "control line" was located 500 meters further to the rear, or just forward of the assembly point. The location of enemy assembly areas further to the enemy's rear is considered to be of a more flexible nature.

C. Control: In the above attack it was learned that each of the three companies and battalion headquarters possessed one US "Walkie-Talkie" radio. The BU stated that his regiment had a total of seven of these captured radios; that one remained with each battalion; that companies received these only when they were being committed. After each engagement the radios were returned to regiment. Interrogation tended to reveal a very limited use of these "Walkie-Talkies". It is felt that control of the attacking forces was maintained primarily through the employment of assembly areas and "lines"; that movement by column was an additional measure of control.

V - CONCLUSIONS

a. With very few exceptions, all intermediate moves made by the enemy prior to attack are performed during the hours of darkness.

b. The enemy shows a definite propensity for night attacks and the time that his infantry units will engage UN forces will depend upon the time required for the approach march from his final assembly area.

c. There appears to be, insofar as can be ascertained, a flexibility permitted CCF commanders in occupying intermediate assembly areas. However, there is no flexibility permitted with respect to the time of jump-off.

d. No deviation is permitted company commanders with regard to their method of attack.

e. Attacks against the flanks of friendly positions are almost certain to follow shortly behind an initial frontal assault of positions.

f. The enemy attack will not always be immediately preceded by enemy probes or patrolling.

VI. NIGHT ATTACK

A. General:

The Chinese and North Korean Armies favor the night time for launching their attacks and therefore vary from Western doctrine which favors the day time attack. While CCF and NK differ in their choice of the best time of the month to launch an attack, coordinated attacks by both forces follow CCF doctrine.

The statement is credited to Lieutenant General Ma Chang, CG, 4th CCF Army (Corps), that "daylight warfare had become disastrous for the CCF because of a lack of air cover, consequently night envelopment must be employed." The actual tactics employed by the CCF in night attacks do not differ substantially from those used in other CCF assaults. The pattern of "two up, one back" and envelopment after initial engagement is not changed. According to General Ma, the following sequence would apply to night attacks:

1. Pass IP at 1900 hours or at first dark, and advance to approximately 2 kilometers from UN lines.
(a) Initiate attack at 2100 hours.
(b) At 2200 hours secure ground that was taken during assault, and rest.
(c) Begin one-hour assault between 0300 - 0400 hours.
After assault withdraw to positions gained during initial attack.

B. CCF Tactics

An analysis of CCF major attacks against UN forces reveals that, with the exception of one attack, each attack commenced on a night when moonlight could be expected to provide maximum illumination. In each case the attack was launched when the moon was in the phase between Full Moon and Last Quarter, and when moonset did not occur until after sunrise the next morning. The first attack against USX troops was launched on night of 20 October - 21 November, four days after Full Moon. The second was on the night of 20 - 21 November, two days after Full Moon. The third attack was on the night of 1 - 2 December, seven days after Full Moon. The CCF launched their attack on US X Corps in the Chosin Reservoir area on the night of 22 - 23 November, four days after Full Moon. The enemy may well have considered that the visibility afforded his troops by moon illumination outweighed the disadvantage suffered as a result of UN Air action during this period of favorable air operating conditions. The details of the CCF night attack have been incorporated into the foregoing paragraphs.

C. North Korean tactics for small unit night attacks:

Statements by North Korean Prisoners of War have consistently disclosed the following tactics to be employed in night attacks:

(1) Soldiers to participate in the night attack are selected by the officers assigned the mission of launching the attack. Particular emphasis is placed on strength, health and character in the selection of the men.

(2) During the day the soldiers are told of the attack scheduled for that night and are given an opportunity to rest and sleep. Two hours prior to departure time the men are awakced.

(3) The men are oriented on the route and method of approach to enemy positions, and the signal word and signals to be used during the attack. After thorough study of the area, the assembly point for use after the attack is selected.

(4) The approach to the attack area is through defiles, valleys, and along little-used trails with the troops in a single file formation—10 yards between men. When a point is reached some 100 - 200 yards from UN positions, the attacking force deploys. After each man is positioned, the attackers spoil to within 50 yards of enemy lines. The first shot, fired by the leader, is the signal for all men to charge and open fire on the UN force. Each man is equipped with the P7S submachine gun. Heavy and light machine guns are employed to assist a withdrawal in the event the attack fails.

(5) The attack will usually take place at approximately 0400 hours and seldom on moonlight nights.

(6) Reports have been received that North Korean troops carry wooden clappers for deception purposes to simulate gun fire and at the same time conserve ammunition.
(7) Local civilians are employed to spy on the enemy and obtain information concerning the terrain over which the attack will take place.
II - CCF DEFENSIVE PRINCIPLES

It has been learned that the CCF stresses the following defensive principles:

(1) Deployment of defense units along a narrow front and disposed in great depth.

(2) Utilization of the forward elements purely in a delaying role to gain time while the remaining units prepare a second line of defense.

(3) Construction of defense positions strong enough to afford protection from air and artillery attack.

(4) Construction of dummy positions and gun emplacements for deception of the enemy.

(5) Placement of light automatic weapons well forward, with the heavy weapons disposed in depth. Use of heavy weapons primarily in support of a counter-attack and fired mainly at night in order to avoid detection by UN air and ground observers.

(6) Withdrawal of defense forces to successive defense positions during hours of darkness only.

Prisoners of War have continually stated that the various types of weapons are employed in successive stages as the enemy approaches CCF defense positions. The 60mm mortars are used at ranges of 1,000 - 1,500 meters on groups of ten or more enemy. Heavy machine guns are used at ranges of 300 - 500 meters, or closer when the terrain permits. Rifle fire commences when the enemy has reached a point within 100 meters of CCF positions, and sub-machine guns fire at 50 meters. Even grenades are brought into use at distances of 30 - 70 meters.

Two overrun enemy positions were inspected, revealing the following characteristics of CCF defenses:

(1) An investigation of one CCF position overrun by UN forces revealed 1,120 one-man foxholes, 664 two-man foxholes, 203 three-man foxholes, and 17 pillboxes, all of which could accommodate an estimated 3,250 men. These entrenchments were well camouflaged by logs covered with earth and were well protected against air attack by being positioned behind rocks and trees. The pillboxes were constructed of logs, dirt and stones. These emplacements afforded maximum protection against mortar and small arms fire, but could be effectively neutralized by artillery or napalm.

(2) The examination of another enemy battalion defense position revealed that the emplacements were well dug-in and organized to a depth of approximately 2,000 meters. Fields of fire covered the slopes and downs and appeared to be well coordinated. A large quantity of ammunition of all types was found at the positions. Weapons and ammunition discovered included: 2 Japanese 60mm mortars, 6 Bren guns, 12 MGs, 2 US light machine guns, 2 US heavy machine guns, 30 - 40 US .50 machine guns, many rifles of foreign make, a large amount of assorted ammunition including 2,000 hand grenades of the potato masher type. The command post was well dug-in on the reverse slope of the hill. Bunkers were well constructed with over-hand cover.

III - COUNTER-ATTACK GENERAL

As has been discovered through prisoners, captured documents and actual engagements, the counter-attack is an integral part of Chinese Communist defense. Defensive elements endeavor to maintain
their positions during daylight, planning their counterassaults for execution during darkness. The actual attack plan does not differ materially from the tactics employed in a night attack. Perhaps more emphasis is placed on penetrations and flank attacks. The purpose of the CCF counter-attack appears to be to blunt the edge of a UN assault. A small group, or groups, makes the initial assault while main elements remain in reserve to exploit the gains that may be realized.

A. Principles Involved in the CCF Counter-Attack

Through Chinese Communist sources it has been learned that the following principles govern the execution of a counter-attack, and, through experience, it has been established that these basic rules are closely adhered to:

(1) If a counter-attack is planned to delay the UN forces, or disrupt their planned offensive, the attack must be launched at night, but early enough so that the engagement will be ended by daylight.

(2) If a counter-assault is planned to regain a lost position, or capture some terrain feature, the attack must be launched early enough in the evening to permit the securing of the objective by midnight, or very shortly thereafter. This enables the CCF to utilize the remaining hours of darkness to build or repair defensive works and generally makes the position more tenable prior to daylight.

(3) In a surprise counterattack if the UN force is larger than a regiment, the attacking unit should be of from company to regimental size, depending upon the situation. The members of the attacking force should be carefully selected for fighting ability.

(4) A thorough reconnaissance of the terrain in the vicinity of the objective must be made. Information on UN strength, dispositions and armament must be sought out. All this is to be accomplished by late afternoon or early evening of the day of the attack.

(5) All members of the attacking group must be completely familiar with the route of approach to the objective, signals to be used, plan of attack and nature of the objective.

B. Counterattack Tactics

Envelopments, turning movements, and penetrations are the maneuvers most favored by the CCF in the counter-attack. Penetrations generally are preceded by infiltration of troops into rear areas. The attacking force is divided into widely extended small groups of squad and platoon size, which approach UN positions stealthily, deploy, then attack swiftly. It is stressed by the CCF that the main assault should be made on both flanks between the enemy reserves and the front line troops, or against a portion of the sector determined to be held weakly. Formations will be the same as those employed in enveloping actions. Upon completion of the assault, if a withdrawal has been planned, the reserve elements cover the withdrawal of the attacking force. This withdrawal must be executed prior to daylight.

IV - ROADBLOCKS

The roadblock, like the counter-attack, is an integral feature of the enemy's system of defense. These roadblocks, in actual construction, differ little from those employed by the UN
forces. Ditches, obstacles, mines, etc., are all used by the Chinese and North Korean forces. The major variance from the UN concept of employment of a roadblock, is the fact that neither the CCP nor the KPA consistently covers these blocks with fire. Instances have been reported when the enemy did cover a roadblock with small arms, but the reports have also stated that the fire was of a sporadic nature only and was relatively ineffective. By and large the enemy will construct an obstacle and allow the block in itself to serve as a deterrent to the UN forces.
CHAPTER II
SECT. 4
WITHDRAWAL

I - GENERAL

This study has been conducted in an effort to establish a pattern, or determine the doctrine of CCF withdrawal tactics. This work has been based primarily upon information received from a reasonably large group of selected prisoners. A concerted effort was made to interrogate officers, squad leaders, and individuals upon whom leaders, individuals with a wide variety of military duties were questioned with the view to obtaining, as nearly as possible, a cross-section of opinion.

The prisoners, almost without exception, contributed information which fitted as essential parts into a single pattern. While it is not the intent of this study to set forth hard and fast CCF withdrawal doctrine, it is believed that the data received from prisoners is representative of at least one of the primary means of breaking contact and withdrawing.

In the following narrative discussion of CCF doctrine of withdrawal a hypothetical tactical situation will be created. The situation described in all its aspects is the embodiment of data obtained from CCF prisoners of war. Times given are relative; distances are approximate and may be expected to vary somewhat with the configuration of the terrain.

II - PREPARATION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL (See Sketch 4)

This particular situation is created around a battalion maneuver, but the principles involved may be applied equally as well to the platoon, company and regiment.

The 9th Battalion has been engaged with UN elements throughout the late afternoon and evening. Companies 'A' and 'B' are on line in position along the ridge of Hill 'X': Company 'C' is in reserve, deployed in a column of platoons behind Hill 'X'; Company has stationed a 3-man observation security group atop Hill 'Y'.

As a result of increased UN pressure, the Battalion Commander has received permission of the Regimental Commander to withdraw at 0300 hours. Contained in the order to withdraw are the following directions:

(1) One squad will be selected from 1st Platoon to cover the withdrawal of the battalion. This squad, armed with 1 LMG and 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 2 SPGs and 160 rounds each, 3 rifles with 150 rounds each, and 8 - 10 hand grenades, will open fire upon UN units and divert their attention from the retreating units. The squad will remain in position at all costs until ordered to withdraw.

(2) Prior to the actual withdrawal, and upon a given signal, companies 'E' and 'H' open fire on UN positions. The fire is lifted with the order to withdraw.
(2) The covering squad commences firing when the companies lift their fires, and under certain conditions may even launch limited probing actions. When the covering force for a regiment is employed, limited enemy counter-attacks may be expected.

III - THE WITHDRAWAL

At 2330 hours "A" Company lifts its fire and moves, ordinarily at a dog-trot, cast along the ridgeline in single file. As soon as the leading elements of 3d Platoon reach the right flank of 4th Platoon, "B" Company moves out in single file to 80th Company's positions. When the leading elements of 8th Platoon contact forward elements of 7th Platoon, Company 80 moves to the north, leading the battalion column. Battalion headquarters is positioned between companies 80 and 88.

As units reach the foot of Hill 88 from the ridge, they are checked off by a member of the battalion staff and by each of the Company Commanders concerned. When it has been determined that all units have withdrawn the battalion moves out. In the event a unit fails to arrive at the "check point" the battalion may delay its departure for no longer than 10 minutes, but normally moves ahead swiftly. If, in the estimate of the Battalion Commander, UN elements do not intend to pursue his forces, he may or may not signal, by flare, bugle, whistle, etc., the covering squad to withdraw. When the squad breaks contact it increases its fire for a brief period, throws what hand grenades remain and runs to catch up with the battalion.

The battalion moves steadily to the rear until shortly before first light at which time a suitable bivouac area is selected and a defense established. The column marches, with no distance between units, at a rate of approximately 7 kilometers per hour on roads; 5 kilometers on trails. The first halt is never made short of 7 - 10 kilometers distance from the point of withdrawal, and is of 10 - 15 minutes duration. Further rest stops are dependent upon the amount of time remaining before daylight and whether or not the unit is being pursued. If UN elements attempt to follow, the battalion column may increase its pace to an 8 - 9 kilometer dog-trot with few, if any, rests.

IV - DISCUSSION

Neither weather condition nor moon phase is taken into consideration in planning a withdrawal.

The regiment is the lowest echelon of command empowered to order a withdrawal.

The covering force of a withdrawing unit is selected from those elements scheduled to break contact last, or from elements located at the greatest distance from the route of withdrawal. The covering force is normally a squad but may range in size from a 3-man group to a platoon, commensurate with the amount of pressure exerted by the UN and size of the withdrawing unit. A squad size force is provided with 1 LMG, several SMGs and rifles and 2-4 hand grenades per individual. The mission of the covering group is to divert UN forces from launching a possible attack and draw attention to themselves by increasing their fire. This force is given explicit instructions to withdraw only upon order; however, that order is rarely forthcoming. From interrogation it was ascertained that in selecting his diversionary element, a unit commander is fully prepared to sacrifice that force.

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From extensive interrogation it was determined that only upon rare occasions did the NVA utilize mortar or artillery fire to support a withdrawal. Likewise, seldom were mines, wire and road blocks used to forestall possible UN pursuit. One of the more cogent reasons given by POWs for not employing mortars or artillery during a withdrawal was the fact that upon opening fire they immediately became the primary targets of UN artillery.

The mission of the covering force included the launching of a feigned counter-attack; an actual counter-attack was seldom, if ever, employed. The last minute burst of firing by all withdrawing elements is the form the deception normally takes.

Interrogation failed to reveal any definite pattern concerning the assignment of routes of withdrawal. In the case of the withdrawal of a battalion, all companies move as one column in single file along the same route. In the withdrawal of a regiment, identical procedures may be used. A variation of this appears to be dictated by configuration of the terrain, in which case, one or more battalions may move in parallel, single file columns.

Assembly areas, as such, were not predesignated. Units withdrew as far to the rear as possible during the remaining hours of darkness. In the event a retreat is started just prior to dawn, a unit may risk continuing its march in daylight provided UN air does not constitute an immediate threat.

Control of withdrawing units lies solely in the type of formation used, normally a single file column with no space interval between units is used. Contact between battalions was maintained by radio communication and by runner.

Prisoners have consistently stated that the Heavy Weapons Company moves to the rear prior to the withdrawal of the main elements. It has been learned that withdrawing units are provided with no artillery support. The major reason given for this lack of support is the fact that the speed of execution of the withdrawal is such that artillery and heavy weapons units, with their definite lack of mobility, could not possibly keep up with the disengaging elements.

Since the enemy does not favor a static defense, but rather employs a fluid or mobile defense, it becomes difficult to engage defensive enemy troops and inflict large casualties on them. The enemy's habit of continually breaking contact likewise works to his advantage because as he is able to present artillery with only a fleeting target and therefore minimize his losses.

In order, therefore, to reduce the chances of successful withdrawals on the part of the enemy the following measures should be utilized by UN units in contact:

a. Determine the extremities of the enemy's positions to the front of friendly units. Normally this is ascertainable through observation of enemy fire.

b. When withdrawal is indicated by enemy actions, such as those heretofore described, artillery should be placed on both ends of the enemy unit position and not on the covering force alone. This artillery fire should be synchronized in depth to ensure complete coverage of withdrawal routes.

c. In order to decrease additionally the effectiveness of an enemy withdrawal, rapid follow-up action should be resorted to by friendly units. Such action prohibits the enemy time in which
to recognize his force and prepare new defensive positions.

In small unit actions, the covering force may easily be bypassed and surrounded while the main body of the friendly troops pursues the withdrawing enemy force, which only occasionally employs a rear guard.
The purpose of this study is to analyze NAPA and CCF armored equipment, organization, tactics, and doctrine, and to evaluate their effect on the employment of UN forces.

II - ENEMY ARMORED EQUIPMENT

A. Comparative data on enemy armor types follows:

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UNCLASSIFIED

- Armour on this tank can be penetrated by Cal .50 machine gun.

B. The CCF have tanks of the JS Series available. So far, no JS series tanks have been reported south of the Inha River, although agents have reported the presence of JS III's in Kansuria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JS I</th>
<th>JS II</th>
<th>JS III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weight (tons)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun (mm)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max range, yds</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP (engine)</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Standard equipment for NE armored units in the past has been the T34/85. Reports have been received that the CCF have received shipments of T34/85a during the past few months. The CCF are known to possess US M3A1 light tanks, US M6A1 light tanks, captured from CI; and the Japanese Type 95 and 97. Due to the low combat worthiness of the Jap 95 and 97 with respect to US armor, it is dubious if these Jap tanks will be employed except in training roles.

III - CCF TANK TACTICS (Translation of a captured document published by the Training Department, Northwestern Manchuria Military District, March 1951.)

A. To the CCF the tank is the strongest weapon for offensive action or defensive counterattack. There are three types of tanks:
(1) Light tanks,
(2) Medium tanks (T-34),
(3) Heavy tanks (IS-2 and JS series).

The tank division and tank regiment are organized as independent units and a tank regiment is commanded by the Army Group Commander, or by the Army (Corps) Commander in coordinated operations with infantry troops. The major duty of a tank regiment is to annihilate the infantry and attack the enemy's defense line with the support of the artillery and the Air Force. It is not good tactics for a tank unit to resist another enemy tank assault, or become involved in an operation against enemy tanks that will influence its fundamental mission. (Note: This differs from the US doctrine that friendly tanks provide AT protection against enemy tanks.)

When the tank regiment is to be engaged in depth during a battle, the commanding officer must carefully observe passes, roads, and areas of rugged terrain. The officer should also consider all possible conditions favorable to the operation of his unit. A tank regiment, which is equipped with heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, can penetrate a strong enemy defense. The heavy tanks are also used as an assault force to defeat an enemy counterattack.

In order to defeat an enemy surprise attack, a tank reserve shall be established and disposed at both flanks, or at unit boundaries. The tank reserve can only be assigned by the order of the commanding officer of the combined arms. He may dispatch the reserve to reinforce advancing units.

The radio is an important and fundamental instrument in any tank unit. During a combat operation, urgent radio messages may be sent in clear text; however, prior to a combat operation codes or telephone communication will be utilized. Codes used in a combat operation will not be the same as those used in the preparatory stage.

B. In any tank operation, the element of surprise is the decisive factor in obtaining victory. Surprise is achieved by camouflage, proper dispositions and movement, night marches, cover by the Air Force, and the preparation of good offensive positions. It is also important to accurately reconnoiter the disposition of the enemy's weapons, the terrain, and any obstacles that may exist.
Liason must be maintained with friendly units. When the enemy retreats, the tank unit should pursue then and occupy narrow passes and cross roads in the enemy rear. They should also strive to circle and annihilate the enemy.

C. In order to reinforce infantry troops in an important mission the tank division may be broken down into smaller units by the permission of the Army Group Commander. (Note: Rarely will a US Armored Division be dispersed among infantry divisions for this purpose. In the US Army, corps tank units serve this purpose. The 1st Armored Division seems to have been employed in this fashion after 1 September 1950.) The tank division is organized with various other arms such as Infantry, Artillery, Engineer, AA, etc. Its fire power and mobility makes the success of the following missions possible:

1. Occupation of key front line positions.
2. Development of the attack in a sectoral offensive.

The formation of the tank division in combat is determined and based on the number of tanks, its mission, the terrain and the enemy's defensive strength.

The direction of the main attack of a tank division should be selected on the enemy's defensive line where the easiest penetration may be made. The enemy should be strongly assaulted; their main disposition annihilated and the drive continued toward their flank or rear. Factors which should be considered in an attack are as follows:

1. The terrain should be suitable for tank combat.
2. Select the area that has the least anti-tank defenses.
3. The artillery should select the penetration areas which has the best possibility for concentration of fire.
4. The penetration area should have air force support.
5. The accumulation of fuel and ammunition and supply routes should be studied.

The fundamental methods of supporting tank combat are by use of artillery, mortars, air force, and motorized infantry reinforcements. The infantry troops and the motorized infantry attached to the tank division, attack the enemy in the rear of the tank echelon. Their missions are as follows:

1. To mop up the enemy force remaining in the penetrated area.
2. To consolidate the zone of penetration.
3. To extend the breach and develop the offense in the rear or flank of the enemy.

D. The distance between tanks and infantry should be from 200 to 400 meters. The tanks drive forward at full speed and the machine gunners and infantry advance toward the enemy rear and flanks. When the tank offensive meets resistance and is compelled to separate from the infantry, the mission should be completed.
with artillery support. In the tank offensive zone, for the
purpose of nine sweeping, an engineer company is attached to
the tank regiment. Due to the limitation of large scale tank
sweeping in the Korean theater and because of lack of
experience and training in coordinated activities, the units
of the tank battalion or tank company are assigned to the
infantry commanding officer. (Note: This may explain to some
extent why enemy tanks have been placed all over North
Korea since 1 December 1950 whereas the North Korean 105th Tank
Division was used as a concentrated tank force between 25 June
1950 - 1 September 1950.)

In the night attack, the tank tactics can be simply
applied in conjunction with the infantry. In the daytime, the
tank men should carefully reconnoiter the formation of the ter-
rain, study the direction of attack and prepare signals.

The tank missions in attacking a city are to occupy
all avenues of approach, cover the assault units, and resist
the enemy tank counterattack.

Tanks fighting in forests are usually within the in-
fantry formation and visibility should be maintained between
the tanks and infantry.

When tanks attack in a mountainous area, the individ-
ual tank unit should be led to the top of the mountain ridge
in order to be in a position to secure the activities of our
own troops. According to our estimation of the present
situation in the Korean theater, if a proper and complete arrange-
ment can be planned tank activities in the mountainous zone have
special value. (Note: Tanks can be used effectively over ad-
verse terrain to gain surprise. This principle appears to be
the intent of the paragraph.) The tank reserve must be con-
trolled in any event.

E. In order to complete the mission swiftly and success-
fully, the tank units should have the mutual support of artil-
lery and infantry.

F. The mission of the tank unit in support of infantry

(1) Annihilate the enemy's automatic weapons and fire
points so that our infantry may advance with ease.

(2) Clear the enemy wire entanglements in the way
of our infantry's avenue of attack.

(3) Support the infantry offensive with fire power,
or lead the infantry in attack.

(4) Destroy the enemy's counterattack.

(5) Stabilize the occupation of the enemy position
and wait for the arrival of our infantry.

(6) Destroy the enemy artillery positions, command
posts, communications net, supply installations, etc.

G. The mission of infantry in support of the tank units

(1) The occupation of position and cover for the of-
sensive preparations of tank unit.

(2) Overpower and annihilate the anti-tank weapons.

---33---
(7) Open the route for tanks and support them while passing mine areas.
(4) Reinforce our tanks in engagements with enemy tanks.
(5) Map up the enemy in the battle field, and cover the positions of our tanks.

E. The mission of artillery in support of the tank unit

(1) The artillery support given to a tank unit during the movement from the rendezvous area to the attack position is very important, even at night, because it can prevent the enemy from hearing the sound of tank activities, suppress the fire of enemy anti-tank weapons, and cover the friendly troops who are locating land mines.
(2) During an offense, a primary artillery target is the enemy's anti-tank weapons. Therefore, in order to support better our tank unit, mobile artillery should be used.
(3) The artillery supports the tank unit in defeating the enemy counterattack.
(4) The artillery concentrates its fire power and shells the enemy and their artillery so the tank unit may regroup.

I. The direction of offense

(1) Select a weak section of the enemy position and as soon as it is captured, surround and attack other important sectors.
(2) The tank offensive tactics should be to attack the target with a concentration of strength.

J. The coordinated attack of infantry, artillery, and the tank unit

(1) The assault echelon is formed with two groups, the infantry group and the tank group. If the terrain is favorable, the enemy anti-tank weapons are weak, and can be suppressed by our commandant, the tank group will be in the first line. In the event they cannot be suppressed, the infantry will be in the first line. (Note: US procedure is similar.)
(2) The support echelon is formed with the regiment artillery, the tank artillery, the self-propelled artillery, and the artillery units which are directly attached to army and division. They organize the strongest fire power possible in the coordinated attack with the assault echelon. (Note: This corresponds to the phase of fire employed by US Army.)
(3) The reserve echelon is formed from the tank unit and infantry combined units used in mobile warfare, for reinforcement of the assault echelon, and the defeat of the enemy counter-attack. (Note: US Army doctrine stresses use of the reserve to exploit success, not to reinforce failure.)

The tank division or regiment is formed in two or three echelons according to the characteristics of the enemy defensive works. The first echelon of the tank division consists of the heavy tank unit and its main purpose are to secure the advance of the assault unit, neutralize the enemy infantry and their weapons, and destroy all their defensive works. The second echelon consists of the medium tank unit, supported by infantry
units, and its main purposes are to destroy the enemy and their weapons which hinder the advance of the infantry, to stabilize the occupation of defensive positions, and to open the route in depth for the infantry. (Note: US tank doctrine calls for heavy tanks to support medium tanks. Heavy and medium in the US Armored Division are employed according to the team concept, not separately.) The assigned tank reserve extends the attack in depth, and sometimes defends against the counter-attack of the enemy infantry.

During an attack on an enemy defense in depth and an attack on the enemy front line, the tank unit is directed by the artillery commander who is in the forward observation post or on the tank which is equipped with a radio set.

The infantry attached to the tank unit begins to assault and to annihilate the defensive works from the front, while another part of the tank strength and the assault unit attack the enemy defensive works from their rear and flanks. (Note: UN tank units have used this method very effectively in Korea.)

IV - EFFECT OF UN FORCES

a. UN armored equipment is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to NPEA and GCF armored equipment with one exception of the JS III outgunning all UN tanks. However, the normal short fields of fire (for a tank gun) in Korean valleys and hills, offset to a large extent the "outgunned" factor between the M46 and the JS III. JS series tanks have not been employed or sighted south of the Yalu. The JS III is only 10 feet wide as compared to 11 1/2 feet width of the US M46; yet both tanks weigh 65 tons. It is not safe to assume that terrain would be as great a limitation on the JS III as on our own M46. Actually the narrowness width of the JS III makes it better suited to Korean terrain than the M46. The appearance of 254/65s and 75s 50s guns would require no special action by UN forces except to "tighten up" unit AT defenses.

b. NEPA and GCF tank doctrine closely approximates US armor doctrine. There is no phase of the enemy armored doctrine that would develop a tactical situation that could not be handled by UN infantry-tank forces in accordance with accepted anti-tank defensive principles.

(This study was prepared by the Armored Officer, IX Corps)
Throughout the Korean hostilities both the Chinese and North Korean Communists have performed their operations with a minimum or support from artillery. What artillery has been available to the Chinese and North Koreans has proved to be obsolete, or worn out and in constant need of maintenance. Numerous Prisoners of War have stated that artillery ammunition has been continually in short supply. PWs have also quoted their officers and Political Officers as having stated that substantial aid in the form of artillery, ammunition, tanks and aircraft, was forthcoming from the Soviets. Of this anticipated aid, a bare minimum has been discovered in use by the CCF or NKPA.

II - ORGANIZATION

Within each Chinese Communist Army is an artillery regiment, composed of three battalions of three firing batteries each. According to the CCF TO & E, each battalion is equipped with 12 guns or howitzers. In actuality, however, this does not necessarily hold true. Instances have been reported of one or two battalions in artillery regiments being equipped with mortars and anti-aircraft weapons because of a shortage of field artillery pieces. Likewise, as a direct result of equipment shortage and lack of trained personnel, the Table of Organization does not hold when a unit is committed to action.

The Table of Organization of a typical CCF Artillery regiment is as follows:

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[Diagram of Table of Organization]
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The Table of Organization of a CCF artillery battalion is as follows:

III - OPERATIONS

Three-man forward observer teams, composed of privates, adjust fire with an instrument of Russian manufacture, similar to the US aiming circle. The angle between burst and target is measured to correct for deflection errors, while range adjustments are made by bracketing the target and then splitting these brackets to bring fire onto the target. Artillery pieces are seldom surveyed in when emplaced. Inasmuch as the battery has only one telephone, and that is connected to the artillery battalion headquarters, all intrabattery communications must be transmitted by runner or by voice.

Although the battery is supposed to "support" an infantry battalion, there is no liaison between the observer and the infantry unit. Infantry requests for fire go through the infantry battalion commander to the battery commander and thence to the observer team by runner or by voice. No close support technique, as practiced by UN forces, is employed by CCF artillery to any great extent.

From interrogation of prisoners of war it has been learned that only a bare minimum of the officers and enlisted men assigned to artillery units have actually received artillery training. Because of the relatively technical nature of artillery, the CCF has been forced to make extensive use of trained former Chinese Nationalist officers. These officers, while considered politically unreliable in most cases, are given the responsibility for all technical details of observation, survey, fire direction, and emplacement. In addition, these officers are required to give artillery instruction to the privates and the enlisted personnel of the unit.
When referring to the support of a UN infantry unit by artillery, the term becomes somewhat nebulous. Due to a number of factors, Chinese Communist artillery does not function in the accepted role of support as practiced by the UN forces. Three primary causes for this deviation from standard practice appear to be:

(1) A very definite scarcity of artillery and the poor condition of the artillery available to the enemy.

(2) A lack of trained artillery personnel.

(3) The heavy toll of CCF artillery taken by UN air strikes and artillery fires. Artillery does not support a CCF attack in the accepted sense. Artillery is employed during these offensives, but mainly with harassing-type missions. No large concentrations of artillery fire are laid down on UN positions as a prelude to CCF attack. Likewise, the Chinese do not utilize their artillery to support the withdrawal of their infantry units. Minor preparations may be fired some time prior to the actual disengagement, however, the artillery moves to the rear well in advance of the withdrawing elements. This procedure has been partially explained by the fact that a CCF withdrawal is staged with considerable speed, thus making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for heavy weapons and artillery units to maintain the same rate of speed because of their heavy equipment and lack of transport. An additional reason advanced for this lack of support for withdrawing units is the fact that their artillery, in such a role, quickly becomes a counterbattery target for UN artillery. During the early part of August, the enemy did, on several occasions, appear to coordinate his artillery with his infantry in defense. In fact, the artillery appeared to be adopting the Western type of defense.

Normally, an artillery regiment supports a CCF army, an artillery battalion supports an infantry division, an artillery battery supports an infantry regiment, and an artillery platoon supports an infantry battalion. No attempt is made to mass fires. For the protection of the artillery units against air strikes, PEs have stated that an AA automatic weapons unit corresponding in size to the field artillery unit would be assigned to them.

V. ARTILLERY POSITIONS

Generally the battery area is selected and designated by the battalion commander with the specific locations for pieces placed by the battery commander. Preferred positions are in mountain areas away from roads. Apparently consideration of roads is of little consequence since many artillery units are pack-type. The distance between pieces is governed by the terrain, but usually it is between 40 and 80 meters.

An inspection was made of a two-piece battery dug in on the reverse slope of a hill, and a four-piece battery dug in on the forward slope of a hill. Positions were selected where trees provided overhead cover and camouflage. Camouflage nets were present on all positions but there was no evidence of their use. As there were no roads into the area, it was evident that much time and labor was involved in getting the pieces into positions by utilizing manpower and pole loaders. All gun pits were dug in six feet and apparently guns were to remain in position for a protracted period of time, as it would have been extremely difficult to march order the batteries from these...
No alternate positions were noted. Ammunition pits, approximately 3' x 6' x 4', were dug from five to ten feet to the right and left rear of the gun pits and connected by a trench. These ammunition pits were covered by four layers of logs with several feet of dirt on top of the logs. Installations other than gun positions were well to the rear and left flank. It is believed that the pieces were placed to fire on pre-selected targets since the field of fire covered only 200 to 500 yards with the limiting factors being overhead cover and the nature of the gun pit. The battery front for the two-gun battery was approximately 150 yards.
CHAPTER III

SECTION C

LOGISTICS

I - GENERAL

Since the commencement of hostilities in Korea and following the advent of the Chinese Communist forces into hostilities, logistical support of their combat arms has proved to be one of the major problems of the Communists. Lack of air cover and AA protection has cost the Communists heavy losses of supplies and transport caused by UN air attacks. The entire length of the enemy's supply routes in Korea has been continually harassed, while enemy rear areas have been constantly under surveillance for the location of supply installations which can be struck. This handicap has served as a serious deterrent to Communist activities in Korea.

II - MOVEMENT AND ROUTES

Through interrogation of prisoners of war and a study of captured enemy documents it is fairly conclusively established that each CSS Army Group had its own supply system which commenced at the China - Korea border and led through its areas of responsibility down to the lower echelons. PWs have likewise told of a system set up by the CSS in North Korea to expedite the transporting of supplies to forward dumps. Under this system North Korea has been divided into sections with control points in each. Drivers are assigned to each section and drive only specified routes in that area. This ensures that drivers become familiar with their particular routes as far as road conditions and available concealment are concerned.

All CSS supply installations reported by PWs are established generally along main roads leading toward the forward areas, and on the secondary roads branching from these principal routes. Sightings have revealed that dumps are clustered at the southern extremities of these routes and indicate supply points for the forward units. The strategic positioning of these supply installations along routes of approach to the front indicate that these particular main routes are probably utilized for the flow of troops into the various sectors of the front. They may also be predesignated routes of retreat for units in the forward areas.

It has become apparent during the study of Communist logistics in Korea that one of their greatest problems is the matter of transportation. It appears that, generally speaking, supplies are moved into Korea from China primarily by rail. Generally this rail travel into Korea averages approximately 100 miles. Once these trains of supply vehicles reach the line of rail, they are unloaded and transported by road. Supplies are then delivered to the forward areas by road. All CSS supply installations reported by PWs are established generally along main roads leading toward the forward areas, and on the secondary roads branching from these principal routes. Sightings have revealed that dumps are clustered at the southern extremities of these routes and indicate supply points for the forward units. The strategic positioning of these supply installations along routes of approach to the front indicates that these particular main routes are probably utilized for the flow of troops into the various sectors of the front. They may also be predesignated routes of withdrawal for units in the forward areas.

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Americans have stated that the North Korean Government has organized repair teams at important railway bridges and junctions whose function is to repair the rail lines immediately after UN air strikes. As a result, the CCP has been able to keep their railways operative despite UN attacks.

It has been discovered by UN forces that the CCP and the NKPA have made use of the Soviet practice, in World War II, of burying items of equipment and ammunition prior to effecting a withdrawal. This procedure provides a ready store of weapons and ammunition when the area is recovered by the Communists. Instances have been found where the NKPA has buried supplies and marked the cache to resemble the grave of a Korean soldier. In many cases this may explain the enemy's capability of resupplying himself during an attack.

III - CAMOUFLAGE

As a result of constant UN air surveillance of the enemy rear areas, it has been necessary that the Communist disperse and camouflage their supplies in order to minimize their destruction by UN air and artillery attack. Prisoners of War were questioned with the view to ascertaining the methods employed by the CCP and NKPA to camouflage supplies. To the greatest extent possible, full use is made of natural cover and concealment. These PWs stated that camouflage material for supply dumps located in towns and villages consisted primarily of the rubble remaining after UN bombing. A number of PWs stated that the supplies in one such dump were stacked on the ground about 3 feet high and covered with galvanized sheet iron, charred wood and bricks; thus the supply area resembled the remains of the devastated town. (See Sketch #6) In the case of another dump, PWs revealed that the supplies were dug into the ground and covered with rubble. (See Sketch #8) In a few instances, dumps were reported as being located in villages with the supplies stored in the huts. Prisoners stated that dumps located in the countryside were camouflaged to resemble rice paddies or cultivated fields. According to the PWs, the dump is camouflaged to such an extent as to be indistinguishable from the grassland. (See Sketch #10) Sketch #11 represents a fourth method of camouflage employed by the enemy. While not firmly established, it nonetheless remains a distinct possibility that tunneling might have been attempted in an effort to evade discovery by UN ground or air observation. In addition, PWs stated that supply installations are located on reverse slopes of mountains, in caves and in wooded areas.

IV - FOOD PROCUREMENT

As a direct result of the constant harassment of their supply convoys and supply installations by UN air and artillery, the CCP and the NKPA have found it a matter of urgent necessity to procure foodstuffs locally. Communist PWs have reported that the CCP and the NKPA have obtained food from Korean natives by kindness, coercion or outright business transactions. Occasionally soldiers have worked for rice, but for the most part it has been stolen from the fields. There have been reports of the CCP and NKPA stealing the entire food supply of individual natives and whole villages.

The following enemy document, captured with a CCP PW, has been reproduced in toto. In addition to setting forth CCP policy on local ration procurement, this document is significant, particularly since it emanates from a Political Section. It makes no attempt to gloss over the logistical and transpor
SKETCH NO. IO

INSTALLATIONS AT ICHON (CT1562)

TO CHINA

LARGE UNIT HEADQUARTERS
(OBSERVED MANY GUARDS
STANDING AROUND THIS
AREA. C.C.F. NOT ALLOWED
CLOSE TO AREA.)

DESTROYED
AREA

TO EAST FRONT

RIVER

1.8 KM

DARK RIver BED

NOT TO SCALE

TO WEST COAST

TO CENTRAL FRONT

LARGE FOOD SUPPLY
DUMP CAMOUFLAGE
WITH WOOD, BRICKS
AND GALVANIZED IRON
TO BLEND WITH DES-
PORTION OF TOWN.

STACK, CEMENT, 15M HIGH

A

B

FOOD SUPPLY (SMALLER THAN
ABOVE) UNDER BRIDGE.

SKETCH NO. II

CHUNG-NI (CT430 178)

SQUARE BUILDING

DESTROYED AREA

SUPPLY AREA

NOT TO SCALE
tion difficulties encountered by the CCT, nor does it endeavor, as do most Political documents, to excuse these set-backs on the grounds that there will be an increase of support.

ORDER

From: Political Section, 39th Army
To: Unit down to Regt
Date: Oct '50

In view of the huge number of troops with which we are waging a war in Korea it is a major problem to supply these troops with food from the rear. Since it is well nigh impossible to supply food from the rear due to inconveniences in communication, difficulties in transportation, and the danger of air attacks, the various supply units are directed to make every effort to procure food, and at the same time are authorized to make regulated food procurements from the local government and inhabitants in order to maintain the physical condition of the troops and to keep our troops adequately supplied with the #2 main foodstuffs at all times.

The following regulations should be observed in the collection of foodstuffs:

1. Policy: Government owned food should be procured before any is obtained (borrowed) from the local inhabitants. Food is not to be borrowed unless the army acquire an adequate supply of its own. The amount of food borrowed should be returned, if possible.

2. Organization: The various echelons and detachments connected with civil economy will coordinate and assist the supply agencies in obtaining and delivering the food.

3. Procedure: Food will be borrowed from government agencies through local party members. Should the government agency be without food, the local inhabitants shall be approached through the local party members. Receipts for amounts borrowed will be made in accordance with public and private seal and will be written in Chinese and Korean.

4. The amount of food borrowed should be returned as soon as our own supplies are acquired. If the borrowed amount cannot be repaid within a month, receipts shall be issued to the lender for clearance of the account with the government.

5. Besides food for the fighting troops, the acquirer of food should have in readiness a constant supply of "rice" for the wounded. Borrowing agencies should make monthly reports to the higher echelon on the amount of food borrowed.

* Believed to be rice, millet, and kaoling.
CHAPTER III
SECTION D
UNCLASSIFIED
GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

I - HISTORY

In view of the prominent part played by guerrilla forces during the Korean hostilities, this study is devoted to the organization, tactics, and logistics of these Communist guerrilla bands. Experience has revealed that the guerrilla potential has been exploited to a high degree in close coordination with the main Communist effort during planned operations.

At the outset of the war it was estimated that the number of Communist guerrillas operating in South Korea (including the island of Ch'ung-Do) was 5,000. These guerrillas were directed by a core of some 1,700 trained personnel who adhered to the Soviet line of Communism. With the defeat of the North Korean People's Army in the South, most of the cut-off military units fled to the hills in an attempt to escape to the North. Some of these units, together with stragglers whose units had succeeded in effecting an escape, found themselves in positions where their own immediate withdrawal to the north was virtually impossible. As a result, they either formed their own guerrilla units or joined forces with previously established guerrilla bands. In addition, the ranks of the guerrillas were swelled by Communists and Communist sympathizers who had been forced to flee before the advance of UN troops. This latter group, while not considered a serious threat as actual fighters due to their lack of arms, ammunition and training, has been able to furnish logistical support to the guerrillas and perform espionage missions.

Prior to the war, South Korea contained approximately 600,000 Communists or Communist sympathizers, 10,000 of whom were estimated to be party card holders. As the North Koreans overran South Korea, the natural self-preservation instinct, coupled with the general political disinterest toward national affairs displayed by Koreans, caused an increase in the number of Communist sympathizers. Some persons openly joined the party in hope of rewards while others confined their activities to rendering aid in the form of food, clothing, and information. With the defeat of the Communist troops in the South, many of these persons departed to the large city areas where they hoped to become "lost" in the mire of post-war confusion while others went into the hills where they joined the Communist brigades.

In a number of instances guerrilla bands were believed to have realized the futility of attempting to continue coordinated activities in the UN rear areas. As a result of this change in attitude guerrilla groups were discovered to be moving north and northwest through the SORAEK and Southern SORAEK Mountain Ranges.

Through constant contact with these groups and numerous reports of guerrilla locations, it was a relatively simple matter to determine the routes used by these bands in their escape to the North. It necessarily followed that blocking action on the part of the UN forces resulted in a heavy volume of casualties inflicted against the guerrillas and a considerable number taken prisoner by capture or voluntary surrender.
One of the methods by which the Communists gain party members, or at least increase the ranks of sympathizers, has been to infiltrate leaders through UN lines for the purpose of spreading Communist doctrine and propaganda to civilian groups.

I - ORGANIZATION

The guerrilla force in South Korea is widely dispersed in groups varying in strength from less than one hundred to three to five thousand. In all probability, the leadership of the majority of these units is vested in a well-trained cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers who, armed with regular army units in the early stages of hostilities, it is a distinct possibility that at least during part of this period, two general officers and their staffs were in this cadre group, and probably were responsible for the overall coordination of these bands as well as the coordination of the activity of these bands with the CCP and NK forces.

In early February 1951, guerrilla units were reinforced by English-speaking, college-educated guerrillas from North Korea. These personnel held English classes for the other guerrillas. Those who were considered most proficient in the English language were utilized to cultivate the friendship of the American soldiers in order to procure ammunition and weapons. Reportedly, others have been sent out disguised as Korean policemen and/or ROMA soldiers, to buy guns and ammunition from the American soldiers.

III - TACTICS AND MISSIONS

The skill of Soviet-trained troops in guerrilla type warfare has been amply demonstrated in the past in the Russo-Finnish War, in Greece, and in China. Soviet doctrine of guerrilla operations and tactics has been utilized by Communist guerrillas in Korea in their surprise attacks on towns, destruction of supplies, ambush of rearguards, guerilla tactics and rear-guard actions. Their aptitude for guerrilla operations extends to the attacking of trains, UN troops and motor convoys. The guerrillas have mastered the art of camouflage and night attacks. In addition to the missions already mentioned, the guerrillas have made a concerted effort to destroy railroad and highway bridges, as well as spread rumors throughout Southern Korea about the weaknesses of the UN forces and the return of the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces to South Korea.

Guerrilla bands have appeared to establish strongly-guarded "headquarters" in the mountains in their respective areas of operation from which they conduct their activities. The security of these strongholds rests with the guerrilla guards at the camp itself, members of the band in a wide perimenter disguised as peasants, and with spies in nearby towns and villages.

The pattern of guerrilla activity has shown a marked coordination with the operations of the main Communist forces. During UN offensives, it was more than just coincidence that the guerrillas increased their activities and devoted their energies toward harassing the UN's immediate rear area installations, the main supply routes, and the rear and flanks of advancing elements. At the time of a Communist offensive, guerrilla elements made a determined effort at striking friendly elements on flanks and rear, ambushing or attacking friendly elements moving to support or reinforce friendly units under attack, and disrupting the flow of supplies along the UN MSR.
An examination of the guerilla activity indicates that during the first twelve days of December 1950, while UN forces were engaged in establishing new lines of defense, 87 separate contacts with guerilla forces were reported. An analysis of those reports revealed that the guerilla incidents fall generally into the following divisions of activity:

1. Attacks and raids against UN troops
2. Attacks and raids against villages and police
3. Raids on lines of communication

While this analysis is of guerilla activity during a short period only, it is, nonetheless, indicative of the emphasis placed by the guerillas on fields of activity from which can be realized the most gain.

Weapons employed by the guerilla forces consist primarily of small arms with only occasional mortars being reported. Weapons most often encountered by UN elements in engagements with bands have been the US carbine, the US M-1 rifle and the sub-machine gun (US or PPSh). While the guerilla forces at the outset of hostilities had very little in the way of weapons and ammunition, they continued as a result of their raids on UN installations, to gather more and more equipment for their bands. It is believed very probable that the guerillas preferred utilizing captured US arms instead of their own, inasmuch as the problem of ammunition supply would be incomparably simplified. Raids on UN installations were necessary in order to replenish ammunition stocks since regular supply from Communist held territory would be next to impossible.

IV - ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND COMPOSITION

The following guerilla organization is believed to be reasonably representative of the structure of most guerilla units in South Korea. The People's Guerilla Unit of CHIRABAN is organized as follows:

Commander-in-Chief

General Staff

Political Affairs Commander

Military Affairs Commander

506th Regt 507th Regt 508th Regt People's Liberation Brigade Division

The 506th Regiment is organized as follows:

506th Regiment

First Branch Squad

First Platoon Second Platoon

First Squad Second Squad

Second Branch Squad

First Platoon Second Platoon

First Squad Second Squad

The other regiments of the unit are organized the same as the 506th Regiment. There are approximately 150 men per regiment with 60 men assigned to each Branch Squad; 30 to each Platoon and 15 to
onch squad. No information is available as to why four of the
syndicates were numbered and two were named.

The equipment of the 505th Regiment is as follows:

- 2 pistols - 1 US and 1 Soviet. Quantity of ammunition
  unknown.
- 14 US carbines with 560 rounds of ammunition.
- 3 Soviet rifles with 200 rounds of ammunition.
- 26 US M-1 rifles with 2,640 rounds of ammunition.
- 1 US SMG with 200 rounds of ammunition.
- 2 Soviet LMGs with 1,600 rounds of ammunition.
- 1 US HMG with 500 rounds of ammunition.
- 1 Chinese 82mm mortar with 8 rounds of ammunition.
- 2 AT grenades and 56 hand grenades.

The equipment of the other regiments was reported as substan-
tially the same as the 505th Regiment with the exception that the
506th Regiment had one US Cal. 50 MG with 600 rounds of ammunition.

The Communist guerrillas in their operations in Korea have
been able to combine effectively fire power, mobility and surprise.
The achievement of this has enabled the guerrilla bands to move
rapidly through numinous areas along well concealed trails, strike
effectively against unsuspecting UN troops and move con-
voyes and withdraw with relatively few casualties. Worthy of note
is the ability of the guerrillas to communicate between groups
and to coordinate the activities of the various bands, thereby
increasing the general effectiveness of the guerrilla program
of operations. Little has been learned to date of the actual
means of communication between bands in South Korea or with the
Central Headquarters in North Korea. UN raids on guerrilla
groups have disclosed the use, in some cases, of captured US
vehicles. How extensive this use of radio communications is among
the various bands cannot be ascertained.

It has been conclusively proved that the guerrillas rely
heavily on couriers for the transmission of messages to and from
the North Korean guerrilla headquarters and as a means of com-
munication supplementary to the radio network.

Y - LOGISTICS

Logistical support, as such, of the various guerrilla groups
in South Korea is non-existent. Guerrilla bands are expected to
carry necessary food and clothing from the area in which they
operate. These supplies are gathered either from voluntary con-
tributors and sympathizers or collected through raids on farms,
villages, and towns. A portion of the guerrilla foodstuffs
comes as the result of captured UN supplies. Terrorization of
villagers and the capturing of hostages serves to increase the
list of "voluntary" contributors to the guerrilla cause.

One of the techniques used by the guerrillas in night
foraging operations is for a few to surround and engage the
police box while the remainder of the group raids and plunder
the houses.
As has been mentioned in the foregoing remarks concerning weapons, the guerrillas maintain their stock of ammunition and arms with captured UN supplies.

VI - CONCLUSIONS

The predominant factor contributing to the reluctance to surrender on the part of guerrillas and Communist sympathizers is their fear of the retaliatory measures which they feel certain will be taken against them. Their fears are not wholly unfounded in view of the treatment accorded Communists by the South Korean Police prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Starting with the mass arrests of the Communists in August 1947, the brutality of the police against Communists and suspected Communists in South Korea is common knowledge. It is this one element, in great measure, which serves to deter any large-scale surrenders or confessions by Communists and collaborators. It is believed that an amnesty, if granted, would prove of little value.

As a result, the Communists, both guerrillas and political adherents, probably will continue their attempt to evade capture by hiding in the mountainous areas and using the cover of darkness for movement and procuring food and clothing by plundering. Some guerrillas who can claim POW status may surrender, but by far the major percentage, especially those led by former guerrilla units, will shelter from giving themselves up, or will never be given the opportunity to do so.

It is believed that guerrilla groups will continue to be active in South Korea even after the cessation of hostilities. A hard core of Communist-indoctrinated and trained leaders could readily be gathered from the Communist North Korean Army to replace losses of guerrilla leaders suffered during the Korean Campaign. In this respect a recent agent report stated that the North Korean government plans to have three (3) divisions of guerrilla troops available for infiltration into South Korea. An undetermined percentage of these troops will be former UN personnel who have defected and have been indoctrinated.
CHAPTER IV
SECTION A

INDICATIONS OF FUTURE ENEMY ACTIONS

I - GENERAL

A study of enemy operations in Korea to date has revealed that certain CCF actions and activities follow a relatively standard pattern and may be utilized as indications of the course of action which the CCF is planning to employ. Although no single indication is conclusive in itself, a study and comparison of indications developed can prove of material assistance in determining the most probable course of action that the enemy is apt to adopt. This chapter is devoted to tabulating and discussing those indications which have been found useful in the past and which most probably continue to be useful in determining the course of action that the CCF will follow in the future.

Experience has proved that the CCF appreciate the tactical value of surprise. They have taken great pains to conceal their true intentions as long as possible in order to gain the maximum surprise by their actions. For this purpose they have utilized every possible ruse, in addition to superior camouflage and camouflage discipline, to prevent their intended course of action from being revealed prematurely. Therefore, it is imperative that no single indication, in itself, be considered as conclusive evidence of the enemy's attitude, but rather that all indications be carefully compared and evaluated before a conclusion as to the CCF's most probable course of action is drawn from the indications noted. It will be well to remember that whenever this indicated course of enemy action is not the most disadvantageous to our mission, the indications must be re-examined for reliability and accuracy.

II - DISCUSSION OF INDICATIONS

The indications discussed separately below are discussed from the standpoint of their relation to Attack, Defense, and Withdrawal action. It is realized that this list is not complete, and additional indications should be added when developed and available. A study should be made of every major enemy action to determine what indications, if properly evaluated, would have foretold that action.

A. Movement of Troops into Forward Areas:

This enemy action may indicate either an attack or a strong defense. The detection of movement of CCF troops into forward areas, usually in small groups, after a period where other indications have pointed to a pending offensive, has usually signalled the imminence of such an attack. These movements are necessary for the CCF to move his troops from assembly areas outside the range of friendly artillery to regimental or divisional assembly areas from which he moves into attack positions. The fact that the CCF usually makes these moves at night or during inclement weather when UN observation is restricted, plus his adeptness at camouflage, makes the detection of these movements extremely difficult.

B. Increased Probing and Reconnaissance:

This enemy action usually indicates that a CCF attack is pending. Reports of this action have been received prior to each major CCF offensive where contact has been broken between
friendly forces and major CCF elements. These probing actions usually took place two to three days prior to an attack and served to locate boundaries between friendly units and to determine the disposition of ROK units. Exceptions have been noted where the CCF attacked against advancing UN forces in areas where the CCF had had ample opportunity to reconnoiter at will. Where contact has been maintained by UN forces conducting a protracted defense, information as to friendly dispositions is known and probing actions have no particular significance.

C. Bridging Activity and the Repair or Construction of Roads in Forward Areas

This action has served not only to indicate a CCF offensive but also to point out the avenues of approach to be used. During offensive actions and withdrawals the CCF creates extensive road blocks and barriers by ditching and cratering roads and valleys, destroying bridges, and constructing barriers. This activity has also been noted extensively prior to CCF attacks, where it served to deny UN forces access to CCF assembly areas as well as to deceive the UN forces as to the enemy's intended action. Shortly before the CCF launched his attack, road and bridge damage was repaired along a route which he would use in his attack. Where extensive repairs to a bridge or road are required prior to an attack the CCF will perform this work, usually at night, immediately prior to the date of his attack. Air observation of such actions has reported the progress being made on such projects prior to the actual attack.

Prior to the CCF drive to Kapyong in April all routes going south into the IX Corps sector were rendered impassable except the one secondary road from KSNKVA to SANCHJU-RI to SACHJU-RI which he used as his axis of attack. The CCF has been reported to improve existing roads or construct new roads in order to move armor, artillery, or other heavy equipment forward. Such action could not be camouflaged. It must be realized, however, that during periods of protracted defense, the enemy may be required to repair roads and bridges along routes of resupply in order to maintain his forces logistically.

D. Issue of Battle Rations and Ammunition

The issue of combat rations and ammunition to CCF troops usually indicates an imminent offensive. Information of the issue of such rations is obtained from PWs and occasionally from agents and captured enemy documents. Usually the PWs have been instructed not to eat these rations until a given date (the starting date of the offensive). The number of days rations issued is indicative of the proposed duration of the attack, while the amount of ammunition issued the individual gives some indication of the status which the enemy supply has attained. There have been instances reported, however, where troops in defensive actions have been issued combat rations to sustain them when resupply is difficult or impossible. Prior to the 22 April offensive PWs stated that they had been issued a six-day combat ration. This attack continued for five days. Prior to the May offensive PWs captured in the I and IX Corps sectors stated that they had been issued an average of fifteen days of combat rations on or about 10 May prior to their departure from their assembly areas for their march to the East. This offensive was launched against X Corps on 16 May, which would have left each soldier with 9 days of combat rations if no resupply had been received. The CCF attack was broken up after seven days by a UN counterattack.

E. Increase in the Number of Stragglers and Deserters

This is usually an indication of an impending CCF attack. As new enemy units move into position, some enemy soldiers become stragglers and find their way to UN lines. Stragglers, along the
CCI inform their soldiers of the details of future attacks, there are usually a few soldiers who will desert in order to avoid conflict. Since these conditions take place just prior to a planned offensive, they are usually indicative of the imminence of the attack. Under conditions of rather extreme hardship or when UN forces are successfully launching an attack, these indications do not necessarily presage enemy offensive action. During the period 17 - 21 April and 11 - 15 May increases in the number of deserters and stragglers were noted. Following these increases the enemy launched the 22 April and 16 May offensive.

F. Increase in the Number of Captured Agents;

This is usually an offensive indication. Immediately preceding an offensive the enemy has "flooded the field" with agents in an attempt to obtain all last minute information concerning UN dispositions and strengths. Generally speaking these are low level agents who possess no particularly significant information concerning the enemy's forces. However, it has been found that the date by which the agents must return to enemy lines precedes offensive operations by approximately five days.

G. Sharp Increase in Refugee Travel Followed by a Drop in Travel;

While no conclusion as to the offensive or defensive nature of the enemy's attitude can be drawn from this observation, it is almost certain that it indicates a strengthening of the enemy's potential in the area. As new enemy units move forward into positions, the civilian populace has a tendency to flee before these units in order not to get caught in the center of any future conflict. As the enemy is able to tighten his security this flow of refugees will fall off sharply.

H. PW Statements;

Experience to date has revealed that CCF PWs are surprisingly well informed concerning tactical plans not only of their own units but of overall CCF plans as well. The political indoctrination program as practiced by the CCF includes keeping the individual informed of planned operations and building up his patriotic sense of duty to prepare him for his part in such operations. This was especially true during the first few months of CCF operations in Korea when a CCF private could state the grand strategy of the CCF operations as planned. A CCF lieutenant, a platoon leader from a 38th CCF Army (Corps) unit captured south of the Han River in the IX Corps sector on 11 February revealed the time of attack and general scheme of maneuver of the CCF attack launched against X Corps on 12 February. Few CCF PWs are able to reveal such accurate tactical information; however, a careful analysis of PW statements, when considered in conjunction with other indications, can narrow down the period during which an expected offensive may be launched. For example, an examination of the dates given by PWs for the start of the 22 April and 16 May offensives indicated that the PW will usually give a date which precedes the actual offensive date by three to nine days. The dates given for the 22 April attack lay between 3 and 15 April while dates given for the 16 May attack lay between 1 and 15 May. The premature nature of these dates may be attributed to the fact that the PWs may have been given readiness dates rather than actual attack dates.

I. Decrease in Vehicle Sightings;

This is an offensive indication but should be accepted with caution. A comparison of past pre-offensive periods has shown that two to four days prior to an attack, the enemy has
telephoned his readiness from a logistical standpoint by sharply decreasing the number of vehicles used for transport. A drop in the number of vehicles sighted, due either to poor visibility or full moon illumination, which permits the enemy to move vehicles without use of headlights, is not to be misconstrued as indicative of a completed supply effort. On 20 April, a decided drop in vehicular traffic was noted and continued until the offensive on 22 April was launched.

J. Release of POWs

During periods preceding past enemy offensives the enemy has, in most instances, released UN personnel whom he had previously captured. Preceding the enemy's withdrawal from the CHICHESTER - HONGKIN OFFENSIVE offensive the enemy likewise released prisoners. Whether this release of prisoners is contingent upon his ability to evacuate them prior to his maneuver, or whether he is using this release as a means to demoralize UN personnel so that they will be more apt to surrender during a pending engagement cannot be ascertained. That the release of POWs has been followed by very definite action on the part of the enemy cannot, however, be ignored.

K. Presence of Screening or Delaying Forces

Preceding the initial CCF assault and several times since then, the enemy has attempted to avoid all contact with UN patrols, in an effort to deceive as to his intended actions, and to permit him to regroup beyond artillery range. The enemy's usual object for striking UN forces on the move, in terrain favorable to the enemy, apparently causes him to adopt this evasive action. Or, however, the enemy has shown a tendency to use a strong screening force to veil activity in his rear areas. This screening force shows no particular change in attitude during the transition period from defense to offense. During the course of an enemy withdrawal, the delaying force usually has been assigned the mission of defending for only a certain length of time. Generally speaking, POWs are familiar with the predetermined date when they will cease defending in the forward areas and withdraw successive defensive positions. During the UN drive into CHICHESTER - HONGKIN - PUKCHON area in April 1951, the enemy continued to withdraw his delaying-screening force and then suddenly launched an attack against UN forces.

L. Artillery Moved into Veto Forward Positions

The movement of artillery into forward areas accompanied by a continued use of this artillery by the enemy, has been found in the past to indicate a strong determined defense. The positioning of enemy artillery in forward areas from which the enemy can bring to bear a greater amount of fire on friendly forces quite naturally improves his position with regard to either an attack or a strong defense. To date, the enemy has not supported his attacks with any notable amount of artillery fire, but rather has relied on mortars and fully automatic weapons. Twice during the past ten months the enemy has made an extensive use of artillery to strengthen his defensive positions; during his defense south of the PAN River in February 1951 and during his defense north of the 38th parallel in June, July and August of 1951. At no time to date has a major CCF attack been preceded by any noticeable movement of artillery into forward positions.

M. Armor Sightings

During the period of time that the CCF have engaged UN forces there has been no large scale use of armor in Korea. Occasional tanks have been sighted by friendly air, and it has
been determined that the enemy makes use of dummy and repainted, burned out tanks in an effort to deceive UN forces and to draw fire from friendly planes. The sighting of tanks in enemy rear areas in not shown any particular relation to future enemy action.

E. Receipt of Replacements:

This action, which is revealed through PV and agent reports, connotes a strengthening of enemy units, and is considered a part of the enemy regrouping activity. While applicable to either offense or defense, it has been found that this is not indicative of immediate offensive action. A receipt of large numbers of replacements by badly depleted enemy units may well reveal a lack of sufficiently trained new units with which to engage friendly forces.

F. Supplies Stockpiled in Forward Areas:

This condition is common to both offensive and defensive actions. Until June 1951 the enemy utilized rather large supply dumps at Division and Army (Corps) level. Subsequent to that time, the enemy reduced the size of his supply installations and dispersed them widely in an effort to minimize the effect of UN air and artillery fire on his supply. In general, the location of recent enemy supply installations conforms very closely with his troop dispositions.

G. Movement of Reserves into Rear Areas:

This indication, obtainable through air sightings, PV and agent reports, is indicative of pending offensive action or a determined defense. Past experience has proved that the enemy’s shrewdness at camouflage, cover, and concealment and his use of inclement weather periods and the hours of darkness to move his troops have made an actual observation of these movements difficult. To aid in determining the new positioning of his troops there have been the results of daily Air CP coverage of troop concentrations. An increase in the number of sightings in any particular area is generally conclusive evidence of an increase in troop strength in that vicinity.

H. Use of Smoke to Screen Movements:

This usually indicates an impending offensive. In the past the enemy has made rather extensive use of this method of creating his own artificial concealment during periods of extended clear visibility when natural vegetation was dry and combustible. The use of chemical smoke generators has been extremely limited, but the burning of debris and vegetation has been found to create the desired effect. Twice during the Korean Campaign to date, the enemy has used smoke to conceal the movement of his troops. The most noted use of smoke took place from 11 to 15 May when the enemy set up a smoke screen across his entire front in order to move undetected his forces to the Eastern portion of the KUSAK front prior to launching his 16 May offensive.

I. Movement of Reserves into Assembly Areas:

The capture of reconnaissance agents from units not previously in contact is considered a good indication of the planned movement forward of those reserves. The presence of reserve elements so positioned is indicative of the importance of an attack. This indication is generally obtained through PV statements and occasional agent reports. To be guarded against, however, is the misconstruing of a relief of units with pre-offensive action.
Radio silence has been resorted to by the enemy, 24 to 48 hours preceding each offensive. Not to be confused with this radio silence is the lack of radio traffic inherent to a prolonged defense when telephone communications, for security reasons, are extensively used.

III - CRITICAL PERIOD

Since the CCF has shown a definite affinity for utilizing periods of maximum moon illumination for his attacks, such periods should be considered as critical. Except for one offensive, that launched on 12 February 1951, the enemy has chosen the period between full moon and the last quarter for his offensive. The 12 February attack may be classified as a diversionary effort launched to permit the extrication of his battered forces facing I and IX Corps south of the Han River, and therefore, did not follow the normal pattern of CCF offensives. Since control of troops is the most difficult feature of any night attack, it is readily understandable why the CCF seeks moonlight to assist him, especially as he possesses no equipment such as searchlights for providing battlefield illumination. The periods chosen between full moon and last quarter have provided him with continuous moonlight illumination from the time his attack was launched till sunrise of the next morning. Since maximum moon illumination is so important to the CCF for his night attacks more careful consideration should be given to offensive indications during periods immediately preceding a period of full moon illumination.
CHAPTER IV

SECTION B

CCF INTELLIGENCE

A study of the structure of the Chinese Communist Forces has revealed a probable intelligence organization within the CCF. Due to a lack of information available, complete details of all intelligence agencies are unknown at this time. While prisoner of war statements and captured enemy documents continue to verify the structure set forth herein, it must be borne in mind that there exists the possibility of some deviation. This intelligence study is included in this document because of the vital role played by intelligence in CCF planning and conduct of operations.

I - GENERAL STRUCTURE

Basically, the major departure of CCF Intelligence from Western Intelligence organizations is that there exist three separate staff sections, organic to higher units, which perform the work of gathering, collating and disseminating intelligence. These three sections are the Political Control Department, the Staff Department, and the Classified Activities Department. The Political Control Department confines its activities to civilian Communist groups and acts in the capacity of an intelligence agency only insofar as it becomes feasible to gather intelligence utilizing these groups or agents of these groups. The Intelligence Section of the Staff Department is the CCF counterpart to our G-2 Section and encompasses all phases of intelligence work dealing with tactical intelligence. The Classified Activities Department is comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States in that it is centrally directed from and renders its reports to the Bureau of Current International Affairs, the Supreme Intelligence Agency of Manchuria. Its activities are aimed at gathering strategic rather than tactical intelligence, and apart from administrative support, the sections of this department are not connected with the activities of the tactical units. Their activities are limited to military areas of responsibility which apparently cover all of the Far Eastern countries. The Chief of Staff of a tactical unit is the coordinator of intelligence activities and plays the counterpart of an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in our Army.

II - POLITICAL CONTROL DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONS

The Political Control Department is interested primarily in matters affecting the Communist Party itself as the civilian populace is concerned. This section is responsible for organizing, leading and maintaining liaison with such leftist civilian organizations as the Youth Group, New Democratic Doctrine Youth Corps, Farmer's League, the Democratic Women's League, and so forth. In addition to controlling these civilian groups, the Political Department has a branch, comparable to the IPW team in the US Army, which is charged with the interrogation of prisoners of war and the indoctrination of these PWs. Information of a tactical nature is gathered through the branch maintaining liaison with the civilian Communist groups and through the PW interrogation branch. The screening of refugees is the joint responsibility of the Security and Liaison Sections, and is another source of tactical information. All tactical information of intelligence value is passed to the Intelligence Section, Staff Department through the respective Liaison Sections of the two departments and is also submitted to the Chief of Staff.
III - STAFF DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

The duties and functions of the various branches in the Intelligence Section are as follows:

Order of Battle Branch: Obtains enemy order of battle information from subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. The Order of Battle Branch collects, collates, and disseminates all intelligence material for the Intelligence Section. Within this branch is an Estimate Group whose function it is to evaluate and analyze intelligence received. A Files Group, also in the OB Branch, checks and files all intelligence material received.

Liaison Branch: Maintains close liaison with subordinate, adjacent, and higher units and in Korea with the X Corps Intelligence Organization, which covers an intelligence standpoint all of Korea. Within each echelon this branch maintains close contact with the Political Control Department in order to obtain intelligence from this source.

Map Branch: This branch is responsible for procuring and distributing maps and photo maps.

An additional agency available to the section for obtaining information concerning the enemy is the attached Reconnaissance Regiment. This regiment is assigned the mission of working out the disposition of enemy forces, determining quantity, types, and locations of heavy weapons and learning unit strengths.

The first platoon, first company, of the reconnaissance element at Army Group and Army (Corps) is provided with civilian clothing and has the additional function of penetrating enemy lines to conduct espionage assignments. The reconnaissance element range is also from a regiment at Army Group to a platoon at Regiment. At Division the first platoon of the Reconnaissance Company is issued the civilian clothing and performs the additional penetrating missions, and at Regiment it is the first squad of the Reconnaissance Platoon which is utilized for these assignments.

However, as a result of the language barrier in Korea, these missions have necessarily been curtailed. Reports indicate that some corps divisions are utilizing Koreans, probably attached from X Corps units to perform at least a portion of these penetration and espionage missions.

While the attached organizational charts show, in the case of Army Group and Army (Corps), the reconnaissance elements to be of regimental size, such is not the case in Korea. In actuality, due to the shortage of personnel, these units do not exceed six companies and three companies respectively.

IV - CLASSIFIED ACTIVITIES DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONS

The Third Department concerned with the gathering of intelligence is the Classified Activities Department. This department is concerned with the control of espionage agents engaged in performing long-range strategic intelligence missions, and such radio intercept intelligence as its equipment permits it to perform. Information of a tactical nature obtained during the course of conducting strategic missions is submitted to the Intelligence Section, Staff Department as well as to the Chief of Staff.
The following are the duties of the various sections within the Classified Activities Department:

**Operations Section:** This section dispatches high level intelligence agents, to include espionage agents, saboteurs, contact agents and propagandists, to large cities far behind the enemy front lines, for the purpose of obtaining high level intelligence and carrying out missions of sabotage and propaganda.

**Liaison Section:** This section maintains liaison with the agents of this department after they have been dispatched by the operations section and aids them in transmitting their messages back to the Classified Activities Department.

**Assistant Section:** Selects and assigns intelligence agents for duty with Army (Corps) and Divisions. This section also formulates codes, handles confidential funds, and effects liaison within the Army Group, etc.

**Order of Battle Section:** This section is responsible for obtaining strategic enemy order of battle information. All intelligence gathered by the Operations Section is furnished to this section which in turn disseminates it to the Intelligence Section, Staff Department. At the same time information is sent to the Pile Section for confirmation and recording.

**Security Section:** This section, upon receipt of intelligence information from the Order of Battle Section, processes the information through the Documents, Publications, Photographic, Map, and Current Records sub-sections for confirmation and recording. The information is then filed for future reference.

**Radio Section:** Handles all signal communication and in addition performs intercept and jamming of enemy radio nets.

**V - TRAINING OF AGENTS**

It has been learned through interrogation of POWs that agents employed by the CCF are given varying degrees of training to equip them for the types of missions they will perform. Agents in the Classified Activities Department are highly skilled, having been given extensive training by the Bureau of Current International Affairs in Manchuria. These agents represent all Far East nationalities and apparently function only in military districts in the Far East. The training of agents used by other Staff Sections of the CCF is commensurate with the echelon at which they are employed. For example the mission of the agents controlled by Army (Corps) is broader in scope and more sensitive than that of agents at Division and Regiment, and consequently the training requirements for these personnel are increased.

**VI - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

The organization, heretofore discussed, exists at the CCF Army Group level. The same organization holds true through Army (Corps) (Chart #6), Division (Chart #6), and Regiment (Chart #7) echelons with some minor modifications.

No change in function or organization of any of the Staff sections is found at Army (Corps). At Division there is no change in the structure of the Political Department or the Intelligence Section of the Staff Department. There is, however, an additional function performed by both departments. The Security Branch of the Political Department selects agents from the
various civilian Communist groups for utilization by the Intelligence Section of the Staff Department. These agents are primarily line-crossers sent on limited missions to obtain tactical information concerning UN forces. The classified activities conducted by a section at division level deal solely with radio intercept and radio communication with agents dispatched by higher echelons of the Classified Activities Department. On the Regimental Staff the Political Section and the Intelligence Branch of the Staff Section, remain unchanged organizationally and functionally from that at division. No Classified Activities Section appears below division level.
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