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ENEMY TACTICS

UNCLASSIFIED
REMARKS

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R. DAVIS AF/CHO SAREPHER
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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH U.S. ARMY KOREA
(EUSAK)
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ENEMY TACTICS, TO INCLUDE GUERRILLA METHODS AND
ACTIVITIES, INFILTRATION METHODS, AND COUNTER-
MEASURES

This monograph was compiled by personnel of the Historical
Section, EUSAK and the Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Prov).
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script was the work of 1st Lt John Mowha. Information was secured both
from interviews with pertinent personnel and from official documents of
GHQ, FSC; EUSAK; and EUSAK subordinate units. The classification of
this document is SECRET; handling and regrading will be accomplished in
accordance with the provisions of AR 380-5.
The Communist armies opposing United Nations forces in Korea employed the commonly accepted principles of war, namely, the principles of mass, movement, the offensive, surprise, security, simplicity, coordination of command, and economy of force. In the tactical execution of these principles they agreed in some aspects with western tactical doctrine and differed in others.

Basically the Communist forces, particularly the CCF, followed the military doctrine outlined by Mao Tse Tung on 25 December 1947 as the "ten principles of war by which the CCF fight":

1. "First strike scattered and isolated armies; later strike concentrated powerful enemy forces."

2. "First take the small and middle-sized towns, cities and countryside; later capture the big cities."

3. "Regard the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength, and not the holding and taking of cities, as the major objective. The holding or taking of cities is the result of the destruction of the enemy's strength, and this often has to be repeated before they can be finally held or taken."

4. "In every battle, concentrate superior forces (double, triple, quadruple, even five or six times that of the enemy) to encircle the enemy on all sides, and strive to annihilate the enemy. Destroy part of the enemy forces and move the same troops to wipe out other portions of the enemy strength. Avoid battles of attrition in which gains are not sufficient to compensate for losses, or in which gains merely balance..."
losses. We (Communists) are numerically inferior, but we must secure local superiority in every section and every campaign.

5. "Fight no unprepared engagements. Fight no engagements wherein there is no assurance of victory. Endeavor to secure victory by preparation and staff work.

6. "Promote the valiant characteristics of no fear of sacrifice and fatigue, of continuous action or successive combat actions.

7. "Destroy the enemy while he is in movement. At the same time, emphasize the tactics of attacking positions.

8. "In respect to assault of cities, wrest from the enemy all cities and strongpoints which are weakly defended. When opportunity favors, take similar points which are defended to a medium degree. Strongly held cities and installations can be attacked after conditions mature.

9. "Replenish our army by capturing enemy personnel and material. The source of men and arms of our army is mainly at the front.

10. "Utilize the periods between combat operations to rest, regroup, and train the troops. This interval of rest should not be too long, however. Insofar as possible, do not permit the enemy to have a breathing space."

The CCF used certain armies offensively and others defensively. None was restricted, however, to one type of warfare, because the enemy had to employ all committed armies to fit the immediate tactical situation.

The Chinese Communists developed these principles in war against the Japanese and successfully used them against the Chinese Nationalist
Government. Since a large portion of the cadre of the North Korean People's Army served with the Chinese Communist Forces in battle against the Japanese, North Korean tactics employed against United Nations Forces were similar to CCP and Soviet Russian tactics. At the outbreak of hostilities on 25 June 1950, three of the North Korean People's Army divisions committed to action, the 5th, 6th, and 12th, were composed of approximately 60% Chinese Communist trained North Koreans. All Commanding Generals and other key officers of all North Korean People's Army divisions were Chinese Communist Forces and/or Soviet trained. Many North Korean People's Army noncommissioned officers also had undergone extensive Chinese Communist Forces training.

The contents of this monograph is an attempt to show the pattern or trend of enemy tactics successfully employed in Korea. Source materials were obtained from files of the Eighth United States Army in Korea and its component corps; interviews with various staff members: G2 Research and Analysis files; GHQ; FEC; documents from the Army Translation and Intelligence Section, GHQ; FEC; and translations of captured enemy documents by the 164th Military Intelligence Detachment. Special mention is made of the excellent G2 report, US IX Corps, entitled, "Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine."
CHAPTER ONE
OFFENSIVE TACTICS
SECTION A

Offensive Indications as Determined by United Nations Forces.

Every enemy offensive showed evidence of being a well-prepared, well-coordinated attack. The tactical value of surprise was vital to the Communist attack, and the enemy went to great effort to utilize every ruse, in addition to superior camouflage discipline, to prevent his intended action from being revealed. However, certain indications were prevalent before all major attacks on United Nations positions in Korea. Yet no one indication in itself warranted the belief of an impending attack.

1. Enemy regrouping and re-equipping.

The receipt of replacements connoted a strengthening of enemy units, and was considered a part of the enemy regrouping activity. This did not always indicate an immediate offensive action, as the replacements were often intended for badly depleted enemy units. Small groups moving to various sections of the front, coupled with other offensive indications, usually pointed to a pending offensive. Units were shifted in accordance with the enemy practice of designating units for offensive or defensive employment. It was necessary to move the offensive units forward prior to the implementation of the offensive. This action usually took place 5 to 36 hours prior to the attack.

Withdrawal of the defensive units thereby breaking contact with UN forces generally presaged an enemy attack. This proved true in operations since the MAKTONG perimeter period.
2. **Sensitivity in the direction of known or suspected troop concentrations.**

Initially proceeding an offensive operation, Communist forces attempted to avoid all contact with United Nations patrols, apparently as an effort to disguise their main intention. Late in the campaign, the enemy used strong screening and delaying forces to shield his rear area activity. After holding for a certain predetermined time, the delaying forces withdrew to new defensive positions. The sensitivity of the enemy in the direction of his supply bases or troop concentrations was ably illustrated by his resistance to a United Nations drive toward the CHOKWON-KUMHWA-PYONGGANG triangle in April 1951. The enemy used a delaying-screening force and then suddenly launched an attack against UN forces.

3. **Army reserves close to the front rather than in depth.**

Reserves, within overnight marching distance of the front as contrasted with a deep displacement of reserves for defensive purposes, was an offensive indication. Actual observation of enemy movement was difficult during periods of inclement weather, due to his utilization of darkness, and by his adeptness at camouflage. An increase of troop sightings in a particular area was generally conclusive evidence of an increase in troop strength in that vicinity.

4. **Stockpiling of supplies in forward areas.**

Until June 1951 the enemy utilized large supply dumps at division and Army (corps) level. Subsequent to that time, the enemy...
reduced the size of his supply installations and dispersed them widely to minimize the effect of UN air and artillery.

5. The increase in deserters' and stragglers apprehended from units not in contact.

Night marches in the rear encouraged straggling and desertion.

During the summer of 1951 it was possible to trace the shifting of the North Korean VI Corps from the west to the east front by the capture of stragglers and deserters. The enemy usually informed his soldiers of a future offensive, and some deserted to avoid conflict.

6. Increased guerrilla activity behind friendly forces.

Early in the Korean conflict, guerrilla forces successfully hampered the United Nations supply lines. Prior to an enemy offensive, such activity increased sharply with the primary targets being communications, bridges, and supply routes. Due to the successful screening of all high ground, plus the use of ROK National Police, guerrilla activity was later reduced to a minimum.

7. PW statements of impending operations.

Enemy soldiers were well informed about tactical plans of their units and the overall plan as a result of the Communist political indoctrination method of building up the individual's sense of duty in the operation. Readiness dates were probably given to the enemy soldier rather than the actual attack date.

8. Increased enemy reconnaissance on the front and from rear areas.

Enemy probing attacks and infiltration methods were used to find out troop dispositions, artillery positions, command posts, boundaries...
between friendly units, and the disposition of ROK units. Enemy
agents returned to their lines approximately five days before an
offensive, and the probing attacks took place two or three days prior
to the attack. When the enemy had the opportunity to reconnoiter an area
at will during a withdrawal, he attacked advancing UN forces without
immediate prior reconnaissance.

9. Use of smoke screens to hide large-scale daylight movements.

The enemy's use of chemical smoke generators was limited, but
the desired effect of screening troop movements was obtained by burning
dry natural vegetation and debris during periods of extended clear
visibility. During 11 to 15 May 1951 the enemy established a smoke
screen across his entire front to screen the movement of his forces
to the eastern sector of the Eighth Army's front prior to launching his
16 May offensive.

10. Increased propaganda effort to include the release of friendly PWs.

UN capture of enemy PWs who made fantastic claims of a coming
offensive coincided with the enemy release of captured United Nations
personnel. This was an attempt to undermine the morale of other UN
troops.

11. Forward displacement of artillery.

In the past, the movement of artillery into forward areas
tended to indicate a strong defense, but the enemy did not support his
later attacks with any notable amount of artillery fire. He relied
chiefly on mortars and automatic weapons. However, the forward
displacement of artillery had to be considered as a potential offensive
12. FW statements as to being issued extra combat rations (up to fifteen-twenty days per man).

The enemy soldier was instructed not to eat his combat rations until a given date which usually was the starting date of the offensive. The number of days' rations issued was indicative of the proposed duration of the attack. Prior to the 22 April 1951 offensive, FWs stated they were issued a six-day combat ration. This attack continued for five days. Prior to the May 1951 offensive, FWs captured in the US I and IX Corps sectors stated they were issued an average of fifteen days' combat rations on or about 10 May. This was prior to their departure from assembly areas for their march to the east. This offensive was launched against IX Corps on 16 May, which would have left each soldier with nine days of combat rations if no resupply had been received. The CCF attack was broken up after 16 seven days by a United Nations counterattack.

13. Repair and Construction of roads in forward areas by the enemy.

Besides being an offensive indication, this also pointed out the avenue of approach of the pending enemy offensive. To protect assembly areas and on withdrawals, the enemy made extensive roadblocks and barriers by ditching and cratering roads and destroying bridges. Shortly before launching his attack, the road and bridge damage was repaired. If extensive repairs were necessary, the enemy performed this work at night. At times, Communist Forces had to improve existing roads or construct new roads in order to move artillery and other heavy equipment forward.
14. Sharp increase in refugee travel followed by drop in this travel.

This indicated a strengthening of an enemy potential in one area. As new enemy units moved forward into position, civilians in the area fled to avoid being caught in the center of any future conflict. As the enemy tightened his security, the flow of refugees fell sharply.

15. The imposition of radio silence by the enemy.

Radio silence was resorted to by the enemy, 24 to 48 hours preceding each offensive.

Steps Taken by Friendly Forces to Counteract Enemy Offensive Indications.

When such enemy offensive indications pointed to an attack at an early date, United Nations forces took certain counter measures to hinder his preparations.

Air attacks were increased on known enemy supply and troop concentrations. An extended aerial effort was made to cut his lines of supply and reinforcements. Night attacks by radar guided aircraft and attacks in adverse weather were made on enemy positions and suspected routes of advance. Evidences of the success of our air offensive was indicated by the enemy's use of secondary roads and trails, his extensive use of camouflage, and his dispersal of troops.

Limited objective attacks and probing attacks by friendly armor in November 1950 and April 1951 kept the enemy off balance and forced him to commit his reserves and attack prematurely. Undoubtedly this

*In January and May 1951, UN forces awaited the enemy attack.
had an adverse affect on the morale of the enemy soldier by forcing him to engage in a defensive action rather than an offensive one. These attacks also made the enemy delve into his stockpiles of ammunition and supplies needed for a sustained offensive.

To determine the enemy's movement and offensive potential, increased intelligence effort was made by United Nations Forces. Agent reports, P.O.W. interrogation reports, air observers' reports and other means were screened carefully. Increased patrol activity was stepped up with many patrols having the primary mission of capturing prisoners. Small probing attacks were conducted to determine the areas in which the enemy was most sensitive.

When the direction of the anticipated enemy attack was determined, friendly forces were shifted to meet the offensive. This in turn enabled United Nations Forces to contain the enemy offensive and, as in the case of the Communist May offensive, mount a counter offensive.
SECTION B

Preparation for the Attack

Prior to launching a major offensive, the enemy carefully planned his every movement. Of utmost importance was his problem of supply. Hampered by persistent United Nations air strikes, the enemy became a master of movement and camouflage due to the constant harassment by bombing and strafing. Supply dumps were destroyed, which placed a strain on preparations for offensive or defensive actions.

The CCF supply system began at the China-Korea border and led to the lower echelons. To expedite the transporting of supplies to forward dumps, North Korea was divided into sections, each with Branch Unit control points. Specific drivers were assigned to each section and drove only routes in that area. This enabled the driver to become familiar with the routes and available concealment, and facilitated the transporting of supplies during the hours of darkness.

The CCF Northeast Military Area Rear Service Department was charged with the transportation of supplies. Supplies were moved into North Korea from China by rail to trucking points where vehicles picked them up and delivered them to dumps located along main and secondary roads. Air sightings revealed that these dumps, on secondary roads branching from principal routes, were clustered at the southern extremities of the roads. This indicated supply

*An excellent study, "CCF--NKPA Supply and Transport" was prepared jointly by the G2, 5th Army and the A2, 5th Air Force in September 1951. Reference should be made to this study.}
routes for the forward units. It also indicated these routes were probably utilized for the flow of troops into various sectors of the front or for the withdrawal of units in forward areas.

The Transportation Section of a Communist army is very flexible and varies according to the number of vehicles on hand. Generally, all vehicles in a Communist army were organized into three units to facilitate supply. Cart units were organized in each enemy division to supply division, regiments, and sometimes Army units. All carts available within regiments were utilized in these units, supplementing vehicular transportation. Each cart was supposed to travel about 23 miles a day. Also within each regiment were two transportation groups—a wheelbarrow group and a "coolie" or pack laborer group. These were charged with the responsibility of supplying forward dumps. Each unit, company through division, sent personnel to the next higher echelon to draw necessary supplies for their organizations.

Constant bombing and harassing by air raids forced the enemy to use vehicular travel extensively at night or in overcast weather and to employ camouflage of tree branches and foliage. To deceive United Nations aircraft, the last vehicle in a convoy sometimes used its headlights to make the pilot of the aircraft think it was the lead vehicle. This caused the pilot to overshoot the convoy.

During the day, vehicles hid under bridges, in woods, and in tunnels. Rail travel was also restricted to night movement.

All available bypasses around destroyed bridges and roads were utilized, and squads of enemy soldiers were stationed at bridges to
to begin repairs immediately after hostile air raids.

Submerged bridges were used effectively by the enemy. Logs were cut and held under the water by rocks and sandbags. However, this method was effective only where the water was relatively shallow and slow-moving. Antiaircraft squads were stationed at key bridges and aerial targets to defend them against attack. These squads remained at the site of the installation even if it had been slightly damaged. If it were destroyed completely, the antiaircraft unit moved to another prime location.

On bridges and trestles along railroad routes, air sightings reported several bypasses and alternate routes constructed. Bridges which were blown were repaired overnight. It was reported the enemy laid his rails on top of the wreckage, permitting travel to continue, although dangerous due to the unsteadiness of the wreckage.

Each enemy company and regiment was required to have seven days' combat rations on hand; each division, ten days'; and an army from one half month to one month. Storage shelters were dispersed, and each shelter was supposed to contain no more than ten thousand catties (approximately thirteen thousand pounds) of food. Each dump was located in a place easily camouflaged, readily accessible to vehicles, and so located that troops were able to draw supplies at any time.

A few prisoners of war stated that in some cases there was a system of night truck delivery from division dumps to regimental and, in some instances, battalion dumps. This type of supply system was the exception rather than the rule.
As a direct result of rapid advance and consistent pressure by

In the field relations are and particularly the enemy had to procure foodstuffs

Some were obtained from Korean farmers by influence/ coercion.

Locally. The need relations are and attended by the enemy need to procure foodstuffs

of our recent business transactions. Political introductions compelled the

of the necessary for cordial relations.
SECTION C

Movement to the Assembly Area

The smallest enemy unit to be assembled for an offensive was usually of corps strength. Sub-units in outlying bivouacs one night's march away (15-25 miles distance) were ordered to assembly areas, which were normally favorable points near United Nations positions. During the approach, two divisions moved forward with the third in reserve. When the main line of the United Nations resistance, or when formidable hostile resistance was encountered, one division spread out to assume the responsibility for the entire front. The second division withdrew to the area of the reserve division to prepare for the pending attack.

In the movement to the assembly area, multiple columns—each of battalion strength—were used. Prior to movement, reconnaissance elements scouted out the routes of approach and any suspected hostile positions. A point, three to fifteen men, was sometimes used at the head of a regimental column followed by an advance guard. The point proceeded the main column 1000 to 1500 yards. Very little emphasis was placed on flank security; although during tactical marches, a part of an antitank company, armed with 37 millimeter guns, was attached to the advance guard or divisional main columns. In open terrain, the antitank company was employed on parallel roads as flank security. If a small United Nations group was encountered, a small force was sent to engage it while the main body endeavored to bypass the resistance.
3 HOURS WALKING DISTANCE

MARCH OR ONE

40 HOURS WALKING DISTANCE

Position in the Attack

Symbols:

- Army HQ of Reserve Army
- Division of Reserve Army
- Army HQ of Attacking Army
- Reserve Division of Attacking Army
- Division in Attack
In rear areas, most units marched in a column of two or a column of files on both sides of the road. In forward areas, the men in the battalions marched in single file on one side of the road to minimize casualties from air strikes and possible artillery fire. This also facilitated control. The standard distance between enemy soldiers during the march was three to five paces; between Platoons, eight to ten yards; and between companies, ten to fifteen yards. The distances were dependent upon the amount of illumination, since most moves were made at night. Marches usually started about 1630 hours and continued until daybreak with brief five-to ten-minute rest periods given to the men every hour. While the troops were resting, guards were not employed for local security because of the prior reconnaissance.

During night movements, the enemy generally utilized secondary roads and trails. Villagers provided the enemy with information regarding locations of United Nations troops, and sometimes native guides were employed. Routes of approach were marked with blazed trees, rocks, and sign markers. Some captured Pows reported the use of a luminous substance, easily discernible at night, to mark trails.

During the march strict discipline was exercised by enemy troops. The men were cautioned about loud noises, smoking, talking, and the display of lights. Communications during the march were conducted either orally or by written messages delivered by runners or horse-mounted messengers. At higher echelons, radios were used. Often at night, the individual soldier wore a white armband to facilitate
control.

Air observers, posted on high ridge lines during the march, fired warning shots when a hostile plane was sighted. A soldier on the next hill, hearing the shot relayed the warning by firing another shot; thus the entire column of marching troops was alerted for an anticipated air raid.

Only under the most trying circumstances were vehicles used to transport troops, and even then it was generally limited to transportation of the wounded. In spite of this, enemy units advanced from rear areas to the battle zone at the rate of 25 miles a day. United Nations air strikes did not seriously impede their movement at night.

Some daylight moves were made during adverse weather conditions or under the cover of smoke. The enemy, lacking smoke producing materials and equipment, created smoke hazes by resorting to widespread forest fires and the firing of villages during periods of relatively little wind velocity. To insure against a possible wind shift, enemy infiltrators set fires behind UN lines to assure a continuous smoke haze. However, during the Communist May offensive, daylight moves were made in good weather. The enemy troops marched in a single continuous column with 25 to 40 yards between groups. Strafing attacks were ineffective as the enemy soldiers squatted in ditches during the attack and then moved on. This indicated a high state of discipline.

Two assembly areas were used. The first was an area approximately 25 miles from the front lines where battalion-size units assembled and received orders from a divisional staff officer through the
Regimental CP, to march to a designated area. Escaped American soldiers reported a large orange light, about five feet square, on the top of a hill facing in the direction of the enemy's rear lines. Large troop concentrations with pack horses were gathered in the vicinity of the light, indicating that the light might have designated an assembly area.

Before launching a large-scale attack, the enemy attempted to evacuate all civilians in and around his area, and prohibited the entrance of civilians into the sector. This was done to counter United Nations espionage activities. The evacuation of civilians took place one month prior to the launching of the attack for security reasons.

A second assembly area, the regimental area, was generally the bivouac area. The distance of this area from the front lines varied from 7 miles to 1 1/2-1 1/2 miles. Attack battalions were later sent to a point from which the attack was launched, and they may have accounted for the recorded closeness of United Nations lines. Some units, however, designated areas other than the bivouac areas, and the subordinate units moved to them in separate columns. This indicated an amount of flexibility on the part of the regimental or divisional commander in selecting his own area prior to an attack. These areas were selected out of the range of United Nations artillery, where air spotterings were impossible, and beyond the normal distance of United Nations patrols. However, prior to the 1 January 1951 attack, enemy troops moved into trenches within artillery range and remained undetected all day.

* Such light was only reported once.
During the early phases of the Korean conflict, the most heavily vegetated portions of a hill or mountain were selected as the bivouac site. This was done to minimize the effectiveness of United Nations air attacks. Fox holes were dug and camouflaged, and about ten to twenty guards per regiment were posted on the high ground around the area. With the increased effectiveness of United Nations air power, the enemy resorted to digging his bivouac positions in valleys and around bombed or burned-out villages. W\-s stated UN planes usually bombed and strafed mountain tops rather than valleys and previously bombed villages.

The enemy also used the reverse slopes of hills and draws along the routes of advance as assembly points. Closely bunched, shallow fox holes were dug commencing at the line of foliage, but these extended only a short distance toward the crest. These emplacements were for protection against air and artillery fire. Beyond a few hundred feet, observers found these positions difficult to detect.

Countermeasures Taken by United Nations Forces to Prevent Enemy Movement

United Nations Forces used various methods to detect and prevent enemy movement to the front. The use of night bombers and interdictory artillery fire on suspected enemy routes of advance were the chief means.

By the use of radar, night bombers were guided to enemy troop concentrations and supply points. Captured PWs testified to the accuracy of these raids, and pilots reported secondary explosions in some sectors. Flare ships were used to illuminate areas so that
fighter-bombers could more effectively strafe and bomb enemy troops.

Interdictory artillery fire was used by United Nations Forces on all likely routes of advance and on suspected enemy assembly areas. However, enemy prisoners indicated that they had been able to march into attack positions through artillery fire simply by studying its pattern. Usually enemy assembly areas were selected outside the range of friendly artillery, so too much importance could not be placed on this countermeasure.

Night patrols were used to note enemy movement. Patrols consisting of American and Republic of Korea soldiers were dispatched behind the enemy lines to note enemy troop movements and assembly points. These patrols, equipped with radios, were successful in calling down artillery and airstrikes on enemy troop concentrations.

Artillery and 81mm mortar illuminating flares were used to reveal enemy troop movements in close proximity to United Nations lines. Searchlight companies were also used. On dark nights, searchlights reflected against low-hanging clouds gave the effect of a moonlit night, but it did not prove too effective for aerial observation.
SECTION D

Reconnaissance

The enemy division or Army which made initial contact with United Nations forces and assumed responsibility of the front conducted extensive reconnaissance missions and light probing attacks. There were many similarities between Chinese and North Korean reconnaissance; however, because of some basic differences, an attempt has been made to treat each separately. A captured Chinese manual translated into Korean revealed basically the same objectives to be reconnoitered and the same methods of reconnaissance. Movement of hostile troops, hostile positions, engineering works, and fire power were all of primary concern. In addition, the units selected the break-through point, point of attack, unit cover, routes of march, and the attack commencement point. Reconnaissance in force was used to learn the hostile strength and deployment of firepower. Observation posts were used to note enemy movement, and all officers were required to conduct reconnaissance and to know the terrain and the hostile situation.

CCF Units

Reconnaissance units were organic in the Chinese Communist Forces from Army group through regiment. The size of these units ranged from a platoon at regimental level to a battalion at army group. Reconnaissance elements were triangular in structure and were built up from basic unit of two officers, and three ten-man squads. One-third of each reconnaissance unit was issued civilian clothing and performed
missions in a semi-agent capacity behind hostile lines.

The primary responsibilities of Chinese Communist Forces reconnaissance units other than those issued civilian clothing were to make terrain reconnaissance, obtain road guides, and guide units to positions. They reconnoitered to within a few thousand yards of the United Nations positions but rarely made contact or engaged in combat patrolling. It must be taken into consideration, however, that the enemy's preliminary tactical reconnaissance prior to an engagement in the past was effective and persistent. The reconnaissance of positions of the US 2nd Infantry Division at KUNURI before the main attack was made by three to five detached groups of five or six men advancing in an upright position in single file or sometimes bunched until hostile fire was encountered. They approached as close as 20 yards before being recognized as enemy. After drawing fire, the enemy then withdrew and moved along the front lines to the next suspected United Nations positions. At no time did the enemy reply to United Nations fire, and at times they appeared to be unarmed.

The reconnaissance group with civilian clothing was also given this mission which was performed by three or four men at night. The enemy squad fired indiscriminately at suspected hostile positions in an attempt to have United Nations forces disclose their positions by returning fire. This procedure was repeated along different sections of the front. As a result of these probes, the group attempted to infiltrate and reconnoiter behind United Nations forces.
Nations lines. Some of these agents wore ROKA, US or civilian clothes. In some instances, these small patrols marked the location of United Nations mortar and artillery targets with bursts of automatic fire into the target areas. These locations were passed back by outguards and observation posts.

As an advance patrol or while acting as guides, three-man reconnaissance teams preceded the main body by a distance of about 3000 yards and reported back each hour. If the patrol failed to report back, the main body halted and another three-man patrol was dispatched. If hostile units were sighted, the reconnaissance groups were ordered to return to the main body.

It was common practice to send one reconnaissance squad to accomplish a mission, although on some occasions a unit larger than a squad was dispatched. As few as one or two men were sent to make a terrain reconnaissance. In hostile territory, enemy patrols split up and each man reconnoitered a certain section. Upon completion of the mission, the patrol reassembled at some predesignated spot and returned to its parent organization. Reconnaissance elements also established liaison with other units in the area.

**North Korean People's Army Reconnaissance**

Reconnaissance units of the North Korean People's Army were organized within the structure of every echelon from corps to company level. The North Korean People's Army corps and divisions had a reconnaissance battalion; the regiment had a reconnaissance company; the battalion, *In the CCF, the organization of reconnaissance units extended to regimental level only.*
a platoon; and the company, a reconnaissance squad. All such units were attached to the headquarters of each echelon and were employed by their respective commander.

Three common types of missions were performed by North Korean reconnaissance units. First, a political reconnaissance was made to determine the trends, political thoughts, and the caste system of villagers in the area of proposed attack. The local Korean Labor Party and its sympathizers were contacted, and the political tendencies of the area were analyzed. The members of reconnaissance units were usually Korean Labor Party members or known Communist sympathizers of proletarian origin. The members were thoroughly oriented before each mission of this type with the Communist doctrine so that they were capable of indoctrinating local citizens and gaining their support. Political officers led political reconnaissance groups.

A second type of mission was intelligence reconnaissance. The primary concern was to capture United Nations classified documents and to collect order of battle information. This mission was accomplished by infiltrating United Nations positions, using local Korean Labor Party members and sympathizers as scouts. In combat, local citizens, classified as low level espionage or tactical information agents, were utilized because of their knowledge of the surrounding terrain and language. Political and military officers led the intelligence reconnaissance missions.

The third type of mission was similar to that of Chinese
Communist Forces reconnaissance units. It was armed reconnaissance to determine hostile firing positions. Weapons were fired indiscriminately in the direction of suspected UN positions, and return fire was carefully noted. This type of mission was led by military officers.

When a unit commander was given an objective, he called upon his respective reconnaissance unit to determine the political trends of civilians in the area and any hostile positions. Before the mission, the group was given a map orientation on terrain features in the objective area, and every member familiarized himself with the conditions of the approach. A rigid physical inspection was made of each unit member to eliminate anyone who might hinder the assignment. Each man was issued three to five rations depending upon the length of the mission. Men on the patrols were taught simple English or Korean phrases to use on infiltration missions to deceive United Nations guards. Before leaving on the mission, a last minute Communist indoctrination talk was given by the political officer, and each group was made to repeat its mission and general orders.

The most advanced echelon was a patrol consisting of three to seven persons led by a squad leader. The patrol was about 300 yards ahead of the squad, which in turn was about 600 yards ahead of the platoon. Some advance units had a supporting group to cover the advance of the reconnaissance patrol, and an obstacle clearing group to remove any obstructions, such as barbed wire.
and mines, in the way.

An intelligence patrol consisted of a confiscation group and a raider group. The confiscation group had the mission of capturing enemy documents or obtaining orders of battle information by infiltrating enemy lines. The raider group had the mission of protecting the confiscation group within UN lines. Passwords used among members of the reconnaissance units were normally names of trees, rivers, towns, areas, etc., depending on the unit to which it was attached. On three-to five-man patrols, each member was numbered according to the rank held by him in the patrol.

Passwords were also used among local citizens who acted as temporary or low level agents. Often small patrols held the family of a temporary informant as hostages until the assigned mission of the informant was completed. Upon detection by hostile forces, the members of the reconnaissance unit would discard all weapons and act as refugees.

**Engineer Reconnaissance**

In a normal situation, the engineer combat battalion in support of a North Korean division was habitually allocated to subordinate regiments and functioned under the control of the regimental commanders within the general limits of the division field order. The mission of the engineers in regard to reconnaissance was summed up in an excerpt from a captured enemy document.
The engineers... will discharge all duties (engineer reconnaissance, fortifications, road building, crossing rivers, building bridges, camouflage, reconnaissance for drinking water, etc.) pertinent to activities of the other arms.

North Korean engineer reconnaissance patrols normally operated at night and penetrated as far as six miles into hostile territory or to a distance that permitted return to the assembly point within eight hours after departure. The mission was generally to secure information of engineer interest. The location, nature, and extent of hostile obstacles and mine fields; the existence of signal devices and booby traps and feasible methods of breaching such obstacles; the type and nature of hostile weapons emplacements; potential routes of attack, conditions of roads, and the location of river-crossing sites; water points and their location; and similar data of engineer importance were gathered. During the reconnaissance, North Korean engineers performed simple road and bridge repairs along future routes of advance but more extensive repairs were left to regular pioneer teams of the divisional engineer battalion.

In addition to the reconnaissance missions stated above, enemy engineers were also called upon to conduct special reconnaissance operations having limited and specific objectives. Road reconnaissance, bridge reconnaissance, reconnaissance for a stream-crossing point, and reconnaissance of hostile obstacles all fell into this category.
When reconnoitering a road prior to an advance, engineer patrols determined the road's load capacity, the condition of the road and the necessary repairs, whether such needed repair materials were available, the location of roadblocks and mines and how they could be detoured. Bridges and possible fords were reconnoitered, and the availability of materials needed to repair the bridge or to construct ferries was noted. Upon completion of the mission, a reconnaissance sketch was submitted to the division engineer officers.

Miscellaneous

Observation Posts

Both Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Forces utilized observation posts. Several observation posts were prepared on high ground in one definite sector. Each was selected with the enemy's operation and strength in mind and was well-camouflaged. Each observation post consisted of three members, two reconnaissance personnel and one staff officer. The method of observation was determined by high ranking officers only, and the mission of the observation posts was to obtain intelligence pertaining to both communication and the mission of United Nations Forces. When available, compasses, telescopes, and Very pistols were used in making observations.

At night, the enemy used ruses to locate United Nations artillery positions. Friendly artillery fire was adjusted on what appeared to be lights of enemy vehicles. The next morning, a thorough
reconnaissance of the area produced negative results. Because of the close proximity of the lights to the front lines, it was believed that the enemy simulated the vehicle lights to draw United Nations artillery fire and thus, by sound and flash, locate the gun positions.

Patrols

The Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Peoples' Army placed more weight on information gathered from civilians and reconnaissance patrols than on the results of their probing attacks. Another important source of information to the enemy was captured United Nations personnel. The enemy selected the time of arrival of United Nations forces at a new place as the opportune time to capture prisoners. United Nations personnel away from their units, stragglers, and wire men were desired prisoners. Patrols were instructed to cut telephone lines and wait to capture the linemen.

Prior to departing on a mission to capture prisoners, the patrol determined the weak point in the United Nations defense line and selected routes of approach and withdrawal. A rendezvous point was also selected.

A captured prisoner from the Reconnaissance Company, 15th North Korean Division, stated that reconnaissance units employed a capturing team which consisted of three groups with one leader. A support group of three men chose a location from which it could support the other two groups. Its primary mission was to engage United Nations Forces, if necessary, to allow the
group which was to take the prisoners to go as far as possible. A capture group of three men, led by the team leader, had the mission of capturing one enemy soldier while the other groups covered. When the leader spotted hostile soldiers, he gave a signal by whistling or using a pass word.

The capture group never attempted to capture more than three enemy soldiers because this increased the possibility of failure. When two or more United Nations soldiers were captured, one was kept and the others killed. After the capture group started to withdraw, the attack group of three men, which always worked with the capture group, remained in position to protect the capture group from a possible United Nations attack.

Daylight patrols consisted of approximately eighteen men, half of whom were dressed in civilian clothes. These were either unarmed or armed with pistols. The members of the patrols dressed in civilian clothes were usually North Koreans, and these attempted to infiltrate United Nations lines. The remainder of the patrol waited for their return and furnished supporting fire if needed.

Enemy patrol formations seemingly always assumed a column formation with the squad leader at the head of the column. If a three-column formation was employed, he assumed a position at the head of the center column. Chinese Communist Forces patrols appeared always to take the shortest route to their objective regardless of cover and concealment, and returned the same way.

* More men were used on night patrols.
The selection of routes differed with various units. Security guards were not employed as such, and a point or rear guard was rarely used.

Avoiding defiles and crests of ridges was a characteristic of enemy patrols when moving through mountainous terrain. Usually two parallel files were used to move forward just below the ridgelines of the mountains forming the defile. At night, each member of the patrol kept a three to five-pace interval from the man in front, and in daylight, from ten to twenty paces. Control of the parallel files was split between the squad leader and his assistant. Each led a file. Prearranged signals controlled the patrol—lighting of matches, blinking a flashlight, clapping hands, or whistling.

If the patrol was forced to move through a defile, a three-man point was sent fifteen to twenty meters ahead of the main body. If it received fire from the surrounding hills, the main body rushed through or withdrew. This action depended on the importance of the mission and the amount of fire received.

When the patrol squad moved across flat open terrain, it split into three columns. The squad leader led the three-man center column. The two flanking columns, consisting of three men each, moved slightly ahead of the center column. The assistant squad leader either led one of the flank columns or followed at the rear. Distance between the men and columns depended on the distance from the center column and the ability to hear the squad leader's signals. Audible signals were used in the open rather
than visual means. Similar formations were used by enemy patrols while moving through wooded areas. Control was maintained by whistling and lighted matches.

When a reconnaissance unit reconnoitered a ridgeline or high hill, a squad was normally sent out. When it reached the foothills, two patrol members took up posts at the base of the mountain and observed both sides of it. The remainder of the patrol gradually moved up the side in a single file. When the enemy reached a point near the center of the crest and just below, the patrol turned ninety degrees and moved in a single file straight up the crest. If the mountain was clear of hostile troops, the two outposts at the base were signaled to join the patrol. If a further reconnaissance was needed, the patrol proceeded. If not, it returned by the same route.

Unit control appeared to dictate the formation used by reconnaissance patrols. If a fairly wide area to reconnoiter was given a patrol, three or four members, with the assistant squad leader, were dispatched to reconnoiter the prominent terrain feature. The remainder of the patrol remained in a defiladed position to the rear. If the area was clear, a message or signal was sent back to the squad leader. If United Nations forces were sighted, a member of the first group was sent to warn the remainder of the patrol while the rest continued to observe. Usually enemy reconnaissance patrols withdrew if they saw hostile forces in any strength. Rarely were members left to continue observation.
If hostile forces were not sighted, another three-man team was
dispatched to another area on the flank, and the squad leader took
two men and reconnoitered an objective in the middle. Each team was
given a time limit to check its area, after which it awaited a signal,
either visual or audible, from the squad leader. When the signal
was received, the two teams proceeded to where the squad leader was--
the point of rendezvous. The entire patrol then returned to its unit
by using the same route of approach.

Probing Attacks

Enemy probing attacks were used to locate United Nations strong
points and weapons; to determine United Nations strength; to create
diversions; to throw the opponent off balance prior to the main attack;
and to determine the junction of units. Enemy probing attacks were
ordered to determine the junction point of ROKA units and other United
Nations forces. In the past, ROKA units habitually assumed perimeter
defenses at night without contact with other units on line or with its
reserves. Lack of physical contact or close liaison had been caused
by wide frontages and difficult terrain. Because of this, a series of
strong points with wide gaps existed between units.

Probing attacks were made anywhere from two weeks prior to an
attack to immediately preceding a main offensive. The size of the
probing unit varied from a platoon to a company depending upon the
judgment of the enemy division commander. Later in the campaign,
enemy attacks increased in size, using larger units than those
employed by United Nations Forces. An enemy regiment attacked a UN
Battalion, and a battalion attacked a company. Strong probing attacks took place about 1/2 hour to 1 hour after an intense preplanned supporting fire. Close liaison was maintained by messenger with the main body, located from 30 to 300 yards to the rear.

From the enemy unit, small groups were organized and a triangular formation employed. These groups tried to avoid the front of a strong point and circled to the flanks or rear using the base of a hill as an avenue of approach. Hills and weeds were avoided to prevent any possible noise. When contact was made with United Nations troops, action was swift and the enemy adopted a scattered formation. If United Nations forces withdrew, the probing force occupied the position until relieved by the enemy's main force. If it were unsuccessful, it attempted to capture prisoners and return, unless the opportunity for enrolement occurred.

**Countermeasures Employed Against Enemy Reconnaissance**

United Nations Forces employed air observation using flares to detect enemy reconnaissance patrols. Harassing artillery fire on likely enemy approaches and suspected enemy OPs aided in counteracting the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance. Counter-reconnaissance screens, sufficiently in advance of friendly lines to intercept enemy patrols, prevented the enemy from gaining information regarding United Nations positions.

Because of the enemy's stereotyped way of using the approach of shortest distance and his lack of all-around security, ambush patrols were easily employed.
Friendly defense perimeters in depth, with physical contact between units and prearranged fields of fire, prevented enemy patrols from determining friendly boundaries. Rigid control of fire also denied the enemy this information. Only troops immediately to the front of the enemy's probing action fired on him. Friendly flank elements held fire except in the face of a sizeable enemy attack.
SECTION E

Enemy Movement to the Attack Point

After the screening army or division which had assumed responsibility of the front had completed its reconnaissance, the two reorganized armies or divisions in the rear moved to an attack point. One of the two divisions was committed to a thrust on a maximum frontage of about three miles, usually through a weak point in the United Nations line. This point was preferably at the boundary of two units or a portion of the front defended by ROKA troops.

The attack point was usually near the juncture of two United Nations forces where it was difficult for one to support the other by fire, or it was near a point of shallow depth in United Nations strength. Salients were also selected as a departure point as it aided enemy supporting fire and hindered United Nations observation. Routes of communication were usually avoided.

Prior to the movement on foot to an attack point, enemy troops were issued from five to seven days' combat rations and were warned not to eat them until needed. Basic loads of ammunition were also issued, and the troops were instructed to utilize captured UN material. Battalion commanders were given their zones of attack at the assembly area. In movement from the assembly area to the attack point, multiple columns were again used, each in battalion strength. The columns showed no increase of emphasis on flank security; however, the rate of advance was reduced to about 2500 yards per hour. At 2000 hours, three squads were sent out within audible distance.
of the advance squad and about 200 to 300 yards from the center of
the column. The route of advance avoided highways and flat terrain.

About 2000 meters from hostile line, the enemy troops were
given a short rest period and were allowed to eat one combat ration.
At this point, company commanders were given their orders and took
over from the battalion commanders. Method of attack and the
time element were controlled by the division commander. No
flexibility was permitted the battalion and company commander in
this respect. Platoons maintained liaison with company head-
quartes by runner and deployed by squad columns to the left or
right with intervals of fifty to one hundred yards between squads
according to the terrain. The first squad used a line formation,
the second squad a triangular formation, and the third squad
echeloned to the left. Supporting weapons were set up, and indi-
vidual squads crawled as close as 800 yards to United Nations lines
where they awaited the signal for attack.
SECTION F

The Attack

Frontages in the attack

* In the attack, a Communist Army had a front of not less than twelve miles. The maximum division front was usually six miles, although on occasions, an enemy division conducted a thrust on a maximum three mile front. An enemy infantry battalion usually attacked on a 400 to 600 yard front, but in one instance a battalion attacked on a 300-yard front. This battalion was also approximately 400 yards in depth. An enemy company area varied in width from 100 to 600 yards depending on the terrain and the strength of the enemy. At night, troops were deployed over a large front, causing United Nations forces to distribute their fire.

During an offensive action, the enemy battalion commander usually took a position to the rear of his observation post about 100 yards from the attack point. Similar to our tactics, the regimental commander was found anywhere from the regimental CP to the battalion CP or from 200 to 2000 yards from the front. The division commander was located anywhere from the division rear area to the regimental CP during the attack or from 1000 to 5000 yards from the front. The regimental observation post was usually located about 200 yards from the front lines, whereas the division observation post varied from 300 to 2000 yards from the front. Movement of command and observation posts was conducted only by orders of the next higher commander.

* A Chinese Army corresponded roughly to a North Korean Corps.
The Assault Force

Multiple penetrations of United Nations line in a given sector were attempted by enemy forces. These were normally followed by an envelopment of the hostile flank. The attack formations were organized in great depth and continued their assaults by the passage of reserve units through the troops in contact. The depth allowed for a degree of flexibility in exploiting a penetration at will.

CCP units attacked frontally, employing a skirmish line varying from twenty to sixty men. Ineffective marching fire was used. During the day, the skirmish line approached to within 300 yards of United Nations positions before opening fire; but at night, it approached as close as 20 yards to friendly positions. In many cases, the initial assault wave was not armed with individual weapons but just carried grenades. Rifle fire, mortars, and machine guns engaged and fixed United Nations elements in support of the assault force.

In the frontal attack, the skirmish line was not always used. For example, in several instances CCP columns moved down the ridgelines toward friendly lines in columns of twos and fours. In another action, an enemy platoon charged United Nations positions in a single file.

When the enemy skirmish line was fired upon, it halted and the men took cover by laying prone on the ground. When the hostile fire lifted, the skirmish line moved forward again until it received fire. When some enemy soldiers were wounded, others took their places from defiladed positions.
In some attacks, the assault force utilized a wide-front and a shallow-depth formation. The first echelon deployed two-thirds of its strength. For example, the first line of a division deployed two regiments, and the first line of the regiment deployed two battalions. This continued down to smaller units. The mission of the second echelon was to mop up, capture prisoners, and observe disorganized United Nations forces. In the main line of attack, strength of the enemy units was distributed in depth. Only a few men with automatic weapons were used in the initial assault.

The battalion secondary echelon stayed in line as much as possible with the main direction of the attack. Regimental and divisional secondary echelons also attempted to keep in line with the main direction of assault carried out by battalions and regiments. When the penetration was accomplished, battalions through platoons continued to search for weak points so the attack could be continued successfully.

Another method of assault on United Nations positions revealed that a twelve-man enemy squad, each armed with a submachine gun, deployed to a base of a hill defended by friendly troops. A base of fire was placed on United Nations defensive positions by the squad while the remainder of the attacking company moved up the face of the hill in nine columns of three-man assault teams. These columns were distributed across the front.

When an assault failed, enemy troops withdrew by leapfrogging. If the assault troops were forced to disperse, they reported to the rear of the enemy lines for reorganization.
Mass Wave Tactics

When mass wave tactics were mentioned, one pictured a human sea of bodies overwhelming friendly positions. This was far from correct.

In the initial phases of the Korean conflict, North Korean Forces utilized a tactic which might easily be thought a human wave tactic. Attacks on United Nations positions were made in waves. The first wave was composed of young Koreans with very little training in the art of warfare. Each enemy soldier had a rifle but did not fire it. These were easily mowed down, but a costly ammunition expenditure resulted. A second wave of slightly more experienced Koreans who fired but seldom aimed their rifles took their place. These, too, were easily stopped but more friendly ammunition was expended. The third and fourth waves were still slightly trained troops. When United Nations firepower slackened due to the lack of ammunition, seasoned North Korean troops overran the positions. These frontal attacks were usually accompanied by flanking attacks.

In the latter phases of the conflict, the enemy deployed in depth and employed numerous waves of troops depending on the formation of the United Nations defensive positions. As a rule, too much strength was not concentrated in the spearhead of the attack. The terrain determined the number of men used. If the leading element failed to break through United Nations lines, a second and third wave were used until a breakthrough was established.
The distance between these echelons was so determined that United Nations artillery fire could never cover more than one echelon.

In one Chinese assault, small groups of enemy grenadiers, armed with bags of 20 to 30 potato-masher type hand grenades, attacked United Nations strong points and main positions. Enemy troops armed with submachine guns supported their attack. Heavier automatic weapons supported the attack from the flanks. The grenadiers and the troops with the submachine guns advanced at a walk using marching fire. As some were killed, others took their places from defiladed positions. Chinese Communist Forces accepted heavy casualties until the defending forces ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw. When enemy troops approached close to United Nations positions, they seldom used bayonet charges.

In the attack pattern infantry assaults followed an artillery or mortar barrage.

Prior to May 1951, the Chinese Communist Forces had the objective of overcoming United Nations forces of division size.

One FW from the 26th CCF Army remarked:

"The objective of the CCF will be to destroy US manpower. . . . Previously the CCF used large units such as three CCF divisions to one US division. In this manner the CCF expected to overcome the US with a sea of men. However, when the CCF concentrated such large numbers of men in a small area, it made them vulnerable to the US "sea of fire" (artillery). . . . the CCF will now concentrate on the destruction of units, attacking one US company with three CCF companies or one US battalion with three CCF battalions. The main emphasis will be on destroying small US infantry units, and to avoid concentrating large numbers of CCF troops where the US can bring its superiority of artillery into effect."

Massed manpower was used after May 1951 by the Communist forces to destroy individual small United Nations units.

Penetration of Mine Fields

The Communist engineer doctrine held the engineer staff responsible for breaching obstacles, neutralizing hostile field fortifications, and preparing a route of advance for the attacking infantry. Because of the shortage of engineer personnel, each combat unit was required to clear obstacles and mine fields in its own sector. Enemy engineers applied their efforts only in the sector of the main advance. If time permitted, minefields and obstacles were removed over a broad front, but usually, only a sufficient number of paths were cleared for passage of the assault troops.

Both Chinese and North Korean units sacrificed small details by sending them through suspected and known minefields to explode mines by stepping on them. Mine fields were determined by the enemy from interrogation of prisoners of war, local inhabitants of the area, observation of United Nations movement, and by estimating and evaluating the terrain and material found. In the early part of the conflict, the enemy also rounded up large numbers of civilians and drove them through minefields to detonate any trip flares, anti-personnel, and land mines.

Another method of clearing mine fields by enemy troops was the use of wire nets to which a powder charge was attached. The wire net was laid over the mines and then the powder bag was exploded. The downward pressure of the net exploded mines in the minefield. The
enemy also probed minefields using reconnaissance by fire. When a
firefight took place between United Nations and enemy forces, enemy
infantry units fired machine guns, tossed grenades, and fired 60mm
mortar shells into the minefield in an effort to detonate the mines.
Bangalore torpedoes, long pipes filled with explosives, were also
used once a minefield pattern was determined. When one was slid into
the minefield and exploded, it caused all mines within 1.5 yards to
detonate. When hand probing was done, the enemy soldiers kept a
sufficient interval in case one man detonated a mine. When this
happened, the other men closely checked the area for other explosive
charges. Hooks on long poles were also used for tripping cords
attached to UN booby traps.

Enemy skirmish lines in attack were proceeded by small units,
which had the primary purpose of clearing obstacles and destroying
United Nations firepower.

North Korean divisions organised assault units comprised of
engineers, infantry, and supporting arms. These units had four
elements: an obstacle clearing team, consisting of an engineer squad,
which cleared and marked paths through hostile obstacles; a
demolition team, consisting of an engineer squad with two flame
throwers, which neutralised pill-boxes; a capturing team,
consisting of rifle platoon, which attacked United Nations infantry
in an effort to isolate a strong point and prevent reinforcements;
and a firing team which supported the rest of the assaulting force
with a base of fire.
Under the cover of supporting machine gun fire, the obstacle clearing team marked a path through mine fields and obstacles. When it had completed its mission, it signaled the demolition team, which, utilizing all available cover and dead space, advanced by leaps and bounds. Reaching the objective, the latter attacked fortified positions with grenades, demolition charges, and flame throwers. The capturing team advanced with the demolition team and destroyed United Nations weapon emplacements and isolated the objective from its supporting infantry. It also supported by fire the assault force and prepared for any United Nations counterattack. During this operation, the firing team supported the demolition and capturing team by directing its fire at hostile fortifications and weapon emplacements.

Two types of assault teams were organized by North Korean forces. The first aided the assaulting enemy troops by removing obstacles in their approach and securing strong points. This type team was organized in each battalion by order of the regimental commander. It also had the mission of destroying United Nations artillery positions. The second type was assigned to a unit to destroy hostile command posts, signal centers, military warehouses, airfields, and to penetrate deeply into United Nations territory.

The commanding officer of the forward echelon regiment of a division organized two or three assault teams in each battalion. One or two were also organized as a reserve and attached directly to the regiment to secure its advance.
The assault team CP was composed of one team leader, a messenger, and a medical aid man. The team was divided into an assault sub-team, which consisted of one infantry squad with two engineers attached; a security sub-team, which consisted of four engineers with wire cutters and one heavy machine gun squad; two 60-mm mortars; and one anti-tank squad. A reserve sub-team acted with the security sub-team until assigned as an assault sub-team. The entire assault team consisted of approximately 50 men and was commanded either by a platoon leader or a company commander. The assault team which penetrated United Nations lines was equipped with enough firepower to withstand a counterattack.

Each man on the assault team carried one day's cooked rice and one day's raw food. Light dress was generally worn, and sometimes uniforms similar to United Nations were utilized.

The penetrating assault team cooperated closely with local guerrilla leaders, obtaining from them supplies and equipment. Each team had two alternate commanders; and the political sub-team leader, security sub-team leader or reserve sub-team leader was appointed the first alternate.

The assault team usually infiltrated friendly lines one by one and reorganized at a designated spot. If larger groups were used and hostile fire was received, the assault team sent a small group to engage and destroy the friendly strong point while the main body changed directions. The team rarely passed through a populated area; however, if it were necessary, it divided into small groups and passed through without attracting attention.
Often native guides were employed.

When an objective was to be taken, the assault sub-team attacked frontally under the covering fire of the machine guns. If United Nations forces discovered the attack, the assault sub-team approached on the run. In the meantime, the reserve assault sub-team attempted to envelope the resistance and strike the flank or rear. In an attack on a United Nations CP, fire was distributed among the tents or buildings, communication centers, and the various weapon emplacements. At a prearranged signal all fired at once. In order to fire on various weapon emplacements, the assault team was divided into several small groups — each group taking a specific target. If the buildings or tents were entered, the men were divided into groups, including one group of lookout men equal to the number of entrances. The enemy entered the buildings or tents at the same time. All actions were swift, and the assault teams quickly withdrew. If heavy resistance was encountered, the assault teams withdrew to prearranged assembly points.

Bayonet Companies and Penetration Unit

Chinese Communist Forces employed Bayonet Companies — "Chien Tao Lien" — and penetration units as assault units.

Bayonet companies were used to assault and breach United Nations positions. The first platoon had the mission of clearing the path for the remainder of the company. One squad, equipped with four PPsh submachine guns, 56 grenades, and seven rifles, acted as a spearhead. Two squads, equipped with bangalore torpedos, RPG-3 grenades, and rifles, acted as demolition squads, with the view of
demolishing triple United Nations defensive fortifications -- barbed wire, mines, and roadblocks. One squad, equipped with two light machine guns, in coordination with a 60mm mortar squad, covered the spearhead and demolition squads with fire.

The second platoon acted as the assault platoon and took action after the first platoon had completed its mission. The third platoon acted as the support platoon and reinforced the second platoon. If the bayonet company encountered heavy hostile fire, 82mm mortars and heavy machine guns from the regimental heavy weapons company were used for support.

Bayonet companies had the mission of removing obstacles in front of the second wave of troops and also had the objective of seizing United Nations CPs and artillery positions. Each regiment had one or two of these companies.

Penetration units were organized within individual enemy infantry companies. Their mission was similar to that of the bayonet company and the North Korean assault team--being that of clearing mines and obstacles hindering the enemy infantry advance.

The penetration unit was composed of an assault team, a demolition team, and a support team. The assault team was equipped with two 60mm mortars, two to three light machine guns, one heavy machine gun, plus three or four submachine guns. This team actually attacked United Nations positions. A demolition team, including demolition squads and anti-tank teams equipped with at least fifteen Bangalore torpedoes and Molotov Cocktails, cleared wire entanglements, abattis, mines, and demolished hostile tanks. A support team of six to eight men carried
and transported ammunition for the other two teams. The company commander led the penetration unit.

Exploitation of Weak Points in United Nations Lines

When the juncture between two United Nations units was noted by the enemy, or when he determined hostile forces were shallow in depth, he was quick to exploit. Reconnaissance companies and other units were sent through the weak point, mainly by infiltrating, to United Nations rear areas where road blocks were established and harassing attacks made.

In the early stages of the Korean conflict, the enemy demonstrated his ability of attaining supposedly inaccessible high ground and bridging other so-called natural obstacles. In one instance, a North Korean unit succeeded in infiltrating United Nations lines by scaling practically vertical cliffs. To accomplish this, the enemy shot a form of harpoon or anchor, with a rope attached, to the high ground. When it was secured, enemy troops climbed the rope and attacked United Nations positions from the rear. In one other case, United Nations troops depended upon a river as a natural obstacle against the enemy. The enemy troops swam the river and ferried individual equipment over on logs. Temporary bridges were quickly constructed capable of supporting light vehicles, oxcarts, and 69 foot troops.

The Envelopment Support Force

Great stress was placed on envelopment tactics by the Communist
forces in Korea. This is evident from the tactics employed and from captured enemy documents:

Surrounding tactics are a great threat to the enemy (UN) and it is easy to succeed with such measures. The enemy has no great strength, their morale is low, and fighting ability is not good. Not only is their rear unguarded, a strict watch not kept, but the enemy are careless of their guard to the front. Thus we can easily succeed in breaking through their lines and going around them.

The fundamental tactical doctrine of all Communist Forces combat echelons was that of "double envelopment" tactics, or attacking a weak point from two directions. One unit attacked the front as two others hit the rear from different directions.

The mission of the enveloping force was three-fold: first, it was to arrive undetected at a given location as quickly as possible. Second, it was to attack the United Nations line of retreat. Thirdly, it was to blockade the line of retreat. A point for a break-through of the enveloping force was generally selected about three miles from the point where the frontal assault of the United Nations Force was taking place. This was to avoid any possible United Nations cross fire. The depth of flanking penetrations and the distance between penetrations varied, depending upon the situation, terrain, and mission. All units moved as quietly as possible to avoid detection.

If small enemy units were engaged while thrusting towards the rear of United Nations lines, a small force was used to disperse them while the main body continued toward its objective. Other small groups such as assault teams and bayonet companies, were given the mission of attacking United Nations' command posts and artillery.
positions. Encirclements were accomplished in great depth behind UN lines.

If United Nations Forces counterattacked the Communist frontal assault, two regiments of an enemy division would attack the United Nations forces from the flanks. If United Nations forces did not attack, the two regiments would then advance to the flanks and attack to envelope the position. Enemy soldiers advanced slowly from any direction to avoid hostile artillery fire. They were taught to continue to advance without reference to their flanks.

Once behind United Nations lines, Communist forces established road blocks to cut off fleeing forces. The road block was usually started by ambushing the lead vehicle of a convoy and disabling it. Any vehicle that then attempted to by-pass was also disabled. This process was continued until the road was completely blocked with disabled vehicles. Machine gun fire and mortar fire were used extensively in road blocks along the normal small arms and automatic weapons fire. During the United Nations withdrawal north of HOENSONG in February 1951, the enemy lighted fires near the road at night to silhouette the vehicles as they passed. When friendly troops passed the fire, they were subjected to intense automatic weapons and mortar fire.

Commitment of Reserves

When a Communist division penetrated United Nations lines and was well to the rear of the hostile line units, approximately two battalions continued to engage United Nations reserves. The reserve enemy division, in the meantime, executed a single envelopment around
ATTACK MANEUVER SKETCH

(A)
PRIOR TO ATTACK

CCF 3

CCF 2   CCF 1

EN     EN

(B)
DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACK

CCF 2   CCF 3

EN

SYMBOLS

EN - ENEMY FORCES
1 - DEFENSIVE CCF DIV
2 - FLANKING CCF DIV
3 - RESERVE CCF DIV

->-> - ROUTES TAKEN BY DIVS

--- - AREA INDICATES FANNING

/ / - OUT OF DEFENSIVE DIV

U - PROBING ATTACK

UNCLASSIFIED
one flank and joined one of the penetrating forces moving out to the left or right. The remaining Communist division, which was about one night's march to the rear when the attack commenced, moved up to act as an active reserve for the attacking division.

Attack formations were organized in great depth, and the enemy's continual attacks were maintained by the consecutive passage of reserve units through units which were in contact. After the objective was secured, the enemy re-established his "two-up, one-back" formation. This tactic was basic to the Communist forces and was employed down to company level.

The reserve (or defense) army was generally located about 23 miles to the rear of the attacking armies, out of the range of United Nations artillery fire. It was close enough, however, to be available to any area upon demand.

Isolating Units

In a Communist attack, certain units of various sizes, depending on the situation, were designated as "isolating units." These were designated before the attack and usually accompanied the enveloping force. An isolating unit was assigned two missions: first, to attack reinforcements; and second, to destroy fleeing isolated United Nations units.

When the unit arrived at its destination, it divided into two segments. Each one dealt with one specific mission. Defensive positions were built in depth in rugged areas which provided excellent coverage of escape routes and easy camouflage. Strong shelters were
built and all spoil was removed. Two different type positions were constructed -- one to prevent United Nations reinforcements, and the other to deal with remnants of United Nations troops trying to break out of the encirclement. The two positions were constructed close enough to provide easy control, yet wide enough apart to afford maneuverability. A portion of the isolating unit was held for reserve, and anti-tank positions were set up at ambush points and spots where tanks might appear. All neighboring terrain features which dominated the position were seized to guarantee the security of the position and prevent the withdrawal of United Nations troops.

When United Nations forces counterattacked to relieve surrounded troops, a small enemy unit, with reinforced fire power, remained in position and engaged the assaulting troops. The main force deployed to the flanks and took cover. When the United Nations force drew close enough, the enemy counterattacked both flanks and the rear of the approaching troops.

Pursuit and Reorganization

When an enemy attack succeeded in surrounding United Nations forces, a major effort was made by the Communist units to separate and annihilate United Nations units. However, pursuit was carried out only when the Communist commanders saw the opportunity of encircling the hostile units. Generally, an enemy company, if supported by other units, pursued United Nations forces until contact was broken. When enemy troops pursued fleeing United Nations soldiers, they used shouting as a psychological weapon to add to the resulting confusion. In the early
stages of the conflict, the enemy buried caches of ammunition and weapons to insure supply during a pursuit.

When the enemy maintained sound logistical support, his advance generally conformed to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERRAIN</th>
<th>TYPE OF RESISTANCE</th>
<th>RATE OF ADVANCE (miles per day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Relatively flat</td>
<td>a. light</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. moderate</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. heavy</td>
<td>less than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rugged</td>
<td>a. light</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. heavy</td>
<td>less than 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extremely rugged</td>
<td>a. light</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. moderate</td>
<td>less than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. heavy</td>
<td>less than 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When extensive and rapid withdrawals were made by United Nations forces, the enemy normally allowed contact to be broken due to his difficulty in maintaining adequate logistical support. When an objective was seized by Communist forces, the enemy organized temporary defensive positions and issued orders for the next movement if one was contemplated. The second echelon of the attacking force mopped up the objective and consolidated the position.

The mopping-up method used by the enemy was a well-coordinated plan. Blockades were set up at key points on routes of communication to prevent enemy vehicular traffic from withdrawing. Special units, lightly equipped and wearing disguises, carried out systematic searches during daylight hours of all likely places which offered concealment for United Nations troops. Chinese Communist forces endeavored to capture small isolated groups of UN soldiers. Special emphasis was placed
on the capture of the leaders of United Nations units.

All mopping-up operations were conducted with a company or platoon front, with the search parties using a squad wedge formation. Reserve units were stationed at commanding key positions along mountain ridges to support the search and to provide for any emergency. Enemy troops moved quietly and under cover and executed small envelopments around isolated United Nations units. Ambushes were established before the searches began.

Countermeasures Taken by UN Forces Against Enemy Attack

Probably the most effective measure taken by United Nations Forces against Chinese Communist attacks was the effective use of artillery. Artillery fire was placed on all suspected routes into United Nations positions and was registered in on areas adjoining friendly units. Artillery and mortar concentrations were placed on vacated United Nations positions within a few minutes after the withdrawal of friendly troops.

During the April enemy offensive against the US I Corps, Communist troops came down valleys towards United Nations positions in massed columns of four, five, and six hundred at a time. In five days, the I Corps Artillery, including the artillery organic to divisions, fired 186,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

During the May Communist offensive, the artillery was unable to fire fast enough to suit General James Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army Korea. A basic load of ammunition for an artillery gun prior to May was 50 rounds per 105mm howitzer per day.
However, during the May offensive, the "Van Fleet" day of fire was instituted. Each gun fired five ordinary days' supply in one day.

One battalion of 105mm howitzers in the US 2nd Infantry Division fired 270 rounds per gun per day for three days; the battalion fired 14,580 rounds during the three day period.

Friendly mine fields and obstacles were booby-trapped and covered by fields of fire to prevent enemy mine reconnaissance and removal.

To prevent the enemy from using supposedly inaccessible terrain for his approach, UN Forces utilized a defense of all key terrain features with an all-around defensive perimeter. Units, although surrounded, preserved their tactical integrity until relieved by counterattacking United Nations Forces.

Air sorties against advancing enemy troops proved to be very effective. During night attacks by the enemy in April and May 1951, B26 and B29 bombers were guided to enemy formations by the use of the MPQ-2 radar system. An effective bomb ratio for four VT to one HE was used with very effective results against enemy troops. In isolated instances, patrols reported finding 800 to 900 enemy dead in the areas of the drops. Some B29 bombers used 100-lb bombs in six quick opening clusters and 500-lb general-purpose bombs with VT fuses on Chinese troops during the enemy's April offensive. Results were excellent.

To prevent attacks by infiltrating and enveloping Communist columns, rear CPs and artillery positions adopted all-around security.

*This was amply illustrated by the 23rd Infantry Regiment, US 2nd Infantry Division, at CHIYONG-NI in February 1951.
measures. Strong outposts to detect, report, and delay the enemy were set up, and an interior main battle line which could be quickly manned in strength and held at all costs was established. Trip flares and illumination shells revealed enemy movement, and all obstacles, natural and improvised, were covered by fire. Defensive positions were organized into tight perimeters at night; and during the day, patrols in strength were dispatched within the different units' zones of responsibility. UN units laid tactical wire (two aprons) and mines across the entire front of the defensive positions regardless of the rugged terrain. An alert wire, strung with tin cans and other noise devices, was placed about 200-300 yards in front of the UN outpost line of resistance. To strengthen boundaries between friendly units, extensive use was made of trip flares, mines, barb wire, and booby traps. Adjacent units coordinated their fields of fire in the area, and the outposts bordering the boundary were as amply supplied with ammunition as the strong point was in the middle of the defensive line.

UN Forces exercised fire control so as not to expose friendly positions, and all United Nations troops were oriented to the fact that the enemy attacked the flanks as well as the front. Alternate and dummy positions were employed to deceive the enemy, as his reconnaissance usually took place a few days ahead of the attack. Patrols with radios were dispatched one to two thousand yards in front of outposts to warn friendly troops of the advancing enemy.

Plans for an organized withdrawal were provided in case the need arose. Valuable lessons learned during the retrograde movements...
made by United Nations forces early in the conflict, were utilized. Tanks were employed at the head of columns to push disabled vehicles off the roads and allow columns to withdraw. At the same time, infantry forces screened key terrain features during withdrawals to eliminate enemy roadblocks. This high firepower of mobile antiaircraft weapons was also utilized.

Tank companies were used to great advantage in fighting delaying actions and permitting the withdrawal of friendly units.

Alternate defensive positions, manned by fresh reserves, aided United Nations forces in withdrawing and forced the enemy to fight a "war of attrition" rather than one of encircling and annihilating friendly units.

Counterattacks were planned before the enemy attacks to force a debouchment and proved very successful. United Nations counterattacks after the enemy May offensive regained all lost ground and forced the enemy to withdraw beyond his original attack point. By successfully exploiting the counterattack, UN forces established a new defensive line north of the 38th Parallel.
SECTION G

Support in Attack

Armor

Only during the early months of the Korean conflict did the enemy employ armor to any great extent. At the outbreak of hostilities, the North Korean People's Army had one armored component, the 105th Armored Division. This division had approximately 123 T34 medium tanks in its three regiments, 22 T34s and 11 T70s in a training regiment, making a total of 156 tanks.

Ordinarily Communist tank divisions and tank regiments were organized as independent units. The 105th Armored Division's component tank regiments were not under the control of the division but were used in support of other infantry divisions. Tactical control was exercised by the unit to which they were attached.

Tank assembly areas were usually ten to fifteen thousand yards from hostile positions, the line of departure for an attack about one to four thousand yards from the front. In one instance, a US Regimental Combat Team reported hearing enemy tanks racing their engines for several hours before they attacked. Tank speeds depended upon the terrain and the situation. Approximately ten to twenty miles per hour was achieved on roads, whereas a speed of only five to ten miles per hour was accomplished in open country.

As a rule, North Korean tanks were supported by infantry in an attack. The tank regimental commander received orders from the infantry commander and relayed them to lower echelons. A small
advance infantry party, equipped with mine detectors, checked in
front of the lead tank for mines. This party also sought out hostile
troop dispositions and located any warning devices and obstacles.
The main body of infantry advanced abreast about 300 to 500 yards
to the rear of the tanks. The tanks attempted to pin down United
Nations forces while the infantry maneuvered to the sides and
attacked the flanks of the hostile position. During the attack,
82
enemy tank crews drove buttoned up.

In other attacks, the infantry moved out about 1000 yards, and
the tanks then came on line and took defensive positions. From
these positions, the tanks shelled United Nations positions. North
Korean tank fire was moderately accurate; however, attempts by
the enemy to silence UN artillery fire with tank fire proved
ineffective due to the flat trajectory of the tank guns and the
position defilade tactics employed by United Nations artillery.

Early in the conflict, the enemy employed his tanks by twos
and often singly because of the nature of the terrain which
channelized movement. At other times, the tanks operated in groups
of three to five. One of the primary missions of enemy tank crews
was to seek and destroy hostile 3.5 rocket launcher teams.

By November 1950, the North Korean 105th Armored Division was
destroyed as a potential fighting force by the accuracy of United
Nations air power and infantry ground units. The superiority
of UN air strength forced North Korean tanks to move at night and
use secondary roads and trails. Because of this, the tanks became

*The NK 105th Armored Division was reconstituted by late summer 1951.
roadbound and herded close together, moving one at a time. Enemy tanks moved without lights at night.

The enemy adopted many camouflage measures in order to deceive United Nations airmen. When UN aircraft approached, the enemy tank crews lit smudge pots or oily rags near the tanks to give the impression that the tanks were burning. Other tanks used United States markings. Still others crashed into houses or used thatched roofs as concealment. Others parked beside destroyed trucks or Sh tanks.

**North Korean Artillery**

North Korean artillery was initially superior to that of any other oriental nation; however, it was rendered impotent by United Nations air power and its over-extended supply lines. North Korean artillery, in its battle doctrine, relied on a modified version of the battle-tested Soviet doctrine which called for the utilization of all available artillery to meet the requirements of each phase of a projected operation.

Each North Korean Artillery regiment consisted of two battalions (24) of 76mm guns, and one battalion (12) 122mm howitzers. In addition, each regiment had one antiaircraft battalion and one battalion of self-propelled artillery. Each infantry regiment had one battery (4) 76mm howitzers; one antitank company which consisted of six 45mm AT guns; and one mortar company composed of six 120mm mortars.

In an offensive action, the artillery commander determined the artillery requirements. This was done by personal reconnaissance.

*By fall 1951, NK Artillery became much stronger.*
by intelligence information, and by an analysis of United Nations capabilities. From this study, he determined the amount of artillery, including the artillery and mortars of subordinate units, needed to support the attack.

Each attack operation was divided into three phases -- the preparatory fire phase, the assault support fire phase, and firing phase during penetration and consolidation. The objectives of the enemy's preparatory fire were to break up the hostile command and observation system, to neutralize hostile supporting weapons, to open gaps through hostile defenses, and to soften up the opponent's defending forces. Preparatory concentrations varied from ten to thirty minutes according to the amount of available ammunition. It was SOP for the enemy to open artillery preparations at known firing positions in the United Nations main line of resistance. The enemy also executed one or more false transfers of fire to mask his impending assault. A final intense concentration of fire, accompanied by the fire of infantry automatic weapons, sometimes preceded the actual attack. For application of the preparatory fire, the artillery was emplaced after dark in well forward camouflaged positions. Flat trajectory weapons were emplaced 500 to 1000 yards from United Nations lines for direct laying; and the enemy's 82mm and 120mm mortars, which he classified as artillery, were placed in defilade. The mission of the mortars was to attack personnel and weapons in the United Nations line of defense by observed fire.
With the start of the enemy assault, general and direct support artillery transferred its fire to appropriate targets in depth and on the flanks of the United Nations' position. This was executed either at the signal of the division commander or automatically as directed in the operations plan. The missions of this assault fire were to continue the neutralization of UN firepower, to engage the opponent's reserves in order to prevent a counterattack, to isolate UN defenders from reinforcements and supply, and to deny the use of any withdrawal routes.

The artillery continued to support an enemy breakthrough in depth by prompt displacement. The enemy's 45mm or 76mm guns, by direct laying from the flanks or through intervals between platoons, fired on targets of opportunity. Occupation of the United Nations first line of defense signaled the forward displacement of direct support artillery. The sequence of displacement and routes selected were preplanned before the attack, and the movement was controlled by the assault regimental commander. Usually, the artillery displaced by echelon in a leapfrog manner. One-third displaced forward while two-thirds remained in position.

**CCF Artillery**

A Chinese artillery company consisted of three platoons, each platoon having two 105mm howitzer guns and one sub-squad of four men assigned as observers. The company had one squad of twelve men assigned as observers in addition to those in the platoons. An artillery battalion consisted of three companies, each with six guns.

*In a CCF artillery division. Most CCF infantry division organic artillery had 75-76mm guns.*
and the battalion had an additional forward observer squad of twelve men.

The company's twelve-man observer group maintained an OP forward of the artillery company. The assistant company commander was in charge of the group, and the distance in front of the company varied according to the tactical situation. Telephone communication was maintained by the OP with the artillery company commander. The principal function of the OP was to observe deployment of United Nations troops and the emplacement of their fortifications. This information was relayed to the company commander who in turn notified the regimental headquarters. This unit was responsible for the preparation of the night fire plan. Missions were usually fired between 2000 hours and 0300 hours in support of infantry assaults. This was done to avoid detection by United Nations aircraft.

There was no apparent liaison between the CCF artillery forward observer and the infantry unit to which the artillery battery was attached. The infantry requested fire through the infantry battalion commander, who, in turn, relayed the request to the battery commander. The battery commander then relayed the message to the observer team.

Only one fire plan was prepared by the regimental staff. No secondary or auxiliary plans were made. If, during the night, the enemy withdrew or shifted his position from left to right, no further plans were made until the following day.

In preparation for an attack, the artillery company was deployed approximately 200 yards from the United Nations line of
The first wave of enemy infantry deployed immediately to the artillery company's front. Successive waves of infantry were echeloned to the rear. No preparatory fires were laid, and the initial barrage occurred when the assault wave reached a point approximately 100 yards from the UN MLR. Fire was continued until the objective was neutralized. During the attack, the forward OP was responsible for maintaining artillery fire ahead of the attacking units. This was done by relaying the message to the company commanders, who in turn, by the use of messengers, informed gun crews to shift fire or lift it. The observer squad assigned to each platoon computed the necessary corrections.

Artillery company weapons fired as a unit on one section of the assigned target and shifted as a unit to other sections of the target. Control fire was oral for those weapons nearest the company commander, and written to the guns beyond the range of voice. As a consequence, firing was irregular although concentrated. Fire power of the artillery company was massed. Interdictory and harassing types of fire were not employed by the CCF.

For night operations, the divisional artillery battalion was assigned to the regiment having the most difficult mission. The regiment assumed operational control and prepared the fire plan, although the division commander reserved the right to divert the artillery battalion to support another regiment. No flexibility was permitted once a fire plan was made. It was either adhered to or CCF artillery improved vastly since the spring of 1951. It became more intense and more accurate.
abandoned until the next day, when a new one was formulated. The artillery battalion forward observation post was charged with shifting the fire within the target area and controlling it.

During the night operations, the divisional artillery battalion was no closer than 600 yards from United Nations lines. The eighteen guns in the battalion were normally assigned a general target area approximately 200 feet in diameter. If it exceeded that, the battalion awaited specific requests from the infantry battalions, through regiment. Fire power of the battalion was concentrated upon one section of the target.

It was the doctrine of the CCF that mortars had the primary mission of destroying personnel; and artillery, of destroying hostile fortifications.

During daylight assault, artillery pieces on the right and left flanks of the regimental artillery company were spaced approximately 400-500 feet apart and had a depth of 300 feet. The guns remained relatively immobile and were well camouflaged. At night, it was the general practice for each weapon to fire five rounds and move 100-200 yards to avoid detection.

Mortars

Mortars were habitually emplaced on the reverse slope of a hill about 10 yards from the crest. This afforded the enemy several advantages; the forward observer was within speaking distance of the gun crew, and by placing himself on the gun-target axis, made computations for deflections unnecessary when obtaining initial fire 86
data. This position afforded the gun crew protection from United Nations flat trajectory fire.

Mortars were infrequently used in batteries but were mostly employed singly. Except for his light mortars, the enemy used previously prepared concentrations which were called down by infantry units as needed. This indicated a poor communications network which limited the use of observation posts and forward observers. The enemy adapted the policy of firing five to ten rounds rapidly and then deploying. Light mortars were zeroed in on a target and heavier mortars were brought in as needed.

The main mortar firing positions was circular in shape with the forward edge about 1 yard deep and the rear edge 1/2 yard deep. Very little effort was made to camouflage this position as it was only occupied during the actual firing. At all other times, the gun was taken out of position and concealed in smaller well-camouflaged holes about 5 to 10 yards from the firing position.

Miscellaneous

Captured enemy documents indicated that each Communist unit making an assault in strength had a supporting fire power unit or team, equipped with battalion (82mm) mortars, recoilless guns, and type 92 infantry guns. This unit was supposedly commanded by a battalion cadre member.

The supporting regimental fire unit was equipped with heavy mortars, mountain guns attached from the division, and field guns and howitzers attached from a CCF army. In addition, artillery pieces, were set up by artillery units themselves.
The mission of the field guns and howitzers was to make breaches in hostile positions for infantry units to penetrate; to neutralize United Nations artillery positions; and to carry out a creeping barrage. Two batteries were used to neutralize UN artillery and to furnish a creeping barrage. Mountain guns fired at all obstacles in front of the attacking enemy infantry units.

During the latter part of the conflict, CCF artillery used high angle fire on a main objective. Neutralizing fire was also placed on adjacent strategic points. CCF mortars were set up on forward slopes for firing, and artillery was brought well forward in daylight.

In the US 24th Infantry division's sector, positions were found which indicated artillery was left in position for a protracted length of time. No roads were in evidence, and deep emplacements with connecting ammunition pits and roof shelters were found. Because of the overhead protection against UN aircraft, the pieces were believed placed to fire on preselected targets because of the narrowness of the field of fire, which varied from 200 to 500 miles.

In other instances, artillery was echeloned in depth and was well dispersed to combat UN patrols. Frequent displacements were made by enemy artillery to avoid UN observation and counterbattery fire.

Countermeasures Taken to Counteract Enemy Artillery and Armor

Perhaps the two most effective countermeasures employed against enemy artillery and armor were the use of counterbattery artillery fire and air strikes.

*This was probably a regimental 70mm infantry gun often used for direct fire. This gun was usually employed singly.
To overcome the fortified positions of enemy artillery, friendly artillery employed intense concentrations of accurately adjusted fire using a preponderance of fuze delay. Area fire, using approximately 100 rounds of 155mm or 105mm with mixed fused delay and VT, was also effective. Tanks were engaged with VT fuze and fuze quick, forcing the enemy armor to button up and also immobilizing some by damaging a track. Once the tanks were immobilized, UN artillery used WP shear area fire to set the vehicles on fire. High angle fire, using a combination of fuze quick, VT, and fuze delay, was employed against mortars on reverse slopes.

The effectiveness of air strikes destroyed the North Korean armor potential by November 1950. The enemy's extensive use of camouflage measures demonstrated his respect of United Nations air power.

United Nations armor was also effective against enemy tanks during the early days of the Korean conflict. The US 70th Tank (Heavy) Battalion destroyed two enemy T34 tanks with one round of 76mm HVAP each. During the period prior to 2 November 1950, 3.5 rocket launcher teams were used in conjunction with friendly tanks. The system employed had friendly tanks drive the enemy tanks off the road into covered positions away from accompanying North Korean infantry. The US rocket team gunners then advanced under cover and destroyed the enemy tanks.
The Daylight Attack

In rare instances, the Communist Forces employed daylight attacks. The feasibility of such an attack depended upon several factors; first, and most important, the battle success outweighed the casualties in the opinion of the enemy commander. Second, the weather shielded his movement from observation and attack by United Nations air power.

In one attack, the enemy took advantage of the fact that United Nations forces were disorganized and could not differentiate between friend or foe. In the preponderance of enemy attacks, the night attack was the favored assault.

The Night Attack

Communist Forces relied on night warfare because of the overwhelming force of United Nations artillery and air power. Lieutenant General Na Chang, Commanding General, 4th CCF Army (Corps) stated:

Daylight warfare had become disastrous for the CCF because of a lack of air power, consequently night envelopment must be employed.

The tactics employed at night were the same as employed during the day. An envelopment followed the initial engagement.

The enemy selected the cover of darkness as advantageous for attack because it minimized the effectiveness of United Nations air, artillery, and tank support. The attacks were designed to secure an objective prior to daylight. Junior officers were trained to

*The 4th CCF Army (Corps) was never in Korea.
estimate the situation during daylight, and to determine whether an
attack should be pressed at night.

The enemy exercised control at night by the use of white banners,
armbands, and placards. Ropes, lime, trumpets, and whistles were used
to indicate directions and transmit messages. In one instance, the
enemy used a series of rice straw doughnuts about 24" in diameter to
guide troops into position.

At night in an assault, small North Korean units, in single file,
approached United Nations positions through defiles, valleys and along
trails, keeping a ten-yard interval between men. About 100-200 yards
from the hostile position, the attacking force deployed. When each
man was in position, the leader fired a shot whereupon all rushed the
United Nations defensive positions. If a withdrawal was necessary,
the enemy troops were supported by heavy and light machine guns.

In one instance after attacking enemy troops had penetrated
defensive positions of the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd US Infantry
Division, they placed illuminating grenades on both flanks of the
area. This enabled enemy troops slightly to the rear to coordinate
their movements and to increase pressure on the penetrated areas.

Chinese favored the time of the full moon to launch major
offensives, evidently assuming that the advantage of tactical control
offset the danger of United Nations bombing and strafing. North
Koreans preferred to attack on dark nights.

The enemy employed various ruses at night to gain entrance
into United Nations positions. Most typical was the favorite trick
of pretending to be ROK troops. On one instance, enemy soldiers gained entrance into the Netherlands Battalion perimeter by calling out, "O-kay, we're ROKs." In a resulting firefight, Netherlands soldiers noticed the enemy wearing ROK insignia. On other occasions, North Koreans used wooden clappers for deceptive purposes to simulate gun fire. Shortly after the Communist Chinese Forces entered the conflict, they conducted a preliminary reconnaissance of UN positions by a ruse. Four flutists deployed around a base of a hill about fifty yards apart in the open and under a full moon and played tunes. For five minutes they played while skirmishers kept shuttling up to them and withdrawing. They succeeded in drawing fire which disclosed the outline of the perimeter.

Communications

Lack of communications hampered Communist Forces considerably in battle, especially at night. This statement was borne out by a captured enemy document entitled "A Collection of Combat Experience."

Headquarters: XIX Army Groups

Difficulty of maintaining signal communications at night after the deployment of troops resulted in difficulties of command control. . . .

Because of poor communications, the enemy had difficulty in either controlling his units or halting an attack. For this reason, the enemy often had to continue his attack even under adverse conditions.

Both the Chinese Communist Forces and the North Korean People's Army utilized the same modes of communication -- radios, bugles, flares, whistles, flags, and messengers.
Radio

Radio communications were used on regimental level and higher. On rare occasions, units smaller than a regiment had American SCR 300 radios. Wire nets extended down to and included battalions and fire support companies. All messages transmitted by radio were coded. Transmissions in the clear were made only to direct artillery fire, to avoid disaster in battle, and by enemy armored units in actual combat. The principal axis of communication ran from the forward CP to the commander's CP. The nerve center of the entire North Korean signal system was the base message center at the forward CP.

During the early part of the conflict, North Korean forces established radio relay stations forward of the advance message center on the flank from which an development of United Nations forces was to take place. The enemy found radios not too reliable in Korea because of the difficulty in keeping wire in due to the effectiveness of UN artillery fire and the failure of batteries in cold weather. American 100 and Chinese Communist Forces telephones were used by the enemy.

Bugles — Bugles were used at company and battalion levels for signals primarily, and as a fear weapon. All signals were short and pre-arranged for withdrawals, attacks, or consolidation of positions. During the attack of some enemy regiments, bugle calls preceded the main assault. However, this varied from regiment to regiment. An extensive number of calls was used during an attack.

As a fear weapon, the bugle was employed in two ways: first, it was used as a means to draw fire and disclose the outline of a
United Nations unit's defense perimeter; second, buglers were deployed around the perimeter to create the impression of an enemy envelopment in great strength. Finally, when a United Nations position was taken, enemy buglers sounded "Taps" to demoralize retreating UN soldiers.

Whistles — Whistles were used only during close engagement as a method of group control. It was apparently used only at platoon and squad level, and its primary use was to urge troops forward. When an enemy attack faltered, the whistle signaled a resumption of fire. Whistle messages were prearranged before an attack.

Flares — Flares were one of the principal types of visual signals used. Different colors signified short prearranged messages. These were changed frequently. The North Koreans used three flares to request supporting fire to commence and five flares to halt it.

An electric torch was used to rally troops on a position.

Flags — Flags were used for communications in combat, primarily to direct battalion-size and smaller units under tactical conditions. Various movements meant orders to attack, withdraw, commence firing, or drop to the ground. All prearranged orders were tactically controlled. These orders were used until an engagement was finished, and then new orders were issued.

The commander of a unit regulated the usage of flags, and only battalion, company, and platoon leaders waved them. When a blue flag was used, it was handled by a squad leader to indicate a particular prearranged squad signal. The location of other signal flags indicated the presence of the commander or the location of a
command post.

Messengers -- Messengers, both mounted and dismounted, were used on all levels -- each unit from platoon size and up had a group of messengers. These messengers carried both oral and written messages. Runners were used for communications between patrols and parent units.
SECTION I

Weakness in Enemy Offensive Tactics

1. The Communist attack doctrine, as observed in all major enemy attacks in Korea, was inflexible. Subordinate units were not permitted to make adjustments which terrain, friendly defenses, or other factors might have indicated as being desirable. Alternate or secondary missions were not assigned to assaulting units. Enemy patrols always utilized the routes of shortest approach and return. Enemy patrol formations were standard and made no allowance for differences in terrain or friendly disposition. Preparations for an attack followed an inflexible and unvarying pattern which soon became apparent to friendly forces. And finally, enemy insistence, due to inflexibility, on mass employment tactics proved costly in the face of United Nations air and artillery fire.

2. The enemy lacked sufficient logistical support to sustain an extended offensive.

3. The enemy lacked communications facilities. This hampered control of units in the attack, and may have been the basic cause for the inflexibility of enemy tactics.

4. Enemy units employed little flank support or security during a tactical march.
CHAPTER TWO

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

SECTION A

Defensive Indications as Determined by Friendly Forces

1. Elaborate Bunkers, covered artillery positions, and troop shelters.

During periods of defensive operations, either when preparing for a new offensive or denying certain terrain features to UN forces, the Communist forces prepared elaborate fortifications which successfully withstood UN air and artillery attacks. These positions were placed on commanding terrain features and hindered UN advances.

2. Appearance of barb wire entanglements in front of enemy positions.

Barb wire entanglements were first reported in the North Korean sector of the eastern front in June 1951, although some use of wire by the enemy in defensive positions was encountered in the central front as early as March.

3. Extensive AT obstacles (mines, ditches, barricades) on routes of advance.

The appearance of numerous obstacles to hinder United Nations vehicular and tank traffic indicated a defensive phase in the enemy's operation. Barricades and ditches of various types were used, not only on routes of advance, but also in other sectors to channelize UN troops into enemy fields of fire.

4. Lack of FW statements of an impending offense.

Enemy FWs were well informed of their offensive operations, and United Nations officers were able to fix the approximate date of attack.

from their statements. Lack of information of such attacks indicated an enemy defense.

5. **Stockpiling of supplies.**

   This was an indication of either offensive or defensive action.

6. **A stubborn defense line instead of an elastic defense.**

   The use of a stubborn defense line immediately after an enemy offensive indicated a lack of counteroffensive potential and a need of time for regrouping and re-equipping. The enemy also displayed a stubborn defensive attitude when his supply bases were threatened. It was also probable that, during the latter stages of the Korean conflict, North Korean troops realized they were fighting for their homeland and would not trade space for time. The armistice talks no doubt influenced the Communist armies to resort to a stubborn defense line.

7. **The use of an active defense (numerous counterattacks).**

   Communist Forces used numerous counterattacks to restore lost positions and to hinder United Nations advances. Units from squad to battalion size were used in these attacks.
SECTION B

The Elastic Defense

It was apparent that two types of defensive tactics were employed by the enemy during the Korean conflict. The North Korean People's Army employed a modified type position defense, although some provision was made for an elastic type defense, and the Chinese Communist Forces used a mobile defense.

Chinese Communist Forces

The Chinese Communist Forces did not employ the principle of a main line of resistance nor a position defense. When the enemy expected to be in one place for three or four weeks, he employed a defensive army which occupied the sector of two offensive armies. In a defensive phase, the CCF employed a tactical formation of "one up, and two back." When a defensive army of division was in a delaying position, one division or regiment was placed on line as a screening and delaying force. Small forces from the defending unit launched limited attacks to confuse and delay United Nations Forces. In the meantime, the other two divisions of the army, approximately three 105 hours' walking distance to the rear, rested and reorganized.

When United Nations Forces attacked, the unit on line offered moderate to stiff resistance but withdrew slowly when forced to do so. When it withdrew as far back as the two reserve units, a counterattack was launched to restore the lost ground. If the reserve units were unable to launch a counterattack, the enemy slowly withdrew to the offensive armies in reserve. A major counteroffensive was then

* Since June 1951, the CCF definitely employed a position defense.
SYMBOLS:

A - DIVISION ON DEFENSE
B - RESERVE DIVISIONS OF DEFENSIVE ARMY
C - DEFENSIVE ARMY HO
D - OFFENSIVE ARMY ASSEMBLY AREA

(REORGANIZATION & REGROUPING

APPROXIMATELY 100 KMS

3 HOURS MARCHING TIME

POSITION IN THE DEFENSE
launched by the CCF.

In an elastic defense, the holding of terrain was of minor importance. The enemy's major desire was to create weaknesses in the United Nations offensive which could be exploited by counter-effort. The countereffort was an important part of the elastic defense employed by the enemy, and it was mainly directed toward an exposed United Nations flank.

Parusel of enemy documents leads this writer to believe that the enemy propagated his soldiers about the importance of the elastic defense tactic. Evidently this was done to bolster morale after withdrawing from hard-won positions. The enemy referred to this tactic as two-fold: "hard work" -- construction of emplacements and field works in every place to which they moved, and "roving motion" -- employments of troops in attack or defense to delay a United Nations offensive. "Strong defense, deplete the enemy, find the chance, and destroy the enemy" was the theme of the Chinese Communist Forces high command.

CCF regiments usually deployed in three lines. Two-thirds of each unit was supposedly disposed on the front line with one-third kept on both flanks for a possible counterattack. Deployment was along a narrow front and in great depth. Command and observation posts were set up on favorable terrain, and telephone communications were established between the OP and the CP. The first and second defensive lines consisted of well-constructed fortifications connected by communications trenches. Dummy camouflaged positions were built to draw United Nations fire. All hill positions were
defended by small units adequately equipped with automatic weapons, and all fields of fire appeared to be well-coordinated.

Most defensive works for the first line were constructed on the forward slope of hills facing the direction of United Nations approach. The second line of defense was usually set up on the reverse slope of the hills, or where its fire power could readily support the first line. All-around defensive positions were built to guard against United Nations surprise attacks. Fields of fire covering as large an area as possible were selected, with the front line having the preponderance of machine guns and automatic weapons.

To counteract United Nations daylight gains, CCF troops sent small groups to counterattack at night to regain lost ground. Sometimes, two or three such attacks a night were employed.

North Korean People's Army

The North Korean elastic defense, or in their terminology "mobile defense," was characterized by the counterattack and withdrawal to successive lines of defense. It was designed to allow an inferior force to trade space for time against a superior force. The general execution of this maneuver was not greatly different from the tactics of the United Nations Forces; however, no flexibility was permitted the subordinate commanders. All withdrawals and disengagements had to be made on the order of the senior commander.

Each regiment occupied two lines of defense at the same time; but the bulk of the North Korean force was concentrated in the forward position. The enemy's defensive doctrine specified the
distance between the two positions had to be great enough to cause an attacker to displace his artillery and mortars after occupying one of the sectors. One third of the effective strength of the unit on defense was deployed as a reserve well to the rear of the second line of defense.

The forward unit opened fire at extreme ranges in an attempt to force United Nations forces to deploy and make time-consuming preparations for the assault. However, before the forward line could be pinned down by UN fire, it withdrew to rear positions under cover of supporting weapons. Concurrently with the withdrawal to the second line, counterattacks were immediately launched to throw UN forces off balance and inflict casualties. If the forward line was unable to disengage, a counterattack was launched against the attacker's flank by the troops in the rear position. This was done only on the order of the senior commander.

Withdrawals

Inverted-V Formation

During the early phases of the Korean conflict when UN forces restricted their offensive warfare to the low ground and valleys, the Communist forces used an inverted-V formation in conjunction with a mobile force. By withdrawing to the high ground, they permitted United Nations troops to enter the V, at which time a superior numerical force encircled the attacking column and closed the V. As one North Korean PW stated:
Our troops make strategic withdrawals when the enemy (UN) attacks; our troops then attack from the flanks and encircle the enemy with superior numerical strength. In most cases the enemy (UN) had no additional forces on their own flanks to assist them.

Enemy groups occupied the forward slopes of ridges paralleling low ground and placed fire on the United Nations columns. An attempt was made to destroy the first and last vehicle of a column to canalize and halt movement on the narrow roads. A sizeable enemy force deployed to the rear to prevent retreat of friendly units and the arrival of UN reinforcements.

Tactical traps were employed by the enemy to lure United Nations troops into an area. Withdrawals were made by some enemy troops to entice UN forces into a hasty exploitation. Other enemy troops positioned themselves to strike the flank or flanks of the attacking force, in an attempt to destroy small UN units. In selecting such an ambush site, the number of riflemen on the first line was decreased, but an increase of automatic weapons was provided. The bulk of the enemy troops deployed under cover to afford a quick attack.

**Delaying Parties**

The covering force or delaying party which covered an enemy withdrawal was usually selected from the last unit to break contact with United Nations Forces. These delaying parties were placed at strategic points where the land was least favorable to attack, where the roads were poor and natural approaches few. Thus, a small number of men armed with automatic weapons were able to hinder a United Nations attack.
The covering forces ranged in size from a 3-man group to a platoon, although a squad was normally employed. The variation in size of the group depended on the size of the withdrawing unit and the pressure exerted by United Nations Forces. A platoon usually covered the withdrawal of a battalion. The mission of the delaying party was to divert a possible United Nations attack by increasing their volume of fire on UN positions. Radios were not used to control the delaying action.

A marked change took place in the delaying action of CCF covering forces after their May 1951 offensive. Usually, the Chinese, in their withdrawal tactics, moved out after dark leaving no delaying parties. Close contact with United Nations units was avoided. A marked departure from this tactic was noted when CCF units defended tenaciously, even to death. A covering force was forbidden to withdraw until ordered to do so by higher authority; rarely was such an order issued.

Withdrawal Tactics

The regiment was the lowest echelon of command authorized to order a withdrawal. Assembly areas were not predesignated, and the units withdrew as far as possible during the hours of darkness under the protection of the delaying force. In a battalion withdrawal, all companies moved as one column in single file along the same route. Regiments used the same procedure. Variations of column movement were dictated by the terrain and enemy situation. One or more battalions also moved in parallel, single-file columns. Contact between battalions was maintained by radio communications and runner.

Enemy artillery and heavy weapons deployed before the withdrawal
Under covering fire of one squad of the 1st Platoon, Company A moves east in single file along the ridgeline toward Company B. As elements of the 3d Platoon, Company A, reach the right flank of the 4th Platoon, Company B, the latter moves out in single file toward Company C. When elements of the 6th Platoon, Company C, contact the 7th Platoon, Company C, the latter moves north leading the Battalion. Upon reaching the foot of Hill X, units are checked off by the Battalion Staff and Company Commanders. Upon order of the Battalion Commander, the covering squad then joins its parent unit. Battalion Headquarters is positioned between Companies B and C.
of the main body of troops. This was due to their lack of mobility. As far as could be determined, no artillery or mortar fire supported a withdrawal. Counterattacks were rarely made in conjunction with a withdrawal, although the last units to disengage, together with the delaying party, increased their volume of fire.

Use of the Counterattack

Enemy counterattacks were an integral part of their defensive system and were used for various purposes: (1) to blunt the edge of a United Nations assault; (2) to annihilate a portion of the hostile force; and (3) to recapture a lost position.

If the purpose of a Communist counterattack was to delay United Nations Forces or blunt an offensive, the attack began at night, but early enough to end the engagement by daybreak. If its motive was to regain a captured position, the attack began early in the evening, to permit recapturing the objective by midnight. This enabled the remainder of the night to be spent in organizing defensive positions to make the objective tenable for the next day's fighting.

The enemy counterattacked United Nations positions which he thought lacked depth or strong rear support. He also counterattacked when United Nations Forces appeared disorganized, or when the United Nations Forces used the captured position as a starting point for a new offensive action without organizing it for defense.

The enemy attacking unit varied in size from a company to a regiment depending upon the situation. A thorough reconnaissance of the terrain in the vicinity of the objective to gain information on
United Nations strength, disposition, and armament was accomplished by late afternoon or early evening of the day of the attack. All members of the attacking unit were familiar with the routes of approach, and the signals to be used, and the plan of attack before moving out.

The location of the prearranged counterattack unit was set up on the flank at the depth of the defense line 50 to 80 yards to the rear of the front defensive position. Communication trenches connected the rear position from the front. An order for the attack was usually oral. The attacking force was usually divided into widely extended small groups of squad and platoon size which approached United Nations lines quietly, deployed, and then attacked swiftly. Generally one squad moved out first in a triangular formation with one angle pointing forward.

Envelopments, turning movements, and penetrations were employed by the enemy in his night counterattacks. Enemy troops infiltrated into UN rear areas and endeavored to make the main assault on both flanks of the United Nations position between the frontline troops and reserves, or against a sector weakly defended. The enemy counterattack did not extend beyond the limit of frontal supporting fire, and when a position was taken, the enemy main body dispersed to the flanks to avoid UN artillery fire.

If a planned withdrawal from the sector was to take place, enemy reserve elements covered the withdrawal of the attacking unit. If the position was to be held, the enemy constructed fortifications and consolidated his positions.
Countermeasures Taken By UN Forces Against the Elastio Defense

The same defensive measures employed against the night attack of enemy forces in a major offensive worked equally well against his counterattacks. A tight perimeter in depth, together with coordination of fire between units, permitted United Nations units to withstand and repel enemy counterattacks.

A favorite tactic of United Nations Forces against the enemy’s elastic defense was to press the attack until an enemy strong point was contacted. Friendly units then withdrew and placed artillery concentrations on the enemy’s positions. To protect against the inverted-V formation of the enemy, UN forces screened all high ground in their forward movement and kept flanks well protected.

United Nations Forces determined the extremities of the Communist defensive positions by observation of its pattern of fire. When enemy action indicated a withdrawal, artillery concentrations were placed on both ends of the enemy’s positions as well as on the delaying party. This artillery fire was echeloned in depth to cover any possible enemy withdrawal route. Rapid follow-up of the enemy withdrawal by UN Forces often prevented him from reorganizing and preparing new defensive positions. In small unit actions, the hostile covering force was easily by-passed and the withdrawing main body engaged. The enemy occasionally employed a rear guard. UN tank units proved effective in by-passing the enemy strong points.

In October 1951 near KUMSONG, tanks from the 72nd US Tank Battalion by-passed one such strong point and surprised the enemy as he was
being relieved by another unit. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the hostile force.

United Nations air power, by the use of radar, inflicted heavy losses on enemy troops as they withdrew at night.
SECTION C

The Stubborn Defense

Late in the Korean conflict, the Communist Forces changed from an elastic defense to one utilizing a main line of resistance (MLR). Several theories may be advanced to justify the change, although no concrete proof has been found to support any one.

In the past, Communist Forces could afford to trade space for time in order to launch countereoffensive measures. However, when the enemy reached the 38th Parallel, he could not afford to "lose face" by sacrificing territory of the homeland of the North Korean people. To do so, he may have felt, would cause loss of respect of the North Korean people and possibly of the entire oriental world.

In view of a possible armistice, to permit sections of North Korea to fall into United Nations hands would have given UN delegates a weapon in negotiation. Furthermore, forcing the UN troops to halt at the 38th Parallel would have enabled the Communist world to retain its "iron curtain" in Korea.

Probably the most logical reason for the change from elastic to stubborn defense tactics was the effect of United Nations air and artillery en masse of enemy troops. Formerly, the Communists attempted to destroy friendly division-size units by superior weight of numbers. But because of friendly air and artillery, the enemy resorted to attempts to annihilate small friendly units. This tactic was more effective when the MLR in defense was employed.

A Communist document supports this theory as follows:
TYPICAL DEFENSIVE PERIMETER OF A RIFLE COMPANY

SKETCH PREPARED BY ATIS-GHQ FEC
FROM MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS
REF: BM DOC 200117, 201314

SKETCH 2
We are to defend and further fortify the present positions of our battalions; therefore, we must not yield a single inch of ground or allow even one enemy soldier to penetrate. At the same time, in order to inflict a large number of casualties, we must be on the alert in the front lines so that we may seize upon suitable opportunities for aggressive small unit action.

Establishment of Defensive Positions

North Korean People's Army

The North Korean Army employed a modified type position defense. This consisted of a main line of resistance composed of a series of self-sufficient islands. Each island was capable of all-around defense; most were capable of mutual support by fire. The North Korean defense doctrine stressed the fact that the effectiveness of its defensive positions depended on the co-ordination of all types of fire with antitank defenses and obstacles.

Depths of North Korean rifle units varied. A regiment sometimes extended to a depth of six miles from the main line of resistance; a division sometimes extended to a depth of twelve miles. Normally, a North Korean battalion occupied a front of about 2000 yards and a depth of 1500 to 2000 yards. In mountainous terrain, an enemy battalion often defended a front of 3 1/2 miles.

The North Korean main line of resistance had a depth of three to four miles and was divided into regimental and battalion sectors. These consisted of a number of strong points protected by obstacles. About 1 to 1 1/2 miles in front of the MLR was a security line, manned by an enemy battalion, which consisted of number of individual strong points protected by a system of obstacles. It was designed to
to prevent surprise attacks and to act as a reconnaissance screen for the MLR. Each individual strong point in the line was supported by fire from the main line of resistance. In front of the security line was an outpost line which usually consisted of hasty emplacements manned with troops armed with small arms and hand grenades. This line was about six to eight miles in front of the MLR.

Enemy reserves varied in strength from one-third to one-sixth of the main force. Commitment was made only on the order of the senior commander, and this was usually done to restore penetrations in the MLR. Battalion OPs were generally located 200-300 yards from the MLR; regiments, 300-500 yards; and divisions, 500-1000 yards; command posts were located further to the rear—a battalion, 800-1000 yards; a regiment, 1500-2500 yards; and a division, 3500-1000 yards.

The smallest self-sufficient tactical unit in the North Korean Army in defensive combat was the regiment. Regimental sectors in the MLR were made up of battalion and company strong-points deployed in a circular manner in depth around the regimental key positions. This provided fire support for the flanks and critical sectors.

The initial shock of a UN attack on North Korean defensive positions was absorbed by the security line. The unit holding this line attempted to force UN troops to deploy prematurely or to lure them into the MLR fields of fire. If hostile pressure was too strong, the security line withdrew to the MLR under the protective fire of supporting weapons. If the MLR was penetrated, all fire
DEFENSIVE ZONES OF A RIFLE DIVISION

SKETCH PREPARED BY ATIS-GHC, FEC, FROM MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM ENEMY DOCUMENTS

REF: EN DOC 20017 and 201314

UNCLASSIFIED
power from the other strong-points, on the flanks and depth was concentrated to seal the gap.

In the event a United Nations' unit enveloped a section of the North Korean defensive line, the encircled unit continued its defensive mission, for according to North Korean doctrine, the encircled unit was still responsible for its assigned mission. To prevent such a hostile movement, the enemy launched vigorous counterattacks against the flanks of the UN unit. Withdrawal was made only on the order of the senior commander. When such a withdrawal was impossible, the enemy attempted to infiltrate UN positions and conduct guerrilla activities to the rear.

Chinese Communist Forces

Shortly after the Chinese Forces entered the Korean conflict, they defended key terrain features as a screening action for a pending offensive. A small reconnaissance group occupied forward positions to observe United Nations movement and troop deployment. The remainder of the enemy unit remained concealed in well-protected foxholes dispersed over the crest of the hill from which it could easily attack forward. When United Nations Forces crossed the crest, the enemy laid a devastating fire on the attacking force. When UN troops faltered, the enemy counterattacked.

The CCF stubborn defense or main line of resistance was organized in depth along a narrow front. Extended outposts were placed to the front and on the flanks. Small groups of enemy soldiers, armed with light automatic weapons, manned the outposts and had the mission of delaying United Nations probing attacks on
the CCF main line of resistance. Chinese forces organized key
terrain features for an all-around defense if necessary, and
erected obstacles to channelize United Nations movement. All
dead space was covered by mortar fire, and cross fire patterns were
established between the strong points.

In the mountainous terrain of Korea, the CCF rifle companies
usually occupied the lower slopes of a ridgeline. The heavy weapons
company occupied the top of the ridge. Battalion headquarters was
somewhere between the rifle companies and the heavy weapons. All
units from the squad upward maintained OPs, mainly in saddles between
hills. Reserve units occupied areas to the rear of the terrain
feature selected for the defensive action. The Chinese depended
on counterassault as an integral part of their defense, and certain
small units were designated as assault groups. These attacked UN
positions under cover of light machine gun fire.

Utilization of Terrain Features

Both North Korean and Chinese Communist forces selected hill
tops as principal defensive positions. Positions were always located
in places inaccessible to United Nations armor. Most of the enemy's
defensive positions were dug near or on the topographical crest of
ridge-lines or high hills, and were usually dug in for three-sided
defense. The enemy's strongest defense was normally directed against
valley corridors containing principal roadways, and his positions
were usually mutually supported in depth between hill masses. All
positions were heavily fortified, well-supplied with ammunition,
and tied together by interlocking fire.

**Entrenchments and Fortifications**

Early in the Korean conflict when UN forces were on the defensive, Communist forces utilized hasty emplacements in a defensive action. Foxholes were of the slit-trench type, each large enough to accommodate a squad. Foxholes were sometimes dug along a hillbase for good fields of fire and observation, and security observation posts for such positions were located midway up the hillside. Platoon trenches were often constructed with machine gun emplacements at both ends, large enough for the entire machine gun squad.

When the enemy was forced to fight prolonged defensive actions, adequate protective measures had to be taken against United Nations air and artillery fire. Simple emplacements became elaborate dirt and log fortifications. A typical enemy strongpoint consisted of foxholes for riflemen, automatic weapons positions, mortar firing positions, and 76mm pack howitzer positions. All positions were connected by communications trenches. On forward slopes these trenches were covered with logs and soil; on the reverse slope, they were only partially covered. On the reverse slopes were located dug-in shelters and mortar firing positions. It was common practice to place primary defense positions on the forward slope, with personnel shelters on the reverse slope. Communications between the two were maintained by tunnel and by alternate trenches. All positions were constructed to afford cover from high angle fire yet provide good fields of fire. Entrenchments on the forward slope were constructed to enable enemy...
troops to rain grenades down on an assaulting force.

Hill top fortifications were covered with alternate layers of logs and dirt from 4 to 15 feet in depth. From 3 to 12 layers of logs were used for cover. Other underground shelters were constructed in soil, rock and shale. All bunkers were connected by communications trenches. Ammunition storage compartments were also joined to the main network of defensive position by trenches. These were located near the personnel shelters on the reverse slope. All were well fortified against hostile artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.

All brush and inflammable materials were cleared from the vicinity of the defensive works as protection against hostile incendiaries. Lips of dirt were placed around some bunkers, located below the military crest, to divert the flow of VN napalm bombs.

Two-or three-man foxholes were dug about six or eight yards apart on the forward slope and were manned during a hostile attack. When United Nations artillery fire was placed on a Communist strong point, the enemy riflemen moved from foxholes through the communications trenches to underground personnel shelters on the reverse slope. Each shelter held about six to eight men. When UN artillery fire was lifted, the enemy moved back, occupied the former positions, and fired on the attacking troops. Enemy mortar fire was also placed on the assaulting force. Reserve enemy troops, in shelters on the reverse slope, were used to counterattack UN troops to prevent them from occupying newly taken positions. Alternate positions were prepared in case one was destroyed by hostile fire.
The enemy also constructed many dummy positions which were successful in drawing fire.

Mortars and artillery pieces usually were emplaced in well-fortified positions on or just below the reverse slope. Often, fields of fire were restricted by overhead cover. However, in the US I Corps sector several unusual methods of employing mortars and artillery were observed. Pieces, located in well-constructed bunkers below the crest on the forward slope of the hill, could be fired and resupplied with ammunition while under cover. Escape tunnels leading to the reverse slope allowed the pieces to be evacuated. In one such instance, a four-gun battery of 76mm guns was found located on the forward slope of a hill within 2000 yards of the enemy MLR. The emplacement for these guns measured 21 feet by 35 feet and was at least 18 feet beneath the ground level of the ridge.

Camouflage

One of the most effective weapons of defense employed by the enemy in Korea was his use of camouflage. Methods of concealment and deception increased as the war progressed.

No special training was given the Communist soldier in the art of camouflage, but each squad leader was responsible for teaching the members of his unit camouflage discipline. This was probably why United Nations forces encountered such a wide variety of concealment and deceptive tactics. Enemy caps and coats were equipped with fiber loops so that natural camouflage could be used. When no cover existed, the soldier smeared dirt and mud over his clothing and face.
Units up to battalion size escaped aerial detection during the day by sleeping in ditches covered with pine branches, or rolling up in straw mats and lying in orderly rows, like piles of straw. During the enemy retrograde movement in May 1951, enemy soldiers carried pine branches. When United Nations aircraft were overhead, the enemy squatted and remained immobile. Had the enemy used the side of the road rather than the middle, he would have given the appearance from the air of an orderly row of bushes.

Self-propelled guns and tanks escaped detection by crashing into houses or haystacks. Others burned smudge pots to give the impression that the vehicles were on fire. Wheeled vehicles were dug in during the day in forward areas and covered with surrounding vegetation. If the vehicles had to be ready to move in a short time, they were parked in ditches, gullies, under partially destroyed bridges, and in tunnels. These, too, were camouflaged with branches and other vegetation. In one instance when enemy vehicles crossed soft ground, some dragged trees behind to erase their tracks. Pack animals were kept hidden during daylight as much as possible and camouflaged by the individual animal's attendant when necessary.

Railroad engines and cars were also covered with branches and brush, but the movement of the train and the smoke rendered this camouflage method ineffective. However, open flat cars and gondola cars were camouflaged with corrugated metal and dirt which successfully hid the cargo. Tunnels were frequently used for daylight concealment of trains.
Camouflage of depots and other installations of units lower than division was not mandatory, but installations from division upward were well-concealed. Maximum use was made of tunnels and caves for supply depots. Excavations were made by the responsible unit whenever necessary.

When an individual soldier dug his foxhole he carefully removed the soil and concealed the hole with natural vegetation. He disposed of the dirt by placing it on a cloth, then by strewing it around his position, later camouflaging it with scrub pine, sod, rice straw, or other materials at hand. Enemy soldiers digging entrenchments were difficult to see unless they were skylined. They camouflaged their uniforms and shovels, and when digging, they used short strokes.

The enemy once camouflaged a long highway bridge to simulate a continuous roadway. To create this effect, he attached high trees to the sides of the bridge and added gravel to the bridge floor. On occasions he broke up pontoon bridges during the day and hid the sections under nearby bridge wreckage or along the river bank. For some time friendly forces thought that these pontoon bridges were under construction; actually they were being used every night.

The enemy often used dummy positions and simulated targets to draw United Nations fire. Straw dummies made to represent riflemen, some partially clothed with discarded garments, succeeded in drawing considerable UN small arms and machine gun fire. Dummy tanks and aircraft attracted considerable air strafing and bombing. Artillery positions made out of natural material were emplaced.
in the standard horseshoe manner. Stacks of empty shell cases were
placed near each position, while other empty cases were scattered
around each simulated gun. Barrels consisted of 6 inch logs;
shields were steel plates; trails were boards; the wheels were
made of straw. Realism was carried to the extent of manufacturing
foot and vehicle tracks in the position area.

Employment of Weapons in the Defense

North Korean People’s Army

Artillery and Mortars -- North Korean artillery had the mission of
harassing and inflicting casualties on UN reserves in assembly areas.
It also fired to disperse and neutralize United Nations tank and
infantry assaults. Purely interdictory missions were not fired.
Mortars fired antipersonnel and harassing missions as well as
antiattack missions at extreme ranges. Fire missions always
attempted to separate UN infantry from its armor support. If a
penetration in the North Korean main line of resistance occurred,
artillery and mortars engaged the penetrating force to contain
it. Enemy mortars displaced laterally over a distance of
approximately 450 yards but rarely deployed in depth. Mortars
were used when UN forces were within 1000 to 1500 yards of the
MLR or when ten or more men were concentrated together.

In the early days of the Korean conflict, North Korean military
documentary required a command reconnaissance (1) to determine the
most suitable location of the outpost line of resistance, (2) to
assign regimental sectors of responsibility, and (3) to select
areas to be mined and neutralized by obstacles. This reconnaissance was conducted jointly by the division, regiment, and battalion commanders together with the division artillery commander and the commanders of other supporting weapons. The division artillery officer made the over-all fire plan, including the use of 82mm and 120mm mortars, for support of the division security line, counter-battery fire, fire on the final protective line, and support of counterattacks.

Fire support for the security line was furnished by NK artillery located in the main defense zone and by mortars which were moved in front of the MLR. The bulk of the artillery and supporting weapons was attached to the various strong points in the defensive line. Normally one artillery battalion was attached to an infantry regiment. Artillery fire was delivered from alternate positions in support of the security line.

To support the main line of resistance and assure maximum coverage, specific weapons were assigned zones of responsibility. Special attention was given to provide adequate fire protection to the zones between the individual strong points. The emplacement of the artillery varied with the situation and terrain, but it was generally employed in depth to assure that any penetration of the defense zone could be brought under fire. The weapons not assigned to support the security line were kept well concealed for the element of surprise. These weapons were not fired until the attacking force approached to within 450 yards of the main line.
of resistance. If a portion of the MLR was penetrated, all available
fire was focused on that spot.

In the elastic defense, NK artillery deployed by echelons after
dark, firing at maximum ranges in an endeavor to force United Nations
forces to deploy. Part of the artillery was employed under decentralized
control by attaching it to units in the forward defense positions.
The remainder of the artillery was concentrated in the rear and
fired under control of the senior commander.

During the latter part of the conflict, NK artillery generally
took positions in inaccessible terrain; however, this depended on the
hostile situation and the terrain. A battery of mountain guns was
assigned to different infantry regiments for support. The sites
selected were usually on the slopes of hills or at the foot of the
high ground. Gun positions were dug approximately 100 yards apart
and 800 yards to the rear of front line troops. Ammunition was
stored in shelters about thirty feet to the rear of the guns on
level ground, and six to seven feet where the terrain was hilly.
Gun positions were in bunker-like positions and well-camouflaged.
Light machine guns were dug in between the gun positions on
both flanks for local security. All firing was done during daylight
hours, and if firing was done at night, calculations were
made during the day. If the artillery remained for an extended
length of time in one location, auxiliary positions were dug
approximately 150 yards to the flank of the battery. If the enemy
artillery pieces were discovered by UN air observation, the alternate
positions were used.
Heavy and Light Machine Guns

The NK battalion heavy machine gun company was usually deployed with the rifle companies. Each rifle company assigned to the defense of the main line of resistance had one heavy machine gun platoon, as did the battalion CP for all-around security and antiaircraft defense. This latter platoon could be committed to the defense of the MLR in an emergency.

Most of the heavy machine guns were placed on the flanks as were the light machine guns. This permitted oblique fire along the front and adequate coverage of obstacles. Positions of the guns were staggered in depth to avoid simultaneous destruction by UN air or artillery. All guns were controlled centrally by the platoon leader and were shifted from one target to another on his command. NK heavy machine guns usually opened fire at a range of 800 to 1000 yards; the light machine gun range for opening fire was 300 to 500 yards. When UN troops first assaulted, only a few guns opened fire, for the enemy usually waited until the assaulting troops were vulnerable to cross fire.

Small Arms and Automatic Weapons

North Koreans depended on heavy rather than accurate automatic weapons fire in halting a UN attack. The enemy usually waited until United Nations troops were within 75 yards of their positions before they opened fire with small arms and automatic weapons. However, submachine guns opened fire at about 200 yards, and rifles at 100 yards. Grenades were hurled at distances from 10 to 30 yards.
Chinese Communist Forces

Artillery

CCF artillery was seriously depleted by UN air strikes and artillery fire, and therefore did not constitute too great a threat to UN forces; however, after June 1951, enemy artillery increased in strength and constituted a real hazard. Normally a CCF artillery regiment supported an Army; an artillery battalion supported an infantry division; an artillery battery, a regiment; a platoon, a battalion. No attempt was made to mass fire. For protection against UN air strikes, a CCF antiaircraft automatic weapons unit corresponding in size to the field artillery unit was assigned to them.

Chinese did not utilize their artillery to support the withdrawal of their infantry units, although minor preparations were fired some time prior to the actual disengagement. Usually, the artillery, because of its lack of mobility, moved to the rear well in advance of the withdrawing units. During the latter part of August 1951, the enemy appeared to have adopted the Western type of defense, for at that time his artillery began to be well-coordinated with his infantry.

The artillery battery area was generally selected and designated by the battalion commander with specific locations for the artillery pieces picked by the battery commander. Preferred locations were in mountainous areas away from roads, since many of the CCF artillery pieces were of the pack-type. The
distance between pieces was governed by the terrain, but usually it was between 40 and 80 yards. All guns were dug in and well-camouflaged.

**Mortars**

CCF mortars were normally located at the foot of high ground, or just below the reverse slope of a defensive position where the fire could be employed in support of the first defense line. Mortars were usually employed at ranges varying from 1000 to 1500 yards on hostile troop concentrations, and from 500 to 800 yards on attacking troops. Three to five rounds were fired as a shock action on offensive forces, and concentrated fire was placed in the center and rear of withdrawing UN troops to cause confusion.

**Heavy and Light Machine Guns**

CCF machine guns were usually employed in support of the main line of resistance in defensive warfare. All areas of enemy approach were covered by machine gun cross fire patterns. Short bursts of fire commenced on dispersed UN troops when they reached effective ranges or concentrated within 200 yards.

**Small Arms and Automatic Weapons**

Rifles and automatic weapons were fired when UN forces attacked and dispersed within effective firing range, or from 10 to 100 yards. Grenades, on which the enemy placed great reliance, were thrown when UN forces approached within 10 to 40 yards. Most small arms fire occurred with UN forces within 50 to 75 yards of the enemy positions.

**Miscellaneous**

The CCF also employed roving fire power units equipped with various weapons to confuse UN units and cause them to divert their efforts.
fire power.

On one defensive position captured by UN forces, the enemy had prepared corrugated drums filled with rocks and TNT. These were located on rough ramps and evidently were to be rolled down on attacking troops with the hope that flying rock would cause UN casualties. Also on the same position, a trench was constructed about 50 yards below the crest to conceal enemy soldiers controlling trip wires attached to bangalore torpedoes around the hill.

**Mines and Roadblocks**

Both Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean People's Army employed mines and roadblocks during defensive operations. Very little use of them was made under other tactical circumstances.

Enemy mines were generally laid in roads and by-passes, although in some instances the enemy mined open fields which afforded vehicular approach to defensive positions. Roads were mined in cuts, fills, and other places not suitable for by-pass.

Usually they were placed in a staggered manner at three-space intervals and stretched across the road from shoulder to shoulder. In most places, however, the mines were laid so that one lay in the tract or rut most commonly used. Most mines were normally 1 1/2 yards from the edge of the road. Depths of minefields were not uniform. Occasionally trip wires attached to pull-type fuses on some mines were stretched across the road and tied to troops or other objects. If a vehicle missed the mines, the tension on the wire activated them.
North Korean engineers placed mines in five to six rows with a distance of two to five yards between rows. The interval between mines was two to four yards. The depth of the mine fields averaged from 50 to 500 yards. Bridges and stream beds were mined to prevent use by UN armor.

Some mines were buried 18 inches to 28 inches deep. This allowed a great amount of traffic to pass before exploding. These mines were very difficult to locate as they were too deep to be discovered by mine detectors, and probing was useless. Other mines were dug in from the shoulders of the road to avoid detection from the top. During the summer of 1951, the enemy placed large quantities of dynamite atop mines in a roadbed, to destroy UN equipment rather than to cripple or delay it. In other spots, the enemy buried scrap metal and beer cans to hinder the progress of UN engineer groups which were clearing paths. Enemy mined areas were not marked, nor were they in the most cases covered by fire.

The frequent use of roadblocks and undefended road obstructions characterized the enemy's defensive tactics. Roadblocks were constructed from large rocks or stones covered with brush and logs. Abandoned vehicles, ditches, craters dynamited in roads, and artificial landslides caused by demolitions were other favored means of blocking routes of advance. Roadblocks were employed singly and in series, in the latter case being placed close together. Many mines and roadblocks were booby-trapped. Some roadblocks were covered by enemy fire.
Most of the enemy's booby-traps were crude, made mostly from blocks of TNT and grenades. Earthen jars with blocks of TNT, amatol, or picric acid were used. Abandoned UN and enemy equipment was often booby-trapped, and in some instances, enemy dead. Most detonations of enemy booby traps depended on some form of a trip wire. During the cold weather of 1950-1951, the enemy buried a mortar round a few inches below the surface of the ground in an abandoned fireplace. A small amount of fresh wood was placed on top of it to tempt UN soldiers to build a fire. The shell exploded two hours after the fire was kindled.

Miscellaneous

Antitank Defense

The shock action of UN armor was extremely effective on the CCF and the NKPA. To combat both the physical and mental damage done by UN tanks, the enemy took various measures. Many enemy pamphlets and manuals distributed to his troops tried to build up courage to cause personnel to attack UN armor. Specialized antitank armor units were organized.

In the North Korean army, all rifle regiments had two or three antitank teams, or "hunter groups," which had the dual mission of defense against tanks and aircraft. These teams were orginally organized from the NK division antitank battalion and worked with combat engineer teams of platoon to company size. The AT teams consisted of three of four men armed with submachine guns, antitank grenades, mines, and bangalore torpedoes. Teams were deployed in the rear of defensive positions as mobile antitank forces. Their
main mission in defensive warfare was to neutralize hostile tanks which penetrated the defensive perimeter.

The combat engineer unit planted mines and other obstacles to hinder the approach of hostile tanks. The "hunter group" had the mission of attacking and annihilating UN armor. To accomplish this, the teams hid near roads or approaches which could be used by armor, and attacked from the flank. As AT guns attempted to knock out the front and rear tanks, the "hunter group" attacked individual tanks in the column. Multiple attacks were sometimes made to accomplish the purpose.

Chinese Communist forces used antitank teams of various sizes. The enemy doctrine called for all infantry battalions, companies, and platoons to organize teams. Each platoon organized two or three. Company and battalion size teams consisted of two parts: a demolition team of three to four men, armed with one submachine gun each, three hand mines, and two bangalore torpedoes; a support team of three to four men armed with submachine guns and light machine guns. The mission of the support team was to separate UN infantry from armor to allow the demolition team to attack. The platoon teams consisted of two to three men armed with submachine guns, grenades, incendiary bottles, mines, and other explosives. Pole and satchel charges were also carried by the antitank teams.

The antitank crews usually selected terrain in which tanks found it difficult to maneuver to set up positions in depth. Well-camouflaged emplacements, approximately 150 yards from the defense line,
were built adjacent to the routes of approach. When hostile tanks approached, the support group opened fire to separate the assaulting infantry from the tanks. When the tanks approached without artillery support, the antitank teams attacked from the rear flanks. Small arms and machine gun fire was placed on the tanks in an attempt to hit the driver's periscope and keep the tank commander down as the enemy teams attacked. A team assaulted one tank at a time.

When the enemy approached the UN tank, he attempted to climb on the rear and hang small dynamite bags on the turret or gun. He threw grenades and bangalore torpedoes in the bogies. If the tank was disabled, the enemy attempted to set it on fire with incendiary grenades or Molotov cocktails. Although CCF tank hunter teams were fanatical in reaction to initial advances of UN tanks, they were generally content to stay out of sight when the armor returned from an assault.

**Antiaircraft Defense**

During the early stages of the Korean conflict, the NKPA placed little emphasis on antiaircraft defense. However, with the increase of UN air power, he employed both active and passive antiaircraft measures. The North Korean Army organized air defense teams, armed with heavy machine guns, from the divisional antiaircraft units and from the antiaircraft machine gun platoons of subordinate units. Air observation posts were used to warn troops, and 30 to 50 percent of the ground arms were used in antiaircraft defense. Antiaircraft artillery guarded rear installations.
The enemy also employed "hunter groups," armed with machine guns, at key tunnels, bridges, and other installations. This team fired at any overhead United Nations aircraft, and if the installation was hit and could be repaired, the team remained in position. If not, the team moved to guard another key point.

Early in 1951, due to UN air power, CCF regiments were assigned an antiaircraft company armed with six to nine 12.7mm DSHK guns. In addition, each Chinese battalion employed an antiaircraft net in combat. It was composed of a unit manned with nine machine guns -- four heavy machine guns from the battalion, and two light machine guns from each company. Emplacements guarding key positions were usually on high terrain where the weapons could command the sky over the target. Emplacements were in the shape of a triangle with communication trenches connecting the ammunition dumps. All positions were well camouflaged.

If four machine guns were employed, the guns were set up on four corners of an invisible square around the installation. The interval between guns was 50 to 100 yards, and between groups of guns, 200 yards. Three machine guns formed a group and these were placed triangularly with an interval of 30 to 50 yards between guns. Continuous fire, on order of the commanding officer, was placed on UN aircraft.

In a defensive position, one platoon was designated to fire on hostile planes. The fire was concentrated, but staggered at different angles. Heavy machine guns fired at ranges over 800 yards;
Countermeasures Employed by UN Forces Against the Stubborn Defense

In spite of excellent artillery, air, and the support of other weapons, the infantrymen had to finally close and dislodge the stubborn foe.

In a typical assault on an enemy defensive position, air and artillery were first used in the softening up process. Aerial bombs weighing 250 and 500 pounds, with a 10-second delay nose and tail fusing, proved effective on enemy fortifications provided a direct hit was scored. Aerial bombardment was restricted due to the lack of the required precision bombing. On an average, one bunker was destroyed out of eight bomb drops on positively identified targets. This average decreased in adverse weather or because of poor target identification. Field commanders felt that three fighter-bombers, utilizing 250-pound bombs was required for each bunker.

Artillery assault fire, at ranges of 2500 to 3000 yards, was usually employed in 50- to 60- brackets up and over the crest of the hill or ridge defended by the enemy. Enemy machine gun fire was silenced with artillery area fire with fuse quick and converged shell. Precision fire by one piece was employed to destroy the emplacement. The artillery also reconnoitered all suspected enemy positions by fire using VT fuse to strip away any possible camouflage. It was proven that a direct hit by a 155mm shell was effective on enemy pillbox with a 5-foot protective roof; a
A direct hit with a 105mm shell was effective on one with a 3-foot protective roof. The best artillery support was provided by the direct fire of a 155mm gun, although high angle fire from heavy artillery also proved effective. VT fuses were used on bunkers at night to prevent rebuilding.

A method employed by UN forces to lift an artillery concentration on enemy positions was the firing of a WP shell. The enemy quickly recognized this, and when such a shell was fired he returned from his bomb shelters, manned his defensive positions, and fired at the assaulting UN troops. In one such attack on a stubborn enemy objective, UN troops employed a ruse. A WP round was fired at the enemy; and five minutes later, after friendly infantry fired small arms to simulate an attack, a mixed TOT and VT artillery barrage was brought down on the hostile position. The objective was taken without further difficulty.

When artillery fire was lifted, 4.2cm and 82mm mortars pounded the enemy positions at three-minute intervals as the assaulting force moved up. Tanks moved forward of the infantry in the final assault and tried to close within a range of less than 1000 yards to fire on the enemy bunkers. A range of 300 to 400 yards was preferred. Tank fire was placed on the bunker apertures or embrasures using HE delay. If these were not visible, two rounds of APC were fired to effect an opening where the logs in the fortification joined the earth or just below the slope of the roof. This neutralized, but did not destroy the bunker. Antiaircraft weapons also moved out.
with the tanks and supported the ground assault.

When the infantry assaulted the position, the artillery and tanks isolated the bunker being attacked from other enemy supporting installations with WP smoke and HE fire. The infantry used assault teams consisting of one rifle squad, two flame throwers, one demolition team armed with canteen and pole charges, one SCR 536 radio operator, one 75mm recoilless rifle squad, and one light machine gun squad, or a total of 26 men.

The teams deployed with the 75mm recoilless rifle squad placing fire on the apertures of the enemy bunker at a range of about 600 yards. The light machine gun squads deployed to the flanks to support the attack. The rifle squad, together with the two flame throwers, closed in as far as possible and placed small arms and BAR fire on the bunker. The flame throwers then moved forward until 35 yards from the enemy position and engaged the bunker with fire while the demolition team planted the explosive charges. When the position was neutralized, the team hastily reorganized and prepared to move forward or to consolidate the position.

United Nations armor was used in surprise attacks to bypass enemy fortifications and hit him from the rear and flanks. To accomplish this, continuous UN engineer reconnaissance was necessary for the removal of mines and reduction of obstacles. UN infantry and armored officers and men had the highest praise for the work of the combat engineers in Korea. Braving enemy fire, they succeeded in detecting the majority of enemy mines employed. Various apparatus, such as fails and rollers, used on tanks to explode enemy mines,
proved unsuccessful due to malfunctions and the great amount of explosive charges employed by the enemy.
CHAPTER THREE

INfiltrATION AND GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

Infiltration and Guerrilla Activities

Enemy espionage and guerrilla activity were widespread since the beginning of the Korean conflict, and played a large part in the enemy's operations and tactics. The North Korean People's Army intended guerrilla forces to be strictly military, but the Chinese Communist Forces wanted the groups to be for political indoctrination. It appears that a happy medium was struck between the two Communist Forces in Korea. For this reason, infiltration tactics and guerrilla activities will be considered separately.

Infiltration

Infiltration tactics were employed by the enemy for both espionage activities and for military operations. Early in the Korean conflict, enemy troops mingled with refugees fleeing southward because of the reluctance of UN pilots to strafe columns of civilians. In other instances, groups of men, women, and children walked into UN positions with North Korean soldiers interspersed among the lead elements. As the groups were screened, other enemy soldiers launched an attack. UN officials were quick to determine the importance of the enemy's infiltration tactics as shown by the following statement:

Infiltration tactics played a big part in the enemy's attack in the West sector, accomplished by the infiltration of small groups during darkness over a 2-3 day period, after which the infiltrated elements rallied for attacks in coordination with frontal attacks by tanks and infantry.
Not only small groups succeeded in infiltrating UN lines, but major units as well. Early in December 1950, the 10th North Korean Division moved south through mountainous country from the 38° Parallel to within twenty miles of TAEGU. It was a remarkable military feat. It had to rely on the countryside for food and clothing and on captured stocks for ammunition. Lacking medical facilities, it was forced to operate on a survival of the fittest basis. It was able to keep the US 1st Marine Division (as well as ROK security forces) occupied in the mountains northeast of TAEGU. After the 1st Marine Division was committed to action in February, the enemy force became the full time concern of the 2nd ROK Division. Despite heavy losses from constant attacks, it maintained the form of a military unit. Approximately one-third of the enemy division managed to withdraw northward to its own lines by breaking into smaller units.

Because of the effectiveness of UN air power, the North Korean Army changed its tactics and adopted an operation called "Paktisa." Groups of enemy soldiers, dressed as civilians and carrying concealed weapons, infiltrated UN lines at night and attacked from the flanks and rear. Others established roadblocks to cut off withdrawing friendly units. Both Chinese and North Koreans practiced the same ruses of having some soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and mingling with refugees. These men hid in caves and buildings during the day, and gathered information or conducted harassing raids at night. Some so-called civilians apprehended by UN
troops carried mortar base plates, mortar tubes, ammunition, and hand grenades concealed in packs. Other captured North Korean soldiers had a complete change of white civilian clothes, and each had a package of 5000 ROK won.

Enemy espionage was widespread in Korea and was very effective, but it was generally of low calibre. Most enemy agents primarily gathered tactical information in a combat zone. Both North Korean People's Army and Chinese Communist Forces, together with enemy guerrilla forces, utilized large numbers of poorly trained agents to gather information of military value. High-level intelligence was conducted by training companies established by the North Korean Political Security Bureau and by North Korean field grade officers, especially trained for intelligence and espionage work. These agents normally confined their activities to the supervision of subordinate information nets.

Assignments given to agents varied with the sector to which assigned. On the front lines, the agents attempted to determine the location of the UN main line of resistance; the strength, composition, and disposition of various units; the number and types of weapons; the condition of roads; the objective and movement of UN patrols; and the location of hidden foodstuffs. In forward areas, the agent also determined the number and location of troops. In addition, he noticed the location of UN artillery, armor, and command posts; the location of the various refugee checkpoints. In rear areas, in addition to noting the location and number of UN troops, agents located
National Police strong points and determined their strength. They took the names and addresses of civilians friendly toward the North Korean cause and those who collaborated with UN Forces. They also noted the attitude and feeling of refugees and the South Korean people.

Enemy agents were recruited from both sexes and all ages. Young boys were very active in collecting information for the NKPA and partisan bands.

Some individuals were used who brought political disfavor upon themselves and tried to prove their loyalty by engaging in espionage activities. Agents were not well-picked and showed little incentive for their work. Evidently, there was no authority which centralized selection, assignment of missions, or control of enemy agents. Young, middle-aged, and elderly men and women were used singly, in pairs, and in "family-type" groups to facilitate movement. One such agent used a stretcher in an attempt to pass through UN lines. Two adults carried the agent, who posed as an ailing father, on the stretcher. Several young children, who knew they would be well-fed as long as the agent needed them, willingly claimed him as father. When apprehended, he was found to have concealed weapons under the bed clothes. Other agents adopted one or more small children and mingled with bonafide refugees. Others disguised themselves as farmers or local villagers and some were left behind when enemy troops withdrew northward.
Some attempted to pass through UN lines as refugees, others utilized mountain trails to avoid checkpoints. Falsified passes were carried by the agents to be used when questioned. Some wore US clothing and pretended to be ROK soldiers separated from their units. Once the agent reached his assigned area, guerrilla and other Communist organizations protected him and transmitted the information he obtained. Sometimes, these organizations assigned the agent subsequent missions. Usually, agents transmitted their information orally, or concealed information in the seams of their clothes or shoes or in the private parts of their bodies. In rear areas, information gained by enemy agents was sent to North Korea by radio.

Enemy espionage agents used many methods of identification. Money was not only a means of identification, but was also a means of transmitting messages. Japanese fifty-sen pieces indicated the agent was a member of the Korean Labor Party. Japanese coins of various denominations indicated types of arms (one sen-carbine, five sen-M1 rifles, etc.). Other Japanese coins indicated the rank of the agent; the higher the denomination, the higher the rank.

Buttons of various colors and buttons sewed with different thread denoted an agent's identity. Cloth, broken eyeglasses which matched other glasses, North and South Korean flags, hair cut in various manners, jackets, pencils, beans, various types of spoons, and tattoo marks on the body, were also used as identification. An agent apprehended in the US IX Corps sector carried a pocket full of various coins of all denominations, buttons in all colors, spoons,
and all the known methods of identification carried by enemy agents. Included in the coins were two sen pieces dated in the eighth year of Emperor Meiji. These were the key coins and the agent's identification pieces. The agent claimed the other coins and trinkets were a life-long collection.
UN Countermeasures Taken Against Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration of enemy military units was combatted in various ways by UN forces. Coordination of fire power between adjacent UN units in suspected areas, plus interdictory artillery fire, abetted the influx of infiltrating enemy troops. At regimental levels, a civil assistant detachment, two counterintelligence agents, and one ROK police company were utilized to detect enemy agents. All refugees in the area were brought to a regimental collecting point and screened by the CIC agents. All indigenous men of military age apprehended were evacuated through prisoner of war channels. All others were sent to a division refugee collection point for further screening. From the division, the refugees were sent to corps points and on to an Eighth Army point if further interrogation was necessary. However, those cleared at corps level were turned over to ROK civilian control. All UN personnel released by the enemy were returned to at least army level for screening prior to release and return to military duty. This was done to detect any possible enemy indoctrination and assignment of an espionage mission.

Friendly troops were instructed to be suspicious of any civilians in front line areas. Lectures by CIC agents also assisted units in spotting enemy agents. Normally, civilians were not in the combat zone. This statement is evidenced by a report issued by the ROK National Police:

*See countermeasures employed by UN Forces against guerrilla activity.
When the defense line is very close from enemy line, those should be evacuated to the area located at 40 to 643 kilometers (approx. 25 to 36 miles) from the defense line; and those areas located 10 to 20 kilometers (approx. 6 to 12 miles) south of the next defense line should be evacuated.

Checkpoints for the control of travel by civilians in both directions were set up by military police units, civil affairs teams, and ROK National Police. Close liaison was maintained between UN Forces and ROK counterintelligence units and the ROK National Police. Informants employed by UN Forces also aided in the detection of enemy agents. Some UN divisions had security forces organized from indigenous personnel which operated under the control of the division G2. These assisted in the prevention of sabotage and in the rounding up of enemy agents. Civil assistance detachments established lines which refugees could not cross going northward in an attempt to return home.

Measures to control refugees were also exercised by the ROK Government. All civilians were required to register in their villages or in a subdivision of a larger city such as SEOUL. In this manner, the National Police, which maintained a police box in every village, knew everyone who belonged in the town. Counterintelligence teams informed the National Police when agents were suspected to be in the area, and the police immediately questioned all strangers. All suspicious persons who lacked proper identification were turned over to investigative agencies for interrogation. Each civilian in South Korea was required to carry a Refugee Certificate or a Prefectural or City Resident's Certificate. These had to be shown at every checkpoint or on request.
Refugee activities were centralized to ward off any possible fifth columnists. Groups to be evacuated were formed in the various villages and sectors, and each group had an appointed leader from the same locality. He knew everyone within his group and notified proper authorities when a stranger joined his column. All refugees in rear areas were required to keep on main roads and avoid trails and secondary roads used by infiltrators and guerrillas.

**Guerrilla Activity**

At the beginning of the Korean conflict, approximately 5000 communist guerrillas were operating in South Korea. These guerrillas were directed by a core of some 1700 Communist indoctrinated personnel. In addition to this force, the North Korean People's Army had an organized army guerrilla unit, the North Korean Zennam Unit, and an independent army unit, the 766th Infantry Regiment. This regiment was expanded later from 3 battalions to 6 battalions and trained for such work. North Korean divisional guerrilla units were similar to NK reconnaissance companies and were seldom divorced from their parent unit. However, they had irregular tables of organization.

Both the North Korean Zennam Guerrilla Unit and the 766th Infantry Regiment were landed amphibiously in South Korea in company-size groups (about 80 men) and dispersed into the hills. The NK Zennam Unit landed in the wrong sector and proved ineffective. Its mission was to destroy railroad tracks at crossings, bridges, tunnels, curves, and switches, and to cut
away telephone and telegraph wires. The 766th Regiment moved by
mountain trails through uninhabited areas to its objective and
succeeded in harassing UN troops.

Enemy military units, used in guerrilla activities, dressed in
uniforms similar to other North Korean outfits and carried the
standard weapons. However, members of the organization wore
civilian dress to reconnoiter towns, villages, and rear areas of
UN forces in daylight. These soldiers returned to the hills before
dark and guided the main body back to the objective. In the
approach to the objective, three scouts were sent out first, each
about 8 yards apart. Companies were separated by 20 to 22
yards; platoons, 15 to 17 yards; and squads, about 10 yards.

After the attack, the guerrilla unit withdrew into the hills before
daylight.

At other times, NK guerrilla units mingled with refugees and
infiltrated to the rear of UN lines. At a certain point, they
separated from the civilian column and assembled their weapons
which had been hidden in oxcarts or bundles. A reconnaissance
was then made by the units and an attack launched. Units were
given specific missions and a specific time limit to accomplish
the assignment.

With the turn of battle in favor of UN Forces, many cut-off
units attempted to escape northward. Some could not. Consequently,
they formed their own guerrilla bands or joined forces with other
previously established bands. Communist sympathizers and Korean
Labor Party members also joined their ranks. These were utilized to furnish logistical support and to perform espionage missions. In November 1950, it was estimated that there was "a minimum of 40,000 guerrillas in South Korea." It was believed that some North Korean general officers and their staffs were responsible for the over-all coordination of the activity of these bands with CCF and NK Forces.

The routes of withdrawal of the guerrilla troops were easily determined, and by effective blocking actions by UN Forces, heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy troops. A considerable number were taken prisoners.

As a result, guerrilla forces in South Korea were widely dispersed, and later were divided up into six branches. Each branch consisted in strength from 600 men to 4,000 men. The People's Guerrilla Command was one of the twelve departments of the NKPA General Headquarters, and it controlled the active guerrilla branches of approximately 8,000 men. In addition to the branches, numerous partisan bands, organized by the Korean Labor Party, operated throughout the western part of South Korea. The branch units operated in the eastern sector. Branch units were organized on an army pattern, but the partisan bands followed the loose organization of the Korean Labor Party.

Guerrilla bands established their headquarters in the mountainous terrain in their areas of operation. Security of these camps depended upon the guards at the stronghold itself. Members of the band deployed in a wide area, disguised as peasants and farmers, and had
spies in nearby villages. Liaison with these strongholds was maintained by the use of couriers dispatched from the People's Guerrilla Command in North Korea. Guerrilla forces were able to receive messages from North Korea, but UN action captured and destroyed most of their sending stations. Messages carried by couriers were frequently in changed secret codes.

The general mission of the enemy guerrilla branches was mainly to impede the South Korean war effort. Communication and supply lines were attacked; villages pillaged and raided; and Communist propaganda disseminated. Many raids were conducted out of necessity. Food and ammunition were critical items, and desperate bands raided many villages. All this increased the hatred of natives toward the guerrilla bands and resulted in brutal treatment of those captured. A general pattern of concentrating guerrilla forces in one area was the general trend.

Food, clothing, and supplies were obtained from the area in which the guerrilla bands were operating. These were gathered from voluntary contributors and sympathizers, by raids on farms, or by capturing UN supplies. Female guerrillas purchased medical supplies from the local markets.

Replacements for guerrilla bands were obtained by volunteers, kidnapped young men and women, hostages, and enemy soldiers who had infiltrated UN lines. Hostages aided in securing contributions of food.
Countermeasures Taken by UN Forces Against Guerrilla Activities

During the days of the initial perimeter and the ensuing days of the breakout by UN Forces, it was necessary for UN Forces to divert large tactical units, division or larger, to secure rear areas. Friendly armor was employed to have a quieting effect on guerrilla forces. The 73rd Heavy Tank Battalion fired WP on dug-in enemy positions within the UN perimeter and forced the enemy to flee in all directions. Heavy and light machine guns were then used to good effect on the enemy. By studying the routes of movement of the guerrilla forces, UN troops were able to block their routes of withdrawal. Normally this was done by employing one battalion, organized for perimeter defense, in the route of enemy withdrawal. The remainder of the regiment of division used deployed to encircle the area in which the enemy was known to be. Initially, platoon-size patrols used to combat guerrilla forces were too small. However, company-size and larger had good success.

On 19 July 1950, the Office of Coordinator, Protection of Lines of Communication, Rear Areas, was set up by the Eighth United States Army Korea. Its mission was to coordinate the efforts of Korean and US police to effect the maximum protection of railroads, highways, and bridges. It was also to provide protection for UN signal communication against sabotage and enemy guerrilla activity. One of the first steps taken by this office was to form Korean Police Battalions. At first, one provisional ROK police company was assigned to the US 24th and 25th Divisions with the mission of procuring local guides, securing information on the enemy and
familiarizing the respective commanding generals with local terrain conditions and road nets. After about two months, the ROK police companies were returned to the Korean National Police.

ROK Security Battalions and the Korean National Police combatted guerrillas in rear areas, and were under the operational control of the ROK Army and supported logistically by it. Arms and ammunition for the National Police were furnished by the US Army. Both had the mission of guarding fixed installations and conducting anti-guerrilla activities. ROK Security Battalions were attached to the TABAEK-SAN Command, which had the mission of guarding two strategic passes on main supply routes, the TANYANG and MUNYONG passes; and the SONAM Command. This command was activated in June 1951 at the insistence of the ROK Army to combat guerrillas in the area.

The ROK National Police was organized in 1945, but did not expand until the outbreak of hostilities. It now has 63,000 men as compared to 48,000 in 1945. The National Police, besides guarding fixed installations and conducting anti-guerrilla activities, also were charged with the security of the railroads in Korea. Several thousand National Police were attached to the American corps to control civilian population, screen indigenous personnel, and conduct counterintelligence missions.

When guerrillas attacked a village or an installation, the National Police went immediately to the scene to pursue the attacking force. ROK Security Battalions did not. When a definite
guerrilla force was located, the area was surrounded, and UN air strikes called in on the target. After the air raid, the National Police moved up to clean out the area. Often such attacks were jointly conducted with the ROK Security Battalions.

Since 25 June 1950, the National Police inflicted an average 100 guerrilla casualties a day.

RESULTS OF NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS FROM 25 JUNE 50 to 31 AUGUST 51

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy heavy weapons captured</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy rifles captured</td>
<td>22,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Killed</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police kidnapped</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police missing</td>
<td>6,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police heavy weapons captured</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police rifles captured</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to physically contacting the guerrillas, the National Police maintained agents in towns and provinces suspected to be harboring guerrillas. Pamphlets, guaranteeing safe conduct, were distributed by hand and air in the same areas, to induce the enemy to surrender.

In addition to guards at VHF stations, which were prime targets for guerrilla raids, wire, booby-traps and mines were extensively used.

* These figures probably included by-passed enemy troops in North Korea during late 1950.
employed. Each rear area organization had an SOP which it followed during a guerrilla raid. Security platoons rode railroad trains. Flat or gondola cars, carrying machine guns and crews, were placed on the front and rear of some trains. Hospital trains had two gondolas in front. The first was to explode any mines on the tracks, and the second carried machine guns and crews. In this manner, the guerrilla menace was virtually eliminated by the fall of 1951.
CHAPTER FOUR

Summary of the Efficacy of Enemy Tactics

Enemy tactics were sound and well-executed. Contrary to the popular conception of the enemy as "a screaming horde," the NK and CC Forces were well-coordinated fighting machines. Enemy attacks showed considerable prior planning and good judgment for the most part.

Reconnaissance of UN positions was thorough and resulted in many penetrations. The extensive use of guerrilla activity, especially during the days of the PUSAN perimeter and the INCHON landing, aided the enemy's fighting machine. Tactics employed were similar to Western tactics; especially, the old Patton adage of "holding them by the nose and kicking them in the pants." Envelopments were widely used. It is believed that air superiority, firepower, and mobility of the UN Forces provided the difference between the two forces.

Defensively, the enemy used the same tactics, on the whole, as UN Forces; namely, that of trading terrain in an effort to gain time and inflict maximum losses on the opposition. After May 1951, the enemy adhered to the principle of the main line of resistance, and proved a stubborn, tenacious foe to dislodge. Massed artillery fire and hand-to-hand assaults were necessary to clear the enemy defensive positions.

Certain definite disadvantages to the enemy were noted in the tactics he employed. Definite offensive indications were conspicuous before every attack. This enabled UN Forces to prepare
themselves. Since the enemy attacks followed a definite pattern in all cases, UN Forces were able to take appropriate defensive measures.

Another weakness noted in enemy tactics was his inability to sustain an offensive, especially at lower unit levels. This was caused by the damage inflicted on his supply system by UN air and artillery. Consequently, each enemy soldier carried approximately a week's supply of food. When this was exhausted, the enemy attack lost momentum and finally stalled. Undoubtedly winter weather hindered the resupply of enemy rear installations. This was due to the scarcity of natural camouflage and to the good flying weather available to UN aircraft.

The advantage of the enemy's superior manpower became a disadvantage in the face of UN fire superiority. Enemy troops became demoralized and confused; units were difficult to control because of inadequate communications; and logistical support was difficult. The capture of many enemy troops suffering from old wounds indicated that Communist medical support was limited.

All in all, the Communist Force employed in Korea was a capable opponent which employed sound basic principles of war.
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ANNEX A

TYPICAL RECONNAISSANCE FORMATIONS
RECONNOITERING AN AREA

When reconnoitering an area, the squad leader first selects the most prominent terrain feature and sends three to four men to reconnoiter this spot. In the above sketch the assistant squad leader is sent with three men to Hill A, which was deemed the most important. Upon arriving at Hill A and determining it to be clear of enemy, a signal is sent to the squad leader at X. In the event enemy is encountered in vicinity of Hill A, one member reports this to the squad leader while the balance of the group remains to continue observation. If no enemy are discovered on or in close proximity of Hill A, the squad leader dispatches a three-man team to reconnoiter area C, while he himself proceeds to area B with two men. The three groups are given a specific time allotment in which to complete their reconnaissances. Upon completion of the mission, each team remains in its respective sector to await signal from the squad leader to move to R, the point of rendezvous. Upon receipt of a signal, either visual or audible, the two flank teams converge on the center by a route close to the river bank. After assembling, the entire squad returns to its parent unit along the approach route.
When reconnoitering a mountain, a squad size unit is normally employed. Upon reaching the foothill, two members of the patrol take up positions so as to observe along both sides of the mass. The remainder of the patrol gradually moves up the side in single file. Upon reaching a point just below the center of the crest, they turn ninety degrees and move in single file to the crest. If the mountain is clear of hostile troops, a signal is made to the two men posted at the foot to proceed to the top. If further reconnaissance is needed, the patrol continues on or returns to its parent unit using the route of approach.
When moving through mountains, a patrol ordinarily splits into two sections. Control of the split patrol rests with the Squad Leader and Assistant Squad Leader, each of whom leads a column. Control is exercised between the files by a system of prearranged signals. If necessary to move through a defile, a three-man point may be sent fifteen to twenty-five meters ahead of the main body. If the point receives fire from the adjacent hillsides, the main body either rushes through the defile or withdraws, depending on the amount of fire received and the importance of the mission.
OPEN TERRAIN

The assistant squad leader places himself with either flank column at the head or bringing up the rear, depending upon the situation.

WOODED AREA

The formation used when moving a patrol through a wooded area is in nearly all aspects similar to that employed when crossing open terrain. The density of the woods dictates the division of the patrol into two or three columns. Control, also dependent upon the density of the area, consists of whistle signals and lighted match signals.
ANNEX B

TYPICAL CCF SMALL UNIT FORMATIONS
CCF SMALL UNIT FORMATIONS

A. SQUAD LEADERS LEFT TRIANGLE:

```
 0 0
 0 X (Sqd Ldr)
 0 0
 0 0
 0 0
```

42 - 48 PACES

B. SQUAD LEADERS RIGHT TRIANGLE:

```
X (Sqd Ldr) 0
 0 0
 0 0
 0 0
```

42 - 48 PACES

C. REAR TRIANGLE:

```
28-32 PACES

X (Sqd Ldr)
```

15 PACES
D. RIGHT STAIR TEAM:

E. LEFT STAIR TEAM:

F. WIDE FRONT:

G. RIGHT TRIANGLE:

H. LEFT TRIANGLE:
I. FRONT TRIANGLE

```
  O   O
  X (SQD LDR)
      O
      O
      O
```

J. REAR TRIANGLE

```
  O   O   O   O
  X (SQD LDR)
      O
      O
      O
```

UNCLASSIFIED
Overhead cover on point of construction trench.
Two personnel shelters with communications trench at CTF232SR.
Map No 52-10, Korea, 1960.
Personnel shelter at GU P-3905, YE 55-10, Korea, 1:250,000
Communication trench with overhead cover CSP93993. (Map NJ 52-10, Korea, 1:250,000.)
Foxholes at base of hill at 38035E5E. (Map No 52-10, Korea 1:250,000)
AN Bunker on top of ridge at GSRPP925. (Map NJ 52-10, Korea, 1:280,000.)
Personnel shelter on ridge at 38°57'49" N. (Map No. 52-10, Korea, 1:250,000.)
ANNEX D

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
Oblique aerial photograph illustrating elaborate communications trenches employed by the Communist forces in Korea.
Oblique aerial photograph showing elaborate antitank ditches (see arrows) used by Communist Forces in Korea. The hill mass between the two roads was covered with many well-camouflaged bunkers and trenches.