MEMORANDUM TO: GENERAL ALMOND

SUBJECT: Guerrilla Warfare

1. In connection with the mission of this headquarters during the occupation period, it is my belief that one of the most important and serious problems which will confront the Corps will be the coordinated activities of Communist inspired and directed guerrillas.

2. Guerrilla activity at present is uncoordinated, sporadic, and the aftermath of a military campaign. While the reason for such activity is currently based upon escape, evasion, survival, or fear of capture, ultimate activities will be motivated by entirely different circumstances.

3. It can be expected that once reorganised and with the residue of escaped forces as a nucleus for operations, a well-conducted campaign will be launched either from the mountains within the North Korean borders or from Manchuria.

4. As has been experienced in other parts of the world where Communist inspired guerrillas have operated, such operations will follow a definite pattern. These operations are normally characterised by the following:

a. The Organised Regulars: A force constantly under arms, in training in small groups, rarely committed but readily available for attacks at vulnerable points. This force is the backbone and the hard political core of the system. Its existence acts as reinforcement to, as well as a monitor of,

b. The Armed Militia: This group lives normally during the day; individuals work in the fields and at their business executing raids by night. They are usually accompanied by a few regulars but usually return home after hiding their arms in the hills. They can be detected by the large amounts of rice in their huts as they feed regularly and others working with them.

c. The Peoples Army: Individuals are poorly armed, usually with knives, swords, spears, axes, etc. Primarily, this group is composed of local peasants who attack individual targets such as sentries, police and semi-Communist leaders as directed by higher ups. In the main they are informants, and employ to a great extent women and very young boys (6-13) for this purpose.
SUBJECT: "Guerrilla warfare", dated 29 October 1950

In these three groups there are political commissars sprinkled throughout whose primary mission is the passing on of directives and the designation of suspected agents or defectors for elimination.

5. The leadership of a North Korean force exists at present in the form of KIM IL Sung and his entourage. As is well known, he personally is a guerrilla specialist, having operated successfully against the Japanese.

6. In anticipation of such operations it is my feeling that we should prepare ourselves for this eventual problem. In that connection, I recommend the following be considered and where possible accomplished progressively:

a. Conduct initial discussions with ROK unit commanders with a view of solidifying remote areas through anti-Communist propaganda and exemplary conduct by occupying troops.

b. Procure all available information on techniques of guerrilla warfare for dissemination to U.N. occupying forces and for instructional purposes.

c. Procure for the Corps Staff, the best qualified anti-guerrilla specialists in U.S. Army.

d. Establish school for indoctrination in subject utilizing above specialists as instructors and using materials procured reference paragraph b above.

e. Organize (particularly among ROKs) anti-guerrilla units, equipped and trained for mountain work to fight guerrillas on their own terms. In this connection, the Infantry School is organizing and training separate companies along these lines. It may be possible to have them shipped to this area for further training in actual operations. In addition, our own Special Operations Company may be trained and employed in this type of work.

f. Develop, with ROK personnel, an extensive and long range intelligence program designed to penetrate guerrilla strongholds and operating groups for the purpose of keeping us informed as to locations, plans, strength, etc., of Communist forces.

g. Develop an extensive and comprehensive anti-Communist propaganda program. Prepare plans for leaflet drops and other psychological warfare methods to generate defectors and maintain morale of loyal groups subjected to guerrilla attacks.

h. Take steps to rapidly arm selected police and vigilance groups.
SUBJECT: "Guerrilla warfare", dated 29 October 1950

7. Although it is not anticipated that the activities referred to above will be initiated with any degree of coordination or effectiveness until next spring, it is believed that physical measures in preparation for their neutralization should be started as soon as the current campaign is concluded.

8. In connection with the above, it should be noted that no reports have been received pertaining to large groups of the enemy having been by-passed north of the HAECHUN-SUNGAJU lines. Preventing those forces south thereof from infiltrating back to the Manchurian border, would further reduce Communist guerrilla capabilities in the future.

W. R. QUINN
Lt Col GSC
AC of S, C-2
1. Subject of attached radio, Lt Col Volckmann, is reported to be one of the foremost authorities on guerrilla activities in U.S. Army. We requested his services in radio dispatched to GHQ last week.

2. In view of your approval of plan outlined in memorandum of 29 October 1950, subject: "Guerrilla Warfare", Col Volckmann's duties will be as follows:

   a. Initially to locally orient himself as to personnel, terrain, and current tactics of enemy forces (both conventional and guerrilla), to include visits to all regimental commanders.

   b. Procure, for use by this headquarters and corps units, all available information on techniques of guerrilla warfare. Such material subsequently to be disseminated to U. N. occupying forces for appropriate use.

   c. Prepare plans for: 1) the establishment and conduct of a short indoctrination course on guerrilla tactics for selected small unit commanders. 2) the establishment and conduct of a comprehensive course of instruction, in all phases guerrilla activities, during occupation phase of operations and for U. N. occupation personnel.

   d. Prepare plans and participate in the execution of an extensive and comprehensive anti-Communist propaganda program.

   e. Provide staff planning and direction for utilization of psychological warfare facilities incident to the generation of defectors and maintenance of morale among loyal groups subjected to guerrilla attacks.
f. Assist in the establishment of a long range intelligence program designed to penetrate guerrilla strongholds and operating groups. 

g. Be available to corps units for assistance in establishment of unit schools or to render assistance in organization of anti-guerrilla task forces.

3. In the event the above functions can be successfully initiated, the overall program will have received an excellent start. Col Hanes, as you know, is currently reorienting the Corps Special Operations Company (soon to receive 200 ROK attachments) in the direction of an anti-guerrilla force. Besides the direction of the activities of this force, he has been placed in charge of the short range agent group serving G-2. These two groups, to include those additional special units due to arrive from Japan, will be constitute the X Corps anti-guerrilla force. Other functions in the operational field of anti-guerrilla work are also his responsibility.

4. With these two officers working together on different phases of the same problem, I believe that an effective program will result.

W. W. Quinn
Lt Col. GSC
AG of S, G-2
MEMORANDUM TO: G-2

1. In my opinion this is a brilliant paper.

2. The following comments are my own and are in the nature of an extension of your excellent principles.

   a. Organize a large network of stay-behind agents, radio equipped, in the mountains to report locations, movements, and personalities of guerrilla forces.

   b. Organize Assassination Groups to carry out death sentences passed by ROK Government in "Absentia" trials of guerrilla leaders.

   c. Provide radio communications to our agents for air-ground traffic to provide air strikes in the mountains.

   d. If necessary clear the areas of civilians in which the guerrillas operate.

   e. Establish a series of armed camps, laterally connected, and mop up in rear. Then push line about 20 miles forward.

   f. Cut the supply lines to the guerrillas across the Yalu.

   g. Inflame the local population against the guerrillas by every propaganda device possible.

CLARK L. KUFRY
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

[Signature]
FROM: CINCFE
TO: CG X CORPS
NR: C 68167

Ref X Corps msg X 11896 DTG 121314 I. Lt Col R W Volckmann available your comd indefinite TDY; ETD 8 Nov. Will advise soonest of availability of additional off experienced in guerrilla warfare.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG, CS, G-3
ADDSN DIST: (5 Nov 50)
INFORMATION: G-1, AG PERS

M/R This msg received in AG Rad Br at 050755 I.
S U B J E C T :  Anti-Guerrilla Operations

T O :  Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
       Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division
       Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division
       KMAG, Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps
       Commanding General, 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment

1. Reports of enemy movements, assembly areas, troop concentrations, and raids in rear of what is normally construed as the "line of contact", established a requirement for coordinated "anti-guerrilla operations" against these forces. Information concerning the above activities comes from many sources: civilians, prisoner interrogation, agents, and occasionally ground patrols and air reconnaissance. These reports are frequently inaccurate, unreliable, and nearly always late. Nevertheless, the regularity of such sources of information definitely indicates that such activity does exist, or did at one time; provides the basis for predictions as to future locations; and establishes the necessity for confirmation by ground or air reconnaissance.

2. Reports of this nature which are received by divisions direct from such agencies must be promptly investigated as a matter of standing operating procedure. Investigation will be accomplished, whenever practicable within the time limits, by ground patrol. When time does not permit such ground investigation, the presently available "mosquito" aircraft or organic liaison-type aircraft will be directed, under proper control, to perform the necessary investigation to confirm or deny the validity of the report.

3. Reports which can be definitely confirmed by either ground patrol or air reconnaissance will be promptly and energetically attacked by ground fire or fighter aircraft.
DRAFT

4. Henceforth, reports from subordinate commands which repeat information concerning "behind the lines activity" will invariably include the measures taken by the reporting command to confirm or deny the report.

5. This directive is effective upon receipt.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL ALMOND:

FRANK W. ROBERTS
Lt Colonel AGC
Adjutant General
MEMORANDUM TO: AC of S, G-1
" " " G-2
" " " G-3 (in turn)

Attached is Staff Study and plan developed by Lt Col Volckman G-2 Section, in connection with Anti-Guerrilla operations to be conducted by X Corps.

Request concurrences be indicated below or statements of non-concurrence be attached.

Concur: G-1 [Signature]
G-3 [Signature]
G-4 [Signature]

W. W. QUINN
Lt Col GSC
AC of S, G-2
MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Anti-Guerrilla Activities

1. Submitted herewith, in accordance with instructions received from the Corps Commander, is the plan developed by Lt Col Volckmann in connection with anti-guerrilla activities to be conducted by X Corps. The attached plan has as its basis the experience and results obtained through like operations elsewhere, combined with an analysis of current enemy guerrilla type operations in the X Corps Zone. Although not designed to immediately eradicate such activities, it's implementation will lead to ultimate control of our area of responsibility, both politically and militarily.

2. In view of the large numbers of NK straggler formations in, or moving towards, our area, conventional forces initially will be required to reduce their effectiveness. It is believed, however, that the intelligence aspects alone of the executed plan will expedite the accomplishment of this goal.

3. Relative to the implementation of the plan, the following recommendations are made:

   a. The plan be approved.

   b. Lt Col Volckmann be appointed Chief of Special Forces Staff Section, X Corps.

   c. Lt Col Hanes be designated commander of the Special Activities Group (which includes Spec Opns Co).

   d. Necessary office space in or near CP building be provided by Hq Comdt.

   e. Personnel be provided as indicated.

   f. General Order be published establishing Special Forces Staff Section.

[Signature]

W. W. QUINN
Lt Col GSC
AC of S, G-2
STAFF STUDY

AND PLAN

ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE

IN X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION
FORECAST OF MAJOR REQUIREMENTS OF A TYPICAL ANTI-GUERRILLA AREA COMMAND

1. The following forecast of requirements is based upon the assumption that there will be a minimum need within each anti-guerrilla area command for:

   a. One (1) anti-guerrilla area command headquarters.
      (1) Headquarters and headquarters detachment.
      (2) One (1) Company (ROK).

   b. Five (5) District Headquarters.
      (1) Headquarters and headquarters detachment.
      (2) Two (2) local anti-guerrilla units.

   c. Twenty-five (25) local anti-guerrilla units.
      (1) In the event regular forces are withdrawn from the Zone of a Anti-Guerrilla Area Command, one Battalion (ROK) should be stationed at the Area Command as a mobile reserve to supplement the anti-guerrilla Area Command.

2. Arms and Equipment (one (1) Anti-Guerrilla Area Command).

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CNR or Rifles</th>
<th>Auto Rifle</th>
<th>Grenades</th>
<th>Radio</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Anti-Guerr Units</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2544</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ammunition. Units of fire will be maintained at the various echelons as follows:

   a. At Anti-Guerrilla Area Commands - Two (2) units.
   b. At District - One (1) unit.
   c. At local Anti-Guerrilla units - One (1) unit.

4. Clothing. In general the policy will be to supply the minimum clothing requirements. The local anti-guerrilla at district level and below should not be uniformed. It is desirable that they can move as civilians in outward appearance.

5. Rations. Since the concept for organization is predicated upon the organization of local anti-guerrilla units from the local populace they will, in general, subsist on their own local sources. In needy areas in which there is a shortage of food it will be necessary to supplement their supplies. Area command and district echelons will have to supply rations. The total daily ration forecast for a typical anti-guerrilla area command is five hundred (500) rations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CBN or Auto</th>
<th>Gernades</th>
<th>Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Anti G. Area Comd</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Anti G. Area Comd (1st Mar)</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Anti G. Area Comd (7th Div)</td>
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<td>2544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Anti G. Area Comd (II ROK)</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Anti G. Area Comd (RMC)</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4050</strong></td>
<td><strong>310</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,720</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above total requirements would be phased over three months period.
TAB "A"

TO STAFF STUDY "ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE IN X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION

CONCEPT FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF SPECIAL FORCES IN X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION
I. PROBLEM

1. To develop an overall plan to combat and destroy straggler forces engaged in guerrilla warfare and to prevent, minimize or combat organized guerrilla forces supported and directed by North Korean and/or Chinese Communist Forces within the X Corps Zone of Action.

II. DISCUSSION

2. Enemy Guerrilla Capabilities.

   a. Phase One. Bypassed North Korean forces that have worked their way north and northeast may be expected to continue to harass the civilian populace and engage in guerrilla warfare throughout the X Corps Zone of Action. These remnant forces will increase in number as additional groups work their way into the X Corps Zone from the Army Eight Zone. During the next few weeks large remnant groups may be expected to break up into small groups (30 to 50) in order to subsist upon the land. They will endeavor to induce the local populace to support their efforts. In areas that fail to cooperate, the guerrillas will obtain support by means of threats or violence. In this connection the theme of their propaganda will be directed to convince the populace of the success of the Chinese Communist Forces in conjunction with the North Korean Forces and the ultimate defeat in the near future of United Nations Forces. In general, the nature of their operations will be characterized by spasmodic uncoordinated acts of sabotage, raids and ambushes launched against our troops, installations and communications.

   b. Phase Two. Guerrilla units during this phase will become better organized. Encouraged by their initial success of establishing themselves amongst the local populace and conducting operations against our forces, the guerrilla units, unless vigorously and methodically opposed, may be expected to coordinate their efforts locally. They will likewise exert strong effort to establish contact with and receive guidance and support from Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Forces. During this phase, the overall capabilities of the hostile guerrilla forces that became established will greatly increase. They may be expected to fully exploit the cooperative elements of the civil populace to strengthen their own security and as a source of intelligence upon which to base their operations against our forces.

   c. Phase Three. In the event contact is established between guerrilla forces and Chinese and/or North Korean forces, they will undoubtedly be supported with key personnel and limited equipment. Communication will be established and rapidly expanded. Control and coordination between the regular Chinese and/or North Korean Forces will be progressively established to a point where the guerrilla forces will be capable of being exploited as a potential strategic and tactical weapon. Any lull in current operations and any success of the Chinese and/or North Korean forces will greatly stimulate these developments.

3. To prevent, minimize, or combat guerrilla forces and to deter the enemy guerrilla capabilities as set forth above, an overall plan should develop and correlate political, administrative, and military measures to be implemented throughout the X Corps Zone of Action. The importance of closely coordinating and correlating these measures at an operating level is essential in order to obtain maximum effectiveness and conserve personnel and material. The basic objective of the overall plan is to:

   a. Isolate guerrilla forces from the civilian population and from each other.

   b. Deny guerrilla forces contact with and support from the Chinese and/or North Korean Forces.

   c. Destroy the guerrilla forces.
4. To accomplish the basic objective, it is essential to establish effective control through a systematic and sound organization of stabilized commands that encompass both accessible and inaccessible areas. In order to do this, maximum utilization must be made of the local populace which in turn requires a comprehensive program to gain and maintain their support. It must be the responsibility of all echelons of command to establish a feeling of good will between United Nations Forces and the local populace. The people may further be aligned to our aims through a vigorous civil affairs program and sound psychological campaign. To maintain the support of the populace, every effort must be made to provide them maximum protection from guerrilla coercion. In addition to vigorous and aggressive operations launched against guerrilla forces by regular forces, additional protection must be provided by organized and controlled local units. In conjunction with the organization of local units, extensive intelligence nets should be organized that will provide a source of information upon which coordinated operations may be launched against guerrilla forces that cannot be destroyed by local units. A less extensive plan will result in the diversion of regular forces from their normal missions and will further result in ineffective measures that will waste time, material, and troop effort.

5. General Organizational Structure. (See Tab A, Concept for the Organization and Conduct of Special Forces).

a. Special Forces Staff Section, X Corps. A special forces staff section should be organized within X Corps Headquarters responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. Their principal duties would include:

1. Formulation of policies.
2. Preparation of plans.
3. Coordination with G-1 (Civil Affairs and Provost Marshal), G-2, G-3 and G-4 of all activities pertaining to special forces operations.
4. Supervision of all activities pertaining to special forces operations.

b. Anti-Guerrilla Area Commands. Within each division Zone of Operations, there will be organized a Anti-Guerrilla Area Command. These area commands will be organized into subordinate district commands following wherever possible the existing subdivisions of the provincial county sectors. The area commands and their subordinate district commands will be organized so that they may operate independent of division control in the event the division is moved from their present sectors, thereby providing a stabilized area command and insuring continuity of control of the area. The organization of area command headquarters and district headquarters will be cadred by US personnel and ROK personnel to train Korean personnel to carry out their functions and responsibilities. A portion of the personnel throughout all echelons will be recruited locally. (See Tab A for detailed organization and functions).

c. Local Anti-Guerrilla Units. Under each subordinate district command, local units will be organized throughout the district sectors. Well trained ROK cadres (squad size) will be employed to form local anti-guerrilla units and to basically train them. In addition to providing local on-the-ground units to combat guerrillas that enter their sector, these local units will organize an extensive net of agents or informers within their sectors to provide a source of information to local, district, and area Anti-Guerrilla Commands. Priority within each area command will be given to organizing local anti-guerrilla units along the LSR and will thereafter be expanded throughout their respective sectors. (See Tab "E" for schematic diagram for the organization of a typical anti-guerrilla Area Command).
5. The Psychological Approach. In order to foster a spirit of cooperation among the populace necessary to generate effective local units, appeals should be directed through the provincial-county-myun (small town) and clan heads. The appeals should be correlated to the close relation of these people to their land holdings. It should be stressed how, by fully cooperating under an organized plan, they may protect their homes, families and crops from the guerrillas. For a more detailed concept of psychological program to induce local support and to combat guerrilla warfare, see Tab B, The Psychological Program.

6. Desirability. The organization of the anti-guerrilla forces within each division sector will:

a. Provide an extensive organized intelligence net throughout both accessible and inaccessible areas and a rapid means of transmittal of such information so that it may be promptly acted upon.

b. Provide on-the-ground local units to combat guerrilla forces.

c. Conserve on the diversion of regular forces that would otherwise have to be committed to counterguerrilla operations.

d. Provide a continuity of command and effort throughout the X Corps Zone of Action regardless of the shifting of regular units.

e. Align the local populace throughout the X Corps Zone to our aims, thereby thwarting any effort on the part of North Korean and/or Chinese Communist supported guerrillas from inducing, imposing or forcing the populace to support their efforts.

III CONCLUSIONS

7. That unless an effective coordinated overall plan that encompasses political, administrative and military measures is adopted and implemented through organized stabilized commands, counterguerrilla warfare in the X Corps Zone of Action will be ineffective and will result in an ever increasing diversion of regular troops, a waste of time and material.

8. That the proposed plan offers a solution that is within available means to effectively combat subversion and guerrilla warfare. (See Tab "C" Forecast of Major Requirements).

IV

9. That the Special Forces Staff Section be organized within X Corps to work out in detail the proposed plan in conjunction with the other interested staff agencies of this headquarters. (See Tab "D").

10. That the proposed plan as set forth in Tab "A" be adopted and implemented in the major subordinate commands of X Corps.

R. W. VOLKEMANN
Lt Col Inf
TAB "B"
TO STAFF STUDY "ANTI-GUERRILLA
WARFARE IN X CORPS ZONE
OF ACTION"

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM
CONCEPT FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF SPECIAL FORCES IN X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION

SECTION I
ORGANIZATION

1. Introduction. The stirring up of strife by means of subversion and guerrilla forces in the application of old and tried communistic Soviet-sponsored methods that is given great emphasis by all echelons of command. Likewise the Chinese Communist Forces have had extensive experience (against the Japanese and Chinese Nationalist Forces) in the organization and conduct of guerrilla Warfare. We must assume that the North Korean and/or Chinese Forces will exploit to the maximum their capabilities to organize and conduct guerrilla warfare against our forces. The inaccessible terrain that the X Corps Zone of action encompasses and the long exposed lines of communication are extremely suited to hostile guerrilla warfare. To establish adequate control over these vast inaccessible areas and to protect our lines of communications would require an ever increasing diversion of regular troops that would seriously threaten our offensive capabilities. This discussion develops a concept and a solution to gain control of the inaccessible areas throughout the X Corps zone of action and a method to combat guerrilla warfare with a minimum diversion of regular forces.

2. Purpose. This discussion develops the organization, support and conduct of a 'Antiguerilla, area Command in the major subordinate zone of action within X Corps.

3. Object. To develop within each major subordinate zone, a stabilized on-the-ground organization capable of producing useful information and capable of combating straggler groups and guerrilla forces.

4. Mission of Anti-Guerrilla Area Commanders. The missions of an Anti-Guerrilla area commander are assigned by the division commander in whose zone the anti-guerrilla command is organized. The missions will include the organization, training, administration, functions and the courses of action to be pursued to meet possible contingencies.

5. Schematic Diagram of an Anti-Guerrilla Command Organization.

```
District Command

Forces

Local Anti-Guerrilla Units

Hq Detachment
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7. Local Anti-Guerrilla Unit.

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1 Comdr
1 Asst Comdr
4 Runner

Local Cargadores
2 CBN

```

8. Personnel.

a. *Anti-Guerrilla Area, District and Local Defense Units.*

(1) Area Command Headquarters and staffs will be made up of fifty percent trained South Korean personnel and fifty percent locally recruited personnel.

(2) Forces under area command direct control will consist of a lightly equipped company (three platoons, total 100 officers and men) all Korean personnel.

(3) District command Headquarters and staff will be made up of fifty percent trained South Koreans and fifty percent locally recruited personnel.

(4) Each district command will organise and train two local anti-guerrilla platoons in addition to organizing local anti-guerrilla platoons at designated towns (or Kyuns) within their sector of responsibility. The local anti-guerrilla platoons kept at district commands may be employed to secure the area immediately around district headquarters and to reinforce local defense units within the district sector when the need arises.
b. Cadre Personnel.

(1) US officer and enlisted cadre personnel will be employed at the anti-guerrilla area command and district command levels as command, technical, and training advisors in order to expedite the organization and control of the anti-guerrilla area command, subordinate units.

(2) ROK personnel (trained) will be employed at all echelons of command as cadre personnel around which the headquarters and forces are organized.

9. Cadre Unit. The Special Activities Group consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (22-0, 165 EM), the provisional Raider Company (8-0, 200 EM) and the ROK Special attack Bn (11-0, 290 EM) which has been assigned to X Corps will be employed as the cadre unit for the organization and training of anti-guerrilla area commands. This group has sufficient organic equipment to include transportation and communications to efficiently accomplish this function. It likewise has had considerable experience in training Korean personnel.


a. Third Division Zone. An analysis of the X Corps Zone of Action taking into consideration both the enemy capabilities and the possible forecast of employment of the Third Division to the north or northwest thereby reducing their capabilities to adequately cover and control their present zone of action makes it desirable to organize an Anti-Guerrilla Area Command covering the present Third Divisions Zone of action (The First Anti-Guerrilla Area Command). See Tab E for schematic organization of a typical Area Command.

b. First Marine Division Zone. At such a time as the First Anti-Guerrilla Command become operational and the Special Activities Group can be withdrawn, the Second Anti-Guerrilla Area Command will be organized in the First Marine Division Zone. The Special Activities Group will be attached to the First Marine Division for this purpose.

c. In the same manner the Seventh Division and ROK Corps Anti-Guerrilla Area Command in the order named, will be organized.

SECTION II

COMMUNICATIONS

11. General. Communication is vital to the anti-Guerrilla Area Commands in order to exercise command, control, coordination, and to expedite the flow of information. Although radio provides the most flexible means of communication to fulfill the complex requirements, other improvised means are employed, particularly at echelons below district commands. Commercial communications may be used to supplement the Anti-Guerrilla Area Command facilities; however, there must be established available means independent of commercial nets.

12. Radio Nets. In the initial phase of organization, radio nets will be established down to and including district commands. Since the distances involved will be relatively short, voice sets will be used in order to save time in training of personnel. As equipment becomes available and the needs of subordinate operational sectors become known, radio nets may be extended to vital local Anti-Guerrilla units.

13. A runner messenger service provides one of the most workable means of communication to supplement radio and to extend communication to subordinate sector, sub-sector and local unit commands. A messenger service to be efficient must be highly organized, flexible, and manned by dependable, clever and alert personnel. Such a system is adaptable to the terrain conditions of Korea.
a. Communication routes are established linking the Anti-Guerrilla headquarters with subordinate district commands linking subordinate sector, sub-sector and local units. At each unit headquarters through which a communication route passes, a message center is organized. Additional message centers are organized at the junction of main routes. Between message centers, along communication routes, relay stations are located every four to six hours traveling time. Each message center and relay station is manned by local personnel thoroughly familiar with the surrounding terrain and the populace.

b. It is the responsibility of each message center and relay station to route and carry messages to the next center or station along designated routes. Messages with prescribed priority travel day and night. Each message center and relay station is also charged with the responsibility of keeping themselves as well as adjacent stations informed of the enemy situation and activities within their respective areas. If a portion of a route becomes compromised, the responsible relay or message center station open an alternate route. In addition to handling the flow of messages, the communication routes serve as arteries over which personnel and supplies are moved. The value of an organized network of communication routes for a source of intelligence information is self-evident. The efficiency and speed of this system in rugged terrain similar to Korea has been proven. A message that travels day and night, relayed over an organized route, will travel in less than 48 hours the same distance it would take one individual to travel in 7 days.

SECTION III
INTELLIGENCE

14. General. Detailed intelligence is essential for combating guerrilla forces and subversive activities. The anti-guerrilla area commands with the subordinate district and local units provide an on-the-ground net that will produce useful information.

15. Schematic Chart Showing Flow of Information.

Agents or Informers

Local Anti-Guerrilla Units

District Cmd

Anti-Guerrilla Area Command

Division or other Reg. Forces

16. Local Anti-Guerrilla Units. Each local defense unit by working through the clan leaders within their sectors will develop informers in each village. The clan or village leader will be induced to report to designated local defense units all information relative to North Korean or Chinese forces, guerrilla bands or strangers that enter their areas.
Local defense units will relay this information to district headquarters where in turn it will be reported by the most rapid means to the Anti-Guerrilla Area Command.

SECTION IV

OPERATIONS

17. The extensive organization of the Anti-Guerrilla Area Commands will materially strengthen the security of the X Corps Zone; the operations of the Anti-Guerrilla Area Command is characterized by aggressive action. Their main objective is the destruction of guerrilla forces and their will to continue resistance. Unlike normal operations the capture of ground contributes little to the attainment of the objective. In general their tactics should parallel guerrilla warfare tactics.

18. Local Units. Based upon information from their screen of informers, local units operate against hostile forces that come within their sector. Local commanders are given great freedom of action and are encouraged to use their initiative in attacking hostile forces. Ordinarily they will endeavor to ambush or attack hostile forces attempting to take them by surprise. Local units will, when necessary, call on adjacent units for support. In the event large forces enter their areas they keep these forces under observation and render frequent periodic reports to their district headquarters.

19. District and area command forces may be employed to assist local units. In the event the area commander deems it necessary he may call for support from regular forces.

20. Regular Forces. All echelons of commands operating within the area commands should strive to develop close coordination and teamwork with the Anti-Guerrilla forces. There must be complete understanding on the part of all commanders of the capabilities and limitations of the Anti-Guerrilla units. They can not, for example, be expected to attack in the same manner as regular forces, against organized positions, nor can they be expected to defend positions for a prolonged period of time against superior forces.

21. Air Support: Air strikes may be employed in support of local defense units. Reports from the local defense units should reach division headquarters in less than twelve hours. Local units by panel display may designate target area. Mosquito tactical air control planes may be used to direct such strikes.
TAB "C"

STAFF STUDY

"ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE IN X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION"

FORECAST OF MAJOR REQUIREMENTS
1. Local Officials.

The organization of the anti-guerrilla area commands should be accomplished with the aid and cooperation of the provincial, county, and town (myun) officials that have been organized by the civil affairs division. To generate a cooperative spirit among the local populace, and in order to give the plan more impulse, the local officials and people should be made to feel that the anti-guerrilla area commands are being organized to protect their family, homes and property from the misguided elements. Clothing, food and medical aid that may be made available through Civil Affairs may be directed to specially deserving communities that have displayed their willingness to fully cooperate.

2. Local Provincial Paper. The local bulletin of HUNGNIAN provides an excellent media through which to supply current news and instructions from the Provincial Head to the county seats and the outlying areas. In addition to current news this bulletin could be utilized to implement civil affairs instructions. At frequent intervals, surrender instructions to stragglers may be printed in these bulletins. Written and published by the local press employing their local style, it is believed such bulletin would have a greater appeal and have better psychological approach than any leaflet or bulletin that we could publish.

3. Leaflets. A series of leaflets should be prepared that briefly outline the current reverses suffered by the North Korean forces and outlining the futility of further resistance. These leaflets should further outline safe surrender conduct to local officials and UN Forces. To have the greatest effect, these leaflets should be printed to cover specific geographical area that name the exact places (by name) that an enemy soldier is to surrender. The personal appeal of a leaflet of this type will have greater psychological effect than the general type leaflets.

4. Economic and Finances. The continued reliance of procuring the services of civilians without monetary remuneration may seriously effect the efforts of all echelons commands within the X Corps to establish and maintain the good will and support of the populace. A medium of exchange is urgently needed for both practical and psychological reasons to induce cooperation and good will relation between the populace and United Nations Forces. When such a medium of exchange is authorized, tight control must be exercised over wages and prices in order to prevent rapid inflation that will occur with the sudden influx of money throughout the Corps Zone of Action. For obvious psychological reason this control should outwardly appear to originate and to be imposed by the Korean established government.

5. Employment of Local Civilians. Idleness among the civilians breed unrest that in turn generates contempt. The damage inflicted upon factories and industry throughout North Korea leaves many individuals idle. Every effort should be exercised to keep the civil populace busy developing or rehabilitating their homes and industry. Maximum use of local labor should be employed to supplement our forces in the engineer and logistical fields. Our ability to do this, however, is dependent upon a monetary exchange discussed above.

6. Transfer of Responsibilities. The responsibility of security and control over liberated areas should be transferred to the local government as rapidly as possible. In the course of their transfer of responsibility, and as long as there remains a threat to the security of United Nations Forces, close liaison and support will be maintained with the established agencies through Civil Affairs teams and the anti-guerrilla commands.
7. United Nations Forces. The most effective means of establishing good will between the populace and the United Nations Forces lies with the soldier individually and collectively. Discipline, of course, is command responsibility. However, it is paramount that commanders at all echelons impress upon their units that their actions and relations with the civilians greatly influence the ability of the command to cultivate a cooperative attitude among the civilians. Command echelons must likewise establish within their zones of action a publicized media through which the civilians may file complaints. It has been established that in some instances depredations and criminal acts against the civil populace by both US and ROK personnel have been delayed in coming to the attention of the proper authority because of the language barrier and because of the fear on the part of the complainant to expose or complain, not knowing to whom such charges can be filed with. The punishment or corrective measures taken, as the result of charges filed by the civilians, should be publicized locally in order that the populace will understand that criminal acts and depredations are not tolerated by United Nations Forces. Such action will go far in establishing good will relations.
TAB "D"
TO STAFF STUDY "ANTI-GUERRILLA
WARFARE IN X CORPS ZONE
OF ACTION

SPECIAL FORCES STAFF
SECTION, X CORPS
1. Functions. The special forces staff section is directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for:

   a. Formulation of policies.

   b. Preparation of plans.

   c. Coordination with G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, of all activities pertaining to special forces operations.

   d. Supervision of all activities pertaining to special forces operations.

2. Personnel

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