

Trinette G. Kent, Esq. (Bar No. 222020)  
Of Counsel in Arizona and California  
Lemberg Law LLC  
10645 North Tatum Blvd.  
Suite 200-192  
Phoenix, AZ 85028  
Telephone: 855-301-2100 ext. 5533  
Facsimile: 203-653-3424  
E-mail: tkent@lemberglaw.com

Sergei Lemberg (*phv* application to follow) (CT Bar. No. 425027)  
Stephen Taylor (*phv* application to follow) (CT Bar No. 428505)  
Lemberg Law LLC  
1100 Summer Street  
Stamford, CT 06905  
Telephone: (203) 653-2250  
Facsimile: (203) 653-3424  
E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com  
E-mail: staylor@lemberglaw.com

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

Noah Duguid, *on behalf of himself and all  
others similarly situated,*

Plaintiff,

vs.

Facebook, Inc.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-985

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR  
DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE  
RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE  
TELEPHONE CONSUMER  
PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227,  
ET SEQ.**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

1 For his Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff, Noah Duguid, by and through his  
2 undersigned counsel, pleading on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly  
3 situated, states as follows:

#### 4 **INTRODUCTION**

5 1. Plaintiff, Noah Duguid (“Plaintiff”), brings this class action for damages  
6 resulting from the illegal actions of Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook” or “Defendant”).  
7 Defendant negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully sent unauthorized automated text  
8 messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer  
9 Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, *et seq.* (the “TCPA”).

10 2. Wireless spam is a growing problem in the United States. In April 2012,  
11 the Pew Research Center found that 69% of texters reported receiving unwanted spam  
12 text messages, while 25% reported receiving spam texts weekly.  
13 <http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/> (last visited  
14 November 6, 2014); *see also* Nicole Perlroth, *Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the*  
15 *Cellphone*, N.Y. Times, April 8, 2012, at A1 (“In the United States, consumers received  
16 roughly 4.5 billion spam texts [in 2011], more than double the 2.2 billion received in  
17 2009 . . .”).

18 3. Facebook operates an online social network. Facebook’s market value  
19 reportedly exceeds \$200 billion. Facebook had 864 million daily active users and 1.35  
20 billion monthly active users as of September, 2014.

21 4. Consumers often share private information on Facebook. As an “extra  
22 security feature,” Facebook can send “login notifications” to alert users when their  
23 account is accessed from a new device (computer, smart-phone, tablet, etc.). Facebook  
24 describes the login notifications as follows: “When you turn on login notifications,  
25 we’ll send you an alert each time someone logs into your account from a new place.”  
26 *See Exhibit A.* Login notifications can be sent to mobile telephones. *See Exhibit A.*

27 5. Login notifications in the form of text messages are often sent to the  
28

1 cellular telephones of people who have not authorized Facebook to contact them on  
2 their cell phones, who have requested that the notifications stop, and, still more  
3 egregious, to the phones of people who do not use Facebook whatsoever. These text  
4 messages state: “Your Facebook account was accessed from [internet browser] at  
5 [time]. Log in for more info.” Consumers can receive these unwanted text messages  
6 several times a day.

7 6. Facebook provides instructions on its website to deactivate the login  
8 notification feature. However, these instructions only address stopping the messages  
9 by changing a Facebook user’s account settings. See Exhibit B. Facebook offers no  
10 solution for those receiving the messages despite having no Facebook account.

11 7. Online blogs indicate that consumers can also respond “off” to  
12 Facebook’s text messages to get them to stop. See Exhibit C. Indeed, Facebook  
13 responds to such texts with messages stating: “Facebook texts are now off. Reply on  
14 to turn back on.” See Exhibits C & D. However, Facebook often disregards  
15 consumers’ requests to stop the login notifications. Rather than cease as instructed,  
16 Facebook continues to knowingly hound consumers with unwanted and unauthorized  
17 text messages. See Exhibits C & D. As one Facebook user complained, “I have tried  
18 texting ‘Off’ ‘OFF’ ‘off’ ‘STOP’ ‘Stop’. NONE of them have stopped the text  
19 messages. If I get one more text message from Facebook I will delete the whole  
20 account.” Exhibit C.

21 8. Servicing over a billion Facebook accounts worldwide, Facebook’s  
22 automated systems are powerful and, when used improperly, capable of extreme  
23 invasions into the privacy of American consumers. See Exhibit C (consumer  
24 complaining of receiving text messages from Facebook “at all hours of the night”).  
25 Facebook operates a sloppy system and in doing so shows complete disregard for the  
26 privacy of consumers.

27 9. Plaintiff is such a consumer and he seeks relief for himself and all others  
28

1 similarly situated from Facebook's unlawful behavior.

## 2 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

3 10. This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
4 § 1331. *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Serv., LLC*, 132 S.Ct. 740, 751-53 (2012).

5 11. Jurisdiction in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),  
6 as Plaintiff seeks at least \$500 in damages for each violation of the TCPA, which when  
7 aggregated among a proposed class numbering more than a thousand members,  
8 exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 threshold for federal court jurisdiction. Plaintiff also  
9 alleges a national class which will result in at least one class member residing in a  
10 different state.

11 12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because  
12 Defendant resides in this District and because a substantial part of the events giving  
13 rise to the claim occurred in this District.

## 14 **PARTIES**

15 13. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an adult individual  
16 residing in Stevensville, Montana, and is a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).

17 14. Facebook is a California business entity with an address of 1601 Willow  
18 Road, Menlo Park, California 94025, and is a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. §  
19 153(39).

## 20 **THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991**

21 15. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone  
22 dialing systems ("ATDS").

23 16. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) defines an ATDS as equipment having the  
24 capacity—

25 (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or  
26 sequential number generator; and

27 (B) to dial such numbers.  
28

1 17. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(1)(A)(iii) prohibits any call using an ATDS  
2 to a cellular phone without prior express consent by the person being called, unless the  
3 call is for emergency purposes.

4 18. The FCC has clarified that text messages qualify as “calls” under the  
5 TCPA:

6 We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an  
7 automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to  
8 any wireless telephone number. Both the statute and our rules prohibit these  
9 calls, with limited exceptions, “to any telephone number assigned to a paging  
10 service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other  
11 common carrier service, or any service for which the party is charged.” This  
encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for  
example, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the call is made to a  
telephone number assigned to such service.

12 *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of*  
13 *1991*, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (July 3, 2003); *see Satterfield v.*  
14 *Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).


15 19. “Prior express written consent” means that there must be a written  
16 agreement, signed by the person receiving the call or text, with a “clear and  
17 conspicuous disclosure” that specifically authorizes the seller to send telemarketing  
18 communications using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or  
19 prerecorded voice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.

20 **ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS**

21 20. On or around January 25, 2014, Facebook began placing text messages to  
22 Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 406-xxx-7935.

23 21. Facebook placed the text messages from number 326-65 (spelling  
24 FBOOK), an abbreviated telephone number known as an SMS short code licensed and  
25 operated by Defendant or one of its agents on its behalf.  
26  
27  
28

22. Facebook placed repeated text messages to the Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of several of the messages received by Plaintiff are produced below:



23. Facebook obtained Plaintiff's telephone number through unknown means.

24. At no time did Plaintiff ever provide his cellular telephone number to Facebook.

25. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Facebook.

26. At no time did Plaintiff provide Facebook prior written consent for it to send text messages to his cellular phone.

27. Further, on or around April 20, 2014, Plaintiff sent Facebook a detailed email complaining of the unauthorized text messages to his cell phone and requesting that the text messages cease. In response, Facebook sent Plaintiff an automated email directing Plaintiff to log on to the Facebook website to report problematic "content."

1 Plaintiff responded to the email by re-explaining his issue and stating: “A human needs  
2 to read this email and take action. Thank you!” In response, Facebook sent the same  
3 automated email as received in response to the first email. *See Exhibit E.*

4 28. Still further, on October 18, 2014, Plaintiff responded to a text messages  
5 from Facebook with the word “off.” Facebook responded: “Facebook texts are now  
6 off. Reply on to turn them back on.” However, the very same day, Facebook sent  
7 Plaintiff another text message. Plaintiff once again responded “off” and “all off.”  
8 Again, Facebook responded: “Facebook texts are now off. Reply on to turn them back  
9 on.” Again, still in the same day, Facebook sent Plaintiff another text message. *See*  
10 *Exhibit D.*

11 29. The text messages sent to Plaintiff’s cellular phone were made with an  
12 ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

13 30. The ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be  
14 called, using a random or sequential number generator.

15 31. The telephone number messaged by Facebook was assigned to a cellular  
16 telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs charges for incoming messages pursuant to  
17 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).

18 32. The messages from Facebook to Plaintiff were not placed for “emergency  
19 purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).

## 20 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

### 21 A. The Class

22 33. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on  
23 behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

24 34. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes:

25 **Class 1: All persons within the United States who did not provide**  
26 **their cellular telephone number to Defendant and who received**  
27 **one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said**  
28 **person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any**



1 automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to  
2 the filing of the Complaint.

3 **Class 2:** All persons within the United States who, after notifying  
4 Defendant that it no longer wished to receive text messages and  
5 receiving a confirmation from Defendant to that effect, received  
6 one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said  
7 person's cellular telephone, made through the use of any  
8 automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to  
9 the filing of the Complaint.

10 35. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes.  
11 Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class  
12 members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be  
13 certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.

14 36. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of  
15 economic injury on behalf of the Classes, and it expressly is not intended to request  
16 any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right  
17 to modify or expand the Class definitions to seek recovery on behalf of additional  
18 persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.

#### 19 **B. Numerosity**

20 37. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent text messages to cellular  
21 telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States  
22 without their prior express consent. The members of the Classes, therefore, are  
23 believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

24 38. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this  
25 time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class  
26 members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's records.

#### 27 **C. Common Questions of Law and Fact**

28 39. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that  
predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These  
questions include:



- a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff and Class members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to send each message;
- c. Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and/or willful;
- d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and
- e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.

40. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely sends automated text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services without prior express consent is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.

**D. Typicality**

41. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

**E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members**

42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.

**F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable**

43. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against Facebook is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions.

44. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: *Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv.*, 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); *Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC*, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); *CE Design Ltd. V. Cy's Crabhouse North, Inc.*, 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); *Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC*, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012).

**COUNT I**  
**Violations of the Telephone**  
**Consumer Protection Act,**  
**47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.**

45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference.

46. Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent.

47. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation of the TCPA.

48. Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of \$500.00 in statutory damages for each message sent in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).

49. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.

**COUNT II**  
**Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the**  
**Telephone Consumer Protection Act,**  
**47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.**

50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference.

51. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text

1 messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the  
2 Classes without their prior express consent.

3 52. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a knowing  
4 and/or willful violation of the TCPA.

5 53. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,  
6 Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of treble damages up to \$1,500.00 for  
7 each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C.  
8 § 227(b)(3)(C).

9 54. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive  
10 relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.

11 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

12 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant Plaintiff and the Classes  
13 the following relief against Defendant as follows:

- 14 1. Injunctive relief prohibiting such violations of the TCPA by Defendant  
15 in the future;  
16 2. Statutory damages of \$500.00 for each and every call in violation of the  
17 TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B);  
18 3. Treble damages of up to \$1,500.00 for each and every call in violation  
19 of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C);  
20 4. An award of attorneys' fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the  
21 Classes; and  
22 5. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.  
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24 **TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS**  
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1 DATED: March 3, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

2 By: /s/ Trinette Kent  
3 Trinette Kent, Esq. (Bar No. 222020)  
4 Lemberg Law, LLC  
5 Attorney for Plaintiff, Noah Duguid  
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